ÿWPC.J …# VUNa %¯ 0Nµ 0Í bÐ w@Ø 4 , ˜; 0DÓ † mŸ¶¾ mÀ× 0Jß 0T) 0^} BÛ 0hø D3` 0r“ 0| 0@ 0†Á 0G 1u×U,L 0dxU,ÜU:>B)FDCo AM²U*ÿC)·l¨#TËy  ˜(£+:À-=ú.=70ot19ã3O5Pk6D»8Ûÿ:^Ú<v~8AvÓ¶B AO‰HÆØH 0DžI D/âI BJ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (í€"  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular¼(&öy$¡¡Ó  ÓÙñÓ Ù(}(2”^$¤¤Ý ƒöy!ÝÓ  ÓÙñÓ ÙÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X´âX¼¼Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- ÇUÈÉUÊUËUÌUÍDÎÏÓ€ÙDÒ Pƒ¬ð€À\3|xÙSumner ERBYBednarzMowlesKriegWaldropMendenhallHardin 6thT.P.I. EducAssn 402BCJ2d 8th 5thChevelleN.W.2d TRXCortazzoConoverStephenson S.W. Mut InsPerkeyRidingsRyBrazealeCurranLoefflerKjellgrenSmithwickSharpeLewisburgMessingerGreene J.C.1BPairamored.c.r.o.McCormicMCorryHersteinKemker1970s-1980s1980s1930sSpellmeyer(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóLadd v. Honda - Opinion Ì 5& ' IB011C20IB011C2 .   ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(((('ÿÿdxd2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô&')+,./ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d;;;;7Border 1dd€-<Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial 9Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€>ÔÔ€>ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€>XÔÌÌAugust€7,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ­Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€complaint€alleged€negligence€claims€against€Mr.€Givens€and€the€dealership€thatÏsold€him€the€all„terrain€vehicle.€€This€appeal€concerns€only€the€claims€against€the€HondaÏdefendants.Ì žÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€motions€actually€contain€twenty€grounds;€however,€two€of€the€grounds€in€theÏsecond€motion€for€new€trial€duplicate€grounds€contained€in€the€first€motion€for€new€trial.Ì JÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òò¢Clingan£€v.€Vulcan€Life€Ins.€Co.,óó€694€¢S.W.2d£€327,€331€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985).Ì o Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝFew€appellate€dispositions€have€caused€more€confusion€among€the€bench€and€bar€thanÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€practice€of€declining€to€review€an€intermediate€appellate€courtððsÏopinion€ð ðconcurring€in€results€only.ðð€€One€justice€has€characterized€the€practice€as€ð ðpatentlyÏunfairðð€because€it€leaves€the€intermediate€appellate€courts,€the€trial€courts,€and€the€litigants€toÏspeculate€about€the€reasons€for€the€Courtððs€action.€€òò¢Pairamore£€v.€¢Pairamore£,óó€547€¢S.W.2d£€atÏ552€(Henry,€J.,€dissenting).ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€never€satisfactorily€explained€the€difference€betweenÏthe€ð ð¢d.c.r.o.£ðð€disposition€and€a€simple€denial€of€an€application€for€permission€to€appeal.€€WhenÏthe€Court€denies€an€application€for€permission€to€appeal€ð ðconcurring€in€results€only,ðð€it€isÏobviously€concurring€only€in€the€opinionððs€results,€not€necessarily€its€reasoning.€€However,Ïthe€Court€has€never€held€that€the€simple€denial€of€an€application€for€permission€to€appealÏamounts€to€an€endorsement€of€both€the€reasoning€and€the€results€of€the€intermediate€appellateÏcourtððs€opinion.€€While€it€has€pointed€out€that€the€denial€of€a€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application,Ïwithout€more,€ð ðemphasizes€the€concurrence€of€the€Court€in€the€opinion€of€the€.€.€.€[intermediateÏappellate€court],ðð€òòBeard€v.€Beard,€óó158€Tenn.€437,€442,€14€¢S.W.2d£€745,€747€(1929),€it€hasÏalso€explained€that€it€is€primarily€concerned€with€the€results€reached,€òòAdams€v.€State,óó€547Ï¢S.W.2d£€553,€556€(Tenn.€1977);€òòBryan€v.€Aetna€Life€Ins.€Co.,óó€174€Tenn.€602,€611,€130Ï¢S.W.2d£€85,€88€(1939),€and€that€the€simple€denial€of€an€application€for€permission€to€appealÏdoes€not€commit€the€Court€to€all€the€views€expressed€in€the€particular€intermediate€appellateÏcourt€opinion.€€òòSwift€v.€Kirby,€óó737€¢S.W.2d£€271,€277€(Tenn.€1987);€òòStreet€v.€¢Calvert£,óó€541Ï¢S.W.2d£€576,€587€(Tenn.€1976).€€Thus,€it€would€appear€that€the€Courtððs€simple€denial€of€anÏapplication€for€permission€to€appeal€does€not€have€any€greater€jurisprudential€significance€thanÏa€denial€ð ðconcurring€in€results€only.ððÌÌà àThus,€the€distinction€between€a€¢ð ðd.c.r.o.ðð£€disposition€and€the€simple€denial€of€anÏapplication€for€permission€to€appeal€is€extremely€subtle.€€On€the€face€of€things,€the€CourtÏappears€to€be€engaging€in€a€result„oriented€analysis€in€both€circumstances€and€is€not€necessarilyÏagreeing€with€the€intermediate€appellate€courtððs€reasoning€when€it€simply€denies€the€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.€11€application.€€A€better€understanding€of€the€two€dispositions€will€only€come€whenÏthe€Court€provides€a€clearer€explanation€of€the€differences€between€them.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWhile€the€court€may€have€been€dissatisfied€with€some€portion€of€the€reasoning€in€ourÏearlier€opinion,€it€left€our€conclusion€that€the€trial€court€had€not€given€an€improper€dynamiteÏcharge€in€tact.€€Presumably€the€Court€would€not€have€permitted€our€decision€to€stand€if€we€hadÏreached€the€wrong€result.€€The€Court€alluded€to€our€decision€in€a€later€case€without€criticism.ÏòòSeeóó€òòJohnson€v.€Hardin,óó€App.€No.€01„S„01„9510„CV„00188,€slip€op.€at€13€n.8€(Tenn.€JulyÏ15,€1996)€(Opinion€designated€ð ðFor€Publicationðð).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€note€contained€a€reference€to€the€portion€of€the€special€verdict€form€containing€theÏquestions€relating€to€Michael€Laddððs€misrepresentation€claims.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€andÏthe€parties€concluded€that€the€jury€had€not€been€able€to€reach€a€unanimous€decision€on€thisÏissue.Ì 0Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòJohnson€v.€Hardinóó,€òòsupraóó€note€5,€slip€op.€at€13.Ì 3Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòJohnson€v.€Hardin,óó€òòsupraóó€note€5,€slip€op.€at€15„18.Ì 3Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòJohnson€v.€Hardin,óó€òòsupraóó€note€5,€slip€op.€at€18„19.Ì eÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€have€confined€our€analysis€of€this€issue€to€the€portion€of€the€trial€courtððsÏinstructions€requesting€an€advisory€verdict.€€We€have€not€considered€whether€other€portions€ofÏthe€charge€improperly€coerced€the€jury€into€reaching€a€decision€since€we€addressed€this€issueÏon€the€earlier€interlocutory€appeal€of€this€case€and€our€decision€has€become€the€law€of€the€case.Ì /Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€Honda€¢TRX£€250€is€an€adult„sized€all„terrain€vehicle.Ì EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòAmerican€Safety€Equip.€Corp.€v.€Winkler,óó€640€P.2d€216,€218„19€(Colo.€1982).Ì FÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€used€the€term€ð ðchattelðð€in€Section€¢402B£.€€We€seeÏno€meaningful€distinction€between€the€terms€ð ðchattelðð€and€ð ðproductðð€which€are€frequently€usedÏinterchangeably.€€Adhering€to€the€language€of€the€Tennessee€Products€Liability€Act€of€1978,Ïwe€will€continue€to€use€the€term€ð ðproduct.ððÌ :Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€need€not€decide€here€whether€actions€based€on€express€warranties€must€always€beÏmodel„specific.€€We€note,€however,€that€the€seminal€case€of€òòBaxter€v.€Ford€Motor€Co.óó,€fromÏwhich€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€402B€was€developed,€involved€a€representationÏconcerning€all€Ford€automobiles,€not€just€a€specific€model.Ì ÑÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€Honda€defendantsðð€burden€of€proof€instruction€stated€that€the€plaintiff€mustÏprove€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€they€ð ðmade€material€misrepresentations€about€theÏvehicle€which€were€not€true€.€.€..ððÌ TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€:XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€instructions€contain€another€error€not€briefed€by€the€parties€that€is€materialÏenough€to€mention€here€because€this€case€will€be€retried.€€The€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€thatÏð ð[a]€manufacturer€of€a€product€is€not€liable€for€any€injury€to€a€person€or€property€caused€by€theÏproduct€unless€the€product€is€determined€to€be€in€a€defective€condition€or€unreasonablyÏdangerous€at€the€time€it€left€the€control€of€the€manufacturer.ðð€€While€this€is€a€correct€statementÏof€the€law€with€regard€to€most€claims€under€the€Tennessee€Products€Liability€Act€of€1978,€itÏdoes€not€apply€to€claims€based€on€misrepresentation.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„105(c).€ÏThe€trial€court€failed€to€explain€this€distinction€in€the€portions€of€its€instructions€dealing€withÏMichael€Laddððs€burden€of€proof,€the€misrepresentation€claim,€or€the€products€liability€claims.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€1ÔÓ&€99X„d&ÓÑ#€99Xd#ÑÔ€:ÔÔ€:¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ý›Ñ Ü ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€Þ°¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñà@ àÔ€:„Ôò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLE̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€=?<;+'h|q` ç `€€Lß›ÌÔ€:¼ÔÌó óMICHAEL€ANTHONY€LADD,à à)Ìa€minor,€by€VIRGINIA€LADD,à àà à)Ìas€next€friend€and€legal€guardian,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSumner€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€9605„CÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌHONDA€MOTOR€CO.,€LTD.;à àà à)à àAppeal€No.ÌHONDA€R€&€D€CO.,€LTD.;à àà à)à à01„A„01„9503„CV„00091ÌAMERICAN€HONDA€MOTOR€CO.,à à)ÌINC.;€BOWLING€GREEN€CYCLES,à à)ÌINC.;€and€ERBY€L.€GIVENS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)Ì̛̜Ìà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€SUMNER€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€¢GALLATIN£,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€¢GOODALL£,€JUDGEÌ̛̜ÌòòFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€theÏDefendants/Appelleesóó:ÌÌJoe€Bednarzà àà àà àà àà àà àà àLinda€J.€Hamilton€MowlesÌNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àà àR.€Dale€BayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àLewis,€King,€Krieg€&ÏWaldropÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌœÌÌÌÌ›ÌÌà@ àÔ€:„Ôò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌÔ€:¼ÔÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,ÏJUDGEÇÑ d ÑÓ€ÓÔ€:„Ôà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÔ€:¼ÔÌà àThis€appeal€involves€a€twelve„year„old€boy€who€became€paralyzed€whenÏhe€lost€control€of€an€all„terrain€vehicle€and€crashed€into€a€utility€pole.