ÿWPCÛ 2# ÌUN× %% 0G+U:rw@¬4ìLcU:k 0J¥ 0Tï 0^C 0h¡ 0r  0|{ 0†÷ 0} 1u 0d‚ 0@æ D3& BY U>v U*´ B)Þ DC AMJ AQ— Æè 0D® 0Dò D/6 Be ‚ v~ŠvÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX('\$¡¡Ô€XåÙXXMXÔ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular D[EFGEHIEJKÓ€WZŒƒ*#žçUpB3|xZC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPTß"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd* 'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd þÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌò òSeptember€10,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€%ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€\ÈXXdðXXdð7ÑÙ€*ÙßR€(/'A1-j|“¦` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÌÌJAMES€M.€LOWERY,€for€himself€andà à)Ìthe€use€and€benefit€of€his€sister,à à)ÌLINDA€œLANEY,€in€the€death€of€à àà à)Ìhis€father,€JAMES€G.€LOWERY,à à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àò ò)€€Madison€Circuit€No.€C„95„328Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9612„CV„00304Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌGARY€AND€EMILY€FRANKS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendants/Appellees.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€MADISON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€JACKSON,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€FRANKLIN€MURCHISON,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌò òHAROLD€R.€GUNNó óÌHumboldt,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òCLINTON€V.€BUTLER,€JR.ó óÌò òPATRICK€W.€ROGERSÌRAINEY,€KIZER,€BUTLER,€REVIERE€&€BELL,€P.L.C.Ìó óJackson,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ó ó›à àœÌÓÓà àIn›€this€wrongful€death€action,€Plaintiffs,€James€Lowery€and€Linda€Laney,€filedÏsuit€Ñ7€ øÂ XXdðXXdð7Ñagainst€Defendants,€Gary€and€Emily€Franks,€for€the€wrongful€death€of€their€father,ÏJames€Lowery€(ð ðDecedentðð),€which€occurred€after€Decedent€was€struck€by€DefendantsððÏvehicle.€€In€their€complaint,€Plaintiffs€allege€that€Defendant,€Emily€Franks,€the€driver€ofÏthe€vehicle,€is€liable€for€common€law€and€statutory€negligence€which€was€the€directÏand€proximate€cause€of€Decedentððs€death.€€œPlaintiffs›€premise€their€suit€againstÏDefendant,€Gary€Franks,€upon€the€family€purpose€doctrine.€€œPlaintiffs›€allege€thatÏDefendant,€Gary€Franks,€was€the€owner€of€the€vehicle€driven€by€Emily€Franks€at€theÏtime€of€the€accident,€that€the€vehicle€was€maintained€for€the€use€of€the€family,€and€thatÏDefendant,€Emily€Franks,€was€entrusted€with€the€vehicle€in€accordance€with€the€familyÏpurpose€doctrine.€€œDefendants›€filed€an€answer€denying€their€negligence€and€assertingÏthat€the€negligence€of€the€Decedent€was€the€proximate€cause€of€the€accident.ÏœDefendants›€thereafter€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€œThe›€trial€court€granted€theÏDefendantsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment€holding€that€there€was€no€evidence€ofÏnegligence€which€could€be€attributed€to€the€Defendant,€Emily€Franks,€and,Íalternatively,€if€some€fault€could€be€attributed€to€the€Defendant,€Emily€Franks,€theÏnegligence€of€the€Decedent€equaled€or€exceeded€fifty€percent€of€the€total€faultÏattributable€to€the€parties.€€œPlaintiffs›€appeal€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€arguing€thatÏthe€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€Defendants.€€For€theÏreasons€stated€hereafter,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@ àò òFACTSó óÌà àOn€December€17,€1994€at€approximately€6:00€p.m.,€œDecedent›€was€struck€by€aÏ1987€Chevrolet€van€driven€by€the€Defendant,€Emily€Franks€œ(ð ðDefendantðð).›€DefendantððsÏvan€was€traveling€northbound€on€Highway€45,€and€Decedent€was€walking€in€aÏsoutherly€direction€adjacent€to€the€northbound€lane€of€Highway€45.€ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€the€œaccident,›€it€was€dark€outside.€€œNo›€street€lights€lit€the€areaÏwhere€the€accident€occurred.€€œThere›€were€no€warning€lights,€flashing€lights€or€trafficÏlights€near€œÌÌthe›€area€of€the€accident.€€œDefendantððs›€headlights€were€on€and€working€properly€at€theÏœtime.›€€œDecedent›€was€wearing€dark€clothing€at€the€time€of€impact.€ÌÌà àThe€posted€speed€limit€was€45€miles€per€hour.€€œIn›€an€affidavit,€DefendantÏtestified€that€she€was€traveling€at€approximately€40€miles€per€hour€at€the€time€of€theÏaccident.€€œThe›€area€where€the€accident€occurred€was€flat,€level€and€smooth.€€œThe›€streetÏwas€dry.€€ÌÌà àDefendant€testified€that€at€all€times€prior€to€the€point€of€impact,€she€was€travelingÏwithin€her€lane€of€traffic.€€œDefendant›€did€not€veer€outside€of€her€lane€of€traffic€either€toÏthe€right€or€to€the€left.€€œDefendant›€testified€that€at€all€times€prior€to€the€accident€she€wasÏpaying€full€and€complete€attention€to€the€road€ahead€and€that€at€no€time€prior€to€theÏimpact€did€she€see€any€person€or€obstruction€in€the€roadway.€€œDefendant›€further€statedÏthat€she€did€not€veer€from€her€traffic€lane€and€hit€the€Decedent;€rather,€the€DecedentÏwalked€into€her€traffic€lane€while€she€was€driving€in€her€lane.€ÌÌà àOne€eyewitness€to€the€accident,€Phillip€Rushing€(ð ðRushingðð),€testified€that€heÏwas€traveling€southbound€on€Highway€45€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€œAs›€RushingððsÏvehicle€traveled€past€Defendantððs€van€on€Highway€45,€Rushing€saw€the€DefendantððsÏvanððs€reflectors€fly€upward€into€the€air.€€œRushing›€later€discovered€that€the€reason€theÏDefendantððs€vanððs€reflectors€flew€œupward›€into€the€air€was€the€result€of€DecedentððsÏimpact€with€Defendantððs€van.€€œAfter›€witnessing€the€accident,€Rushing€stopped€hisÏvehicle€at€the€accident€scene.€ÌÌà àCorroborating€the€testimony€of€the€Defendant,€Rushing€stated€that€there€were€noÏstreet€lights,€warning€lights,€flashing€lights€or€traffic€lights€in€the€area€where€theÏaccident€occurred.€œBased›€upon€his€observation€of€Defendantððs€vehicle,€RushingÏestimated€that€Defendantððs€van€was€traveling€at€approximately€forty€miles€per€hour€andÏthat€Defendant€did€not€veer€outside€of€her€lane€of€traffic€at€any€time€prior€to€impact.€ÏœRushing›€further€testified€that€he€was€paying€full€and€complete€attention€to€the€roadÍahead€and€that€at€no€time€prior€to€impact€did€he€see€any€person€or€obstruction€in€theÏroadway.€€Rushing€stated€that€the€Defendant€did€not€veer€outside€of€her€lane€of€trafficÏand€hit€the€Decedent;€rather,€the€Decedent€walked€into€the€path€of€the€Defendantððs€vanÏwhile€the€Defendant€was€driving€in€her€lane.€€Rushing€testified€that€the€Defendant€wasÏnot€driving€in€a€careless,€reckless€or€negligent€manner€and€that€there€was€nothing€thatÏthe€Defendant€could€have€done€to€avoid€this€accident.€ÌÌà àà àà@ àò òLAWó óÌà àThe€two€issues€before€this€Court€are€as€follows:Ìà à1)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€theÏDefendants;€andÌà à2)€Whether€the€Plaintiff€failed€to€properly€perfect€his€appeal€by€failing€to€serve€aÏcopy€of€his€notice€of€appeal€upon€the€clerk€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€as€required€by€T.€R.ÏA.€P.€5.ÌÌà àThe€standards€governing€our€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€action€on€a€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€are€well€settled.€€Since€our€inquiry€involves€purely€a€question€ofÏlaw,€no€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€and€our€taskÏis€confined€to€reviewing€the€record€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Rule€56Ïof€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€have€been€met.€€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995);€òòCowden€v.€Sovran€Bank/Central€Southóó,€816€S.W.2d€741,Ï744€(Tenn.