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D/e" B”"˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTČŚŲŚŚŲČŚ0nLLĪ(ÖĆ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($””C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT- ł- ĖĢÕŠ[Ń[ŅÓ[ŌDÕDÖӀąDŅ 3|xą((3üŻ$¤¤Ż ƒ!ŻŻ  Żą  ąņņŚ  Ś0Ś  Śóó(#Ć$ņņŚ  Ś0Ś  Śóó2 ’’0Indent1Ō2ŌŌ3  Ō2" ’’0Indent2ą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2, ’’0Indent3ą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō26 ’’0Indent4ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2@ ’’0Indent5ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2J ’’0Indent6ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2T ’’0Indent7ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2^ ’’0Indent8ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō ’’?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ’’8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cž’ << G’’ '’’dxd< Œ 9p`(Arial Ż ƒ!ŻŃ  ŃŃ#€d#ŃŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŌ€+ŌŌ€+ŌÓ  Óņ ņŌ YYY ŌFILEDŌ€+XŌĢĢApril€23,€1997ĢĢCecil€W.€CrowsonĢAppellate€Court€ClerkŌ  Ōó ó("’’$££Ņ  ŅŅ  Ņ ŅŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŻ ƒ $Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŻ  Ż€€In€a€footnote€to€their€brief,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€this€court€should€not€apply€ņņņ ņCarvelló óóóĻretroactively€to€their€case€if€ņņņ ņCarvellóóó ó€overruled€prior€precedent.€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€thatĻthe€supreme€court€did€not€overrule€its€earlier€decisions.€€Although€the€court€directed€that€courtsĻshould€no€longer€use€the€term€š širremediable€injury,šš€it€did€not€expressly€overrule€or€criticize€any€ofĻits€earlier€decisions.€€Moreover,€the€court€did€not€attempt€to€provide€definitions€of€the€new€terms.€ĻThus,€it€seems€the€supreme€court€simply€changed€the€terms€to€avoid€the€confusion€caused€by€theĻword€š širremediable.šš€€It€appears€the€courtššs€previous€decisions€which€used€the€term€š širremediableĻinjuryšš€may€still€be€useful€in€deciding€when€a€legally€cognizable€or€actual€injury€has€occurred.Ģ tŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŻ ƒ $Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŻ  ŻWe€could€not€find€any€direct€evidence€that€Mr.€Hinton€charged€Plaintiffs€for€his€services.€ĻNevertheless,€there€is€sufficient€evidence€in€the€record€from€which€we€can€infer€PlaintiffsĻcompensated€Mr.€Hinton€for€his€services.€€Ģ HŻ ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŻ ƒ $Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŻ  Ż€We€note€that€our€decision€in€this€case€does€not€mean€that€a€plaintiff€has€to€incur€monetaryĻdamages€in€order€for€there€to€be€actually€injury.€€It€just€happens€to€be€so€in€this€case.Ģ ¹Ż ƒ!ŻŃ#€d#ŃŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŻ ƒ $Żą ąņņŚ  ŚŚ  ŚóóŻ  Ż€€One€reason€for€this€conclusion€is€that€the€corrective€work€never€rectified€the€problemsĻwith€the€plan.€€As€a€result,€Plaintiffs€terminated€the€Plan€on€19€April€1996.€€In€addition,ĻDefendants€contend,€in€part,€that€King€&€Ballow€spent€a€great€deal€of€time€on€project€which€theyĻnever€completed.ĢPtPtHHŚ(’į’āłFG(üHHŚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆŠ ŠŠHHŠŠ  ŠŠ2ŠŠ’’øę$’ŠŠHHŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ  ŠŠ ŠŠ ŠŃŃŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŃ € ŃŃ<Px–ČŃŅŅŅ443!#4ŅŅ$ *$ŅŅ$*$ŅŅ ’KK ŅŅ  Geneva ŅŅ  Geneva ŅÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŅ  h HD: Geneva ŅŅ  h HD: Geneva Ņ€-‚ƒCž’<< C’’ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ņ ņŚ  Ś1Ś  Śó ó„„'÷’ dxdü’P PdŻ ƒ!ŻŌ . ŌŌ€&ŌŻ  ŻŃ\R AŲ'\ŃŃ\R AŲ'\ŃŃ€ŃŃ7€6BXXdģdČ7ŃŃ  ŃÓ#` Ü` ä œ ’X#Ó›Ž ŽĢJOHN€KOHL€&€COMPANY,€P.C.,ą ą)ĢJOHN€B.€KOHL,€III,€and€HELEN€H.€KOHL,ą ą)ĢIndividually,€and€JOHN€B.€KOHL,€III,ą ą)ĢTRUSTEE,€as€Trustee€of€the€John€Kohl€&ą ą)ĢCompany,€P.C.€Profit€Sharing€Plan,ą ą)Ģą ąą ą)Ģą ąPlaintiffs/Appellants,ą ą)ą ąAppeal€No.Ģą ąą ą)ą ą01„A„01„9609„CV„00421Ģv.ą ąą ą)Ģą ąą ą)ą ąDavidson€CircuitĢDEARBORN€&€EWING,€a€Tennesseeą ą)ą ąNo.ą ą90C„1962̜Ł€€ŁßR€),(A1-j|Ł` ē `€€@’RߛGeneral€Partnership,€andą ą)ĢDAN€E.€HUFFSTUTTER,ą ą)Ģą ąą ą)Ģą ąDefendants/Appellees.ą ą)ĢĢĢÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEĢĢMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEĢĢĢAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYĢĢAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEĢĢĢTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€W.€BROTHERS,€JUDGEĢÓ  ÓĢĢĢĢĢĢĢĢĢSTEVEN€C.€DOUSEĢKing€&€BallowĢ1200€Noel€PlaceĢ200€Fourth€Avenue,€NorthĢNashville,€Tennessee€€37219Ģą ąATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSĢĢĢJOHN€BRANHAMĢKATHRYN€BARNETTĢBranham€&€DayĢ150€œFourth›€Avenue€NorthĢSuite€1910ĢNashville,€Tennessee€€37219Ģą ąATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESĢĢĢĢĢÓ  ÓAFFIRMED€IN€PART,ĢREVERSED€IN€PART,Ģ€AND€REMANDEDĢÓ  ÓĢSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEĢĢņņÓ  ÓŌ€&„ŌOPINIONóóĢÓ  ÓĢÓ€ÓŌ€&¼Ōą ąThis€is€an€appeal€by€plaintiffs/appellants,€John€and€Helen€Kohl,€from€aĻdecision€of€the€Davidson€County€Circuit€Court.