€€TheÏboy€sued€the€manufacturer€of€the€all„terrain€vehicle€in€the€Circuit€Court€forÏSumner€County,€alleging€that€its€advertisements€falsely€and€misleadinglyÏdepicted€all„terrain€vehicles€as€safe€enough€to€be€operated€by€children.€€TheÏjury€returned€a€verdict€for€the€manufacturer€following€a€lengthy€trial,€and€theÏchild€and€his€mother€appealed.€€We€have€determined€that€the€trial€courtððsÏinstructions€did€not€fairly€appraise€the€jury€of€the€plaintiffððs€theory€of€the€caseÏand€that€its€supplemental€instructions€confused€the€jury€about€the€significanceÏof€their€verdict.€€Therefore,€we€reverse€the€judgment€and€remand€the€case€forÏa€new€trial.€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà à¢Erby£€Givens€purchased€a€four„wheeled€Honda€all„terrain€vehicle€ModelÏ¢TRX£€250€in€January€1986.€€Approximately€four€months€later,€he€drove€hisÏð ðfour„wheelerðð€to€Earl€and€Virginia€Laddððs€apartment€in€the€Portland€HousingÏAuthority€complex.€€During€his€visit,€Mr.€Givens€permitted€the€¢Ladds£ðð€twelve„year„old€son,€Michael,€to€drive€the€œall„terrain€vehicle.›€€He€had€permitted€theÏboy€to€drive€the€œall„terrain€vehicle¢£›€in€the€past,€and€he€believed€that€childrenÏcould€safely€operate€œit›€because€he€had€seen€Hondaððs€advertisements€showingÏchildren€driving€all„terrain€vehicles.€ÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€began€driving€the€œall„terrain€vehicle›€on€the€street€in€frontÏof€the€housing€complex.€€After€several€hours,€he€and€a€passenger€beganÏdriving€the€vehicle€on€a€grassy€area€behind€his€parentsðð€apartment.€€WhileÏMichael€Ladd€had€adult€supervision€during€the€early€part€of€the€day,€hisÏparents€and€Mr.€Givens€became€€involved€with€other€activities€as€the€afternoonÏwore€on.€€Mr.€Givens€and€Mr.€Ladd€were€drinking€beer€on€the€¢Ladds£ðð€frontÏporch,€and€Ms.€Ladd€was€babysitting€her€granddaughter€inside€the€¢Ladds£ððÏapartment.ÌÌÑ Ü Ñà àMichael€Ladd€drove€the€œall„terrain€vehicle›€on€the€grassy€area€behind€hisÏparentsðð€apartment€all€afternoon.€€At€approximately€5:30€p.m.,€he€and€aÏtwelve„year„old€passenger€hit€a€two„foot€wide€dish„shaped€depression€in€theÏground.€€Michael€Ladd€lost€control,€and€the€œall„terrain€vehicle›€crashed€into€aÏutility€pole.€€The€passenger€was€thrown€from€the€vehicle€without€seriousÏinjury,€but€Michael€Ladd€hit€the€utility€pole€head„on.€€His€injuries€haveÏrendered€him€a€paraplegic.ÌÌà àIn€May€1991,€Michael€Ladd€filed€suit€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€SumnerÏCounty€against€Honda€Motor€Co.,€Ltd.,€Honda€Research€and€Development,ÏLtd.,€Honda€R&D€North€America,€Inc.,€American€Honda€Motor€Company,ÏInc.,€Mr.€Givens,€and€the€dealership€that€sold€the€four„wheeler€to€Mr.€Givens.€ÏWith€regard€to€the€four€Honda€defendants,€the€complaint€alleged:€(1)€that€theÏ1986€œ¢Honda€TRX£›€250€all„terrain€vehicle€was€defective€or€unreasonablyÏdangerous,€(2)€that€the€safety€warnings€for€the€vehicle€were€inadequate,€(3)Ïthat€the€Honda€defendants€had€misrepresented€the€characteristics€of€all„terrainÍvehicles,€and€(4)€that€the€design,€manufacture,€testing,€or€inspection€of€theÏ1986€Honda€¢TRX£€250€all„terrain€vehicle€was€negligent.× ƒ@ ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€trial€began€in€March€1993€and€lasted€five€weeks.€€On€the€third€dayÏof€deliberations,€the€jury€reported€that€it€could€not€reach€a€decision€withÏregard€to€the€misrepresentation€claims.€€The€trial€judge€gave€the€juryÏadditional€instructions€and€urged€them€to€answer€as€many€of€the€questions€onÏthe€special€verdict€form€as€they€could.€€The€jury€completed€the€special€verdictÏform€within€one€hour€and€answered€all€questions€in€favor€of€the€HondaÏdefendants.€€Michael€Ladd€filed€two€timely€motions€for€new€trial.€€The€trialÏcourt€initially€denied€the€motions€but€later€reversed€itself€because€it€believed€itÏhad€given€an€improper€dynamite€charge.€€The€Honda€defendants€sought€andÏobtained€an€interlocutory€appeal€with€regard€to€this€decision.€ÌÌà àOn€May€13,€1994,€this€court€filed€an€opinion€concluding€that€the€trialÏcourt€had€not€given€the€jury€a€dynamite€charge€and,€therefore,€that€the€trialÏcourt€had€erroneously€granted€the€new€trial.€€Since€the€trial€court€had€notÏacted€on€the€other€Ñ d ÑÑ 8 Ñgrounds€stated€in€the€motion€for€new€trial,€this€courtÏvacated€the€order€granting€the€new€trial€and€remanded€the€case€with€directionsÏthat€the€trial€court€consider€and€act€upon€these€other€grounds.€€òòLadd€v.€HondaÏMotor€Co.,óó€App.€No.€01„A„01„9309„CV„00399,€slip€op.€at€9„10€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€May€13,€1994),€òòperm.€app.€denied€concurring€in€results€onlyóó€(Tenn.ÏSept.€26,€1994).€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€denied€the€remaining€grounds€of€the€motion€for€newÏtrial€in€July€1994€before€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€had€disposed€ofÏMichael€Laddððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal.€€In€October€1994,€afterÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€denied€Michael€Laddððs€application€forÏ¢permission£€to€appeal,€the€trial€court€entered€a€final€order€approving€the€juryððsÏverdict€as€thirteenth€juror,€denying€the€first€and€second€motions€for€new€trial,Ïand€taxing€the€costs€to€Michael€Ladd.€€This€appeal€ensued.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Scope€of€the€Appealó óóóÌÌà àWe€turn€first€to€the€scope€of€this€appeal.€€Since€this€is€the€second€appealÏin€this€case,€Michael€Ladd€cannot€reargue€issues€that€have€already€been€heardÏand€decided.€€Several€of€the€issues€he€has€raised€on€this€appeal€were€eitherÏdirectly€or€implicitly€decided€on€the€first€appeal€and,€therefore,€will€not€beÏconsidered€now.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€filed€two€timely€post„trial€motions€containing€eighteenÏgrounds€for€a€new€trial.× ƒA ××  ×€€Eight€of€these€grounds€related€to€the€trial€courtððsÏinstructions€and€comments€to€the€jury,€including€the€supplemental€instructionsÏgiven€after€the€jury€reported€it€was€deadlocked.€€The€trial€court€first€deniedÏthe€motions€for€new€trial,€observing€that€the€appellate€courts€ð ðwill€certainlyÏhave€a€great€deal€to€chew€on.ðð€€During€a€later€hearing€concerning€the€wordingÍof€its€final€order,€the€trial€court€announced€that€it€had€changed€its€mind€andÏhad€decided€to€grant€Michael€Ladd€a€new€trial.€€The€decision€was€based€solelyÏon€the€trial€courtððs€belief€that€it€had€given€an€improper€dynamite€charge€whenÏthe€jury€announced€it€was€deadlocked.€€ÌÌà àBoth€the€trial€court€and€this€court€granted€the€Honda€defendantsÏpermission€to€perfect€an€interlocutory€appeal€to€determine€whether€the€trialÏcourtððs€supplemental€instructions€amounted€to€ð ðan€improper€ððdynamite€chargeððÏwhich€may€have€improperly€influenced€the€jury.ðð€€In€this€court,€the€HondaÏdefendants€insisted€that€the€only€issue€to€be€decided€was€whether€the€trial€courtÏused€a€dynamite€charge€to€coerce€the€jury€to€return€a€verdict.€€Michael€Ladd,Ïon€the€other€hand,€argued€that€the€court€could€consider€the€broader€issue€ofÏwhether€there€was€any€ground€for€granting€him€a€new€trial.€€This€courtÏdetermined€that€the€trial€court€had€not€used€an€inappropriate€dynamite€chargeÏand€accordingly€vacated€the€order€granting€the€motion€for€new€trial.€€òòLadd€v.ÏHonda€Motor€Co.,óó€òòsupra,óó€slip€op.€at€9.€€We€also€remanded€the€case€withÏdirections€that€the€trial€court€consider€and€rule€on€the€other€grounds€assertedÏin€the€motions€for€new€trial.€€òòLadd€v.€Honda€Motor€Co.,óó€òòsupra,óó€slip€op.€at€10.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€thereafter€approved€the€verdict€as€thirteenth€juror€andÏdenied€both€of€Michael€Laddððs€motions€for€new€trial€on€all€grounds.€€The€trialÏcourt€stayed€its€order€while€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€considered€whetherÏit€would€review€this€courtððs€decision.€€After€the€Court€declined€to€review€theÏcase,€the€trial€court€entered€a€final€order€again€denying€both€motions€for€newÏtrial€on€all€grounds.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€law€of€the€case€doctrine€is€a€discretionary€rule€of€practice€thatÏpromotes€judicial€economy€and€consistency€and€also€protects€litigants€from€theÏburdens€of€repeatedly€rearguing€issues€that€have€been€decided.€€18€Charles€A.ÏWright€et€al.,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€4478,€at€788„90€(1981).€€It€isÏnot€a€limitation€on€a€courtððs€power€like€the€doctrine€of€res€judicata,€but€ratherÏit€is€a€common€sense€recognition€that€issues€ordinarily€need€not€be€revisitedÏonce€they€have€been€litigated€and€decided.€€òò¢Messinger£€v.€Anderson,óó€225€U.S.Ï436,€444,€32€S.€Ct.€739,€740€(1912);€òò¢Mendenhall£€v.€Barber„Greene€Co.,óó€26ÏF.3d€1573,€1582€(Fed.€Cir.),€òòcert.€denied,óó€115€S.€Ct.€582€(1994).ÌÌà àUnder€the€law€of€the€case€doctrine,€an€appellate€courtððs€decision€on€anÏissue€of€law€becomes€binding€precedent€to€be€followed€in€later€trials€andÏappeals€of€the€same€case€involving€the€same€issues€and€facts.€€òòJones€v.€Jones,óóÏ784€¢S.W.2d£€349,€351€n.1€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€òò¢Cook£€v.€¢McCullough£,óó€735Ï¢S.W.2d£€464,€470„71€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987)€(quoting€¢òòHolcomb£€v.€¢McClureóó£,€64ÏSo.€2d€689,€691€(Miss.€1953));€¢1B£€James€W.€Moore€&€Jo€¢Desha£€Lucas,ÏòòMooreððs€Federal€Practiceóó€ðð€0.404[1]€(2d€ed.€1995).€€The€doctrine€applies€toÏissues€that€were€actually€before€the€court,€òòBarnes€v.€¢Walker£,óó€191€Tenn.€364,Ï374,€234€¢S.W.2d£€648,€652€(1950),€or€to€issues€that€were€necessarily€decidedÏby€implication.€€18€Wright€et€al.,€òòsupra,€óóðð€4478,€at€789.€€It€does€not€apply€toÏdicta.€€òòRidley€v.€¢Haiman£,óó€164€Tenn.€239,€248„49,€47€¢S.W.2d£€750,€752„53Ï(1932);€òò¢Schoen£€v.€J.C.€Bradford€&€Co.,óó€667€¢S.W.2d£€97,€101€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1984).€€Thus,€taking€an€interlocutory€appeal€does€not€preclude€a€later€appealÏfrom€the€final€judgment,€but€the€decision€of€the€appellate€courts€on€theÏinterlocutory€appeal€constitutes€the€law€of€the€case€with€regard€to€the€œissues›Íraised€and€decided€on€the€interlocutory€appeal.€€1B€Moore€et€al.,€òòsupra,óó€ððÏ0.404[4.„7],€at€II„36€to€II„37.ÌÌà àThe€application€of€the€law€of€the€case€doctrine€to€intermediate€appellateÏcourt€opinions€does€not€necessarily€depend€upon€whether€the€opinion€œhas›€beenÏreviewed€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court.