ÿWPCh, …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µ 1mÝ4J ^ U<m 0 ³© 0D\ 0d  0 0J“ 0TÝ 0^1 0h 0r÷ 0|i 0†å k 0kwû 1u U ,€ 0d¬ BU,-U >YB)—DCÀ AM D3PU*ƒø­ 0@¥Ðå(µ Ýçýz(a¢v~vÓ 0ŠT& 0 Þ& 0´~' 0Ç2( 0Ûù( 0ïÔ) AOÃ*Æ+ 0DØ+ D/, BK,˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0†(  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ uvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)nnG 3|x©-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman(c(2É«$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XypXXXÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔŸÓ€© ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ$$$$'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial îÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌFebruary€23,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò ÆÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý"Q.€€You€admitted€to€having€an€affair€three€years€ago?€€A.€€That'sÏcorrect.€€Q.€€That€affair€continued€until€when?€€A.€€About€a€year€ago.€€Q.€€AtÏthat€point€did€it€stop?€€A.€€That's€correct."€€Pgs.€96„97,€Transcript€ofÏProceedings.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðððð€36„4„121€and€„122;€36„5„101€and€„102.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTransmutation€occurs€when€separate€property€is€treated€in€such€aÏway€as€to€give€evidence€of€an€intention€that€it€become€marital€property.€ÏOne€method€of€causing€transmutation€is€to€purchase€property€withÏseparate€funds,€but€to€take€title€in€joint€tenancy.€€This€may€also€be€doneÏby€placing€separate€property€in€the€names€of€both€spouses.€€The€rationaleÏunderlying€both€of€these€doctrines€is€that€dealing€with€property€in€theseÏways€creates€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€the€gift€to€the€marital€estate.€ÏòòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€858.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€Pg.€107,€Transcript€of€Proceedings.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€Pg.€108,€Transcript€of€Proceedings.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€Pg.€44,€Transcript€of€Proceedings.Ì pÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)(D)€provides€"separate€property"€meansÏ"property€acquired€by€a€spouse€at€any€time€by€gift,€bequest,€devise€orÏdescent."Ì WÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€court€in€its€original€order€allowed€$2,000€per€month,€butÏupon€a€Rule€59€motion€reduced€that€amount€to€$1,500.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€%%X„d&ÓÑ#€%%Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÔ€ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌ_______________________________________ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ#` ܇X2 ’X#ÓCAROL€JEAN€MOSEó ó,à àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌÓ  ÓÓ)` Ü` × „X2 ’X)Óà àPlaintiff/Appellant/Counter„Appellee,à àò ò)€€ó óÔ€&ÔMaury€Chancery€No.€94„01ò ò1ó óÔ€XÔÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌÙ€€Ùò òßL€),(;+'h|!Û` ç `€€Lßv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Ô€&Ôó óC.A.€No.Ï01A01„9508„CH„00337à àò òÔ€XÔà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ó óà àÌò òJEFFREY€NORMAN€MOSEó ó,à àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àDefendant/Appellee/Counter„Appellant.€ò ò)ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€MAURY€COUNTYÌAT€COLUMBIA,€TENNESSEEÌTHE€HONORABLE€JIM€T.€HAMILTON,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓThomas€W.€HardinÌHardin€&€ParksÌó óColumbia,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/Appellant/Counter„AppelleeÌÌÌÌò òWilliam€C.€BarnesÌMary€Frances€Lyleó óÌò òBruce,€Weathers,€Corley,€Dughman€&€Lyleó óÌNashville,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Defendant/Appellee/Counter„AppellantÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIEDÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€WILLIAMS,€SENIORÏJUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌÑ7€¨IXXdìXXdì7ÑØØÙ  ÙÌÓ ` ܇X2 ’X ÓÓÓó óà àThis€is€an€appeal€from€a€non„jury€divorce€action€heard€in€ChanceryÏform€in€Maury€County,€Tennessee.€€The€Complaint€alleging€irreconcilableÏdifferences€or,€in€alternative,€inappropriate€marital€conduct€was€filed€byÏthe€appellant,€Carol€Jean€Mose,€on€January€7,€1994.€€The€hearing€of€allÏissues€was€tried€October€14,€1994€and€by€final€order€entered€November€4,Ï1994,€Mrs.€Mose€was€awarded€an€absolute€divorce€from€the€appellee,ÏJeffrey€Norman€Mose,€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€ÏThe€trial€court€ordered€distribution€of€marital€assets,€payment€of€medicalÏinsurance,€attorneys'€fees,€and€alimony.€€Mrs.€Mose€filed€two€motions€toÏalter€or€amend€the€final€order€pursuant€to€Rule€59.04,€T.R.C.P.,€onÏNovember€23,€1994€and€November€29,€1994.€€The€defendant€filed€a€motionÍto€alter€or€amend€judgment€or€in€the€alternative€for€a€new€trial€and€aÏrequest€for€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€All€motions€wereÏheard€by€the€trial€court€on€January€13,€1995.€€By€order€styled€"Order€onÏMotion€to€Reconsider"€filed€February€21,€1995,€the€trial€court€reduced€theÏmonthly€alimony€payments€to€be€paid€by€Mr.€Mose€from€$2,000€to€$1,500.€ÏBoth€parties€filed€a€Rule€3,€T.R.A.P.,€appeal€and€by€agreement€between€theÏparties,€Mrs.€Mose,€the€plaintiff€below€is€the€appellant€here,€and€Mr.€Mose,Ïthe€defendant€below,€is€the€appellee€here.€€Both€appeals€have€beenÏperfected€and€are€properly€before€this€Court.€€The€appellant,€Mrs.€Mose,Ïwill€be€addressed€in€this€Court€as€Wife,€and€Mr.€Mose,€the€appellee,€will€beÏaddressed€as€Husband.