ÿWPCÞ …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) 0J8 0T‚ 0^Ö 0h4 0rœ 0| 0†Š 0 1u  0d U*y B)£ DCÌ AMü\v~XvÓÖ B© D3Æ 0@ù AO9ƈ 0DN D/’ BÁ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - íîDïDðDñòDóôõÓ€ÿDÒ 3|xÿ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ òÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌFebruary€21,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHøHÿöÿòV,(ühhØ hd'0ÿÎÿºF ® Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò d%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€§¦XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌLOVELL€&€MALONE,€INC.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9607„CH„00299ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌÙ€€ÙßR€ A1-j|Õå` ç `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€93„2525„II(III)ÌCOMMONWEALTH€LIFE€INSURANCEà à)ÌCOMPANY€and€CAPITAL€HOLDINGà à)ÌCORPORATION,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellants.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌFRED€E.€COWDEN,€JR.Ì211€Third€Avenue€NorthÌP.€O.€Box€198288ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppelleeÌÌWILLIAM€R.€OððBRYAN,€JR.ÌMARY€ELLEN€MORRISÌTRABUE,€STURDIVANT€&€DEWITTÌ511€Union€StreetÌ2500€Nashville€City€CenterÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219„1738Ìà àAttorneys€for€Defendants/AppellantsÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.ÌLEWIS,€J.ÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€XÔÌÌà àà àThe€Chancery€Court€entered€a€judgment€for€the€plaintiff€mortgageÏloan€correspondent,€finding€that€the€defendant€insurance€company€had€breachedÏthe€correspondent€agreement€by€refusing€to€pay€the€required€termination€fee€afterÏterminating€the€contract€without€cause.€€The€insurance€company€argues€onÏappeal€that€it€was€not€obligated€to€pay€the€fee,€because€valid€grounds€existed€forÏthe€termination.€€We€affirm€the€trial€court.€ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àOn€October€1,€1962,€Lovell€&€Malone,€Inc.,€executed€a€mortgageÏcorrespondent€agreement€with€Commonwealth€Life€Insurance€Company,€a€whollyÏowned€subsidiary€of€Capital€Holding€Corporation€(hereafter€Capital).€€In€theÏcontract,€Lovell€&€Malone€agreed€as€correspondent€to€originate€and€serviceÏresidential€and€commercial€loans€for€Capital.€€Article€VI€of€the€contract€specifiedÏthe€manner€in€which€the€parties€could€terminate€the€contract,€and€their€rights€andÏobligations€following€termination.ÌÌà àà àEach€party€had€the€right€to€terminate€the€agreement€with€or€withoutÏcause€by€sending€a€written€notice€of€the€termination€to€the€other€party€byÏregistered€mail€at€least€ninety€days€before€the€scheduled€termination€date.€€If€itÏterminated€the€agreement€without€cause,€Capital€was€obligated€to€pay€Lovell€&ÏMalone€one€percent€(1%)€of€the€outstanding€principal€amount€being€serviced€for€itÏby€the€correspondent€at€the€time€of€termination.€€If€the€termination€was€for€cause,Ïthen€no€money€would€be€due.€€Circumstances€constituting€cause€were€listed€inÏthe€same€section,€and€will€be€discussed€later€in€this€opinion.Ìà àÌà àà àIn€1985,€Capital€submitted€a€new€correspondent€contract€to€Lovell€&ÏMalone€for€review.€€The€termination€clause€in€the€new€contract€eliminated€the€feeÏfor€termination€without€cause.€€William€C.€Boyers,€then€president€of€Lovell€&ÏMalone,€objected€by€letter€to€the€change,€but€stated€that€he€would€be€willing€toÍaccept€it€for€future€loans,€as€long€as€the€1%€provision€remained€in€place€for€loansÏacquired€under€the€old€contract.ÌÌà àà àIn€a€letter€dated€December€12,€1985,€Paul€Edberg,€Capitalððs€DirectorÏof€Asset€Management,€agreed€that€the€1962€contract€would€remain€in€force€for€allÏexisting€loans,€and€that€the€new€contract€would€only€cover€future€loan€production,Ïbeginning€on€January€1,€1986.