ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µLÝb) w@1 4q … ” 0Jœ 0Tæ 0^: 0h˜ 0r 0|r 0†î 0t 1u 0dy U>Ý B)DCD AM‡U*Ô Bþ v~'vÓ¥ D3x 0@« AOëÆ: 0D D/D Bs˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLLÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT- ù- w/xyDz{D|}~DÓ€‰DÒ 3|x‰2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌJuly€9,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€6dXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ#` Ü` ä œ ’X#Ó›Þ ÞÌDIANA€SUE€LONG,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9701„CV„00003Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌMICHAEL€GEORGE€LONG,à à)à àNo.à à93D„4318̜ـ€ÙßR€#&"A1-j|ù` ç `€€@ÿRß›à àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€MURIEL€ROBINSON,€JUDGEÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌROSE€PALERMOÌCheatham€&€PalermoÌ43€Music€Square€WestÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37203Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLEEÌÌÌDAVID€H.€HORNIKÌ222€Second€Avenue€NorthÌSuite€360MÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37201„1649Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌòòÓ  ÓÔ€ „ÔOPINIONóóÌÓ  ÓÌÓ€ÓÔ€ ¼Ôà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€the€defendant,€Michael€George€Long,€from€thatÏportion€of€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€which€awarded€alimony€in€futuro€to€hisÏformer€wife,€Diana€Sue€Long,€who€was€the€plaintiff€below.ÌÓ  ÓÌI.ÌÌÓ  Óà àWhen€the€parties€divorced€in€June€of€1996,€they€had€been€married€forÏover€27€years.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€wife€was€48€years€of€age€and€theÏhusband€49.€ÌDuring€the€marriage,€they€had€two€children,€a€son€born€in€1976,€and€a€minorÏdaughter,€born€in€1986.€€The€parties€stipulated,€inter€alia,€that€the€wife€should€beÏawarded€an€absolute€divorce€from€the€husband€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriateÏmarital€conduct,€that€the€wife€should€be€awarded€the€absolute€care,€custody,€andÏcontrol€of€the€partiesðð€minor€daughter,€and€that€their€marital€property€should€beÏdivided€equally.ÌÌà àThe€parties€met€while€they€were€both€attending€West€VirginiaÏUniversity€in€Morgantown,€West€Virginia.€€After€two€years€of€college,€the€wifeÏdiscontinued€her€education€and€worked€full€time€while€the€husband€attendedÏschool€and€completed€a€four„year€degree.€€For€the€first€six€years€of€the€partiesððÏmarriage,€the€wife€worked€as€a€secretary.€€She€stopped€working€when€the€partiesÍdecided€that€they€wanted€a€family€and€she€did€not€work€again€until€twenty€yearsÏlater€when€she€obtained€part„time€employment€in€October€1994€as€a€sales€clerkÏfor€J.€C.€Penney.€€ÌÌà àAt€J.€C.€Penney,€the€wife€was€working€twenty€hours€per€week€earningÏ$6.10€per€hour€which€amounted€to€a€monthly€net€earning€of€$400.00.€€SheÏtestified€that€she€could€have€obtained€full€time€employment€at€œJ.€›C.€Penney€butÏthat€the€additional€hours€would€entail€her€working€on€weekends€and€eveningsÏwhich€would€be€difficult€with€her€daughter€at€home.€€The€wife€testified€that€sheÏdid€not€object€to€working€full€time€and€that€she€knew€full„time€work€would€beÏnecessary€for€her€to€maintain€herself€and€her€minor€daughter.€€However,€sheÏwanted€a€full„time€job€which€would€require€her€to€work€only€in€the€daytime,ÏMonday€through€Friday.€€The€record€also€shows€that€the€wife€is€suffering€from€aÏphysical€ailment€which€consists€of€nerve€damage€in€her€hand.€€This€conditionÏinhibits€the€wifeððs€ability€to€lift€and€raise€her€fingers€such€that€she€is€prohibitedÏfrom€engaging€in€secretarial€work€or€other€work€which€would€require€the€use€ofÏher€fingers.ÌÌà àThe€husband,€who€went€to€work€directly€out€of€school,€is€currentlyÏemployed€by€œBridgestone›/Firestone.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€husband€hadÏa€gross€annual€income€of€approximately€$87,000.00.€€The€husband€testified€œthat,›Ïin€addition€to€this€amount€of€gross€income,€his€girlfriend€was€earningÏapproximately€$45,000.00.€€He€said€that€he€lived€with€her€and€paid€her€$300.00Ïper€month€for€expenses.€€He€paid€no€other€expenses€other€than€this€$300.00€perÏmonth.€€The€husband€admitted€at€trial€that€he€could€afford€to€pay€the€alimonyÏrequested€by€the€wife€but€that€he€had€concerns€for€paying€permanent€alimonyÏbecause€he€was€uncertain€about€his€job€and€what€his€ability€to€pay€ð ðdown€the€roadÍðð€might€be.€ÌÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€husbandððs€first€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€theÏwife€alimony€in€futuro€rather€than€rehabilitative€alimony.€€Our€supreme€courtÏhas€noted€that€while€the€legislature€has€expressed€a€preference€for€rehabilitativeÏalimony,€a€court€may€grant€alimony€in€futuro€where€rehabilitation€is€not€feasible.€Ïò òòòAaron€v.€Aaron,€ó óóó909€S.W.2d€408,€410€(Tenn.€1995);€òòò òSelf€v.€Selfó óóó,€861ÏS.W.2d€360,€361€(Tenn.€1993);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(1996).€€TheÏamount€of€alimony€awarded€in€any€case€is€a€matter€of€discretion€for€the€trialÏcourt€in€view€of€all€of€the€particular€circumstances.€€ò òòòAaronó óóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€410.€Ïð ðWhile€there€is€no€absolute€formula€for€determining€the€amount€of€alimony,€œððthe›Ïreal€need€of€the€spouse€seeking€the€support€is€the€single€most€important€factor.€€InÏaddition€to€the€need€of€the€disadvantaged€spouse,€the€courts€most€often€considerÏthe€ability€of€the€obligor€spouse€to€provide€support.ðððð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€(quoting€ò òòòœCranford›€v.ÏCranfordó óóó,€772€S.W.2d€48,€50€(Tenn.€App.€1989).€€Moreover,€the€court€mustÏdetermine€the€amount€of€alimony€such€that€ð ðððthe€party€obtaining€a€divorce€[is€not]Ïleft€in€a€worse€financial€situation€than€he€or€she€had€before€the€opposite€partyððsÏmisconduct€brought€about€the€divorce.ðððð€€ò òòòAaron,ó óóó€909€S.W.2d€at€410„11€(quotingÏò òòòShackleford€v.€Shacklefordó óóó,€611€S.W.2d€598,€601€(Tenn.€App.€1980).€Ïð ðWhile€alimony€is€not€intended€to€provide€a€former€spouse€with€relative€financialÏease,€we€stress€that€alimony€should€be€awarded€in€such€a€way€that€the€spousesÏapproach€equity.ðð€€ò òòòAaronó óóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€411.ÌÌà àThe€Court€in€òòò òAaronó óóó€reviewed€and€upheld€the€trial€courtððs€€award€ofÏalimony€in€futuro€in€a€factually€similar€case.€€There,€the€parties€had€been€marriedÍfor€many€years€when€they€divorced€on€the€grounds€of€the€husbandððsÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€at€which€time€he€was€forty„five€years€of€age€andÏhis€wife,€forty„six.€€While€together,€they€had€enjoyed€a€high€standard€of€livingÏwith€the€husband€being€the€primary€wage„earner€and€the€wife€being€a€homemakerÏwithout€work€experience€or€a€college€decree.€€In€upholding€a€significant€award€ofÏalimony€in€futuro,€the€supreme€court€concurred€in€the€lower€courtððs€finding€thatÏthe€wife€was€not€capable€of€rehabilitation.€€Furthermore,€it€noted€that€the€husbandÏhad€offered€no€proof€that€he€was€unable€to€pay€the€alimony€ordered€by€the€trialÏcourt.ÌÌà àThe€facts€in€the€instant€case,€when€compared€to€the€similar€facts€inÏòòò òAaronó óóó,€strongly€support€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€alimony€in€futuro.€€The€LongsÏhave€been€married€for€an€even€longer€period€than€the€Aarons.€€During€the€LongsððÏtwenty„seven€year€marriage,€the€husband€has€been€building€a€career€outside€of€theÏhome€while€the€wife€has,€for€the€most€part,€worked€within€the€home€such€that€sheÏhas€no€college€degree€and€only€limited€outside„work€experience.€€The€Longs€wereÏolder€at€the€time€of€their€divorce€with€the€wife€being€forty„eight€years€of€age€andÏthe€husband€being€forty„nine.€€The€Longs,€like€the€Aarons,€enjoyed€a€highÏstandard€of€living€during€their€marriage.€€Ms.€Long€offered€proof€that€in€orderÏfor€her€and€the€partiesðð€daughter€to€maintain€their€pre„divorce€standard€of€living,Ïshe€would€need€$4,600€per€month.€€The€husband€acknowledged€the€need€onÏbehalf€of€the€wife€of€at€least€$3,600€per€month.€€A€significant€difference€in€theÏtwo€cases€is€that€Ms.€Long€suffers€from€medical€problems€which€may€prohibitÏher€from€doing€the€only€type€of€work€in€which€she€has€any€experience.Ì€Ìà àThe€record€clearly€shows€that€the€wife€is€a€disadvantaged€spouse€andÏthat€rehabilitative€alimony€is€not€feasible€because€of€her€lack€of€work€experienceÍand€her€medical€problems.€€It€is€unlikely€that€she€will€ever€be€able€to€approachÏthe€level€of€income€which€her€husband€is€able€to€enjoy.