ÿWPCš 5#†öUN| %Ê 0ÐU D×4/ 0K> 0D‰Í 0JÍ 0T 0^k wÉ 0hß 0#G 0rj 0|Ü ÆX 0† 0¤ AO4 0Dƒ 1uÇU,< 0dh BÌ 0@é D3)U,\ D/ˆU>· BõU*B)<DCe AM¨U*õeâ Gv~IvÓǘIBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0ÙP ï? wC·^2×è2 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ß Ñ$¡¡ÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XgØXXXÔÑ7€UXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Ó8§ÖhZŠ,Century-WP Regular1# üô` ÿ3|x>(û(3m©$¤¤Ý ƒ Ñ!ÝÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€Xö~XXXÔÑ7€ö~XXdìdì7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(û3~ø$¢¢Ý ƒ Ñ!ÝÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€Xö~XXXÔÑ7€ö~XXdìdì7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò####'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Monaco**'÷ÿ dxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New RomanüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd$-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ØÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€)ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ€/ÔÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔó óÌò òÔ€/¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ0 ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€/XÔÌÌò òCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.Ô€Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€ÂÔÔ€/ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€ÔÔ€XÔ =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€)ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€this€proceeding,€defendants€have€not€raised€any€defenseÏconcerning€the€viability€of€the€causes€of€action.€€Nothing€in€this€opinionÏshould€be€construed€as€dealing€with€anything€other€than€the€question€ofÏvenue.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€''X„d&ÓÑ#€''Xd#ÑÔ€)ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÑ#€++Xd#ÑÑ#€++Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÙ€ÙÑ  ÑÑ  ÑßL€.1-;+'h|v- `€€Lßà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OFÏTENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌà àà àÏ_______________________________________________ÌÌSUE€MCGEEó ó,ÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,ÌÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àMaury€CountyÏCircuit€6359Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€01A01„9508„CV„00341Ìò òTHE€FIRST€NATIONAL€BANKÌand€NEAL€LOVLACE,€JR.,€ó óÌÌà àDefendants„Appellees.€ò òÌó ó_________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€MAURY€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JAMES€L.€WEATHERFORD,ÏJUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àWinston€S.€Evans€of€NashvilleÌà@ àFor€Appellee,€LovlaceÌÌà@ àKevin€S.€Carr€of€Spicer,€Flynn€&€RudstromÏof€NashvilleÌà@ àFor€Appellee,€First€National€Bank€of€CentervilleÌÌà@ àMichael€E.€Gilmer€of€ColumbiaÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòAFFIRMEDÌÌà@ àó óóóOpinion€filed:ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌó óÌÓÓà àThis€appeal€involves€a€venue€dispute.€€Plaintiff,€Sue€McGee,Ïappeals€from€the€order€of€the€Circuit€Court€for€the€Twenty„SecondÏJudicial€District€in€Maury€County,€Tennessee,€that€dismissed€her€suitÍagainst€defendants,€First€National€Bank€and€Neal€Lovlace,€for€improperÏvenue.€€The€record€in€the€case€consists€of€what€was€formerly€called€theÏtechnical€record€and€a€"transcript€of€proceedings"€which€has€noÏtestimony€and€contains€only€argument€and€statements€of€counsel€andÏthe€court.Ìà àA€review€of€the€pleadings€and€affidavits€reveals€that€in€1993,Ïdefendant€First€National€Bank,€represented€by€defendant€Lovlace,€filed€aÏsuit€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€the€Twenty„First€Judicial€District€inÏHickman€County,€Tennessee,€against€Jimmy€McGee,€husband€of€plaintiff,ÏSue€McGee,€that€resulted€in€a€judgment€against€Jimmy€McGee€in€excessÏof€$50,000.00.