ÿWPCÙ/ R# ŒUN— %å 0(ëw@4Sg 0 lv 0DâB&hU:p Bª 0@Ç D3 AQ:Æ‹ 0DQ 0D• D/Ù B 0J% 0To 0^à 0h! 0r‰ 0|û 0†w 0ý 1u 0dU >fU*¤B)ÎDC÷ AM:‡ù‹&„[ª "¥3}ØU”j!Šþ&v~ˆ(vÓ*˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ®/¯/g°/±/î²/D³/U´/µ/ g¶/Ó€Â/äzz!xúÿÿú, ú3|xÂ/((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóC:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT`"Arial Regular d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò$$$$'ÿÿdxd*+%,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô01234567 ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 dBBBB7Border 1dd*%CCþÿ << Gÿÿ úÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€AXÔÌÌò òMarch€18,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€AôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ïÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔThe€Trust€Agreement€stated€that€the€Settlorððs€primary€purpose€in€creating€the€Trust€was€theÏsupport€of€the€Capadalis€children.€€In€the€event€the€Trust€income€was€inadequate€to€support€Capadalis€orÏthe€Capadalis€children,€the€Trust€Agreement€authorized€the€co„trustees€to€invade€the€corpus€of€the€Trust.€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔApril€4,€1976,€was€the€date€that€the€youngest€Capadalis€child€reached€twenty„two€years€of€age.€€Ì QÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔWe€note€that€the€masterððs€report€did€not€recommend€termination€of€the€Trust€but€merelyÏrecommended€distribution€of€the€Trustððs€accrued€income.€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔA€transcript€of€this€hearing€was€not€included€in€the€record€on€appeal.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔòòSeeóó€òòCommodity€Futures€Trading€Commððn€v.€American€Commodity€Group€Corp.óó,€753€F.2d€862,Ï866€(11th€Cir.€1984)€(indicating€that€court€would€not€review€underlying€merits€of€dispute€upon€whichÏdefault€had€been€entered€pursuant€to€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€55,€unless€defaulting€party€was€challenging€districtÏcourtððs€subject€matter€jurisdiction).Ì ›Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔAt€common€law,€ð ðthe€nonjoinder€of€necessary€parties€to€an€action€[could]€be€taken€advantage€ofÏonly€by€plea€in€abatement€or€answer,€unless€it€appear[ed]€on€the€face€of€the€complaint,€in€which€case€itÏ[might]€be€taken€advantage€of€by€demurrer€or€motion€in€arrest€of€judgment.ðð€€òòBrady€v.€Correllóó,€97€S.W.2dÏ448,€451€(Tenn.€App.€1936).€€In€discussing€the€effect€of€the€failure€to€join€necessary€parties,€one€authorityÏhas€explained€that€ð ðthe€general€rule€requiring€all€parties€in€interest€to€be€made€parties€to€the€action,€is,€inÏmost€cases,€not€a€right€of€the€parties€brought€before€the€Court,€but€rather€a€rule€prescribed€by€Courts€ofÏEquity€for€their€own€government,€a€rule€founded€in€their€anxiety€to€do€justice€among€all€parties€having€anÏinterest€in€the€subject€matter,€or€in€the€object€of€the€action,€and€thereby€to€prevent€future€controversy€andÏlitigation.ðð€€Henry€R.€Gibson,€òòGibsonððs€Suits€in€Chanceryóó€ðð€68,€at€67„68€(William€H.€Inman€ed.,€7th€ed.Ï1988).Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔInasmuch€as€all€of€the€Capadalis€children€have€reached€the€age€of€twenty„two€years,€their€interestÏin€the€Trust€is€now€contingent€upon€surviving€their€mother,€Peggy€Nickas€Capadalis.€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔOn€appeal,€the€Appellees€contend€that€the€trial€courtððs€termination€of€the€Trust€was€properÏbecause€the€Trustððs€purpose€has€been€accomplished.€€This€argument€is€without€merit€because,€until€theÏoccurrence€of€the€event€upon€which€the€Trust€is€to€cease,€the€Trust€cannot€be€terminated€without€theÏconsent€of€all€of€the€Trust€beneficiaries.