ÿWPCØ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0lH 0D´ 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð 1u` U,Õ 0dU,eU>‘B)ÏDCø AM;U*ˆÿ²¡±v~R D3Ð BvÓ  0@ó AO3Æ‚ 0DH D/Œ B»˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ cd£e f g h i jkÓ€wyJÚ #I$3|xw((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial õÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òAugust€8,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó —Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝR.C.€3113.215(A).€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`++++'ÿÿdxd dStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€!!X„d&ÓÑ#€!!Xd#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ` Ü` p”XÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€WESTERN€SECTIONÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà@ à_______________________________________________________ÌÌó óà à)ò òÌNINA€ALICE€KIMBLE,ó óà à)à àShelby€Law€Ìà à)à àCircuit€Court€No.€137254€R.D.Ì€€€€€Petitioner/Appellee.à à)Ìà à)̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€%'$;+'h|7â` Å `€€Lß›VS.à à)à àC.€A.€No.€02A01„9503„CV„00049Ìà à)Ìò òMICHAEL€WAYNE€KIMBLE,ó óà à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Respondent/Appellant.à à)Ìà à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis.Ìò òHonorable€Kay€S.€Robilio,€Judge€ó óÌÌÌò òMichael€L.€Ageeó ó,ÌAGEE€&€AGEE,€Bartlett,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Respondent/Appellant.ÌÌÌÌò òKathryn€A.€Kingó ó,ÌSHEA,€KING€&€LANDERS,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Petitioner/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌœò òAFFIRMED€IN€PART,€REVERSED€IN€PART€AND€REMANDED›ÌÌÌà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌHIGHERS,€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)Ìò òLILLARD,€J.€ó ó:€œ(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓÓ` Ü` ˜XÓà àThe€gravamen€of€this€appeal€is€child€support.€€Nina€Alice€Kimble€and€MichaelÏWayne€Kimble€were€married€in€1985,€divorced€in€1992€and€will€be€referred€to€as€Wife€andÏHusband,€respectively.€€When€they€married,€Wife€had€a€son€from€a€previous€marriage€andÏHusband€a€daughter.€€Husband€adopted€the€son€but€Wife€did€not€adopt€the€daughter.ÌÌà àThe€divorce€decree€incorporated€the€terms€of€a€marital€dissolution€agreement€whichÏprovided€that€Husband€would€pay€child€support€of€$250€monthly€for€24€months.€€It€was€furtherÏagreed€that€at€the€end€of€that€period€it€would€not€be€necessary€for€Wife€to€show€a€material€changeÏof€circumstances€upon€petitioning€for€an€increase€in€child€support€due€to€the€fact€that€Husband€hadÏjust€begun€a€new€business€and€his€income€was€uncertain€at€that€time.ÌÌà àWife€petitioned€for€an€increase€in€child€support€and€the€matter€was€referred€to€aÏreferee.€€Following€a€hearing,€the€referee€ruled€that€the€child€support€be€increased€to€$637€perÏmonth€ð ðwhich€includes€adjustment€for€self„emp.€tax€and€fact€of€no€visitation€and€$37€for€her€costÏof€health€insurance€on€child.ðð€€Wife€was€also€awarded€$1,700€in€attorneyððs€fees.€€Upon€motion,Ïthe€trial€court€modified€the€refereeððs€ruling€and€ordered€that€Husband€pay€$348€per€month€ð ðas€baseÏchild€support,€taking€into€consideration€the€Child€Support€Guidelines€and€deviating€therefrom€byÏallowing€[Husband]€credit€of€21%€of€his€net€income,€or€$441,€for€expenditures€for€his€daughter,ÏLydia€Kimble.ðð€€The€court€ordered€Husband€to€pay€an€additional€$225€per€month€as€child€supportÏdue€to€Husbandððs€non„visitation€and€$37€for€the€childððs€health€insurance,€for€a€total€monthlyÏsupport€award€of€$610.