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àà àIn€the€spring€of€1991,€a€holding€company€owned€by€the€wife€of€J.ÏThomas€Holland€purchased€the€stock€of€Lovell€&€Malone,€and€Mr.€Holland€tookÏover€as€president€of€the€mortgage€correspondent.€€In€September€of€that€year,€Mr.ÏHolland€travelled€to€Capitalððs€headquarters€in€Louisville€to€introduce€himself€toÏthat€companyððs€management,€and€to€see€if€he€could€obtain€their€agreement€toÏoriginate€residential€loans€on€their€behalf.€ÌÌà àà àCapital€had€ceased€to€accept€residential€loans€sometime€in€theÏ1960's,€but€had€resumed€residential€lending€in€1987,€concentrating€on€so„calledÏð ðjumboðð€non„conforming€loans.€€Lovell€&€Malone€had€voluntarily€taken€itself€out€ofÏresidential€lending€in€the€early€1980's€to€concentrate€on€commercial€lending,€butÏwas€now€interested€in€returning€to€the€Nashville€residential€market.€ÌÌÌà àà àCapitalððs€residential€loan€production€officer,€Mr.€Craig€Atchley,Ïadvised€Mr.€Holland€that€unless€he€could€originate€mortgage€loans€in€theÏNashville€area€in€the€amount€of€twenty„five€to€thirty€million€dollars€per€year,€LovellÏ&€Malone€would€not€be€permitted€to€make€residential€loans€on€Capitalððs€behalf.€ÏMr.€Holland€felt€that€his€company€might€be€able€to€originate€ten€million€dollars€inÏresidential€loans€each€year€or€two,€but€in€view€of€the€size€of€the€lending€marketÏand€the€number€of€competing€firms€in€the€area,€he€could€not€guarantee€the€higherÏvolume€demanded€by€Capital.€ÌÌà àà àDuring€this€same€visit,€Mr.€Holland€spoke€to€Mr.€Ray€Brewer,€whoÏwas€apparently€Mr.€Atchleyððs€counterpart€on€Capitalððs€commercial€loan€side.€€Mr.ÏHolland€advised€Mr.€Brewer€about€the€possibility€of€Lovell€&€Malone€originating€aÏloan€of€about€ten€million€dollars€on€a€building€owned€and€occupied€byÏSouthwestern€Publishing€Company€in€Nashville,€but€Mr.€Brewer€said€hisÏcompany€was€not€interested€in€making€that€loan,€because€of€the€high€valuationÏplaced€on€the€property.€ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àà àIn€September€of€1992,€Capitalððs€director€of€residential€servicing,ÏKenneth€K.€Hodge,€called€Mr.€Holland,€and€told€him€that€the€holding€company€hadÏdecided€to€terminate€its€contracts€with€its€smaller€correspondents,€including€LovellÏ&€Malone.€€Mr.€Holland€later€testified€that€no€cause€for€termination€was€discussed,Ïother€than€Capitalððs€desire€to€deal€with€a€smaller€number€of€loan€producers,€andÏno€fee€for€termination€was€mentioned.€€However,€in€a€letter€dated€September€22,Ï1992,€Mr.€Hodge€wrote:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðThis€letter€confirms€our€agreement€to€transfer€theÏservicing€of€the€loans€serviced€by€Lovell€&€Malone€underÏthe€subject€agreement€to€our€offices€in€Louisville.€€As€weÏdiscussed,€no€cancellation€and/or€transfer€fees€will€be€dueÏto€Lovell€&€Malone€for€the€transfer€of€the€servicing.ðð€€ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌà àà àMr.€Holland€responded€with€a€letter€dated€September€25,€1992,€andÏenclosed€with€it€copies€of€the€1962€and€1985€contracts€and€the€December€12,Ï1985€letter€from€Mr.€Edberg.€€In€his€own€letter,€Mr.€Holland€stated€that€he€and€Mr.ÏHodge€had€never€discussed€the€termination€fee,€and€that€Lovell€&€Malone€wasÏdetermined€to€collect€the€fee€for€the€remaining€balance€on€the€loans€it€originatedÏprior€to€1986,€a€fee€amounting€to€$136,881.ÌÌà àà àMr.€Hodge€subsequently€shifted€his€ground€with€a€letter€datedÏOctober€1,€1992.€€That€letter€stated€that€no€termination€fee€was€due€becauseÍtermination€was€for€cause€under€Article€6.02(e)€of€the€correspondent€agreement,Ïwhich€allows€immediate€termination€for€the€following€reason:€ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ6.02(e)€€€Inability€of€Correspondent€to€perform€satisfactorilyÏits€duties€and€obligations,€including€the€producing€of€aÏreasonable€and€satisfactory€volume€of€mortgage€loans€forÏthe€Companyððs€account€from€the€area€served€byÏCorrespondent€over€a€two€year€period.