ÿWPC, …# VU:a %› 0(¡U <Éw@ 4E Y 0”h 0Dü 0J@ Š 0T’ 0^æ 0hD 0r¬ 0| 0†š 0 1u° U,% 0dQU,µU *áB)  B4DCQ AM”ááÂv~à D3AvÓt 0@G AO‡ÆÖ 0Dœ D/à B˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 , øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman E[{DÓ€ !DÒ 3|x!(D(2´¤$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d####7Border 1dd€-%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ×Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌAugust€21,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÷Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ÔRule€56,€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`$$$$'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€!!X„d&ÓÑ#€!!Xd#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òœÙ€€ÙÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ÔßL€&'%;+'h|e` Å `€€LßIN›€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEó óÌ_____________________________________________ÌÓ  ÓÌÌò òÓ  ÓCORA€LADELL€HELTON€KIMBROUGHó ó,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€à à)à àÌà àà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àC.A.€No.€01A01„9507„CH„00318Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà à€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSumner€Chancery€No.€90D„272R3Ìò òDONALD€HENRY€HELTONó ó,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àDefendant/Appellant.à àà à)ÌÌÓÓÌÓÓò òÓ  ÓAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SUMNER€COUNTYÌTHE€HONORABLE€TOM€E.€GRAY,€CHANCELLORÌó óÌÓ  ÓÌÌò òWilliam€P.€Jonesó óÌHendersonville,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌÌò òNancy€Kay€Corleyó óÌò òR.€Patrick€Parkeró óÌNashville,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌò òÓ  ÓREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àò òWILLIAM€H.€WILLIAMS,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌHIGHERS,€J.Ìó óÌÑ7€ôCXXdXXdæ7ÑØØÙ  ÙÓ  ÓÓÓà àThis€case€involves€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€arising€initiallyÏout€of€a€divorce€proceeding€in€the€Chancery€Court€of€Sumner€County,ÏTennessee.€€The€decree€of€divorce€was€filed€on€December€20,€1991€andÏcontained€therein€a€marital€dissolution€agreement€between€the€partiesÏwhich€provided,€òòinter€aliaóó,€for€the€payment€by€the€Husband/Appellant€toÏthe€Wife/Appellee€the€sum€of€$50,000€termed€as€alimony€òòin€solidoóó.€€€TheÏamount€was€to€be€paid€over€a€period€of€five€years€in€cash€of€$11,000€firstÏpayment,€and€thereafter€beginning€February€1,€1992€the€sum€of€$24,000Ïpayable€at€$400€monthly€together€with€interest€from€entry€of€the€finalÏdecree,€and€three€concurrent€future€payments€of€$5,000€each€on€certainÍdates€specified€in€the€marital€dissolution€agreement.€€It€was€furtherÏprovided€in€a€subsequent€and€separate€paragraph€of€the€marital€dissolutionÏagreement€that€Husband€would€pay€$200€monthly€as€rehabilitative€alimonyÏfor€24€months.€€This€paragraph€provided€that€the€payments€forÏrehabilitative€alimony€would€terminate€upon€Wifeððs€death€or€remarriage€orÏthe€conclusion€of€24€months.€€The€former€clause€providing€for€alimony€òòinÏsolidoóó€did€not€contain€the€death€or€remarriage€clause.€€Also,€theÏrehabilitative€alimony€paragraph€specifically€provided€that€ð ðsaid€sumÏshall€be€taxable€to€Wife€and€deductible€by€Husband.ðð€€The€paragraphÏproviding€for€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€did€not€so€provide.€€Paragraphs€10€and€11Ïstate€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à10.€€òòAlimony€In€Solidoóó.€€Husband€shall€pay€to€WifeÏalimony€òòinóó€òòsolidoóó€in€the€sum€of€$50,000.00.€ÏHusband€shall€pay€said€alimony€òòinóó€òòsolidoóó€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(a)€He€shall€pay€a€total€of€$11,000€cashÏbefore€or€on€January€17,€1992.€€FailureÏof€Husband€to€pay€said€$11,000€beforeÏor€on€January€17,€1992€shall€be€a€basisÏfor€the€Court€to€set€aside€thisÏAgreement€in€its€entirety.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(b)€Husband€shall€pay€$24,000€at€theÏrate€of€$400€per€month€until€paid€inÏfull,€with€the€first€payment€due€onÏFebruary€1,€1992.€€Said€sum€shall€bearÏinterest€thirty€(30)€days€after€the€entryÍof€the€Final€Decree€at€the€rate€of€8%€perÏannum.€€A€portion€of€each€payment€shallÏbe€interest€if€accrued.€€Wife€shallÏprovide€Husband€with€an€amortizationÏschedule.