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òòòISSUESó óóóÌÓ  Óà àThe€Wife's€issues€are€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à1.€€Whether€the€trial€court€failed€to€provide€forÏequitable€division€of€the€marital€assets€byÏomitting€to€award€Mrs.€Mose€an€equitable€share€inÏthe€Husband's€retirement€account.ÌÌà8 àà8 à2.€€Whether€the€trial€court€properly€awarded€Mrs.ÏMose€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€and€erred€by€reducing€Mr.ÏMose's€alimony€obligation€in€the€absence€ofÏadditional€record€evidence€demonstrating€aÏsubstantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.ÌÌà8 àà8 à3.€€Whether€Mr.€Mose€should€be€obligated€to€pay€allÏpost„trial€€attorneys'€fees€and€expenses€incurred€byÏMrs.€Mose.ÌÌÌà àThe€Husband's€issues€are€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 à1.€€Whether€the€trial€court€properly€acted€withinÏits€discretion€in€awarding€Wife€$92,800€of€after„tax€marital€property€and€awarding€Husband€a€netÏafter„debt€of€only€$56,166€of€largely€pre„taxÏproperty.ÌÌà8 àà8 à2.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€theÏWife€$1,500€alimony,€a€$414€car€payment,€and€$235Ïhealth€insurance€premium€in€view€of€her€ability€toÏearn€and€Husband's€limited€ability€to€pay.ÌÌà8 àà8 à3.€€Whether€Wife€should€be€allowed€attorneys'€feesÏon€appeal.ÌÌÌÓ  Óò òòòFACTSó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓà àThe€parties€were€married€June€16,€1979€in€Michigan.€€At€the€time€ofÏtrial,€wife/plaintiff€was€62€years€of€age€and€the€husband/defendant€wasÏ48€years€of€age.€€No€children€were€born€of€the€marriage.€€Both€had€beenÏpreviously€married.€€Wife€was€widowed€after€25€years€and€had€sevenÏchildren€with€her€first€husband.€€At€the€time€of€the€marriage€to€theÏdefendant€Mose,€Wife€owned€a€home€and€106€acres€that€she€received€uponÏher€first€husband's€death.€€After€their€marriage,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Mose€livedÏupon€the€property€for€about€seven€years€before€moving€to€Tennessee€whereÍthe€Husband€accepted€a€transfer€to€Saturn,€a€General€Motors€subsidiary.€ÏThe€Husband's€pension€and€his€savings€accounts€with€General€Motors€allÏamounted€to€about€$10,000€at€the€time€of€the€marriage.€€After€theÏmarriage,€the€Michigan€house€was€placed€by€the€Wife€in€both€of€theirÏnames€as€co„tenants.€€Upon€moving€to€Tennessee,€the€Michigan€house€wasÏsold€at€a€net€equity€of€$46,000.€€A€portion€of€these€proceeds€was€used€toÏpay€off€the€balance€of€a€property€improvement€loan€of€$28,000.€€The€WifeÏalso€received€$8,800€from€the€sale€of€the€second€tract€of€land€that€wasÏlocated€across€the€road€from€the€house.€€The€record€is€not€clear€whetherÏthat€land€was€also€titled€in€the€joint€names€of€the€parties.€€Additionally,Ïunder€a€land€purchase€contract€for€the€aforesaid€land€located€across€theÏroad€from€the€house,€the€Wife€received€$108€a€month€through€October,Ï1995€for€the€sale€of€this€acreage.€€After€the€divorce€complaint€was€filed,Ïthe€Tennessee€house,€that€was€built€by€the€parties€in€which€the€netÏproceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€Michigan€house€were€used,€was€sold€inÏAugust,€1994€for€a€net€equity€gain€of€$45,000.€€The€Wife€returned€toÏMichigan€to€live€permanently.€€At€the€trial,€Husband€stated€he€planned€toÏtransfer€to€the€General€Motors€plant€at€Warren,€Michigan€to€continue€hisÏemployment€as€a€general€foreman€in€maintenance.€€The€Wife€workedÏoutside€the€home€during€the€marriage€in€addition€to€the€Husband.€€SheÍworked€while€living€in€Michigan€as€a€school€bus€driver,€making€about€$230Ïweekly.€€In€Tennessee,€she€worked€at€the€Saturn€cafeteria,€where€sheÏearned€approximately€$200€per€week.€€The€Wife€saved€her€pay€in€a€separateÏaccount€by€agreement€and€with€the€consent€of€the€Husband.€€She€treatedÏher€money€earned€by€working€as€a€separate€account.€€The€accountÏoriginally€accumulated€about€$20,000,€but€the€Wife€subsequently€loaned€toÏher€son€by€previous€marriage€$10,000€from€the€account€in€order€for€theÏson€to€purchase€a€horse.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€balance€in€theÏsavings€account€was€$10,000.€€Wife€had€primary€responsibility€of€caringÏfor€the€home.€€At€time€of€the€divorce,€the€Husband€had€been€employed€byÏGeneral€Motors€for€over€30€years€and€had€worked€for€several€divisionsÏincluding€Saturn.€€At€time€of€trial,€he€was€a€general€foreman€at€SaturnÏearning€in€excess€of€$90,000€annually€including€overtime.€€He€had€earnedÏyear„to„date,€that€is,€October,€1994,€$73,714.€€The€parties€stipulated€thatÏthe€present€value€of€the€pension€plan€of€the€Husband€was€$52,380.€ÏHusband€also€participated€in€the€General€Motors€stock€savings€program€andÏthe€Saturn€personal€choices€savings€account,€the€cumulative€value€ofÏwhich€was€$48,000.€€The€Husband€withdrew€$9,700€for€personal€useÏbetween€the€date€the€complaint€was€filed€and€the€date€of€the€trial.€€Ìà àIt€is€fair€to€say€that,€based€upon€a€thorough€examination€of€theÍrecord,€the€Wife€came€into€the€marriage€with€no€debt€and€significantÏassets€while€the€Husband€had€substantial€debts€including€$660€per€monthÏchild€support€payments€and€virtually€no€assets€except€his€clothes€andÏemployment€with€General€Motors.€€The€record€further€shows€that€duringÏthe€marriage€of€15€years€the€Husband€earned€substantially€more€than€theÏWife€and€was€overall€a€good€provider.€€At€the€trial,€the€Husband€testifiedÏthat€the€Wife€was€a€good€homemaker.€€The€couple€had€lived€in€Michigan€forÏseven€years€before€moving€to€Tennessee€where€they€lived€together€forÏeight€years.€€Ìà àThe€Wife€discovered€that€the€Husband€was€having€an€affair€with€aÏco„worker€at€Saturn€about€two€years€before€the€complaint€was€filed.