€€The€trial€court€awardedĻPlaintiffs€a€total€of€$33,091.05€for€the€legal€malpractice€of€defendants/appellees,ĻDearborn€&€Ewing€and€Dan€E.€Huffstutter,€and€held€the€remainder€of€Plaintiffs'Ļclaims€were€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€The€facts€out€of€which€thisĻmatter€arose€are€as€follows.ĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€own€a€land€surveying€business.€€They€retained€Defendants€inĻ1983€to€incorporate€the€business€and€to€handle€other€corporate€matters.€€FromĻ1983€to€1988,€Huffstutter€advised€Plaintiffs€on€many€œissues.›€€He€aided€them€in€theĻdevelopment€of€a€profit€sharing€plan€(š šthe€Planšš)€and€administered€the€Plan€untilĻ1988.€€He€also€advised€Plaintiffs€in€1986€on€how€to€finance€the€purchase€of€aĻbuilding€for€their€business.€€Pursuant€to€this€advice,€Plaintiffs€obtained€a€loanĻfrom€Commerce€Union€Bank.€€The€Small€Business€Administration€covered€aĻportion€of€the€loan.€€Huffstutter€advised€Plaintiffs€the€Plan€should€purchase€all€orĻa€portion€of€the€loan.€€He€explained€to€Plaintiffs€they€needed€to€transfer€fundsĻfrom€their€IRA€accounts€into€the€Plan€in€order€to€do€this,€but€stated€the€IRAĻwithdrawals€would€not€be€taxed.ĢĢą ąIn€September€1988,€Plaintiffs€received€a€letter€from€the€IRS€informingĻthem€of€the€following:ĢÓÓÓ#` Ü` ä < ’X#Óą8 ąą ąIn€our€review€of€your€tax€return€for€1986,€it€appearsĻthat€the€income€deductions,€and€credits€you€reported€do€notĻagree€with€the€amounts€reported€to€us€on€information€returnsĻfiled€by€the€payers.€(see€attached€page(s)).Ģą8 ąą ąPlease€explain€in€a€signed€statement€where€the€amountsĻare€reported€on€your€tax€return.€€If€the€income€was€notĻreported€or€if€the€deductions€or€credits€were€overstated,€pleaseĻexplain€why.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓPlaintiffs€responded€to€the€letter€through€their€accountant,€David€Hinton.€€InĻOctober€1988,€Robert€E.€Kolarich,€Plaintiffs'€attorney,€wrote€Dearborn€&€EwingĻthe€following€letter:ĢÓÓą8 ąIn€our€last€discussion€of€John€Kohl's€account€with€your€firm,€itĻwas€agreed€that€you€would€handle€the€application€for€anĻextension€of€his€tax€return,€after€which€the€file€would€beĻremoved.€€Mr.€Kohl€intends€to€hire€a€new€firm€to€handle€hisĻtax€work,€however,€I€understand€that€a€new€question€has€arisenĻwith€regard€to€his€pension€and€profit€sharing€plans.€€Evidently,ĻMr.€Huffstetter€[sic]€had€advised€that€the€funds€held€in€an€IRAĻaccount€could€be€transferred€to€the€pension€and€profit€sharingĻaccount€and€the€IRS€is€reviewing€the€transaction.€€Please€adviseĻas€to€when€this€issue€may€be€resolved€so€that€the€files€may€beĻtransferred.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓJohn€Kohl€next€received€a€letter€in€August€1989€from€Dearborn€&€Ewing.€€TheĻletter€stated,€in€part,€as€follows:€š šHowever,€because€the€Sales€Agreement€alsoĻlooked€to€the€status€of€Plan€participants€(as€beneficial€owners€of€the€Plan),Ļofficers€and€shareholders€of€the€Borrower€who€are€also€Plan€participants€mayĻcause€the€Plan's€purchase€of€the€SBA€Loan€to€be€questioned.šš€ĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€filed€a€complaint€against€Huffstutter€and€Dearborn€&€EwingĻon€1€May€1990.€€The€complaint€alleged€the€following€acts€constituted€legalĻmalpractice:€1)€advising€Plaintiffs€the€Plan€should€acquire€all€or€a€portion€of€theĻ$250,000.00€loan;€2)€advising€Plaintiffs€they€should€transfer€funds€from€theirĻIRA€accounts€into€the€Plan€and€the€withdrawals€would€not€be€taxed;€and€3)Ķadvising€Plaintiffs€to€make€a€$2,000.00€voluntary€deductible€contribution€to€theĻPlan€in€1986.€€Defendants€answered€the€allegations€and€claimed€Plaintiffs€hadĻfailed€to€mitigate€their€damages€and€the€statute€of€limitations€barred€their€claims.€ĻPlaintiffs€moved€to€amend€their€complaint€by€adding€a€count€regarding€theĻnegligent€drafting€and€administration€of€the€Plan.€€The€court€granted€the€motion.ĢĢą ąDefendants€filed€a€motion€for€partial€summary€judgment€as€to€Plaintiffs'Ļclaims€to€attorney's€fees€incurred€in€pursuit€of€the€litigation€on€22€January€1996.€ĻDefendants€argued€there€was€no€statutory,€legal,€or€contractual€basis€for€theĻrecovery€of€the€fees.€€The€court€granted€the€motion,€but€noted€that€it€made€noĻdetermination€as€to€the€remainder€of€Plaintiffs'€claims€š šincluding€attorney's€feesĻallegedly€expended€for€corrective€action€resulting€from€defendants'€negligence.ššĢĢą ąœTrial›€œwas€held€from›€29€April€to€2€May€1996.€€Plaintiffs€submitted€aĻsupplement€to€their€expert€witness€statement€on€26€April€1996.€€The€supplementĻreflected€an€upward€change€in€the€amount€of€damages€for€the€lost€value€of€theĻfunds€transferred€from€the€IRA€accounts.