€€Subsequently,€in€the€course€of€postjudgment€discoveryÏprocedures,€defendants€caused€various€subpoenas€to€be€issued€andÏserved€in€Maury€County€on€the€plaintiff,€a€resident€of€Maury€County,€andÏother€witnesses.€€Pursuant€to€the€subpoenas,€depositions€were€takenÏapparently€to€ascertain€the€existence€of€assets€that€might€be€subjectÏto€execution€in€payment€of€the€judgment€against€Jimmy€McGee.€€Ìà àPlaintiff€alleges€that€each€process€issued€from€the€HickmanÏCounty€Circuit€Court€to€be€served€in€Maury€County€was€maliciouslyÍissued€and€was€"a€calculated€attempt€to€harass€and€embarrassÏ[plaintiff]€into€paying€the€debt€incurred€by€her€husband"€and€therefore,Ïconstituted€abuse€of€process.Ìà àBoth€defendants€filed€motions€to€dismiss€on€the€ground€ofÏimproper€venue.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€Both€parties€concede€that€a€malicious€prosecutionÏaction€and€an€abuse€of€process€action€are€transitory€actions.€€Venue€ofÏtransitory€actions€is€governed€by€T.C.A.€ðð€20„4„101€(1994)€whichÏprovides€in€pertinent€part:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àò ò20„4„101.€€Transitory€actions.ó 󀄀(a)€In€allÏcivil€actions€of€a€transitory€nature,€unless€venueÏis€otherwise€expressly€provided€for,€the€actionÏmay€be€brought€in€the€county€where€the€cause€ofÏaction€arose€or€in€the€county€where€theÏdefendant€resides€or€is€found.ÌÌÓÓà àThe€plaintiff€concedes€that€neither€defendant€is€a€resident€ofÏMaury€County,€nor€was€either€defendant€found€in€Maury€County€asÏcontemplated€by€the€statute.€€The€trial€court€dismissed€the€action€forÍimproper€venue,€and€the€only€issue€for€review€is€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€so€doing.€€To€decide€this€issue,€we€must€determine€where€theÏcause€of€action€arose.€€If€it€arose€in€Maury€County€the€trial€judge€erred;Ïif€it€arose€in€Hickman€County,€the€trial€judge€was€correct.€€à àInÏò òòòDonaldson€v.€Donaldsonó óóó,€557€S.W.2d€60€(Tenn.€1977),€our€SupremeÏCourt€stated:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€There€are€two€tort€actions€that€may€be€broughtÏto€obtain€redress€for€the€alleged€misuse€of€legalÏprocess€by€another:€€abuse€of€process€andÏmalicious€prosecution.€€An€action€for€abuse€ofÏprocess€lies€for€the€use€of€legal€process€toÏobtain€a€result€it€was€not€intended€to€effect,€forÏa€wrongful€purpose.€€ò òòòPriest€v.€Union€Agency,ó óóóÏ174€Tenn.€304,€125€S.W.2d€142€(1939)€MaliciousÏprosecution,€or€the€malicious€use€of€process,€isÏthe€employment€of€legal€process€for€itsÏostensible€purpose,€but€without€probable€cause.ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€62.ÌÌÓÓà àIn€72€C.J.S.€òòProcessóó€ðð€108€(1987),€it€is€stated:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àò òb.€Wrongful€UseÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€unlawful€use€of€process€after€itsÏissuance€is€the€gist€of€the€wrong€of€abuseÏof€process.ó óÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€The€gist€of€the€tort€or€wrong€consists€of€theÏunlawful€use€of€lawful€process€after€itsÏissuance.€€There€must€be€an€actual€abuse€of€theÏprocess€by€its€perversion€to€obtain€a€resultÏwhich€it€was€not€intended€by€law€to€effect.€€AÏlegal€and€legitimate€use€of€process,€to€effectÏthe€result€which€such€process€is€designed€by€lawÏto€accomplish,€cannot€constitute€abuse,€evenÏthough€the€user€was€actuated€by€a€wrongfulÏmotive€or€intent€or€by€malice.ÌÌÓÓà àPlaintiff€asserts€that€a€cause€of€action€for€abuse€of€processÏarises€when€the€cause€of€action€becomes€complete,€and€in€that€case€theÏcause€of€action€became€complete€in€Hickman€County.€€€In€support€of€thisÏassertion€plaintiff€cites€ò òòòMid„South€Milling€Co.,€Inc.€v.€LoretÏFarms,€Inc.ó óóó,€521€S.W.2d€586€(Tenn.€1975).€€From€our€examination€ofÏthis€case,€we€do€not€reach€the€same€conclusion.€€In€ò òòòMid„South€Millingó óóóÏthe€suit€was€for€breach€of€warranty€in€a€sales€contract.€€The€CourtÏlooked€to€T.C.A.€ðð€47„2„725,€the€statute€of€limitations€in€salesÏcontracts,€to€determine€when€and€where€the€cause€of€action€arose.