€ÏEfforts€were€made€by€both€parties€to€reconcile,€but€they€were€not€able€toÏdo€so.€€During€the€course€of€the€marriage,€the€Husband€had€always€agreedÏwith€the€Wife€that€the€income€earned€by€the€Wife€was€hers€to€use€as€sheÏdesired.€€However,€at€the€trial,€the€Husband€listed€the€savings€account€ofÏthe€Wife€in€the€amount€of€$10,000€as€a€marital€asset,€as€well€as€theÏ$45,000€realized€from€the€sale€of€the€Tennessee€house,€and€insisted€thatÏthese€accounts€should€be€divided€between€the€parties.€€Fault€cannot€beÏconsidered€by€the€court€in€the€distribution€of€marital€assets,€but€we€thinkÏit€is€nevertheless€pertinent€to€note€that€the€Husband€admitted€in€hisÍanswer€to€the€allegations€set€out€in€the€complaint€charging€him€withÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€that€the€allegations€were€true.€€Also,€theÏHusband€testified€under€oath€at€trial€that€the€charges€were€true€and€thatÏhe€had€had€an€affair€three€years€before€the€complaint€was€filed,€but€hadÏstopped€it€a€year€ago.× ƒ. ××  ×€€Ìà àThe€assets€listed€by€the€parties€at€the€time€of€the€trial€that€theyÏowned€and€was€for€disposition€by€the€court€were€as€follows:€€cash€„Ï$45,000,€savings€account€„€$8,800,€savings€account€„€$10,000,€householdÏgoods€„€$18,000,€1994€Lumina€van€„€$14,000,€1993€Z„34€automobile€„Ï$15,000,€Saturn€savings€and€General€Motors€stock€savings€„€$48,000,€andÏvalue€of€pension€retirement€fund€„€$52,380.€€Debts€consisted€of€a€$4,000Ïloan€from€Nations€Bank€and€a€$31,000€balance€on€the€GMAC€loan€for€theÏLumina€and€Z„34€vehicles.Ìà àThe€record€shows€that€the€parties€had€previously€agreed€that€theÏWife€take€the€Lumina€van€valued€at€$14,000€and€the€Husband€take€the€Z„34Ïautomobile€valued€at€$15,000.€€Household€furniture€of€the€estimated€valueÏof€$18,000€was€split,€with€$15,000€value€to€the€Wife€and€$3,000€to€theÍHusband.€€The€parties€do€not€take€issue€with€the€division€of€the€personalÏproperty€other€than,€as€will€be€later€shown,€the€requirement€that€theÏHusband€pay€the€car€note€on€the€Lumina€van.€€The€financial€liability€of€theÏHusband€at€the€time€of€the€trial€was€a€$4,000€loan€from€Nations€Bank€andÏthe€payments€in€the€total€amount€of€$31,000€owed€jointly€by€the€partiesÏto€GMAC.€€The€monthly€payment€on€the€Lumina€van€is€$419.€€Husband'sÏmonthly€expenses€are€$1,360.€€The€Wife's€expenses€listed€at€the€trial€wereÏ$2,437.72.€€The€income€of€the€Wife€at€the€time€of€the€trial€was€$108€forÏthe€land€contract€ending€October,€1995€and€a€social€security€payment€ofÏ$331€a€month.€€Wife€testified€that€she€was€buying€a€house€in€Michigan€at€aÏprice€of€$74,900.€€The€$2,437.72€monthly€expense€included€an€estimatedÏmortgage€payment€on€the€house.€€Wife€had€no€other€liabilities.Ìà àThe€court's€order€filed€November€4,€1994€granted€an€absolute€divorceÏto€the€Wife€on€the€ground€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€The€order€setÏaside€as€separate€property€to€the€Wife,€cash€in€the€amount€of€$45,000,€theÏ$8,800€and€the€$10,000€savings€accounts.€€The€personal€propertyÏpreviously€agreed€by€the€parties,€including€the€Lumina€van,€was€awardedÏto€the€Wife,€and€the€Husband€was€ordered€to€satisfy€the€remaining€balanceÏof€the€indebtedness€thereon.€€The€Husband€further€was€required€toÏmaintain€major€medical€and€hospitalization€insurance€covering€the€WifeÍby€COBRA€for€36€months€and€at€the€conclusion€of€the€36€months,€Husband'sÏspousal€support€be€increased€by€$300€per€month€automatically€to€coverÏadditional€and€supplemental€insurance€coverage€as€Wife€will€no€longer€beÏeligible€for€COBRA.€€The€trial€court€awarded€the€Wife€alimony€of€$6,550.25Ïfor€attorneys'€fees€to€be€paid€by€the€Husband€and€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€in€theÏamount€of€$2,000€monthly.€€In€order€to€provide€a€fund€to€insure€thisÏpayment,€it€was€ordered€that€the€Wife€be€irrevocably€designated€asÏbeneficiary€of€Husband's€life€insurance€in€the€amount€of€$200,000.€€TheÏHusband€was€ordered€to€pay€the€court€costs.€€The€order€further€recitedÏthat€the€Husband€receive€the€General€Motors€stock€savings€program€and€theÏSaturn€personal€choices€savings€account€in€the€total€amount€of€$48,000,Ïthe€General€Motors€retirement€fund€in€the€amount€of€$52,400,€the€1993ÏChevrolet€Z„34€automobile€and€the€indebtedness.€€The€order€of€the€courtÏfurther€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 àThe€court€has€considered€the€relative€earningÏcapacity,€obligations,€needs€and€financial€resourcesÏof€each€party,€including€income€from€pension,Ïprofit€sharing€or€retirement€plans,€and€all€otherÏsources,€the€relative€training€and€education€of€eachÏparty,€the€duration€of€the€marriage€and€the€age€andÏphysical€condition€of€each€party€in€reaching€aÏdecision€in€this€case.€€ÌÌÌÓÓThe€Wife€was€a€high€school€graduate€and€the€Husband€had€received€twoÏyears€of€college€education.Ìà àThis€is€a€divorce€action€held€without€the€intervention€of€a€jury.€€AsÏsuch,€the€trial€court€is€vested€with€broad€discretion€in€adjudicating€theÏrights€of€the€parties.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòEvans€v.€Evansóó,€558€S.W.2d€851,€854€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1977);€òòFisher€v.€Fisheróó,€648€S.W.2d€244,€246€(Tenn.€1983).€€RuleÏ13(d)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure€requires€this€Court€toÏreview€the€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€upon€the€record,Ïaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings.€€UnlessÏthe€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise,€we€must€affirm€absentÏerror€of€law.€€The€trial€court€in€this€case€did€not€make€an€oral€or€writtenÏfindings€of€fact.