ÌÌà àà8 àà8 à(c)€Husband€shall€pay€$5,000€plusÏaccrued€interest€on€February€1,€1993,Ïsaid€sum€to€bear€interest€from€thirtyÏ(30)€days€after€the€entry€of€the€FinalÏDecree€at€8%€per€annum.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(d)€Husband€shall€pay€$5,000€plusÏaccrued€interest€on€August€1,€1993,Ïsaid€sum€to€bear€interest€from€thirtyÏ(30)€days€after€the€entry€of€the€FinalÏDecree€at€the€rate€of€8%€per€annum.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(e)€Husband€shall€pay€$5,000€plusÏaccrued€interest€on€February€1,€1994,Ïsaid€sum€to€bear€interest€from€thirtyÏ(30)€days€after€the€entry€of€the€FinalÏdecree€in€this€cause€at€the€rate€of€8%Ïper€annum.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(f)€Husband€may€prepay€said€alimony€òòinóóÏòòsolidoóó€€at€any€time€prior€to€the€due€dateÏand€upon€payment€in€full,€Wife€shallÏacknowledge€full€payment€in€writing.ÌÌà8 àà8 àHusband€acknowledges€that€the€sums€set€forthÏabove€are€for€Wifeððs€necessary€support€andÏmaintenance,€however,€said€sum€may€not€beÏmodified€or€contractual€beyond€the€agreed€terms.€ÏHe€further€represents€that€the€amount€isÏreasonable€and€that€it€is€within€his€means€to€pay.€ÏHe€acknowledges€and€agrees€that€the€alimony€òòinóóÏòòsolidoóó€as€set€forth€above€is€non„dischargeable€inÍbankruptcy.ÌÌà8 àà8 à11.€€òòRehabilitative€Alimonyóó.€€Husband€agrees€to€payÏto€Wife€rehabilitative€alimony€in€the€amount€ofÏ$200.00€per€month€for€twenty„four€(24)€months,Ïdue€and€payable€in€hand€or€postmarked€on€the€10thÏday€of€each€month€beginning€January€10,€1992.€ÏSaid€rehabilitative€alimony€payment€is€for€aÏtwenty„four€(24)€month€interval€and€may€not€beÏextended€beyond€such€term€except€as€set€forthÏbelow.€€Said€rehabilitative€alimony€payment€shallÏterminate€upon€Wifeððs€death€or€remarriage€or€at€theÏconclusion€of€the€twenty„four€(24)€month€term,Ïwhichever€occurs€first.€€Said€sum€shall€be€taxableÏto€Wife€and€deductible€by€Husband.ÌÌà8 àà8 àWife€agrees€that€she€will€not€seek€modificationÏwith€regard€to€the€rehabilitative€alimony€so€long€asÏHusband€keeps€his€agreements€as€set€forth€in€thisÏMarital€Dissolution€Agreement€regarding€theÏpayment€of€alimony€òòinóó€òòsolidoóó.€€If€Husband€shouldÏfail€to€pay€any€sums€of€alimony€òòinóó€òòsolidoóó€set€forthÏin€this€Agreement€for€any€reason,€including€theÏfiling€of€a€bankruptcy€proceeding,€to€WifeððsÏfinancial€detriment,€then€Wife€shall€have€the€rightÏto€seek€modification€of€the€rehabilitative€alimonyÏprovision€to€provide€for€the€satisfaction€andÏcompletion€of€the€partiesðð€agreement€herein.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àHusband€proceeded€to€duly€pay€according€to€the€terms€of€the€maritalÏdissolution€agreement€until€March€8,€1993€when€he€filed€a€bankruptcyÏpetition€in€Federal€Court,€Middle€District€of€Tennessee,€seeking€toÏdischarge€the€two€obligations€arising€under€the€marital€dissolutionÍagreement,€to€pay€alimony€òòin€œsolidoóó€plus€interest,›€and€rehabilitativeÏœalimony.›€€Wife€lifted€the€automatic€stay€in€the€federal€bankruptcy€court€asÏallowed€by€federal€law€and€filed€a€complaint€in€the€state€divorce€court€onÏJune€11,€1993,€asking€the€trial€court€to€determine€that€HusbandððsÏobligation€to€pay€Wife€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€pursuant€to€the€final€decree€ofÏdivorce€is€nondischargeable€in€bankruptcy€under€11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5).€ÏSubsequently,€the€Wife€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€TheÏHusband,€in€his€response€opposing€the€summary€judgment€motion,€declaredÏthat€the€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€was€actually€a€property€settlement€in€disguise.€ÏThe€chancellor€granted€Wifeððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€in€whole,€theÏeffect€of€which€barred€the€disputed€debts€from€discharge€in€the€federalÏbankruptcy€court.€€Husband€appealed€and€is€properly€before€this€Court.€€WeÏreverse€and€remand€this€cause€for€a€full€evidentiary€hearing.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓISSUEÌÓ  Óà àó óThe€sole€issue€presented€is:€Ìà àòòWhether€the€chancellor€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€for€theÏWife/Appellee.óóÌà àThis€is€a€summary€judgment€action€pursuant€to€Rule€56.02,€Tenn.€R.ÍCiv.€P.€€The€federal€rule× ƒ( ××  ×€is€ð ðvirtually€identicalðð€with€Rule€56,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.ÏP.