ÿWPC  JUѺæá¥k*c§ÑkKÚü.æþƒäÚ œn ŽÄ6ñ•JÝgŒóKðù«wxð;YçÜsµ~Êß'4"6 0(Emw@uÒµUN‡ 0lÕ 0DAUN…rÓUNE r“ UN UNS S S S S S S S S S UB¡ %ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã Bé ¤U<%ÔøÔô3|xÝ($¡¡ ÓÔDÕÖDרÚÛEÜÝ ÈÝ ƒüÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÐ  ÐÒܰÒÔ€ X øXXXÔÔ€ &€&X X øÔà 4 àBennett€conceded€on€cross„examination€that€the€City€does€not€always€adhere€to€the€plans€itÐ ˜ Ðcreates€for€development.€€He€observed:ÌÌà0 4 àYou€know,€and€itððs€our€hope€that€they€adhere€to€the€plans,€but€sometimes€that€isnððt€alwaysÐ &  Æ Ðthe€case.Ð 4(#4(# ÐÌà 4 àThe€record€demonstrates€that€the€City€has€not€adhered€to€its€plans€for€the€development€of€thisÏarea,€and€such€deviations€needlessly€raise€the€specter€of€favoritism€and€diminish€the€legitimacy€ofÏsuch€plans.Ì(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó(%Ã$òòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular hÝ ƒüÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÐ  ÐÒܰÒÔ€ X øXXXÔÔ€ &€&X X øÔÔ‡&€&& &€ÔÔ‡ŠðVŠ&&€Ô€€Ô#†&€&ŠŠðVÃ#ÔThe€plaintiff€did€not€request€R„4€or€O„1€zones€in€this€case.€€Ô#† &€&&&€¤#Ô(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular hÝ ƒüÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÐ  ÐÒܰÒÔ€X«‘XXXÔÔ€&XÍ&X X«‘ÔÔ‡&XÍ&& &XÍÔÔ‡ŠP#Š&&XÍÔ€€The€plaintiff€did€not€request€R„4€or€O„1€zones€in€this€case.€€Ô#†ŠP#ŠŠŠP#¤#ÔÔ#†&XÍ&Š ŠP#Ã#Ô(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ݛѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€gXXdðdÈ7ÑÔ€X øXXXÔÔ€ŠðVŠXX øÔ€€€€à@j j ‚àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  ÐÌà@==%‚àAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌó óÌÌMC€PROPERTIES,€INC.,à < àà ” àà ì à)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9807„CH„00216Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellee,à < àà ” àà ì à)€HAMILTON€CHANCERYÐ $ Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìv.à 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€HON.€HOWELL€N.€PEOPLES,Ð ,$  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€CHANCELLORÌTHE€CITY€OF€CHATTANOOGA€andà ì à)Ð 4,  ÐTHE€CHATTANOOGA€CITY€à ” àà ì à)Ð 80  ÐCOUNCIL,à Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àœ)€REVñÛñISEDñÛññÜñERSEDñÜñ›Ð <4  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àœ)€AND›Ìà 4 àDefendants„Appellants.à ” àà ì àœ)€REMANDED›Ð D< ÐÌÌÌJOHN€R.€ANDERSON€and€HARRY€R.€CASH,€GRANT,€KONVALINKA€&ÏHARRISON,€P.C.,€Chattanooga,€for€Plaintiff„Appellee.ÌÌPHILLIP€A.€NOBLETT€and€LAWRENCE€W.€KELLY,€Chattanooga,€for€Defendants„¼Appellants.ÌÌÌÌà@%‚àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óˆÐ t"l ÐÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àà œ àFranks,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€City€Council€denied€plaintiffððs€request€to€rezone€10.2€acres€of€aÏcertain€tract€of€land€on€and€near€Shallowford€Road€in€Chattanooga.€€Plaintiff€filed€aÏpetition€for€certiorari€in€the€Chancery€Court€and€after€trial,€the€Chancellor€orderedÏrezoning€of€the€property.€€The€City€has€appealed€to€this€court.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€issues€raised€on€appeal€are:ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#à1.à0ä Œ (#Œ (#àWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€admitting€evidence€andÐ ´2¬++ Ðtestimony€which€had€not€been€presented€to€the€City€Council.Ð ä (#ä (# ÐÌà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#à2.à0ä Œ (#Œ (#àWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€finding€that€the€action€of€theÐ À5¸.. ÐCity€Council€was€illegal,€arbitrary€or€capricious.Ð ä (#ä (# ÐÌà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#à3.à0ä Œ (#Œ (#àWhether€the€denial€of€the€rezoning€request€constitutes€anÐ Ì8Ä11 Ðunconstitutional€taking€of€property.