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€the€chancellor€stated€thatÏhe€was€going€to€take€the€case€under€advisement€and€would€let€the€partiesÏknow.€€So€it€is€that€this€Court€is€presented€with€the€transcript€of€theÏproceedings,€the€transcript€of€the€technical€record,€the€exhibits,€and€theÏcourt's€decree.€€We€note€that€the€Husband€presented,€by€a€post„trialÏmotion,€a€paper€writing€filed€as€Exhibit€1€to€the€motion€styled€"Findings€ofÏFact€and€Conclusions€of€Law"€and€moved€the€court€to€approve.€€The€courtÏdid€not€sign€and€the€motion€was€apparently€denied.€€In€the€case€of€òòKelly€v.ÏKellyóó,€679€S.W.2d€458€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984),€the€trial€court€failed€to€makeÍa€findings€of€fact.€€It€was€held€that€the€court€would€review€the€record€òòdeóóÏòònovoóó€without€the€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòSeeóó€òòKellyóó,€òòidóó.€at€460.ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€this€case,€our€ability€to€attach€the€presumptionÏof€correctness€to€the€trial€court's€decision€hasÏbeen€hampered€by€the€absence€of€any€findings€ofÏfact€and€conclusions€of€law€by€the€trial€judge€orÏany€other€explanation€of€the€rationale€used€toÏachieve€the€final€result.€€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àRather€we€will€proceed€to€review€the€record€òòdeóóÏòònovoóó.€€Since€the€trial€court€made€no€findings€ofÏfact,€there€is€nothing€in€this€record€upon€which€theÏpresumption€of€correctness€contained€in€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.€13(d)€can€attach.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€agree€with€òòKellyóó€and€this€Court€will€proceed€to€review€theÏevidence€in€this€case€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€without€the€presumption€of€correctness.€ÏHowever,€the€material€facts€necessary€to€support€the€conclusions€of€theÏchancellor€granting€a€divorce€absolute€to€the€Wife€on€the€ground€ofÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€are€admitted€by€the€Husband€in€his€answer,Ïby€counsel€for€the€Husband€in€his€opening€statement€and€by€the€Husband€inÏhis€testimony€at€the€trial,€thereby€rendering€that€issue€moot.€€TheÏchancellor€accordingly€found€for€the€Wife.€€We€affirm.Ìà àFurthermore,€there€is€no€material€dispute€by€the€parties€of€theÍevidence€necessary€to€determine€the€identification€and€division€of€theÏproperty,€the€alimony,€spousal€support,€and€the€post„trial€attorneys'€feesÏincurred€by€the€Wife.€€The€basic€question€then€to€be€answered€by€this€CourtÏis€whether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€its€determinations€toÏbe€found€in€its€order€granting€the€divorce.Ìà àThe€various€state€statutes× ƒ/ ××  ×€applicable€to€the€issues€in€this€case€giveÏwide€discretion€to€the€trial€court€in€making€its€decision.€€This€Court€hasÏrepeatedly€stated€in€many€decisions€that€the€trial€court's€discretionaryÏdecisions€will€be€given€great€weight,€and€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€its€findings€or€there€is€error€of€law€requiring€Ïreversal€under€T.R.A.P.€36(a),€we€must€affirm.€€òòSeeóó,€òòcf.óó,€òòWade€v.€Wadeóó,€897ÏS.W.2d€702,€715€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994);€€òòEvans€v.€Evansóó,€558€S.W.2d€at€854;ÏòòPennington€v.€Penningtonóó,€592€S.W.2d€576,€577€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1979);ÏòòWallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102,€106€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).Ìà à"Abuse€of€discretion"€may€be€defined€generally€as€a€naked€exerciseÏof€power€by€a€court€of€law€committed€capriciously€and€arbitrarily€withoutÏauthority€of€law.€€òòWebster's€Third€International€Dictionary€UnabridgedóóÏdefines€the€word€"capricious"€to€mean€"marked€or€guided€by€caprice:€givenÏto€changes€of€interest€or€attitude€according€to€whims€or€passing€fancies:Ínot€guided€by€steady€judgment,€intent€or€purpose."€€òòWebster'sóó€also€definesÏthe€word€"arbitrary"€to€mean€"arising€from€unrestrained€exercise€of€theÏwill,€caprice€or€personal€preference."€€Ìà àAccordingly,€this€Court€will€review€this€record€independently€and€òòdeóóÏòònovoóó€without€the€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòSeeóó€òòKelly€v.€Kellyóó,€òòidóó.€atÏ460.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.ó óÌò òMARITAL€PROPERTYó óÌÓ  Óà àWe€will€first€consider€the€marital€property€issue€raised€by€bothÏparties.€€The€Wife€complains€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€awarding€herÏan€equitable€share€of€Husband's€retirement€accounts€as€marital€propertyÏand€Husband€questions€whether€the€trial€court€properly€acted€within€itsÏdiscretion€in€awarding€Wife€$92,800€of€after„tax€marital€property€andÏawarding€Husband€a€net€after„debt€of€only€$56,166€of€largely€pre„taxÏmarital€property.€€Both€parties€cite€basically€the€same€authorities€toÏsupport€their€contentions,€not€because€the€facts€are€the€same,€but€becauseÏthese€cases€lay€down€certain€basic€principles€that€the€courts€must€followÏin€making€decisions€to€distribute€marital€property.€€Ìà àIn€divorce€cases,€the€distribution€of€marital€property€rests€squarelyÍin€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court€under€statutory€and€case€lawÏguidelines,€but€each€case€must€be€decided€upon€its€own€facts€on€an€òòadóó€òòhocóóÏbasis.€€Two€cases€that€are€generally€the€most€quoted€for€this€purpose€areÏòòBarnhill€v.€Barnhillóó,€826€S.W.2d€443€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991),€and€òòBatson€v.ÏBatsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€849€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€òòBarnhillóó€states€at€pagesÏ449„50:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(a)€provides€that€marital€propertyÏshould€be€equitably€divided€without€regard€to€fault.€ÏAn€equitable€division,€however,€is€not€necessarilyÏan€equal€one.€€Trial€courts€are€afforded€wideÏdiscretion€in€dividing€the€interest€of€the€parties€inÏjointly€owned€property€(citing€authorities).€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àAccordingly,€the€trial€court's€distribution€will€be€given€great€weightÏon€appeal,€òòEdwards€v.€Edwardsóó,€501€S.W.2d€283,€288€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973),Ïand€will€be€presumed€to€be€correct€unless€we€find€the€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence€otherwise.€€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€502Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Ìà àT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€sets€forth€factors€which€are€intended€to€guideÏthe€court€in€making€an€equitable€distribution:€€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[T]he€court€shall€consider€all€relevant€factorsÏincluding:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(1)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€The€age,€physical€and€mental€health,€vocationalÏskills,€employability,€earning€capacity,€estate,Ïfinancial€labilities€and€financial€needs€of€each€ofÏthe€parties;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€The€tangible€or€intangible€contribution€by€oneÏ(1)€party€to€the€education,€training€or€increasedÏearning€power€of€the€other€party;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(4)€The€relative€ability€of€each€party€for€futureÏacquisitions€of€capital€assets€and€income;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(5)€The€contribution€of€each€party€to€theÏacquisition,€preservation,€appreciation,€orÏdissipation€of€the€marital€or€separate€property,Ïincluding€the€contribution€of€a€party€to€theÏmarriage€as€homemaker,€wage€earner€or€parent,Ïwith€the€contribution€of€a€party€as€homemaker€orÏwage€earner€to€be€given€the€same€weight€if€eachÏparty€has€fulfilled€his€or€her€role;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(6)€The€value€of€the€separate€property€of€eachÏparty;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(7)€The€estate€of€each€party€at€the€time€of€theÏmarriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(8)€The€economic€circumstances€of€each€party€atÏthe€time€the€division€of€property€is€to€becomeÏeffective;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(9)€The€tax€consequences€to€each€party;€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(10)€Such€other€factors€as€are€necessary€toÏconsider€the€equities€between€the€parties.ÌÌÌÓÓà àT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(A)€defines€the€"marital€property"€to€mean:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[A]ll€real€and€personal€property,€both€tangible€andÏintangible,€acquired€by€either€or€both€spousesÏduring€the€course€of€the€marriage€up€to€the€date€ofÏthe€final€divorce€hearing€and€owned€by€either€orÏboth€spouses€as€of€the€date€of€filing€of€a€complaintÏfor€divorce,€except€in€the€case€of€fraudulentÏconveyance€in€anticipation€of€filing,€and€includingÏany€property€to€which€a€right€was€acquired€up€toÏthe€date€of€the€final€divorce€hearing,€and€valued€asÏof€a€date€as€near€as€reasonably€possible€to€the€finalÏdivorce€hearing€date.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€'Marital€property'€includesà8 à€income€from,€and€anyÏincrease€in€value€during€the€marriage,€of€propertyÏdetermined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordanceÏwith€subdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€party€substantiallyÏcontributed€to€its€preservation€and€appreciationÏand€the€value€of€vested€pension,€retirement€orÏother€fringe€benefit€rights€accrued€during€theÏperiod€of€the€marriage.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(C)€€As€used€in€this€subsection,€'substantialÏcontribution'€may€include,€but€not€be€limited€to,€theÏdirect€or€indirect€contribution€of€a€spouse€as€aÏhomemaker,€wage€earner,€parent,€or€familyÏfinancial€manager,€together€with€such€otherÏfactors€as€the€court€having€jurisdiction€thereofÏmay€determine.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(D)€€Property€shall€be€considered€marital€propertyÏas€defined€by€this€subsection€for€the€sole€purposeÏof€dividing€assets€upon€divorce€and€for€no€otherÏpurpose;€andÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€'Separate€property'€means:€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(A)€All€real€and€personal€propertyÏowned€by€a€spouse€before€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(B)€Property€acquired€in€exchange€forÏproperty€acquired€before€the€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(C)€Income€from€and€appreciation€ofÏproperty€owned€by€a€spouse€beforeÏmarriage€except€when€characterized€asÏmarital€property€under€subdivisionÏ(b)(1);€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(D)€Property€acquired€by€a€spouse€at€anyÏtime€by€gift,€bequest,€devise,€orÏdescent.ÌÌ€€ÌÓÓà àòòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€òòidóó.€at€856€states€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àTennessee€is€a€dual€property€jurisdiction€becauseÏits€divorce€statutes€draw€a€distinction€betweenÏmarital€and€separate€property.€€Since€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€36„4„121(a)€(Supp.€1988)€provides€only€forÏthe€division€of€marital€property,€properÏclassification€of€a€couple's€property€is€essentialÏ(citing€authorities).