€€Indeed,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,Ï214€(Tenn.€1993)€so€stated€and€declared€the€federal€cases€of€òòAnderson€v.ÏLiberty€Lobby,€Inc.óó,€477€U.S.€242,€106€S.Ct.€2505,€91€L.Ed.2d€202€(1986);ÏòòCelotex€Corp.€v.€Catrettóó,€477€U.S.€317,€106€S.Ct.€2548,€91€L.Ed.2d€265Ï(1986);€and€òòMatsushita€Elec.€Indus.€Co.,€Ltd.€v.€Zenith€Radio€Corp.óó,€475€U.S.Ï574,€106€S.Ct.€1348,€89€L.Ed.2d€538€(1986)€to€be€the€applicable€law€inÏTennessee€for€procedural€guidance€of€the€state€courts€in€decidingÏsummary€judgment€cases.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€214.€€Tennessee€trialÏcourts€possess€concurrent€jurisdiction€with€federal€bankruptcy€courts€toÏdecide€the€dischargeability€of€debts€to€a€spouse€in€connection€with€aÏdivorce€decree.€€In€òòHoughland€v.€Houghlandóó,€844€S.W.2d€619€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1992),€this€Court€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àWe€recognize€that€the€trial€court€has€concurrentÏjurisdiction€with€the€bankruptcy€court€toÏdetermine€the€dischargeability€of€debts€of€a€spouseÏincurred€in€connection€with€a€divorce€decree€(citingÏcases).€€Under€11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5),€theÏdetermination€of€dischargeability€depends€onÏwhether€the€debt€may€be€characterized€as€alimony,Ïmaintenance,€or€support.€€òòSeeóó€òòIn€reóó€òòCalhounóó,€715ÏF.2d€1103€(6th€Cir.€1983).€€ÌÌòòHoughlandóó,€at€625.ÌÌÌà à11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5)(B)€states€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àÔ€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523.€€ò òExceptions€to€dischargeó ó.Ìà8 àà8 à(a)€A€discharge€under€section€727,€1141,€1228(a),Ï1228(b),€or€1328(b)€of€this€title€.€.€.€does€notÏdischarge€an€individual€debtor€from€any€debt.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(5)€to€a€spouse,€former€spouse,€or€child€of€theÏdebtor,€for€alimony€to,€maintenance€for,€or€supportÏof€such€spouse€or€child,€in€connection€with€aÏseparation€agreement,€divorce€decree€or€otherÏorder€of€a€court€of€record€.€.€.€or€propertyÏsettlement€agreement,€but€not€to€the€extent€that.€.€.Ï.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€such€debt€includes€a€liability€designated€asÏalimony,€maintenance,€or€support,€unless€suchÏliability€is€actually€in€the€nature€of€alimony,Ïmaintenance,€or€support.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€short,€under€this€federal€code€section,€if€the€debt€is€a€propertyÏsettlement,€it€is€dischargeable.€€If€it€is€actually€alimony,€maintenance,€orÏsupport€payments€to€the€spouse,€it€is€not€dischargeable.€€State€courts€mayÏhear€and€decide€such€actions,€but€the€state€court€must€apply€federalÏbankruptcy€law€in€deciding€dischargeability.€€òòSeeóó€òòIn€re€Calhounóó,€715€F.2dÏat€1107,€which€states:€ð ðWhat€constitutes€alimony,€maintenance€or€supportÍwill€be€determined€under€the€bankruptcy€law,€not€state€law.ððÌà àThis€appeal€is€from€the€action€of€a€state€trial€court€upon€a€motionÏfor€summary€judgment€decided€procedurally€under€Rule€56,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,Ïbut€under€substantive€statutory€bankruptcy€law.€€Regardless,€the€wordingÏof€Rule€56(c),€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.,€and€Rule€56.03,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€are€identical.€ÏThe€pertinent€portion€of€each€states:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à.€.€.€The€judgment€sought€shall€be€renderedÏforthwith€if€the€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€toÏinterrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€togetherÏwith€affidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€theÏmoving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matterÏof€law.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓà àAlso,€Rule€56(e),€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.,€and€Rule€56.05,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€areÏpractically€identical.€€The€pertinent€portion€of€each€provides€that€theÏadverse€(non„moving)€party€ð ðmay€not€rest€upon€the€mere€allegations€orÏdenials€of€his€pleading,€but€his€response€by€affidavits€or€as€otherwiseÏprovided€in€this€rule,€must€set€forth€specific€facts€showing€that€there€is€aÏgenuine€issue€for€trial.€.€.€.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210.