Ð ä (#ä (# ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àZoning€cases€œhave€historically€entered›€the€court€system€through€twoÐ Ø;Ð44ý  Ðdifferent€procedures,€i.e.,€a€writ€of€certiorari€and€a€declaratory€judgment€action.€ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð27„8„101€addressing€the€common€law€writ€of€certiorari,Ïprovides€that€the€ð ðwrit€of€certiorari€may€be€granted€whenever€authorized€by€law,€andÏalso€in€all€cases€where€an€inferior€tribunal,€board,€or€officer€exercising€judicialÏfunctions€has€exceeded€the€jurisdiction€conferred,€or€is€acting€illegally,€when€in€theÏjudgment€of€the€court,€there€is€no€other€plain,€speedy€or€adequate€remedy.ðð€€The€CodeÏalso€provides€for€a€statutory€writ€of€certiorari:€ð ðanyone€who€may€be€aggrieved€by€anyÏfinal€order€or€judgment€of€any€board€or€commission€functioning€under€the€laws€of€thisÏstate€may€have€said€order€or€judgment€reviewed€by€the€courts.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð27„9„101.ÏThe€language€of€the€Code€appears€to€limit€the€writ€to€judicial€determinations€by€lowerÏtribunals€or€administrative€agencies,€making€the€writ€appropriate€for€such€œmatters›€asÏappeals€from€determinations€€made€by€a€Board€of€Zoning€Appeals,€which€areÏadministrative,€but€inappropriate€for€such€œmatters›€as€challenges€to€the€enactment€ofÏordinances€or€resolutions€which€create€or€amend€zoning€regulations,€which€areÏlegislative.€€òòFallin€v.€Knox€County€Bd.€Of€Commððrs.óó,€656€S.W.2d€338,€342€(Tenn.Ð x#p Ð1983).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€said€that€ð ðan€action€for€declaratoryÏjudgment,€as€provided€by€T.C.A.€ðððð29„14„101„„29-14„113,€rather€than€a€petition€forÏcertiorari€is€the€proper€remedy€to€be€employed€by€one€who€seeks€to€invalidate€anÏordinance,€resolution€or€other€legislative€action€of€county,€city€or€other€municipalÏlegislative€authority€enacting€or€amending€zoning€legislation.ðð€€òòId.óó€€The€Court,Ð  -˜&& Ðhowever,€went€on€to€say€that€ð ðwhere,€as€here,€the€plaintiff€mistakenly€employs€theÏremedy€of€certiorari€the€court€may€treat€the€action€as€one€for€declaratory€judgment€andÏproceed€accordingly,€rather€than€dismiss€the€action.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ ¸3°,, Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€review€by€courts€in€a€declaratory€judgment€action€examining€theÏvalidity€of€a€zoning€ordinance€is€limited.€€Zoning€has€long€been€accepted€as€a€validÏexercise€of€the€police€power.€€òòSee€Spencer€Sturla€Co.€V.€City€of€Memphisóó,€155€Tenn.Ð Ð9È22 Ð70,€290€S.W.€608,€612„613€(1927).€€When€faced€with€such€an€exercise€of€police€powerÏthe€Supreme€Court€has€stated:ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àZoning€is€a€legislative€matter,€and,€as€a€general€proposition,€the€exerciseÏof€the€zoning€power€should€not€be€subjected€to€judicial€interferenceÏunless€clearly€necessary.€€In€enacting€or€amending€zoning€legislation,Ïthe€local€authorities€are€vested€with€broad€discretion€and,€in€cases€whereÏthe€validity€of€a€zoning€ordinance€is€òòfairly€debatableóó,€the€court€cannotÐ (  Ðsubstitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€legislative€authority.€€If€there€is€aÏòòrational€or€justifiable€basisóó€for€the€enactment€and€it€does€not€violate€anyÐ 0(  Ðstate€statute€or€positive€constitutional€guaranty,€òòthe€wisdom€of€the€zoningÐ 4,  Ðregulation€is€a€matter€exclusively€for€legislative€determinationóó.€€InÐ 80  Ðaccordance€with€these€principles,€it€has€been€stated€that€the€courtsÏshould€not€interfere€with€the€exercise€of€the€zoning€power€and€hold€aÏzoning€enactment€invalid,€unless€the€enactment,€in€whole€or€in€relationÏto€any€particular€property,€is€shown€to€be€clearly€arbitrary,€capricious,€orÏunreasonable,€having€no€substantial€relation€to€the€public€health,€safety,Ïor€welfare,€or€is€plainly€contrary€to€the€zoning€laws.