€1991);€òòFoley€v.€St.€Thomas€Hosp.óó,€906€S.W.2d€448,€452€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1995);€òòBrenner€v.€Textron€Aerostructures,€A€Division€of€Textron,€Inc.óó,€874€S.W.2d€579,Í582€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€56.03€provides€thatÏsummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€where:€(1)€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact€relevant€to€the€claim€or€defense€contained€in€the€motion,€and€(2)€the€moving€partyÏis€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòCarvellóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€at€26;€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòAnderson€v.€StandardÏRegister€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burden€ofÏproving€that€the€motion€satisfies€these€requirements.€€òòDownen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àWhile€the€summary€judgment€procedure€is€not€a€substitute€for€trial,€it€goes€to€theÏmerits€of€a€case€and€should€not€be€ignored€or€treated€lightly.€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210;ÏòòJones€v.€Home€Indem.€Ins.€Co.óó,€651€S.W.2d€213,€214€(Tenn.€1983);€òòFowler€v.€HappyÏGoodman€Familyóó,€575€S.W.2d€496,€498€(Tenn.€1978);€òòFoleyóó,€906€S.W.2d€at€452;ÏòòFerguson€v.€Tomerlinóó,€656€S.W.2d€378,€382€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1983).€€Tenn.R.Civ.P.Ï56.05€warns€the€opponent€of€a€summary€judgment€motion€not€to€"rest€upon€the€mereÏallegations€or€denials€of€his€pleadings."€€œWhen›€faced€with€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€a€party€should€respond€by€affidavit€or€by€otherwise€setting€forth€factsÏshowing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€fact.ÌÌà àIt€has€been€repeatedly€stated€by€the€appellate€courts€of€this€state€that€theÏpurpose€of€a€summary€judgment€proceeding€is€not€the€finding€of€facts,€the€resolution€ofÏdisputed€factual€issues€or€the€determination€of€conflicting€inferences€reasonably€to€beÏdrawn€from€the€facts.€€òòBellamy€v.€Federal€Express€Corp.óó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33€(Tenn.Í1988).€€€Rather,€the€purpose€of€summary€judgment€is€to€resolve€controlling€issues€ofÏlaw.€€òòIdóó.€€ÌÌà àIn€evaluating€the€propriety€of€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€we€view€theÏevidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€draw€all€reasonableÏinferences€in€the€nonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€A€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€should€only€be€granted€when€both€the€facts€and€the€conclusionsÏdrawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.05€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àWhen›€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€made€andÏsupported€as€provided€in€this€rule,€an€adverse€party€may€notÏrest€upon€the€mere€allegations€or€denials€of€the€adverseÏparty's€pleading,€but€his€or€her€response,€by€affidavits€or€asÏotherwise€provided€in€this€rule,€must€set€forth€specific€factsÏshowing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.€€If€the€adverseÏparty€does€not€so€respond,€summary€judgment,€ifÏappropriate,€shall€be€entered€against€the€adverse€party.̛̜à àIn€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€211€(Tenn.€1993),€the€supreme€court€stated:ÌÌà8 àœà8 àOnce›€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€party€mustÏthen€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discovery€materials,€thatÏthere€is€a€genuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€ÏòòFowler€v.€Happy€Goodman€Familyóó,€575€S.W.2d€496,€498Ï(Tenn.1978);€€òòMerritt€v.€Wilson€Cty.€Bd.€of€Zoning€Appealsóó,Ï656€S.W.2d€846,€859€(Tenn.App.1983).