€€Ìà àIt€is€clear€then€that€the€trial€court,€in€its€consideration€of€a€motionÏfor€summary€judgment,€is€limited€to€the€ð ðpleadings,€depositions,€answersÏto€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€the€affidavits,€ifÍany,€.€.€.ðð€€There€can€be€no€evidentiary€hearing€entailing€findings€of€fact.€ÏIndeed,€under€the€rules€of€summary€judgment€jurisprudence,€the€trialÏcourt€cannot€weigh€the€evidence€and€judge€the€credibility€of€theÏdeponents.€€The€trial€court€must€accept€the€facts€alleged€by€the€adverseÏ(non„moving€party)€as€true.€€òòSeeóó€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€òòidóó.,€at€212.€€Therefore,€theÏpresumption€of€correctness€of€finding€of€facts€under€Rule€13(d),€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.,€does€not€come€into€play.€€Rule€13(d)€states:ÌÓÓÌò òà8 àà8 àFindings€of€fact€in€civil€actions.€€ó óUnlessÏotherwise€required€by€statute,€review€of€findingsÏof€fact€by€the€trial€court€in€civil€actions€shall€beÏòòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,Ïaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctnessÏof€the€finding,€unless€the€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€is€otherwise.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€review€is,€therefore,€òòde€novoóó€without€the€presumption€ofÏcorrectness.€€Further,€this€Court€is€not€bound€by€conclusions€of€law€by€theÏlower€court.€€òòSeeóó€òòAdams€v.€Dean€Roofing€Co.óó,€715€S.W.2d€341,€343€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1986);€òòCarter€v.€Kruegeróó,€916€S.W.2d€932,€935€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1995).€€Ìà àIn€arriving€at€our€decision€in€this€case,€we€are€mindful€of€the€tenetsÏset€forth€in€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€òòidóó.,€as€to€the€proper€summary€judgment€analysisÍto€be€applied€in€Tennessee.€€We€quote:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à.€.€.€[T]he€party€seeking€summary€judgment€mustÏcarry€the€burden€of€persuading€the€court€that€noÏgenuine€and€material€factual€issue€exists;€that€theÏnonmoving€party€must€affirmatively€demonstrateÏwith€specific€facts€that€there€is€indeed€a€genuineÏand€material€factual€dispute;€that€the€court€mustÏview€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€partyÏand€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€his€favor;Ïthat€trial€judges€are€not€to€weigh€the€evidence;Ïthat€the€critical€facts€are€those€deemed€ððmaterialððÏunder€the€substantive€law€governing€the€case;€andÏthat€summary€judgment€is€to€be€used€only€when€theÏresolution€of€the€case€depends€upon€the€applicationÏof€a€legal€principle,€such€that€there€is€nothing€toÏsubmit€to€the€trier€of€fact€to€resolve€in€favor€ofÏone€party€or€the€other.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àRule€56€comes€in€to€play€only€when€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€theÏmoving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matterÏof€law.€€Thus,€the€issues€that€lie€at€the€heart€ofÏevaluating€a€summary€judgment€motion€are:€(1)Ïwhether€a€òòfactualóó€dispute€exists;€(2)€whether€theÏdisputed€fact€is€òòmaterialóó€to€the€outcome€of€theÏcase;€and€(3)€whether€the€disputed€fact€creates€aÏòògenuineóó€issue€for€trial.€€€(emphasis€in€original).€€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àFirst,€when€the€facts€material€to€the€application€ofÏa€rule€of€law€are€undisputed,€the€application€is€aÏmatter€of€law€for€the€court€since€there€is€nothingÏto€submit€to€the€jury€to€resolve€in€favor€of€oneÍparty€or€the€other.€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àSecond,€to€preclude€summary€judgment,€a€disputedÏfact€must€be€ððmaterial.ðð€€A€disputed€fact€isÏmaterial€if€it€must€be€decided€in€order€to€resolveÏthe€substantive€claim€or€defense€at€which€theÏmotion€is€directed.€€Therefore,€when€confrontedÏwith€a€disputed€fact,€the€court€must€examine€theÏelements€of€the€claim€or€defense€at€issue€in€theÏmotion€to€determine€whether€the€resolution€of€thatÏfact€will€effect€the€disposition€of€any€of€thoseÏclaims€or€defenses.€€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àThird,€when€the€evidence€or€proof€in€support€of€orÏin€opposition€to€a€summary€judgment€motionÏestablishes€a€disputed€fact,€and€the€fact€isÏmaterial,€as€we€have€defined€that€term,€the€courtÏmust€then€determine€whether€the€disputed€materialÏfact€creates€a€genuine€issue€within€the€meaning€ofÏRule€56.03.