ÿWPCþ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 Ò@ 0J 0T\ 0^° 0h 0rv 0|è 0†d 0ê 1uz 0dïU>SB)‘DCº AMýU*Jtv~xvÓö BÉ D3æ 0@ AOYƨ 0Dn D/² Bá˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ DDDDDDDDÓ€DÒ /%01C3|x01A01 CLUNKireyczykParadisoinviteesRebuildersGargaroT.C.R.P.FontenotUpJohn EvcoCelotexBrennanCatrett 10A CivLJconclusoryPittmanCarvellfarsideTrentHeatonFlannigan2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌAugust€13,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò d%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ7€¢ˆXdêdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÞ ÞÌÌ›à@ àœò òIN›€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̛̜à@ àMIDDLE€SECTION,€AT€NASHVILLEÌœÌÌPATRICIA›€KIREYCZYK€and,à àà àà à)ÌJOHN€KIREYCZYK,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à@ àà à)à àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)€€à àAppeal›€No.€œÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9612„CV„00549›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌMF€ATHLETIC€CLUB,€L.P.,€à àà àà à)à àWilliamson€Circuit̜ـ€ÙßR€ "A1-j|kÝ` ç `€€@ÿRß›THE€ATHLETIC€CLUB€OF€MARYLANDà à)ÌFARMS,€INC.,€and€CLUN€SPORTSà àà à)ÌINTERNATIONAL„NASHVILLE,€INC.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)Ìà àÌœÌÌ›€à@ àœòòÔ€¼ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€XÔóó›ÌÓÓó óœÌ›à àThis€is€a€ð ðslip€and€fallðð€case€before€the€Court€for€review€of€the€trial€Court€actionÏsustaining€a€Motion€for€Summary€Judgement€filed€by€the€Defendants.̛̜à àThe€Appellants,€Patricia€E.€Kireyczyk€and€her€husband,€John€Kireyczyk,€areÏmembers€of€the€Athletic€Club€of€Maryland€Farms,€a€social€and€athletic€club€operated€by€theÏAppellees.€€Plaintiffs€were€frequent€visitors€to€the€club€which€has€various€kinds€of€athleticÏequipment€available€€for€its€members,€including€both€indoor€and€outdoor€swimming€pools.€€ÏThere€is€a€wooden€deck€located€on€the€concrete€path€between€the€outdoor€pool€and€theÏconcrete€patio€adjacent€to€the€clubhouse.€€€ÌœÌ›à àOn€June€7,€1994,€Patricia€Kireyczyk€visited€the€club€with€her€daughter€and€herÏdaughterððs€girlfriend€for€the€girls€to€practice€swimming€at€the€indoor€pool.€€Her€daughterÍasked€to€swim€in€the€outdoor€pool€after€swimming€practice€and€Patricia€Kireyczyk€wentÏwith€her€daughter€to€the€outdoor€pool€to€test€the€water€and€see€if€it€was€warm€enough€forÏœswimming.€€The€water€in€the€outdoor€pool€was€too€cold€and€Patricia€Kireyczyk€followedÏbehind€the€two€girls€in€returning€to€the€clubhouse.€€As›€Patricia€Kireyczyk€walked€across€theÏwooden€deck€surface,€her€foot€slipped€out€from€under€her.€€She€fell€injuring€herself.ÌÌà àIt€is€well€at€the€outset€to€observe€that€few€areas€of€modern€law€are€more€frustratingÏto€counsel,€to€the€Trial€Court€and€to€the€Appellate€Court€than€ð ðslip€and€fall.ðð€€The€reportedÏdecisions€are€so€fact„sensitive€that€a€line€of€demarcation€between€proper€disposition€byÏœsummary›€œjudgement,›€as€opposed€œto›€trial€by€jury€on€the€œmerits,›€is€almost€imperceptible.€ÏThus,€the€search€œfor€a›€ð ðruleðð€is€illusory.̛̜à àThe€respective€general€duties€and€obligations€of€the€parties,€in€this€case,€is€notÏsubject€to€dispute€and€is€well€stated€by€Justice€Henry€in€òòMcCormick€v.€Watersóó€594€S.W.2dÏ385,€387€(Tenn.€1980):ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà àð ðOwners€and€occupiers€of€land€have€an€obligation€to€exerciseÏordinary€care€and€diligence€in€maintaining€their€premises€in€a€safe€conditionÏfor€invitees.