ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 0l@ 0D¬ ð 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð B` 1u} U,ò 0dU,‚U>®U6ìB)"DCK D3Ž AMÁU* 0@8#x1›v~ÌvÓJ AOÆl 0D2 D/v B¥˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ gDhDiDjUkDlUmUnDo[pÓ€©U!3|x{((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd'ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌò òAugust€19,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€,ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ôÔWe€will€refer€to€the€parties€by€their€first€names€because€they€shareÏthe€same€surname.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€%%X„d&ÓÑ#€%%Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ P ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÔ€'ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€µXXdìdÈ7ÑœÑ  ÑIN›€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̛̜ÌÓ  ÓÌÌRUTH€HALL€LANE,€à àà àà à€€€)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9603„CH„00094Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€KNOX€COUNTY€CHANCERY€COURTÌà àà àPlaintiff„Appellant,€€€)̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€+.);+'h|` ¤ `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìv.€à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€HONORABLEÏSHARON€BELL,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€CHANCELLORÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)ÌESTATE€OF€THOMAS€ROBERT€E.€LANE,€)ÌœDeceased,›€NELLE€œANNE›€JOHNSON€œ€€€€)ÌLANE,€Executrix,›€and€NELLE€œANNE€€)ÌJOHNSON›€œLANE,›€œIndividually,›à àœ€€€)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€œ)›Ìà àà àDefendants„Appellees.€€)€œAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌ›ÌÌÌÌÌÌDOUGLAS€M.€ANDERSON€of€ANDERSON€&€ANDERSON,€Knoxville,€forÏœAppellant›ÌÌJOHN€E.€McDONALD€of€JOYCE,€MEREDITH,€FLITCROFT€&€NORMAND,€OakÏRidge,€and€JAMES€C.€CONE€of€JENKINS€&€JENKINS,€Knoxville,€forÏœAppellees›ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÓ  Óóớ̜à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœà àSusano,›€J.ÌÓÓà àà àRuth€Hall€Lane€œ(Ruth›× ƒ/ ××  ל)›€filed€a€petition€for€œwidowððsÏrights,€including€an€elective›€share€of€the€estate€of€Thomas€RobertÏE.€Lane€(Robert),€asserting€that€she€is€œthe›€surviving€spouse€œofÏthe€deceased.€€In›€so€œdoing,›€she€challenges€the€validity€of€aÏdecree€granting€Robert€œan›€òòex€parteóó€œdivorce,€said€decree€being›Ïœentered›€œon€September€29,€1958,€by›€the€Trial€Justice€Court€œof›ÏAnderson€œCounty.€€Robertððs›€will€leaves€his€œestate›€to€Nelle€AnneÏJohnson€Lane€(Nelle),€to€whom€he€was€married€on€February€17,€œ1959,›Ïand€œto€whom€he€remained›€œmarried€until›€his€death€on€July€29,€1994.€ÏThe€Chancellor€dismissed€Ruthððs€petition€on€the€œground›€that€it€œwas›Ïtime„barred€by€the€equitable€doctrine€of€laches.€€Ruth€argues€onÏappeal€that€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€œexists.€ÍConsequently,€she€argues€that€summary€judgment€is€not€appropriate.€ÏWe›€affirm€the€Chancellorððs€judgment.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓIÌÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€material€facts€are€œnot€in€dispute.›€€Robert€and€RuthÏwere€married€in€Claiborne€County,€Tennessee,€on€March€15,€1941.