€€Proceeding€from€the€premise€that€RuleÏ56€is€intended€to€avoid€unnecessary€trials,€the€testÏfor€a€ððgenuine€issueðð€is€whether€a€reasonable€juryÏcould€legitimately€resolve€that€fact€in€favor€of€oneÏside€or€the€other.€€If€the€answer€is€yes,€summaryÏjudgment€is€inappropriate;€if€the€answer€is€no,Ïsummary€judgment€is€proper€because€a€trial€wouldÏbe€pointless€as€there€would€be€nothing€for€the€juryÏto€do€and€the€judge€need€only€apply€the€law€toÏresolve€the€case.€€In€making€this€determination,€theÏcourt€is€to€view€the€evidence€in€a€light€favorable€toÏthe€nonmoving€party€and€allow€all€reasonableÏinferences€in€his€favor.€€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àFourth,€the€party€seeking€summary€judgment€hasÏthe€burden€of€demonstrating€to€the€court€that€thereÏare€no€disputed,€material€facts€creating€a€genuineÏissue€for€trial,€as€we€have€defined€those€terms,€inÏthat€he€is€entitled€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€ÏA€conclusory€assertion€that€the€nonmoving€partyÏhas€no€evidence€is€clearly€insufficient.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€Plaintiff€(non„moving€party)€[sic]€is€notÏrequired€to€prove€his€entire€case€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€at€the€summaryÏjudgment€stage.€€He€need€only€raise€genuine€issuesÏof€material€fact,€making€summary€judgmentÏinappropriate.€€Nothing€more€is€required€of€theÏPlaintiff€as€the€nonmoving€party.€€ÌÌòòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€214„17.ÌÌÓÓò òÓ  ÓÌCONTENTIONS€OF€THE€PARTIESó óà àÓ  Óà àA€thorough€perusal€of€theÏpleadings€and€affidavits€filed€by€both€parties€in€the€cause€discloses€asÏfollows:Ìà àWife/Appellee,€as€the€moving€party,€relies€upon€the€final€divorceÏdecree€and€the€provisions€of€the€marital€dissolution€agreement€to€supportÏher€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€She€contends€that€the€final€decree€ofÏdivorce€of€December€20,€1991€granted€her€an€absolute€divorce€on€groundsÏof€irreconcilable€differences€and€by€incorporation€approved€the€maritalÍdissolution€agreement€signed€by€both€parties€that€provided€for€payment€ofÏtwo€types€of€alimony€to€her.€€One€type,€under€paragraph€11,€was€short„term€rehabilitative€alimony€providing€for€payments€at€$200€a€month€forÏtwo€years€or€until€death€or€remarriage€by€Wife.€€It€is€the€contention€ofÏWife/Appellee€that€this€paragraph€was€for€the€purpose€of€supplementingÏher€immediate€earning€capacity.€€The€second€type,€in€paragraph€10,€was€forÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó€of€$50,000€payable€in€accordance€with€a€paymentÏschedule€set€out€in€the€agreement€and€was€an€effort€to€assist€her€inÏcontinuing€her€standard€of€living€at€the€level€she€had€enjoyed€during€theÏmarriage.€€There€was€no€termination€clause€by€death€or€remarriage.€€WifeÏfurther€states€that€the€appellant€personally€acknowledged€under€oath€thatÏthe€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€[sic]€was€for€her€necessary€support€and€maintenance,Ïand€he€did€so€with€the€advice€and€consent€of€his€attorney.€€She€furtherÏalleges€that€the€appellant€filed€for€bankruptcy€on€March€8,€1993€and€listedÏthe€alimony€and€rehabilitative€alimony€as€a€debt€for€discharge€in€theÏamount€of€$37,259.55€plus€interest.€€Ìà àHusband/Appellant,€as€the€nonmoving€party,€countered€by€stating€inÏhis€response€€and€the€affidavits€of€his€attorney€and€himself€that€he€didÏagree€to€the€rehabilitative€alimony€as€provided€in€paragraph€11€of€theÏmarital€dissolution€agreement€and€that€was€the€only€alimony€agreed€to€byÍhim.€€He€stated€there€were€no€discussions€that€the€alimony€òòin€solidoóóÏ(property€settlement)€in€paragraph€10€was€necessary€for€plaintiffÏ(wife/appellee)€to€continue€a€certain€standard€of€living.€€HusbandððsÏaffidavit€further€stated€that€ð ðnone€of€the€payments€pursuant€to€paragraphÏ10€of€the€marital€dissolution€agreement€made€to€plaintiff€were€taxable€toÏher€nor€deductible€for€me€because€they€were€payments€for€propertyÏsettlement.ðð€€Attached€to€Husband/Appellantððs€affidavit€as€an€exhibit€areÏcopies€of€checks€paid€by€him€to€Wife/Appellee€for€years€1992€and€1993€inÏwhich€checks€for€rehabilitative€alimony€in€the€amount€of€$200€each€wereÏso€marked€and€checks€in€the€amount€of€$400€each€were€marked€ð ðpropertyÏsettlement.