€€The€court€additionally€ordered€Husband€to€pay€Wife€approximatelyÏ$3,000€in€attorneyððs€fees.€€Husbandððs€motion€for€rehearing€or,€alternatively,€to€alter€or€amend€theÏjudgment€was€denied.€€Husband€appeals€to€this€Court€where€our€scope€of€review€is€òòò òde€novoóóó ó€ofÍthe€record€with€a€presumption€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€correct€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Rule€13(d)€T.R.A.P.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€stated€from€the€bench€that€an€additional€$225€was€awarded€due€to€theÏfact€that€Husband€had€no€visitation€with€his€adopted€son€and,€according€to€Husbandððs€testimony,Ïhad€virtually€no€contact€with€the€child€whatsoever.€€Husband€argues€that€this€was€error€on€the€partÏof€the€trial€court€because€Wife€failed€to€present€any€evidence€of€the€childððs€expenses.€€Wife€arguesÏthat€the€additional€amount€of€$225€per€month€for€non„visitation€is€proper.€€She€relies€upon€ch.Ï1240„2„4„.02(6)€which€provides€for€an€upward€deviation€if€the€child€is€not€staying€overnight€withÏthe€obligor€for€the€average€visitation€period€of€every€other€weekend€from€Friday€evening€untilÏSunday€morning,€two€weeks€during€the€summer€and€two€weeks€during€holiday€periods€throughoutÏthe€year.ÌÌà àNeed€and€ability€to€pay€are€factors€to€be€considered€in€determining€child€support.€ÏOur€review€of€this€matter€is€hampered€somewhat€by€the€fact€that€the€record€contains€scant€evidenceÏof€the€expenses€incurred€by€Wife€as€a€result€of€her€custody€of€Christopher.€€While€it€appeared€thatÏHusband€was€testifying€from€a€statement€of€income€and€expenses€before€the€referee,€such€aÏdocument€does€not€appear€in€this€record.€€Other€than€the€testimony€of€Husband,€the€evidenceÏconsists€of€his€1993€individual€income€tax€return,€a€corporate€return€and€two€canceled€checks.ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€record€before€us€is€not€entirely€clear€as€to€the€formula€used€by€theÏcourt€in€arriving€at€the€figure€of€$225.€€In€òòò òLindberg€v.€Lindbergóóó ó,€No.€02A01„9407„CV„00169Ï(Tenn.App.€1995),€this€Court€held€that,€in€accordance€with€the€guidelines,€there€is€to€be€anÏð ðupward€or€downward€deviation€when€certain€assumptions€upon€which€the€Department€of€HealthÏand€Safety€based€the€regulations€are€not€present.ðð€€òòò òLindbergóóó ó,€slip€op.€at€8€(citing€òòò òNash€v.ÏMulleóóó ó,€846€S.W.2d€803,€805€(Tenn.€1993)).€€In€the€event€of€non„visitation,€òòò òLindbergóóó ó€held€thatÏa€trial€judge€is€ð ðto€increase€the€amount€of€support€from€the€guidelines€minimum€to€some€amountÍthat€would€òòò òapproximate€the€expenses€incurredó óóó€by€the€custodial€parent€that€[he/she]€wouldÏnot€.€.€.€otherwise€have€incurred€if€the€obligor€parent€had€appropriately€exercised€his€visitation.ðð€Ïòòò òIdóóó ó.€€(Emphasis€added.)€€We€find€a€remand€of€this€cause€to€the€trial€court€necessary€withÏinstructions€to€entertain€evidence€on€the€amount€of€actual€expenses€incurred€by€Wife,€onÏChristopherððs€behalf,€due€to€Husbandððs€non„visitation.ÌÌà àWife€further€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€considering€the€fact€that€HusbandÏis€the€sole€support€of€his€minor€daughter€from€a€previous€marriage€because€the€child€is€not€includedÏin€a€decree€of€child€support.€€She€relies€upon€a€portion€of€the€guidelines€which€provides€that€theÏchildren€of€the€obligor€who€are€not€included€in€the€decree€of€child€support€shall€not€be€consideredÏfor€the€purposes€of€reducing€the€obligorððs€net€income€or€in€calculating€guideline€amounts.€€òòò òSeeóóó ó€ch.Ï1240„2„4„.03(4).