€€(EmphasisÏsupplied).Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌÓÓòòFallinóó,€656€S.W.2d€at€342„343,€òòalso€seeóó€òòDavidson€County€v.€Rogers,óó€184€Tenn.€327,Ð \T Ð198€S.W.2d€812„814„815€(1947);€òòFamily€Golf€of€Nashville,€Inc.€V.€The€MetropolitanÐ d\ ÐGovððt€of€Nashville€and€Davidson€Countyóó,€964€S.W.2d€254,€260€(Tenn.€App.€1997);Ð l d ÐòòCarter€v.€Adamsóó,€928€S.W.2d€39,€40€(Tenn.€App.€1996);€òòCopeland€v.€City€ofÐ t"l ÐChattanoogaóó,€866€S.W.2d€565,€567€(Tenn.€App.€1993).€€Ð |$t МñÝñà 4 àà Œ àThe€statutory€provisions€dealing€with€declaratory€judgment€actions€stateÏthat€ð ð[w]hen€a€proceeding€under€this€chapter€involves€the€determination€of€an€issue€ofÏfact,€such€issue€may€be€tried€and€determined€in€the€same€manner€as€issues€of€fact€areÏtried€and€determined€in€other€civil€actions€in€the€court€in€which€the€proceeding€isÏpending.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð29„14„108.€€They€also€provide€that€the€chapter€ð ðis€to€be€liberallyÏconstrued€and€administered.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð29„14„113.€€›ÌñÝñ›à 4 àà Œ àThough€there€are€procedural€differences€between€common€law€certiorariÏand€declaratory€judgment,€any€distinction€in€the€application€of€the€substantive€law€toÏlegislative€and€administrative€actions€has€ð ðdissipated€with€the€passage€of€time.ðð€ÏòòMcAllen€v.€City€of€Memphis,€óó786€S.W.2d€633,€641€(Tenn.€1990).€€The€TennesseeÐ œ,”%% ÐSupreme€Court€has€found:ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àThe€ð ðfairly€debatable,€rational€basis,ðð€as€applied€to€legislative€acts,€andÏthe€ð ðillegal,€arbitrary€and€capriciousðð€standard€relative€to€administrativeÏacts€are€essentially€the€same.€€In€either€instance,€the€courtððs€primaryÏresolve€is€to€refrain€from€substituting€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€localÏgovernment€body.€€An€action€will€be€invalidated€only€if€it€constitutes€anÏabuse€of€discretion.€€If€ð ðany€possible€reasonðð€exists€justifying€the€action,Ïit€will€be€œupheld.€€(òòId.óó)›ÐÄ6¼//Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àWhether€there€is€sufficient€evidence€to€support€the€zoning€action€is€aÐ Ì8Ä11 Ðquestion€of€law,€making€appellate€review€òòde€novoóó€without€a€presumption€ofÐ  Ðcorrectness.€òòCarter€v.€Adams,óó€928€S.W.2d€39,€40€(Tenn.€App.€1996).€€Tennessee€RulesÐ   Ðof€Appellate€Procedure€13.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThough€the€Trial€Court€did€not€state€it€was€treating€the€matter€as€aÏdeclaratory€judgment€action,€that€is€essentially€what€it€did€by€admitting€additionalÏevidence.€€It€allowed€in€evidence€œwhat›€it€considered€relevant€to€any€of€the€matters€thatÏwere€discussed€by€the€members€of€the€City€Council,€instead€of€limiting€the€evidenceÏto€the€record€of€the€œhearing.›Ìà 4 àà Œ àUnder€the€declaratory€judgment€provisions,€the€admission€of€newÏevidence€is€not€œlimited›€as€it€is€under€a€writ€of€certiorari.€€The€statute€provides€thatÏð ð[w]hen€a€proceeding€under€this€chapter€involves€the€determination€of€an€issue€of€fact,Ïsuch€issue€may€be€tried€and€determined€in€the€same€manner€as€issues€of€fact€are€triedÏand€determined€in€other€civil€actions€in€the€court€in€which€the€proceeding€is€pending.ðð€ÏT.C.A.€ðð29„14„108.€€It€also€provides€that€the€chapter€ð ðis€to€be€liberally€construed€andÏadministered.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð29„14„113.€€œAny›€evidence€that€is€relevant€to€the€courtððsÏresponsibility€of€determining€whether€the€zoning€decision€is€ð ðfairly€debatableðð€orÏwhether€there€is€ð ðany€possible€reasonðð€for€the€zoning€regulation€should€be€admitted.€ÏThat€is€what€the€Trial€Judge€did€in€this€case,€and€it€was€proper€to€do€so.