€€During€the€trial,€Plaintiffs€moved€theĻcourt€to€amend€their€complaint€to€claim€special€damages€for€the€fees€paid€toĻDearborn€&€Ewing€for€the€negligent€work.€€The€court€denied€the€motion.€€TheĻtrial€court€also€ruled€that€it€would€only€consider€the€expert€testimony€consistentĻwith€the€original€expert€witness€statements€and€depositions.€€As€a€result,€the€trialĻcourt€completely€disregarded€the€supplemental€expert€witness€statements€ofĻSamuel€Butts,€Plaintiffs'€expert.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€ruled€the€testimony€ofĻLarry€Crabtree,€the€attorney€who€performed€or€supervised€the€corrective€work,Ļwas€not€admissible€under€Disciplinary€Rule€5„101(B)(3).€ĢĢą ąThe€trial€court€entered€its€final€order€on€22€May€1996.€€The€orderĶincorporated€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€made€at€theĻclose€of€the€parties'€cases.€€As€to€the€statute€of€limitations€defense,€the€trial€courtĻreasoned€as€follows:ĢÓÓÓ ` Ü` ‚„ ’X Óą8 ąą ąIn€this€case,€Mr.€Kolarich€wrote€a€letter€on€OctoberĻ24,€1988€that€clearly€points€out€there€is€some€problemĻassociated€with€the€rollover€of€IRA€funds€into€the€pensionĻplan,€it€had€been€noticed,€they€were€aware€of€it,€and€it€was€soĻsevere€in€his€mind€and€Kohl's€mind€that€they€were€going€toĻchange€law€firms€and€have€someone€else€do€their€tax€work.€ĻThey€had€turned€this€over€to€their€CPA.€€They€were€takingĻactions.€€They€knew€that€they€had€received€some€injury€as€aĻresult€of€potentially€erroneous€advice€they€had€received€fromĻMr.€Huffstutter€and€the€Dearborn€&€Ewing€law€firm.Ģą8 ąą ąAnd€the€Court€finds€that€as€of€October€24,€1988,€theĻKohls€should€have€known,€if€they€were€not€aware,€they€shouldĻhave€known,€as€a€reasonable€person,€that€they€had€suffered€aĻlegally€cognizable€injury€from€the€misconduct€of€Mr.ĻHuffstutter.€€And€therefore,€any€action€against€him€shouldĻhave€been€filed€in€relationship€to€that€rollover€within€one€year.€ĻAn€interesting€question€is€whether€„„€and€therefore,€the€claimsĻbased€upon€the€rollovers€are€barred.Ģą8 ąą ąA€question€that's€tied€in€with€that€is€whether€or€notĻthat€bars€any€recovery.€€Does€that€put€them€on€notice€as€to€theĻentire€plan?€€And€I€find€that€it€does€not,€This€letter€is€veryĻspecific.€€It€points€out€that€there€are€problems€with€theĻchanging€of€monies€from€an€IRA€plan€into€a€pension€plan,Ļprofit€sharing€plan€only.€€It€doesn't€address€the€SBA€loan€orĻany€other€aspect€of€the€plan,€simply€that€specific€item.€€And€IĻthink€that€it€is€clearly€distinct€enough€that€it€does€not€bar€theirĻfiling€suit€until€they€became€aware€of€this,€under€Mr.€Kohl'sĻtestimony,€sometime€shortly€before€he€first€went€to€King€&ĻBallow€in€September€of€1989,€and€this€action€was€filed€timelyĻ„„€in€a€timely€manner€for€the€other€claims.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓThe€court€held€Defendants€liable€to€Plaintiffs€in€the€amount€of€$28,591.05€forĻadvising€Plaintiffs€the€Plan€could€purchase€a€portion€of€the€loan€and€in€theĻamount€of€$4,500.00€for€negligently€drafting€and€administering€the€Plan.€€TheĻtrial€court€also€ruled€that€it€would€have€awarded€$30,000.00€to€Plaintiffs€for€theĶlost€earning€power€of€the€money€withdrawn€from€the€IRA€accounts€andĻ$19,000.00€in€attorney's€fees€had€the€statute€of€limitations€not€barred€the€claimsĻrelating€to€the€IRA€rollovers.€€Thereafter,€Plaintiffs€filed€a€timely€notice€ofĻappeal€and€presented€the€following€issues:ĢÓÓą8 ąI.ą0 ąWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€holding€that€theĻstatute€of€limitations€barred€recovery€for€certainĻdamages€claimed€by€Plaintiffs.Ģą8 ąII.ą0 ąWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€holding€thatĻPlaintiffs€were€not€entitled€to€recover,€as€generalĻdamages€in€a€legal€malpractice€action,€fees€paid€forĻlegal€work€that€was€negligently€performed.Ģą8 ąIII.ą0 ąWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€a€partialĻsummary€judgment€holding€that€Plaintiffs€could€notĻas€a€matter€of€law€recover€any€of€the€costs€ofĻprosecuting€this€action€as€consequential€damages€forĻlegal€malpractice.Ģą8 ąIV.ą0 ąWhether€erroneous€evidentiary€rulings€by€the€trialĻcourt€prejudiced€the€record€on€which€the€courtĻassessed€damages.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓWe€address€all€of€these€issues€below.ĢĢņ ņI.ą ąStatute€of€Limitationsó óĢĢą ąRecently,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€addressed€the€issue€of€when€theĻstatute€of€limitations€begins€to€run€in€legal€malpractice€actions.€€ņņņ ņCarvell€v.ĻBottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€28„30€(Tenn.€1995).€€The€court€restated€the€twoĻoccurrences€necessary€to€begin€the€running€of€the€statute€of€limitations€andĻmodified€them€to€avoid€past€confusion.ĢĢą ąThe€first€occurrence€necessary€to€begin€the€running€of€the€statute€is€theĻplaintiff€must€suffer€a€legally€cognizable€or€actual€injury€as€a€result€of€theĻdefendantššs€negligence.€€ņņņ ņId.