ÿWPCè /#†¢U:( %b 0(hb 4œ° B¿Ü 0JÜ 0T& 0^z 0hØ 0r@w² 0|È 0DD 0†ˆ 0Æž 1udU,Ù AO 0DT 0d˜ U,ü U *( 0@R B)’ D3» DCî D/1 AM` B­ eÊ ÌË v~— vÓ˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0ÙP —/æ¿1·^×  ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù -1# 3|xK d2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(Modern$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d 'ÿÿdxd%%%%7Border 1dd**'÷ÿ dxd$'Cþÿ << GÿÿüÿP Pd ÂÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔó óÌò òÔ€#¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ+ ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€#XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€#ÂÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€#XÔPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€7“XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑJACK€KELLER,à àà àà àà à)ÌJORDAN€S.€KELLER,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9505„CV„00212ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌÙ€ÙßL€),';+'h|DÈâ `€€Lßà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€94C„2054ÌCOLGEMS€„€EMI€MUSIC,€INC.,à àà à)ÌSCREEN€GEMS€„€EMI€MUSIC,€INC.,à à)ÌEMI€MUSIC€PUBLISHING,€INC.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€WALTER€C.€KURTZ,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌJACK€KELLERÌJORDAN€S.€KELLERÌ8282€Collins€roadÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37221Ìà àPro€Se€Plaintiffs/AppellantsÌÌROBERT€L.€SULLIVANÌMANATT,€PHELPS€&€PHILLIPSÌ1233€17th€AvenueSouthÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37212Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendants/AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌLEWIS,€J.ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà@ àò òòòÔ€#„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€#XÔÌÌà àà àOn€June€28,€1994,€Plaintiff€Jack€Keller€sued€the€defendants€in€theÏDavidson€County€Circuit€Court€claiming€a€breach€of€fiduciary€duty€by€fraudulentlyÏfailing€to€disclose€the€contents€of€a€contract€amendment€signed€in€1960.€€JordanÏKeller,€to€whom€a€part€of€the€contract€rights€had€been€assigned,€joined€his€fatherÏas€plaintiff.€ÌÌà àà àThe€breach€of€duty€allegedly€was€discovered€in€1988€and€theÏquestion€in€this€case€is€whether€the€three€year€statute€of€limitations€or€the€six€yearÏstatute€applies.€€We€hold€that€the€three€year€statute€applies,€and€therefore€affirmÏthe€trial€court's€action€in€dismissing€the€complaint.€€ÌÌà àà@ àò òòòFactsóóó óÌÌà àà àPlaintiff€Jack€Keller,€a€professional€songwriter,€signed€anÏemployment€agreement€with€Aldon€Music,€Inc.€on€November€5,€1959,€to€performÏvarious€services€as€a€songwriter,€producer,€and€performer.€€The€contractÏcontained€a€provision,€an€"Exhibit€B"€which€obligated€Aldon€"to€counsel€[JackÏKeller]€as€to€contracts€for€his€professional€work€.€.€.€to€make€the€professionalÏcareer€of€[Keller]€the€success€contemplated,€both€professionally€and€financially,Ïand€in€general€.€.€.€endeavor€to€the€best€of€[Aldon's]€ability€to€forward€the€interestsÏof€[Keller].€€The€contract€also€contained€an€"Exhibit€A"€which€was€crossed€out€byÏthe€parties.