€ÏIn€1956,€they€separated,€Ruth€moving€to€West€Virginia€with€theirÏonly€child,€and€Robert€œstaying€in›€Knoxville.€€In€œAugust,€1957,›ÏRuth€took€a€teaching€job€in€Gaffney,€South€Carolina;€RobertÏremained€in€Knoxville.€€ÌÌÌà àà àOn€March€14,€1958,€Robert€filed€for€divorce€œin›€the€TrialÏJustice€Court€œof€Anderson›€œCounty.›€€The€divorce€complaint€allegedÏthat€Ruth€œhad€ð ðbeen›€guilty€of€willful€or€malicious€desertion€orÏabsence,€without€a€reasonable€cause,€for€two€whole€years.ðð€€TheÏcomplaint€further€alleged€that€Ruth€and€the€coupleððs€daughter€wereÏresiding€in€Jackson,€Mississippi,€and€that€œhis€wifeððs€ð ðexact›Ïaddress€and€other€statistics€œ[could€not]›€be€obtained€by€diligentÍinquiry.ðð€€Ruth€was€œserved›€œby›€publication€in€œa€newspaper,€the›òòÏClintonóó€œòòCourier„Newsóó.›€€ÌÌà àà àOn€September€29,€1958,€the€Trial€Justice€Court€œawardedÏRobert€an›€òòex€parte€œóódivorce.€€On›€February€17,€1959,€Robert€marriedÏNelle€in€Murray€County,€Georgia.€€Robert€and€Nelle€thereafterÏlived€together€as€husband€and€wife€in€Knoxville€for€more€than€35Ïœyears.€€Robertððs›€will€names€Nelle€as€executrix€and€leaves€hisÏœestate,›€estimated€at€$584,000,€to€her.€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€record€includes€portions€of€œRuthððs›€discoveryÏœdeposition.€€In›€it,€she€œsays›€that€Robert€visited€her€and€theirÏdaughter€in€South€Carolina€ð ð[r]egularly,€every€week€or€every€twoÏweeks,ðð€from€1957€through€1971.€€Ruth€also€œstates›€that€in€1965,ÏRobert€accompanied€them€on€a€summer€vacation€to€the€Worldððs€FairÏin€New€York€and€to€Canada.€€€€ÌÌà àà àRuth€testified€that€she€œfirst€learned›€of€the€divorceÏdecree€on€May€24,€1971,€when€Robert€provided€her€with€a€copy.€€SheÏlearned€of€his€second€marriage€to€Nelle€in€January€of€1972.€ÍSometime€in€the€late€1970s€or€early€1980s,€Ruthððs€daughter€andÏson„in„law€went€to€Anderson€County€to€investigate€theÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€divorce.€€They€apparently€locatedÏand€read€the€divorce€papers,€returned€to€South€Carolina€and€toldÏRuth€that€œRobertÌÌÓÓà àà8 àsaid›€that€you€were€someplace€in€MississippiÏand€he€couldnððt€find€you.€€He€ran€it€in€thatÏpaper€for€two€or€three€times€or€however€theyÏdid,€and€thatððs€how€he€got€œ[the›€œdivorce].›ÌœÌÌ›ÌÓÓà àà àRuth€took€no€further€action€œregarding€the€divorce€until›Ïafter€Robertððs€œdeath.›€€While€consulting€an€attorney€in€October€ofÏ1994,€she€was€advised€that€her€divorce€was€ð ða€œfraud.ððÌÌà àà àIn€the€petition€filed€in€this€case€on€February€24,€1995,ÏRuth€alleges›€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThis€said€divorce€that€was€granted€to€ThomasÏRobert€E.€Lane€(now€Deceased)€from€Ruth€LaneÏis€void€and€the€subsequent€marriage€of€ThomasÏRobert€E.€Lane€and€Nelle€Ann€Johnson€Lane€isÏan€absolute€and€complete€nullity.€.€.€ÌÌÌÌœÓÓIn›€addition€to€challenging€the€œvalidity€of€the€1958›€divorce,€RuthÏœcontends€as€follows:›ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€the€alternative,€if€the€Court€shall€holdÏthe€said€Anderson€County€divorce€valid,€theÏDeceased€remarried€Ruth€Hall€Lane€by€means€ofÏa€common€law€marriage€in€the€State€of€SouthÏCarolina€before€his€purported€marriage€toÏNelle€Anne€Johnson€Lane.€.€.After€SeptemberÏ29,€1958,€and€before€February€17,€1959,€ThomasÏRobert€E.