€€TheÏstatute€specifically€provides€that€the€cause€of€action€for€breach€ofÏwarranty€accrues€when€the€breach€occurs,€and€the€breach€occurs€whenÏthe€tender€of€delivery€is€made.€€The€court€held€that€since€the€breachÍoccurred€at€the€time€of€delivery€it€also€occurred€at€the€place€of€theÏtender€of€delivery.€€In€the€instant€case€there€is€no€correspondingÏstatute€to€determine€when€and€where€an€abuse€of€process€cause€ofÏaction€arises.€€Ìà àIn€ò òòòMattix€v.€Swepstonó óóó,€127€Tenn.€693,€155€S.W.€928€(1913),€ourÏSupreme€Court€was€called€upon€to€make€a€determination€as€to€whetherÏan€action€was€a€local€action€or€a€transitory€action.€€The€Court,€inÏdefining€the€cause€of€action,€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€It€may€be€safely€said€that€no€attempt€so€far€toÏgive€an€accurate€definition€of€the€term€so€as€toÏmeet€the€exigencies€of€all€cases€which€mayÏarise€has€been€successfully€made,€and,€indeed,Ïsuch€a€general€and€inflexible€definition€couldÏserve€no€particular€purpose,€€and€should€not€beÏattempted.€€With€this€qualification,€it€may€beÏstated€generally€that€the€cause€of€actionÏincludes€all€the€facts€which€together€constituteÏthe€plaintiffs'€right€to€maintain€the€action.€€ThisÏdefinition€has€the€approval€of€such€eminentÏauthority€as€Mr.€Justice€Cooley€in€ò òòòPost€v.ÏCampauó óóó,€42€Mich.,€96,€3€N.W.,€272,€and€Mr.ÏJustice€Johnson€in€ò òòòMarquat€v.€Marquató óóó,€12€N.ÏY.,€341.€€Mr.€Pomeroy,€in€his€work€on€Remedies,Ïgives€substantially€the€same€definition€atÏsection€521.ÌÌò òòòIdó óóó.€at€697.ÌÌà àIn€the€instant€case,€the€gravamen€of€plaintiff's€action€is€stated€inÏher€brief:€€Ìà8 àà8 àThe€theory€of€the€Appellant's€case€below€is€thatÏthe€Appellee,€Lovlace,€and€the€Appellee,€Bank,Ïjoined€together€to€force€the€Appellant€to€pay€aÏjudgment€for€which€she€was€not€legally€liable€byÏusing€oppressive€and€harassing€discoveryÏprocesses€to€wear€down€her€resolve€until€sheÏcapitulated€and€paid€up.€ÌÌÓÓà àThe€process€about€which€plaintiff€complains€consists€ofÏsubpoenas€to€obtain€postjudgment€discovery€from€various€businessÏenterprises€and€individuals.€€Apparently€all€of€the€subpoenas€wereÏproperly€served€and€the€discovery€process€completed.€€The€gist€ofÏplaintiff's€case€is€that€these€processes€were€a€form€of€extortion€toÏcompel€plaintiff€to€pay€the€judgment€against€her€husband.€€It€isÏundisputed€that€all€of€the€subpoenas€were€issued€from€the€Circuit€CourtÏin€Hickman€County,€and€that€if€there€was€an€improper€motive€or€purposeÏbehind€the€issuance€of€the€subpoenas,€that€motive€or€improper€purposeÏwas€to€have€a€judgment€in€Hickman€County€paid.Ìà àWe€have€been€cited€to€no€Tennessee€authority€dealing€with€theÍquestion€before€us,€nor€has€our€research€revealed€any€such€authority.€ÏThe€few€cases€touching€on€the€subject€from€other€jurisdictions€involveÏstatutes€somewhat€different€from€the€Tennessee€statutes,€or€haveÏfactual€situations€not€entirely€like€the€case€at€bar.€€However,€ò òòòHarrisonÏCommunity€Hosp.€v.€Blusteinó óóó,€76€Mich.€App.€176,€255€N.W.2d€802Ï(Mich.€Ct.€App.€1977)€is€somewhat€analogous.€€In€òòò òHarrisonó óóó,€a€judgmentÏdebtor€brought€an€action€against€a€judgment€creditor€to€recoverÏdamages€for€an€unlawful€garnishment€which€the€creditor€obtained€in€anÏattempt€to€collect€a€judgment.€€The€judgment€was€entered€in€theÏCircuit€Court€of€Wayne€County,€and€the€garnishments€were€issued€fromÏthat€court.€€The€judgment€debtor€brought€the€action€against€theÏjudgment€creditor€in€Macomb€County€where€the€garnishments€wereÏserved.€€Michigan€law€provides€that€the€proper€county€in€which€toÏcommence€and€try€an€action€is€the€county€in€which€all€or€part€of€theÏcause€of€action€arose.€€Mich.€Comp.€Laws€Ann.€ðð€600.1627;€Mich.€Stat.ÏAnn.€€ðð€27A.1627.€€The€question€before€the€€court€was€whether€any€partÏof€the€plaintiff's€cause€of€action€arise€in€Macomb€County.