ÿWPC(  …# VU:a %› 0û¡4œ ° 0?¿ 0Dþ B H w@P R â è 0Jî 0T8 0^Œ 0hê 0rR 0|Ä 0†@ 0Æ 1uV 0dË B/U*LB)vDCŸ AMâ¥/ D3Ôëv~ò 0@pvÓ° AOƒÆÒ 0D˜ D/Ü B ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(ÓH=$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XÎ_XXXÔÑ7€¾úXXdðXXdð7ÑobF"#3|x(ï(3¶¦$¤¤Ý ƒH=!ÝÑ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ€X¯¥XXXÔÑ7€¯¥XXdædæ7ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÈR P E P EEÊÓ€ÈÔ  Ôôdddì  ÔÔ,$ÔôL5E,HP LaserJet 4,LPT1:HH2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ›Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌò òMarchÏ20,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€%ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó$$$$'ÿÿdxd áÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€Limberg€denies€making€any€age„related€comments,€this€CourtÏmust,€for€the€purpose€of€appellate€review,€accept€the€facts€in€the€light€most€favorableÏto€the€plaintiff.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ Òò òÑ  ÑÓ  Ó›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌ„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„ÌÓ  ÓÌÌRONALD€D.€McKINNA,à àà àà àó ó)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àShelby€Chancery€Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellantà àà àà àœ)à àCase€No.€104080„3R.D.Ô% € Ô›à àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌò òœÙ€€ÙßR€()'A1-j|ÄÙ` à. `€€@ÿRß›LASCO,€INC.,à àà àà àó óà à)à àAppeal€No.€02A01„9604„CH„00083Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appelleeà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌTHE€HONORABLE€D.€J.€€ALISSANDRATOS,€CHANCELLORÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌò òALEX€SAHAROVICHà àà àà àà àRICHARD€D.€BENNETTÌMARY€SPEIDELó óà àà àà àà àò òà àGEORGE€H.€œRIEÔ% € ÔGER,ó ó›€ò òJR.ó óÌ5100€Poplar€Ave.,€Ste.€2500à àò òà àà àWeintraub,€Robinson,ÏWeintraub,€Ìó óMemphis,€TN€€38137à àà àà àà àò òà àStock,€Bennett,€EttingoffÏó óAttorneys€for€Appellantò òà àó óà àà àà àò òà à&€Grisham,€P.C.ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSte.€2560,€One€Commerce€SquareÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€€38103Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAttorneys€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌò òREVERSEDà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€INMAN,€SENIOR€JUDGEó óÌÌÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGE€ÌÌÌHOLLY€K.€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌÓÓà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌóóó óà àThis€action€for€damages€for€age€discrimination€in€violation€of€T.C.A.€ðð€4„21„401(a)(1)€and€(2)€was€dismissed€on€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€propriety€ofÏwhich€is€presented€for€our€review.€€Appellate€review€is€òòde€novoóó€with€noÏpresumption€of€correctness.€€òòPresley€v.€Bennettóó,€860€S.W.2d€857€(Tenn.€1993).Ìò òÓ  ÓIó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€plaintiff€is€58„years„old.€€He€is€a€pipefitter€by€trade€and€was€employed€byÏthe€defendant€in€1984.€€He€was€laid€off€on€December€3,€1993,€ostensibly€for€lack€ofÏwork,€which€he€claims€was€pretextual€because€the€business€of€his€employer€wasÏburgeoning€and,€on€various€occasions,€a€corporate€official€had€made€disparagingÏremarks€about€his€age.