ÿWPCó …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) 0l8 0D¤ 0Jè 0T2 0^† 0hä 0rL 0|¾ 0†: 0À 1uP 0dÅ U*)B)SDC| AM¿ AM üYv~UvÓÓ D3¦ BÙ 0Xö AONÆ 0Dc D/§ BÖ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - ËDÌÍEÎÏDÐÑÒÓÓ€ÝDÒ 3|xÝ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ òÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌNovember€27,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  inion Geneva ÒÒ  inion Geneva Ò++++'ÿÿdxd d(0"ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€÷XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌPAUL€D.€MARTIN,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellant,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9606„CH„00254ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95„2877„IIIÌßR€"# A1-j|€‡` ç `€€@ÿRßDEPARTMENT€OF€CORRECTION,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àRespondent/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌÌPAUL€D.€MARTIN,€#153053ÌRiverbend€Maximum€Security€InstituionÌ7475€Cockrill€Bend€Industrial€RoadÌNashville,€Tennessee€37209„1010Ìà àPro€Se/Petitioner/AppellantÌÌCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌPATRICIA€C.€KUSSMANNÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ404€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌNashville,€Tennessee€37243Ìà àAttorney€for€Respondent/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌKOCH,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€XÔÌÌà àà àA€prisoner€in€the€custody€of€the€the€Department€of€Correction€wasÏaccused€of€assaulting€a€prison€guard.€€After€a€hearing,€disciplinary€sanctions€wereÏimposed€against€the€inmate,€including€a€postponement€of€his€release€eligibilityÏdate.€He€filed€a€Petition€for€Certiorari€in€the€Chancery€Court,€arguing€that€he€hadÏacted€in€self„defense,€and€that€irregularities€in€the€hearing€procedure€were€inÏviolation€of€departmental€procedures.€€The€Chancery€Court€dismissed€the€petitionÏfor€untimeliness.€€We€affirm€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àThis€case€arose€from€an€incident€that€occurred€on€December€28,Ï1994.€Paul€D.€Martin,€an€inmate€housed€in€the€Mark€H.€Luttrell€Reception€Center,Ïwas€in€the€dining€hall€and€became€involved€in€a€verbal€altercation€with€a€prisonÏguard.€€He€was€charged€with€the€disciplinary€offense€of€threatening€an€officer.€ÏWhile€the€guard€who€was€allegedly€threatened€was€placing€the€prisoner€inÏsegregation,€blows€were€exchanged€between€them.€€Both€men€were€seen€by€theÏmedical€staff,€the€guard€for€an€injury€to€his€right€hand€and€a€cut€to€his€nose,€andÏthe€prisoner€for€injuries€to€the€face.ÌÌà àà àDisciplinary€hearings€were€held€on€January€6€and€9,€1995.€€€ThoughÏthe€inmate€claimed€that€the€officer€instigated€the€encounter€€and€struck€the€firstÏblow,€the€hearings€resulted€in€findings€of€guilt€against€the€prisoner€on€the€twoÏcharges€of€threatening€an€employee€and€assaulting€an€employee.€The€affidavitsÏof€inmates€who€had€witnessed€the€encounter€between€Mr.€Martin€and€the€officerÏwere€submitted,€but€the€inmate€witnesses€were€not€permitted€to€testify€at€theÏhearing.ÌÌà àà àThe€disciplinary€board€recommended€that€Mr.€Martin€be€placed€inÏinvoluntary€administrative€segregation.€€Mr.€Martin€filed€two€appeals€of€theÏdisciplinary€boardððs€rulings€on€January€18€and€January€20th,€respectively.€€BothÏappeals€were€rejected€by€the€Associate€Warden.ÌÌà àà àOn€April€8,€1995,€Mr.€Martin€received€a€ð ðTomis€Offender€SentenceÏLetter.ðð€€This€computer„generated€document€contained€a€ð ðSummary€of€CurrentÏRelease€Dataðð€which€indicated€that€Mr.€Martin€would€not€be€eligible€for€paroleÏuntil€January€21,€2010.€€An€earlier€Tomis€Offender€Sentence€Letter€had€indicatedÏa€release€eligibility€date€of€January€4,€2002.ÌÌà àà àOn€May€24,€1995,€Mr.€Martin€was€notified€that€his€release€eligibilityÏdate€had€been€extended€by€30%.€€This€was€apparently€in€accordance€withÏDepartment€of€Correction€Policy€No.€502.02(VI)(E)€which€reads€in€pertinent€part:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ ° ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓIn€all€cases€in€which€an€inmate€is€found€guilty€of€aÏdisciplinary€offense€that€resulted€in€physical€injury€to€anÏemployee,€volunteer€or€visitor,€in€addition€to€any€otherÏpunishment€imposed,€the€offenderððs€parole€or€releaseÏeligibility€date€shall€be€extended€by€adding€thereto€anÏadditional€thirty€percent€(30%)€of€the€offenderððs€originalÏmaximum€sentence€.€.€.€.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌÒ € ÒÒ „ Òà àà àElsewhere€in€Policy€502.02,€physical€injury€is€defined€as€ð ð[a]€cut,Ïabrasion,€bruise,€burn€or€disfigurement;€physical€pain€or€temporary€illness€ofÏimpairment€of€a€bodily€member,€organ,€or€mental€faculty.