€€òòAlcottóó,€686€S.W.2d€at€82;€òòHunteróó,€6€Tenn.€App.€at€567.€€By€itsÏterms,€the€Trust€in€this€case€will€not€cease€until€all€of€the€Settlorððs€children€have€died€and€all€of€the€SettlorððsÏgrandchildren€have€reached€the€age€of€twenty„one.Ì ŠÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔTennessee€courts€recognize€the€doctrine€of€virtual€representation,€under€which€parties€with€aÏpresent€interest€in€property€may€represent€the€interests€of€unborn€or€unascertained€contingentÏremaindermen,€provided€that€their€interests€in€the€property€are€sufficiently€similar.€€òòRidley€v.€Hallidayóó,€61ÏS.W.€1025€(Tenn.€1901).€€Generally,€this€doctrine€is€applicable€to€trust€proceedings€in€Tennessee.€€òòSeeóóÏòòQuinn€v.€First€Natððl€Bankóó,€73€S.W.2d€692€(Tenn.€1934)€(suit€seeking€distribution€of€trust€income);€òòHail€v.ÏNashville€Trust€Co.óó,€212€S.W.2d€51€(Tenn.€App.€1948)€(suit€against€trustee€for€breaches€of€trust);ÏòòNashville€Trust€Co.€v.€Cain„Sloan€Co.óó,€193€S.W.2d€103€(Tenn.€App.€1946)€(suit€seeking€court€approval€ofÏlease€of€trust€property);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòJones€v.€Dukeóó,€1991€WL€83326€(Tenn.€App.€1991)€(suit€seeking€courtÏapproval€of€proposed€agreement€for€sale€of€real€estate€comprising€trust).€€In€òòAlcottóó,€however,€this€courtÏrefused€to€apply€the€doctrine€of€virtual€representation€in€a€proceeding€to€compel€the€early€termination€of€aÏtrust.€€òòAlcottóó,€686€S.W.2d€at€83„85€(citing€76€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòTrustsóó€ðð€72€(1975),€and€Restatement€(Second)€ofÏTrusts€ðð€340(1)€(1959)).Ì €Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€AÔÔ€AôÔIn€light€of€their€adversarial€positions€throughout€much€of€this€lawsuit,€we€also€question€how€bothÏthe€Plaintiff€and€Capadalis€could€be€entitled€to€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€from€Trust€funds.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€@ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓ ` p›XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€AÔÑ7€!¶I!XXdðXXdð7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÌÌGEORGE€NICKAS,à àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appelleeà àà àò ò)€€Shelby€Chancery€No.€102190„1€R.D.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9511„CH„00248̜ـ*ÙßR€DECA1-j|³û¼` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌPEGGY€NICKAS€CAPADALIS€andà à)ÌCHARLES€C.€NICKAS,€Trustees,à à)Ìfor€EMMA€C.€NICKAS€TRUST,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendants/Appellees,à àò ò)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ÌCHARLES€C.€NICKAS,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellant.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€NEAL€SMALL,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌò òJAMES€T.€BLAND,€JR.Ìó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌò òJERRE€G.€DUZANEÌAPPERSON,€CRUMP,€DUZANE€&€MAXWELL,€PLCÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellee,€Peggy€Nickas€CapadalisÌÌò òGEORGE€SKOUTERISÌMICHAEL€SKOUTERISó óÌMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMED€IN€PART,€REVERSED€IN€PARTÌAND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌœ›Ìó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœò òALAN›€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SR.€œJ.ó óà àÌÑ7€!¶I!XXdð!XXdð7ÑÓÓà àDefendant€Charles€C.€Nickas€(Trustee),›€œco„trustee›€for€the€Emma€C.€Nickas€TrustÏ(Trust),€œappeals›€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree€œterminating›€the€Trust€and€distributing€theÏTrust€assets€to€certain€Trust€beneficiaries.