€€We€do€not€believe€that€the€intent€of€the€guidelines€was€to€cover€a€situation€suchÏas€this,€where€a€sole€surviving€parent€has€sole€custody€of€a€minor€child,€as€there€could€notÏreasonably€be€expected€to€be€a€support€order€entered€by€a€court€in€these€circumstances.€€WithoutÏdoubt€he€is€obligated€to€support€his€minor€daughter.€€The€Child€Support€Guidelines€apply€as€aÏrebuttable€presumption€in€child€support€cases.€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(e)(1).€€As€noted,€the€guidelinesÏare€subject€to€deviation€upward€or€downward€when€the€assumptions€on€which€they€are€based€doÏnot€pertain€to€a€particular€situation.€€òòò òSee€Nash€v.€Mulleóóó ó,€846€S.W.2d€at€805.€€Wife€cites€to€thisÏCourtððs€decision€in€òòò òTower€v.€Toweróóó ó,€No.€02A01„9407„CV„00170€(Tenn.€App.€Nov.€3,€1995).€ÏHowever,€the€father€in€òòò òToweróóó ó€contended€he€was€voluntarily€paying€child€support€for€childrenÏfrom€a€previous€marriage.€€He€did€not€purport€to€be€the€sole€surviving€parent.€€Under€the€presentÏcircumstances,€we€find€no€error€by€the€trial€court€in€extending€Husband€a€credit€for€expendituresÏfor€his€daughter,€for€whom€he€is€the€sole€support.€€ÌÌà àHusband€argues€that€his€actual€out„of„pocket€expenses€of€$10,313,€representing€theÏpurchase€of€certain€office€equipment€in€the€calendar€year€1993,€was€properly€deducted€from€hisÏgross€income.€€Wife€counters€that€these€expenses€are€included€within€his€depreciation€deduction€ofÍ$12,108€on€his€federal€income€tax€return€and€are€not€deductible€in€accordance€with€the€guidelines.€ÏThe€guidelines€provide€that€ð ð[i]ncome€from€self„employment€includes€income€from€businessÏoperations€and€rental€properties,€etc.,€less€reasonable€expenses€necessary€to€produce€such€income.€ÏDepreciation€.€.€.€should€not€be€considered€reasonable€expenses.ðð€€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.,€ch.Ï1240„2„4„.03(3).€€The€parties€stipulated€that€Husband€paid€$10,313€for€the€office€equipment.€€TheÏtrial€court€deducted€this€figure€from€Husbandððs€gross€income€as€a€means€to€guard€against€hisÏð ðpaying€child€support€on€money€he€[does]€not€have.ðð€€Husband€agrees€that€depreciation€is€notÏdeductible€for€child€support€purposes.ÌÌà àOur€research€of€this€issue€has€uncovered€the€following:€In€òòò òKamm€v.€Kammóóó ó,€616ÏN.E.2d€900€(Ohio€1993),€the€Supreme€Court€of€Ohio€considered€whether€capital€expenditures€mayÏbe€used€to€reduce€the€gross€income€of€a€parent€in€calculating€the€appropriate€amount€of€childÏsupport.€The€court€looked€to€state€statute× ƒ( ××  ×€for€guidance€which€identified€ð ðself„generated€incomeðð€asÏð ðgross€receipts€received€by€a€parent€from€self€employment€.€.€.€and€rents,€minus€ordinary€andÏnecessary€expenses€incurred€by€the€parent€in€generating€the€gross€receipts.ðð€€The€statute€definedÏð ðordinary€and€necessary€expenses€incurred€in€generating€gross€receiptsðð€as€ð ðactual€cash€itemsÏexpended€by€the€parent€or€his€business.€€ððOrdinary€and€necessary€expenses€incurred€in€generatingÏgross€receiptsðð€does€not€include€depreciation€expenses€and€other€non„cash€items€that€are€allowed€asÏdeductions€on€any€federal€tax€return€of€the€parent€or€his€business.ðð€€òòò òKammóóó ó,€616€N.E.2d€at€902.ÌÌà àThe€obligor€parent€in€òòò òKammóóó ó€was€a€farmer€who€sought€to€deduct€the€acquisitionÏcost€of€a€tractor€from€his€gross€income€in€determining€his€child€support€obligation.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€900.€ÏThe€court€concluded€that€the€acquisition€of€a€capital€asset€by€a€self„employed€child€support€obligorÏmay€be€deductible€against€his€gross€receipts€for€purposes€of€computing€his/her€child€supportÏobligation€so€€long€as€the€acquisition€is€ð ðordinary€and€necessaryðð€and€acquired€by€an€actual€cashÍexpenditure.