€Paradiso€v.€Kroger€Co.,€499€S.W.2d€78€(Tenn.€App.Ï1973).Proprietors€are€under€an€affirmative€duty€to€protect€invitees,€amongÏthem€business€visitors,€not€only€against€dangers€of€which€they€know€butÏalso€against€those€which€with€reasonable€care€they€might€discover.€IllinoisÏCentral€Railroad€Co.€v.€Nichols,€173€Tenn.€602,€118€S.W.2d€213€(1937).€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€possessors€of€land€are€not€insurers€of€the€safetyÏof€invitees.€The€proprietor€will€not€be€held€liable€if€the€dangerous€orÏdefective€condition€is€obvious,€reasonably€apparent,€or€as€well€known€to€theÏinvitee€as€to€the€owner.€Paradiso,€supra;€Illinois€Central€Railroad,€Co.,Ïsupra.€ÌÌà àThis€duty€of€the€owner€or€occupier€of€the€land€arises€from€theÏposition€of€control€which€this€person€in€possession€occupies;€he€is€theÏperson€normally€best€able€to€prevent€any€harm€to€others.€See€Paradiso,Ïsupra.€This€same€position€of€superior€knowledge€and€control€gives€rise€toÏthe€requirement€that€the€possessor€of€land€exercise€ordinary€or€reasonableÏcare€to€provide€a€reasonably€safe€place€for€the€performance€of€work€byÏemployees.€Stringer€v.€Cooper€and€Cooper€Office€Equipment,€Inc.,€486ÍS.W.2d€751€(Tenn.€App.1972).€ÌÌà àThe€corollary€to€the€owner€or€occupier's€duty€to€exercise€reasonableÏcare€is€the€business€invitee's€equivalent€duty€to€exercise€reasonable€care.ÏO'Brien€v.€Smith€Bros.€Engine€Rebuilders,€Inc.€494€S.W.2d€787,€791Ï(Tenn.€App.€1973);€Gargaro€v.€Kroger€Grocery€and€Baking€Co.,€22€Tenn.ÏApp.€70,€118€S.W.2d€561€(1938).€We€emphasize€that€the€term€reasonableÏcare€is€not€susceptible€of€one€definition€but€must€be€given€meaning€inÏrelation€to€the€circumstances.€O'Brien,€supra€at€791.€ÌœÌà àWhere›€either€party€comes€forward€with€material€evidence€that€theÏother€has€acted€with€the€lack€of€care€necessary€under€the€circumstances,€aÏjury€question€is€created.€It€is€also€for€the€jury€to€determine€whether€aÏplaintiff€has€failed€to€see€and€avoid€a€defect€and€thus€has€failed€to€meet€theÏduty€to€exercise€reasonable€care.€O'Brien,€supra.€A€court€is€expected€toÏdirect€a€verdict€for€the€defendant,€however,€when€the€evidence€presented€isÏclear,€not€conflicting,€and€where€the€only€inference€a€reasonable€personÏexercising€his€own€judgment,€could€make€is€that€the€defendant€has€not€beenÏnegligent.€O'Brien,€supra;€Stringer,€supra.ðð€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒœÌÌÌÌ›à@ àà@ àò òSUMMARY€JUDGEMENT€STANDARDS€AND€BURDENSÌó óÌÌÓÓà àVolumes€have€been€written€on€various€aspects€of€summary€judgement.€€The€two€(2)Ïinquiries€in€this€case€are,€first€of€all,€œwhat€is€the›€standard€of€review€applicable€both€to€theÏtrial€courts€and€the€appellate€courts,€and€secondly,€what€is€necessary€for€the€moving€partyÏto€sustain€itððs€burden.€€Ìà àT.C.R.P.€56€parallels€the€federal€rule€and€it€has€been€aptly€observed:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓӜ̛à àð ðThe€abandonment€of€fact€pleading€displaced€the€demurrer,€€theÏmotion€to€dismiss,€and€various€equivalents€as€a€means€to€test€the€sufficiencyÏof€factual€allegations.€€The€function€of€intercepting€factually€insufficientÏclaims€is€now€assigned€œto€the€summary€judgment.€€As€the€notes€of€the›Ïadvisory€committee€on€Civil€Rules€state,ÌÌà àððThe€very€mission€of€the€summary€judgment€procedure€is€œto›à àpierceÏthe€pleadings€and€to€assess€the€proof€in€order€to€œsee€whether›€there€is€aÏgenuine€need€for€œtrial.