€€In€this€regard,€RuleÏ56.05€provides€that€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€simply€relyÏupon€his€pleadings€but€must€set€forth€specific€facts€showingÏthat€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€for€trial.€€"If€heÏdoes€not€so€respond,€summary€judgment€...€shall€be€enteredÏagainst€him."€€€Rule€56.05.€€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€addressing€when€entry€of€an€order€of€summary€judgment€is€appropriate,€thisÏCourt€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àUnder›€Rule€56.03,€upon€motion,€summary€judgment€shallÏbe€entered€against€a€party€who€failed€to€make€a€showingÏsufficient€to€establish€the€existence€of€an€essential€elementÏto€that€party's€case€and€on€which€the€party€will€bear€theÏburden€of€proof€at€trial.€€If€the€non„moving€party€fails€toÏestablish€the€existence€of€an€essential€element,€there€canÏbe€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€since€aÏcomplete€failure€of€proof€concerning€an€essential€element€ofÏthe€non„moving€party's€case€necessarily€renders€all€otherÏfacts€immaterial.€€òòCelotex€Corp.€v.€Catrettóó,€„„„€U.S.€„„„„,€106ÏS.Ct.€2548,€91€L.Ed.2d€265€(1986).Ìà àÌòòÓÓMoman€v.€Waldenóó,€719€S.W.2d€531,€533€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986).€€Similarly,€in€òòOwen€v.ÏStanleyóó,€739€S.W.2d€782,€787€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987),€we€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€can€put€the€plaintiff's€caseÏto€the€test.€€After€a€plaintiff€has€been€given€a€reasonableÏopportunity€to€substantiate€its€claims,€a€summary€judgmentÏmay€be€entered€if€the€plaintiff€has€failed€to€establish€anÏessential€element€of€his€case€on€which€it€will€bear€theÏburden€of€proof€at€trial.€€€òòCelotex€Corp.€v.€Catrettóó,€477€U.S.Ï317,€„„„„,€106€S.Ct.€2548,€2552„53,€91€L.Ed.2d€265€(1986);€ÏòòMoman€v.€Waldenóó,€719€S.W.2d€531,€533€œ(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.1986).›ÌÌà àÌÌÓÓà àIn€order€to€prevail€in€an€action€based€upon€negligence,€a€plaintiff€must€establish:Ï(1)€a€duty€of€care€owed€by€the€defendant€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)€conduct€falling€below€theÏapplicable€standard€of€care€amounting€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;€(3)€an€injury€or€loss;€(4)Ïcausation€in€fact;€and€(5)€proximate€or€legal€cause.€€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,Ï153€(Tenn.€1995);€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.€1993);ÍòòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€767,€774€(Tenn.€1991);€òòLindsey€v.€MiamiÏDevelopment€Corp.óó,€689€S.W.2d€856,€858€(Tenn.€1985).€€Recovery€in€a€negligenceÏaction€may€occur€only€if€the€plaintiff€can€show€that€the€defendantððs€conduct€wasÏnegligent€and€was€the€proximate€cause€of€plaintiffððs€injury.€€òòTennessee€Trailways,€Inc.Ïv.€Ervinóó,€438€S.W.2d€733,€735€(Tenn.€1969);€òòLancaster€v.€Montesióó,€390€S.W.2d€217,Ï220€(Tenn.€1965).€€Tennessee€courts€have€repeatedly€stated€that€negligence€is€notÏpresumed€from€the€mere€fact€of€an€accident€or€injury.€€òòWilliams€v.€Jordanóó,€346€S.W.2dÏ583,€586€(Tenn.€1961);€òòDe€Glopper€v.€Nashville€Ry.€&€Light€Co.óó,€134€S.W.€609,€611Ï(Tenn.€1911);€òòGunteróó,€1996€WL€283069,€at€*1;€òòArmes€v.€Hulettóó,€843€S.W.2d€427,€432Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòNichols€v.€Smithóó,€111€S.W.2d€911,€920€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1937).€€Ì€Ìà àIn€Tennessee,€proximate€cause€has€been€defined€as€that€act€or€omission€whichÏimmediately€causes€or€fails€to€prevent€the€injury;€an€act€or€omission€occurring€orÏconcurring€with€another€which,€if€it€had€not€happened,€the€injury€would€not€have€beenÏinflicted.€€òòErvinóó,€438€S.W.2d€at€735;€òòSoutheastern€Greyhound€Lines,€Inc.€v.€Grovesóó,Ï136€S.W.2d€512,€515„16€(Tenn.€1940);€òòAnderson€v.€Milleróó,€33€S.W.€615,€618€(Tenn.Ï1896);€òòPostal€Telegraph€Cable€Co.€v.€Zopfióó,€24€S.W.