€€There€is€evidence€in€the€record€that€at€the€time€the€plaintiffÏwas€laid€off€for€lack€of€work,€December€1993,€his€employer€had€negotiated€variousÍcontracts€to€install€fire€prevention€systems€during€the€fourth€quarter€of€1993,€but€theÏcontracts€negotiated€for€completion€in€1994€were€still€in€the€executory€stages€inÏDecember€1993.Ìà àWith€respect€to€the€specific€evidence€of€age€discrimination,€there€is€evidenceÏthat€a€Vice„President€of€the€employer,€about€a€month€before€the€plaintiff€was€laid€offÏsaid€to€him,€"Well€man,€you're€getting€old,€aren't€you?€€Roger€can€run€more€headsÏthan€you."€€And€in€August€1993,€the€plaintiff€testified€that€the€same€official€referred€toÏhim€as€an€"old€man,"€who€was€getting€"old€and€fat€and€can't€keep€up."€€Ìò òÓ  ÓIIó óÌÓ  Óà àT.C.A.€ðð€4„21„401(a)€provides:ÌÓÓÌà0 àIt€is€a€discriminatory€practice€for€an€employer€to:ÌÌà0 àà0 à(1)à8 àfail€or€refuse€to€hire€or€discharge€any€person€orÏotherwise€to€discriminate€against€an€individual€withÏrespect€to€compensation,€terms,€conditions€or€privilegesÏof€employment€because€of€such€individual's€race,€creed,Ïcolor,€religion,€sex€age€or€national€origin;€orÌÌà0 àà0 à(2)à8 àlimit,€segregate€or€classify€an€employee€or€applicants€forÏemployment€in€any€way€which€would€deprive€or€tend€toÏdeprive€an€individual€of€employment€opportunities€orÏotherwise€adversely€affect€the€status€of€an€employee,Ïbecause€of€race,€creed,€color,€religion,€sex,€age€orÏnational€origin.ÌÓÓÌThe€preamble€to€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€specifically€provides€that,€"[œi]t›€isÏthe€purpose€and€intent€of€the€General€Assembly€by€this€enactment€to€provide€forÏexecution€within€Tennessee€of€the€policies€embodied€in€the€Federal€Civil€RightsÍActs€of€1964,€1968€and€1972€and€the€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act€ofÏ1967,€as€amended€.€.€.€.€"€€T.C.A.€ðð€4„21„101.Ìà àIn€an€age€discrimination€case,€the€burden€is€a€shifting€process.€€òòBruce€v.ÏWestern€Auto€Supply€Co.óó,€669€S.W.2d€95,€97€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€òòSee€alsoÏCooley€v.€Carmike€Cinemas,€Inc.óó,€25€F.3d€1325,€1329€(6th€Cir.€1994);€òòBrenner€v.ÏTextron€Aerostructures,€Inc.óó,€874€S.W.2d€579,€583€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€TheÏemployee€must€first€prove€a€òòprima€facieóó€case€of€age€discrimination.€€òòBruceóó,€669ÏS.W.2d€at€97,€following€which,€the€burden€shifts€to€the€employer€who€must€simplyÏproduce€evidence€of€a€legitimate,€non„discriminatory€reason€for€the€employee'sÏdischarge.€€òòId.óó€€If€the€employer€meets€this€burden,€the€plaintiff€must€then€prove€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€that€the€reason€proffered€by€the€employer€was€notÏits€true€reason€but€merely€a€pretext€for€intentional€age€discrimination.€€òòId;€Board€ofÏTrustees€v.€Sweeneyóó,€439€U.S.€24,€99€S.€Ct.€2931,€58€L.€Ed.€2d€216€(1978).Ìà àWhile€the€burden€shifts€throughout€the€age€discrimination€analysis,€"theÏburden€of€persuasion€remains€at€all€times€with€[plaintiff]."€€òòBruceóó,€669€S.W.2d€at€97.€ÏòòSee€also€Phelps€v.€Yale€Sec.,€Inc.óó,€986€F.2d€1020,€1024€(6th€Cir.€1993)€(òòcitingóóÏòòBlackwell€v.€Sun€Elec.€Corp.óó,€696€F.2d€1176,€1179€(6th€Cir.€1983)).