ó óóó€€Prior€to€the€decision€in€ņņņ ņCarvellóóó ó,€judges,Ķpractitioners,€and€scholars€used€the€term€œš širremediable›€injuryšš€instead€of€legallyĻcognizable€or€actual€injury.€€ņņņ ņSee€id.óóó ó€at€28.€€In€ņņņ ņCarvellóóó ó,€the€supreme€courtĻchanged€the€terminology.œ× ƒ. ××  כ€€The€second€occurrence€necessary€to€begin€the€runningĻof€the€statute€of€limitations€is€that€š šthe€plaintiff€must€have€known€or€in€theĻexercise€of€reasonable€diligence€should€have€known€that€this€injury€was€caused€byĻthe€defendantššs€negligence.šš€€ņņņ ņId.óóó ó€€The€court€then€elaborated€on€the€knowledgeĻrequirement€and€adopted€a€holding€from€a€medical€malpractice€case.€€The€courtĻstated:ĢÓÓą8 ąIt€is€not€required€that€the€plaintiff€actually€know€that€theĻinjury€constitutes€a€breach€of€the€appropriate€legal€standard€inĻorder€to€discover€that€he€has€a€ššright€of€actionšš;€the€plaintiff€isĻdeemed€to€have€discovered€the€right€of€action€if€he€is€aware€ofĻfacts€sufficient€to€put€a€reasonable€person€on€notice€that€he€hasĻsuffered€an€injury€as€a€result€of€wrongful€conduct.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€Óņņņ ņId.óóó ó€at€29€(quoting€ņņņ ņRoe€v.€Jeffersonóóó ó,€875€S.W.2d€653,€657€(Tenn.€1994)).ĢĢą ąApplying€these€requirements€to€this€case,€it€is€the€opinion€of€this€courtĻthat€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run€on€those€claims€related€to€the€IRA€rollovers.€ĻIn€this€case,€the€legally€cognizable€or€actual€injury€occurred€at€the€very€latestĻwhen€Plaintiffs€began€to€incur€expenses€as€a€result€of€Defendantsšš€negligentĻadvice.€€The€earliest€evidence€of€this€in€the€record€is€19€October€œ1988.›€€On€thisĻdate,€Plaintiffsšš€accountant,€David€Hinton,€wrote€a€letter€to€the€IRS€in€response€toĻthe€IRSššs€request€for€information.€€The€IRS€letter,€quoted€in€an€earlier€portion€ofĻthis€opinion,€explained€that€the€IRS€had€noticed€a€conflict€between€the€amountsĶreported€by€Plaintiffs€and€those€amounts€reported€by€payers.€€Mr.€HintonššsĻresponse€stated:€š šPlease€be€advised€that€the€retirement€plan€distributions€wereĻrolled€over€to€the€John€Kohl€Company,€P.C.,€Profit„Sharing€Plan.šš€€As€of€theĻdate€of€this€letter€or€possibly€even€earlier,€Plaintiffs€began€incurring€expensesĻdirectly€related€to€Mr.€Huffstutterššs€advice€on€the€IRA€rollovers.€œ× ƒ/ ××  כ€Thus,ĻPlaintiffs€were€actually€injured€at€that€time.ĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€correctly€stated€that€the€injury€element€is€not€met€if€it€isĻcontingent€on€a€third€partyššs€actions€or€if€there€is€a€mere€possibility€orĻprobability€of€injury.€€ņņņ ņCaledonia€Leasing€and€Equip.€Co.€v.€Armstrong,ĻAllen,€Braden,€Goodman,€McBride€&€Prewittóóó ó,€865€S.W.2d€10,€17€(Tenn.ĻApp.€1992).€€Relying€on€this€case,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€the€injury€was€stillĻinchoate€in€October€1988€because€the€IRS€had€not€filed€suit€or€issued€a€deficiencyĻstatement€and€Plaintiffs€had€not€incurred€any€attorneyššs€fees€or€other€damages.€ĻWe€can€not€agree.€€Plaintiffsšš€injuries€were€no€longer€contingent€on€a€thirdĻpartyššs€actions€or€speculative€once€they€began€to€incur€expenses€related€to€theĻnegligence.× ƒ0 ××  ׀€In€addition,€it€is€not€necessary€for€Plaintiffs€to€have€suffered€all€theĻinjurious€effects€of€Defendantsšš€negligence€for€the€statute€to€begin€running.€Ļņņņ ņSecurity€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€v.€Fabricating,€Inc.ó óóó,€673€S.W.2d€860,€864„65Ļ(Tenn.€1983).ĢĢą ąIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€Plaintiffs€had€the€requisite€knowledgeĻat€the€very€latest€on€24€October€1988.€€On€that€date,€John€Kolarich,€PlaintiffsššĶattorney,€wrote€a€letter.€€The€letter€clearly€demonstrates€Mr.€Kolarich€knew€theĻIRSššs€investigation€involved€the€rollover€of€funds€into€the€Plan€and€Mr.ĻHuffstutter€had€advised€Plaintiffsšš€as€to€the€rollovers.€€Mr.€Kolarichššs€knowledgeĻis€attributable€to€Plaintiffs.€€ņņņ ņMoody€v.€Moodyóóó ó,€681€S.W.2d€545,€546€(Tenn.Ļ1984).€€It€is€not€necessary€for€a€plaintiff€to€know€the€facts€constitute€a€claim€forĻlegal€malpractice.€€Instead,€a€plaintiff€only€needs€to€be€š šaware€of€facts€sufficientĻto€put€a€reasonable€person€on€notice€that€he€has€suffered€an€injury€as€a€result€ofĻwrongful€conduct.šš€€ņņņ ņCarvellóóó ó,€900€S.W.2d€at€29€(quoting€ņņņ ņRoe€v.€Jeffersonóóó ó,Ļ875€S.W.2d€653,€657€(Tenn.€1994)).€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€theĻknowledge€that€the€IRS€was€investigating€a€transaction€recommended€by€anĻattorney€without€reservation€is€sufficient€to€put€a€reasonable€person€on€notice.ĢĢą ąThe€statute€of€limitations€as€to€any€claims€resulting€from€the€IRAĻrollovers€began€to€run€on€24€October€1988.€€As€of€that€date,€Plaintiffs€hadĻsuffered€an€actual€injury€and€had€the€requisite€knowledge.€€Plaintiffs€filed€theirĻcomplaint€on€1€May€1990.€€The€trial€court€correctly€determined€the€statute€ofĻlimitations€barred€Plaintiffsšš€claims€because€they€filed€their€complaint€more€thanĻone€year€after€the€cause€of€action€accrued.