Ìà 4 àà Œ àWe€conclude€the€Trial€Court€was€in€error€in€finding€that€the€action€of€theÏCity€Council€was€illegal,€arbitrary€or€capricious.€€The€Supreme€Court€has€determinedÏthat€ð ðððfairly€debatable,€rational€basis,ðð€as€applied€to€legislative€acts,€and€the€ððillegal,Ïarbitrary€and€capriciousðð€standard€relative€to€administrative€acts€are€essentially€theÏsame.€€In€either€instance,€the€courtððs€primary€resolve€is€to€refrain€from€substituting€itsÏjudgment€for€that€of€the€local€governmental€body.€€An€action€will€be€invalidated€onlyÏif€it€constitutes€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€If€òòððóóany€possible€reasonòòðð€óóexists€justifying€theòòÐ È7À00 Ðóóaction,€it€will€be€upheldòò.ðð€€McAllenóó,€786€S.W.2d€at€641.€€œÐ Ð9È22 Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe›€City€œadvanced›€several€reasons€why€the€Council€properly€denied€theÏchange€of€zoning.€€They€may€not€be€good€reasons,€but€this€is€not€for€the€Court€toÏdetermine€so€long€as€the€issue€is€fairly€debatable.€€Barry€œBennetñÚñtñÚñ,›€the€Director€ofÏCurrent€Planning€and€Operations€of€the€Regional€Planning€Agency,€offered€testimonyÏthat€the€staff€of€the€Planning€Agency€recommended€denial€because€under€the€currentÏpolicy,€Shallowford€Road€has€been€established€as€the€most€definable€stopping€pointÏfor€the€northward€expansion€of€commercial€development€in€the€area,€œñÓñandñÓñ›€the€areaÏsouth€of€Shallowford€Road€is€all€commercial€and€the€area€north€of€Shalllowford€RoadÏis€predominantly€residential.€€He€explained€that€the€policy€recommends€R„4€and€O„1Ïtype€zones€on€the€frontage€properties,€which€would€be€low€œdensity,›€low€traffic€officeÏor€institutional€zones€œñÔñthatñÔññÕñwhichñÕñ›€would€serve€as€a€buffer€between€the€commercial€areas€toÏthe€south€and€the€residential€areas€to€the€œnorth.ñØñ׃ ×ñØññØñ׃ ×ñØñÝ ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The›€staff€also€wanted€to€set€aÐ `X Ðprecedent,€because€if€the€œpropertñÖñyñÖññ×ñiesñ×ñ›€in€question€were€rezoned,€Mr.€Bennett€anticipatedÏrezoning€requests€for€another€70€or€75€acres€of€œproperty€in€the€area›€currently€zonedÏresidential.€€He€stated€that€the€street€system€could€not€accommodate€the€traffic€thatÏwould€be€generated€by€70€more€acres€of€commercial€development,€and€thatÏimprovements€would€need€to€be€made€to€the€roads€before€any€rezoning€takes€place.€ÏBennett€believes€that€the€area€will€go€commercial€eventually,€but€he€wants€theÏimprovements€to€the€roads€to€be€made€first.€Bennett€testified€that€the€staff€alsoÏconsiders€the€impact€on€people€who€live€in€the€area€and€people€who€shop€in€the€area.€ÏThis€potential€rezoning,€along€with€other€potential€rezoning,€would€have€a€significantÏimpact€on€the€residents€and€shoppers€until€the€new€infrastructure€is€in€place.œ×ƒ$×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כР°1¨** Ðà 4 àà Œ àEven€though€plaintiff€in€this€case€offered€evidence€that€it€couldÏaccommodate€any€additional€œtraffic,€it€might›€generate,€limiting€commercialÏdevelopment€in€this€area€until€the€appropriate€infrastructure€can€be€built€is€a€fairlyÏdebatable€œissue.›€€œWhile›€the€City€Council€has€previously€allowed€rezoning,€withoutÏhaving€proper€infrastructure€in€place,€and€the€fact€that€the€City€Council€often€goesÏagainst€the€recommendations€of€the€planning€agency€staff,€the€Council€has€the€powerÏto€zone€property€in€its€discretion,€so€long€as€it€is€rationally€related€to€the€welfare€of€theÏpeople.€€Waiting€to€rezone€property€until€the€road€system€can€handle€the€additionalÏtraffic,€œis›€in€the€power€of€the€legislative€body,€and€if€the€Councilððs€decision€diminishesÏthe€value€of€property,€œit€is›€in€their€legislative€power€to€do€so,€as€well.€€òòSee€Nichols€v.Ð PH ÐTullahoma€Open€Door,€Inc.óó,€640€S.W.2d€13€(Tenn.€App.€1982).