€€€Exhibit€A€would€have€allowed€Aldon:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à"To€secure€copyright€registration€and€protection€of€saidÏworks€at€your€own€cost€and€expense€and€at€yourÏelection,€including€any€and€all€renewals€of€copyright€toÏwhich€I€may€hereafter€become€entitled,€and€to€haveÏand€to€hold€said€copyrights€and€all€rights€of€whatsoeverÏnature€thereunder€existing,€for€and€during€the€full€termsÏof€all€said€copyrights€and€all€renewals€and€extensionsÏthereof.€€It€is€hereby€agreed€that€one„half€of€the€generalÏadvance€royalty€payable€to€me€under€paragraph€4(k)€ofÏthis€agreement€is€in€consideration€of€the€grant€by€me€ofÏsaid€renewals€of€copyright€and€the€rights€existingÏthereunder."€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà à€à àIn€1960,€(the€amendment€is€not€dated,€and€the€exact€date€isÏnowhere€to€be€found€in€the€record)€Plaintiff€Jack€Keller€signed€an€amendment€toÏthe€1959€agreement€effectively€reinstating€the€provisions€contained€in€Exhibit€A.€ÍKeller€claims€that€Aldon€co„owner€Don€Kirshner€told€him€the€only€effect€of€theÏamendment€would€be€to€enable€Keller€to€produce€other€artists€for€an€increasedÏroyalty€rate.€€Mr.€Keller€also€€claims€he€signed€the€amendment€only€after€relyingÏon€the€misstatements€of€his€personal€manager€Aldon€Music.€€€€€ÌÌà àà àMr.€Keller€allegedly€first€discovered€the€amendment's€provisionÏgoverning€copyright€renewal€rights€on€July€13,€1988,€which€he€maintains€is€"whenÏthe€first€composition€copyrighted€under€the€1959€agreement€between€himself€andÏAldon€became€subject€to€renewal."€€At€that€time€EMI€Music€Publishing,€Inc.,€Ï("EMI")€which€had€subsequently€acquired€Aldon€Music,€informed€€Mr.€Keller€thatÏhe€did€not€have€the€right€to€renew€his€copyrights.€€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòIssuesó óóóÌÌà àà à€The€principal€issue€before€this€Court€is€the€appropriate€statute€ofÏlimitations€applicable€to€this€action,€more€specifically€whether€the€three€yearÏstatute€of€limitation€for€injuries€to€personal€property€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ28„3„105€applies€to€bar€appellants'€claims€as€the€appellees€insist,€or€whether€theÏsix€year€statute€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„3„109(c)€is€more€appropriate.€ÏTenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€28„3„105€states:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àProperty€tort€actions€„€Statutory€liabilities.€„„€TheÏfollowing€actions€shall€be€commenced€within€three€(3)Ïyears€from€the€accruing€of€the€cause€of€action:ÌÌà àà à(1)€Actions€for€injuries€to€personal€or€real€property;Ìà@ àÌà@ à*€€€€€*€€€€*à@ à€ÌÌà àà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð28„3„109(c)€reads€in€relevant€part:€ÌÌà8 àà8 àRent€„€Official€misconduct€„€Contracts€not€otherwiseÏà8 àà8 àcovered€„€Title€insurance€„ÏDemand€notes.€„„€à8 àà8 à(a)€TheÏfollowing€actions€shall€beÏcommenced€within€six€(6)Ïyears€after€the€cause€ofÏaction€accrued:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€Actions€on€contracts€not€otherwise€expresslyÏprovided€for.ÌÌà@ à*€€€€€*€€€€€*ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àIn€Tennessee€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations€is€determinedÏaccording€to€the€gravamen€of€the€complaint€rather€than€its€designation€as€anÏaction€for€tort€or€contract.€€òòPera€v.€Kroger,óó€674€S.W.2d€715,€719€(Tenn.€1984).€€InÏdetermining€the€gravamen,€or€real€purpose€of€an€action,€the€court€must€look€to€theÏbasis€for€which€damages€are€sought.€€òòBland€v.