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€902.ÌÌà àThe€court€continued:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àIt€may€be€argued€that€our€decision€permits€ð ðdouble€dippingððÏby€allowing€the€child„support€obligor€to€deduct€the€capital€assetÏcosts€from€both€his€child„support€obligation€and€his€federal€incomeÏtax€liability.€€While€so€doing,€we€only€point€out€that€this€is€notÏdouble€dipping€in€the€traditional€sense€of€that€term€inasmuch€as€theÏdipping€is€at€two€different€wells.€€The€legislature€specificallyÏprohibits€any€double€dipping€from€the€child„support€obligation€wellÏby€excluding€any€additional,€duplicative€deduction€for€the€capitalÏasset€cost€through€depreciation€in€the€last€sentence€of€R.C.Ï3113.215(a)(4).€€Though€we€believe€the€preferred€way€to€recognizeÏa€child„support€obligorððs€expense€for€a€capital€asset€would€haveÏbeen€to€spread€the€deduction€of€its€cost€over€its€useful€life€viaÏdepreciation€rather€than€by€a€lump„sum€deduction,€the€legislature€hasÏchosen€otherwise.ÌÌÌÌòòò òÓÓIdóóó ó.€€ÌÌà àThe€court€in€òòò òKammóóó ó€recognized€that€such€construction€could€result€in€a€financialÏadvantage€to€the€child€support€obligor,€enabling€him€or€her€to€reduce€his/her€income€for€purposesÏof€setting€child€support€by€accumulating€assets,€taking€a€tax€deduction€for€them€and€having€hisÏchild€support€lowered.€€He/she€could€ð ðcontinue€the€process€by€depreciating€the€assets€and/orÏreplacing€them.ðð€€To€guard€against€this€ð ðpotential€for€inequitable€results,ðð€òòò òKammóóó ó€held€thatÏð ðallowance€of€a€deduction€for€acquisition€of€a€capital€asset€by€a€self„employed,€child„supportÏobligor€against€such€obligorððs€gross€receipts€may€be€grounds€for€deviation€from€the€child„supportÏguidelines€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€€Factors€to€be€included€in€a€courtððs€consideration€of€whether€deviation€isÏproper€were€identified€as€(1)€the€cost€of€the€capital€asset€compared€to€the€parent€obligorððs€grossÏincome;€(2)€the€cost€of€the€capital€asset€compared€to€the€net€worth€of€the€obligorððs€business;€(3)€theÏexistence€of€a€past€pattern€of€acquisition€of€capital€assets€as€deductions€against€gross€income€forÏchild€support€calculations;€(4)€the€proximity€in€time€of€the€acquisition€of€the€capital€asset€to€the€dateÏof€termination€of€the€child€support€obligation;€(5)€analysis€of€the€necessity€of€the€capital€asset€toÍmaintain€or€increase€past€or€current€levels€of€income€as€opposed€to€unnecessary,€punitive€or€overlyÏaggressive€expansion€of€business;€and€(6)€whether€the€asset€is€acquired€from€the€current€yearððsÏincome€or€out€of€past€year(s)ðð€savings.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.ÌÌà àIn€òòò òZakrowski€v.€Zakrowskióóó ó,€594€N.E.2d€821€(Ind.€App.€1992),€the€issueÏbefore€the€Court€of€Appeals€of€Indiana€was€whether€the€trial€court€had€erred€in€disallowing€certainÏbusiness€expenses€in€calculating€the€obligorððs€available€income€for€child€support.€€One€suchÏbusiness€expense€was€for€various€items€of€office€equipment.€€òòò òZakrowskió óóó,€594€N.E.2d€at€823.€ÏThe€pertinent€provisions€of€Indianaððs€child€support€guidelines€stated:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àWeekly€Gross€Income€from€self„employment,€operation€of€aÏbusiness,€rent€and€royalties€is€defined€as€gross€receipts€minusÏordinary€and€necessary€expenses.€€Specifically€excluded€fromÏordinary€and€necessary€expenses€for€purposes€of€these€GuidelinesÏare€depreciation,€.€.€.€or€any€other€business€expense€determined€byÏthe€Court€to€be€inappropriate€for€determining€weekly€gross€incomeÏfor€purposes€of€calculating€child€support.