ÿWPCn …UNV %¤ 0(ª4Òæ 0lõ 0DaUF¥ëw@ë 0J+ 0Tu 0^É 0h' 0r 0| 0†} 0 1u“ U, 0d4 U,˜ U>Ä U6B)8DCa AM¤U*ñ&<A B} D3škÍv~8 0@¶vÓö AOÉÆ 0DÞ D/" BQ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡Gav 3|x((3úÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóD.Courier New Regular íîDïPðñDòDóUôÓ€þ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌNovember€17,€1995ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó 2Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€During€oral€argument,€appellants€stated€that€"the€negligence€was€in€the€manner€in€whichÏthat€drop€wire€was€left€dangling€along€the€pole."Ì d))))'ÿÿdxd aÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€In€an€affidavit,€a€Bell€South€employee€testified€in€that€he€went€to€the€accident€scene€andÏmeasured€the€distance€between€the€road€and€the€pole.€€It€was€seventeen€feet€and€three€inches.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€  X„d&ÓÑ#€  Xd#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€"ÔÑ7€ uC XXdÖdÈ7ÑRICHARD€C.€KING,€and€Wife,à àà à)ÌKIMBERLY€KING,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà à)à à01A01„9505„CV„00210Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌW.D.€SCHOCK,€INC.,€SOUTH€CENTRALà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌBELL€TELEPHONE€COMPANY€a/k/a€à àà à)à àNo.€€93C„1649ÌÙ€€ÙßL€%'$;+'h|:þ¾` ç `€€LßBELLSOUTH€TELECOMMUNICATIONS,€à à)ÌINC.,€and€CHARLES€LARUE,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌNASHVILLE€ELECTRIC€SERVICE,€VIACOMà à)ÌCABLEVISION€a/k/a€VIACOM€à àà à)ÌINTERNATIONAL,€INC.,€RICHARD€LARUE,)ÌCARLOS€LEWIS€d/b/a€CARLOS€LEWIS€&€à à)ÌSON€HOME€MOVERS,€METROPOLITAN€à à)ÌNASHVILLE€AIRPORT€AUTHORITY€andà à)ÌTHE€METROPOLITAN€GOVERNMENT€OF€à à)ÌNASHVILLE€AND€DAVIDSON€COUNTY,à à)ÌACTING€BY€AN€THROUGH€THE€ELECTRIC€à à)ÌPOWER€BOARD€AND€OPERATING€UNDER€à à)ÌTHE€NAME€"NASHVILLE€ELECTRIC€à àà à)ÌSERVICE,"€€€à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants.à àà àà àà à)ÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€FIFTH€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€WALTER€C.€KURTZ,€JUDGEÌÌÌDAVID€I.€KOMISARà àà àà àSANDRA€L.€RANDLEMANÌ211€Printer's€Alley€Bldg.à à333€Commerce€Street,€#2101ÌSuite€400à àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37201„3300ÌNashville,€TN€€37201à àà àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àBELLSOUTH€TELECOMMUNICATIONS,€INC.ÌCASEY€E.€MORELANDà àà àà àÌMetropolitan€Courthouseà àà àROBERT€L.€ESTESÌ3rd€Floorà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€E.€ANDERSONÌNashville,€TN€€37201à àà àStewart,€Estes€&€DonnellÌà àATTORNEYS€FORà àà àà àThird€National€Financial€CenterÌ€à àPLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSà à424€Church€Street,€14th€FloorÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37219„2392Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àW.D.€SCHOCK€COMPANY,€INC.ÌC.€BENTON€PATTONÌManier,€Herod,€Hollabaugh€&€SmithÌ2200€One€Nashville€PlaceÌ150€Fourth€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€TN€37219ÌÌCHRISTINA€K.€BOYERÌ4016€Farnam€St.