ðð€ðð›ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àœòòFontenot›€v.€UpJohn€Company,Ìà àà àà àà àà àóó780€F.2d€1190,€1196€(5th€Cir.)ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓӜ̛à àShortly€after€the€adoption€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€JusticeÏHarbison€for€the€Supreme€Court€delineated€the€standards€for€summary€judgement€inÏlanguage€clear€and€concise€and€this€standard€has€never€changed.ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓœà àð ðSummary›€judgement€proceedings€in€this€state€were€authorized€forÏthe€first€time€by€Rule€56€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€ThisÏnew€procedure€was€designed€to€fill€a€vacancy€or€void€which€had€existed€inÏprior€practice€and€to€provide€a€procedural€step€which€had€heretofore€notÏexisted.€€Under€previous€practice,€in€both€the€circuit€and€chancery€courts,Ïthere€had€been€no€satisfactory€intermediate€step€between€the€demurrer,Ïwhich€dealt€only€with€the€contents€of€pleadings,€and€a€full„scale€trial€of€aÏcase€upon€the€merits.€€The€summary€judgment€procedure€was€designed€toÏprovide€a€quick,€inexpensive€means€of€concluding€cases,€in€whole€or€inÏpart,€upon€issues€as€to€which€there€is€no€dispute€regarding€the€materialÏfacts.€€Where€there€does€exist€a€dispute€as€to€the€facts€which€are€deemedÏmaterial€by€the€trial€court,€however,€or€where€there€is€uncertainty€as€toÏwhether€there€may€be€such€a€dispute,€the€duty€of€the€trial€court€is€clear.€€HeÏis€to€overrule€any€motion€for€summary€judgment€in€such€cases,€becauseÏsummary€judgment€proceedings€are€not€in€any€sense€to€be€viewed€as€aÏsubstitute€for€a€trial€of€disputed€factual€issues.ððÌÌà àà àà àà àà àòòà àEvco€Corp.€v.€Ross,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóó528€S.W.2d€20,€24„25.ÌÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àWhile€Federal€Rule€56€was€adopted€in€1938,€it€was€for€the€next€half€century€ð ð.€.€œ.Ïinfrequently›€used.€.€œ.€because›€it€was€plagued€with€ambiguities€and€restrictiveÏinterpretations.ðð€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó€€847€S.W.2d€208,€211€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àIn€1986,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€decided€òòAndersonóó,€òòCelotexóó,€andÏòòMatsushitaóó,€otherwise€known€as€the€ð ð1986€trilogyðð.̛̜à àSeven€years€later,€after€a€number€of€intermediate€Tennessee€Appellate€CourtÏdecisions€had€pointed€the€way,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€essentially€adopted€the€ð ð1986Ïtrilogyðð.€€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó€€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àœThe›€burden€of€the€moving€party€is€best€articulated€by€Justice€Brennan€in€hisÍdissenting€opinion€in€òòCelotex€Corp€v.€Catrettóó€477€U.S.€317,€91€L.Ed.2d€265,€106€€S.Ct.Ï2548.€€It€should€be€œnoted,›€that€it€is€somewhat€misleading€when€the€opinion€of€JusticeÏBrennan€is€characterized€as€a€dissenting€opinion€as€it€relates€to€the€burden€of€the€movingÏparty.€€His€dissent€involves€the€ultimate€disposition€of€remanding€the€case€to€the€District€ofÏColumbia,€Court€of€Appeals€rather€than€to€the€trial€court€for€trial€on€its€merits.€€As€far€as€itÏdeals€with€the€summary€judgement€burden€of€the€moving€party,€it€reflects€exactly€the€sameÏposition€as€is€taken€by€Chief€Justice€Rehnquist€writing€for€the€majority€in€òòCelotex.ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓóóœà àð ðThe›€burden€of€production€imposed€by€Rule€56€requires€the€movingÏparty€to€make€a€prima€facie€showing€that€it€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment.€Ï10A€Wright€ðð2727.€€The€manner€in€which€this€showing€can€œbe›€madeÏdepends€upon€which€party€will€bear€the€burden€of€persuasion€on€theÏchallenged€claim€at€trial.€€If€the€moving€party€will€bear€the€burden€ofÏpersuasion€at€trial,€that€party€must€support€its€motion€with€credibleÏevidence„„using€any€of€the€materials€specified€in€Rule€56(c)„„that€wouldÏentitle€it€to€a€directed€verdict€if€not€controverted€at€trial..€Ibid.€€Such€anÏaffirmative€showing€shifts€the€burden€of€production€to€the€party€opposingÏthe€motion€and€requires€that€party€either€to€produce€evidentiary€materials€thatÏdemonstrate€the€existence€of€a€ððgenuine€issueðð€for€trial€or€to€submit€anÏaffidavit€requesting€additional€time€for€discovery.€Ibid,;€Fed€Rules€Civ€ProcÏ56(e),€(f).ÌÌà àIf€the€burden€of€persuasion€at€trial€would€be€on€the€nonmovingÏparty,€the€party€moving€for€summary€judgment€may€satisfy€Rule€56'sÏburden€of€production€in€either€of€two€ways,€first,€the€moving€party€mayÏsubmit€affirmative€evidence€that€negates€an€essential€element€of€theÏnonmoving€partyððs€claim.€€Second,€the€moving€party€may€demonstrate€toÏthe€court€that€the€nonmoving€partyððs€evidence€is€insufficient€to€establish€anÏessential€element€of€the€nonmoving€partyððs€claim.€€See€10A€Wright€ðð2727,Ïpp€130„131;€Louis,€Federal€Summary€Judgment€Doctrine:€A€CriticalÏAnalysis,€83€Yale€LJ€745,€750€(1974)(hereinafter€Louis).€€If€the€nonmovingÏparty€cannot€muster€sufficient€evidence€to€make€out€its€claim,€a€trial€wouldÏbe€useless€and€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment€as€a€matterÏof€law.€€Anderson€v.€Liberty€Lobby,€Inc.,€ante,€at€249,€91€L€Ed€2d€202,Ï106€S€Ct€2505.€€ÌÌà àWhere€the€moving€party€adopts€this€second€option€and€seeksÏsummary€judgment€on€the€ground€that€the€nonmoving€party„„who€will€bearÏthe€burden€of€persuasion€at€trial„„has€no€evidence,€the€mechanics€ofÏdischarging€Rule€56's€burden€of€production€are€somewhat€trickier.€€Plainly,Ïa€conclusory€assertion€that€the€nonmoving€party€has€no€evidence€isÏinsufficient.€€See€ante,€at€328.€91€l€Ed€2d,€at€277€(White,€J.,€concurring).€ÏSuch€a€ððburdenðð€of€production€is€no€burden€at€all€and€would€simply€permitÏsummary€judgment€procedure€to€be€converted€into€a€tool€for€harassment.€ÏSee€Louis€750„751.€€Rather,€as€the€Court€confirms,€a€party€who€moves€forÍsummary€judgment€on€the€ground€that€the€nonmoving€party€has€no€evidenceÏmust€affirmatively€show€the€absence€of€evidence€in€the€record.€€Ante.€AtÏ323,€91€l€Ed€2d,€at€273.€€This€may€require€the€moving€party€to€œdepose›€theÏnonmoving€partyððs€witnesses€or€to€establish€the€inadequacy€of€documentaryÏevidence.€€If€there€is€literally€no€evidence€in€the€record,€the€moving€partyÏmay€demonstrate€this€by€reviewing€for€the€court€the€admissions,Ïinterrogatories,€and€other€exchanges€between€the€parties€that€are€in€theÏrecord.€€Either€way,€however,€the€moving€party€must€affirmativelyÏdemonstrate€that€there€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€a€judgment€forÏthe€nonmoving€party.ððÌÌœ›à àà àà à91€L.Ed.2d€265,€278„279€(Brennan€œdissenting).›ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓӜ̛à@ àò òTHE€EVIDENCEó óÌà àThe€court€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€opponent€of€theÏmotion€for€summary€judgement.€€òòHaynes€v.€Hamilton€Countyóó€€883€S.W.2d€606€(Tenn.Ïœ1994).€€All›€reasonable€inferences€from€the€evidence€must€be€drawn€in€favor€of€theÏnonmoving€party.€€òòPittman€v.€UpJohn€Companyóó€890€S.W.2d€425€(Tenn.€1994).€€€There€isÏno€presumption€of€correctness€to€the€trial€courts€findings€in€a€summary€judgement€case.€ÏòòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó€900€S.W.2d€23€(Tenn€1995).€€If€any€doubt€or€any€uncertainty€existsÏwith€regard€either€to€€the€facts€or€to€the€conclusions€to€be€drawn€to€the€facts,€the€summaryÏjudgement€order€must€be€vacated€and€the€case€remanded€for€trial.€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó€847ÏS.W.2d€€211€and€òòEvco€v.€Rossóó€528€S.W.2d€€20.Ìœ›à àThe€record€contains€portions€of€the€deposition€of€Patricia€Kireyczyk€in€which€she€isÏœasked›€many€œquestions›€concerning€the€accident€and€how€it€occurred.€€She€testifies€that€sheÏhad€walked€across€this€same€deck€hundreds€of€times€and€had€never€noticed€anything€thatÏmade€an€impression€on€her.€€She€did€not€perceive€anything€to€be€hazardous.€€She€furtherÏtestified:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓð ðQ.à àDo€you€know€what€it€was€that€made€you€fall?€€Was€it€the€beads€ofÏœà àwater›€œon›œ€the›€deck?ÌœÌA.›à àAll€I€know€is€I€slid,€felt€myself€sliding€and€went€down€the€stairs.€€ÌœÌQ.›à àSo€you€donððt€know€if€it€was€one€leaf,€two€leaves€or€the€water?ÌœÌA.›à àNo.ÌœÌMr.›€White:€or€a€combination€of€the€two?ÌœÌWitness:›à àright.ððÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Ҝ̛à àImmediately€prior€to€the€œhearing›€on€the€motion€for€summary€judgement€before€theÏtrial€court,à àPlaintiffs€filed€an€affidavit€of€Patricia€E.€Kireyczyk€.Ìà àIn€this€affidavit,€she€says€in€part:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓð ð15.à àAs€I€neared€the€œfar€side›€of€the€deck,€approaching€the€œsteps›€whichÏœdescend›€œto€the›€patio,€suddenly,€without€warning,€and€without€anyÏrealization€of€the€œreason,›€my€foot€slipped€out€from€under€me€and€I€slid€onÏthe€deck€surface.€œ›œ€Desperately,›€œI€fought›€to€regain€my€balance;€but€I€wasÏunsuccessful,€falling€œto€the›€deck€on€my€right€hip,€right€hand,€and€rightÏelbow.€€I€slid€down€the€œsteps€to›€the€bottom.€€At€that€time,€I€did€not€knowÏwhat€happened€or€why€I€œslipped›€and€fell€as€I€did.€€If€someone€had€asked€meÏat€that€moment€if€œMaryland›€Farms€had€done€anything€wrong€or€whetherÏthey€could€have€œprevented›€my€fall,€I€would€have€said€ððnoðð.€€It€was€not€untilÏlater€€œI€learned›€œthe›€cause€of€my€fall€and€the€part€played€in€my€fall€by€theÏMaryland€œFarms›€œAthletic›€Club.ÌœÌ16.›à àAfter€regaining€my€composure,€I€walked€into€the€clubhouse.€€I€wasÏmet€œin€the›€clubhouse€by€Trent€Heaton,€the€director€of€fitness,€who€wasÏœsubstituting›€for€the€manager€on€duty€and€who€was€dispatched€by€the€œclubÌto›€investigate€the€accident.€€I€spoke€first€with€Mr.€Heaton€inside€the€œclub,Ìout›€of€sight€of€the€deck.€€In€response€to€his€inquiry€what€happened,€I€œtoldÌ›€œhim›€I€fell€on€the€deck.€€His€exact€words„„which€still€ring€my€ears„„were€œððitÌ›€œrained›€and€thereððs€leaves€on€the€deck.€Huh?ðð€€Frankly,€at€that€point€I€œdidÌ€not›€appreciate€the€import€and€significance€of€his€statement€to€me.ÌœÌ17.›à àMr.