€633,€634€(Tenn.€1894);€òòDeming€€v.ÏMerchantsðð€Cotton„Press€&€Storage€Co.óó,€17€S.W.€89,€99€(Tenn.€1891).€€An€actorððsÏconduct€will€be€considered€the€proximate€or€legal€cause€if€the€following€threeÏœrequirements›€are€met.€€First,€the€actorððs€conduct€must€have€been€a€substantial€factor€inÏbringing€about€the€harm.€€Next,€there€must€be€no€legal€rule€or€policy€that€would€operateÏto€relieve€the€actor€from€liability.€€Finally,€the€harm€that€occurred€must€have€beenÏreasonably€foreseeable€by€a€person€of€ordinary€intelligence€and€prudence.€ÍœòòMcClenahanóó,›€806€S.W.2d€at€775.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòTennessee€Trailways,€Inc.€v.€Ervinóó,€438€S.W.2d€733€(Tenn.€1969),€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€faced€an€issue€similar€to€the€one€in€the€case€at€bar.€€InÏòòErvinóó,€plaintiffððs€decedent€was€riding€a€motorcycle€on€a€private€roadway€toward€anÏintersection.€€Plaintiffððs€decedent€drove€across€Highway€70„S€where€he€was€struck€andÏkilled€by€defendantððs€bus.€€Plaintiff€alleged€that€the€defendant€bus€driver€failed€to€keepÏa€lookout€ahead,€failed€to€stop€or€alter€his€course€of€travel€after€he€saw€or,€in€theÏexercise€of€due€care,€should€have€seen,€plaintiffððs€decedent€in€a€position€of€peril,€failedÏabide€by€the€posted€speed€limit€and€failed€to€drive€in€a€careful€and€prudent€manner.€ÏThe€posted€speed€limit€in€the€area€where€the€accident€occurred€was€sixty„five€milesÏper€hour.€€Plaintiffððs€expert€testified€that,€according€to€his€calculations,€the€defendantÏbus€driver€was€traveling€at€a€speed€of€73.5€miles€per€hour€at€the€time€of€impact.€œ€òòIdóó.€atÏ734.€›€The€defendantððs€witnesses,€which€included€the€driver€of€the€bus,€passengers€onÏthe€bus€and€the€driver€of€a€car€following€the€bus,€all€testified€that€the€bus€was€travelingÏat€a€speed€less€than€sixty„five€miles€per€hour.€€œòòIdóó.€€Passengers›€on€defendantððs€busÏfurther€testified€that€plaintiffððs€decedent€ð ðspurtedðð€out€onto€the€highway€€ð ðsuddenlyðð€andÏð ðright€in€front€of€the€bus.ðð€€œòòIdóó.€at€735.€€Plaintiff›€offered€no€evidence€to€the€contrary.€€InÏaffirming€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€a€directed€verdict€in€favor€of€the€defendant€and€inÏholding€that€the€defendant€bus€driverððs€illegal€conduct,€if€any,€was€not€the€proximateÏcause€of€the€decedentððs€death,€the€supreme€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àThe›€record€in€the€instant€case€leaves€no€doubt€but€thatÏplaintiff's€intestate€rode€his€motorcycle€up€to€theÏintersection,€either€hesitated€or€stopped,€and,€with€the€busÍin€unobstructed€view,€suddenly€and€abruptly€crossed€theÏhighway€into€the€northbound€lane€to€the€point€of€collision.€€ItÏbecomes€too€clear€for€argument€that€the€assertedÏdifferential€in€the€bus'€speed€simply€could€not€be€a€realisticÏproximate€cause€of€the€accident.€€In€the€fact€ofÏuncontroverted€testimony€showing€that€plaintiff's€intestateÏsuddenly€rode€into€the€path€of€the€oncoming€bus,€whetherÏdefendant's€bus€was€traveling€at€73.5€or€at€63€miles€perÏhour€becomes€insignificant.€€It€is€plain€that€the€immediateÏcause€of€the€collision€was€not€the€speed€of€the€bus;€butÏapparently€the€sudden€and€heedless€entry€of€plaintiff'sÏintestate€onto€the€north€side€of€the€highway.ÌÌòòÓÓErvinóó,€438€S.W.2d€735.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòBudiselich€v.€Rigsbyóó,€639€S.W.2d€663€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1982)€(holding€that€there€was€material€evidence€presented€from€which€the€juryÏcould€infer€that€plaintiffððs€negligence€was€the€proximate€cause€of€plaintiffððs€injuriesÏwherein€the€proof€showed€that€plaintiff€drove€his€automobile€into€the€path€ofÏdefendantððs€pickup€truck€when€the€defendantððs€truck€was€only€ten€feet€away);€òòCombs€v.