€€The€doctrine€has€been€applied€toÏdecisions€that€have€not€been€reviewed€by€the€Supreme€Court,€òò¢Bivins£€v.ÏHospital€Corp.€of€Am.,óó€910€¢S.W.2d£€441,€447€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995),€as€wellÏas€to€decisions€that€the€Supreme€Court€has€declined€to€review.€€òòLife€&ÏCasualty€Ins.€Co.€v.€¢Jett£,óó€175€Tenn.€295,€299,€133€¢S.W.2d£€997,€998„99€(1939);Ï¢òòState€ex€rel.€Kirkpatrick€v.€Tipton£,óó€670€¢S.W.2d£€224,€226€&€n.5€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1984);€òò¢S.M.R.£€Enters.€v.€Southern€¢Haircutters£,€Inc.,óó€662€¢S.W.2d£€944,Ï950€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€Obviously,€it€does€not€apply€to€intermediateÏappellate€court€opinions€that€have€been€reversed€or€vacated.€€While€someÏquestion€exists€with€regard€to€its€application€to€intermediate€appellate€courtÏdecisions€that€the€Supreme€Court€has€declined€to€review€ð ðconcurring€in€resultsÏonly,ðð¢× ƒB ××  ×£€we€conclude€that€the€doctrine€applies€to€these€cases€because€theÏdecision€to€concur€only€with€the€results€of€an€opinion€simply€ð ðevinces€.€.€.€[the]ÏCourtððs€judgment€¢that£€the€opinion€of€the€.€.€.€[intermediate€appellate€court]Ïshould€not€be€published.ðð€€òò¢Pairamore£€v.€¢Pairamore£,óó€547€¢S.W.2d£€545,€548Ï(Tenn.€1977).¢× ƒC ××  ×£€€These€decisions€still€have€precedential€value€with€regard€to€theÍparties€involved€in€the€case.€€òòPatton€v.€¢McHone£,óó€822€¢S.W.2d£€608,€615€n.10Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àThis€courtððs€decision€in€the€earlier€interlocutory€appeal€in€this€case€hasÏbecome€the€law€of€the€case€with€regard€to€four€of€Michael€Laddððs€issues€onÏthis€appeal.€€First,€this€court€has€squarely€decided€that€the€trial€courtððsÏsupplemental€instructions€did€not€amount€to€a€dynamite€charge€thatÏimproperly€coerced€the€jury€into€returning€a€verdict€for€the€defendants.€ÏSecond,€this€court€expressly€concurred€with€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€anÏinterlocutory€appeal€from€its€decision€to€grant€a€new€trial€was€warranted.€ÏThird,€this€court,€not€the€trial€court,€ultimately€decided€what€the€scope€of€theÏinterlocutory€appeal€would€be€and€also€which€standard€of€review€we€wouldÍapply.€€Thus,€the€trial€courtððs€decisions€with€regard€to€the€latter€two€points€hadÏno€practical€effect€on€the€direction€or€scope€of€the€interlocutory€proceedings.ÌÌà àThis€court€also€decided€a€fourth€issue€by€necessary€implication.€€ByÏdetermining€that€the€trial€courtððs€supplemental€instructions€were€notÏinappropriately€coercive€and€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€granting€a€new€trial,Ïwe€necessarily€decided€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€by€giving€supplementalÏinstructions€instead€of€declaring€a€mistrial.€€We€would€not€have€addressed€theÏsubstance€of€the€supplemental€instructions€had€we€concluded€that€noÏsupplemental€instructions€should€have€been€given.€€Thus,€our€decision€that€theÏsupplemental€instructions€did€not€amount€to€an€inappropriate€dynamite€chargeÏnecessarily€rested€on€our€conclusion€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€by€givingÏthese€instructions€rather€than€declaring€a€mistrial.ÌÌà àThis€court€addressed€these€four€issues€directly€or€by€necessaryÏimplication€when€we€granted€and€decided€the€earlier€interlocutory€appeal€inÏthis€case.€€Our€decisions€on€these€issues€have€not€been€reversed€or€vacated€byÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court× ƒD ××  ×€and,€therefore,€have€become€the€law€of€theÏcase.€€Accordingly,€we€will€not€revisit€these€issues€on€this€appeal.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Request€for€an€Advisory€Verdictó óóóÌÌà àWe€now€turn€to€the€trial€courtððs€supplemental€instructions€after€theÏforeperson€announced€that€the€jury€was€deadlocked.€€The€trial€courtÏapparently€decided€that€the€case€would€have€to€be€tried€again€and€exhorted€theÏjury€to€return€an€advisory€verdict€that€would€be€helpful€to€the€court€and€theÏparties.€€We€have€determined€that€this€instruction€was€contrary€to€establishedÏlaw€and€that€it€confused€the€jury€with€regard€to€their€function.€€Accordingly,Ïit€undermined€the€validity€of€the€juryððs€verdict.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThe€jury€encountered€difficulties€almost€as€soon€as€they€beganÏdeliberating.€€During€the€first€two€days€of€deliberations,€the€jury€requestedÏfour€clarifications€of€different€portions€of€the€instructions€and€the€questions€onÏthe€special€verdict€form.€€On€the€third€day,€after€the€jury€had€deliberated€forÏover€fifteen€hours,€the€foreperson€passed€a€note€to€the€trial€court€stating:€ð ðWeÏcannot€come€to€a€¢unanamous£€[sic]€¢decision£.€€We€have€tried€very€hard€but€onÏone€question€we€simply€cannot€agree.× ƒE ××  ×€€We€feel€that€we€all€have€followed€ourÏown€convictions.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€called€the€jury€into€the€courtroom€in€response€to€the€noteÏand€asked€the€foreperson€whether€the€jury€had€agreed€on€the€answers€to€theÏquestions€on€the€special€verdict€form€other€than€those€relating€to€theÏmisrepresentation€claims.€€After€the€foreperson€announced€that€the€jury€hadÏbeen€able€to€answer€the€other€questions,€the€trial€court€instructed€the€juryÌÓÓà8 àà8 àto€go€back€and€fill€out€what€you€can.€€Now,€you€mustÏremember,€I€doubt€that€I€have€instructed€you€on€this,ÏI€will€look€it€over€to€be€certain€there€is€not€anyÏinconsistent€verdict,€Iððll€review€that.€.€.€.€ThoseÏthings€that€you€have€agreed€on,€go€on€and€fill€thatÏ[the€verdict€form]€out,€sign€it,€come€back€and€let€meÏlook€at€that.ÌÌÌÓ€Óà àThe€jury€returned€approximately€twenty€minutes€later€with€a€partiallyÏcompleted€verdict€form.€€The€trial€court€repeated€the€portions€of€its€originalÏcharge€concerning€the€requirement€of€a€unanimous€verdict,€the€duty€of€jurorsÏto€consult€with€each€other€during€deliberations,€and€the€jurorsðð€obligation€notÏto€surrender€their€honest€convictions.€€The€trial€court€also€stated€that€it€wouldÏdiscuss€the€possibility€of€giving€additional€instructions€with€the€lawyers€andÏthen€asked€each€juror€whether€ð ðan€expanded€definitionðð€of€the€portion€of€theÏinstructions€relating€to€Michael€Laddððs€misrepresentation€claim€would€beÏhelpful.€€Five€of€the€seven€jurors€responded€that€they€doubted€that€additionalÏinstructions€would€be€helpful.ÌÌà àAs€soon€as€the€jury€returned€to€the€jury€room,€the€trial€court€informedÏthe€lawyers€that€it€intended€to€give€the€jury€a€ð ðdynamite€charge.ðð€€After€theÏlawyers€could€not€agree€on€the€instructions€to€accompany€this€supplementalÏinstruction,€the€trial€court€stated€out€of€the€juryððs€presence:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[¢Y]ou£€all€can€assign€this€as€an€error,€but€Iððm€going€toÏcall€them€back€in€and€give€them€the€dynamite€charge.€ÏAnd€you€all€can€assign€it€as€error,€either€one€of€you,Ïand€Iððll€grant€a€new€trial€on€that,€but€I€donððt€thinkÏthat€working€this€long€we€should€leave€the€courtroomÏand€not€have€some€sort€of€an€advisor,€because€theÏSupreme€Court€is€advocating€alternative€disputeÏresolutions€and€itððs€„„€you€€know,€even€if€a€majorityÏcan€decide€on€a€certain€thing,€whatever€that€majorityÍdecides,€Iððd€like€to€know€that€to€have€in€the€file€here,Ïand€Iððll€grant€a€new€trial€based€on€that.€€But€this€rightÏhere€[the€partially€completed€verdict€form]€as€I€haveÏgot€it€is€an€inconclusive,€partial€verdict.ÌÌÓ€ÓThereafter,€the€trial€court€summoned€the€jury€back€to€the€courtroom€andÏrepeated€its€original€instructions€with€regard€to€Michael€Laddððs€burden€ofÏproof€and€the€elements€of€his€misrepresentation€claims€against€the€HondaÏdefendants.€€In€addition€to€these€instructions,€the€trial€court€instructed€the€juryÏas€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àNow,€five€of€you€have€said€you€donððt€think€itÏwill€do€any€good€for€this€further€instruction€andÏseveral€of€you€have€said€you€thought€it€would€help,Ïcould€possibly€help.€€Iððm€reluctant€to€give€you€theÏrest€of€this€charge,€but€I€am.€€You€have€worked€hardÏand€weððre€into€the€6th€week.€€This€is€my€job.€€I€loveÏmy€work€and€I€try€my€best€to€give€fair,€impartialÏinstructions€to€all€of€you,€and€I€certainly€donððt€wantÏto€fuss€at€anyone.€€Some€jury€has€got€to€try€this€case.€ÏAnd€weððre€not€going€to€ever€find€a€better€jury€thanÏyou€are.€€If€we€ever€find€any€better€listeners,€IÏhavenððt€seen€any€in€the€four€years€I€have€been€on€theÏbench.€€You€have€all€impressed€me€as€intelligentÏpersons€and€understanding€things€in€an€objectiveÏmanner.€€These€parties,€for€whatever€reasons€that€IÏmight€perceive€or€you€might€perceive€need€anÏanswer.€€This€accident€occurred€in€the€early€part€ofÏðð86.€€The€newspapers€and€„„€well,€I€donððt€want€toÏpick€on€the€newspapers,€critics€say€that€we€move€tooÏslowly€in€the€administration€of€justice.€€I€made€it€myÏcredo€when€I€took€this€position€here€to€moveÏlitigation€as€expeditiously€as€possible€withoutÏhurrying€anyone.€€I€want€you€to€go€back€there€andÏrecognize€that€as€your€part;€we€need€an€answer€toÏthese€questions€somehow,€one€way€or€the€other.€€AndÏthose€that€can€sign€it,€sign€it.€€If€you€canððtÏconscientiously€sign€the€judgment,€those€that€canÏconscientiously€sign€it,€whatever€you€find,€thatððs€anÍadvisory€to€me€and€œall›€parties€involved.€€Now,€if€youÏwill€make€that€much€of€an€effort,€we€have€gotÏanother€hour€here€and€I€appeal€to€your€sense€of€fairÏplay.€€Donððt€surrender€your€honest€convictions€butÏtake€this€and€try€to€arrive€at€some€sort€of€verdict€thatÏwill€be€helpful€to€all€of€us.€€Thank€you.ÌÌÌÓ€Óà àAfter€the€jury€retired€to€continue€deliberating,€the€trial€court€explainedÏto€the€lawyers€that€its€comment€that€ð ðwe€have€got€another€hour€hereðð€was€notÏintended€to€leave€the€jury€with€the€impression€that€the€trial€court€had€placed€aÏone„hour€time€limit€on€the€juryððs€deliberations.€€Nevertheless,€approximatelyÏone€hour€after€receiving€the€supplemental€instructions,€the€jury€returned€aÏcompleted€verdict€sheet€signed€only€by€the€foreperson.€€It€answered€allÏquestions€concerning€liability€in€favor€of€the€Honda€defendants.€€In€response€toÏthe€trial€courtððs€questions,€each€juror€confirmed€that€these€answers€were€theirÏown.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àJuries€have€the€exclusive€duty€to€decide€all€disputed€questions€of€factÏsubmitted€to€them,€òòMcCormic€v.€Smith,óó€668€¢S.W.2d£€304,€306€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1984);€òòFinks€v.