€Heaton€and€I,€accompanied€by€Tyrone€Harper,€anotherÏemployee€œof›œ€the›€club,€walked€out€of€the€clubhouse€and€across€the€patio€toÏthe€first€step€œto›€the€deck.€€From€this€position,€I€could€see€clearly€the€deckÏsurface€which€œà àwas›€near€eye€level€for€me.€€Spontaneously€I€said€ððyesðð,€toÏthe€previous€œstatement›€of€Mr.€Heaton;€i.e.,€ððit€rained€and€thereððs€leaves€onÏthe€deckðð.€€I€œcould›€see€beads€of€water€on€the€œdeckððs›€surface€in€the€areaÏwhere€I€slipped.€€œThe›€beads€of€water€appeared€to€me€like€the€beads€of€waterÏseen€on€the€œsurface›€of€an€automobile€which€had€been€waxed.€€I€also€saw€aÏvery€light€œscattering›€of€leaves€on€the€œdeckððs›€surface€in€the€area€where€IÏslipped.€€I€œknew›€then€what€caused€me€to€fall€and€why.ÌœÌ18.›à àI€had€a€second€conversation€with€Trent€Heaton€approximately€oneÏand€a€œà àhalf›€weeks€after€my€accident,€when€he€came€in€response€to€myÏrepeated€œrequests›€to€speak€with€Cindy€Flannigan,€the€œclubððs›€manager.€€I€askÏMr.€œHeaton›€why€Maryland€Farms€had€not€put€up€a€sign€warning€that€theÏdeck€œsurface›€is€slippery€when€wet.€€He€told€me€that€the€club€had€planned€toÏœrepair›€the€deck€two€(2)€weeks€prior€to€my€accident€and€that€he€would€lookÍœinto›€changes€to€prevent€an€accident€from€reoccurring.ÌœÌ19.›à àCindy€Flannigan,€the€œclubððs›€manager,€confirmed€that€the€DefendantÏhad€œplanned›€to€repaint€the€deck€two€œweeks›€prior€to€my€accident.ÌœÌà@ àò ò.›€.€.ó óÌœÌ21.›à àI€have€read€the€motion€and€memorandum€filed€by€the€DefendantsÏand€œreviewed›€my€deposition€testimony.€€Either€I€misunderstood€a€series€ofÏœquestions›€œasked›€me€by€the€Defendantsðð€attorney€or€the€œDefendantsððÌattorney›€œmisunderstood›€my€answers.€€At€the€outset€of€my€deposition€I€œwasÌasked›€a€œseries›€of€questions€in€the€context,€as€I€understood€the€questions,€œofÌwhat›€œI€knew›€and/or€had€observed€before€or€at€the€time€of€my€fall.€€œForÌexample,›€œthe›€question€was€asked,€ððwhat€do€you€œthink›€made€you€fall?ðð.€€œIÌanswered,›€ððI€œà àdonððt›€knowðð.€€Another€question,€ðð.€.€.what€could€have€œbeenÌdone›€œby€Maryland›€Farms€to€have€prevented€your€fall?ðð.€€I€responded€œððIÌdonððt›€œà àknow.ðð.›€€I€answered€these€questions€and€the€others€œasked›€in€œtheÌsame€context›€œas›€I€thought€I€was€asked€with€the€knowledge€I€had€at€the€œtimeÌof€my›€fall.€€œAfter›€I€spoke€to€Mr.€Heaton€and€heard€his€statement;€i.e.€œððitÌrained›€and€œthereððs›€leaves€on€the€deckðð,€and€observed€with€him€the€œwaterÌbeads›€and€the€œleaves›€on€the€deck€surface,€œmy›€answers€to€the€œsameÌquestions›€are€strikingly€œdifferent.›€€For€example,€to€the€question€ððwhat€œdoÌyou›€think€made€you€fall?ðð€€œMy›€answer€is,€ððI€slipped€and€fell€because€œtheÌdeck›€surface€was€slippery€with€œrain›€and€wet€leavesðð.€€To€the€question€œððwhatÌcould›€have€been€done€by€œMaryland›€Farms€to€have€prevented€my€fall?ðð,€œmyÌanswer›€is,€ððthe€defendant€œcould›€have€properly€and€timely€maintained€œtheÌdeck›€by€pressure€washing€œand›€repainting€the€surface€so€as€to€eliminate€œtheÌslippery›€œcondition;›€or€they€œcould›€have€dried€the€wet€surface€and€œremovedÌthe›€wet€leaves;€or€they€could€œà àhave›€placed€a€sign€nearby€warning€that€œtheÌdeck›€was€slippery€when€wet€œand/or›€they€could€have€roped€œoff›€the€œdeck,Ìpreventing›€persons€œfrom€crossing›€the€deck€when€œslipperyðð.ððÌÌ›ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Ò€€€€€à à€Section€œ21›€of€the€affidavit€of€Mrs.