€€Plaintiff's€finalÏburden€of€showing€that€defendant's€articulated€legitimate€non„discriminatoryÏreasons€for€the€lay„off€are€pretextual€"merges€with€.€.€.€Plaintiff's€ultimate€burden€ofÏpersuading€the€Court€that€[he]€has€been€the€victim€of€intentional€discrimination."€ÏòòRea€v.€Martin€Marietta€Corp.óó,€29€F.3d€1450,€1455€(10th€Cir.€1994)€(òòciting€TexasÏDep't.€of€Community€Affairs€v.€Burdineóó,€450€U.S.€248,€256€(1981)).Ìà àIn€order€to€establish€a€òòprima€facieóó€case€of€age€discrimination,€plaintiff€mustÏshow€that€(1)€he€was€a€member€of€the€protected€class€(over€age€40),€(2)€he€wasÏsubjected€to€an€adverse€employment€action,€(3)€he€was€qualified€for€the€positionÏand€(4)€he€was€replaced€by€a€younger€person.€€òòLoeffler€v.€Kiellgrenóó,€884€S.W.2dÏ463,€469€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994)€(òòciting€McDonnell€Douglas€v.€Greenóó,€441€U.S.€792Ï(1973)).€€But€a€plaintiff€may€show€by€direct€or€circumstantial€evidence€that€his€ageÏwas€a€determining€factor€in€the€employer's€decision€to€terminate€his€employment.€ÏòòBruce,óó€669€S.W.2d€at€97;€òòBlackwellóó,€696€F.2d€1176€(6th€Cir.€1983).Ìà àThe€prohibition€imposed€by€statute€relating€to€age€discrimination€inÏemployment€is€limited€to€persons€who€fall€into€the€40€to€70€year€age€group.€€T.C.A.Ïðð€4„21„126(a).€€Since€the€plaintiff€was€58€when€he€was€laid€off,€and€eventuallyÏterminated,€he€is€protected€by€the€Human€Rights€Act,€if€he€establishes€theÏremaining€criteria€or€if€he€shows€that€age€was€a€determining€factor€in€his€discharge.Ìà àIt€œis›€not€disputed€that€the€plaintiff€was€"subjected€to€adverse€employmentÏaction,"€nor€is€it€contended€that€he€was€unqualified€for€the€position.€€The€case,€then,Ïturns€upon€the€issues€of€whether€he€was€replaced€by€a€younger€person€and€aÏclosely€allied€consideration€of€whether€the€employer's€evidence€of€a€non„discriminatory€reason€for€the€plaintiff's€discharge€was€merely€pretextual€to€shieldÏthe€real€reason,€that€being€the€plaintiff's€age.Ìà àIn€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993),€the€Supreme€Court€directedÏthe€standard€to€be€used€in€this€state€when€determining€summary€judgment€motions.€ÏThe€Court€reaffirmed€the€summary€judgment€principles€announced€in€previousÍTennessee€cases€and€also€adopted€the€summary€judgment€standards€explainedÏby€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€in€an€earlier€trilogy€of€cases.€€òòSee€Anderson€v.€LibertyÏLobby,€Inc.óó,€477€U.S.€242€(1986);€òòCelotex€Corp.€v.€Catrettóó,€477€U.S.€317€(1986);Ïand€òòMatsushita€Elec.€Indus.€Co.,€Ltd.€v.€Zenith€Radio€Corp.óó,€475€U.S.€574€(1986).€ÏThe€òòByrdóó€court€held€that€Rule€56€was€designed€to€enable€the€courts€to€pierce€theÏpleadings€and€determine€whether€a€case€justifies€the€time€and€expense€of€a€trial.€ÏòòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€214.€€The€non„moving€party€bears€the€burden€of€establishingÏthe€essential€elements€of€his€case€which€must€be€proved€at€trial.€€òòGagne€v.ÏNorthwestern€Nat'l€Ins.€Co.óó,€881€F.2d€309,€312€(6th€Cir.€1989)€(òòciting€Celotexóó,€477ÏU.S.€at€322„23).€€Failure€to€do€so€will€result€in€summary€judgment€for€the€movingÏparty€because,€"in€such€a€situation,€there€can€be€ððno€genuine€issue€as€to€anyÏmaterial€facts,'€since€a€complete€failure€of€proof€concerning€an€essential€element€ofÏthe€non„moving€party's€case€necessarily€renders€all€other€facts€immaterial."