€ÌOmaha,€NE€68127Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌà àCHARLES€LARUEÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÇÓÓà@ àÔ€"„ÔòòOPINIONóóÌÔ€"XÔà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€plaintiffs/appellants,€Richard€andÏKimberly€King,€from€the€trial€court's€order€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€defendants/appellees,€W.€D.€Schock,€Co.€("Schock"),ÏSouth€Central€Bell€Telephone€Co.€a/k/a€Bell€SouthÏTelecommunications,€Inc.€("Bell€South"),€and€Charles€LaRue.ÌÌà àThe€underlying€facts€of€this€case€developed€around€1989.€€InÏor€near€that€year,€Metropolitan€Nashville€Airport€AuthorityÏ("MNAA")€purchased€some€land€along€Allen€Road€as€part€of€a€noiseÏabatement€program.€€It€then€began€to€sell€the€houses€on€the€land.€ÏLater,€the€new€owners€moved€the€houses€to€a€different€location.€ÏPursuant€to€a€contract€with€MNAA,€Schock€maintained€the€land€andÏmanaged€the€land€sales.€€Brian€Dillingham€purchased€the€houseÏlocated€at€842€Allen€Road.€€Mr.€Dillingham€hired€Charles€LaRue€toÏmove€the€house.€€Mr.€LaRue€and€his€employees€moved€the€houseÏaround€12€August€1992.€€Bell€South€provided€telephone€services€toÏthis€area.ÌÌà àOn€the€night€of€6€September€1992,€Mr.€King€was€riding€hisÏmotorcycle.€€At€some€point€in€time,€he€stopped€at€the€MajikÏMarket.€€Marty€Barnes,€a€Majik€Market€employee,€asked€Mr.€King€toÏchase€down€a€car€because€the€driver€had€not€paid€for€his€or€herÏgas.€€Mr.€King€proceeded€east€on€Allen€Road.€€As€he€entered€theÏcurve€near€837€Allen€Road,€he€claims€to€have€seen€a€jumble€ofÍcables€in€the€middle€of€the€right€hand€lane.€€Mr.€King€lostÏcontrol€of€his€motorcycle€and€crashed.ÌÌà àAfter€sending€out€Mr.€King,€Marty€Barnes€asked€WilliamÏPennington,€Jr.€and€his€wife,€who€were€also€on€motorcycles,€€ifÏthey€would€go€look€for€a€man€travelling€down€Allen€Road.€€TheÏcouple€agreed€to€help€Mr.€Barnes.€€When€they€arrived€at€the€scene,Ïthe€accident€had€already€occurred,€but€neither€the€police€nor€anÏambulance€had€arrived.€€Mr.€Pennington€testified€that€as€heÏapproached€the€scene€he€ran€over€a€cable€in€the€lying€in€the€road.€ÏHe€also€stated€that€his€wife€pulled€the€cable€out€of€the€roadway.€ÏFinally,€Mr.€Pennington€testified€that€he€noticed€the€cable€wasÏhanging€from€a€pole.€€ÌÌà àLater,€Marty€Barnes€arrived€at€the€scene.€€In€his€deposition,Ïhe€testified€that€he€ran€over€a€"tangle"€of€cable€or€wire€as€heÏentered€the€curve.€€He€also€testified€that€the€cable€was€lying€onÏthe€right€side€of€the€right„hand€lane€and€that€he€noticed€a€wireÏhanging€from€a€pole.€€Finally,€Mr€Barnes€testified€that€he€did€notÏtell€any€of€the€investigating€officers€at€the€scene€about€theÏcable.ÌÌà àAppellants'€theory€is€that€someone€or€something€disconnectedÏthe€drop€wire€which€serviced€842€Allen€Road,€and€this€left€theÏwire€hanging€from€the€utility€pole€numbered€09832003.€Somehow,Ïappellants€contend,€the€wire€got€into€the€roadway.€€The€night€ofÍthe€accident,€Mr.€King€ran€over€the€wire€which€became€entangled€inÏthe€bike€causing€Mr.€King€to€loose€control€and€crash.€ÏInterestingly,€Mr.€King€testified€that€he€did€not€know€if€the€bikeÏmade€any€contact€with€the€wires.ÌÌà àAppellees,€however,€argue€that€Mr.€King's€recklessness€wasÏthe€proximate€cause€of€the€accident.€€In€support€of€this€theory,Ïthey€point€to€Officer€Taylor's€deposition.