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€28„3„104(a)(2)Ļ(Supp.€1996).ĢĢņ ņII.€€Damagesó óĢĢą ąPlaintiffsšš€second€and€third€issues€involve€the€different€types€of€damagesĻavailable€in€a€legal€malpractice€action.€€This€case€involves€three€differentĻcategories€of€attorneyššs€fees.€€The€first,€initial€fees,€are€those€fees€the€plaintiffĻpaid€or€agreed€to€pay€to€the€negligent€defendant.€€The€second,€corrective€fees,€areĻthose€fees€the€plaintiff€incurred€to€correct€the€errors€created€by€defendantššsĶnegligence.€€The€existence€of€corrective€fees€distinguishes€this€case€from€a€greatĻmajority€of€the€cases.€€To€explain,€every€case€does€not€include€corrective€fees.€ĻFor€example,€when€an€attorney€fails€to€file€a€personal€injury€claim€within€theĻstatute€of€limitations€there€are€no€corrective€fees.€€The€injured€party€has€incurredĻonly€the€initial€fees€and€has€lost€his€or€her€claim.€€Finally,€the€third€category€ofĻfees,€litigation€fees,€are€those€fees€paid€by€the€plaintiff€to€prosecute€theĻmalpractice€action.€€It€is€Plaintiffsšš€contention€that€they€should€be€able€to€recoverĻboth€their€initial€fees€and€their€litigation€fees€and€at€the€very€least€one€of€the€two.ĢĢą ąņ ņA.€€Initial€Feesó óĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€primarily€rely€on€ņņņ ņFoster€v.€Dugginóóó ó,€695€S.W.2d€526Ļ(Tenn.€1985),€to€support€their€argument€that€they€are€entitled€to€the€initial€feesĻand€the€litigation€fees.€€Although€the€specific€facts€of€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó€are€distinguishableĻfrom€the€present€case,€the€general€holding€of€the€case€is€useful.€€In€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó,€theĻplaintiffs€retained€an€attorney,€Mr.€Duggin,€on€a€contingency€fee€basis€toĻrepresent€them€in€a€personal€injury€action.€€Mr.€Duggin€committed€malpracticeĻwhen€he€failed€to€file€the€complaint€within€the€statute€of€limitations.€€As€a€result,Ļthe€plaintiffs€lost€their€claim.€€This€is€the€typical€malpractice€scenario.€€In€such€aĻcase,€the€successful€plaintiff€is€entitled€to€recover€at€the€very€œleast›€the€value€of€theĻlost€claim.€€7€Am€Jur.€2d€ņņAttorneys€at€Lawó󀚚€226€(1980).ĢĢą ąThe€only€issue€before€the€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó€court€was€whether€the€trial€courtĻshould€have€reduced€the€malpractice€award€by€the€fee€Mr.€Duggin€would€haveĻreceived€had€he€competently€handled€the€case.€€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó,€695€S.W.2d€at€526.€€TheϜtrial€court›€concluded€that€Mr.€Duggin€was€not€entitled€to€a€set€off€and€the€courtĻof€appeals€affirmed.€€The€supreme€court€also€agreed€Mr.€Duggin€was€not€entitledĶto€a€set€off€and€explained€š šthe€burden€of€[Mr.€Dugginššs]€incompetence€should€notĻbe€placed€upon€the€innocent€clientšš€and€the€plaintiffs€š šshould€not€be€required€toĻassume€the€burden€of€twice€paying€for€legal€representation.šš€€ņņņ ņId.óóó ó€at€527.€€Thus,Ļthe€plaintiffs€recovered€their€initial€fees€in€a€roundabout€way.€€ņņņ ņSee€alsoó óóó€ņņņ ņBruceĻv.€Oliveóóó ó,€No.€03A01„9509„CV„00310,€1996€WL€93580,€at€*5€(Tenn.€App.€4ĻMarch€1996).ĢĢą ąAlthough€œņ ņņņFosteró óóó›€was€a€contingency€fee€case,€there€is€no€reason€why€theĻsame€logic€can€not€be€applied€in€this€case.€€The€Plaintiffs€in€the€present€case€areĻentitled€to€recover€their€initial€fees€with€the€exception€that€Defendants€receiveĻš šcredit€for€expenses€which€were€incurred€on€behalf€of€[Plaintiffs]€whichĻultimately€benefitted€[Plaintiffs].šš€€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó,€695€S.W.2d€at€527.€€Defendants€argueĻthat€allowing€Plaintiffs€to€recover€their€initial€fees€ultimately€allows€them€toĻreceive€free€legal€services€because€they€will€recover€both€the€corrective€fees€andĻthe€initial€fees.€€At€first€glance€this€argument€appears€logical,€but€this€conclusionĻis€not€necessarily€the€result€dictated€by€the€case€law.€€First,€the€corrective€fees€inĻthis€case€are€analogous€to€the€value€of€the€lost€claim€in€ņņņ ņFosteró óóó,€that€is,€theĻdamages€directly€flowing€from€the€malpractice.€€Second,€the€justification€of€theĻsupreme€court€in€ņņņ ņFosteró óóó€that€a€plaintiff€š šshould€not€be€required€to€assume€theĻburden€of€twice€paying€for€legal€representationšš€refers€to€the€payment€of€theĻinitial€fees€and€the€litigation€fees.€€As€is€explained€below,€it€is€the€opinion€of€thisĻcourt€that€Plaintiffs€are€not€entitled€to€their€litigation€fees.€€Thus,€in€the€endĻPlaintiffs€are€having€to€pay€certain€fees€for€the€work€they€had€hoped€to€haveĻproperly€performed€in€1983.ĢĢą ąņ ņB.€€Litigation€Feesó óĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€argue€that€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó€stands€for€the€proposition€that€litigationĻexpenses€are€recoverable€as€incidental€damages.€€Plaintiffs€cite€the€followingĻsentence:€€š šThe€additional€fees€necessary€to€pursue€this€action€are€in€the€nature€ofĻincidental€damages€flowing€from€Mr.