ðð€€Attached€as€Exhibit€B€to€the€affidavit€are€the€1991€and€1992Ïfederal€income€tax€returns€for€Husband/Appellant€and€as€Exhibit€C€are€theÏ1991€and€1992€federal€income€tax€returns€of€the€Wife/Appellee.€€NoÏdeductions€are€shown€on€Husbandððs€returns€for€the€$400€payment€and€noÏcorresponding€amounts€are€listed€as€alimony€on€the€Wife/AppelleeððsÏreturn.€€The€affidavit€of€Husband/Appellant€explains€the€other€paymentsÏreflected€by€the€respective€returns€of€each€in€which€all€were€madeÏpursuant€to€the€provisions€set€out€in€the€marital€dissolution€agreement.€ÏHusband/Appellant€contends€that€the€$50,000€amount€found€in€paragraphÏ10€was€a€property€settlement€in€disguise€as€it€was€agreed€thatÍWife/Appellee€would€receive€$50,000€in€cash€payments€in€lieu€of€anyÏproperty€or€business€interest.€€He€submits€that€his€ð ðaffidavit€and€otherÏevidenceðð€raise€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€precluding€summaryÏjudgment.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓCONCLUSIONÌÓ  Óà àó óWife/Appellee€insists€that€Husband/Appellant€is€judicially€estoppedÏfrom€repudiating€his€agreement€made€under€oath€and€contained€in€theÏmarital€dissolution€agreement€incorporated€into€the€final€divorce€decree.€ÏNo€authority€allowing€the€state€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€in€federalÏbankruptcy€court€is€cited€in€support€of€her€contention.€€We€do€not€agreeÏthat€the€state€rule€of€judicial€estoppel€should€apply€to€bar€a€hearing€on€theÏmerits€under€federal€bankruptcy€law€of€dischargeability€of€a€debt.€€Ìà àThe€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€precludes€a€party€who€has€madeÏsworn€statements€in€a€judicial€proceeding€from€subsequentlyÏcontradicting€the€sworn€statements€in€a€later€judicial€proceeding.€€òòSeeóó,Ïòòe.g.óó,€òòSartain€v.€Dixie€Coal€&€Iron€Co.óó,€150€Tenn.€633,€266€S.W.€313€(1924).Ìà à11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5)€states€that€an€individual€debtor€is€notÏdischarged€from€any€debt€to€a€spouse,€former€spouse,€or€child€of€theÏdebtor€for€alimony€to,€maintenance€for,€or€support€of€such€spouse€or€child,Íbut€not€to€the€extent€that:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à(B)€such€debt€includes€a€liability€designated€asÏalimony,€maintenance,€or€support,€òòunlessóó€suchÏliability€is€òòactuallyóó€in€the€nature€of€alimony,Ïmaintenance€or€support.€€(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌÌ11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5)(B).ÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€think€the€above€language€clearly€places€the€duty€upon€theÏbankruptcy€court€or,€as€here,€the€state€court€to€establish€the€true€natureÏof€the€debt.€€The€state€doctrines€of€òòres€judicataóó,€collateral€estoppel,€orÏjudicial€estoppel€would€all€bar€consideration€of€the€federal€bankruptcyÏlaw€from€further€inquiry€if€such€doctrines€were€given€full€faith€and€creditÏin€the€bankruptcy€court.€€òòSeeóó€òòIn€re€Helmóó,€48€B.R.€215,€218„19€(Bkrtcy.€W.D.ÏKentucky€1985).€€Ìà àThere€has€not€been€a€full€evidentiary€hearing€on€the€merits€at€theÏstate€or€federal€level€concerning€the€dischargeability€of€the€obligation€inÏthe€case€òòsub€judiceóó.€€This€is€a€vital€point€under€federal€bankruptcy€law.€ÏòòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòIn€re€Helmóó,€at€218.€€In€òòHelmóó,€former€husband€as€debtor€filedÏcomplaint€seeking€determination€of€his€contractual€ð ðmaintenanceððÏobligation.€€It€was€held€that€neither€the€doctrine€of€òòres€judicataóó€norÏcollateral€estoppel€barred€the€court€from€considering€the€issue€of€the€trueÍnature€of€debtor€husbandððs€obligation.€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àUnder€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel,€fourÏcriteria€must€be€met€before€a€determination€isÏconclusive€in€a€subsequent€proceeding:€€(1)€theÏissue€sought€to€be€precluded€must€be€the€same€asÏthat€involved€in€the€prior€litigation;€(2)€that€issueÏmust€have€been€òòactually€litigatedóó;€(3)€it€must€haveÏbeen€determined€by€a€valid€and€final€judgment;€andÏ(4)€the€determination€must€have€been€essential€toÏthe€judgment.€€€(emphasis€added)€(citingÏauthorities).ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€doctrine€of€òòres€judicataóó€bars€a€later€suit€whenÏ(1)€the€first€suit€resulted€in€a€final€judgment€òòonÏthe€meritsóó;€(2)€the€first€suit€was€based€on€properÏjurisdiction;€(3)€both€suits€involved€the€same€causeÏof€action;€and€(4)€both€suits€involved€the€sameÏparties€or€their€privies.