€Lane€held€himself€out€in€SouthÏCarolina€to€be€the€husband€of€Ruth€Hall€Lane,Ïthereby€creating€a€common€law€marriage.Ì̛̜ÌÓÓÓ ` ÜŽX¹(0*ŒX Óà àà àThe€Chancellor€dismissed€Ruthððs€petition.€€Regarding€theÏœchallenge€to€the€divorce,›€the€Chancellor€found€that€ð ðtheÏpetitioner€has€not€shown€good€cause€for€her€failure€to€attack€theÏvalidity€of€the€divorce€at€an€earlier€œdate,ðð›€and€applied€theÏdoctrine€of€laches€to€bar€Ruthððs€claim.€€Regarding€the€common€lawÏmarriage€claim,€the€Chancellor€found€thatÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àbetween€the€pertinent€dates,€the€petitionerÏdid€not€know€she€was€divorced€and€did€not€knowÏshe€had€the€capacity€to€enter€into€a€commonÏlaw€marriage€and,€therefore,€could€not€haveÏintended€to€enter€into€a€common€law€marriageÏas€a€matter€of€law.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓIIÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àœSince›€matters€outside€the€pleadings€were€œconsidered€byÏthe›€Chancellor,€we€treat€œher›€dismissal€as€a€grant€of€summaryÏœjudgment.€€Rule€12.02,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.›€€Our€standard€of€review€inÏœsuch€cases›€is€œwell„settled.›€€In€deciding€whether€a€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€is€appropriate,€we€must€determine€ð ðif€theÏpleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€interrogatories,€and€admissionsÏon€file,€together€with€the€affidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€isÏno€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€partyÏis€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.ðð€€œRule€56.03,€Tenn.›ÏR.€Civ.€œP.›€€We€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidenceÏin€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferencesÏfrom€that€evidence€in€œhis€or€her›€favor,€and€discard€allÏcountervailing€evidence.€€òòSee€ò òByrd€v.€Hall,óóó ó€847€S.W.2d€208,€210„11Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÓ  Óà àIIIÌÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€first€issue€we€address€is€whether€the€ChancellorÏerred€in€applying€the€doctrine€of€laches€to€bar€Ruthððs€challengeÏto€the€1958€divorce.€€òòGibsonððs€Suits€in€Chancery€óó(Inman,€7th€ed.Ï1988)€defines€the€equitable€defense€of€laches€as€follows:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àThe€neglect€of€a€person€to€make€complaint,€orÏbring€action€in€due€season,€he€being€òòsui€jurisÏóóand€knowing€the€facts,€or€having€the€means€ofÏknowledge,€is€called€laches.€€Where€there€hadÏbeen€gross€laches€in€prosecuting€rights,€orÏlong€and€unreasonable€acquiescence€in€adverseÏrights,€Courts€of€Equity€refuse€to€interfere.Ï.€.The€Court€never€lends€its€aid€to€one€who,Ïwith€knowledge€of€his€rights€and€withÏopportunity€to€assert€them,€delaysÏunreasonably€œso€to›€œdo.›€€Equity€aids€those€whoÏare€vigilant,€not€those€who€sleep€upon€theirÏrights,€and€always€discourages€stale€demands.€Ïà àà àÌà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*à àà à*ÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€defense€of€laches€presents€a€mixedÏquestion€of€law€and€fact.€€Two€essentialÏelements€of€fact€are€negligence€and€unexcusedÏdelay€by€the€plaintiff€in€asserting€hisÏalleged€claim,€which,€in€combination,€resultÏin€an€injury€(i.e.,€prejudice)€to€the€partyÏpleading€laches.