€€The€legislative€bodyÐ XP Ðdoes€not€have€to€enact€zoning€regulations€which€would€provide€the€best€use€of€theÏproperty.€€It€has€broad€discretion€to€zone€as€it€feels€proper,€which€it€exercised€in€thisÏcase.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThough€the€property€in€question€should,€and€probably€will,€eventuallyÏbe€zoned€commercial,€the€issue€is€fairly€debatable€at€the€present€time,€and€we€may€notÏsubstitute€our€judgment€for€the€City€Council.€€We€find€no€basis€to€overturn€theirÏdecision.Ìà 4 àà Œ àFinally,€the€Trial€Court€dismissed€plaintiffððs€claim€of€an€unconstitutionalÏtaking€under€inverse€condemnation,€before€the€hearing€on€this€matter.€€It€does€relate€toÏour€prior€determination€that€œthe€issue€to›€rezone€was€a€fairly€debatable€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThis€Court€has€previously€held€that€zoning€regulations€may€not€depriveÐ °1¨** Ðproperty€owners€of€the€beneficial€use€of€their€property.€€òòCampbell€v.€Nanceóó,€555Ð  ÐS.W.2d€407€(Tenn.€App.€1976);€òòBayside€Warehouse€Co.€v.€City€of€Memphisóó,€63€Tenn.Ð   ÐApp.€268,€470€S.W.2d€375€(1971).€€These€cases€are€distinguishable€from€the€presentÏcase.€€In€òòCampbellóó,€the€property€in€question€was€zoned€residential€and€was€surroundedÐ   Ðby€property€zoned€commercial.€€The€property€never€had€a€home€on€it€and€was€notÏsuitable€for€residential€purposes€in€its€condition.€€The€entire€area€had€becomeÏœcommercially›€oriented,€and€based€upon€these€factors,€œthe›€Court€determined€that€toÏleave€the€lot€zoned€residential€would€deprive€the€owners€of€the€beneficial€use€of€theirÏproperty.Ìà 4 àà Œ àSimilarly,€in€òòBaysideóó,€the€City€Council€of€the€City€of€Memphis€rezonedÐ PH Ðtwenty„three€acres€of€land€owned€by€Bayside€Warehouse€Company€from€M„2ÏIndustrial€to€C„3€Commercial.€€The€property€was€located€on€Mud€Island.€€The€CourtÏfound€that€the€property€was€ideally€suited€for€river„oriented€industry,€because€it€hadÏvirtually€no€access€by€land€and€there€were€no€plans€to€build€access€in€the€near€future.€ÏIn€its€then€condition€it€was€not€at€all€suitable€for€commercial€use,€so€commercialÏzoning€would€deprive€the€owners€of€any€beneficial€use€whatsoever.€€òòœId.€›óóat€377.€Ð €%x Ðà 4 àà Œ àHere,€the€property€owners,€while€not€receiving€the€most€beneficial€useÏof€their€property,€œdo›€have€a€beneficial€use.€€The€land€consists€of€a€church€and€twoÏresidential€homeowners.€€The€church€is€currently€using€the€property€as€a€church.€€ItÏwants€to€sell€the€property€so€that€it€can€move€to€a€larger€tract€of€land€down€the€street,Ïbut€it€is€still€able€to€use€its€property.€€Only€one€residential€homeowner€testified.€€HeÏtestified€that€the€area€has€changed€drastically€since€he€moved€there,€and€that€he€doesÏnot€want€to€live€there€any€longer.€€He€said€he€has€not€received€offers€to€buy€hisÏproperty€from€anyone€other€than€commercial€developers.€€Though€he€has€not€receivedÏany€offers,€he€did€not€testify€that€he€has€actively€tried€to€sell€his€property€as€officeÏproperty€or€residential€property.€€The€record€shows€œavailable›€beneficial€œuses›€of€theÐ Ð9È22 Мproperties,›€contrasted€with€òòCampbell€óóand€òòBayside.óó€€Accordingly,€there€is€no€basis€toÐ  Ðhold€that€there€has€been€an€unconstitutional€taking€œabsent›€rezoning.Ìà 4 àà Œ àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€vacating€theÏdenial€of€the€rezoning€petition€by€the€City€is€reversed,€and€the€decision€of€the€CityÏCouncil€is€reinstated.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€cost€of€the€appeal€is€assessed€to€appellee,€and€the€cause€remanded.ÌÓÓ€ÌÌÌÌòòà 4 àÌóóà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à__________________________Ð LD Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌDon€T.€McMurray,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.Ì