€¢Gillum£,óó€38€Tenn.€App.€304,€311„13,€273€¢S.W.2d£€722,€726„27Ï(1954);€8€òòTennessee€Pattern€Jury€Instructionsóó€¢T.P.I.£€¢„„£€Civil€1.10€(CommitteeÏon€Pattern€Jury€Instructions€(Civil)€of€the€Tenn.€Judicial€Conference€ed.,€2dÏed.€1988)€(ð ðT.P.I.€„„€Civilðð),€based€on€the€law€as€explained€by€the€trial€court.€Ïòò¢MððCorry£€v.€Kingððs€Heirs,óó€22€Tenn.€(3€Hum.)€266,€277„78€(1842).€€Thus,€theÏsoundness€of€every€jury€verdict€rests€on€the€fairness€and€accuracy€of€the€trialÏcourtððs€instructions.€€Since€the€instructions€are€the€sole€source€of€the€legalÏprinciples€needed€to€guide€the€juryððs€deliberations,€òòState€ex€rel.€Myers€v.ÍBrown,óó€209€Tenn.€141,€148„49,€351€¢S.W.2d£€385,€388€(1961),€trial€courtsÏmust€give€substantially€accurate€instructions€concerning€the€law€applicable€toÏthe€matters€at€issue.€€òòStreet€v.€¢Calvert£,óó€541€¢S.W.2d£€at€584;€òòMitchell€v.€Smith,Ïóó779€¢S.W.2d£€384,€390€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).ÌÌà àJury€instructions€need€not€be€perfect€in€every€detail.€€òòSee€In€re€Estate€ofÏElam,€óó738€¢S.W.2d£€169,€174€(Tenn.€1987);€òòBenson€v.€Tennessee€Valley€Elec.ÏCoop.,€óó868€¢S.W.2d£€630,€642„43€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€A€single€erroneousÏstatement€will€not€necessarily€undermine€otherwise€proper€instructions€that,Ïon€the€whole,€fairly€define€the€issues€and€do€not€mislead€the€jury.€€òò¢Cortazzo£€v.ÏBlackburn,óó€912€¢S.W.2d£€735,€745€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€ÌÌà àInstructions€must€be€viewed€as€a€whole,€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Elam,óó€738Ï¢S.W.2d£€at€174;€òòMemphis€St.€Ry.€v.€Wilson,€óó108€Tenn.€618,€620,€69€¢S.W.£€265,Ï265€(1902);€òòAbbott€v.€American€Honda€Motor€Co.,óó€682€¢S.W.2d£€206,€209Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984),€and€the€challenged€portion€of€the€instructions€shouldÏbe€considered€in€light€of€its€context.€€òòGorman€v.€¢Earhart£,óó€876€¢S.W.2d£€832,Ï836€(Tenn.€1994);€òò¢Hurst£€v.€Dougherty,óó€800€¢S.W.2d£€183,€186€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1990).€€An€erroneous€instruction€will€not€be€considered€reversible€error€if€theÏtrial€court€explains€or€corrects€it€in€other€portions€of€the€charge.€€òòIn€re€EstateÏof€Elam,€óó738€¢S.W.2d£€at€174;€òòSmith€v.€Parker,óó€213€Tenn.€147,€156,€373Ï¢S.W.2d£€205,€209€(1963).ÌÌà àJuries€are€generally€composed€of€persons€who€do€not€have€formal€legalÏtraining.€€Accordingly,€a€trial€courtððs€instructions€should€be€couched€in€plainÏterms€that€lay€persons€can€readily€understand.€€òòSasser€v.€¢Averitt£€Express,€Inc.,óóÏ839€¢S.W.2d£€422,€430€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òò¢Herstein£€v.€¢Kemker£,óó€19€Tenn.ÍApp.€681,€702,€94€¢S.W.2d£€76,€89€(1936).€€It€also€follows€that€appellate€courtsÏmust€view€the€challenged€instructions€not€through€the€practiced€eyes€of€a€judgeÏbut€rather€through€the€eyes€of€an€average€lay€juror.ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àThe€juryððs€verdict€is€the€foundation€of€the€judgment€in€civil€cases€whereÏthe€parties€have€invoked€their€constitutional€or€statutory€right€to€a€jury€trial.€ÏIt€represents€the€juryððs€final€statement€with€regard€to€the€issues€presented€toÏthem.€€The€verdict,€whether€general€or€special,€is€binding€on€the€trial€courtÏand€the€parties€unless€it€is€set€aside€through€some€recognized€legal€procedure.€ÏAccordingly,€neither€the€trial€court€nor€the€parties€are€free€to€disregard€aÏjuryððs€verdict€once€it€has€been€properly€returned.€€òòSeeóó€òòSmith€County€Educ.ÏAssððn€v.€Anderson,óó€676€S.W.2d€328,€336€(Tenn.€1984).ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€recently€reviewed€a€medicalÏmalpractice€case€in€which€the€trial€court€used€a€supplemental€instructionÏrequesting€an€advisory€verdict€substantially€similar€to€the€instruction€involvedÏin€this€case.€€In€that€case,€the€jury€informed€the€trial€court€that€it€wasÏdeadlocked€after€deliberating€for€twelve€hours€over€two€days.€€The€trial€courtÏthen€requested€the€jury€toÌÓÓà8 àà8 àjust€spend€a€little€more€time€as€to€whether€you€canÏgive€an€advisory.€€Iððm€talking€about€an€advisory€toÏme€and€to€€these€lawyers.€€Some€sort€of€answer€isÏbetter€than€nothing.ÌÌà àà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àNow,€I€know€that€some€of€you€have€said€itÏwonððt€do€any€good.€But€some€sort€of€an€advisoryÏmight€be€helpful€for€me,€for€the€lawyers€in€this€case.ÌÌÓ€ÓòòJohnson€v.€Hardinóó,€___€S.W.2d€___,€___€(Tenn.€œ1996).›× ƒF ××  ×€€Following€thisÏinstruction,€the€jury€wrote€a€note€on€the€back€of€the€special€verdict€formÏstating€that€they€had€decided€that€the€defendant€had€not€committed€medicalÏmalpractice.€€The€trial€court€entered€a€judgment€for€the€defendant€based€onÏthe€juryððs€verdict€even€though€he€had€told€the€jury€that€its€verdict€wasÏadvisory.ÌÌà àThe€Court€concluded€that€other€portions€of€the€trial€courtððsÏsupplemental€instructions€had€improperly€coerced€the€jury€into€returning€aÏverdict.€€òòJohnson€v.€Hardin,óó€___€S.W.2d€at€___.× ƒG ××  ×€€In€addition,€the€CourtÏevaluated€the€effect€of€the€trial€courtððs€characterization€of€the€juryððs€verdict€asÏan€ð ðadvisory.ðð€€The€Court€concluded:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àAn€additional€factor€in€our€evaluation€of€theÏeffect€of€the€misguided€charge€is€the€judgeððsÏcharacterization€of€the€desired€verdict€as€anÏð ðadvisory.ðð€€The€jurors€and€counsel€were€obviouslyÏconfused€as€to€the€nature€of€an€advisory€verdict.€ÏBoth€inquired€of€the€judge€as€to€what€he€meant.€€HisÏresponse,€to€counsel€at€least,€indicated€that€he€wantedÏsomething€from€the€jury€to€guide€counsel€in€futureÏnegotiations.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àWhile€advisory€verdicts€are€not€unknown€inÏTennessee€in€equity€matters,€òòseeóó€òòSmith€CountyÏEducation€Association€v.€Andersonóó,€676€S.W.2d€2dÏ[sic]€328€(Tenn.€1984),€once€a€jury€is€impaneled€toÍrender€a€verdict,€that€determination€is€not€anÏadvisory€opinion,€but€a€final€verdict.€€Further,€theÏjuryððs€findings€of€fact€are€binding€upon€the€judge.€ÏòòIdóó.€at€337„38.€€The€judgeððs€request€for€an€ð ðadvisoryððÏwas,€at€the€very€least,€confusing€and€inconsistent€withÏTennessee€law.€€Although€the€judge€polled€the€jury€toÏinquire€whether€the€finding€was€the€ð ðverdictðð€of€eachÏjuror,€the€note,€written€on€the€back€of€the€jury€form,Ïmay€represent€nothing€more€than€the€juryððs€ineptÏattempt€to€render€the€ð ðadvisoryðð€requested€by€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌòòJohnson€v.€Hardin,óó€___€S.W.2d€at€___.œ× ƒH ××  ×›€€Ó€ÓWhile€differences€exist€between€theÏwording€of€the€request€for€an€advisory€verdict€in€this€case€and€the€wording€ofÏthe€request€in€òòJohnson€v.€Hardinóó€and€the€context€in€which€the€requests€wereÏmade,€these€differences€are€not€so€great€that€they€place€this€case€beyond€theÏreasoning€of€the€òòJohnson€v.€Hardinóó€decision.ÌÌà àThe€jury€in€this€case,€like€the€jury€in€òòJohnson€v.€Hardinóó,€had€alreadyÏengaged€in€lengthy,€apparently€fruitless,€deliberations€when€the€trial€court€toldÏthem€that€whatever€they€decided€would€be€œð ðan›€œadvisoryðð›€for€the€court€and€theÏparties.€€The€trial€court€also€told€the€jurors€that€they€should€record€theirÏadvisory€decision€on€the€special€verdict€form€by€answering€the€questions€andÏby€not€signing€the€form€if€they€could€not€conscientiously€sign€it.€€ÌÌà àThese€instructions€must€have€left€the€jury€with€the€impression€that€its€Ïdecision€would€not€be€binding.€€They€must€also€have€induced€the€jury,€alreadyÏtired€from€five€weeks€of€trial€and€fifteen€hours€of€deliberations,€to€reach€aÏquick€decision€in€order€to€bring€their€service€on€the€jury€to€an€end.€€This€isÏprecisely€what€happened.€€The€jury€agreed€on€an€advisory€decision€within€oneÍhour€after€the€supplemental€instructions€and€recorded€its€decision€on€theÏspecial€verdict€form€that€was€signed€not€by€the€entire€jury€but€by€only€theÏforeperson.€€The€jurorsðð€later€acknowledgment€of€the€verdict€in€open€courtÏprovides€no€indication€that€they€œunderstood€that›€their€decision€œwas›€anythingÏmore€than€advisory.ÌÌà àWe€have€reviewed€the€trial€courtððs€comments€concerning€an€advisoryÏverdict€in€light€of€their€immediate€context€and€in€light€of€the€entire€charge.€€InÏthe€context€in€which€they€were€made,€these€comments€could€only€haveÏconfused€the€jury€with€regard€to€its€proper€role€by€leaving€the€jury€with€theÏimpression€that€its€decision€would€not€finally€resolve€the€dispute€between€theÏparties.€€This€confusion,€more€probably€than€not,€affected€the€judgment€in€thisÏcase€and€forces€us€to€conclude,€like€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€theÏòòJohnson€v.€¢Hardin£óó€case,€that€the€juryððs€decision€was€not€a€considered,Ïunanimous€verdict.× ƒI ××  ×€€ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌà@ àòòò òMichael€Laddððs€Misrepresentation€Claimó óóóÌÌà àWe€turn€next€to€Michael€Laddððs€claim€that€the€Honda€defendants€hadÏmisrepresented€the€handling€characteristics€of€all„terrain€vehicles€byÏadvertising€that€they€were€safe€enough€to€be€operated€by€children.€€The€HondaÏdefendants€assert€that€Michael€Ladd€cannot€succeed€with€this€claim€withoutÏproving€that€they€misrepresented€the€handling€characteristics€of€the€particularÍmodel€of€all„terrain€vehicle€involved€in€this€case.€€Michael€Ladd€responds€thatÏhis€claim€may€rest€on€proof€that€the€Honda€defendants€misrepresented€theÏhandling€characteristics€of€all„terrain€vehicles€in€general.€€We€agree€withÏMichael€Ladd.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àIt€was€clear€from€the€outset€that€Michael€Laddððs€principal€claim€againstÏthe€Honda€defendants€was€predicated€on€their€advertisements€from€the€earlyÏ1970s€to€the€mid„1980s€representing€that€all„terrain€vehicles€could€be€operatedÏsafely€by€children€under€sixteen€years€of€age.€€He€asserted€that€theseÏadvertisements€were€misrepresentations€because€they€created€the€illusion€thatÏall„terrain€vehicles€were€safe€when,€in€fact,€they€were€not.€€He€also€assertedÏthat€¢Erby£€Givensððs€and€his€parentsðð€impressions€of€the€safe€use€of€all„terrainÏvehicles€had€been€shaped€by€Hondaððs€advertising€and€that€they€had€permittedÏhim€to€operate€Mr.€Givensððs€all„terrain€vehicle€because€of€their€impressionÏthat€he€could€safely€do€so.ÌÌà àThe€Honda€defendants€insisted€that€the€evidence€with€regard€to€MichaelÏLaddððs€misrepresentation€claim€should€be€limited€to€its€advertisementsÏconcerning€the€1986€Honda€œ¢TRX£›€250€„€the€particular€all„terrain€vehicleÏMichael€Ladd€was€operating€when€he€was€injured.