€€ÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àIt€is€undisputed€that€Lovell€&€Malone€had€not€originated€any€newÏresidential€mortgage€loans€for€Capital€after€it€resumed€residential€lending,€andÏhad€originated€only€one€commercial€loan€for€them€after€January€1,€1986,€a€loanÏon€a€Florida€retail€center€which€had€a€remaining€balance€of€$5,100,000.ÌÌà àà àOn€August€30,€1993,€Lovell€&€Malone€filed€suit€in€Chancery€Court€toÏcompel€Capital€to€pay€the€termination€fee.€€Capital€filed€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€asserting€that€the€plaintiffððs€failure€to€originate€new€loans€constitutedÏsuch€cause€as€would€enable€it€to€avoid€payment€of€the€termination€fee€under€theÏcontract.€The€trial€court€granted€the€motion€for€summary€judgment.ÌÌà àà àOn€appeal,€this€court€reversed€the€trial€court€(Appeal€No.€01„A„01„9503„CH„00119,€Filed€September€6,€1995).€€We€found€that€there€was€a€questionÏof€material€Ìfact€as€to€whether€Lovell€&€Malone€was€actually€unable€to€produce€a€sufficientÏvolume€of€mortgage€loans,€or€whether€the€conditions€imposed€by€Capital€made€itÏimpossible€for€the€correspondent€to€perform€its€obligations€under€the€contract.ÏSpeaking€through€Judge€Lewis,€the€court€wrote:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðDefendants€contend€they€were€entitled€to€set€their€ownÏloan€underwriting€criteria€for€the€making€of€mortgage€loansÏor€to€change€the€criteria€from€time€to€time.€The€plaintiffÏagrees€and€so€do€we.€Defendants€could€decline€to€makeÏloans,€either€residential€or€commercial,€and€defendantsÏdid€have€a€right€to€reject€loans€from€the€plaintiff€basedÏupon€the€defendantsðð€new€loan€criteria.€€However,€we€areÏof€the€opinion€that€the€defendants€cannot€rely€on€this€rightÏas€a€defense€to€the€plaintiffððs€claim€for€a€termination€fee.€ÏTo€allow€this€defense€would€permit€defendants€to€re„writeÏthe€contract€between€the€parties.ððÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àAfter€a€trial€on€the€merits,€the€Chancellor€entered€a€judgment€in€favorÏof€the€plaintiff€in€the€amount€of€$136,438.21€plus€pre„judgment€interest,€for€a€totalÏjudgment€of€$177,369.67.€€The€present€appeal€followed.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àà àAppellant€argues€on€appeal€that€its€termination€of€the€correspondentÏagreement€should€be€considered€to€be€for€cause,€because€the€correspondentÏviolated€two€of€the€terms€of€the€agreement€by€virtue€of€its€inability€to€produce€aÏreasonable€and€satisfactory€volume€of€mortgage€loans,€and€its€transfer€of€theÍcontrolling€interest€in€the€correspondent€in€1991€without€the€prior€written€approvalÏof€Capital.€€We€will€examine€the€first€of€these€assertions€in€this€section.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellee€argues€that€Capital€terminated€the€contract€inÏSeptember€of€1992€solely€for€its€own€convenience,€and€that€the€reasons€it€laterÏalleged€were€post€hoc€rationalizations,€advanced€solely€for€the€purpose€ofÏenabling€it€to€avoid€paying€a€termination€fee.€€The€evidence€clearly€favors€theÏappelleeððs€interpretation€of€the€Ìreasons€for€termination.€€The€testimony€of€Mr.€Hodge€and€of€his€supervisor€Mr.ÏNelis€indicates€that€the€contract€with€Lovell€&€Malone€was€terminated€as€part€of€aÏlarger€program€to€reduce€the€number€of€correspondents€it€had€to€deal€with€to€aÏfew€large€companies,€for€the€sake€of€the€efficiencies€and€the€economies€of€scaleÏthat€such€a€reorganization€would€produce€for€Capital.ÌÌà àà àLovell€&€Malone€received€the€same€form€letter€of€termination€as€didÏthe€other€correspondents€whose€contracts€were€ended€at€this€time.€€It€was€onlyÏafter€Mr.€Holland€insisted€that€his€companyððs€1962€contract€entitled€it€to€aÏtermination€fee,€that€Mr.€Hodge€invoked€Section€6.02(e)€of€that€contract€and€LovellÏ&€Maloneððs€lack€of€loan€production€as€the€reasons€for€termination.