ððÌÌà àà àMr.€Martin€wrote€to€the€Department,€requesting€it€to€issue€aÏdeclaratory€order€that€the€extension€of€his€release€eligibility€date€was€invalid.€OnÏJuly€17,€1995,€W.G.€Lutche,€the€Legal€Assistant€to€the€Department€of€CorrectionÍsent€a€letter€to€Mr.€Martin€informing€him€that€his€request€was€inappropriate,€andÏadvising€him€to€consult€the€policy€guidelines€for€the€proper€grievance€procedures.ÌÌà àà àOn€September€13,€1995,€Mr.€Martin€filed€a€Petition€for€a€Writ€ofÏCertioriari€with€the€Chancery€Court€of€Davidson€County.€Because€the€PetitionÏhad€been€filed€more€than€sixty€days€after€Mr.€Martin€was€informed€of€the€extensionÏof€his€release€eligibility€date,€the€Chancellor€found€that€the€Petition€had€not€beenÏtimely€filed€and€dismissed€it.€ÌÌà@ àò òII.Ìó óÌà àà àThe€Writ€of€Certiorari€is€a€discretionary€writ€that€enables€a€court€toÏorder€an€inferior€tribunal€to€send€up€a€complete€record€for€review,€so€that€the€courtÏcan€determine€whether€that€tribunal€has€exceeded€its€jurisdiction,€or€is€actingÏillegally,€fraudulently€or€arbitrarily.€òò€Yokley€v.€Stateóó,€632€S.W.2d€123,€126€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1981).€The€court€may€not€inquire€into€the€instrinsic€correctness€of€theÏdecision€below,€but€only€the€manner€by€which€that€decision€was€reached.€€òò€PowellÏv.€Parole€Eligibility€Review€Boardóó,€879€S.W.2d€871,€873€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€ÌÌà àà àOur€legislature€has€decreed€that€to€obtain€the€writ,€a€party€must€fileÏhis€petition€within€sixty€days€from€the€entry€of€the€order€or€judgment€appealedÏfrom.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€27„9„102.€€Failure€to€file€the€petition€within€the€statutoryÍtime€limit€results€in€the€order€becoming€final,€and€once€the€decision€is€final,€theÏcourt€is€deprived€of€jurisdiction.€òò€Thandiwe€v.€Traughberóó,€909€S.W.2d€802€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1994);€òòWheeler€v.€City€of€Memphisóó,€685€S.W.2d€4€(Tenn.€App.€1984).ÌÌà àà àThis€apparently€simple€rule€has€presented€some€difficulties€ofÏinterpretation€in€situations€where€a€plaintiff€has€attempted€to€preserve€the€viabilityÏof€an€otherwise€untimely€petition€by€arguing€that€the€sixty€day€period€did€not€beginÏto€run€until€the€conclusion€of€some€administrative€appellate€procedure,€rather€thanÏat€the€time€€the€original€judgment€or€order€was€issued.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€present€case,€the€appellant€argues€that€his€Petition€should€beÏconsidered€timely€because€it€was€filed€less€than€sixty€days€after€the€rejection€ofÏhis€request€for€a€declaratory€order.€€We€believe,€however,€that€to€allow€the€timeÏlimit€to€be€tolled€by€virtue€of€correspondence€between€a€plaintiff€and€an€officialÏwho€may€or€may€not€be€in€a€position€to€give€that€plaintiff€some€relief€would€makeÏthe€sixty€day€rule€virtually€meaningless.€€€ÌÌà àà àThere€is€nothing€in€the€record€to€indicate€that€in€asking€theÏCommissioner€for€a€declaratory€order,€Mr.€Martin€was€following€any€establishedÏappeals€procedure€that€might€have€the€effect€of€postponing€the€finality€of€theÏdecision€as€to€the€extension€of€his€release€eligibility€date,€and€thus€advancing€theÍdate€on€which€the€sixty€day€time€limit€should€be€deemed€to€have€begun€to€run.€€InÏfact,€the€letter€from€Mr.€Lutche€to€Mr.€Martin€indicates€quite€the€opposite.€€€€€ÌÌà àà àWe€conclude€that€the€sixty„day€limit€began€to€run,€at€the€very€latest,Ïon€May€24,€1995,€the€day€that€Mr.€Martin€officially€learned€that€his€releaseÏeligibility€date€had€been€extended€by€30%,€thereby€rendering€untimely€his€petitionÏof€September€13,€1995.ÌÌà àà àWe€also€reject€Mr.€Martinððs€argument€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏdismissing€his€petition€while€his€motion€for€an€extension€of€time€to€respond€to€theÏdefendantððs€motion€to€dismiss€was€still€pending.€€Since€it€was€apparent€from€theÏface€of€his€petition€and€its€attachments€that€the€petition€was€not€timely€filed,€weÏbelieve€it€was€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court€to€grant€the€motion€to€dismissÏeither€for€lack€of€jurisdiction,€or€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€beÏgranted,€without€separately€ruling€on€the€motion€for€an€extension.€€See€Tenn.€R.ÏCiv.€Proc.,€Rule€12.02(1)€and€(6).€€ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Remand€this€cause€to€theÏChancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏopinion.€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÇÑ  Ñ