€€Thus,€as€a€first€order€ofÏbusiness,€it€is€incumbent€on€the€trial€court€toÏclassify€the€property,€and€then€to€divide€theÏmarital€property€equitably€(citing€authorities).ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à***Ìà àà àÌà8 àà8 àA€trial€court's€division€of€marital€property€is€to€beÏguided€by€the€factors€contained€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ36„4„121(c).€€However,€an€equitable€propertyÏdivision€is€not€necessarily€an€equal€one.€€It€is€notÏachieved€by€a€mechanical€application€of€theÍstatutory€factors,€but€rather€by€considering€andÏweighing€the€most€relevant€factors€in€light€of€theÏunique€facts€of€the€case.ÌÌòòIdóó.€at€859.ÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€trial€court€explicitly€set€out€in€its€order€the€factors€itÏconsidered.€€They€were:€€the€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,Ïand€financial€resources€of€each€party€including€income€from€pension,Ïprofit€sharing€or€retirement€plans,€and€all€other€sources,€the€relativeÏtraining€and€education€of€each€party,€the€duration€of€the€marriage,€and€theÏage€and€physical€condition€of€each€party.€€Ìà àWe€think€that€the€trial€court€properly€considered€all€relevant€factorsÏunder€the€facts€of€this€case€necessary€to€its€decision€and€agree€that€thisÏwas€a€case€of€balancing€the€equities€between€the€parties€in€order€toÏeffectuate€a€just€and€reasonable€distribution€of€the€marital€property.€ÏAlthough€the€Michigan€house€and€adjacent€lot€owned€by€the€Wife€prior€toÏthe€marriage€were€subsequently€placed€in€the€joint€names€of€the€partiesÏand€the€proceeds€of€the€sale€of€the€house€were€used€to€purchase€and€buildÏa€house€in€Tennessee€jointly€owned€by€the€parties,€we€agree€with€the€trialÍcourt€that€transmutation€did€not€occur× ƒ0 ××  ×€because€the€Husband€did€not€intendÏit€to€be.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòBatsonóó,€òòidóó.€at€858.€€Ìà àHusband€testified€at€the€trial€that€while€it€never€became€an€issueÏuntil€the€last€few€years,€he€did€tell€his€wife€that€what€she€had€had,€whatÏwas€hers,€that€he€considered€it€to€be€hers.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€Furthermore,€referring€to€theÏsavings€accounts€of€$10,000€and€$8,800,€Husband€testified:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àI€told€her€I€would€not€mess€with€that€money€and€IÏkept€out€of€it€except€for€times€that€she€talkedÏabout,€where€I€dipped€in€and€had€taken€some€money,Ïand€I€have€replaced€it.€€But€I€didn't€mess€with€thatÏmoney.× ƒ2 ××  ×ÌÌÓÓà àAgain,€referring€to€the€$45,000€gained€from€the€sale€of€theÏTennessee€house,€Wife€testified:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQ.€€Why€do€you€think€that's€separate?€€You€mentionÏthat€you€had€put€this€real€estate€in€both€yourÍnames.€€What€is€the€true€source€of€those€moniesÏright€there?ÌÌà8 àà8 àA.€€I€feel€that€I€had€the€house€and€property€before€IÏeven€met€Jeff.€€It€was€something€my€first€husbandÏaccumulated€for€me€and€my€family.€€And,€really,ÏJeff€didn't€put€anything€into€the€house,€when€youÏfigure€the€loan€that€he€made€for€the€improvementsÏwas€paid€back€by€the€selling€of€the€home.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àSo€he€came€into€the€marriage€with€nothing.€€I€thinkÏhe€should€go€out€with€nothing,€as€far€as€the€home.× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌÌÓÓà àòòLangford€v.€Langfordóó,€421€S.W.2d€632,€634€(Tenn.€1967)€says:€€"It€isÏclear€that€the€determination€of€jointly€owned€property€is€a€question€ofÏfact€and€the€trial€court€is€not€held€to€the€record€title."€€Although€HusbandÏat€the€trial€adopted€a€different€position€that€the€$45,000€and€the€$8,800Ïwere€marital€property,€his€testimony€plainly€refutes€such€a€theory.€€WeÏhold€that€the€$45,000€and€the€$8,800€are€separate€property€and€find€thatÏthe€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€by€distributing€this€maritalÏproperty€to€the€Wife.€€The€$10,000€savings€account€should€ordinarily€beÏdetermined€to€be€marital€property€since€the€Wife€acquired€this€moneyÏduring€the€marriage€by€saving€her€payroll€checks€while€employed€outsideÏthe€home.€€However,€the€Husband€consented€to€her€treating€this€account€asÍher€own€property.€€This,€in€effect,€was€a€gift€from€Husband€to€Wife.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€Thus,Ïit€was€never€the€intention€of€either€party€that€this€account€be€jointly€held.€ÏWe,€therefore,€hold€that€the€$10,000€savings€account€was€properlyÏdetermined€by€the€trial€court€to€be€separate€property.€€Ìà àWife€alleges€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€provide€for€anÏequitable€division€of€the€marital€assets€by€omitting€to€award€her€a€shareÏof€the€retirement€accounts€consisting€of€the€GM€pension€retirement€plan,Ïthe€GM€stock€savings€program,€and€the€Saturn€personal€choices€savingsÏaccount.€€The€value€of€the€pension€plan€is€$52,380€and€the€accumulatedÏvalue€of€the€two€savings€plans€is€$48,000.€€The€accounts€were€valued€atÏapproximately€$10,000€before€the€marriage,€leaving€a€net€value€ofÏ$90,380.€€T.C.A.€Ô€+ÔððÔ€Ô€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€provides€that€marital€property€alsoÏincludes€the€value€of€vested€pension,€retirement€or€other€fringe€benefitsÏaccrued€during€the€marriage.€€Wife€insists€that€she€is€entitled€to€a€one„half€portion€because€in€the€absence€of€proof€to€the€contrary,€it€isÏpresumed€that€the€parties€owned€the€marital€property€equally.€€òòHarringtonÏv.