Ìà àIn€reversing€the€trial€court's€denial€of€defendants'€request€forÍchange€of€venue,€the€court€said:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€In€the€case€at€bar,€the€wrong,€if€any,€wasÏgarnishment€in€Wayne€County€and€the€incidentalÏdamages€that€occurred€in€Macomb€County€wereÏnot€part€of€plaintiff's€cause€of€action,€except€asÏelements€of€damages.€€Venue€in€Macomb€CountyÏwas€improperly€laid,€and€it€was€error€not€toÏgrant€defendants'€request€for€change€of€venue.ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€179.ÌÌÓÓà àIn€ò òòòCacciaguidi€v.€Superior€Courtó óóó,€226€Cal.App.3d€181,€276ÏCal.Rptr.€465€(Cal.€Ct.€App.€1990),€the€Court€held€that€the€venue€of€anÏaction€for€abuse€of€process€may€not€be€brought€in€the€county€of€theÏplaintiff's€residence€on€the€theory€that€this€is€where€the€process€wasÏserved€and€where€the€injury€occurred.€€The€California€venue€statuteÏallows€suit€for€injuries€to€the€person€to€be€brought€in€the€county€whereÏthe€injury€occurs€or€the€county€in€which€the€defendant€resides.€€Cal.ÏCode€Civ.€Pro.€ðð€395.€Ìà àIn€ò òòòState€ex€rel.€Banta€v.€Wiesmanó óóó,€864€S.W.2d€374€(Mo.€Ct.ÏApp.€1993),€the€applicable€venue€statute,€Mo.€Rev.€Stat.€ðð€508.010€(6)Ï(1986)€provided:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àSuits€instituted€by€summons€shall,€except€asÏotherwise€provided€by€law,€be€brought:ÌÌà àà à.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(6)€In€all€tort€actions€the€suit€may€be€brought€inÏthe€county€where€the€cause€of€action€accruedÏregardless€of€the€residence€of€the€parties€.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓà àPlaintiff,€the€son€of€the€defendant,€sued€his€father€in€the€CircuitÏCourt€of€St.€Louis€County€alleging,€among€other€things,€abuse€of€processÏin€connection€with€a€proceeding€filed€by€the€father,€a€resident€ofÏMississippi€County,€in€the€Circuit€Court€of€Mississippi€County.€€In€theÏunderlying€suit,€writs€were€issued€from€the€Mississippi€County€CircuitÏCourt€and€served€in€St.€Louis€County€effecting€the€son's€confinement€inÏmental€institutions.€€The€court€noted€that€all€of€the€father's€conductÏoccurred€in€Mississippi€County€pursuant€to€his€appointment€as€guardianÏin€Mississippi€County€and€held€that€"it€is€the€place€of€defendant'sÏwrongful€conduct,€not€the€place€where€the€effect€of€that€conduct€isÏultimately€felt€or€realized€that€is€controlling€for€venue€purposes."€€ò òòòId.óóó óÏat€376.Ìà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€plaintiff€does€not€assert€that€the€process€fromÍthe€Circuit€Court€of€Hickman€County€was€not€served€in€a€lawful€manner.€ÏEach€process€was€utilized€for€its€intended€purpose,€that€is,€to€obtainÏlawfully€authorized€discovery.€€Plaintiff's€claim€rests€solely€on€herÏassertion€that€the€discovery€proceedings€were€for€the€purpose€ofÏharassing€the€plaintiff€and€coercing€her€into€paying€the€Hickman€CountyÏjudgment€against€her€husband.€€Plaintiff€argues€that€a€cause€of€actionÏfor€abuse€of€process€arises€when€and€where€process€is€served,€becauseÏthat€is€when€the€cause€of€action€becomes€complete.€€Therefore,Ïplaintiff€argues€that€her€cause€of€action€arose€in€Maury€County.€€We€doÏnot€agree.Ìà àUnder€plaintiff's€theory€in€the€case€at€bar,€if€plaintiff€has€a€causeÏof€action€for€abuse€of€process,€then€that€cause€of€action€arose€inÏHickman€County€where€the€process€was€issued.€€If€defendantsÏcommitted€a€wrongful€act€in€connection€with€the€process,€then€theyÏcommitted€that€act€in€Hickman€County€by€virtue€of€having€the€processÏissued€in€the€first€place.€€The€fact€that€the€effects€of€that€wrongful€actÏwere€felt€in€Maury€County€through€the€allegedly€harassing€discoveryÏprocedures€does€not€cause€plaintiff's€abuse€of€process€action€to€ariseÍin€Maury€County.à àÌà àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€dismissing€plaintiff'sÏsuit€for€improper€venue€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€assessedÏagainst€the€appellant.€òòÌÓÓóóà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.Ìó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò òHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àSENIOR€JUDGEó ó