€€The€dispositive€question€ofÏwhether,€in€view€of€the€established€facts,€itÏwould€be€inequitable€to€the€defendant€to€allowÏa€recovery€to€the€plaintiff,€is€a€question€ofÏlaw.ÌœÌÓÓòòÌId.,›€óóðð€95€at€œ90„91.›€ÌÌà àà àThe€undisputed€facts€establish€that€Ruth€did€not€bringÏher€action€challenging€her€divorce€œuntil›€œapproximately›€24€yearsÏafter€she€learned€of€the€divorce;€œsome›€23€years€after€she€learnedÏof€Robertððs€remarriage;€and€at€œleast,›€œgiving›€her€the€benefit€ofÏœthe›€œdoubt,›€a€dozen€years€after€œher€daughter€reported€to€herÏregarding€the€formerððs€search€at€the€Anderson€County€Courthouse.€ÏMore›€significantly,€she€waited€until€Robert€was€dead€and€could€notÏexplain€or€defend€his€actions.€€In€her€brief,€Ruth€does€not€argueÏthat€she€was€not€guilty€of€negligence€and€unreasonable€delay€underÏthese€facts.€€Rather,€the€thrust€of€her€argument€appears€to€beÏthat€a€defense€of€laches€always€raises€a€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact,€and€that€summary€judgment€is€therefore€never€proper€whenÏœthat€defense€is€asserted.€€We€disagree.›€ÌÌà àà àRuthððs€brief€cites€a€single€case€in€support€of€thisÏproposition,€ò òòòFrye€v.€Postal€Employees€Credit€Union,€ó óóó713€S.W.2d€324Ïœ(Tenn.€App.›€1986).€€The€òòò òFryeó óóó€case€involved€very€œdifferent€facts,›Ïand€presented€a€œdissimilar›€issue,€from€the€case€at€bar.€€The€issueÍin€ò òòòFrye€ó óóówas€whether€the€plaintiff€had€unreasonably€delayed€inÏpresenting€a€bank€account€passbook€which€had€been€opened€by€hisÏfather€many€years€earlier.€€òòId.€óóat€325.€€The€proposition€uponÏwhich€Ruth€relies€was€stated€by€the€ò òòòFrye€ó óóócourt€as€follows:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àThe€reasonableness€of€the€plaintiffððs€actionsÏin€making€the€demand€is€a€factualÏdetermination€for€the€trial€court€to€make€atÏtrial,€not€on€summary€judgment.€ÌœÌ›ÌÌÓÓòòId.€óóat€326„27.€€œThis›€statement€was€not€intended€as€a€general€orÏuniversal€proposition€regarding€laches,€but€rather€was€simply€aÏrecognition€that€in€that€case,€there€existed€a€genuine€factualÏissue,€as€the€court€had€previously€noted:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àViewing€the€facts€in€the€light€most€favorableÏto€plaintiff,€his€lack€of€knowledge€or€lack€ofÏmeans€of€knowledge€of€the€account€could€excuseÏhis€delay€in€demanding€the€funds.Ì̛̜ÌÓÓòòId.€óóat€326.€€There€is€no€such€issue€regarding€knowledge€of€theÏfacts€in€the€present€œcase.›€œ€Ruth€knew€that€Robert€had€sought€andÏobtained€an€òòex€parte€óódivorce,€and€further€that€he€had€sworn€sheÍwas€living€in€Mississippi€when,€according€to€her,€she€had€noÏconnection€with€that€state.€€She€knew€the€totality€of€these€factsÏas€early€as€the€late€1970s€or€early€1980s,€and€her€depositionÏsuggests€that€when€she€first€learned€of€the€divorce€in€1971,€sheÏsuspected€that€something€was€amiss:ÌÓÓÌÌà8 àà8 à[S]ee,€I€never€did€understand€how€you€couldÏget€a€divorce€unless€you€were€both€there€andÏsigned€it€and€went€through€the€stuff€you€goÏthrough€to€get€a€divorce.ÌÌÌÌÓÓò òòòFrye›€œó óóóis›€of€little€aid€to€Ruthððs€œposition€in€the€instantÏlitigation.›€€ÌÌà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€a€line€of€Tennessee€œcases,›Ïœall€of›€which€affirm€a€summary€dismissal€œbased€on€a€finding›€ofÏlaches,€is€persuasive€in€this€case,€and€effectively€refutes€theÏnotion€that€summary€judgment€is€never€appropriate€when€laches€isÏraised.