€€(emphasis€added)€(citingÏauthorities).€€ÌÌòòHelmóó,€òòidóó.,€at€219.ÌÌÓÓà àFor€the€same€reasons€stated€in€òòHelmóó,€òòidóó.,€applying€federal€bankruptcyÏlaw€and€not€state€law,€we€hold€that€the€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppelÏwould€not€be€applicable€because€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó€has€never€beenÏdecided€upon€its€merits€and€as€such€to€apply€the€state€law€would€act€toÏbar€the€federal€right€to€inquire€into€the€true€nature€of€the€debt€in€question.€ÏSuch€an€inquiry€was€not€an€issue€and€would€have€been€meaningless€orÏsuperfluous€in€the€earlier€state€action€for€divorce€in€this€case.€€We,Ítherefore,€hold€that€the€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€is€not€applicable€toÏthe€consideration€of€this€issue.Ìà àWife/Appellee€relies€heavily€upon€the€cases€of€òòFitzgerald€v.ÏFitzgeraldóó,€9€F.3d€517€(6th€Cir.€1993)€and€òòIn€re€Pinkstaffóó,€163€B.R.€504Ï(Bkrtcy.€N.D.€Ohio€1994).€€We€do€not€find€either€case€to€be€dispositive€ofÏthe€issue€in€this€case.€€òòFitzgeraldóó€basically€limited€òòCalhounóó€and€theÏð ðpresent€needsðð€test€to€those€situations€involving€the€assumption€ofÏformer€spousesðð€debts€where€there€was€no€designation€of€the€nature€of€theÏdebt€as€alimony,€maintenance,€or€support€and€further€ruled€out€the€ð ðneedsððÏtest€where€obligations€were€specifically€designated€as€alimony€òòand€wasÏintended€by€the€parties€as€suchóó€(emphasis€added).€€Quoting€òòFitzgeraldóó,€òòidóó,Ïat€521:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àUnlike€òòCalhounóó,€where€it€was€necessary€toÏdetermine€whether€something€not€denominated€asÏsupport€in€the€divorce€decree€was€really€support,Ïhere€the€only€question€is€whether€somethingÏdenominated€as€alimony€is€really€alimony€and€not,Ïfor€example,€a€property€settlement€in€disguise.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àòòFitzgeraldóó,€òòidóó.,€did€not€involve€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€whichÏraises€under€Rule€56,€federal€or€state,€an€entirely€different€issue,€òòi.e.óó,€hasÏthe€non„moving€party€under€Rule€56.03,€T.R.C.P.,€raised€a€genuine€issue€of€aÍdisputed€material€fact€that€cannot€be€resolved€as€a€matter€of€law.€€òòIf€soóó,Ïthen€the€issue€must€be€decided€by€trial.€€òòIf€notóó,€then€no€further€inquiry€isÏrequired€and€the€moving€party€is€awarded€the€judgment.€€Unlike€òòFitzgeraldóó,Ïthis€Court€is€merely€deciding€the€question€of€whether€the€granting€of€aÏsummary€judgment€by€the€trial€court€was€proper.€€We€are€not€deciding€theÏissue€of€dischargeability€after€a€full€hearing€on€the€merits.€€Ìà àòòA€fortiorari,óó€in€òòFitzgeraldóó,€the€legal€issue€is€not€the€same€as€here.€ÏThe€obligation€in€òòFitzgeraldóó€was€designated€as€alimony€and€it€wasÏundisputed€that€the€parties€intended€it€to€be€alimony.€€Husband€relied€uponÏthe€ð ðpresent€needsðð€test€of€òòCalhounóó,€òòidóó.,€and€the€fact€that€Wife€was€self„supporting€at€time€of€divorce€to€defeat€her€objection€to€dischargeability.€ÏòòFitzgeraldóó€changed€the€federal€law€in€regard€to€the€ð ðpresent€needsðð€testÏby€restricting€its€applicability€as€heretofore€pointed€out.€€In€so€doing,ÏHusbandððs€contention€in€òòFitzgeraldóó€failed€and€the€debt€was€notÏdischargeable.€€We€find€òòFitzgeraldóó€to€be€of€no€help€in€deciding€this€case.Ìà àIn€the€case€of€òòIn€re€Pinkstaffóó,€163€B.R.€504€(Bkrtcy.€N.D.€Ohio€1994),Ïthe€matter€was€before€the€federal€bankruptcy€court€upon€KathleenÏPinkstaffððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€her€complaint€as€a€creditorÏto€except€two€of€the€listed€debts€of€Lawrence€Pinkstaff€from€dischargeÏunder€11€U.S.C.€Ô€"ÔððÔ€Ô€523(a)(5).€€The€debtor€(former€husband)€had€filed€aÍpetition€in€bankruptcy€in€December,€1991.€€The€parties€were€previouslyÏdivorced€on€May€24,€1991.€€On€April€28,€1992,€Kathleen€filed€an€exceptionÏto€discharge€two€of€the€obligations€ordered€in€the€divorce€decree€of€theÏOhio€State€Court€of€Common€Pleas.€€As€in€this€case,€òòPinkstaffóó€was€aÏsummary€judgment€case€but€in€federal€bankruptcy€court;€however,€theÏsimilarity€of€facts€and€the€law€to€be€applied€stops€there.€€In€òòPinkstaffóó,€theÏbankruptcy€court,€citing€òòFitzgeraldóó,€òòidóó.,€found€that€an€independentÏdetermination€by€the€divorce€court€after€a€contested€hearing€clearlyÏdenominated€that€the€attorney€fees€of€the€Wife€were€alimony€and€theÏwater€bill€in€dispute€was€for€support.