€€In€his€deposition,ÏOfficer€Taylor€concluded€that€the€cause€of€the€accident€was€Mr.ÏKing's€inability€to€negotiate€the€curve.€€Further,€as€to€theÏlocation€of€the€wire,€Officer€Taylor€testified€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àQ.à àOkay.€Did€you€see€any€evidence€out€there€at€theÏscene,€I'm€talking€about€physical€evidence€now,€of€whereÏthe€motorcycle€left€the€highway€or€the€roadway€and€theÏpath€it€took€to€wherever€it€stopped?ÌÌà8 àA.à àYes,€sir.€€There€is€a€„„€there€was€a€distinct€skidÏmark€through€the€grass€across€a€paved€driveway.€ÏActually,€it€was€more€metal€marks€that€it€was€tireÏmarks.ÌÌà à.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àQ.à àAll€right.€€Now,€did€you€see€some€cable?ÌÌà8 àA.à àThere€is€a€pole€marked€there.€€I've€got€it€markedÏby€number,€09832003.€€That€was€probably€about€15€„„€I'dÏsay€10€to€15€feet€off€the€roadway.€€ÌÌà8 àQ.à àOkay.ÌÌà8 àA.à àThere€was€a€cable€€coming€from€that€pole,€and€ifÏI'm€not€mistaken,€it€was€running€east€to€the€pole,Ïlaying€on€the€ground.ÌÌà8 àQ.à àOkay.€€Was€that€cable€in€any€way€in€the€path€of€theÏmotorcycle,€whose€path€you€saw,€indicated€by€the€gougeÏmarks€you€talked€about€earlier?ÌÌà8 àA.à àWhen€I€got€to€the€scene,€the€cable€was€away€fromÏthe€accident€scene.ÌÌà8 à.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àQ.à àCould€you€estimate€how€many€feet€it€was€away€fromÏthe€path€of€the€motorcycle?ÌÌà à.€.€.€.€ÌÌà8 àA.à àFrom€the€path€of€the€motorcycle,€where€I've€showedÏit€laid€down,€I€would€say€the€cable€was€three€or€fourÏfeet€from€that€laid€down€mark.ÌÌÌÓÓà àAs€a€result€of€the€accident,€Mr.€King€suffered€seriousÏinjuries€and€was€permanently€disabled.€€He€filed€a€complaint€inÏthe€Fifth€Circuit€Court€of€Davidson€County€on€3€September€1993.€ÏInitially€the€only€named€defendant€was€Schock.€€Later,€Mr.€andÏMrs.€King€filed€an€amended€complaint€naming€numerous€parties€asÏdefendants€including€Bell€South€and€Mr.€LaRue.€€Appellants'Ïamended€complaint€alleged€that€defendants€were€negligent€withÏrespect€to€the€dangling€cable.€€At€various€points€in€time,€each€ofÏthe€defendants€filed€motions€for€summary€judgment.€€Although€theÏcourt€disposed€of€the€motions€individually,€on€27€February€1995,Ïthe€trial€judge€entered€a€final€order€dismissing€all€claimsÏagainst€each€of€the€defendants.€€Subsequently,€appellants€filedÏthis€appeal€against€Schock,€Bell€South,€and€Charles€LaRue.ÌÌà àAppellants€only€issue€on€appeal€is€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€granting€appellees'€motions€for€summary€judgment.€€We€areÏof€the€opinion€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€and€that€itÏproperly€entered€judgment€in€favor€of€appellees.€€We€discuss€ourÍdecision€as€to€each€appellee€below.€€€ÌÌò òI.à àBell€South€and€W.€D.€Schock€Companyó óÌÌà àBell€South€and€Schock€each€filed€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment.€Bell€South€argued€that€it€did€not€have€notice€of€theÏdowned€drop€wire€and€that€neither€its€acts€nor€its€omissionsÏproximately€caused€appellants'€injuries.€€Schock€claimed€thatÏsummary€judgment€was€appropriate€because€it€did€not€owe€a€duty€toÏappellants€and,€like€Bell€South,€that€it€did€not€commit€an€act€orÏomission€which€proximately€caused€the€accident.