€Dugginššs€breach€of€contract.šš€€We€can€notĻagree€with€Plaintiffsšš€argument.€€Although€the€statement€seems€clear,€a€literalĻapplication€of€the€statement€is€inconsistent€with€the€rest€of€the€opinion.€€ToĻexplain,€the€statement€is€inconsistent€because€if€plaintiffs€were€able€to€recoverĻtheir€litigation€expenses€the€recovery€of€the€initial€fees€would€not€be€necessary€toĻensure€that€plaintiffs€were€not€š šrequired€to€assume€the€burden€of€twice€paying€forĻlegal€representation.šš€€ņņņ ņId.ó óóó€€Moreover,€in€another€portion€of€the€opinion,€theĻsupreme€court€discussed€the€majority€view€and€explained€that€the€œlitigation›€feesĻš šare€said€to€cancel€out€any€fees€which€the€plaintiff€would€have€owed€the€attorneyĻhad€he€performed€competently.šš€€ņņņ ņId.óóó ó€€It€is€clear€that€the€supreme€court€intendedĻto€award€the€initial€fees€only.€€This€is€further€evidenced€by€the€fact€that€the€courtĻlimited€its€decision€to€a€determination€of€this€issue€only.€€ņņņ ņId.€ó óóóat€526.€€Thus,€it€isĻthe€opinion€of€this€court€that€ņņņ ņFosteróóó ó€does€not€stand€for€the€proposition€that€aĻplaintiff€in€a€legal€malpractice€action€may€recover€their€litigation€fees.ĢĢą ąIt€is€further€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€Plaintiffs€are€not€entitled€toĻtheir€litigation€fees.€€A€party€may€not€recover€attorneyššs€fees€absent€a€contractualĻagreement€between€the€parties€or€a€statutory€provision.€€ņņņ ņGoings€v.€Aetna€Cas.Ļ&Sur.€Co.ó óóó,€491€S.W.2d€€847,€848€(Tenn.€App.€1972).€€Attorneyššs€fees€are€noĻmore€damages€in€a€legal€malpractice€action€than€they€are€in€a€personal€injuryĻcase.€€Plaintiffs€have€failed€to€convince€this€court€that€Tennesseeššs€courts€shouldĻtreat€legal€malpractice€claims€differently€than€all€other€claims.ĢĢą ąņ ņC.€€Initial€Fees€as€Special€or€General€Damagesó óĢĢą ąIn€addition€to€determining€that€the€law€did€not€entitle€Plaintiffs€toĻrecover€the€initial€fees,€the€trial€court€also€determined€the€initial€fees€were€specialĻdamages€and€denied€Plaintiffsšš€request€to€amend€their€complaint€to€include€aĻclaim€for€the€initial€fees€as€special€damages.€€We€disagree€and€hold€that€the€initialĻfees€are€recoverable€as€general€damages.ĢĢą ąThe€supreme€court€has€defined€general€and€special€damages€as€follows:€Ļš šššGeneral€damages€are€such€as€ņņnaturally€and€necessarilyóó€result€from€the€wrong€ofĻinjury€complained€of,€while€special€damages€are€such€as€ņņnaturally€but€notĻnecessarilyóó€result€from€the€wrong€or€injury€complained€of.šššš€€ņņņ ņInland€ContainerĻCorp.€v.€Marchóóó ó,€529€S.W.2d€43,€44€(Tenn.€1975)€(quoting€Caruthers,€HistoryĻof€a€Lawsuit€šš155€(8th€ed.€1963)).€€Initial€fees€as€damages€naturally€result€fromĻlegal€malpractice.€€In€all€malpractice€cases,€the€plaintiff€has€retained€an€attorneyĻpresumably€for€a€fee€to€perform€certain€services.€€If€malpractice€occurs,€theĻplaintiff€may€recover€the€fee€which€is€a€natural€part€of€the€transaction.€ĻMoreover,€the€recovery€of€a€fee€paid€to€a€negligent€attorney€is€necessary€to€makeĻthe€plaintiff€whole.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€determined€the€initial€feesĻwere€special€damages.ĢĢĢņ ņIII.ą ąExpert€TestimonyĢĢą ąA.€€Samuel€Buttsó óĢĢą ąFollowing€our€review€of€this€record€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€trialĻcourt€did€not€err€in€excluding€portions€of€the€testimony€of€Samuel€Butts,ĶPlaintiffsšš€expert€witness.€€The€trial€court€excluded€portions€of€Mr.€ButtsššĻtestimony€for€two€reasons:€€1)€Plaintiffs€failed€to€seasonably€supplement€hisĻexpert€witness€testimony€and€2)€the€basis€of€his€testimony€lacked€trustworthiness.ĢĢą ąThe€trial€court€has€discretion€to€determine€the€proper€corrective€actionĻfor€discovery€abuses.€€This€court€will€not€disturb€that€determination€unless€theĻtrial€court€abused€its€discretion.€€ņ ņņņLyle€v.€Exxon€Corpó óóó.,€746€S.W.2d€694,€699Ļ(Tenn.€1988).€€In€the€instant€case,€Mr.€Butts€was€deposed€on€22€September€1995.€ĻEight€months€later€on€the€Friday€before€the€trial€on€Monday,€Plaintiffs€deliveredĻa€supplement€to€Mr.€Buttsššs€prior€testimony.€€The€supplement€substantiallyĻaltered€his€prior€opinions.€€During€his€deposition,€Mr.€Butts€concurred€with€aĻdamage€memorandum€of€December€1992€that€estimated€Plaintiffsšš€damagesĻresulting€from€the€š šloss€of€usešš€of€funds€to€be€$58,000.00.€€His€supplement€raisedĻthat€amount€significantly.€€On€the€morning€of€trial,€Plaintiffs€produced€anotherĻcalculation€raising€the€damage€claim€to€$124,668.75.€€Mr.€Butts€was€also€of€theĻopinion€in€his€deposition€that€$27,000.00€in€attorneyššs€fees€were€reasonable.€€HisĻlater€statement€raised€that€amount€to€$50,335.91.ĢĢą ąThere€are€certain€factors€for€trial€courts€to€consider€when€determiningĻappropriate€sanctions€for€abuse€of€expert€witness€discovery.€€These€are:€€1)€theĻexplanation€given€for€the€abuse;€2)€the€importance€of€the€testimony;€3)€the€needĻfor€time€to€prepare;€and€4)€the€possibility€of€a€continuance.