€€Prior€to€trial,€they€soughtÏto€preclude€the€introduction€of€all€evidence€that€did€not€relate€to€the€œ¢1986ÏHonda€TRX£›€250€on€the€ground€of€relevance.€€The€trial€court€overruled€theÏobjections€and€permitted€Michael€Ladd€to€introduce€evidence€of€theÏdevelopment€and€marketing€of€all„terrain€vehicles€from€the€early€1970s€to€theÏmid„1980s€to€prove€that€Hondaððs€marketing€had€shaped€the€publicððs€perceptionÍof€the€use€and€safety€of€all„terrain€vehicles€and€that€this€marketing€had€misledÏthe€public€into€believing€that€all„terrain€vehicles€could€be€operated€safely€byÏchildren.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àHonda€first€introduced€all„terrain€vehicles€into€the€United€States€marketÏin€the€early€1970s.€€They€were€modeled€after€motorcycles€but€had€threeÏwheels.€€Since€they€were€intended€to€be€used€year„round€in€all€types€ofÏweather€and€terrain,€the€marketing€of€these€vehicles€was€originally€directedÏtoward€off„road€enthusiasts.€€Honda€shifted€its€marketing€strategy€in€the€earlyÏ1980s€to€begin€promoting€all„terrain€vehicles€as€suitable€for€family€recreation.€ÏIts€broadcast€and€print€advertising€depicted€entire€families,€including€youngÏchildren,€safely€operating€all„terrain€vehicles.€€In€1984,€Honda€introduced€aÏfour„wheeled€all„terrain€vehicle€into€the€United€States€market€and€marketed€itÏas€a€utility€vehicle€that€could€also€be€used€for€sports€and€recreation.€€ÌÌà àThe€rate€of€accidents€and€injuries€associated€with€all„terrain€vehiclesÏincreased€dramatically€during€the€1970s€and€1980s.€€The€Consumer€ProductÏSafety€Commission€launched€an€industry„wide€investigation€in€1984.€€The€all„terrain€vehicle€manufacturers€retained€a€child€safety€expert€who€advised€themÏthat€their€advertising€should€be€more€realistic€and€safety„oriented.€€The€expertÏalso€recommended€that€parents€should€be€better€informed€about€the€problemsÏand€dangers€in€using€all„terrain€vehicles€before€purchasing€them€for€theirÏchildren.€€Despite€these€private€warnings,€Honda€responded€publicly€to€theÏConsumer€Product€Safety€Commission€that€children€as€young€as€seven€or€eightÏyears€old€could€safely€operate€an€all„terrain€vehicle€and€that€three€and€four„wheeled€all„terrain€vehicles,€like€large€and€compact€automobiles,€hadÏadvantages€and€disadvantages.ÌÌà à¢Erby£€Givens€bought€his€Honda€¢TRX£€250€in€January€1986.€€His€decisionÏto€purchase€this€particular€all„terrain€vehicle€was€chiefly€influenced€by€hisÏbrotherððs€decision€to€purchase€one,€not€by€any€of€Hondaððs€advertisements.€ÏNone€of€Hondaððs€advertisements€œof€the€1986€Model›€¢TRX£€250€œdepicted€it€being›Ïoperated€by€young€children.ÌÌà àEight€months€after€Michael€Laddððs€injury,€the€Consumer€Product€SafetyÏCommission€released€its€findings€that€all„terrain€vehicles€represented€anÏimminent€hazard€to€American€consumers.€€In€December€1987,€the€DepartmentÏof€Justice€filed€suit€against€all€manufacturers€selling€all„terrain€vehicles€in€theÏUnited€States,€alleging€that€all„terrain€vehicles€required€a€high€degree€of€skillÏand€attentiveness€despite€their€deceptively€safe€outward€appearance.€€TheÏcommission€also€alleged€that€the€all„terrain€vehicle€industry€had€failed€toÏprovide€potential€users€with€adequate€warnings€of€the€hazards€associated€withÏthe€operation€of€all„terrain€vehicles.ÌÌà àThe€all„terrain€vehicle€industry€immediately€settled€with€the€DepartmentÏof€Justice.€€In€March€1988,€Honda€signed€a€consent€agreement€in€which€itÏagreed€to€stop€distributing€and€marketing€three„wheeled€all„terrain€vehicles.€ÏHonda€also€agreed€to€warn€the€consuming€public€that€children€under€sixteenÏyears€of€age€should€never€ride€an€adult„sized€all„terrain€vehicle,¢× ƒJ ××  ×£€to€mailÏsafety€alerts€to€all€past€purchasers,€and€to€provide€similar€safety€alerts€to€allÏfuture€purchasers.ÌÌÌÌÌà@ àœò òC.ó ó›ÌÌà àIn€the€early€1930s€American€courts€began€to€hold€sellers€strictly€liableÏfor€injuries€to€consumers€who€relied€on€the€sellerððs€misrepresentationsÏconcerning€their€productððs€character€and€quality.€€In€one€of€the€leadingÏdecisions,€the€Washington€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€manufacturer€whoÏadvertised€that€its€automobileððs€windshield€was€shatterproof€was€liable€to€aÏpurchaser€who€was€injured€when€a€€windshield€shattered€after€being€struck€byÏa€stone.€€òòBaxter€v.€Ford€Motor€Co.,€óó12€€P.2d€409,€412€(Wash.€1932).€€TheÏAmerican€Law€Institute€included€these€decisions€in€Restatement€(Second)€ofÏTorts€ðð€¢402B£€(1964)€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àOne€engaged€in€the€business€of€selling€chattelsÏwho,€by€advertising,€labels,€or€otherwise,€makes€toÏthe€public€a€misrepresentation€of€a€material€factÏconcerning€the€character€or€quality€of€a€chattel€soldÏby€him€is€subject€to€liability€for€physical€harm€to€aÏconsumer€of€the€chattel€caused€by€justifiable€relianceÏupon€the€misrepresentation,€even€thoughÌà8 àà8 àà à(a)€€it€is€not€made€fraudulently€or€negligently,ÏandÌà8 àà8 àà0 à(b)€the€consumer€has€not€bought€the€chattelÏfromÌà àà àor€entered€into€any€contractual€relation€with€the€seller.ÌÌÌÓ€Óà àDespite€being€a€ð ðcorollaryðð€of€the€widely€accepted€strict€liabilityÏdoctrine€articulated€in€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€¢402A£€(1964),× ƒK ××  ×Ïliability€for€innocent€misrepresentation€under€Section€¢402B£€has€beenÏrecognized€in€only€a€minority€of€jurisdictions.€€1€Louis€R.€¢Frumer£€&€MelvinÏI.€Friedman,€òòProducts€Liabilityóó€ðð€2.05[4],€at€2„76€&€n.88€(1996);ÏòòMisrepresentation,óó€1€Prod.€¢Liab£.€Rep.€(¢CCH£)€ðð€1900,€at€4991€(1993).€€OneÏtreatise€has€surmised€that€Section€¢402B£€has€been€overshadowed€by€the€broadÏacceptance€of€Section€¢402A£.€€1€¢Frumer£€&€Friedman,€òòsupra,óó€ðð€2.05[4],€at€2„76Ïto€2„80.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€first€recognized€Section€¢402B£€claimsÏthirty€years€ago,€òòFord€Motor€Co.€v.€¢Lonon£,óó€217€Tenn.€400,€423,€398€¢S.W.2d£Ï240,€250€(1966),€òò¢revððd£€on€other€grounds,óó€òòFirst€¢Natððl£€Bank€v.€Brooks€Farms,óóÏ821€¢S.W.2d£€925,€931€(Tenn.€1991),€and€has€recently€reaffirmed€its€decision.€ÏòòRitter€v.€Custom€¢Chemicides£,€Inc.,óó€912€¢S.W.2d£€128,€131„32€(Tenn.€1995).€ÏThe€General€Assembly€likewise€included€Section€¢402B£€claims€in€the€TennesseeÏProducts€Liability€Act€of€1978.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(6)€(1980).ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ 9 Òà àA€claim€based€on€Section€¢402B£€is€entirely€distinct€from€a€Section€¢402A£Ïclaim.€€It€does€not€condition€liability€on€the€product€being€defective€orÏunreasonably€dangerous.€€òòFord€Motor€Co.€v.€¢Lonon£,óó€217€Tenn.€at€423,€398Ï¢S.W.2d£€at€250;€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„105(c)€(1980);€1€¢Frumer£€&ÏFriedman,€òòsupra,óó€ðð€2.05[4],€at€2„79€n.91.€€Rather,€it€focuses€on€whether€theÏproduct€conforms€to€the€manufacturerððs€express€statements€about€the€product.€Ïòò¢Klages£€v.€General€Ordnance€Equip.€Corp.,€óó367€A.2d€304,€310„11€(Pa.€Super.ÏCt.€1976).€€In€order€to€create€liability€under€Section€¢402B£,€there€must€be€proofÍof€a€misrepresentation€of€a€material€fact,€made€to€the€public,€with€respect€toÏthe€character€and€quality€of€the€product,€which€is€false€and€upon€which€theÏconsumer€is€expected€to€justifiably€rely.€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ððÏ¢402B£;€1€¢Frumer£€&€Friedman,€òòsupra,óó€ðð€2.05[4],€at€2„80€to€2„83.€€TheÏrepresentations€must€€be€more€than€mere€statements€of€opinion€or€the€kind€ofÏloose€general€sales€talk€commonly€referred€to€as€ð ðpuffing.ðð€€RestatementÏ(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€¢402B£€¢cmt£.€g.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Products€Liability€Act€of€1978€includes€causes€of€actionÏbased€on€Section€¢402B£.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(6);òò€First€¢Natððl£€Bank€v.ÏBrooks€Farms,óó€821€¢S.W.2d£€at€931.€€Accordingly,€causes€of€action€forÏmisrepresentation€must€be€couched€in€the€terms€used€in€the€products€liabilityÏstatutes€rather€than€the€terms€used€in€the€Restatement.€€Tennesseeððs€productÏliability€statutes€apply€to€ð ðproductsðð€which€include€ð ðany€tangible€object[s]€orÏgoods€produced,ðð€rather€than€to€ð ðchattels.ðð¢× ƒL ××  ×£€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(5).ÌÌà àWe€must€still€determine€whether€the€term€ð ðproductðð€refers€only€to€aÏspecific€model€or€brand€or€whether€it€may€refer€more€generally€to€similarÏtypes€of€goods.€€The€Honda€defendants€insist€that€ð ðproductðð€should€be€limitedÏto€a€specific€model€or€item€because€actions€based€on€Section€¢402B£€derive€fromÏactions€on€an€express€warranty€and€an€express€warranty€must€be€model„specific.€€While€the€¢Restatment£€recognizes€the€concept€of€misrepresentation€as€aÏnon„contractual€express€warranty,€it€also€points€out€that€this€warranty€ð ðis€atÍleast€a€different€kind€of€warranty€from€that€involved€in€the€ordinary€sale€ofÏgoods€.€.€.€and€is€subject€to€different€rules.ðð€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ððÏ¢402B£€¢cmt£.€d.€€ÌÌà àWhen€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€approved€causes€of€action€based€onÏSection€¢402B£,€it€noted€that€it€viewed€the€claim€as€one€based€on€aÏmisrepresentation€theory€rather€than€a€warranty€theory.€€òòFord€Motor€Co.€v.Ï¢Lonon£,óó€217€Tenn.€at€419,€398€¢S.W.2d£€at€248.€€Likewise,€liability€under€theÏTennessee€Products€¢Liabity£€Act€of€1978€includes€ð ðall€actions€brought€for€or€onÏaccount€of€personal€injury,€death€or€property€damage€caused€by€or€resultingÏfrom€the€manufacture,€construction,€design,€formula,€preparation,€assembly,Ïtesting,€service,€warning,€instruction,€marketing,€packaging€or€labeling€of€anyÏproductðð€notwithstanding€whether€the€claim€is€predicated€on€contract,Ïwarranty,€tort,€or€misrepresentation.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(6).€€BasedÏon€these€authorities,€we€conclude€that€a€products€liability€cause€of€action€basedÏon€innocent€misrepresentations€concerning€the€character€or€quality€of€aÏproduct€is€not€subject€to€the€same€limitations€that€might€otherwise€be€applicableÏto€actions€based€on€an€express€warranty€relating€to€a€specific€product.× ƒM ××  ×ÌÌà àWe€have€been€unable€to€find€any€cases€construing€Section€402B€thatÏdiscuss€the€definition€of€ð ðproductðð€or€ð ðchattel.ðð€€Three€cases€addressedÏevidentiary€issues€similar€to€the€ones€involved€in€this€case,€but€none€of€theseÏcases€discussed€the€admissibility€of€advertisements€in€terms€of€the€scope€ofÏliability€under€Section€402B.