€€In€two€separateÏorders,€the€trial€court€granted€the€motions€of€each€party.ÌÌà àò òA.à àDutyÌó óÌà à"No€claim€for€negligence€can€succeed€in€the€absence€of€anyÏone€of€the€following€elements:€€(1)€a€duty€of€care€owed€by€theÏdefendant€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)€conduct€falling€below€theÏapplicable€standard€of€care€amounting€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;Ï(3)€an€injury€or€loss;€(4)€causation€in€fact;€and€(5)€proximate,Ïor€legal€cause."€€òòò ò€Bradshaw€v.€Danielóóó ó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€The€issue€of€whether€a€person€owes€another€a€dutyÏof€care€is€a€question€of€law€for€the€court€to€decide.€€òòò òId.óó€Ïó óFurther,€the€purpose€of€a€summary€judgment€proceeding€"is€toÏresolve€controlling€issues€of€law,€and€that€alone."€€òòò òBellamy€v.ÏFederal€Express€Co.óóó ó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33€(Tenn.€1988).€€BecauseÍthe€existence€of€a€duty€of€care€is€a€legal€issue€and€is€anÏessential€element€of€negligence,€a€court€may€grant€summaryÏjudgment€if€it€finds€that€the€defendant€did€not€owe€a€duty€of€careÏto€the€plaintiff.€€òòò òDoe€v.€Linder€Constr.€Co.óóó ó,€845€S.W.2d€173,Ï183€(Tenn.€1992);€òòò òsee€Lindsey€v.€Miami€Dev.€Corp.óóó ó,€689€S.W.2dÏ856,€859€(Tenn.€1985)€(quoting€W.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,€òòProsser€andÏKeeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€ðð€37,€at€236€(5th€ed.€1984));€ò òòòNicholsÏv.€Atnipóóó ó,€844€S.W.2d€655,€658€(Tenn.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€determination€of€whether€a€person€owes€a€duty€to€anotherÏbegins€with€the€realization€that€"all€persons€have€a€duty€to€useÏreasonable€care€to€refrain€from€conduct€that€will€foreseeabilityÏcause€injury€to€others."€€òòò òBradshawóóó ó,€854€S.W.2d€at€870.€€ItÏfollows,€therefore,€that€a€duty€of€care€does€not€arise€unless€theÏinjury€is€reasonably€foreseeable€based€on€all€of€the€circumstancesÏat€the€time€the€negligent€conduct€occurred.€€òòò òDoeóóó ó,€845€S.W.2d€atÏ178.€€An€injury€is€reasonably€foreseeable€when€"a€reasonableÏperson€could€foresee€the€probability€of€its€occurrence€or€if€theÏperson€was€on€notice€that€the€likelihood€of€danger€to€the€party€toÏwhom€is€owed€a€duty€is€probable."€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€Finally,€"the€degree€ofÏforeseeability€needed€to€establish€a€duty€of€care€decreases€inÏproportion€to€the€magnitude€of€the€foreseeable€harm."€€€òòò òPittmanÏv.€Upjohn€Co.óóó ó,€890€S.W.2d€425,€433€€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€appellants€argued€that€Schock€had€a€duty€toÏcoordinate€the€removal€of€the€drop€wire€from€the€utility€pole€andÍto€ensure€that€it€was€properly€secured.€€We€can€not€agree€withÏappellants€because€Mr.€King's€injuries€were€not€a€reasonablyÏforeseeable€consequence€of€Schock's€failure€to€fulfill€its€duty€asÏdefined€by€appellants.€€Likewise,€we€cannot€agree€with€appellants'Ïcontention€that€Bell€South€had€a€duty€to€inspect€the€Allen€RoadÏarea€for€improperly€cut€drop€wires€hanging€from€utility€poles.ÌÌà àTo€begin€with,€it€is€necessary€to€determine€when€theÏpurported€negligent€act€occurred.× ƒ( ××  ×€€On€or€about€23€July€1992,€Mr.