€Smith,óó€197€Tenn.€683,€277€S.W.2dÏ377€(1955).€€€Another€way€of€stating€this€principle€is€"[t]he€limitation€is€notÏdetermined€by€the€form€of€the€action€but€by€its€object."€€òòBodne€v.€Austinóó,€156€Tenn.Ï156,€2€S.W.2d€100€(1928),€òòquotingóó€òòBirmingham€v.€Chesapeake€&€Ohio€RailwayÏCo.,óó€37€S.E.€17€(Va.€1900).€€ÌÌà àà àThus,€regardless€of€whether€a€complaint€sounds€in€contract,€if€theÏsuit€seeks€to€recover€damages€for€injuries€to€the€plaintiff's€property,€the€applicableÏlimitations€period€is€three€years€as€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„3„105.€€ÏòòAlexander€v.€Third€National€Bankóó,€1994€W.L.€424287,€*3€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€AnÏ"injury€to€property"€need€not€be€physical€however,€just€as€an€injury€to€the€person€isÏnot€limited€to€bodily€injury.€€òòId.€€óóAlso,€actions€for€damages€resulting€from€theÏbreach€of€contract€to€a€builder€of€real€property€are€considered€actions€forÏdamages€to€property€even€where€they€have€sued€in€contract.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àà àThe€Second€Amended€Complaint€alleges€fraud,€and€breach€ofÏfiduciary€duty€with€regard€to€the€1960€amendment.€€The€appellants€insist€that€theyÏhave€been€deprived€of€the€right€to€recapture€100%€of€their€copyrights€after€the€firstÏ28€year€copyright€period.€€They€contend€that€they,€and€not€Aldon€Music,€wouldÏhave€been€the€owners€of€the€renewal€rights€in€the€copyrights€before€theÏamendment€was€signed.€€Whether€the€loss€of€these€renewal€rights€is€actionableÏas€an€injury€to€"personal€property"€under€the€tort€statute€of€limitations,€or€moreÏappropriately€as€economic€damage€to€one's€"pocketbook"€€is€the€foremost€issue€inÏthis€appeal.€€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòVance€v.€Schulder€óóthe€owner€of€10%€of€the€stock€of€a€corporationÏfiled€suit€alleging€that€one€of€the€defendant€directors€had€fraudulently€representedÍthat€there€had€been€an€offer€to€purchase€the€corporation€for€$360,000,€but€that€theÏoffer€had€been€for€$708,000€and€that€the€plaintiff€had€been€induced€to€sell€hisÏinterest€for€$36,000€and€suffered€damage€in€the€amount€of€$34,800€because€ofÏthis€fiduciary€breach.€€547€S.W.2d€927€(Tenn.€1977).€€In€applying€the€three€yearÏstatute€of€limitations,€the€Supreme€Court€stated€that€it€was€"important€toÏdistinguish€this€transaction€from€the€more€typical€situation€where€corporateÏdirectors€or€officers€with€inside€information€purchase€or€sell€stock€detrimentally€toÏstockholders€at€large."€€òòId.€óóat€931.€€Those€more€typical€fiduciary€breaches€theÏCourt€reasoned,€are€"quasi„contractual€in€nature"€and€thus€the€six€year€statuteÏwould€be€applicable.€€òòId.€óó€€ÌÌà àà àAs€in€this€case,€the€plaintiff€in€òòVance€óóalleged€damages€resulting€fromÏbreach€of€a€fiduciary€duty€caused€by€a€face€to€face€misrepresentation€whichÏinduced€a€financial€loss.€€In€òòVance€óóthe€property€rights€were€in€shares€of€stock,€inÏthis€instant€case,€copyright€renewals.€€The€Court€in€òòVance€óódetermined€that€theÏgravamen€of€the€action€was€tortious,€specifically€fraud€in€the€inducement€of€aÏcontract.€€òòId.€€óóAs€the€appellants€do€in€this€case,€the€plaintiff€in€òòVanceóó€argued€thatÏthe€monetary,€non„physical€loss€suffered€cannot€be€an€"€'injury€to€property'€in€theÏclassic€tort€sense€of€the€word."€€€òòId.€óóat€932.