€€ņņņ ņSee€id.ó óóó€€The€trialĻcourt€entertained€arguments€from€the€parties€on€the€application€of€these€factors€toĻthe€admission€of€Mr.€Buttsššs€testimony.€€In€regard€to€the€need€for€time€to€prepareĻto€address€this€substantial€leap€in€the€expertššs€opinion€of€damages,€the€trial€courtĻcommented:€€š šI€am€concerned.€€Itššs€about€a€$68,000€jump€and€it€would€surpriseĻme,€and€it€sounds€like€thatššs€a€surprise€to€someone€if€they€were€not€made€awareĶof€that€till€three€days€before€trial.šš€€Considering€the€first€factor€in€ņ ņņņLyleó óóó,€the€trialĻcourt€found€as€follows:ĢÓÓą8 ąThe€Court€finds€that€there€is€no€justification€for€thisĻunseasonable€response€to€a€timely€discovery€response.Ģą8 ąą ąThe€purpose€of€Rule€26€and€the€purposes€ofĻscheduling€orders€are€to€require€that€expert€witnesses€set€forthĻtheir€opinions€with€certain€sufficient€clarity€that€the€opponentsĻmay€have€the€opportunity€to€prepare€to€respond€to€thoseĻopinions.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓIt€is€clear€from€the€record€in€the€instant€case€that€the€trial€court€properly€andĻfairly€considered€the€Plaintiffsšš€proof€and€arguments€regarding€the€failure€toĻcomply€with€the€discovery€rules.€€Moreover,€the€trial€court€did€not€exclude€all€ofĻMr.€Buttsšš€testimony,€but€held€an€appropriate€sanction€was€the€exclusion€of€thoseĻportions€of€Mr.€Buttsššs€testimony€that€exceeded€his€earlier€discovery€responses.€ĻWe€are€of€the€opinion€this€was€not€an€abuse€of€the€trial€courtššs€discretion.ĢĢą ąThe€trial€court€had€other€reasons€for€limiting€Mr.€Buttsššs€testimony.€ĻThe€trial€court€found€the€increased€damages€amount€was€contrary€to€Mr.€ButtsššsĻoriginal€deposition€testimony€and€seemed€untrustworthy.€€The€court€noted:€€š šIĻhave€some€concerns€over€the€trustworthiness€of€Mr.€Buttsšš€[sic]€testimony,Ļspecifically€dealing€with€these€calculations€that€were€not€even€prepared€by€himĻthat€presume€individuals€living€to€be€115€years€old€to€the€year€2056.€€FranklyĻsome€of€those€figures€seemed€absurd.šš€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€703€provides:Ļš šThe€court€shall€disallow€testimony€in€the€form€of€an€opinion€or€inference€if€theĻunderlying€facts€or€data€indicate€lack€of€trustworthiness.šš€€ĢĢą ąDeterminations€concerning€the€admission€of€expert€testimony€are€left€toĻthe€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€and€will€not€be€disturbed€absent€an€abuse€ofĻthat€discretion.€€ņ ņņņBuchanan€v.€Harrisó óóó,€902€S.W.2d€941,€945€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€ĶIn€the€instant€case,€the€trial€court€was€afforded€the€opportunity€to€observe€andĻconsider€the€testimony€offered€by€Mr.€Butts€over€the€course€of€two€days.€ĻPlaintiffs€offered€no€indication€that€the€courtššs€finding€of€the€lack€ofĻtrustworthiness€was€an€arbitrary€exercise€of€discretion.€€The€court€did€not€abuseĻits€discretion€in€striking€portions€of€Mr.€Buttsššs€testimony.€€Therefore,€we€are€ofĻthe€opinion€this€issue€is€without€merit.ĢĢą ąņ ņB.€€Larry€Crabtreeó óĢĢą ąThe€trial€court€also€excluded€the€testimony€of€Plaintiffsšš€co„counsel,ĻLarry€Crabtree.€€Plaintiffs€proposed€to€offer€Mr.€Crabtreeššs€testimony€to€explainĻand€justify€the€fees€charged€by€King€&€Ballow€to€correct€defendantsšš€errors.ĢĢą ąCannon€5€of€the€Code€of€Professional€Conduct€provides€that€š ša€lawyerĻshould€exercise€independent€professional€judgment€on€behalf€of€a€client.šš€ĻDisciplinary€Rule€5„101(B)€mandates:ĢÓÓą8 ą€€(B)€A€lawyer€shall€not€accept€employment€in€contemplated€orĻpending€litigation€if€the€lawyer€knows€or€it€is€obvious€that€theĻlawyer€or€a€lawyer€in€the€lawyer's€firm€ought€to€be€called€as€aĻwitness,€except€that€the€lawyer€may€undertake€the€employmentĻand€the€lawyer€or€a€lawyer€in€the€lawyer's€firm€may€testify:Ģą ą€€(1)€If€the€testimony€will€relate€solely€to€an€uncontested€matter.Ģą8 ą€€(2)€If€the€testimony€will€relate€solely€to€a€matter€of€formalityĻand€there€is€no€reason€to€believe€that€substantial€evidence€willĻbe€offered€in€opposition€to€the€testimony.Ģą8 ą€€(3)€If€the€testimony€will€relate€solely€to€the€nature€and€valueĻof€legal€services€rendered€in€the€case€by€the€lawyer€or€theĻlawyer's€firm€to€the€client.Ģą8 ą€€(4)€As€to€any€matter,€if€refusal€would€work€a€substantialĻhardship€on€the€client€because€of€the€distinctive€value€of€theĻlawyer€or€the€lawyer's€firm€as€counsel€in€the€particular€case.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€ÓThis€rule€embodies€important€public€policy€considerations€and€ultimately€protectsĶclients.€€Ethical€Consideration€5„9€recognizes€the€costs€to€a€client€when€anĻattorney/€witness€refuses€to€withdraw€as€counsel€providing:€€š šIf€a€lawyer€is€bothĻcounsel€and€witness,€the€lawyer€becomes€more€easily€impeachable€for€interest€andĻthus€may€be€a€less€effective€witness.€€Conversely,€the€opposing€counsel€may€beĻhandicapped€in€challenging€the€credibility€of€the€lawyer€.€.€.€.