ÏDillingham€purchased€the€home€at€842€Allen€Road€from€MNAA.€€InÏAugust€of€1992,€Mr.€Dillingham€entered€into€a€house€movingÏagreement€with€Mr.€LaRue.€€Mr.€Dillingham€testified€that€he€didÏnot€request€anyone€to€remove€any€wires€from€the€house.€€InÏaddition,€there€was€testimony€that€neither€Richard€LaRue,€ErnestÏLaRue,€Charles€LaRue,€nor€any€of€the€other€house€moversÏdisconnected€any€wires€from€the€house€at€842€Allen€Road.€€Further,ÏErnest€LaRue€testified€that€there€was€not€a€Bell€South€wireÏconnected€to€the€house€when€the€house€movers€began€to€remove€theÏhouse.€€Ms.€McClain,€who€lived€on€Allen€Road,€€testified€that€sheÏhad€seen€the€wire€hanging€from€the€pole€approximately€one€weekÏprior€to€the€accident.€€She€further€stated€that€the€wire€wasÏrolled€up€like€a€water€hose€and€placed€beside€the€pole.€€Given€theÏabove,€it€is€difficult€to€determine€when€the€wire€was€cut€and€whenÏthe€negligent€act,€leaving€the€wire€dangling€from€the€pole,Íoccurred.€€Assuming€that€the€wire€was€connected€to€the€house€whenÏMNAA€sold€it€to€Mr.€Dillingham,€the€best€point€in€time€from€whichÏto€make€the€determination€would€be€from€the€date€of€the€sale€andÏthereafter.ÌÌà àIt€is€impossible€to€say€that€the€injury€was€a€reasonablyÏforeseeable€probability€on€that€day€or€any€day€thereafter€becauseÏa€reasonable€person€could€not€foresee€the€probability€of€itsÏoccurrence.€€òòò òDoeóóó ó,€845€S.W.2d€at€178.€€In€order€for€this€accidentÏto€have€occurred€as€appellants€suggested,€an€unauthorizedÏindividual€had€to€cut€the€wire€or€something€had€to€happen€to€pullÏthe€wire€down.€€Next,€someone€would€have€had€to€roll€the€wire€upÏand€place€it€next€to€the€pole€at€least€one€week€before€theÏaccident.€€Later,€that€same€person€or€another€unidentifiedÏindividual€would€have€had€to€move€the€wire€seventeen€feet× ƒ+ ××  ×€andÏplace€it€in€the€road.€€Then€a€person,€traveling€on€a€motorcycle€atÏa€high€rate€of€speed€in€pursuit€of€a€gas€thief,€would€have€had€toÏcome€down€the€road€at€night€and€run€over€the€wire.€€Finally,€itÏwould€have€to€be€reasonably€foreseeable€that€the€wire€wouldÏsomehow€get€caught€in€the€motorcycle€causing€the€driver€to€loseÏcontrol€and€crash.€€€Even€in€a€situation€such€as€this€where€theÏprobability€of€injury€was€significant,€the€possibility€of€theseÏevents€occurring€is€simply€too€remote€to€impose€a€duty€upon€eitherÏBell€South€or€Schock.ÌÌà àA€second€reason€that€the€injury€was€not€reasonablyÏforeseeable€is€that€neither€Bell€South€nor€Schock€"reasonably€knewÏor€should€have€known€of€the€probability€of€an€occurrence€such€asÏthe€one€which€caused€the€[appellants']€injuries."€€òòò òDoeóóó ó,€845€S.W.2dÏat€178.€€There€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€demonstrating€thatÏSchock€knew€that€there€was€a€probability€of€an€improperly€cut€dropÏwire€getting€into€the€road.€€In€fact,€appellants€did€not€evenÏargue€that€Schock€had€the€necessary€notice.ÌÌà àAs€to€Bell€South,€however,€appellants€argued€that€becauseÏBell€South€knew€or€should€have€known€about€the€relocation€projectÏthe€probability€of€someone€improperly€cutting€a€drop€wire€wasÏforeseeable.€€We€can€not€agree.€€The€fact€that€the€house€was€in€aÏrelocation€project€does€not€increase€the€probability€that€someoneÏwould€improperly€cut€the€drop€wire.