ÏRogersóó,€450€S.W.2d€605€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1969)€(affirming€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€aÏdirected€verdict€in€favor€of€the€defendant€wherein€the€proof€established€that€plaintiffððsÏson€failed€to€stop€his€motorbike€at€the€end€of€a€private€driveway,€lost€control€and€droveÏonto€Shelby€Drive€where€he€was€struck€by€defendantððs€vehicle).ÌÌà àIn€òòGunter€v.€Smithóó,€No.€03A01„9512„CV„00448,€1996€WL€283069€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1996),€plaintiff,€the€administrator€of€decedentððs€estate,€sued€for€the€wrongful€deathÏof€decedent€after€decedent€was€struck€and€killed€by€an€automobile€driven€by€theÏdefendant.€€Defendant€was€traveling€south€in€his€automobile€in€the€outside€lane€ofÏCongress€Parkway€on€a€dark,€cloudy€morning€at€approximately€6:30€a.m.€€The€postedÏspeed€limit€was€forty„five€miles€per€hour.€€As€defendant€approached€an€intersectionÍtraveling€between€thirty„five€and€forty€miles€per€hour,€the€decedent€appeared€directly€inÏfront€of€defendantððs€vehicle€in€the€middle€of€the€right„hand€southbound€lane,Ïapproximately€six€feet€or€less€from€defendantððs€vehicle.€€During€a€period€of€time€beforeÏ6:30€a.m.,€decedent€consumed€a€substantial€amount€of€alcohol.€€At€8:00€a.m.€on€theÏmorning€of€the€accident,€a€blood€sample€taken€from€the€decedent€revealed€that€theÏdecedent€had€a€blood„alcohol€rating€of€.17€percent.€€In€holding€that€the€negligence€ofÏthe€decedent€was€equal€to€or€greater€than€any€inferential€negligence€that€could€beÏattributed€to€the€defendant,€this€Court€stated:€ÌÓÓ€à8 àœà0 àIn›€the€final€analysis,€if€the€[plaintiff]€is€entitled€to€recover€for€theÏdeath€of€the€decedent€under€the€circumstances€present€here,€suchÏrecovery€must€necessarily€be€based€on€an€inference€that€theÏdefendant€should€have€seen€the€decedent€before€the€collisionÏoccurred.€€We€do€not€believe€that€actionable€negligence€can€beÏinferred€from€"the€mere€fact€of€the€occurrence€of€injury€alone."€ÏòòWilliams€v.€Jordanóó,€346€S.W.2d€583,€586€(Tenn.App.1961).€€òòEatonÏv.€McLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€590€(Tenn.1994)€holds€that€theÏdoctrine€of€comparative€fault,€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€833€S.W.2d€52Ï(Tenn.1992),€does€not€alter€the€standards€which€governÏassessment€of€evidence€based€upon€the€negligence€of€a€plaintiff,Ïand€we€think€the€trial€judge€correctly€held€that€reasonable€mindsÏcould€not€differ€as€to€the€conclusion€to€be€drawn€in€a€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€plaintiff€that€the€negligence€of€the€deceased€wasÏequal€to€or€greater€than€any€inferential€negligence€of€theÏdefendant.ÌÌòòGunteróó,€1996€WL€283069,€at€*1.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€òòJohnson€v.€McCommonóó,€No.€02A01„9502„CV„00029,€1996€WL€243895Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),€an€action€was€brought€against€defendant,€Michael€McCommon,Ïand€defendant,€Memphis€Light,€Gas,€and€Water€œ(ð ðMLG&Wðð),›€for€personal€injuriesÏsustained€when€defendant€McCommon,€an€employee€of€œMLG&W,›€struck€plaintiff€withÍhis€vehicle.€€Plaintiffððs€car€stalled€in€the€center€lane€of€an€interstate,€and€plaintiff€wasÏunable€to€start€her€vehicle.€€Plaintiff€proceeded€to€get€out€of€her€vehicle€in€order€to€warnÏapproaching€motorists€of€the€obstruction.€€Plaintiff€testified€that€defendantððs€vehicleÏstruck€her€as€she€emerged€from€her€car€with€her€back€facing€oncoming€traffic.€€œòòIdóó.€at€*1.ÏDefendant›€McCommon,€however,€testified€that€he€reduced€his€speed€as€soon€as€heÏsaw€the€plaintiff€and€that€he€swerved€into€the€median€in€order€to€avoid€hitting€her.€€œòòIdóó.€ÏDefendantððs›€testimony€was€corroborated€by€an€eyewitness€who€testified€that€after€theÏplaintiff€got€out€of€her€car,€she€took€ð ðrunning€stepsðð€across€the€left€lane€of€oncomingÏtraffic.€€œòòIdóó.