€€Two€decisions€excluded€advertisements€about€aÍdifferent€model€of€a€product.€€In€one€case€involving€a€claim€ofÏmisrepresentation€concerning€the€safety€of€a€Jeep€CJ„5€under€certain€drivingÏconditions,€the€court€excluded€television€commercials€depicting€a€JeepÏCherokee.€€òòHaynes€v.€American€Motors€Corp.,óó€691€F.2d€1268,€1270€(8th€Cir.Ï1982).€€In€the€other€case,€the€court€held€that€a€sales€brochure€containingÏpictures€and€representations€about€school€buses€was€not€relevant€to€a€claim€thatÏthe€same€manufacturer€had€made€misrepresentations€about€its€activity€buses.€ÏòòCollins€v.€Wayne€Corp.,óó€621€F.2d€777,€787€(5th€Cir.€1980).ÌÌà àContrary€to€these€cases,€the€Iowa€Supreme€Court€held€thatÏadvertisements€of€a€different€model€of€automobile€were€admissible€to€prove€aÏmisrepresentation€claim.€€In€a€case€involving€a€1968€Chevelle,€the€trial€courtÏpermitted€the€introduction€of€advertisements€of€the€Chevelle€from€1967,€1969,Ïand€1970€because€the€purchaser€ð ðha[d]€tied€in€these€ads€in€with€the€sameÏautomobile€that€he€did€purchase.ðð€€òòJacobson€v.€Benson€Motors,€Inc.,óó€216ÏN.W.2d€396,€402„03€(Iowa€1974).€ÌÌà àEach€of€these€cases€was€essentially€resolved€on€relevancy€grounds.€€TheÏopinion€in€òòJacobson€v.€Benson€Motors,€Inc.óó€indicates€that€the€plaintiff€hadÏdemonstrated€that€the€different€models€were€essentially€similar.€€The€plaintiffÏin€the€òòCollins€v.€Wayne€Corp.óó€case€apparently€did€not€make€a€similar€showingÏand€did€not€rely€on€representations€that€applied€to€both€activity€buses€andÏschool€buses.€€We€cannot€tell€from€the€òòHaynes€v.€American€Motors€Corp.óóÏopinion€whether€the€plaintiff€attempted€to€demonstrate€that€the€models€wereÏsimilar€or€that€the€misrepresentations€applied€to€more€than€one€model.ÌÌà àNone€of€these€cases€hold€as€a€matter€of€law€that€liability€under€SectionÏ402B€is€limited€to€misrepresentations€about€a€particular€model.€€We€have€citedÏthem€simply€to€show€that€courts€deciding€similar€issues€to€the€one€involved€inÏthis€case€have€based€their€decisions€on€the€ad€hoc€basis€of€relevancy.€€None€ofÏthese€cases€undertook€to€construe€the€word€ð ðchattelðð€or€ð ðproductðð€underÏSection€¢402B£.€€Lacking€specific€direction€from€either€Section€¢402B£,€theÏTennessee€Products€Liability€Act€of€1978,€or€the€case€law€from€this€or€otherÏjurisdictions,€we€turn€to€the€underlying€purposes€of€Section€¢402B£€to€determineÏwhether€ð ðproduct€line€misrepresentationsðð€are€¢actionable£€under€Section€¢402B£.ÌÌà àSection€¢402B£€addresses€a€manufacturerððs€liability€for€innocentÏmisrepresentations€made€through€ð ðadvertising,€labels,€or€otherwise.ðð€€It€wasÏthe€lawððs€response€to€the€increasing€use€of€television,€radio,€and€otherÏadvertising€media€to€extol€the€worth,€quality,€and€benefits€of€various€productsÏin€glowing€details€and€terms.€€òòRandy€Knitwear,€Inc.€v.€American€CyanamidÏCo.óó,€181€¢N.E.2d£€399,€402€(N.Y.€1962);€òòRogers€v.€Toni€Home€Permanent€Co.óó,Ï147€¢N.E.2d£€612,€615„16€(Ohio€1958).€€It€recognizes€that€commercialÏadvertising€of€products€is€often€the€guiding€force€in€shaping€consumersððÏexpectations€about€a€product.€€òò¢Leichtamer£€v.€American€Motors€Corp.óó,€424Ï¢N.E.2d£€568,€578€(Ohio€1981);€òò¢Inglis£€v.€American€Motors€Corp.óó,€197€¢N.E.2d£Ï921,€924€(Ohio€Ct.€App.€1964),€òò¢affððd£óó,€209€¢N.E.2d£€583€(Ohio€1965).€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€Section€¢402B£€provides€a€basis€for€holding€manufacturersÏaccountable€for€the€publicððs€reliance€on€the€representations€in€theirÏadvertisements€about€the€character€and€quality€of€their€products.€ConsumersÏshould€be€able€to€rely€on€œrepresentations›€in€advertisements€for€an€entireÏproduct€line€in€the€same€way€that€they€rely€on€advertisements€for€particularÍmodels€in€a€product€line.€€Thus,€manufacturers€should€not€be€permitted€toÏinsulate€themselves€from€liability€under€Section€¢402B£€simply€by€using€generalÏadvertisements€of€an€entire€product€line.€€Accordingly,€we€see€no€reason€whyÏmanufacturers€should€not€be€held€liable€in€actions€based€on€Section€¢402B£€ifÏtheir€general€advertisements€of€a€product€line€contain€representations€of€theÏcharacter€or€quality€of€particular€models€in€the€product€line€and€if€the€otherÏconditions€for€liability€under€Section€¢402B£€have€been€met.ÌÌà àThe€Honda€advertising€introduced€by€Michael€Ladd€extolled€the€use€ofÏall„terrain€vehicles€in€general.€€It€contained€representations€concerning€theÏsafety€of€all„terrain€vehicles€and,€without€being€model„specific,€portrayed€all„terrain€vehicles€as€being€suitable€for€use€by€the€entire€family€„€including€smallÏchildren.€€Thus,€we€see€no€reason€to€shield€the€Honda€defendants€from€liabilityÏunder€Section€¢402B£€for€€representations€in€their€advertising€about€all„terrainÏvehicles€in€general€if€the€general€advertising€contained€misrepresentationsÏapplicable€to€all€Honda€all„terrain€vehicles,€including€the€specific€all„terrainÏvehicle€Michael€Ladd€was€operating€when€he€was€injured.ÌÌà@ àò òV.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Defenses€to€Michael€Laddððs€Misrepresentation€Claimó óóóÌÌà àThe€Honda€defendants€asserted€two€principal€defenses€at€trial€againstÏMichael€Laddððs€misrepresentation€claim.€€First,€they€argued€that€theirÏadvertisements€did€not€contain€the€type€of€misrepresentations€of€the€characterÏor€quality€of€their€product€that€would€subject€them€to€liability.€€Second,€theyÏclaimed€that€Michael€Ladd€did€not€prove€his€misrepresentation€claim€becauseÏMr.€Givens€did€not€rely€on€Hondaððs€advertisements€when€he€purchased€his€all„terrain€vehicle.€€We€find€that€neither€of€these€defenses€was€sufficient€to€preventÏthe€case€from€being€submitted€to€the€jury.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àLiability€for€misrepresentation€under€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ððÏ¢402B£€arises€only€with€regard€to€misrepresentations€of€material€factsÏconcerning€the€character€and€quality€of€the€product€in€question.€€It€does€notÏarise€from€statements€of€opinion€and,€in€particular,€to€the€ð ðkind€of€looseÏgeneral€praise€of€wares€sold€which,€on€the€part€of€the€seller,€is€considered€to€beÏððsales€talk,ðð€and€is€commonly€called€ððpuffing.ðððð€€Restatement€(Second)€of€TortsÏðð€¢402B£€¢cmt£.€g.€€The€Honda€defendants€asserted€at€trial€that€their€advertisementsÏdepicting€young€children€riding€all„terrain€vehicles€were€no€more€than€puffing.ÌÌà àœð ðPuffingðð›€refers€to€loose€general€statements€made€by€sellers€inÏcommending€their€products.€€These€statements€embody€exaggerations,€the€truthÏor€falsity€of€which€cannot€be€determined€easily,€that€amount€to€no€more€thanÏan€expression€of€the€sellerððs€opinion€about€the€character€or€quality€of€theÏproduct.òò€€¢Loula£€v.€Snap„On€Tools€Corp.,óó€498€¢N.W.2d£€866,€868€(Wis.€Ct.€App.Ï1993).€€Buyers€have€no€right€to€rely€on€these€statements.€€Thus,€a€sellerððsÏcharacterization€of€an€automobile€as€a€ð ðdandyðð€or€a€ð ðgood€little€carðð€or€theÏð ðpride€of€our€lineðð€or€the€ð ðbest€in€the€American€marketðð€will€not€give€rise€toÏliability€under€Section€¢402B£.€€òòSeeóó€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€542€¢cmt£.€eÏ(1976).ÌÌà àThe€courts€have€generally€been€cautious€about€a€sellerððs€claim€that€itsÏrepresentations€were€mere€puffing.€€Thus,€the€question€of€whether€a€particularÍstatement€amounts€to€an€actionable€misrepresentation€will€generally€be€left€toÏthe€jury€whenever€the€circumstances€indicate€that€the€buyer€reasonablyÏunderstood€that€he€or€she€was€receiving€something€in€the€way€of€an€assuranceÏas€to€specific€facts.€€W.€Page€¢Keeton£€et€al.,òò€¢Prosser£€and€¢Keeton£€on€the€Law€ofÏTortsóó€ðð€109,€at€757€(5th€ed.€1984).€€The€courts€are€also€more€inclined€to€sendÏclose€cases€to€the€jury€when€the€representation€at€issue€relates€directly€to€theÏproductððs€safety.€€òòHoffman€v.€A.B.€Chance€Co.,óó€346€F.€Supp.€991,€992€(M.D.ÏPa.€1972)€(representation€that€it€was€unnecessary€to€have€another€person€in€theÏcab€when€operating€the€tractor);€òò¢Hauter£€v.€¢Zogarts£,óó€534€P.2d€377,€381€(Cal.Ï1975)€(representation€that€a€golf€training€device€was€ð ðcompletely€safe€[becauseÏthe]€ball€will€not€hit€[the]€playerðð);€òòbut€seeóó€òòHoffman€v.€A.B.€Chance€Co.,óó€339€F.ÏSupp.€1385,€1388€(M.D.€Pa.€1972)€(statement€that€the€product€providedÏð ðunprecedented€safetyðð€was€puffing).ÌÌà àThe€Honda€defendants€rely€heavily€on€the€Washington€Supreme€CourtððsÏholding€œthat›€television€commercials€describing€a€mini„trail€bike€as€œð ða€very›Ïgood€œbike€for›€œchildrenðð›€and€showing€children€riding€œmini„trail€bikes€wereÏmere€puffing.€€òò¢Baughn£€v.€Honda€Motor€Co.,óó€727€P.2d€655,€668€(Wash.€1986).€ÏWe€do€not€find€the€òò¢Baughn£óó€decision€to€be€persuasive€in€this€case€because€it€isÏfactually€distinguishable.€€The€children€in€òò¢Baughn£óó€were€operating€a€mini„trailÏbike€on€a€public€road€despite€warnings€in€the€ownerððs€manual€and€on€a€decal€onÏthe€bike€itself€that€the€bike€was€for€off„road€use€only.€€Their€parents€had€alsoÏwarned€them€repeatedly€not€to€use€mini„trail€bikes€for€street€riding€becauseÏthey€might€get€hurt.€€While€the€television€advertising€at€issue€in€the€òò¢Baughn£óóÏcase€depicted€children€riding€mini„trail€bikes,€it€did€not€depict€them€operatingÏmini„trail€bikes€on€a€public€street.€€Accordingly,€the€manufacturerððsÏadvertizing€at€issue€in€òò¢Baughn£óó€did€not€create€the€impression€in€the€minds€of€theÍchildren€or€their€parents€that€mini„trail€bikes€could€be€operated€safely€onÏpublic€streets.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€Michael€Ladd€presented€proof€that€all„terrain€vehicles€couldÏnot€be€operated€safely€by€any€child€under€the€age€of€sixteen,€that€HondaððsÏadvertisements€represented€that€all„terrain€vehicles€could€be€operated€by€youngÏchildren,€and€that€these€advertisements€materially€influenced€the€decision€of€hisÏuncle€and€his€father€to€permit€him€to€operate€the€all„terrain€vehicle.€€Thus,€theÏfacts€of€this€case€make€out€the€necessary€element€of€justifiable€reliance€that€isÏmissing€in€the€òò¢Baughn£óó€case.€€They€also€demonstrate€that€the€representations€inÏthe€advertisements€were€material€to€the€decision€to€permit€Michael€Ladd€toÏoperate€the€all„terrain€vehicle.€€€€ÌÌà àA€misrepresentation€claim€should€be€submitted€to€the€jury€when€theÏrepresentation€at€issue€may€reasonably€be€interpreted€either€as€an€expression€of€Ïopinion€or€as€a€statement€of€fact.€€òòStamp€v.