€€€As€the€Court€stated€however,€"[t]hisÏargument€is€predicated€upon€a€narrow€definition€of€the€word€'injury'€as€used€in€theÏproperty€actions€three€year€statute,€and€the€notion€that€torts,€in€the€classic€sense,Ïresult€only€in€physical€damage."€€òòId.óóÌÌà àà àThe€Court€concluded€that€the€economic€loss€sustained€by€theÏplaintiff€from€the€fraud€was€an€"€'injury€to€personal€property'€"€as€stated€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€28„305,€the€predecessor€to€today's€Tenn€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„3„105.€ÏAlthough€the€Court€conceded€the€question€was€a€close€one,€it€applied€the€threeÏyear€statute.€€ÌÌà àà àIn€1980€the€Court€of€Appeals€decided€a€case€which€dealt€with€theÏinterplay€between€the€three€and€six€year€statutes€of€limitations€in€Tennessee.€€InÏòòHarvest€Corporation€v.€Ernst€&€Whinneyóó,€the€plaintiff€claimed€that€the€defendantÏpartnership€failed€to€audit€the€inventory€of€a€company€professionally,€causing€theÏplaintiff€to€pay€an€excessive€price€for€the€corporate€stock€of€such€company.€€610ÏS.W.2d€727€(Tenn.€App.€1980).€€The€Court€held€that€such€action€was€for€ordinaryÏmoney€damages€resulting€from€breach€of€contract,€and€thus,€the€applicableÏstatute€of€limitations€was€the€six€year€statute€for€contract€cases€rather€than€theÏthree„year€statute€for€actions€involving€injury€to€real€or€personal€property.€€TheÏCourt€noted€that€although€the€gravamen€of€the€complaint€was€that€the€defendantsÏoverstated€the€value€of€the€corporation€in€question,€the€"general€tenor"€of€theÏcomplaint€was€that€the€defendants€attempted€to€perform€the€contract€in€anÏunprofessional€manner€and€more€importantly,€the€property€being€audited€òòwas€notÏthe€plaintiffs€at€the€time€of€breach.€€óó610€S.W.2d€at€731.ÌÌà àà àThe€Court€in€òòHarvest€Corporation,óó€quoted€the€following€from€òòBland€v.ÏSmithóó,€a€1955€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€case:€€Ìà8 àÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€"It€will€be€found€that€the€weight€of€authority€to€be€(sic)Ïin€Tennessee€and€elsewhere€that€regardless€ofÏwhether€the€suit€is€based€on€tort€or€on€contract€theÏCourt€must€look€to€the€plaintiff's€declaration€to€seeÏwhether€or€not€he€is€suing€for€damages€arising€out€of€aÏcontract€or€for€damages€arising€out€of€tort.€.€.€.€"€€òò€óó277ÏS.W.2d€377,€380€(Tenn.€1955).€€òòId.€óóat€729.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà à€From€this€precedent€the€òòHarvest€Corporationóó€Court€then€observed€that€theÏmajor€criterion€in€determining€the€gravamen€of€the€action€is€the€kind€of€damageÏalleged.€€òòId.€óóat€729.€€The€inquiry€into€the€kind€of€damage€alleged€"is€utilizedÏregardless€of€whether€the€cause€of€action€sounds€in€tort€or€contract."€€òòPrescott€v.ÏAdams,€óó627€S.W.2d€134,€137€(Tenn.€App.€1981).€€The€òòHarvest€Corporationóó€CourtÏthen€examined€two€different€types€of€lawsuits€to€demonstrate€the€principleÏenunciated€in€òòBland€v.€Smith.€€óóFirst,€the€Court€viewed€medical€malpractice€casesÏand€noted€that€"although€the€claim€may€arise€in€contract€by€virtue€of€the€doctor„patient€relationship,€the€damages€sustained€are€to€the€person€.€.€.€and€areÏgoverned€by€the€one€year€statute€of€limitations€and€not€the€general€contractÏstatute€of€limitations."€€òòHarvest€Corp.€óóat€729.