€€The›€eyewitness€testified€that€he€saw€defendant€McCommon€brake€andÏswerve€into€the€median€in€an€attempt€to€avoid€hitting€the€plaintiff.€€œòòIdóó.€€In›€holding€that€theÏplaintiffððs€negligence€was€the€proximate€cause€of€her€own€injuries€and€that€plaintiff€wasÏmore€than€fifty€percent€responsible€for€her€own€injuries,€this€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 à[P]laintiffððs›€act€of€emerging€from€her€vehicle€and€steppingÏinto€oncoming€traffic€was€the€proximate€cause€of€her€ownÏinjuries.€€Similarly,€we€do€not€find€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€determination€thatÏplaintiff€was€more€than€50%€responsible€for€her€ownÏinjuries.€€In€fact,€we€find€very€little€evidence€from€the€recordÏthat€would€support€the€conclusion€that€defendant€wasÏnegligent€in€any€respect.ÌÌòòJohnsonóó,€1996€WL€243895,€at€*3.ÌÌà àÌÌÓÓà àPlaintiffs€argue€that€the€doctrine€of€òòres€ipsa€loquituróó€applies€to€the€facts€of€thisÏcase.€€Plaintiffs€contend€€that€Defendantððs€automobile€was€controlled€exclusively€by€theÏDefendant€and€that€this€accident€would€not€have€occurred€but€for€the€œDefendantððs›Ïnegligence.€€€The€doctrine€of€òòres€ipsa€loquituróó€is€one€of€evidence€and€not€of€substantiveÍlaw.€€òòQuinley€v.€Cockeóó,€192€S.W.2d€992€(Tenn.€1946).€€It€furnishes€a€permissible€butÏnot€compulsory€inference€of€negligence.€€œòòArmesóó,›€843€S.W.2dœ€at›€œ432;›€òòScarbrough€v.ÏCity€of€Lewisburgóó,€504€S.W.2d€œ377,€382›€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973).ÌÌà àWhere€the€thing€causing€the€harm€is€shown€to€be€under€the€management€of€theÏdefendant,€and€the€accident€is€one€which€would€not€occur€in€the€ordinary€course€ofÏevents€if€the€defendant€œhad€exercised›€proper€œcare,›€òòres€ipsa€loquituróó€allows€reasonableÏevidence,€in€the€absence€of€an€explanation,€that€the€accident€arose€from€œa€lack›€of€dueÏcare.€€òòSoutheastern€Aviation,€Inc.€v.€Hurdóó,€355€S.W.2d€œ436,€446›€(Tenn.€1962);€òòCoca„Cola€Bottling€Works€v.€Sullivanóó,€158€S.W.2d€œ721,€726›€(Tenn.€1942);€œòòArmesóó,›€843ÏS.W.2d€at€432.ÌÌà àThe€requisite€elements€necessary€for€application€of€the€doctrine€of€òòres€ipsaÏloquituróó€are:Ìà àœà8 à1.›€€There€must€be€a€ð ðthingðð€causing€an€injury.ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 à2.›€€That€ð ðthingðð€must€be€under€the€exclusive€managementÏand€control€of€the€defendant€or€his€servants.ÌÌà8 àœà8 à3.›€€The€ð ðthingðð€must€be€shown€to€be€of€such€a€nature€thatÏinjury€does€not€ordinarily€result€from€its€carefulÏmanagement.ÌÌœòòArmesóó,›€843€S.W.2d€at€432„33.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€the€œinstant›€case,€Plaintiffs€allege€that€œthe€requisite›€ð ðthingðð€œnecessary€forÏapplication€of€the€doctrine€of€òòres€ipsa€loquituróó€is›€Defendantsðð€van€which€struck€theÍDecedent€and€allegedly€caused€his€death.€œ€However,€this€accident€is€not€of€the€typeÏthat€would€not€€ordinarily€occur€if€the€Defendant€had€exercised€proper€care.›€€On€theÏcontrary,€the€affidavits€of€Defendant€and€Rushing€reveal€that€œthe€Decedent›€steppedÏinto€the€path€of€Defendantsðð€van€as€the€Defendant€was€traveling€in€her€lane€of€traffic.€œ€InÏaddition,€an€automobile€is€not€the€type€of€ð ðthingðð€which€is€of€such€a€nature€that€injuryÏdoes€not€ordinarily€result€from€its€careful€management.€€›€We,€therefore,€conclude€thatÏthe€doctrine€of€òòres€ipsa€œloquituróó€is€inapplicable›€to€the€facts€of€this€case.ÌÌà àIn€òòNichols€v.€Smithóó,€111€S.W.2d€911€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1937),€this€CourtÏaddressed€the€same€issue€as€in€the€case€at€bar.€€In€òòNicholsóó,€plaintiff€sued€for€theÏwrongful€death€of€a€pedestrian€who€was€struck€by€defendantððs€vehicle€while€crossing€aÏstreet€at€an€intersection.