€Honest€Abe€Log€Homes,€Inc.,óó€804Ï¢S.W.2d£€455,€458€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990);€òò¢Mackie£€v.€¢Fuqua£,óó€14€Tenn.€App.€176,Ï185€(1931).€€At€the€very€least,€the€issue€concerning€whether€HondaððsÏadvertisements€showing€entire€families€riding€all„terrain€vehicles€amounted€toÏa€misrepresentation€that€children€like€Michael€Ladd€could€safely€operate€all„terrain€vehicles€should€be€decided€by€a€jury.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€Honda€defendants€also€asserted€that€Michael€Ladd€did€not€make€out€aÏSection€¢402B£€misrepresentation€claim€because€he€failed€to€produce€evidence€ofÏreliance€on€their€advertising.€€They€pointed€chiefly€to€Mr.€Givensððs€testimonyÍthat€he€bought€his€¢Honda€TRX£€250€not€because€of€any€of€HondaððsÏadvertisements€but€because€his€brother€had€purchased€the€same€vehicle.€€EvenÏthough€Mr.€Givensððs€decision€to€purchase€an€all„terrain€vehicle€is€largelyÏirrelevant,€we€will€address€the€reliance€issue€briefly€in€light€of€our€decision€toÏremand€this€case€for€another€trial.€€€Ìà àSection€¢402B£€requires€that€a€consumer€must€justifiably€rely€upon€theÏmisrepresentation€in€order€for€liability€to€arise.€€The€comments€to€SectionÏ¢402B£€discuss€the€element€of€reliance€and€point€out€that€liability€under€SectionÏ¢402B£€will€not€arise€ð ðwhere€the€misrepresentation€is€not€known,€or€there€isÏindifference€to€it,€and€it€does€not€influence€the€purchase€or€subsequentÏconduct.ðð€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€¢402B£€¢cmt£.€j.€€Thus€the€consumerððsÏreliance€may€relate€to€other€later€conduct,€not€just€to€the€consumerððs€decisionÏto€purchase€the€product.ÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€does€not€dispute€that€Mr.€Givens€admitted€that€his€decisionÏto€purchase€the€Honda€TRX€250€was€not€influenced€by€Hondaððs€advertisements.€ÏHowever,€as€we€pointed€out€earlier€in€this€opinion,€Michael€Laddððs€claim€doesÏnot€involve€Mr.€Givensððs€decision€to€purchase€the€all„terrain€vehicle€but€ratherÏhis€decision€to€permit€Michael€Ladd€to€operate€it.€€Mr.€Givens€testifiedÏspecifically€that€seeing€children€on€television€riding€all„terrain€vehicles€led€himÏto€believe€that€Michael€Ladd€could€safely€operate€his€all„terrain€vehicle.ÌÌà àMr.€Givensððs€reliance€on€Hondaððs€advertising€in€deciding€whether€toÏpermit€Michael€Ladd€to€operate€his€all„terrain€vehicle€satisfies€Section€¢402B£ððsÏreliance€requirement.€€Michael€Ladd€is€a€ð ðconsumerðð€for€the€purpose€ofÏSection€¢402B£€because€he€ð ð¢ma[de£]€use€of€the€chattel€in€the€manner€which€aÏpurchaser€may€be€expected€to€use€it.ðð€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€¢402B£Í¢cmt£.€¢I£.€€The€reliance€required€by€Section€¢402B£€need€not€be€that€of€the€injuredÏconsumer€but€may€be€that€of€the€purchaser€who€passes€the€product€along€to€theÏultimate€consumer.€€òò¢Baughn£€v.€Honda€Motor€Co.,óó€727€P.€2d€at€668;ÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€¢402B£€¢cmt£.€j€(the€reliance€ð ðmay€be€that€of€theÏultimate€purchaser€of€the€chattel,€who€because€of€such€reliance€passes€it€on€toÏthe€consumer€who€is€in€fact€injuredðð).€€ÌÌà@ àò òVI.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Trial€Courtððs€Instructionsó óóóÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€also€asserts€that€the€trial€court€did€not€properly€present€hisÏmisrepresentation€claim€to€the€jury€because€its€instructions€did€not€accuratelyÏreflect€his€theory€of€liability€and€because€the€instructions€and€the€questions€onÏthe€special€verdict€form€were€inconsistent.€€The€Honda€defendants€respond€thatÏthe€instructions€correctly€stated€the€law€relating€to€misrepresentation€claimsÏand,€in€any€event,€that€Michael€Laddððs€lawyer€did€not€effectively€object€to€theÏinstructions€or€the€questions€on€the€special€verdict€form.€€We€find€that€MichaelÏLaddððs€lawyer€properly€took€issue€with€these€matters.€€We€also€find€that€theÏtrial€courtððs€burden€of€proof€instruction€misstated€the€law€and€did€notÏaccurately€reflect€Michael€Laddððs€theory€of€the€case€and€that€the€instructionsÏimproperly€conflicted€with€the€questions€on€the€special€verdict€form.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€conducted€a€charge€conference€on€April€8,€1993€after€theÏclose€of€the€proof€but€before€final€arguments.€€During€the€conference,€theÏparties€presented€their€respective€positions€with€regard€to€the€instructionsÍconcerning€the€elements€of€Michael€Laddððs€misrepresentation€claim€as€well€asÏthe€partiesðð€respective€burdens€of€proof.€€They€also€discussed€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€not€to€provide€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€its€instructions€and€theÏuse€of€special€interrogatories.ÌÌà àAfter€Michael€Laddððs€lawyer€would€not€agree€to€the€Honda€defendantsððÏproposed€burden€of€proof€instruction,× ƒN ××  ×€the€trial€court€requested€the€parties€toÏsubmit€additional€instructions.€€The€trial€court€acknowledged€that€it€hadÏoverlooked€an€instruction€defining€the€elements€of€a€Section€¢402B£Ïmisrepresentation€claim€in€its€draft€instructions€and€agreed€to€both€partiesððÏrequests€for€an€instruction€based€on€T.P.I.€„„€Civil€10.20.€€In€addition,€the€trialÏcourt€solicited€suggestions€concerning€the€verdict€form€in€light€of€its€decisionÏnot€to€provide€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€its€instructions.€€The€HondaÏdefendants€proposed€lengthy€special€interrogatories€to€guide€the€juryððsÏdeliberations.€€Michael€Ladd,€who€had€originally€requested€that€the€juryÏreceive€a€copy€of€the€written€instructions,€preferred€a€general€verdict€and€aÏshort€verdict€form.ÌÌà àThe€parties€submitted€revised€burden€of€proof€instructions€on€April€12,Ï1993.€€The€instruction€proposed€by€the€Honda€defendants€stated€that€MichaelÏLadd€had€the€burden€of€proving€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€ð ð[¢t]hat£€theÏHonda€Defendants€made€material€misrepresentations€about€the€1986€HondaÏ¢TRX£€250€and€the€plaintiff€relied€on€such€misrepresentation.ðð€€On€the€otherÏhand,€Michael€Ladd€requested€a€broader€instruction€stating€that€he€had€theÏburden€of€establishing€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€ð ð[¢t]hat£€the€HondaÍdefendants€misrepresented€the€characteristics€of€the€All„terrain€vehicles€and€theÏplaintiffs€relied€on€such€misrepresentation.ððÌÌà àThe€trial€court€and€the€parties€continued€their€discussion€about€theÏinstructions€following€the€closing€arguments.€€Lacking€a€consensus€on€theÏburden€of€proof€instruction,€the€trial€court€announced€that€it€would€use€theÏHonda€defendantsðð€burden€of€proof€instruction€and€Michael€Laddððs€specialÏverdict€form.€€The€trial€court€adhered€to€its€decision€despite€the€concern€of€oneÏof€Michael€Laddððs€lawyers€that€the€instructions€and€the€special€verdict€formÏshould€be€consistent.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€thatÏMichael€Ladd€had€the€burden€of€proving€that€ð ðthe€Honda€defendants€madeÏmaterial€misrepresentations€about€the€Honda€¢TRX£€250ðð€and€then€provided€theÏjury€a€special€verdict€form€asking,€ð ð[¢d]o£€you€find€that€the€Honda€defendantsÏmisrepresented€the€characteristics€of€all„terrain€vehicles?ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€jury€soon€encountered€problems€with€Michael€Laddððs€Ïmisrepresentation€claim.€€On€April€13,€1996,€it€requested€additionalÏinstructions€concerning€the€meaning€of€ð ðcharacteristicsðð€as€it€was€used€on€theÏspecial€verdict€form.€€On€this€occasion,€the€trial€court€declined€to€expand€on€orÏrepeat€its€original€instruction.€€One€day€later,€the€jury€informed€the€trial€courtÏthat€it€was€deadlocked€on€the€misrepresentation€claim.€€The€trial€court€repeatedÏits€original€instructions€pertaining€to€Michael€Laddððs€burden€of€proof€and€theÏelements€of€a€misrepresentation€claim.€€Repeating€these€instructions€apparentlyÏdid€not€resolve€the€juryððs€difficulties€because€it€soon€requested€a€written€copyÏof€these€instructions.€€The€trial€court€complied€with€this€request€despiteÏMichael€Laddððs€objection.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€trial€courtððs€instructions€should€be€complete€and€accurate€and€shouldÏfairly€reflect€the€partiesðð€theories€of€the€case.€€òòCole€v.€Woods,óó€548€¢S.W.2d£€640,Ï642€(Tenn.€1977);€òòStreet€v.€¢Calvert£,óó€541€¢S.W.2d£€at€584;€òò¢Grissom£€v.ÏMetropolitan€¢Govððt£,óó€817€¢S.W.2d£€679,€685€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Trial€courtsÏshould€not€give€inconsistent€instructions.€€òòCitizensðð€St.€R.R.€v.€Shepherd,óó€107ÏTenn.€444,€449„50,€64€¢S.W.£€710,€711€(1901);€òòAbbott€v.€American€HondaÏMotor€Co.,óó€682€¢S.W.2d£€at€209.€€Thus,€trial€courts€should€give€a€requestedÏinstruction€(1)€if€it€is€supported€by€the€evidence,€(2)€if€it€embodies€the€partyððsÏtheory€of€the€case,€(3)€if€it€is€a€correct€statement€of€the€law,€and€(4)€if€itsÏsubstance€has€not€already€been€included€in€other€portions€of€the€charge,Ïòò¢Spellmeyer£€v.€Tennessee€Farmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.,óó€879€¢S.W.2d£€843,€846€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1993).€€It€should€deny€requested€instructions€that€are€erroneous€orÏincomplete.€€òòBetty€v.€Metropolitan€¢Govððt£,óó€835€¢S.W.2d£€1,€10€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1992).ÌÌà àThe€parties€submitted€inconsistent€proposed€instructions€regardingÏMichael€Laddððs€burden€of€proof€on€his€misrepresentation€claim.€€MichaelÏLaddððs€instruction€€relied€on€Hondaððs€advertising€of€all€its€all„terrain€vehiclesÏbetween€the€early€1970s€and€the€mid„1980s;€while€the€Honda€defendantsððÏinstruction€was€limited€to€the€advertisements€of€the€¢Honda€TRX£€250.€€The€trialÏcourt€used€the€Honda€defendantsðð€proposed€instruction.ÌÌà àWe€concluded€in€Section€IV€of€this€opinion€that€Section€¢402B£Ïmisrepresentation€claims€may€be€based€on€representations€contained€in€generalÏadvertising€for€an€entire€product€line.€€Accordingly,€the€Honda€defendantsððÍproposed€instruction€was€not€a€correct€statement€of€the€law.€€It€likewise€did€notÏfairly€embody€Michael€Laddððs€theory€of€liability.€€Michael€Ladd€never€claimedÏthat€the€advertisements€for€the€Honda€TRX€250€contained€representations€thatÏchildren€could€operate€it€safely.€€Rather,€he€claimed€that€Honda€advertisingÏfrom€the€early€1970s€to€the€mid„1980s€represented€that€all„terrain€vehiclesÏwere€suitable€for€family€fun€and€were€safe€enough€to€be€operated€by€children.€ÏThe€instruction€limited€the€juryððs€consideration€of€the€misrepresentation€issueÏto€statements€specifically€made€about€the€1986€Honda€TRX€250.