€€Second,€the€Court€examined€legalÏmalpractice€cases€which€it€concluded€are€"neither€to€the€person€nor€property€ofÏthe€claimant€but€are€to€the€client's€"pocketbook."€€òòId.€óó€The€Court€based€thisÍstatement€of€law€on€a€1966€Supreme€Court€legal€malpractice€actionòò,€óówhere€anÏattorney€failed€to€file€suit€before€the€running€of€the€statute€of€limitations.€€TheÏSupreme€Court€characterized€the€suit€as€one€based€on€the€"failure€to€carry€outÏcontractual€duties€and€not€against€one€for€doing€some€wrong€to€the€person."€€ÏòòHillhouse€v.€McDowell,€óó219€Tenn.€362,€410€S.W.2d€162,€163€(1966).€€The€KellersÏargue€that€their€damages€are€analogous€to€purely€economic€or€"pocketbook"Ïdamages€found€in€legal€malpractice€cases.€€ÌÌÑ X Ñà àà àLater€in€its€opinion€the€òòHarvest€Corporationóó€Court€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 à".€.€.€suits€for€fraud,€deceit,€or€conspiracy,€whether€theyÏarise€incident€to€a€contract€or€not€are€actions€in€tort€andÏmust€be€governed€by€the€applicable€tort€statute€ofÏlimitations.€€At€bar,€neither€fraud,€deceit€nor€conspiracyÏare€charged€and€no€facts€which€could€possiblyÏconstitute€such€have€been€pled.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àWith€the€foregoing€general€principles€in€mind,Ïwe€examine€the€pleadings€in€this€case€in€order€toÏdetermine€the€nature€of€plaintiff's€cause€of€action€lookÏto€the€damages€alleged."€€€òòId.€óóat€730,€731.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€Court€eventually€determined€that€the€damages€sought€by€theÏplaintiff€were€the€"ordinary€money€damages€that€result€from€a€breach€of€contract."€ÏòòId.€óóat€730.€€The€Court€stated€that€the€complaint€essentially€stated€that€theÏdefendants€did€not€advise€the€plaintiffs€of€the€inventory's€true€value€as€required€byÏthe€contract,€and€that€result€led€directly€to€the€damages€alleged.€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€Ìà@ àò òòòConclusionó óóóÌÌà àà àIn€Tennessee€we€determine€the€gravamen€of€the€complaint€byÏlooking€to€the€basis€for€which€damages€are€sought.€€òòBland€v.€Smith,€197€Tenn.Ï683,€óó277€S.W.2d€377€(1955)òò.€óóThe€basis€of€the€appellants'€damages€are€tortious€inÏnature,€specifically€breach€of€fiduciary€duty,€and€fraudulent€misrepresentation.€ÏThe€òòHarvest€Corporation€óóCourt€instructs€us€to€look€at€the€act€which€created€theÏdamages€to€determine€the€statute€of€limitation€regardless€of€whether€a€contractÏexisted€between€the€parties.€€In€òòVance€v.€Schulder,óó€the€Supreme€Court€concludedÏthat€the€phrase€"injury€to€property"€in€the€three€year€statute€of€limitations€was€not€toÏbe€narrowly€confined€to€tangible€property€damaged€in€a€physical€manner€only.€ÏTaking€the€view€of€personal€property€suggested€by€the€òòVanceóó€decision€we€believeÏthe€renewal€rights€must€be€considered€"property."€€€Therefore,€the€three€yearÏstatute€of€limitations€governs€this€suit.€€€€€Ìà àÌà àà àWe€conclude€that€an€economic€loss,€as€in€the€case€before€us,€whichÏis€a€consequence€of€property€damage€is€within€the€three€year€statute€found€inÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„3„105.€€Thus€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€ÏCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellants€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€anyÏproceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÓÓÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÇÑ  Ñ