€€òòByrdóó,Ï847€S.W.2d€at€214.€€Consequently,€where€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€any€materialÏfact,€summary€judgment€is€appropriate.€€òòId.óó€at€212.Ìà àOn€appeal,€the€appellant€has€the€burden€of€showing€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€findings€of€the€trial€court€and€that€the€evidence€reveals€aÏgenuine€issue€of€material€fact.€€òòGalbreath€v.€Harrisóó,€811€S.W.2d€88,€91€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1990).€€In€ruling€on€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€trial€court€and€thisÏCourt€must€consider€the€evidence€in€the€same€manner€as€they€would€a€motion€forÏdirected€verdict€made€at€the€close€of€the€plaintiff's€proof.€€òòWhite€v.€Methodist€Hosp.ÏS.óó,€844€S.W.2d€642,€645€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€If€there€is€no€disputed€issue€ofÍmaterial€fact,€the€granting€of€summary€judgment€should€be€sustained,€since€"theÏissues€that€lie€at€the€heart€of€evaluating€a€summary€judgment€motion€are:€€(1)Ïwhether€a€factual€dispute€exists;€(2)€whether€the€disputed€fact€is€material€to€theÏoutcome€of€the€case;€and€(3)€whether€the€disputed€material€fact€creates€a€genuineÏissue€for€trial.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€214.Ìà àOur€mandate€is€to€scrutinize€the€evidence€to€determine€whether€there€is€aÏfactual€dispute.€€òòBrenneróó,€874€S.W.2d€at€583.€€If€there€is€no€dispute€over€theÏevidence€establishing€the€facts€that€control€the€application€of€a€rule€of€law,Ïsummary€judgment€is€appropriate.€€òòId.óó€€If€this€Court€finds€that€a€factual€dispute€doesÏexist,€then€we€must€determine€whether€the€disputed€fact€is€material.€€òòIdóó.€€A€disputedÏfact€is€material€if€it€must€be€decided€in€order€to€resolve€the€substantive€claim€orÏdefense€at€which€the€motion€is€directed.€€òòIdóó.€€Finally,€if€this€Court€finds€a€disputed,Ïmaterial€fact,€then€we€must€determine€whether€it€creates€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.€ÏòòId.óó€€This€involves€whether€a€reasonable€finder€of€fact€could€legitimately€resolve€theÏfact€in€favor€of€one€side€or€the€other.€€òòId.óó€€If€a€fact€finder€could€not€do€so,€summaryÏjudgment€is€proper€for€obvious€reasons.Ìò òÓ  ÓIIIó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€fourth€criteria€laid€down€in€òòMcDonnell€Douglasóó€does€not€find€support€inÏthis€record.€€Criteria€(4)€is€the€obstacle€in€the€way€of€the€plaintiff,€whoseÏinterpretation€of€the€evidence€in€support€of€his€insistence€that€he€was€replaced€by€aÏyounger€person€goes€beyond€strong€advocacy.€€The€evidence€establishes€thatÏnone€of€the€employees€whom€plaintiff€alleges€replaced€him,€actually€did€so.€€TheseÍemployees€were€current€employees€at€the€time€plaintiff€was€laid€off€or€were€hiredÏmonths€after€plaintiff's€lay„off.Ìà àPlaintiff€says€that€he€was€replaced€by€Vincent€Campbell,€although€theÏevidence€is€clear€that€Campbell€was€employed€by€Lasco€before€the€plaintiff€wasÏlaid€off.€€Campbell€left€Lasco€and€was€re„hired€more€than€one€year€later.€€HeÏobviously€cannot€be€considered€a€replacement€for€the€plaintiff.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€next€says€that€he€was€replaced€by€Robert€Kelly,€who,€similarly€toÏCampbell,€was€employed€by€Lasco€at€the€time€of,€and€before,€the€lay„off€of€theÏplaintiff.