€€We€are€of€the€opinionÏthat€the€alimony€in€futuro€awarded€to€Ms.€Long€is€necessary€for€her€to€continueÏto€maintain€a€reasonable€standard€of€living€which€is€at€least€somewhat€comparableÏto€that€which€she€experienced€before€the€breakup€of€her€marriage.€€Thus,€weÏreject€the€husbandððs€challenge€to€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€alimony€in€futuro.ÌÌÓ  ÓIII.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€the€husbandððs€second€issue,€he€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏstating€that€the€wifeððs€full„time€employment€would€ð ðnot€be€sufficient€grounds€toÏwarrant€a€reduction€or€terminationðð€of€the€alimony€in€futuro.€€At€the€end€of€theÏtrial,€upon€finding€this€to€be€a€case€for€alimony,€the€court€made€the€followingÏobservations:€€ð ðThis€is€a€marriage€of€long€duration.€€There€is€no€doubt€about€it€atÏall,€no€question€at€all€that€Mrs.€Long€is€hampered€in€her€ability€to€earn€an€incomeÏat€this€point.€€So€alimony€is€awarded,€ò òòòconsidering€that€she€is€going€to€haveÏfull€time€employmentóóó ó.ðð€€(emphasis€added).€€The€husband€argues€that€thisÏlanguage€forecloses€the€availability€of€modification€of€the€award€for€"a€substantialÏand€material€change€of€circumstances"€in€direct€contravention€of€the€TennesseeÏCode.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€35„5„101€(1996).Ì€€€Ìà àWe€disagree€with€the€husbandððs€characterization€of€the€trial€courtððsÏruling€and€find€that,€by€its€language,€the€court€was€simply€informing€the€partiesÏthat€it€contemplated€the€wifeððs€full„time€employment€so€that€this€would€not€be€a€"aÏsubstantial€and€material€change€of€circumstances."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€In€òòò òNorvell€v.€Norvelló óóó,Ï805€S.W.2d€772€(Tenn.€App.€1990),€this€court€rejected€a€husbandððs€petition€toÏmodify€the€amount€of€alimony€he€was€paying€his€former€wife.€€With€regard€toÍthe€wifeððs€obtaining€employment€subsequent€to€the€divorce,€the€court€noted€thatÏthe€"[h]usband€introduced€no€proof€to€show€that€at€the€time€the€original€divorceÏdecree€was€entered€it€was€unanticipated€or€unforeseen€that€[the€w]ife€wouldÏbecome€gainfully€employed.€€€To€the€contrary,€it€appears€that€employment€of€[theÏw]ife€was€most€certainly€anticipated,€inasmuch€as€the€original€decree€placed€uponÏher€the€obligation€of€paying€two€mortgages."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€775.€€€In€this€case,€the€courtÏremoved€any€need€for€speculation€by€explicitly€stating€that€it€anticipated€Ms.ÏLongððs€future€employment.€€By€so€doing,€the€court€has€not€preempted€theÏstatutory€right€of€the€husband€to€seek€a€modification€under€proper€circumstances.€ÏIndeed,€if€the€wife€is€one€day€able€to€earn€more€money€than€the€proof€showed€sheÏis€currently€capable€of€earning,€nothing€in€the€trial€courtððs€order€would€prevent€aÏfuture€modification.ÌÌÓ  ÓIV.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àLastly,€the€wifeððs€counsel€has€sought€attorneysðð€fees€for€the€servicesÏrendered€in€this€court€on€her€behalf.€€In€this€instance,€the€husband€presented€noÏvalid€reason€why€the€trial€courtððs€award€should€be€reversed.€€We€find€noÏcompetent€legal€argument€to€justify€the€husbandððs€position€which€appears€to€beÏmotivated€by€nothing€more€than€his€desire€to€escape€his€obligation€to€his€wife.€ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€36„5„101(I)€provides,€in€pertinent€part,€thatÏð ð[t]he€court€may,€in€its€discretion,€at€any€time€pending€the€suit€.€.€.€make€anyÏorder€that€may€be€proper€to€compel€a€spouse€to€pay€any€sums€necessary€.€.€.€toÏenable€such€spouse€to€prosecute€or€defend€the€suit.ðð€€Under€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€of€this€case,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€wife€should€be€awardedÏher€reasonable€attorneysðð€fees€for€defending€this€matter€in€this€court.€€It€thereforeÏresults€on€remand€that€the€trial€court€shall€make€a€determination€of€the€amount€ofÍthe€fees€to€be€paid€by€the€husband.ÌÌà àIn€light€of€the€foregoing,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed,Ïand€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistentÏwith€this€opinion.ÌœCosts€are€taxed€to€defendant/appellant,€Michael€George€Long.›ÌœÌ›ÌÓÓÔ€ XÔà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€J.Ìà àÌÌÌ