€€œWe€reverse€the€final€decree€in€part€becauseÏwe€conclude€that€the€trial€court€improperly€terminated€the€Trust€without€having€all€of€theÏnecessary€parties€before€the€court.›ÌÌà àœThe€partiesðð€mother,€Emma›€C.€Nickas€œ(Settlor),›€created€the€Trust€in€1963€as€anÏirrevocable€trust€for€the€use€and€benefit€of€the€Settlor,€the€Settlorððs€daughter,ÏDefendant/Appellee€Peggy€Nickas€Capadalis€(Capadalis),€and€the€SettlorððsÏgrandchildren,€Timothy€Capadalis,€Alexandra€Capadalis,€and€Emily€Maria€CapadalisÏ(collectively,€the€Capadalis€œchildren).€›€The€Trust€Agreement,€which€designated€theÏœTrustee›€and€Capadalis€as€co„trustees,€provided€that,€during€the€period€of€her€naturalÏlife,€the€Settlor€would€receive€$100€per€month€from€the€Trustððs€net€income.€€œ€Under›€theÏterms€of€the€Trust,€the€co„trustees€were€œrequired€to›€pay€the€remaining€net€income€toÏCapadalis€and€the€Capadalis€children€ð ðfor€their€comfortable€maintenance,€support,Íhealth€and€education.ððœ× ƒF ××  ×›€€€The€Trust€Agreement€further€provided€that,€once€the€last€ofÏthe€Capadalis€children€attained€the€age€of€twenty„two€years,€the€remaining€net€incomeÏwould€be€distributed€equally€to€the€Settlorððs€four€children,€Capadalis,€Zoe€Nickas€GalisÏ(not€a€party€to€this€proceeding),€the€œTrustee,›€and€Plaintiff/Appellee€George€C.€NickasÏ(Plaintiff).€œIn›€the€event€of€the€death€of€any€of€the€Settlorððs€children,€the€co„trustees€wereÏrequired€to€allocate€a€portion€of€the€Trust€corpus€for€the€creation€of€a€new€trust€in€theÏname€of€the€deceased€child.€€œIncome›€from€the€new€trust€was€to€be€used€for€theÏmaintenance,€support,€œhealth,›€and€education€of€the€childððs€issue€œ(the€SettlorððsÏgrandchildren)€until›€the€last€of€such€issue€attained€the€age€of€twenty„one€years.€ÏœThereafter,›€the€new€trust€would€terminate€and€the€remaining€corpus€would€beÏdistributed€to€the€childððs€issue€(or€to€œthe›€issue€œof›€the€childððs€œissue€if€the€childððs€issue›Ïwere€deceased€at€the€termination€of€the€new€œtrust).›€€If€no€issue€survived,€then€theÏcorpus€of€the€new€trust€would€revert€to€the€Trust.€œBy›€its€œterms,›€the€Trust€itself€wouldÏterminate€œin›€the€event€that€all€of€the€Settlorððs€children€died€without€leaving€œanyÏsurviving›€œissue€or,€alternatively,€in€the€event€that€all€of€the€Settlorððs€children€died€andÏall€of€their€surviving€issue€(the€Settlorððs€grandchildren)€had€reached€the€age€of€twenty„one€years.›€ÌÌà àIn€November€1992,€Plaintiff€œGeorge€C.€Nickas€filed›€a€petition€for€an€accounting,Ïremoval€of€the€co„trustees,€dissolution€of€the€Trust,€and€money€damages.€€œThe›ÏPlaintiffððs€petition€named€only€co„trustees€Capadalis€and€the€œTrustee›€as€parties€to€theÍproceeding.€€œIn›€support€of€his€petition,€the€Plaintiff€asserted€(1)€that€the€Plaintiff€was€aÏbeneficiary€of€the€œTrust;›€(2)that€the€Plaintiff€never€had€received€any€income€from€theÏTrust;€(3)€that€the€Plaintiff€never€had€received€an€accounting€of€any€Trust€monies;€(4)Ïthat€the€co„trustees€had€breached€their€fiduciary€duties€with€regard€to€accountings€andÏdistribution€of€Trust€monies;€(5)€that€certain€parcels€of€property€belonging€to€the€TrustÏhad€been€sold€and€that€the€Plaintiff€had€received€no€monies€from€the€sales;€and€(6)Ïthat€the€œTrust›€should€be€dissolved,€ð ðas€the€purpose€and€intent€of€said€Trust€has€ended.ðð€ÌÌà àIn€September€1993,€the€œtrial€court›€referred€œthe€case›€to€a€master€for€the€purposeÏof€taking€and€stating€ð ðan€accounting€of€all€receipts€and€expenditures€of€[the€Trust]€sinceÏœApril4,›€1976.ððœ× ƒG ××  ×›€€œAfter›€conducting€a€hearing,€the€master€issued€a€report€finding€that,€asÏof€December€31,€1993,€the€Trust€account€should€have€contained€$209,514.43œ€butÏinstead€contained€only€$99,731.35.