€€While€it€is€true€that€itÏincreases€the€need€for€cutting€the€wires,€it€does€not€increase€theÏlikelihood€of€them€being€negligently€cut€and€left€dangling.€€Thus,Ïthe€issue€of€whether€Bell€South€had€notice€of€the€relocationÏproject€is€irrelevant€because€knowledge€of€the€project€would€notÏhave€lead€to€notice€that€the€likelihood€of€the€danger€toÏappellants€was€probable.Ì€€Ìà àIn€further€support€of€this€position,€there€was€no€evidenceÏthat€Bell€South€had€notice€that€the€drop€wire€was€improperly€cut.€ÏBell€South€did€receive€requests€to€terminate€telephone€services€atÍ835,€836,€837,€840,€and€842€Allen€Road,€but€the€requests€did€notÏinclude€the€removal€of€the€drop€wires€from€the€houses.€€InÏaddition,€there€is€no€evidence€that€Bell€South€received€all€ofÏthese€requests€at€the€same€location.€€Bell€South€has€523€serviceÏrepresentatives€in€five€different€Tennessee€cities.€€TheseÏrepresentatives€service€customers€in€Tennessee,€Alabama,€NorthÏCarolina,€Georgia,€Kentucky,€and€Mississippi.€€Finally,€no€oneÏcalled€to€report€that€a€drop€wire€was€dangling€from€a€pole€or€thatÏsomeone€was€tampering€with€the€wires.ÌÌà àBecause€appellants'€injuries€were€not€reasonably€foreseeable,Ïneither€Schock's€nor€Bell€South's€duty€of€care€arose.€€òòò òDoeóóó ó,€845ÏS.W.2d€at€178.€€Summary€judgment€is€appropriate€when€an€essentialÏelement€of€negligence€is€missing.€€In€this€case€that€element€isÏthe€existence€of€a€duty€of€care.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court€didÏnot€err€in€granting€summary€judgement€as€to€appellees€Schock€andÏBell€South.ÌÌà àò òB.à àProximate€Causeó óÌÌà àIn€order€for€a€plaintiff€to€prevail€in€a€case€based€onÏnegligence,€the€plaintiff€must€prove€that€the€defendant's€act€orÏfailure€to€act€breached€a€duty€of€care€owed€to€plaintiff€andÏproximately€caused€plaintiff's€injuries.€€€òòò òBradshawóóó ó,€854€S.W.2dÏat€869.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€explained€the€concept€ofÏproximate€cause€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 à"An€injury€that€is€the€natural€and€probable€consequenceÏof€an€act€of€negligence€is€actionable.€€But€an€injuryÏwhich€could€not€have€been€foreseen€nor€reasonablyÏanticipated€as€the€probable€result€of€an€act€or€omissionÏis€not€òòactionableóó;€and€such€act€or€omission€is€eitherÏthe€remote€cause€or€no€cause€whatever€of€the€injury."ÌÌÓÓòòò òMoody€v.€Gulf€Refining€Co.óóó ó,€142€Tenn€280,€290,€218€S.W.€817,Ï819€(1919)€(quoting€òòò òKreigh€v.€Westinghouse,€C.€K.€&€Co.óóó ó,€152ÏFed.120,€122€(1907)).€€It€is€not€necessary€to€establish€that€everyÏaspect€of€the€injury€was€foreseeable.€€Instead,€the€plaintiff€onlyÏneed€show€that€the€accident€in€general€was€foreseeable.€Ïòòò òMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóóó ó,€806€S.W.2d€767,€775€(Tenn.€1991).€€InÏaddition,€the€negligent€conduct€"must€have€been€a€'substantialÏfactor'€in€bringing€about€the€harm.€.€.€."€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€A€party€may€breakÏthe€chain€of€proximate€cause€by€establishing€the€existence€of€anÏunforeseeable,€intervening€cause€of€the€accident.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€The€issueÏof€proximate€cause€is€one€for€the€jury.