€€€ÌÌà àà àWhile€it€is€true€that€Lovell€&€Malone€produced€only€one€new€loan€forÏCapital€after€1986,€it€managed€to€originate€loans€for€other€lenders€during€thisÍperiod,€including€several€million€dollars€worth€of€ð ðjumboðð€loans€in€the€NashvilleÏarea€each€year.€€It€does€not€appear€to€us€that€the€failure€of€Lovell€&€Malone€toÏproduce€loans€for€Capital€over€a€period€of€more€than€two€years€was€due€to€theÏcorrespondentððs€inability€to€perform,€but€rather€to€the€heightened€requirementsÏthat€Capital€imposed€on€its€correspondents€before€it€would€accept€any€new€loanÏoriginations€from€them.ÌÌà àà àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€the€trial€court€stated€that€the€defendantÏhad€failed€to€prove€the€plaintiffððs€inability€to€produce€loans,€and€thus€theÏtermination€of€the€contract€could€not€be€considered€to€be€for€cause.€€The€appellantÏargues€on€appeal€that€the€trial€courtððs€statement€indicated€that€it€had€improperlyÏshifted€the€burden€of€proof.€€Capital€contends€that€as€plaintiff,€Lovell€&€MaloneÏwas€required€to€affirmatively€prove€all€the€elements€of€its€claim,€including€theÏallegation€that€the€termination€of€its€contract€was€without€cause.€€The€appelleeÏargues€to€the€contrary€that€all€it€had€to€prove€was€the€existence€and€validity€of€theÏcontract,€and€its€termination€by€Capital,€in€order€to€shift€the€burden€of€proof€to€theÏdefendant,€because€the€defendantððs€assertion€that€it€had€cause€to€terminate€theÏcontract€constituted€an€avoidance€or€affirmative€defense€that€had€to€be€specificallyÏpled.€€See€Rule€8.03€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.ÌÌà àà àWe€do€not€believe,€however,€that€we€are€required€to€settle€this€fineÏpoint€of€procedure,€because€the€plaintiff€did€present€sufficient€evidence€of€itsÍability€to€originate€both€commercial€and€residential€loans,€in€the€form€ofÏuncontradicted€testimony€that€it€had€placed€a€number€of€such€loans€with€otherÏcompanies€after€the€defendant€declared€its€unwillingness€to€accept€such€loansÏfrom€the€plaintiff.Ì€Ìà@ àò òV.ó óÌÌà àà àCapitalððs€second€argument€on€appeal€pertains€to€the€1991€transferÏof€Lovell€&€Maloneððs€stock.€€The€appellant€points€out€that€the€1962€contractÏincluded€the€following€as€a€cause€for€termination:€€€ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ6.02€(g).€€If€Correspondent€is€a€corporation,€the€transfer€ofÏthe€controlling€interest€in€Correspondent€or,€whether€or€notÏCorrespondent€is€a€corporation,€a€substantial€change€inÏmanagement€personnel€of€Correspondent,€without€theÏprior€written€approval€of€the€Company.€€€ÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àIt€is€undisputed€that€the€prior€written€approval€of€Capital€was€notÏobtained€when€Mr.€Hollandððs€wife€acquired€the€stock€of€Lovell€&€Malone.€€It€is€alsoÏundisputed€that€Capital€became€aware€that€its€correspondent€had€come€underÏnew€management€in€1991,€when€Mr.€Holland€travelled€to€Louisville€to€introduceÏhimself€to€Capitalððs€loan€officers.€€ÌÌà àà àLovell€&€Malone€contends€that€its€failure€to€obtain€the€prior€writtenÏapproval€of€Capital€for€the€acquisition€of€its€stock€is€not€properly€before€this€court,Ïbecause€the€issue€was€not€raised€during€the€course€of€trial€proceedings.€€TheÏappellee€points€out€that€it€is€not€found€in€the€pleadings€or€in€the€defendantððsÏMotion€for€Summary€Judgment€or€in€its€pre„trial€brief,€nor€was€it€mentioned€in€theÏdefendantððs€opening€statement€or€closing€argument.€€In€the€alternative,€appelleeÏargues€that€Capital€waived€this€contract€provision€by€not€raising€it€earlier€in€theÏproceedings.€ÌÌà àà àAppellant€asserts€that€the€issue€was€raised€at€the€trial€level€becauseÏits€answer€declared€the€termination€to€be€for€cause€(even€though€that€cause€wasÏnot€specified),€and€because€the€operative€facts€about€Lovell€&€Maloneððs€changeÏof€ownership€were€elicited€from€Mr.