€€He€obviously€cannot€be€considered€a€replacement€for€the€plaintiff.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€next€says€that€he€was€replaced€by€Wayne€Ware,€who€was€hiredÏto€work€on€jobs€in€Memphis€and€Tuscaloosa.€€Aside€from€the€fact€that€the€onlyÏevidence€offered€by€the€plaintiff€about€Ware's€employment€is€his€affidavit€based€onÏhearsay,€and€therefore€inadmissible,€the€unrebutted€testimony€of€Limberg,€one€ofÏthe€defendant's€officers,€is€that€Ware€was€employed€in€early€1994€for€work€on€a€jobÏin€Tuscaloosa.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€next€argues€that€he€was€replaced€when€the€defendant€hired€fourÏother€pipefitters€in€Tuscaloosa,€but€he€conceded€in€his€deposition€that€he€had€noÏknowledge€of€this€allegation.Ìà àArrayed€against€the€recited€evidence€is€the€evidence€offered€by€theÏdefendant€that€the€plaintiff€was€laid€off€to€reduce€the€labor€force€owing€to€economicÏconditions.€€The€termination€of€an€employee€at€a€time€when€cutbacks€are€necessaryÏbecause€of€economic€conditions€is€not€sufficient€to€establish€a€òòprima€facieóó€case€ofÍage€discrimination.€€òòBrenneróó,€874€S.W.2d€at€584.€€The€evidence€established€that€atÏthe€time€the€plaintiff€was€laid€off,€Lasco€employed€seven€pipefitters.€€After€the€lay„off,Ïthe€defendant€never€employed€more€than€six€pipefitters,€except€for€Ware€whoÏworked€exclusively€in€Tuscaloosa,€Alabama„„months€after€the€plaintiff's€lay„off„„under€restrictive€financial€arrangements€and€for€a€limited€time.Ìà àWe€agree€with€the€conclusion€of€the€trial€judge€that€there€is€no€evidence€theÏplaintiff€was€replaced€by€a€younger€person€and,€thus€the€criteria€of€òòMcDonnellÏDouglasóó€are€not€satisfied,€especially€when€superimposed€upon€the€principle€thatÏan€age„discrimination€plaintiff€who€is€terminated€during€a€reduction€in€force€is€heldÏto€a€higher€burden€than€other€plaintiffs€who€claim€age€discrimination.€€òòId.óó€at€œ584.€ÏBut€inquiry€does€not€end€there›Ìò òÓ  ÓIVó óÌÓ  Óà àIf€a€plaintiff€can€show€that€age€was€a€determining€factor€in€his€termination,€heÏmay€be€entitled€to€recover€under€the€Act,€but€he€must€produce€direct€orÏcircumstantial€evidence€that€his€age€was€a€determining€factor€in€his€termination.€ÏòòBrenneróó,€874€S.W.2d€at€585.€€"The€mere€termination€of€a€competent€employeeÏwhen€an€employer€is€making€cutbacks€due€to€economic€necessity€is€insufficient€toÏestablish€a€prima€facie€case€of€age€discrimination."€€òòId.óó€at€584€(òòquoting€McMahon€v.ÏLibbey„Owens„Ford€Co.óó,€870€F.2d€1073€(6th€Cir.€1989)).€€Further,€mere€conclusoryÏallegations€do€not€suffice€to€prove€intentional€discrimination€based€on€age.€ÏòòSimpson€v.€Midland„Ross€Corp.óó,€823€F.2d€937,€941€(6th€Cir.€1987).Ìà àPlaintiff€argues€that€comments€allegedly€made€by€Karl€Limberg€aboutÏplaintiff's€age€are€sufficient€evidence€of€intentional€age€discrimination.× ƒ+ ××  ×€€The€trialÏcourt€found€that€this€evidence€was€not€sufficient€to€establish€age€discriminationÏbecause€the€comments€were€too€remote€and€isolated,€as€in€òòWaggoner€v.€City€ofÏGarlandóó,€987€F.2d€1160€(5th€Cir.€1993).Ìà àThe€supervisor,€Limberg,€made€three€age„related€comments€to€the€plaintiff€inÏthe€months€before€he€was€laid€off.€€As€heretofore€stated,€these€remarks€were€"WellÏman,€you're€getting€old,€aren't€you?€€Roger€can€run€more€heads€than€you."€and€"OldÏman,€you're€either€going€to€shape€up€or€ship€out,"€and€"[You're]€getting€old€and€fatÏand€can't€keep€up."Ìà àCourts€have€recognized€that€certain€statements€unconnected€to€theÏemployment€decision„making€process€are€simply€stray€remarks€that€do€notÏdemonstrate€discriminatory€intent.€€òòSee€Merrick€v.€Farmers€Ins.€Groupóó,€892€F.2dÏ1434,€1438€(6th€Cir.€1990);€òòSmith€v.€Firestone€Tire€&€Rubber€Co.óó,€875€F.2d€1325,Ï1330€(7th€Cir.€1989).€€"Case€precedent€clearly€reflects€that€isolated€and€ambiguousÏstatements€.€.€.€ððare€too€abstract,€in€addition€to€being€irrelevant€and€prejudicial,€toÏsupport€a€finding€of€age€discrimination'."€€òòBrenneróó,€874€S.W.2d€at€585„86€(òòcitingÏGagneóó,€881€F.2d€at€314).Ìœ›à àIn€contrast,€in€òòFlynn€v.€Shoneyððs€Inc.óó,€850€S.W.2d€458€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992),Ïat€the€time€of€plaintiffððs€termination,€œhe€was€told€by€his›€supervisor€œthat,›€for€the€sameÏmoney€the€plaintiff€was€paid,€the€company€could€hire€a€lot€of€ð ðeager€young€bucksÏright€out€of€collegeðð€and€that€it€was€ð ða€young€manððs€business..ðð€€òòId.óó€at€459.€€TheseÏremarks€were€deemed€sufficient€to€send€the€case€to€the€jury.€€òòId.óó€at€460.€€In€òòHansardÏv.€Pepsi„Cola€Metropolitan€Bottling€Co.óó,€865€F.2d€1461€(5th€Cir.€1989),€the€plaintiffÏalleged€age€discrimination€in€his€discharge.€€As€evidence€of€age€discrimination,€theÏplaintiff€testified€that€prior€to€his€termination,€he€had€told€an€employee„relationsÏtrainee,€ð ðI€have€done€heavy€lifting€all€my€life.€€I€am€not€quite€as€young€as€I€used€toÏbe,.ðð€€and€the€trainee€replied,€ð ðYes,€itððs€kind€of€risky€at€your€age.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1465.€€TheÏplaintiff€also€submitted€opinion€testimony€of€another€employee,€unconnected€withÏthe€plaintiffððs€termination,€that€the€termination€was€part€of€the€companyððs€ð ðyouthÏmovement.ðð€€òòId.óó€€In€addition,€the€termination€took€place€seven€months€before€theÏplaintiffððs€pension€benefits€vested.€€òòId.óó€at€1466.€€Taken€together,€this€evidence€wasÏdeemed€sufficient€to€support€a€finding€of€age€discrimination.€€òòId.óóÌà àThe€remarks€alleged€by€McKinna€in€this€case€are€not€strong€evidence€of€ageÏdiscrimination.€€However,€one€of€the€remarks€allegedly€was€made€ð ða€month€or€twoððÏprior€to€the€layoff.€€There€is€a€series€of€alleged€remarks,€rather€than€a€single€one.€ÏAll€of€the€alleged€derogatory€remarks€were€directed€at€McKinna,€not€generalized,Ïand€can€be€seen€as€linking€McKinnaððs€age€with€his€job€performance.€€TheÏcomments€were€made€by€someone€clearly€involved€in€the€decision„making€processÏand€who,€at€age€thirty„four,€was€considerably€younger€than€McKinna.€€Under€all€ofÍthese€circumstances,€like€the€remarks€in€òòFlynn€óóand€òòHansardóó,€the€comments€allegedÏby€McKinna€were€not€ð ðstray€remarksðð€and€are€sufficient€to€withstand€summaryÏjudgment.Ìà àThe€judgment€is€reversed€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€trial.€€Costs€areÏassessed€to€the€appellee.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌAlan€E.€Highers,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌHolly€K.€Lillard,€JudgeÌÔ% € ÔÔ% € Ô