ÿWPC® …4Vj 0(y¡w@© 0Jé 0T3 0^‡ 0hå 0rM 0|¿ 0†; 0Á 1uQ U,Æ 0dò UBV %˜ U,ž U6Ê B) DC) AMl U*¹ Bã ,i,v~•vÓ D3æ 0@ 0lY 0DÅ AO ÆX 0D D/b B‘ÂZË ÔøÔô3|xM($¡¡ 3Õ:;D<=>E?@DADBÓ€2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd€-!Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òJune€11,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó _Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒg$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ôÔUpon€expiration€of€ten€days€from€the€date€of€the€ex€parte€order,€the€Ìà0 àcase€was€essentially€in€the€posture€of€a€case€with€no€ex€parte€order€ofÏprotection.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò$$$$'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò((3úÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÑ ý ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€¸XXdÈdÈ7ÑÙ€€ÙßL€"%!;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›€€€€à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OFÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àEASTERN€SECTIONÌó óÌÌÌÌKAREN€ELAINE€WHITE€KITE,à àà à)€C/A€NO.Ï03A01„9603„CH„00095Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellant,à à)€KNOX€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌARLIN€JAY€KITE,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòD€I€œS€S›€E€N€T€I€N€G€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌà@ àòòÌÓÓóóà àà àThe€majority€summarily€affirms€the€Trial€CourtððsÏjudgment€œwithout€discussion€by›€œa€procedure›€that€we€œordinarilyÏreserve›€for€issues€controlled€by€settled€œlaw.›€€œHowever,€the›ÏTrial€Courtððs€judgment€demonstrates€that€the€system€not€only€hasÏfailed€the€plaintiff,€but€has€victimized€her€as€well.€€Ìà àà àThe€plaintiff,€relying€on€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏðð36„3„601€òòet€seq.óó,€petitioned€the€Knox€County€Chancery€Court€forÏan€order€of€protection€by€filing€a€petition€on€December€27,Ï1995.€€The€petition,€which€was€sworn€to,€states€that€ð ðpetitionerÏis€in€an€immediate€and€present€danger€of€abuse€by€respondentð ð.€ÏThe€petition€also€asked€for€an€ex€parte€order€œand›€specificallyÍprayed€ð ðthat€a€hearing€in€this€cause€be€set€within€ten€days,Ïpursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð36„3„605.ð ð€€A€ChancellorÏsigned€an€ex€parte€order€of€protection€on€the€date€of€filing,Ïbut€that€order€set€the€hearing€date€for€January€22,€1996.€€TheÏmajority€opinion€outlines€what€the€Chancellor€did€on€theÏscheduled€date€of€hearing,€i.e.,€dismissed€the€action€withoutÏhearing€any€evidence.€€Ìà àà àThe€system€has€victimized€this€œplaintiff›€because€sheÏdid€everything€that€the€statute€required€of€her€and€all€that€wasÏwithin€her€control€to€do.€€Yet€the€Court,€either€intentionallyÏor€by€inadvertence,€set€the€hearing€date€beyond€the€timeÏmandated€by€the€statute,€and€on€the€hearing€date€concluded€thatÏthe€Courtððs€own€action€provided€a€basis€to€dismiss€the€claim,Ïbecause€in€the€Trial€Courtððs€view€it€had€lost€jurisdiction€ofÏthe€œcase€because€the€matter€was€not€heard€within€ten€days€of€theÏissuance€of€the€ex€parte€order.›€€œÌà àà àThe›€issue€on€appeal€is€essentially€what€theÏlegislature€intended€in€T.C.A.€ðð36„3„605.€€The€Supreme€Court€œhasÏcautioned›€all€courts€and€we€should€remind€ourselves,€that€theÏlegislature€œð ðcannot€be€supposed›€to€œintend€its€ownÏstultificationð ð€and›€œthe›€courts€should€avoid€construction€thatÏleads€to€absurd€consequences.€€The€Court€said€œthe›€œpresumption›Ïagainst€absurdity€is€probably€a€more€powerful€guide€in€theÏconstruction€of€statutes,€than€the€presumption€againstÍinconvenience€or€injustice.€€òòWise€v.€Morganóó,€101€Tenn.€273,€48ÏS.W.€971€(Tenn.€œ1898).›€€œÌà àà àThe›€majority€for€some€reason€only€quoted€a€part€ofÏsections€(a)€and€(b)€of€the€statute.€€The€complete€wording€ofÏT.C.A.€ðð36„3„605€reads€as€follows:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àò ò36„3„605.€€Protection€order€„€Extension€„ÏHearing€„€Costs€and€attorneyððs€fees.€„€ó ó(a)€UponÏthe€filing€of€a€petition€under€this€part,€the€courtsÏmay€immediately,€for€good€cause€shown,€issue€an€exÏparte€order€of€protection.€€An€immediate€and€presentÏdanger€of€abuse€to€the€petitioner€shall€constituteÏgood€cause€for€purposes€of€this€section.