€Holland€during€cross„examination.€€AppellantÏattempts€to€turn€appelleeððs€argument€into€aòò€reductio€ad€absurdumóó€by€stating€in€itsÏbrief:€€ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðWhat€Plaintiff€actually€seeks€is€for€this€Court€to€rule,€as€aÏmatter€of€law,€that€every€factual€and€legal€point€notÏmentioned€in€pretrial€briefs,€opening€statement€and€oralÏargument€at€trial€is€waived€on€appeal.€€Such€a€rule€wouldÏmake€for€extremely€lengthy€briefs€òòandóó€opening€andÏclosing€statements.ðð€ÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àHowever,€we€do€not€believe€that€Lovell€&€Malone€is€attempting€toÏplace€such€an€unrealistic€burden€on€the€parties€or€on€the€court.€€We€believe€to€theÍcontrary€that€the€appellee€is€merely€objecting€to€Capitalððs€attempt€to€assert€aÏpreviously€unargued€theory€on€appeal€after€its€initial€theory€was€rejected€by€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌà àà àReview€by€this€court€of€the€proceedings€below€is€de€novo€upon€theÏrecord,€and€thus€this€court€in€its€discretion€may€even€consider€arguments€thatÏwere€not€made€on€appeal,€if€supported€by€facts€in€the€record,€ð ðin€order€to€preventÏneedless€ligitation,€to€prevent€injury€to€the€interests€of€the€public,€or€to€preventÏprejudice€to€the€judicial€process.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€Rule€13(b).ÌÌà àà àHowever€we€may€also€decline€to€consider€arguments€on€appeal€thatÏwere€not€raised€below.€€Our€function€as€an€appellate€court€is€to€examine€theÏrecord€Ìto€determine€if€the€court€below€committed€reversible€error.€€We€are€not€obligatedÏto€grant€relief€to€a€party€ð ðresponsible€for€error,€or€who€failed€to€take€whateverÏaction€is€reasonably€available€to€prevent€or€nullify€the€harmful€effect€of€an€error.ðð€ÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€Rule€36(a).€€Thus,€if€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€ruling€for€CapitalÏon€the€question€of€Lovell€&€Maloneððs€change€of€ownership,€this€court€couldÏdecline€to€rectify€that€error€since€the€appellant€failed€to€bring€that€issue€to€the€trialÏcourtððs€attention.€ÌÌà àà àWe€believe,€however,€that€the€appellant€would€not€be€entitled€toÏprevail,€even€if€it€had€made€the€same€argument€in€the€trial€court€that€it€makes€onÏappeal.€Appellant€bases€its€argument€upon€a€line€of€cases,€starting€with€òòCollegeÏPoint€Boat€Corporation€v.€U.S.óó,€267€U.S.€12,€16,€45€S.€Ct.€199,€200„201,€69€L.EdÏ490,€493€(1925),€which€holds€that€a€party€may€terminate€a€contract€if€legalÏjustification€exists€for€that€action,€even€if€the€party€was€unaware€of€that€justificationÏat€the€time€of€termination.ÌÌà àà àNone€of€the€cases€cited€are€quite€on€point,€because€the€contract€inÏthe€present€case€indicates€that€the€appellant€had€an€absolute€right€to€terminateÏthe€contract€for€any€reason€whatsoever,€or€for€no€reason€at€all.€€The€only€questionÏbefore€the€court€involved€the€contractual€financial€obligation€following€such€aÏtermination.ÌÌà àà àIt€appears€to€us€that€the€obligations€under€the€contract€arise€from€theÏactual€reasons€for€Capitalððs€decision€to€terminate€it,€not€the€reasons€that€mightÏhave€or€could€have€been€asserted.€€Even€if€we€assume,€òòarguendoóó€that€Capital€didÏnot€assert€its€rights€under€section€6.02(g)€of€the€contract€because€it€was€not€awareÏof€the€change€of€ownership€until€the€taking€of€Mr.€Hollandððs€deposition€onÏNovember€30,€1993,€there€are€no€indications€in€the€record€that€it€objected€to€eitherÏthe€new€management€or€the€new€ownership€until€well€after€it€discovered€that€itsÏother€theory€would€not€entitle€it€to€prevail€in€the€trial€court.ÌÌ€à@ àò òVI.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Remand€this€cause€to€theÏChancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏopinion.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÇÑ  Ñà@ à