€€Since€MichaelÏLadd€had€asserted€that€Honda€had€misrepresented€all€of€its€all„terrain€vehicles,Ïthis€instruction€was€erroneous.ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àAn€erroneous€instruction€will€not€require€reversal€if€it€is€corrected€orÏexplained€in€another€portion€of€the€charge.€€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Elam,óó€738€S.W.2dÏat€174;€òòSmith€v.€Parker,óó€213€Tenn.€at€156,€373€S.W.2d€at€209.€€In€this€case,€theÏtrial€court€never€corrected€the€error€in€its€burden€of€proof€instruction€and,€inÏfact,€compounded€it€by€repeating€the€instruction,€by€providing€the€jury€with€aÏwritten€copy€of€this€portion€of€the€charge,€and€by€providing€the€jury€with€anÏinconsistent€special€interrogatory.ÌÌà àRepeating€instructions€is€not€necessarily€erroneous,€òòCortazzo€v.ÏBlackburn,óó€912€S.W.2d€at€745,€as€long€as€the€repeated€instruction€is€broadÏenough€to€cover€the€misunderstood€issues€completely€without€undulyÏemphasizing€the€particular€portion€of€the€charge.€€òòBerry€v.€Conover,óó€673ÏS.W.2d€541,€544„45€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€The€trial€court€repeated€itsÏinstructions€concerning€the€elements€of€a€misrepresentation€claim€and€MichaelÍLaddððs€burden€of€proof€after€the€jury€announced€that€it€was€deadlocked€on€theÏmisrepresentation€claim.€€Repeating€the€instructions€was€appropriate;€however,Ïthe€trial€court€later€provided€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€only€theseÏportions€of€the€charge.€€Under€the€circumstances€of€this€case,€providing€theÏjury€a€written€copy€of€only€a€portion€of€the€charge€improperly€emphasized€thatÏportion€of€the€charge.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€special€interrogatory€on€the€misrepresentation€issueÏcorrectly€presented€Michael€Laddððs€theory€of€the€case€to€the€jury,€it€did€notÏspecifically€correct€the€erroneous€portion€of€the€trial€courtððs€charge.€€Rather,Ïthe€inconsistency€between€the€instruction€and€the€interrogatory€only€served€toÏconfuse€the€jury€further,€as€evidenced€by€the€requests€for€clarification€ofÏð ðcharacteristicsðð€in€the€interrogatory€and€for€repetition€of€theÏmisrepresentation€and€burden€of€proof€instructions.€€ÌÌà àInconsistent€instructions€and€interrogatories,€like€two€inconsistentÏinstructions,€do€not€neutralize€or€validate€each€other€but€rather€intensify€theÏrisk€that€the€jury€will€be€confused.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Stephenson,óó€878€S.W.2d€530,Ï555€(Tenn.€1994);€òòCitizensðð€St.€R.R.€v.€Shepherd,óó€107€Tenn.€at€449„50,€64ÏS.W.€at€711.€€We€have€determined€that€the€erroneous€charge€and€theÏinconsistency€between€the€charge€and€the€special€interrogatory€more€probablyÏthan€not€affected€the€juryððs€verdict€in€this€case€and,€therefore,€that€theyÍconstitute€reversible€error.× ƒO ××  ×ÌÌà@ àò òD.ó óÌÌà àProviding€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions€can€be€quiteÏhelpful€in€civil€cases.€€However,€unlike€the€procedure€in€felony€cases,€òòseeóó€Tenn.ÏR.€Crim.€P.€30(c),€juries€in€civil€cases€are€not€entitled€to€take€a€written€copy€ofÏthe€trial€courtððs€instructions€into€the€jury€room.€€While€trial€courts€must,€onÏrequest,€reduce€their€jury€charge€to€writing€for€the€benefit€of€the€attorneys€inÏcivil€cases,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€20„9„501€(1994),€they€are€not€required€toÏprovide€a€written€copy€of€their€instructions€to€the€jury.€€òòIn€re€Estate€ofÏDepriestóó,€733€S.W.2d€74,€77€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986);€òòSmith€v.€Steeleóó,€44€Tenn.ÏApp.€238,€251,€313€S.W.2d€495,€501€(1956).ÌÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€entered€an€order€in€1991€proposing€anÏamendment€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€51€to€require€that€juries€in€civil€cases€beÏprovided€€with€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions.€€òòIn€Re€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏCivil€Procedureóó€(Tenn.€Jan.€25,€1991).€€The€Court€withdrew€the€proposed€ruleÏone€month€later€without€explanation.€€òòIn€re:€€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure€Amendment€to€Proposed€Amendment€„€Rule€51,€TennesseeÍDecisionsóó,€797„802€S.W.2d€at€XXX€(order€entered€February€28,€1991).€€Thus,Ïthe€decision€to€provide€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions€in€aÏcivil€case€remains€discretionary€with€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àA€written€copy€of€the€trial€courtððs€entire€charge€would€probably€haveÏbenefitted€the€jury€in€this€case.€€However,€in€light€of€the€present€state€of€theÏlaw€with€regard€to€providing€the€jury€with€written€instructions,€we€cannotÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€Michael€Laddððs€request€toÏprovide€the€jury€with€a€written€copy€of€the€entire€charge.€€The€trial€courtððsÏerror€was€to€submit€only€a€portion€of€its€charge€to€the€jury€over€MichaelÏLaddððs€objections.€€Because€of€the€risk€of€improper€emphasis,€trial€courtsÏshould€avoid€providing€juries€with€a€written€copy€of€only€a€portion€of€theirÏcharge.€€If€all€counsel€concur€in€providing€only€a€portion€of€the€charge€inÏwriting,€the€charge€should€contain€an€instruction€substantially€similar€to€T.P.I.Ï„„€Civil€1.11.ÌÌà@ àò òVII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Trial€Courtððs€Role€as€Thirteenth€Juroró óóóÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€also€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€fulfilling€its€role€asÏthirteenth€juror.€€He€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€comments€both€before€andÏafter€the€trial€demonstrate€that€the€trial€court€misunderstood€its€role€asÏthirteenth€juror.€€His€principal€argument€seems€to€be,€however,€that€the€trialÏcourt€could€not€adequately€perform€its€function€as€thirteenth€juror€due€to€theÏfifteen€month€delay€between€the€trial€and€his€review€of€the€verdict.€€WeÏdisagree.ÌÌà àA€court€speaks€only€through€its€written€orders.€€òòMassachusetts€Mut.€LifeÏIns.€Co.€v.€Taylor€Implement€&€Vehicle€Co.óó,€138€Tenn.€28,€39,€195€S.W.€762,Ï765€(1917);€òòEvans€v.€Perkeyóó,€647€S.W.2d€636,€641€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982).€ÏWhile€the€appellate€courts€may€consider€the€trial€courtððs€comments€made€in€theÏcourse€of€reviewing€a€motion€for€new€trial,€òòRidings€v.€Norfolk€S.€Ry.óó,€894ÏS.W.2d€281,€289€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994),€our€review€is€limited€to€determiningÏwhether€the€trial€court€properly€reviewed€the€evidence€and€was€satisfied€orÏdissatisfied€with€the€verdict.€€òòHerbert€v.€Brazealeóó,€902€S.W.2d€933,€936€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1995).€€The€accuracy€of€the€trial€courtððs€determination€as€thirteenthÏjuror€is€not€a€proper€subject€of€appellate€review.€€òòState€v.€Moatsóó,€906€S.W.2dÏ431,€435€(Tenn.€1995).€€ÌÌà àThe€thirteenth€juror€rule€requires€the€trial€court€to€weigh€the€evidenceÏindependently,€to€pass€upon€the€issues,€and€to€decide€whether€the€verdict€isÏsupported€by€the€evidence.€€òòCurran€v.€Stateóó,€157€Tenn.€7,€13,€4€S.W.2d€957,Ï958€(1928);€òòLoeffler€v.€Kjellgren,óó€884€S.W.2d€463,€468„69€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1994).€€If€the€trial€court€comments€on€the€record€about€its€determination€asÏthirteenth€juror,€its€ruling€should€be€clear€and€unequivocal.€€òòState€v.€Moatsóó,Ï906€S.W.2d€at€435.€€This€court€must€remand€a€case€for€a€new€trial€if€the€trialÏcourtððs€comments€demonstrate€dissatisfaction€with€the€verdict.€òòCumberlandÏTel.€&€Tel.€Co.€v.€Smithwickóó,€112€Tenn.€463,€467„68,€79€S.W.€803,€804Ï(1904);€òòMiller€v.€Doeóó,€873€S.W.2d€346,€347€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1993).€€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€finally€reviewed€the€juryððs€verdict€from€itsÏvantage€point€as€thirteenth€juror€fifteen€months€after€the€trial.€€The€passage€ofÏtime€alone€provides€no€basis€for€concluding€that€the€trial€court€could€not€or€didÏnot€properly€review€the€verdict.€€The€October€18,€1994€order€clearly€andÍunequivocally€demonstrates€that€the€trial€court€understood€and€properlyÏperformed€its€role€as€thirteenth€juror.€ÌÌà@ àò òVIII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Return€of€a€General€Verdictó óóóÌÌà àMichael€Ladd€finally€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€directingÏthe€jury€to€return€a€general€verdict.€€While€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€49.03€preservesÏthe€right€to€a€general€verdict,€the€right€must€be€exercised€prior€to€the€time€theÏjury€retires.€€Even€when€a€general€verdict€has€been€requested,€the€court€mayÏrequire€the€jury€to€answer€special€interrogatories.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€49.02.€ÏUsing€special€interrogatories€is€especially€appropriate€when€the€issues€in€theÏcase€are€numerous€and€involved.€€òòSee€Sharpe€v.€City€of€Lewisburg,óó€677€F.ÏSupp.€1362,€1364€(M.D.€Tenn.€1988);òò€Mitchell€v.€Jennings,óó€836€S.W.2d€575,Ï577€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€issues€involved€in€this€case€are€complex€and€involved.€€Accordingly,Ïthe€trial€court€properly€exercised€its€discretion€to€use€special€interrogatories€toÏassist€the€jury€in€rendering€a€reasoned€verdict€consistent€with€the€proof.€ÏHowever,€any€of€the€parties€would€have€been€entitled€to€a€general€verdict€hadÏthey€requested€one€in€a€timely€manner.€€While€Michael€Laddððs€lawyer€told€theÏtrial€court€during€the€charge€conference€that€he€would€prefer€a€general€verdictÏbecause€the€trial€court€had€decided€not€to€provide€the€jury€with€a€written€copyÏof€its€instructions,€he€never€formally€demanded€a€general€verdict€and€did€notÏobject€when€the€trial€court€announced€its€decision€to€use€the€specialÏinterrogatories€that€the€lawyer€himself€had€prepared.€€Accordingly,€we€do€notÍfind€that€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€require€the€jury€to€return€a€general€verdictÏwas€error.ÌÌà@ àò òIX.ÌÌó óà àFor€the€reasons€stated€herein,€we€reverse€the€judgment€and€remand€theÏcase€for€a€new€trial€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€We€also€tax€the€costs€of€thisÏappeal€joint€and€severally€to€Honda€Motor€Co.,€Ltd.,€Honda€R€&€D€Co.,€Ltd.,Ïand€American€Honda€Motor€Co.,€Inc.€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€mayÏissue.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.€ÌÌÌ________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGE