ÿWPC 24Ìà 0(ïw@ AQ_ 0D° BôeU@ 0JR 0Dœ 0Tà 0^4Æ’ 0hX 0rÀUB2 %t 0|z 0†ö 0| 1u 0d 0@å D3% D/X U6‡ B½ B)Ú DC AMF U*“  ½ v~È vÓFÁt!(ÔøÔô3|x?($¡¡ 56‚7•8E9V:î;<E>D?D$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó d ɸ·`(ZapfCalligr BTTT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 526 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò 'ÿÿdxd**'÷ÿ dxd< Œ 9p`(Courier NewüÿP Pd% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd$,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€)ÔÓ  ÓÔ€.ÔÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€.XÔó óÌò òÔ€.¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€.XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.Ô€Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€ÂÔÔ€.ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€ÔÔ€XÔPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ Ü ÒÒ ° ÒÑ ý ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€š{XXdÈdÈ7ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÙ€ÙßR€-/,A1-j|"â `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌ€€€€à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌó óÌÌà@ à________________________________ÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìò òMICHAEL€MORATó ó,€ò òindividually,ó óà à)€Shelby€County€CircuitÏCourtÌò òand€MORATððS€INSURANCE€AGENCY,ó óà à)€No.€25650€T.D.Ìò òINC.ó ó,€a€Tennessee€Corporation,)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs„Appellants,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€C.A.€NO.€02A01„9412„CV„00270Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìò òSTATE€FARM€MUTUAL€AUTOMOBILEà àó ó)ò òÌINSURANCE€COMPANY,à àó óà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà à)Ì_____________________________________________________________ÌÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis,Ìò òHonorable€Wyeth€Chandler,€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌEugene€C.€Gaerig,Ìó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Plaintiffs„Appellants.ÌÌÌò òFred€P.€Wilson,Ìó óWILSON,€McRAE,€IVY,€McTYIER€AND€STRAIN,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌandÌò òAlan€Strain,€ó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Defendant„Appellee.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌà0 àà àà@ àFRANKS,€J.ÌÌÌÌFARMER,€J.:ó ó€(Concurs)Ìò òTOMLIN,€SR.J.:€ó ó(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÓӛ̜›œ›œ›œ›à àà àIn€this€action€for€malicious€prosecution,€the€TrialÏJudge€granted€the€defendant€summary€judgment,€and€plaintiffsÏhave€appealed.€€Ìà àà àPlaintiff€Michael€Morat€is€an€insurance€agent€withÏthe€Morat€Insurance€Agency,€Inc.,€in€Memphis.€€The€genesis€ofÏthis€dispute€occurred€in€1981,€when€plaintiffs€sent€a€policyÏchange€request€form€to€defendant€to€change€the€motor€vehicleÏinsured€by€defendant€under€the€assigned€risk€plan€throughÏthis€agency€for€the€insured,€J.W.€Whitten.€€Whitten€was€inÏthe€process€of€purchasing€a€1981€Cadillac€and€plaintiffs,Ïafter€exploring€the€possibility€of€insurance€from€otherÏcompanies,€agreed€to€Whittenððs€request€to€apply€to€substituteÏthe€1981€Cadillac€for€the€motor€vehicle€on€the€existingÏassigned€risk€policy.€€Michael€Morat€filled€out€theÏapplication€for€change,€which€Whitten€signed.€€The€plaintiffÍnoted€on€the€form€that€it€was€a€replacement€vehicle€and€inÏthe€application€in€the€space€for€ð ðcost€newð ð,€the€plaintiffÏfilled€in€$25,000.00.€€In€a€box€on€the€form,€plaintiff€notedÏthat€the€vehicle€had€not€been€altered.€€Upon€defendantððsÏreceipt€of€the€application,€the€change€was€processed€and€theÏ1981€Cadillac€became€the€insured€vehicle.€€Ìà àà àLess€than€two€months€later€the€vehicle€burned€and€aÏclaim€was€made€to€defendant.€€Upon€investigation€of€the€loss,Ïdefendant€determined€that€the€vehicle€had€been€substantiallyÏaltered,€which€increased€its€value€to€over€$40,000.00.€ÏDefendant€ultimately€settled€with€the€loss€payee€for€anÏamount€in€excess€of€$24,000.00€and€then€brought€an€actionÏagainst€the€agent€and€agency€on€the€theory€that€had€the€trueÏvalue€of€the€vehicle€been€represented,€defendant€would€notÏhave€insured€the€vehicle,€because€the€assigned€risk€plan€doesÏnot€require€an€insurance€company€to€insure€a€motor€vehicleÏfor€more€than€$25,000.00,€and€it€was€defendantððs€policy€notÏto€insure€€vehicles€costing€in€excess€of€that€amount.Ìà àà àThe€case€against€plaintiffs€went€to€trial€with€aÏresulting€judgment€in€their€favor,€whereupon€they€broughtÏthis€action€for€malicious€prosecution.Ìà àà àNumerous€and€exhaustive€depositions€were€takenÏalong€with€exhibits€filed€and€defendant€moved€for€summaryÏjudgment,€€which€the€Trial€Judge€granted€on€the€ground€thatÍdefendant€had€reasonably€relied€on€advice€of€counsel.€€OnÏthat€basis,€the€Court€concluded€there€was€ð ðprobable€causeð ð€toÏfile€suit€against€plaintiffs€herein.Ìà àà àOn€appeal,€plaintiffs€insist€there€are€genuineÏissues€of€material€fact€ð ðas€to€lack€of€probable€cause,Ïmalice,€and€advice€of€counselð ð.€€While€there€are€more€thanÏ4,000€pages€in€the€record€before€us,€we€do€not€find€anyÏgenuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€as€contemplated€inÏRules€of€Civil€Procedure,€Rule€56.€€For€purposes€of€a€summaryÏjudgment,€the€plaintiffsðð€deposition€is€to€be€taken€as€true,Ïand€Michael€Morat€testified€in€pertinent€part:ÌœÓÓ›à0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWere€you€advised€by€Huffman€on€August€31,€1981Ïof€the€value€of€the€automobile?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àMy€notation€shows€that€he€gave€me€a€cost€ofÏthe€automobile.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€did€he€tell€you?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 à$49,900.00.ÌÌà àà à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWell,€then€you€next€called€State€Farm,€is€thatÏright?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àThatððs€correct.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWho€did€you€call€at€State€Farm?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€called€and€asked€for€the€Tennessee€AssignedÏRisk€Underwriting€Department.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€you€tell€this€person€you€were€speaking€toÏthe€figure€Huffman€had€told€you€of€$49,900.00?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€did.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€exactly€did€you€say?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€explained€to€the€man€that€I€spoke€to€thatÏthis€man€is€„€Mr.€Whitten€is€purchasing€thisÏautomobile,€and€because€of€the€value,€I€neededÏto€know€what€to€do€with€this€policy,€whetherÏthey€would€substitute€the€automobile,€or€whatÏthey€would€do€with€it.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€were€you€told?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àHe€explained€to€me€that€under€the€insurableÏinterest€of€the€car€under€the€actual€as€far€asÏthe€value€of€the€automobile,€less€any€customÏequipment,€they€would€protect€the€car€for€noÏmore€than€$25,000.00.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àCan€you€explain€it€to€me?€€Can€you€explain€toÏme€what€you€are€saying€to€me,€can€you€explainÏwhat€they€told€you€they€would€insure€it€for?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àThey€said€they€would€only€insure€it€up€to€theÏvalue€of€the€automobile,€less€any€customÏequipment€for€a€like€make€and€model€of€a€1981ÏCadillac€Seville.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWas€the€$25,000.00€figure€in€there€somewhere?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àNo,€sir.€€The€policy€„€they€would€not€insure€aÏvehicle€over€$25,000.00€less€any€customÏequipment.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àSo€on€August€31€you€did€not€know€the€cost€ofÏthe€custom€modifications€on€this€vehicle?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àNo,€sir.€€The€only€cost€I€knew€was€the€cost€ofÏthat€car,€of€what€the€dealership€was€trying€toÏsell€that€automobile€for€the€customer€at.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àThat€would€be€$49,900.00?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes,€sir.€€ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àBut€you€knew€that€there€were€customÏmodifications?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€knew€there€were€custom€modifications€on€theÏautomobile.€€Yes,€sir.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€you€know€Whitten€was€coming€in€on€the€4th?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àNo,€sir.€€I€didnððt.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àBut€he€came€in?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àHe€came€in€on€the€4th.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€did€he€say,€and€what€did€you€say€on€theÏ4th€when€he€came€into€your€office?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àHe€came€into€my€office,€and€I€advised€him€atÏthat€time€we€have€got€to€make€some€changes€onÏyour€auto€policy,€and€he€said€ð ðthatððs€why€IððmÏhereð ð.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€you€complete€an€application€on€the€4th?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€did.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àAnd€did€Whitten€sign€it?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€completed€a€Tennessee€Automobile€InsuranceÏPlan€Change€Endorsement€form,€or€Policy€ChangeÏRequest,€as€they€call€it.€€ÌÌà0 àà0 àà0 àWe€took€down€the€pertinent€information€on€theÏpolicy.€€We€checked€off€that€this€was€aÏreplacement€vehicle€on€the€particular€policyÏnumber,€an€ðð81€Cadillac€Seville.€€We€listedÏthe€lienholder,€change€of€address€for€him.€€HeÏsigned€it€and€I€witnessed€his€signature.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àIs€this€change€form€different€from€the€initialÍpolicy€application?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes,€sir.€€It€is.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àThis€form€has€a€space€on€it€for€ð ðcost€newð ð,Ïand€written€in€the€space€is€$25,000.00.€€IsÏthat€in€your€writing?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes,€it€is.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhy€did€you€put€$25,000.00€in€the€ð ðcost€newð ðÏblank€on€this€change€request€form?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€put€$25,000.00€because€this€is€the€amount€ofÏwhat€the€company€would€protect€up€to€for€anÏautomobile€like€the€make€and€model€of€an€ðð81ÏCadillac€Seville,€less€any€custom€equipment.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àDid€he€[underwriter]€tell€you€to€putÏ$25,000.00€in€this€blank?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àI€put€$25,000.00€sir,€to€protect€and€limit€theÏcustomer€from€coming€back,€also,€and€beingÏable€to€claim€higher€if€this€thing€should€beÏtotaled€out,€and€then€in€addition€to€it,€I€hadÏhim€also€sign€this€letter€here€so€there€wouldÏbe€no€question€about€it.ÌÌà0 àà0 à.€.€.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àI€see€a€box€for€ð ðaltered,€yes€or€noð ð€on€theÏpolicy€change€request,€and€is€it€marked€ð ðnoð ð.€ÏIs€that€your€mark?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àYes,€sir.€€I€marked€it.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhy€did€you€mark€it€ð ðnoð ð?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àBecause€the€automobile€that€the€policy€insuresÏgoes€back€to€a€1981€Cadillac€Seville,€less€anyÏcustom€equipment.ÌÌà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àWhat€do€you€understand€that€ð ðalteredð ð€box€toÏmean?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àIt€means€any€alterations€done€to€theÍautomobile€or€custom€equipment.ÌÌÓÓà àà àDefendant€sought€advice€of€counsel€on€bringing€suitÏagainst€plaintiffs€and€the€law€firm€employed€by€defendantÏrecommended€and€ultimately€brought€the€action.€€TheÏattorneys,€in€reaching€their€conclusion,€had€other€facts€toÏconsider€relative€to€plaintiffsðð€handling€of€the€matter.€ÏPlaintiff€did€not€inform€defendant€of€his€conversation€withÏan€underwriter€until€the€following€spring,€and€defendant€wasÏunable€to€verify€any€conversation€with€its€underwritersÏthrough€its€investigation.€€Shortly€after€the€loss,€anÏinvestigator€took€plaintiffððs€statement,€wherein€plaintiffÏwas€asked:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àQ.à0 àAnother€thing€I€want€to€question€you€on€theÏapplication€I€got€a€photostatic€copy€of,€youÏput€on€there€costing€you€$25,000.00€in€actualÏcost€was€$42,000.00€something.€€What€were€theÏreasons€for€doing€this€on€the€applicationsÏinstead€of€putting€the€full€amount?ÌÌà0 àà0 àA.à0 àBecause€Mr.€Whitten€agreed€that€this€was€theÏprice€he€wanted€to€show€under€the€terms€ofÏthis€policy€change€request,€any€time€that€theÏcustomer€acknowledges€this,€this€is€what€heÏhas€wanted€to€do.ÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€Supreme€Court€in€òòRoberts€v.€Federal€ExpressÏCorp.óó,€892€S.W.2d€246€(Tenn.€1992),€held€that€theÏreasonableness€of€the€defendantððs€conduct€in€bringing€anÏaction€ð ðshould€be€made€by€a€juryð ð,€and€the€Court€said€thatÏprobable€cause€is€to€be€determined€ð ðsolely€from€an€objectiveÏexamination€of€the€surrounding€facts€and€circumstances.ð ðÌSince€the€surrounding€facts€and€circumstances€in€the€caseÏbefore€us€are€not€in€dispute,€the€issue€thus€becomes€whetherÏð ðreasonable€minds€could€differ€as€to€whether€probable€causeÏexisted€for€bringingð ð€the€action€against€plaintiff.€òòRoberts,ÏId.óó€249.Ìà àà àWe€note€at€the€outset,€that€while€the€same€generalÏrules€and€limitations€apply€to€an€action€founded€upon€a€civilÏproceeding,€vis„a„vis€criminal€proceedings,€there€can€beÏsignificant€differences:€€ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àBut€obviously€less€in€the€way€of€grounds€for€beliefÏwill€be€required€to€justify€a€reasonable€man€inÏbringing€a€civil,€rather€than€a€criminal€suit.€ÏSometimes€this€is€expressed€by€saying€that€want€ofÏprobable€cause€must€be€ð ðvery€clearly€provenð ð€orÏð ðvery€palatableð ð€or€that€ð ðgreater€latitudeð ð€must€beÏallowed€than€in€a€criminal€case.€€Apparently,€whatÏis€meant€is€merely€that€the€instigator€need€notÏhave€the€same€degree€of€certainty€as€to€the€facts,Ïor€even€the€same€belief€in€the€soundness€of€hisÏcase,€and€that€he€is€justified€in€bringing€a€civilÏaction€when€he€reasonably€believes€that€he€has€aÏgood€chance€of€establishing€it€to€the€satisfactionÏof€the€court€or€the€jury.ÌÌòòProsser€and€Keeton€on€Tortsóó,€5th€Ed.€ðð120,€p.€893.ÌÌÓÓà àà àOur€Supreme€Court€is€in€accord€with€this€view,Ïhaving€expressed€in€òòKauffman€v.€A.H.€Robbins€Co.,óó€223€Tenn.Ï515,€448€S.W.2d€400€(1969)€that€in€civil€actions€theÏplaintiff€has€ð ða€heavy€burden€of€proofð ð€in€establishingÏmalice€and€lack€of€probable€cause.€€P.€523.Ìà àà àIn€malicious€prosecution€actions,€advice€of€counselÏto€the€effect€that€there€is€a€reasonable€chance€of€recoveryÍon€a€claim€can€establish€probable€cause.€€òòSee€Sullivan€v.ÏYoungóó,€678€S.W.2d€906€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€In€this€case,€theÏTrial€Judge€concluded€that€the€defendant€had€acted€reasonablyÏin€its€investigation€and€in€obtaining€the€advice€of€counselÏas€to€whether€it€should€attempt€to€recover€from€plaintiff.€ÏAs€we€observed€earlier,€we€are€required€to€take€theÏplaintiffððs€statements€about€the€call€to€an€underwriter€asÏtrue,€but€there€was€ample€evidence€at€the€time€for€theÏattorneys€to€conclude€that€defendant€had€a€reasonable€chanceÏto€recover€in€the€prior€action.€€€€Ìà àà àWe€conclude€on€this€record€that€reasonable€mindsÏwould€not€differ€that€probable€cause€existed€for€bringing€theÏaction.€€Ìà àà àPlaintiffs€argue€that€ð ðdiscovery€was€improperlyÏwithheld€by€State€Farmð ð,€including€failure€to€answerÏinterrogatories€and€produce€documents.€€The€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure€provide€procedures€to€compel€discovery.€€A€trialÏcourt€speaks€through€its€minutes€and€we€find€no€order€in€thisÏrecord€of€the€Trial€œCourtððs›€requiring€defendant€to€complyÏwith€additional€discovery€under€the€Rules.€€òòPalmer€v.€Palmer,óóÏ562€S.W.2d€833€(Tenn.€1978).€€A€party€will€not€be€grantedÏrelief€where€he€has€failed€to€take€whatever€action€wasÏreasonably€necessary€to€prevent€an€error.€€T.R.A.P.€RuleÏ36(a).Ìà àà àFinally,€there€is€yet€another€compelling€reason€theÏjudgment€should€be€affirmed.€€The€underlying€cause€of€theÏcontroversies€between€these€parties€is€plaintiffððs€ownÏactions.€€He€filled€in€two€answers€in€the€application€forÏinsurance,€known€by€him€at€the€time€to€be€false.€€No€partyÏshould€be€allowed€to€profit€from€his€wrongful€conduct.€€TheÏNorth€Carolina€Supreme€Court€has€said€it€well:ÌÓÓà0 àà0 àIt€is€a€maxim€of€law€recognized€and€established,Ïthat€ð ðno€man€shall€take€advantage€of€his€own€wrong;€Ïand€this€maxim,€which€is€based€on€elementaryÏprinciples,€is€fully€recognized€in€courts€of€lawÏand€equity,€and,€indeed,€admits€of€illustrationÏfrom€every€branch€of€legal€procedure.ð ð€€òòBroomððsÏLegal€Maximsóó,€10th€Ed.,€191.ÌÌà0 àà0 àà àð ðThis€maxim€embodied€in€the€common€law,€andÏconstituting€an€essential€part€thereof,€is€statedÏin€the€text€books€and€reported€cases.€€It€has€itsÏfoundation€in€the€universal€law€administered€in€allÏcivilized€lands,€for€without€its€recognition€andÏenforcement€by€the€Courts,€their€judgments€wouldÏrightly€excite€public€indignation.ð ð€€òòÌÌà0 àà0 àIn€Re:€Ives,€óó102€S.E.2d€807,€811€(NC.€1958).ÌÌÓÓà àà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€affirm€the€judgmentÏof€the€Trial€Court€and€remand€with€costs€of€the€appealÏassessed€to€the€appellant.ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌœ›ÌÌÌ___________________________ÌœDavid€R.€Farmer,€J.›Ìœ›ÌÌÌÌœ___________________________ÌHewitt€P.€Tomlin,€Jr.,€Sr.€J.›