€The€master€concluded€that€the€$109,783.08Ïð ðwould€appear€to€represent€unauthorized€expenditures€by€[the€co„trustees].ððÏSpecifically,€the€master€questioned€the€expenditure€of€Trust€funds€(1)€to€provideÏsupport€for€the€Settlor€in€excess€of€the€$1,200€per€year€authorized€by€the€TrustÏAgreement;€(2)€to€purchase€a€home€which€was€placed€in€the€names€of€the€Settlor€andÏCapadalis€and€which,€upon€the€Settlorððs€death,€became€the€sole€property€ofÏCapadalis;€and€(3)€to€pay€for€the€Settlorððs€funeral€expenses.€€Ì›à àAt€the€hearing,€the€œTrustee›€œclaimed›€that€the€œTrust›€owed€him€$71,241.77€forÏloans€made€by€the€œTrustee›€to€the€Trust€in€the€œ1970's.€€In€his€report,€the€master€statedÏthat€he€could€not€determine€the€validity€and€accuracy€of€this€figure,€and€he€declined€toÍmake€any€findings€regarding€ð ðwhether€the€statute€of€limitations€bars€these€loans€orÏwhat€other€legal€defenses€may€be€available.ðð€€The€master€concluded€his€report€byÏrecommending€that€the€trial€court€distribute€$89,269.98€in€accrued€income€among€theÏPlaintiff,€the€Trustee,€and€Zoe€Nickas›€Galis.€€œBecause›€Trust€funds€had€been€used€toÏpurchase€the€home€now€owned€by€Capadalis,€the€master€recommended€thatÏCapadalis€not€be€permitted€to€participate€in€the€distribution€of€the€remaining€œincome.× ƒH ××  ×›ÌÌà àAlthough€the€œTrustee›€appeared€and€participated€in€the€hearing€before€theÏœmaster,›€the€œTrustee›€permitted€a€default€judgment€to€be€entered€against€him€in€MayÏ1995€based€œupon€his›€failure€to€file€an€answer.€œThe›€œTrustee,›€who€was€not€representedÏby€counsel€during€the€proceedings€œbelow,›€never€moved€to€set€aside€the€defaultÏjudgment€in€the€trial€œcourt;€however,€the€Trustee€subsequently€filed€a€òòproóó€òòseóó€answer€inÏwhich€he€asserted,€òòinteróó€òòaliaóó,€(1)that,€under€the€terms€of€the€Trust€Agreement,€only€theÏnet€income€from€the€Trust,€and€not€the€corpus,€could€be€distributed€to€the€Settlorððs€fourÏchildren;€(2)€that€only€the€Settlorððs€grandchildren€were€entitled€to€any€distribution€fromÏthe€Trust€corpus;€(3)€that€dissolution€of€the€Trust€would€deprive€the€SettlorððsÏgrandchildren€of€their€right€to€share€in€the€corpus;€and,€finally,€(4)€that€the€Plaintiff€andÏhis€attorney€should€be€responsible€for€all€expenses€associated€with€the€proceeding.€ÏThe€Trustee€also€asserted€in€his€answer€that€the€Trust€still€owed€him€payments€relativeÏto€$17,500€in€loans€made€to€the€Trust€in€1974€for€ð ðfire€loss.ðð€€According€to€the€TrusteeððsÏanswer,ÌÓÓà8 àThe€loan€was€to€begin€January€6,€1975€and€end€July€6,€1982€with€a€totalÏof€91€payments.€€At€the€end€of€this€loan,€the€second€loan€begins€forÏ$10,000.00€[also]€at€the€rate€of€7%.€€This€second€loan€begins€August€6,Ï1982€and€ends€Ô&  ÔMay€6,€1986€with€a€total€of€46€payments.ÌÌà àà à....ÌÌÔ'  Ôà8 àà à...€[T]he€Trust€could€not€pay€[the€Trustee]€$250.00€per€monthÏso...€[the€Trustee]€agreed€not€to€foreclose,€but€would€be€paid€at€a€laterÏdate€when€the€property€was€sold.€€In€1980,€a€few€more€payments€atÏ$250.00€were€paid,€but€due€to€other€problems,€the€Trust€could€not€payÏanything€more.€€[The€Trustee]€did€not€foreclose,€but€extended€the€[loan]Ïmade€[to€the€Trust]....ÌÌà8 àà àAs€of€May€2,€1995,€these€loans€have€not€been€paid,....ÌÌÓÓThe€Plaintiff€responded€by€filing€a€ð ðPlea€of€Statute€of€Limitations€and€Answerðð€in€whichÏhe€asserted€that€the€Trusteeððs€claim€relative€to€any€loans€made€to€the€Trust€was€barredÏby€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations.€ÌÌà àIn›€August€1995,€after€conducting€a€hearing€at€which€all€four€of€the€SettlorððsÏchildren€were€present,× ƒI ××  ×€the€trial€court€entered€its€final€decree€adopting€the€findings€andÏrecommendations€of€the€master.