Ìà0 àà0 àà à(b)€Within€ten€(10)€days€of€service€of€suchÏorder€on€the€respondent€under€this€part,€a€hearingÏshall€be€held,€at€which€time€the€court€shall€eitherÏdissolve€any€ex€parte€order€which€has€been€issued,€orÏshall,€if€the€petitioner€has€proved€the€allegation€ofÏabuse€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€extend€theÏorder€of€protection€for€a€definite€period€of€time,€notÏto€exceed€one€(1)€year€unless€a€further€hearing€on€theÏcontinuation€of€such€order€is€requested€by€theÏrespondent€or€the€complainant€in€which€case,€on€properÏshowing€of€cause,€such€order€may€be€continued€for€aÏfurther€definite€period€of€one€(1)€year€after€whichÏtime€a€further€hearing€must€be€held€for€any€subsequentÏone„year€period.€€Any€ex€parte€order€of€protectionÏshall€be€in€effect€until€the€time€of€the€hearing.òò€€IfÏno€ex€parte€order€of€protection€has€been€issued€as€ofÏthe€time€of€the€hearing,€and€the€petitioner€has€provenÏthe€allegation€of€abuse€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence,€the€court€may,€at€that€time,€issue€an€orderÏof€protection€for€a€definite€period€of€time,€not€toÏexceed€one€(1)€year.€€óó(Emphasis€supplied).ÌÌÓÓà àà àA€stated€purpose€œby›€the€General€Assembly€when€this€ActÏwas€initially€passed€was€œð ðto›€provide€certain€means€ofÏprotectionð ð€from€physical€and€emotional€abuse.€€Chapter€350ÏPublic€Acts€1979.€€The€construction€placed€upon€the€statute€byÏthe€Chancellor€renders€it€œvulnerable›€œin€many€cases€to›€failing€ofÍits€essential€purpose.€€The€Chancellor€and€appellee€focused€uponÏthe€word€œòòð ðshallð ðóó›€as€being€mandatory.€€However,€while€allÏlanguage€in€the€statute€must€be€given€meaning,€it€is€aÏdistortion€to€single€out€certain€words€to€the€exclusion€of€theÏwhole€statute.€€An€œanalogous€situation€arose€in›€òòShaeffer€v.ÏRichardóó,€43€Tenn.€App.€205,€306€S.W.2d€340€(1956).€€The€Court€inÏthat€case€was€confronted€with€the€wording€of€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€ðð20„9„506,€which€provides€that€in€non„jury€cases€ð ðtheÏjudge€shall€be€required€to€render€the€judgeððs€decisionð ð€withinÏsixty€days€of€the€completion€of€trial.€€In€òòShaefferóó€the€TrialÏJudge€had€not€followed€this€mandate,€but€had€rendered€theÏdecision€at€a€œpoint€in€time›€beyond€the€60„day€requirement.€€InÏthat€case€the€appellant€insisted€that€the€judgment€was€voidÏbecause€the€Trial€Judge€had€in€effect€lost€jurisdiction€when€heÏfailed€to€comply€with€the€requirement€that€he€render€hisÏdecision€within€sixty€œdays.€›€In€forcefully€œrejecting€thisÏcontention,›€this€Court€said€ð ðdoubtless,€if€the€legislature€hadÏintended€for€the€judgment€to€be€void€when€rendered€by€a€trialÏjudge€more€than€sixty€days€after€the€hearing€of€the€causeÏwithout€a€jury,€it€would€have€said€so€in€specific€words.ð ð€€43ÏTenn.€App.€212.Ìà àà àThe€increasing€incidences€of€violence€in€our€societyÏprompted€the€legislature€to€enact€this€legislation,€and€theÏlegislation€œprovides›€that€prompt€ex€parte€protection€œcan›€beÍafforded€upon€the€petitionerððs€complying€with€the€requirementsÏof€the€statute.€€The€legislature€also€took€into€account€theÏrights€of€the€defendant€who€may€have€been€wrongfully€sued€andÏlimited€the€efficacy€of€the€ex€parte€order€to€ten€days€unless€anÏevidentiary€hearing€was€held€within€that€time€frame,€œbut›Ïauthorized€the€continuance€of€the€order€if€the€petitioner€hadÏð ðproved€the€allegation€of€abuse€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidenceð ð€for€a€period€not€to€exceed€one€year.Ìà àà àThere€is€nothing€to€indicate€œthe›€legislature€intendedÏœthat›€the€court€œwould›€lose€jurisdiction€if€it€did€not€act€on€theÏmatter€within€the€ten€day€time€frame,€nor€is€there€œanyÏsuggestion€that›€the€court€would€be€without€power€to€œactÏsubsequently.›€€Indeed,€the€statute€provides€if€no€ex€parte€orderÏof€protection€has€issued€prior€to€the€time€of€the€hearing,€theÏtrial€judge€is€expressly€authorized€to€issue€the€order€ofÏprotection€upon€the€proof€of€abuse€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence.Ìà àà àIn€this€case,€while€the€ex€parte€order€of€protectionÏhad€no€force€and€effect€beyond€the€ten„day€statutory€period,œ× ƒ& ××  ×›Ïthe€failure€of€the€court€to€set€a€hearing€within€the€ten€dayÏperiod€did€not€divest€the€trial€court€of€jurisdiction,€and€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€hear€the€evidence€and€issue€anÍorder€of€protection€œif€warranted›€on€the€behalf€of€petitioner.Ìà àà àI€would€reverse€and€remand€for€a€trial€on€the€issue.ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