€€In€general,€these€types€ofÏincome€and€expenses€from€self„employment€or€operation€of€aÏbusiness€should€be€carefully€reviewed.€òòò ò€ÌÌÌÌÓÓIdóóó ó.€€The€court€noted€that€ð ð[a]lthough€purchases€of€business€equipment€may€properly€be€consideredÏððreasonable€and€necessaryðð€expenditures€in€child€support€computations,€a€deduction€from€grossÏincome€is€not€mandatory.ðð€€The€court€concluded€that€the€trial€court€had€not€abused€its€discretionÏwhen€labeling€these€particular€expenditures€as€ð ðinvestmentsðð€benefiting€the€obligor€rather€thanÏð ðexpenses.ðð€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€823„24.ÌÌà àFinally,€in€òòò òBeardsley€v.€Heazlittóóó ó,€654€N.E.2d€1178€(Ind.€App.€1995),€theÏIndiana€Court€of€Appeals€noted€that€the€stateððs€child€support€guidelines€had€been€ð ðupdatedðð€inÏMarch€1993€to€read:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àWeekly€gross€income€from€self€employment,€.€.€.€is€definedÏas€gross€receipts€minus€ordinary€and€necessary€expenses.€€InÍgeneral,€these€types€of€income€and€expenses€from€self„employmentÏor€operation€of€a€business€should€be€carefully€reviewed€in€order€thatÏthe€deductions€be€restricted€to€reasonable€out„of„pocket€expendituresÏnecessary€for€the€production€of€income.€€These€expenditures€mayÏinclude€a€reasonable€yearly€deduction€for€necessary€capitalÏexpenditures.€€òòò òÌÌÌÌÓÓBeardsleyóóó ó,€654€N.E.2d€at€1181.ÌÌà àAs€noted,€the€Tennessee€child€support€guidelines€provide€only€that€self„employmentÏincome€(for€purposes€of€calculating€child€support)€ð ðincludes€income€from€business€operations€.€.€.Ïless€reasonable€expenses€to€produce€such€income,ðð€and€that€depreciation€allowances€are€notÏconsidered€reasonable€expenses.€€Ch.€140„2„4„.03(3).€€Both€jurisdictions€referenced€aboveÏlikewise€exclude€depreciation€as€a€reasonable€(ð ðordinary€and€necessaryðð)€expense€for€purposes€ofÏestablishing€child€support.€€As€seen€in€òòò òBeardsleyóóó ó€and€òòò òZakrowskióóó ó,€Indiana€allows€for€theÏdeduction€of€out„of„pocket€capital€expenditures€from€an€obligorððs€gross€income,€if€determinedÏreasonable€and€necessary€after€careful€review€by€the€trial€court.€€Conversely,€such€deduction€isÏexpressly€mandated€by€the€Ohio€state€legislature;€however,€the€potential€for€abuse€was€judiciallyÏcurtailed€by€the€state€supreme€court€when€permitting€a€deviation€from€the€child€support€guidelinesÏin€the€event€such€deduction€is€taken.ÌÌà àAs€our€own€state€legislature€has€not€seen€fit€to€either€expressly€exclude€or€authorizeÏa€deduction€for€capital€expenditures,€we€believe€it€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€toÏdetermine€when€and€if€expenditures€of€this€type€are€ð ðreasonable.ðð€€We€believe€the€factorsÏpropounded€by€the€court€in€òòò òKammóóó ó€are€worthy€of€consideration€in€arriving€at€such€a€decision.€ÏThey€are€not€to€be€used€to€determine€whether€deviation€from€the€guidelines€is€proper,€but€rather,€inÏour€case,€whether€such€a€deduction€is€ð ðreasonable.ðð€€We€also€note€that€under€certain€circumstancesÏit€may€be€appropriate,€as€suggested€by€the€court€in€òòò òKammóóó ó,€to€spread€the€deduction€of€the€capitalÏassetððs€cost€ð ðover€its€useful€life€via€depreciationðð€rather€than€a€lump€sum€deduction.€€òòò òSee€Kammóóó ó,Ï616€N.E.2d€at€903.€€On€remand,€we€direct€the€trial€court€to€determine€whether€Husbandððs€out„of„pocket€expenses€for€the€office€equipment€are€reasonable€after€consideration€of€the€factors€cited€withÏapproval€herein€and€all€others€determined€relevant.€ÌÌà àHusband€next€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€Wife€attorneyððs€feesÏand€costs.