€€òòPinkstaffóó€ceased€further€inquiryÏupon€the€divorce€courtððs€declaration€and€held€the€two€debts€to€beÏnondischargeable.€€The€Husband€contested€the€state€divorce€action,€but€didÏnot€contest€the€summary€judgment.€€He€maintained€that€the€two€debtsÏwere€not€alimony€or€support€obligations.€€Ìà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€chancellor,€at€the€time€of€the€uncontestedÏdivorce€action,€simply€recited€in€the€divorce€decree€the€provisionsÏbetween€the€parties€as€set€out€in€the€marital€dissolution€agreement.€ÏThere€was€no€independent€finding€upon€the€merits€by€the€chancellorÏdetermining€the€true€nature€and€character€of€the€$50,000€obligationÏcontained€in€paragraph€10€of€the€agreement.€€Additionally,ÍHusband/Appellant€in€case€at€bar€is€contesting€the€applicability€of€theÏsummary€judgment€rule€by€disputing€a€material€fact€set€out€in€the€maritalÏdissolution€agreement.€€As€heretofore€noted,€this€raises€a€separate€andÏentirely€different€issue€for€consideration€by€this€Court.€€Here,€the€divorceÏaction€in€the€trial€court€was€not€contested€on€the€merits€as€wasÏòòPinkstaffóó,€hence€there€were€no€independent€findings€by€the€divorce€court.€€Ìà àWe€think€the€issue€in€this€case€is€decided€by€the€case€of€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,Ï847€S.W.2d€at€211,€where€the€Supreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€isÏno€genuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmovingÏparty€must€then€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€orÏdiscovery€materials,€that€there€is€a€genuine,Ïmaterial€fact€dispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€€(citingÏauthorities).€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05€providesÏthat€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€simply€rely€uponÏhis€pleadings,€but€must€set€forth€òòspecific€factsóóÏshowing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact€for€trial.€€(emphasis€in€original).€€ððIf€he€doesÏnot€so€respond,€summary€judgment€.€.€.€shall€beÏentered€against€him.ðð€€Rule€56.05.€€If€the€motion€isÏdenied,€the€moving€party€ððhas€simply€lost€aÏpreliminary€skirmish€and€must€proceed€to€trial.ðð€ÏòòWilliamsonóó,€549€S.W.2d€at€372.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àTaking€the€Husband/Appellantððs€allegations€set€forth€in€theÏpleadings,€affidavits,€and€exhibits€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€him€as€theÍnon„moving€party€and€allowing€all€reasonable€inferences€in€his€favor€inÏthe€strongest€legitimate€sense,€we€find€initially€that€the€Wife/AppelleeÏas€the€moving€party€has€not€carried€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€thereÏare€no€disputed€material€facts€creating€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.€€òòSeeóó€òòByrdÏv.€Hallóó,€òòidóó.€at€215.€€Ìà àOn€the€other€hand,€we€find€that€the€non„moving€party,ÏHusband/Appellant,€has€met€his€obligation€under€Rule€56.05,€T.R.C.P.,€byÏshowing€that€there€is,€indeed,€material€disputed€facts€creating€a€genuineÏissue€that€must€be€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€We,€therefore,€find€that€aÏfactual€dispute€exists,€the€disputed€fact€is€material€to€the€outcome€of€theÏcase,€and€the€disputed€fact€creates€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.€€The€issue€forÏdetermination€is,€to„wit:€ð ðDid€the€parties€to€the€marital€dissolutionÏagreement€actually€intend€that€the€$50,000€amount€set€out€in€paragraphÏ10€of€such€agreement€be€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€or€a€property€settlement?ððÌà àIn€making€this€determination,€we€are€mindful€that€the€issue€ofÏcredibility€of€witnesses€and€the€exhibits€will€obviously€be€a€major€factorÏto€the€decision€in€the€trial€court.€€Only€the€trier€of€fact€possesses€theÏpower€to€make€that€determination.€€We€do€not.€€The€action€of€the€trialÏcourt€in€granting€summary€judgment€is€reversed€and€the€cause€remandedÏfor€trial€on€the€merits.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€the€Wife/Appellee.ÌÓÓÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€WILLIAMS,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________________ÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________________ÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.à àà àà àà à