€Kireyczyk€is€almost€inconceivable,€but€œif,›€sheÏindeed€misunderstood€questions€on€the€deposition€and€the€matters€set€forth€in€the€otherÏportions€of€her€affidavit€are€taken€as€œtrue,›€as€they€must€be€under€the€summary€judgementÏstandard,€then€her€credibility€must€be€judged€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€the€trier€of€law.€€œIf,›ÏMr.€Heaton€made€the€statement€attributed€to€him€about€rain€and€leaves€on€the€deck€and€œif,›Ïhe€told€her€that€the€club€had€planned€to€repair€the€deck€two€(2)€weeks€prior€the€her€accidentÏin€order€to€prevent€an€œaccident,€and›€œif,›€this€statement€was€reiterated€by€Cindy€Flannigan,Ïthe€clubððs€manager,€then€a€trier€of€fact€œcould€find€that›€the€Defendants€had€knowledgeÏsuperior€to€that€of€the€Plaintiff,€that€rain€and€leaves€on€the€deck€created€a€slippery€conditionÍthat€could€result€in€the€kind€of€injury€suffered€by€the€Plaintiff.ÌÌà àWhen€this€evidence€is€coupled€with€the€affidavit€of€Judy€Allen,€a€member€of€theÏathletic€club,€familiar€with€deck,€wherein€she€states€that€the€deck€was€slippery€when€wetÏand€especially€when€there€were€leaves€on€top€of€the€wet€surface€and€that€she€had€in€factÏslipped€herself,€although€she€had€not€fallen,€we€have€genuine€issues€of€material€factsÏregarding€causation,€œdangerous›€condition€and€notice.€€Thus,€summary€judgement€isÏœinappropriate.Ì›à@ àò òCONCLUSIONó óÌœ›à àThis€is€a€thin€case€for€the€Plaintiff€and€the€differences€between€the€depositionÏtestimony€of€Patricia€Kireyczyk€and€her€affidavit€testimony€are€perilously€close€to€beingÏsuch€inconsistent€statements€as€to€render€them€probatively€valueless.€€òòPrice€v.€Beckeróó€812ÏS.W.€2d€597.€€€œAt›€this€point,€however,€the€question€is€not€whether€reasonable€minds€òòwillóóÏdiffer€after€hearing€€all€of€the€evidence,€but€whether€reasonable€minds€òòcouldóó€œdiffer€on€theÏfacts€in€the€present€record.›Ìœ›à àòòBurgess€v.€Harleyóó€934€S.W.2d€58€(Tenn.€App.€1996)€was€before€this€Court€in€aÏdifferent€context,€but€involved€the€same€principle€that€prevents€summary€judgement€in€theÏcase€at€bar.€€In€òòBurgessóó€this€Court€observed:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà àð ðMr.€Harley's€credibility€has€been€seriously€undermined.€We€wouldÏnot€second„guess€the€trial€court's€decision€to€give€his€testimony€no€weight€ifÏthis€were€an€appeal€from€a€bench€trial.€This€is,€however,€an€appeal€from€aÏsummary€judgment.€Notwithstanding€Mr.€Harley's€practicallyÏinsurmountable€credibility€problems,€his€different€accounts€of€the€eventsÏimmediately€before€the€collision€give€rise€to€a€genuine€factual€disputeÏconcerning€the€condition€of€his€brakes€and€their€effect€on€his€ability€to€avoidÏthe€accident.€Resolving€these€issues€now€would€require€us€to€weigh€theÏevidence€and€to€judge€Mr.€Harley's€credibility€„€two€things€we€cannot€do€inÏa€summary€judgment€proceeding.ððÌœÌà à›à àà àòòà àBurgess€v.€HarleyÌœ›à àœà àà àóó›€à à934€S.W.2d€58,€67€(Tenn.€App.€œ1996)ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌ›à àò òThe€Summary€Judgement€granted€by€the€trial€court€is€vacated,€andÏthe€case€remanded€for€trial€on€the€facts.ÌÓÓœ›à àà àà àà àà àà àà à___________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌœÌCONCUR:›ÌœÌ_____________________________________›ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,ÌPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌœ_____________________________________›ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌó ó