€€The€first€of€these€is€ò òòòCagle€v.€Cagle,€ó óóó229€S.W.2d€514Ïœ(Tenn.€1950).›€€In€œò òòòCagle,ó óóó›€the€plaintiff€filed€suit€seeking€to€haveÏa€decree€of€divorce,€which€had€been€entered€against€her€some€fiveÍyears€earlier,€set€aside€on€œthe€ground›€of€insufficient€process.€ÏœIn€rejecting€this€attempt,€the›€Supreme€Court€stated€the€following:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àThe€Chancellor€held€that€while€the€allegedÏerrors€and€œirregularities›€in€the€HoustonÏCounty€case€in€1944€might€have€been€possibleÏgrounds€for€a€reversal€of€the€divorce€decreeÏin€that€œcourt,›€in€a€proper€proceeding€for€œsuch›Ïpurpose,€said€decree€could€not€be€successfullyÏattacked€in€a€proceeding€of€this€kind€and€atÏthis€late€date.€€We€agree€with€theÏChancellorððs€conclusions.€ÌÌà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*à àà à*ÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€present€suit€was€not€filed€until€March€21,Ï1949,€almost€five€years€after€the€litigationÏin€the€divorce€decree€here€challenged.€€NoÏgood€cause€is€shown€for€complainantððs€delay€inÏmaking€her€application€to€have€said€divorceÏdecree€set€aside,€although€she€had€known€ofÏthe€existence€of€said€decree€for€about€fourÏyears€before€bringing€this€suit.€€This€delayÏis€unreasonable€and€constitutes€laches.ÌÌÌœò òòòÓÓCagle,óóó ó›€229€S.W.2d€at€œ515„16.›ÌÌà àà àIn€ò òòòHill€v.€Hill,€ó óóó326€S.W.2d€851€œ(Tenn.€App.›€1958),€theÏplaintiff€husband€sought€to€have€a€divorce€decree€set€asideÏbecause€of€fraud€in€procuring€the€œdivorce.€€He€claimed€that›€œhisÏspouse€falsely›€stated€that€his€residence€was€unknown€and€that€heÍcould€not€be€located€with€due€diligence.€€òòId.€óóat€852.€€The€ò òòòHillÏó óóócourt€stated€that€the€plaintiff€had€ð ðfailed€to€show€good€cause€forÏwaiting€a€full€year€before€filing€suit€to€attack€the€decree,ðð€andÏaffirmed€the€Chancellorððs€dismissal€of€the€plaintiffððs€case.€€òòId.Ïóóat€855.ÌÌà àà àThe€facts€of€ò òòòColeman€v.€Coleman,€ó óóó369€S.W.2d€557€œ(Tenn.Ï1963)›€are€remarkably€similar€to€those€of€the€present€case.€€InÏœò òòòColeman,ó óóó›€the€plaintiff€sought€to€have€a€divorce€decree,€which€hadÏbeen€entered€against€her€some€16€years€œearlier,›€set€aside€on€theÏgrounds€of€fraud€and€improper€service€of€process.€€The€SupremeÏCourt€stated€the€following:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àThe€most€serious€allegation€made€by€GeorgeÏColeman€in€the€òòex€parteóó€divorce€hearing€inÏ1945€was€that€the€defendant,€Gertrude€Coleman,Ïthe€complainant€herein,€was€guilty€of€willfulÏand€malicious€desertion€for€two€years€andÏproceeded€against€her€by€publication€when€inÏfact€she€was€a€resident€of€Hamilton€County,ÏTennessee,€and€was€out€of€œState›€onlyÏtemporarily.€€Now€if€Gertrude€Coleman€hadÏattacked€œthis›€decree€within€a€reasonableÏlength€of€time€and€during€the€life€of€herÏhusband,€George€Coleman,€she€would€have€beenÏentitled€to€a€hearing.€.€.The€main€questionÏbefore€this€Court€is€whether€or€not€theÍComplainant€acted€soon€enough€and€in€goodÏfaith.ÌÌ€œÌ›Ìò òòòÓÓColeman,€ó óóó369€S.W.2d€at€561.