€Harringtonóó,€798€S.W.2d€244€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€We€agree€with€theÏprinciple,€but€disagree€that€Wife€is€entitled€to€a€share€of€the€retirementÍaccounts€under€the€particular€facts€of€this€case€because€there€is€proof€toÏthe€contrary€that€effectively€rebuts€the€presumption.€€The€trial€court€didÏconsider€the€factors€enumerated€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(a)€just€as€we€do,Ïand€we€find€that€unlike€òòHarringtonóó€where€the€couple€had€been€married€forÏ35€years€and€had€three€children€of€the€marriage,€the€parties€here€wereÏmarried€only€15€years€and€had€no€children.€€Mr.€Harrington€was€an€on„the„road€salesman€and€was€away€from€the€home€much€of€the€time,€placing€theÏheavy€burden€of€homemaker€and€raising€the€three€children€solely€upon€Mrs.ÏHarrington.€€In€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€both€worked€outside€the€home€andÏthere€was€no€responsibility€of€raising€children€although€Wife's€twoÏchildren€by€previous€marriage€lived€with€them.€€In€both€cases,€the€husbandÏwas€the€principal€income€producer.€€In€Mrs.€Mose's€favor€are€the€factors€ofÏher€age,€her€lack€of€earning€capacity€compared€to€the€Husband's,€and€herÏlimited€ability€by€age€and€education€to€earn€a€substantive€income€in€theÏfuture.€€We€will€discuss€the€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€later,€but,€for€purposes€ofÏdeciding€this€issue,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€on€the€whole,€an€equitableÏand€just€division€of€the€marital€property€was€reached€by€the€trial€court.€ÏAs€said€in€òòHarringtonóó,€òòidóó.€at€245,€"On€the€other€hand€we€have€also€said€thatÏthe€statute€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€does€not€mandate€an€equal€division€of€theÏmarital€estate€but€requires€an€equitable€division€considering€the€factorsÍin€the€statute."€€We€would€add€"and€also€the€facts€peculiar€to€each€case."€ÏWe€affirm€the€division€by€the€trial€court€of€the€marital€property€and€theÏidentification€of€the€separate€property.Ìà àThe€personal€property€division€previously€agreed€upon€by€the€partiesÏincluding€the€Lumina€van€to€the€Wife€and€the€Z„34€automobile€to€theÏHusband€is€not€an€issue€except€that€the€Husband€complains€that€he€mustÏpay€the€Lumina€indebtedness.€€We€find€no€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trialÏcourt€in€requiring€the€Husband€to€do€so€and€affirm.€€Husband€acknowledgedÏat€the€trial€that€he€would€provide€for€Wife's€major€medical€andÏhospitalization€insurance.€€He€now€claims€the€court€erred€by€requiring€himÏto€pay€a€$235€monthly€premium.€€We€find€the€court's€decision€to€beÏreasonable€and,€in€light€of€the€Husband's€previous€testimony€at€the€trial,Ïwe€do€not€disagree€with€the€court's€decision€and€affirm.ÌÇÓ  Óò òII.ÌALIMONYó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€trial€court€awarded€as€alimony€the€Wife's€attorneys'€fees€in€theÏamount€of€$6,550€to€be€paid€by€the€Husband.€€It€awarded€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóóÏof€$1,500€per€month× ƒ5 ××  ×€€with€the€requirement€in€order€to€insure€paymentÏthat€Wife€be€irrevocably€designated€as€beneficiary€on€the€life€insuranceÏpolicy€of€the€Husband€for€$200,000€and€lastly€that€the€Husband€pay€courtÏcosts.€€Wife€asserts€that€the€court€erred€in€reducing€the€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóóÏfrom€$2,000€to€$1,500€in€the€absence€of€additional€record€evidenceÏdemonstrating€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€the€circumstances.€ÏHusband€charges€the€trial€court€with€abuse€of€discretion€in€awardingÏ$1,500€per€month€alimony.€€Husband's€argument€is€based€upon€facts€not€inÏthe€record€to€support€his€contention.€€Ìà àOn€January€13,€1995,€a€hearing€was€held€on€both€parties'€T.R.C.P.€59Ïmotions€to€alter€or€amend€judgment.€€No€additional€testimony€or€evidenceÏwas€offered.€€The€record€is€silent.€€Any€comments€by€either€partyÏconcerning€the€reasons€or€reasoning€of€the€trial€court€in€reducing€theÏalimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€is€purely€speculation€and€will€not€be€considered€by€thisÍCourt.€€We€are€independently€reviewing€this€evidence€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€without€theÏpresumption€of€correctness.€€We€will€not€make€our€decision€by€attemptingÏto€discern€reasons€for€the€trial€court's€decisions.€€òòSeeóó€òòKelly€v.€Kellyóó,€679ÏS.W.2d€at€460.€€We€cannot€agree€with€the€contentions€of€either€party.€ÏUnder€Rule€59,€T.R.C.P.,€it€is€not€necessary€that€there€be€a€substantive€andÏmaterial€change€in€circumstances€to€warrant€the€trial€court€on€its€ownÏmotion,€upon€proper€notice€to€the€parties,€or€on€motion€of€either€party€toÏalter€or€amend€judgment€if€filed€and€served€within€thirty€days€after€theÏjudgment€has€been€properly€entered.€€This€statutory€procedure€affords€theÏtrial€judge€the€discretion€to€correct€any€mistake€of€fact€or€law€it€deemsÏto€have€made€without€granting€a€new€trial.€€Such€procedure€saves€time€andÏefficiency€in€the€appellate€process€and€promotes€equity€and€justice€to€theÏlitigants.€€Ìà àT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€provides€that:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhere€there€is€such€relative€economic€disadvantageÏand€rehabilitation€is€not€feasible€in€considerationÏof€all€relevant€factors,€including€those€set€out€inÏthis€subsection,€then€the€court€may€grant€an€orderÏfor€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long„term€basis.€.€.€.