€€It€is€Husbandððs€position€that€Wife€failed€to€present€evidence€of€her€inability€to€pay€herÏattorneyððs€fees.€€As€this€Court€said€in€òòò òSherrod€v.€Wixóóó ó,€849€S.W.2d€780€(Tenn.€App.€1992),Ïòòò òperm.€app.€deniedóóó ó€(Tenn.€March€1,€1993):ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„103(c)€states€that€awarding€legalÏexpenses€in€custody€and€support€proceedings€is€discretionary€withÏthe€trial€court.€€However,€the€appellate€courts€have€not€necessarilyÏbeen€consistent€in€identifying€the€considerations€on€which€theseÏdiscretionary€decisions€should€be€made.€€Some€panels€follow€theÏcriteria€used€to€award€legal€expenses€in€divorce€proceedings€andÏrefuse€to€approve€awards€in€the€absence€of€proof€that€the€partyÏrequesting€the€fees€is€unable€to€pay€his€or€her€lawyer.€€òòò òJohnson€v.ÏJohnsonóóó ó,€App.€No.€01„A„01„9103„CV„00107,€slip€op.€at€13,€16ÏT.A.M.€39„10,€1991€WL€169568€(Tenn.Ct.App.€Sept.€4,€1991)Ï(citing€òòò òFox€v.€Foxóóó ó,€657€S.W.2d€747€(Tenn.€1983)).€€Others€haveÏapproved€awards€even€in€the€absence€of€proof€of€inability€to€pay€andÏhave€pointed€out€that€ability€to€pay€is€not€a€prerequisite€for€awardingÏlegal€expenses€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„103(c).€€òòò òGaddy€v.ÏGaddyóóó ó,€App.€No.€03„A„01„9109„CV„306,€slip€op.€at€9,€17ÏT.A.M.€17„18,€1992€WL€63441€(Tenn.Ct.App.€April€1,€1992),Ïòòò òperm.€app.€deniedóóó ó€(Tenn.€Oct.€26,€1992).€€ÌÌà8 àà àLike€the€Eastern€Section€in€òòò òGaddy€v.€Gaddyóóó ó,€we€find€thatÏability€to€pay€should€not€be€the€controlling€consideration€with€regardÏto€awards€for€legal€expenses€in€custody€or€support€proceedings.€€ItÏis€certainly€a€factor€to€be€considered,€but€trial€courts€may€awardÏattorneyððs€fees€without€proof€that€the€requesting€party€is€unable€toÏpay€them€as€long€as€the€award€is€just€and€equitable€under€the€facts€ofÏthe€case.€€The€purpose€of€these€awards€is€to€protect€the€childrenððs,Ïnot€the€custodial€parentððs,€legal€remedies.€€Accordingly,€requiringÏparents€who€precipitate€custody€or€support€proceedings€toÏunderwrite€the€costs€if€their€claims€are€ultimately€found€to€beÏunwarranted€is€appropriate€as€a€matter€of€policy.ÌÌÌÌòòò òÓÓSherrodóóó ó,€849€S.W.2d€at€785€(footnote€omitted).€€Wifeððs€attorney€presented€her€affidavit€of€herÏcharges€and€expenses€totaling€$3,027.€€We€find€no€error€in€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€attorneyððsÏfees.€We€decline€Wifeððs€request€to€award€her€additional€attorneyððs€fees€for€this€appeal.ÌÌà àIt€results€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€allowing€Husband€a€21%€credit€for€theÏexpenses€incurred€for€his€daughter,€Lydia,€is€affirmed;€the€judgment€awarding€Wife€$3,027€inÏattorneyððs€fees€is€affirmed;€and€the€judgment€in€all€other€respects€is€reversed.€€This€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€with€instructions€to€hear€evidence€regarding€Wifeððs€costs€in€the€care€ofÏthe€partiesðð€son,€Christopher,€due€to€Husbandððs€non„visitation€and€to€consider€the€relevant€factorsÏstated€herein€in€determining€whether€the€entire€amount€of€Husbandððs€capital€expenditures€isÏreasonable€as€a€deduction€from€his€gross€income€for€purposes€of€calculating€child€support.€€TheÏparties€may€present€additional€evidence€on€this€issue€as€determined€necessary€by€the€trial€court.€ÏCosts€are€assessed€equally€against€Michael€Wayne€Kimble€and€Nina€Alice€Kimble,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓÓ` Ü` È“XÓà à________________________________Ìà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌHIGHERS,€J.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌLILLARD,€J.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌ›Ì