€€The€ò òòòColeman€œó óóócourt›€stated€œthat›€œð ðtheÏcase€at€bar€is€very›€much€on€all€fours€with€the€ò òòòHilló óóó€case,ðð€andÏreached€the€following€conclusion:ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àWe€do€not€believe€that€the€Complainant€hasÏshown€good€cause€for€failing€to€make€furtherÏinquiry€upon€her€return€from€Milwaukee€in€1946Ïas€to€her€husbandððs€marital€status.€€She€hadÏabout€sixteen€years€in€which€to€file€a€billÏwherein€her€husband€then€living€wouldÏcertainly€have€been€a€material€party.€€WeÏbelieve€she€waited€too€long.Ì̛̜ÌÓÓòòId.€óóat€œ562.›ÌÌà àà àThe€cases€discussed€above€demonstrate€that€where€theÏundisputed€facts€clearly€show€negligence€and€unexcusable€delay€inÏbringing€a€claim€by€a€party€who€has€knowledge€of€the€operativeÏfacts€œgiving›€rise€to€the€potential€claim,€summary€dismissal€€canÏbe€œappropriate,€assuming€the€other€necessary€elements€are€alsoÏpresent.ÌÌà àà àThere›€is€one€further€element€which€must€be€present€forÏan€effective€defense€of€laches,€and€that€is€prejudice€to€theÏdefendant€resulting€from€the€delay.€€Lapse€of€time€alone€will€notÏsuffice.€€ò òòòFrye,€œó óóó713€S.W.2d›€at€326;€ò òòòIn€re€Darwinððs€Estate,€ó óóó503ÏS.W.2d€511,€514€œ(Tenn.€1973);›€ò òòòArcher€v.€Archer,ó óóó€907€S.W.2d€412,Ïœ416›€œ(Tenn.€App.›€1995).€€ÌÌà àà àWe€believe€that€Nelle€has€demonstrated€prejudiceÏresulting€from€the€long€delay€in€at€least€two€regards.€€First,Ïboth€œRobert›€and€his€attorney€in€the€divorce€œaction›€are€now€œdead.€ÏòòSee›€ò òArcher,€ó óóó907€S.W.2d€at€416€(ð ðPrejudice€includes€the€loss€ofÏevidence.€.€œ.ðð);€òòò ò›€Hoffman€v.€Tualó óóó,€1991€WL€78235€œ(Tenn.€App.,›ÏW.S.,€filed€May€16,€1991,€Tomlin,€P.J.)€(Discussing€laches€underÏsimilar€facts;€stating€ð ð[a]s€far€as€resulting€prejudice€to€theÏdefendants,.€.€œ.[o]ne›€of€the€parties€to€this€affair,€the€decedent,Ïand€a€material€witness,€the€attorney,€are€now€dead.€€Both€of€themÏhad€personal€knowledge€of€facts€material€to€this€œsuit.ðð)€òòIdóó.€atÏ*5;›€ò òòòHamm€v.€Hamm,€ó óóó614€S.W.2d€366,€371€œ(Tenn.€App.›€1980)€(ð ðifÏappellant€was€unwilling€to€seek€to€preserve€her€marriage€while€herÍhusband€was€alive.€.€.after€the€termination€of€her€marital€dutiesÏby€his€death,€she€is€estopped€to€try€to€resurrect€the€bones€of€theÏmarriage€for€her€financial€benefit€free€of€any€corresponding€dutyÏor€obligation€on€her€œpart.ðð).›ÌÌà àà àSecondly,€if€Ruth€had€œsuccessfully€challenged›€theÏvalidity€of€her€divorce€from€Robert€when€he€was€alive,€then€RobertÏœwould›€have€œhad€the€ability,€should€he€have€chosen€to€do€so,€to›Ïœseek›€a€valid€œdivorce.›€€If€necessary,€Robert€and€Nelle€could€thenÏhave€remarried.€€As€it€stands,€Ruth€is€asking€the€court€to€ruleÏthat€Nelleððs€marriage€of€more€than€35€years€œis›€null€and€void€inÏthe€eyes€of€the€law,€after€there€is€œno€opportunity›€for€Robert€andÏNelle€to€œrectify›€that€situation.€€We€believe€she€waited€too€longÏand€was€guilty€of€laches,€and€affirm€the€Chancellorððs€ruling€onÏthis€issue.€ÌÌÓ  ÓIVÌÌÓ  Óà àà àRuth€œargues,›€in€the€œalternative,›€that€during€the€periodÏbetween€the€divorce€decree€of€September€29,€œ1958,›€and€RobertððsÍmarriage€to€Nelle€on€February€17,€1959,€Robert€and€Ruth€enteredÏinto€a€common€law€marriage,€which€œcontinued›€without€œdivorce›€untilÏRobertððs€death€in€1994.€€Although€a€common€law€marriage€cannot€beÏestablished€œby€conduct€within›€œthe›€œState€of›€œTennessee,€it€can€beÏproved€by€a€showing€of€the€required€elements€in›€a€jurisdictionÏwhere€such€a€marriage€is€sanctioned.€€òòò òIn€re€Estate€of€Glover,€ó óóó882ÏS.W.2d€789,€789„90€(Tenn.App.€1994).€€South€Carolina€allows€commonÏlaw€œmarriages.€›€ò òòòKirby€v.€Kirby,€ó óóó241€S.E.2d€415€(S.C.€1978).ÌÌà àà àœIn›€order€to€enter€into€a€valid€common€law€œmarriage€inÏSouth€Carolina,›€œthere€must€be€òòmutualó󛀜intent€to›€assume€theÏœrelationship›€of€husband€and€wife.€€ò òòòPrevatte€v.€Prevatte,€ó óóó377ÏS.E.2d€114,€117€(S.C.€App.€1989)€(ð ðIn€order€for€a€common€lawÏmarriage€to€arise,€the€parties€must€agree€to€enter€into€a€commonÏlaw€marriage.€.€.though€such€agreement€may€be€gathered€from€theÏœconduct›€of€the€parties.ðð).€€As€noted€by€the€ò òòòKirby€ó óóócourt,€centralÏto€this€agreement€requirement€is€that€both€parties€have€the€intentÏto€œcontract€a€common€law€marriage:›ÌÓӜ̛Ìà8 àà8 àThe€difference€between€marriage€andÏconcubinage€in€the€circumstances€stated€restsÏin€the€intent€of€the€cohabitating€œpartiesÌà àà8 à.›€.€.€œ.€The›€intent€in€marriage€is€usuallyÏevidenced€by€a€public€and€unequivocalÏdeclaration€of€the€parties,€but€that€is€notÏnecessary;€the€intent€may€exist€though€neverÏpublic€and€formally€declared;€òònevertheless€theÏintent€must€œexistÌà àà8 àóó.›€.€.It€is€true€that€when€the€intent€has€notÏbeen€formally€and€publicly€declared,€.€.€.€itÏmay€yet€rest€in€circumstances.€Ì̛̜ÌÓÓò òòòKirby,€ó óóó241€S.E.2d€at€416€(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà àà àRuth€concedes€that€she€and€Robert€never€discussed€orÏconsidered€a€common€law€marriage€during€the€period€at€issue.€€InÏfact,€Ruth€testified€that€she€was€not€even€aware€of€theÏpossibility€of€a€common€law€marriage€until€she€consulted€with€anÏattorney€after€Robertððs€death.€€Nevertheless,€she€argues€a€commonÏlaw€marriage€arose€from€the€conduct€of€the€parties€during€thatÏperiod€of€fewer€than€œfive›€months€between€Robertððs€divorce€and€hisÏmarriage€to€Nelle.€€ÌÌà àà àRuthððs€own€testimony€demonstrates€that€she€did€not€haveÏthe€intent€required€by€South€Carolina€for€a€common€law€œmarriage.€ÍShe›€testified€that€œwhen€the€parties€cohabitated€in€South€CarolinaÏshe›€thought€she€was€legally€married€to€Robert€by€virtue€of€theirÏœTennessee€marriage›€œceremony.€€Since€Ruth€thought€she€was€marriedÏas€a€result€of€the€ceremonial€marriage€in€1941,€it€is€clear€beyondÏany€doubt€that€she€could€not€have€intended€to€contract€a€commonÏlaw€marriage.€€From€her€standpoint,€she€did€not€have€the€capacityÏto€contract€a€marriage,€common€law€or€otherwise;€she€was€alreadyÏmarried.›ÌÓÓÌÌÓÓœà àà àSince€it€is€clear€that€Ruth€did€not€intend€to€contract€aÏcommon€law€marriage,€we€do€not€need€to€address€Robertððs€intent.€ÏSouth€Carolina€requires€òòmutualóó€intent.€€Without€Ruthððs€intent€toÏcontract€a€common€law€marriage,€there€can€be€no€such€marriage.€ÏThe€Chancellor€did€not€err€in€finding€for€the€appellees€on€theÏcommon€law€marriage€issue.›ÌÌà àà àFor€the€aforementioned€reasons,€we€affirm€theÏChancellorððs€judgment€dismissing€Ruthððs€petition.€€œThis€case€isÏremanded€for€collection€of€costs€assessed€below,€pursuant€toÍapplicable€law.€€Costs›€on€appeal€are€taxed€and€assessed€toÏappellant.€€Ìœ›ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.ÌœÌCONCUR:›Ì̛̜Ì___________________________à àÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.ÌÌœÌÌ___________________________›ÌHerschel€P.€Franks,€œJ.›€