€€Nevertheless,€a€court€mayÏrule€on€the€issue€when€the€facts€and€the€inferences€drawn€fromÏthem€are€such€that€"all€reasonable€persons€must€agree€on€theÏproper€outcome."€€òòò òId.óóó óÌÌà àThe€issues€of€whether€the€accident€was€foreseeable€andÏwhether€the€omissions€were€substantial€factors€are€irrelevantÏbecause€there€were€at€least€two€intervening€acts€which€relievedÏSchock€and€Bell€South€of€liability.€€One€of€these€acts€was€Mr.ÏKing€driving€his€motorcycle€at€a€high€rate€of€speed€at€night€whileÏpursuing€an€alleged€gas€thief.€€The€other€was€perpetrated€when€anÏunidentified€individual€moved€the€wire€into€the€road.€€ViewingÍthis€factual€situation€at€the€point€in€time€when€the€wire€was€cut,Ïcoiled€up,€and€placed€next€to€the€pole,€it€is€apparent€that€theÏlikelihood€that€someone€would€move€it€onto€the€road€seventeen€feetÏaway€is€unforeseeable.€€It€is€also€unforeseeable€that€a€person,Ïother€than€a€police€officer,€would€come€down€the€road€on€aÏmotorcycle€in€hot€pursuit€of€another€vehicle.€€€€€€€ÌÌà àEven€if€one€concludes€that€the€intervening€acts€wereÏforeseeable,€Schock's€and€Bell€South's€omissions€were€not€theÏproximate€cause€of€appellants'€injuries€for€a€second€reason.€€InÏorder€for€appellants€to€establish€that€Schock's€and€Bell€South'sÏomissions€were€the€proximate€causes€of€the€accident,€they€mustÏprove€that€the€motorcycle€came€into€contact€with€the€wire.€€TheÏevidence€in€the€record,€however,€failed€to€establish€this€fact.€ÏIn€his€deposition,€Mr.€King€testified€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àQ.à àDo€you€know€for€sure€that€your€tires,€or€any€partÏof€the€motorcycle,€came€in€contact€with€the€cables?ÌÌà àA.à àAm€I€sure?ÌÌà0 àQ.à àYes.ÌÌà àA.à àNo,€I€couldn't€say€yes,€that€they€did.ÌÌÓÓÌAppellants€only€other€evidence€is€the€affidavit€of€Mr.€PenningtonÏand€the€deposition€of€Martin€Barnes.€€Mr.€Pennington€testifiedÏthat€he€and€his€wife€arrived€at€the€accident€scene€before€theÏpolice€or€the€ambulance.€€He€claims€that€he€ran€over€a€cable€as€heÏdrove€down€Allen€Road€on€his€motorcycle.€€Finally,€he€stated€thatÍhis€wife€pulled€the€cable€out€of€the€road€so€that€no€one€elseÏwould€hit€it.€€Mr.€Barnes,€who€was€at€the€accident€scene€at€theÏsame€time€as€the€police,€also€testified€that€he€ran€over€some€wireÏlaying€in€the€main€travel€lane.€€This€evidence€is€contradictoryÏand€fails€to€establish€that€Mr.€King's€motorcycle€touched€theÏwire.ÌÌà àThe€issue€of€whether€the€motorcycle€hit€the€wire€is€materialÏbecause€it€is€essential€to€the€determination€of€proximate€cause.€Ïòòò òByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€215€(Tenn.€1993).€€Appellants,Ïhowever,€have€failed€to€provide€the€court€with€evidence€toÏcontradict€the€testimony€of€Mr.€King€that€he€did€not€hit€the€wire.€Ïòòò òId.óóó ó;€òòò òArmes€v.€Hulettóóó ó,€843€S.W.2d€427,€429€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€ÏThus,€there€is€no€genuine€issue€for€trial.€€Because€appellants€canÏnot€prove€contact€with€the€wire,€they€can€not€establish€proximateÏcause.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court€did€not€err€when€it€grantedÏappellees'€motions€for€summary€judgment.ÌÌò òII.