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 à[T]he€court€shall€consider€all€relevant€factors,Ïincluding:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,Ïneeds,€and€financial€resources€of€each€party,Ïincluding€income€from€pension,€profit€sharing€orÏretirement€plans€and€all€other€sources;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€eachÏparty,€the€ability€and€opportunity€of€each€party€toÏsecure€such€education€and€training,€and€theÏnecessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€education€inÏtraining€to€improve€such€party's€earning€capacity€toÏa€reasonable€level;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(D)€The€age€and€physical€and€mental€condition€ofÏeach€party;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(E)€€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,Ïbut€not€limited€to€physical€disability€or€incapacityÏdue€to€a€chronic€debilitating€disease;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€forÏa€party€to€seek€employment€outside€the€homeÏbecause€such€party€will€be€custodian€of€a€minorÏchild€of€the€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€andÏpersonal,€tangible€and€intangible;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regards€to€theÏmarital€property€as€defined€in€Ô€+ÔððÔ€Ô€36„4„121;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€establishedÏduring€the€marriage;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€suchÏtangible€and€intangible€contributions€to€theÍmarriage€as€monetary€and€homemakerÏcontributions,€and€tangible€and€intangibleÏcontributions€by€a€party€to€the€education,€trainingÏor€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€whereÏthe€court,€in€its€discretion,€deems€it€appropriate€toÏdo€so;€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€taxÏconsequences€to€each€party,€as€are€necessary€toÏconsider€the€equities€between€the€parties.ÌÌÌÓÓà àConsidering€these€factors,€we€find€that€the€trial€judge€failed€toÏadequately€provide€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€for€the€Wife.€€Her€age€of€62€years,Ïtogether€with€a€lack€of€formal€education,€qualifies€her€only€for€minimumÏwage€work.€€There€is€value€to€the€proposition€that€the€Wife€was€a€goodÏhomemaker.€€Another€factor€is€the€relative€fault€of€the€parties.€€TheÏrecord€shows€the€Husband's€income€to€be€$7,164€a€month€and€over€$90,000Ïfor€the€last€two€years€including€overtime.€€Wife's€income€was€about€$800Ïper€month€or€$9,600€annually.€€Husband's€earning€capacity€is€about€nineÏtimes€greater€than€the€Wife's.€€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àAs€a€general€matter,€the€courts€set€the€amount€of€aÏsupport€award€based€on€the€needs€of€the€innocentÏspouse€and€on€the€ability€of€the€obligor€spouse€toÏpay.€€òòFisher€v.€Fisheróó,€648€S.W.2d€244,€246„47Ï(Tenn.€1983);€òòBarker€v.€Barkeróó,€671€S.W.2d€843,€847Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€If€one€spouse€is€economicallyÍdisadvantaged€compared€to€the€other,€the€courtsÏare€generally€inclined€to€provide€some€type€ofÏsupport.€ÌÌÌ€òòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€861.ÌÓÓ€€Ìà àIn€consideration€of€all€relevant€factors,€we€think€that€the€trialÏcourt's€original€award€of€$2,000€was€proper.€€Because€the€Wife€is€62€yearsÏof€age€and€partially€disabled€as€a€result€of€a€car€wreck,€her€ability€to€earnÏincome€is€substantially€limited€while€the€Husband,€who€at€age€48,€has€aÏvastly€superior€earning€capacity€with€thirty€years€of€employment€with€GM.€ÏWe€do€not€agree€with€Husband's€assertion€that€Wife€is€not€willing€to€work.€ÏShe€has€worked€her€entire€life.€€She€suffered€an€injury€in€an€automobileÏaccident€and€while€she€has€made€a€recovery,€she€is€disabled€to€work€inÏcertain€job€categories€that€would€entail€heavy€lifting€for€instance.€€WeÏfind€based€upon€an€independent€review€of€the€relevant€factors€set€out€inÏT.C.A.€ðððð€36„4„121(c)€and€36„5„101(d)€and€upon€the€evidence€in€thisÏrecord€that€the€$2,000€per€month€is€a€proper€award.€€The€Husband€earnsÏover€$90,000€per€year,€overtime€pay€notwithstanding.€€Overtime€as€aÏgeneral€foreman€with€30€years€plus€seniority€is€readily€available€to€theÏHusband.€€The€Wife€so€testified€and€the€Husband€generally€agreed€subjectÏto€a€slight€qualification.€€He€testified€that€he€is€transferring€to€theÍPowertran/Warren€General€Motors,€North€American€Organization€inÏWarren,€Michigan,€and€while€confident€he€would€work€overtime€onÏSaturdays,€Sundays€were€questionable.€€In€other€words,€the€earningÏcapacity€of€the€Husband€is€entirely€in€his€hands.€€His€outstanding€debts€atÏthe€time€of€the€trial€consisted€only€of€a€$4,000€loan€at€Nations€Bank€andÏthe€indebtedness€on€the€two€vehicles.€€If€the€Husband€retires€orÏexperiences€a€change€in€income€or€earning€capacity,€his€proper€recourse€isÏto€petition€the€trial€court€for€relief.€€We€modify€the€trial€court's€award€toÏthe€Wife€of€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€by€fixing€the€amount€to€be€at€$2,000€perÏmonth.€€ÌÓ  ÓÌò òIII.ÌATTORNEYS'€POST„TRIAL€FEESÌÓ  Óà àó óWife€asks€that€her€post„trial€attorneys'€fees€be€paid€by€the€Husband.€ÏThe€Husband€opposes.€€While€we€have€the€discretion€to€allow€legalÏexpenses,€in€light€of€this€Court's€additional€award€of€alimony€òòinóó€òòfuturoóó€toÏthe€Wife,€we€think€it€would€be€unjust€and€unreasonable€to€burden€theÏHusband€with€additional€post„trial€attorneys'€fees.€€Both€parties€appealedÏand€we€feel€each€are€financially€capable€of€paying€their€own€attorneys'Ïfees.Ìà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€as€modified€in€this€opinion€isÏaffirmed.€€The€costs€of€the€appeal€will€be€taxed€in€equal€proportion€toÏCarol€Jean€Mose€and€Jeffrey€Norman€Mose,€for€which€let€execution€issue€ifÏnecessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€WILLIAMS,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌÌÇCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.