€€In€affirming€the€trial€courtððs€order€which€directed€a€verdict€forÏthe€defendants€and€dismissed€plaintiffððs€suit,€this€Court€stated€that:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àAn›€automobile€is€not€a€ð ðdangerous€instrumentality,ðð€as€thatÏterm€is€used€in€the€law€of€negligence.€€The€rule€of€res€ipsaÏloquitur€is€not€applicable€in€this€case.Ìà8 àœà8 àIn›€order€to€justify€the€submission€of€a€case€of€this€characterÏto€the€jury,€over€a€motion€of€the€defendant€for€a€directedÏverdict,€there€must€be€some€material€evidence€reasonablyÏtending€to€support€each€and€all€of€the€three€propositions,Ïviz.:€(1)€A€duty€which€the€defendant€owes€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)Ïa€negligent€breach€of€that€duty;€and€(3)€injuries€receivedÏthereby€resulting€approximately€from€such€negligent€breachÏof€duty.€€òòDe€Glopper€v.€Nashville€Railway€&€Light€Co.óó,€123ÏTenn.€633,€642,€643,€134€S.W.€609,€33€L.R.A.,N.S.,€913.Ìà8 àœà8 àIt›€is€argued€for€œplaintiff›€that€defendant€Sam€HendersonððsÏadmission,€that€he€did€not€see€the€deceased€until€the€latterÏwas€on€the€hood€of€the€truck€Henderson€was€driving,€provesÏthat€he€was€not€maintaining€a€proper€lookout€ahead.€€ThisÏwould€be€a€sound€proposition€if€there€were€proof€thatÏ[decedent]€appeared€in€front€of€the€truck€at€such€distanceÏand€in€such€position€that€he€could€have€been€seen€byÍHenderson€if€the€latter€was€exercising€proper€vigilanceÏ(òòLouisville€&€N.€Railroad€Co.€œv.›€Mayóó,€5€Tenn.App.€100);€butÏthere€is€no€such€evidence.€€The€first€time€and€place€theÏdeceased€was€seen€on€the€night€of€his€death€(so€far€as€thisÏrecord€shows)€he€was€on€the€top€of€the€hood€of€defendantsððÏtruck.€€Whence€he€came€or€whither€he€intended€to€go€doesÏnot€appear.€€Any€finding€by€the€jury€that€the€death€ofÏ[decedent]€was€proximately€caused€by€negligence€ofÏdefendant€Sam€Henderson€would€necessarily€be€based€onÏspeculation€and€conjecture.ÌÌòòIdóó.€at€917„18.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€the€present€case,€the€Defendants€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€and,€inÏsupport€€of€such€motion,€the€affidavits€of€the€Defendant€and€Phillip€Rushing.€€TheÏaffidavits€of€the€Defendant€and€Rushing€show€that€the€Defendant€was€paying€full€andÏcomplete€attention€to€the€road€ahead€at€all€times€prior€to€the€accident,€that€at€no€timeÏprior€to€the€impact€did€the€Defendant€see€any€person€or€obstruction€in€the€roadway,Ïthat€the€Defendant€did€not€veer€from€her€lane€of€traffic€and€hit€the€Decedent,€and€thatÏthe€Decedent€walked€into€the€Defendantððs€lane€of€traffic€while€the€Defendant€wasÏdriving€in€her€lane.€€€The€Plaintiffs,€on€the€other€hand,€did€not€file€any€affidavit,Ïdeposition,€interrogatories€or€any€other€materials€in€opposition€to€the€DefendantsððÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.€€Because€the€Plaintiffs€have€failed€to€set€forth€specificÏfacts€showing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€for€trial€and€have€failed€toÏshow€that€Defendantððs€negligence€was€the€proximate€cause€of€Decedentððs€death,€weÏagree€with€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€there€was€no€evidence€of€negligence€whichÏcould€be€attributed€to€the€Defendant€and€that,€even€if€some€fault€could€be€attributed€toÏthe€Defendant,€the€negligence€of€the€Decedent€equaled€or€exceeded€fifty€percent€ofÍthe€total€fault€attributable€to€the€parties.€€We,€therefore,€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€Defendants.ÌÌà àBecause€of€our€disposition€of€the€foregoing€œissue,€it€is€not€necessary€to€reachÏthe€second€issue€raised€in€this€appeal.›ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€hereby€affirmed.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€toÏthe€œPlaintiff€for›€which€execution€may€issue€if€œnecessary.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà àà àóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.ÌÌ›