à àCharles€LaRueÌÌó óà àAppellants€claim€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€grantedÏLaRue's€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€ÏAs€previously€stated,€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€when€it€isÏshown€that€one€of€the€essential€elements€of€negligence€is€missing.€Ïòòò òDoeóóó ó,€845€S.W.2d€at€183;€òòò òsee€Lindseyóóó ó,€689€S.W.2d€at€859€(quotingÏProsser€,€Sec.€37€at€236);€ò òòòNicholsóóó ó,€844€S.W.2d€at€658.€€A€movingÍparty€will€prevail€if€it€provides€the€court€with€uncontradictedÏevidence€of€the€nonmoving€parties'€inability€to€establish€anÏelement€of€negligence.€€òòò òArmesóóó ó,€843€S.W.2d€at€429.€€In€other€words,Ïthe€moving€party's€evidence€must€be€such€that€a€reasonable€jurorÏcould€not€legitimately€resolve€that€fact€in€favor€of€one€side€orÏthe€other.€€€òòò òByrdóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€LaRue€provided€the€trial€court€with€a€greatÏdeal€of€evidence€indicating€that€he€did€not€disconnect€the€wire.€ÏThe€house€moving€agreement€between€Dillingham€and€LaRue€did€notÏauthorize€LaRue€to€remove€any€wires€or€cables€from€the€house.€ÏCharles€LaRue€and€all€of€his€employees€testified€that€they€did€notÏremove€any€wires€or€cables€from€the€house€at€842€Allen€Road.€ÏLaRue€also€testified€that€his€standard€procedure€was€to€call€theÏappropriate€utility€company€whenever€he€needed€a€wire€or€cableÏremoved€from€a€house.€€In€fact,€Ms.€McClain€testified€that€LaRueÏasked€her€to€call€NES€because€he€needed€the€electrical€wireÏdisconnected€from€the€house.€€Further,€Ms.€McClain€testified€that,Ïalthough€she€had€seen€LaRue€and€his€men€preparing€the€house€at€842ÏAllen€Road€for€removal,€she€had€not€seen€any€of€the€men€or€LaRueÏdisconnect€any€wires€from€any€of€the€houses€they€moved.€€ThisÏevidence€establishes€that€LaRue€did€not€do€anything€which€could€beÏconsidered€a€breach€of€his€duty€of€care.€€ÌÌà àTherefore,€the€next€issue€is€whether€appellants€provided€theÏtrial€court€with€any€evidence€that€LaRue€did€cut€the€wire€and,Íthus,€breached€his€duty€of€care.€€Appellants€contend€that€the€factÏthat€LaRue€moved€the€house€produces€a€reasonable€inference€that€heÏcut€the€wire.€€When€reviewing€a€trial€court's€ruling€on€a€motionÏfor€judgment,€this€court€is€to€"view€the€evidence€in€a€lightÏfavorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€allow€all€reasonableÏinferences€in€his€favor."€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€Without€additional€evidence,Ïhowever,€this€court€can€not€say€that€moving€the€house€creates€aÏreasonable€inference€that€LaRue€cut€the€wire.€€The€connection€isÏsimply€too€tenuous.€€Because€appellants€failed€to€establish€thatÏthere€is€a€genuine€issue€as€to€the€material€fact€of€breach€ofÏduty,€the€trial€court€correctly€determined€that€summary€judgmentÏwas€appropriate.ÌÌà àTherefore,€it€follows€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€isÏaffirmed€in€all€respects€and€is€remanded€for€any€further€necessaryÏproceeding.€All€costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€appellants.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌConcur:ÌÌÌ____________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.€€€€€ÌÌÌÌ____________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGE€€€