€€An€advocate€whoĻbecomes€a€witness€is€in€the€unseemly€and€ineffective€position€of€arguing€theĻadvocateššs€own€credibility.šš€€Finally,€Ethical€Consideration€5„10€mandates:€Ļš šWhere€the€question€arises,€doubt€should€be€resolved€in€favor€of€the€lawyerĻtestifying€and€against€becoming€or€continuing€as€an€advocate.šš€€These€guidelinesĻare€clear.€€An€attorney€must€steadfastly€guard€against€becoming€both€an€advocateĻand€a€witness.ĢĢą ąThis€court€has€held€that€trial€courts€š šhave€a€broad€range€of€optionsĻavailable€to€insulate€trials€from€ethical€taint.šš€€ņņņ ņHilton€v.€Crawfordó óóó,€No.Ļ03A01„9102CV33,€1991€WL€261872,€at€*3€(Tenn.€App.€13€Dec.€1991).€€InĻņņņ ņHiltonóóó ó,€the€court€concluded:€š š[T]he€mere€fact€that€counsel€is€a€potential€witness€isĻnot€sufficient€reason€for€disqualification.€€It€may€very€well€be,€however,€ifĻcounsel€wish€to€become€a€witness€the€Trial€Court€might€exclude€their€testimony.€.Ļ.€.šš€€ņņņ ņId.ó óóóĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€argue€the€exception€contained€in€Disciplinary€Rule€5„101(B)(3)€applies€to€Mr.€Crabtreeššs€testimony.€€We€disagree.€€The€issues€whichĻMr.€Crabtreeššs€testimony€would€address€are€more€involved€than€merely€statingĻthe€š šnature€and€value€of€legal€services€rendered.šš€€In€this€case,€Mr.€CrabtreeššsĻtestimony€would€necessarily€address€highly€disputed€issues.× ƒ1 ××  ׀€In€other€words,€theĶtestimony€and€cross„examination€would€involve€the€appropriateness€of€theĻcorrective€actions€taken,€the€results€of€the€corrective€actions€taken,€alternativeĻactions€which€Plaintiffs€could€have€taken,€the€cost€of€the€corrective€actions,Ļestimates€of€the€cost€of€alternative€actions,€the€propriety€of€the€fees€actuallyĻincurred,€and€so€on.€€As€explained€by€the€trial€court,€this€is€not€a€case€where€theĻtestifying€attorney€simply€lays€the€foundation€for€the€trial€court€to€make€an€awardĻof€attorneyššs€fees.ĢĢą ąPlaintiffs€also€argue€the€trial€court€should€have€permitted€Mr.€CrabtreeĻto€testify€because€excluding€his€testimony€worked€a€hardship€on€Plaintiffs.€€TheĻSixth€Circuit€has€noted€that€š š[a]€self„inflicted€injury€is€not€a€hardship.šš€€ņ ņņņGeneralĻMill€Supply€Co.€v.€SCA€Servs.,€Inc.,€óóó ó697€F.2d€704,€713€(6th€Cir.€1982).€ĻThe€court€in€ņ ņņņGeneral€Milló óóó€stated:ĢÓÓą8 ąNow€they€turn€to€the€United€States€District€Court€and€say€inĻeffect:€ššYes,€judge,€we€know€that€the€canons€would€neverĻallow€[the€attorney]€to€represent€General€Mill€in€an€abuse€ofĻprocess€suit,€and€also€be€its€star€witness.€€But€you€canššt€doĻanything€to€us,€because,€knowing€what€was€down€the€road,€byĻour€own€deliberate€action€we€created€a€situation€where€[theĻattorney]€is€indispensable€to€General€Mill€and€his€withdrawal€aĻhardship.€€So,€judge,€youššll€just€have€to€swallow€it.Ģą8 ąą ą.€.€.€[T]he€duty€to€withdraw€is€plainest€when€the€needĻto€be€a€witness€is€well€known€in€advance.€€The€canon€would€beĻabsurd€and€indefensible€if€it€excused€compliance€when€theĻdependence€of€the€client€on€the€lawyer€had€been€created€in€factĻof€the€knowledge€that€the€dependence€would€be€used€toĻfrustrate€the€enforcement€of€the€canon.€€The€term€š šhardshipššĻis€certainly€capable€of€rational€interpretation,€of€meaning€aĻsituation€the€alleged€victim€of€the€hardship€has€not€knowinglyĻcaused€and€could€not€reasonable€foresee.ĢÓ€ÓĢÓ€Óņņņ ņId.óóó ó€at€714„15.€€After€hearing€the€proffered€Crabtree€testimony,€the€trial€courtĶfound:€€š šThis€is€exactly€the€type€of€situation€that€the€DR€5„101€is€intended€toĻaddress.€€It€puts€lawyers€in€the€most€uncomfortable€position€to€be€both€advocateĻand€witness.€€This€is€not€a€situation€that€was€not€unforeseeable.šš€€Attorneys€cannotĻbe€allowed€to€create€client€hardships€in€order€to€force€the€court€to€acceptĻprohibited€testimony.ĢĢą ąIn€addition,€the€trial€court€in€this€case€specifically€found€PlaintiffsĻsuffered€no€substantial€harm€in€the€exclusion€of€Mr.€Crabtreeššs€testimony.€€WeĻagree.€€Plaintiffs€had€an€independent€expert,€Samuel€Butts,€who€could€base€hisĻopinions€about€the€necessity€and€reasonableness€of€the€corrective€work€uponĻCrabtreeššs€representations€to€him.€€Based€upon€€the€record,€the€trial€court€did€notĻabuse€its€discretion€in€excluding€the€testimony€of€co„counsel€Larry€Crabtree€fromĻthe€trial€in€this€cause.ĢĢą ąņ ņIV.€€Conclusionó óĢĢą ąIt€results€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€in€part,Ļreversed€in€part,€and€remanded.€€On€remand,€the€trial€court€shall€determine€theĻappropriate€amount€of€the€initial€fees€payable€to€Plaintiffs€as€damages.€€Costs€onĻappeal€are€taxed€equally€to€Plaintiffs€and€œDefendants.ĢÓÓĢÓ ` °§XÓĢĢą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą_______________________________Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEĢĢĢĢĢCONCUR:ĢĢĢĢ_____________________________________ĢBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€J.ĢĢĢĢ_____________________________________ĢWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€J.Ģą ąĢĢĢ