€œAccording›€to€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree,€at€theÏhearing€the€Settlorððs€children,€with€the€exception€of€the€œTrustee,›€announced€that€theyÏhad€reached€an€agreement€relative€to€œdissolution›€of€the€œTrust›€and,€further,€that€theirÏrespective€children€were€ð ðall€adults€and€[were]€willing€to€waive€their€respective€residualÏrights€of€benefit€to€their€respective€parents.ðð€œBased›€on€the€announced€agreement,€theÏtrial€court€œdecided›€to€terminate€the€œTrust.›€€In€support€of€its€decision,€the€trial€court€madeÏthe€following€findings:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 à[F]rom›€all€the€evidence,€and€from€the€statement€in€openÏcourt€of€[the€œTrustee],›€that€the€primary€purpose€of€the€trustÏwas€for€the€benefit€of€[the€Settlor],€the€mother€of€the€children,ÏEmma€C.€Nickas;€that€she€died€on€Juneœ8,›€1989;€that€sinceÏthat€time,€the€burden€of€executing€the€trust€has€been€uponÏœ[Capadalis]›€since€her€brother,€œ[the›€œTrustee],›€œlived›€inÏJacksonville,€Florida,€although€from€time€to€time€sheÏconsulted€with€him;€that€although€there€appeared€to€beÏirregularities€from€the€accounting,€which€have€beenÏresolved;€notwithstanding€the€plain€language€of€the€trust,Ïthat€$100.00€a€month€would€be€paid€over€to€œ[the€Settlor],›Ïnevertheless,€the€intent€as€expressed€by€[the€œTrustee]›€in€hisÏstatement€to€the€court,€was€for€the€support€of€œ[the€Settlor],›Ïand€the€assets€were€used€for€that€purpose;€that€the€purposeÏof€the€trust€has€been€fulfilled;€that€the€trust€should€beÏterminated€or€the€assets€will€be€wasted;€that€all€of€the€assetsÏhave€now€been€reduced€to€cash€with€the€only€exceptionÏbeing€the€real€property€located€at€Pontotoc€and€MainÏStreets€in€Memphis,€Tennessee;€that€the€real€property€is€inÏbad€condition€and€the€estate€cannot€afford€to€rehabilitate€it;Ïthat€in€accordance€with€the€statement€of€the€attorney€ofÏœ[Capadalis],›€all€of€the€cash€assets€should€be€paid€out,€theÏexpenses€being€first€paid;€and€that€the€trust€remain€in€effectÏonly€until€the€real€estate€at€Pontotoc€and€Main€Streets€beÏdisposed€of€and€the€proceeds€thereof€be€divided€equallyÏamong€the€four€children€of€œ[the€Settlor];›€that€the€plea€of€theÏstatute€of€limitations€by€[the€Plaintiff]€and€claimed€by€[theÏœTrustee]›€is€well€taken,€and€the€claim€of€[the€œTrustee]›€forÏreimbursement€for€any€loan€that€he€may€have€made€to€theÏtrust€many€years€ago,€is€barred.ÌÌÓÓœIn›€accordance€with€the€agreement€of€the€three€children,€the€trial€court€œdistributed€to›ÏCapadalis€the€sum€of€$5,000.€œOf›€the€remaining€Trust€balance,€the€trial€court€distributedÏone„third€each€to€the€Plaintiff,€the€œTrustee,›€and€Zoe€œNickas€Galis,›€after€the€payment€ofÏtaxes,€debts,€costs,€and€attorneyððs€fees.€€œFinally,›€the€trial€court€awarded€attorneyððs€feesÏto€counsel€for€the€Plaintiff€and€œcounsel€for€Capadalis.›€ÌÌà àOn€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree€œterminating›€the€Trust,€the€œTrustee›Ïcontends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€three€respects:€€(1)€in€œdissolving›€the€œTrust›€whenÏsome€of€the€Trust€beneficiaries€were€not€parties€to€the€proceeding€and/or€did€not€agreeÏto€the€premature€termination€of€the€Trust;€(2)€in€ruling€on€the€œTrusteeððs›€claims€againstÏthe€Trust€for€loans€made€to€the€Trust;€and€(3)€in€awarding€attorneyððs€fees€to€counsel€forÏthe€Plaintiff€and€counsel€for€Capadalis.€€We€conclude€that€a€resolution€of€the€œTrusteeððs›Ïfirst€issue€requires€œus€to€reverse€in€part›€the€final€decree.ÌÌà àAs€an€initial€matter,€we€œare›€troubled€by€the€œTrusteeððs›€efforts€to€appeal€theÏunderlying,€substantive€issues€in€this€lawsuit€after€permitting€a€default€judgment€to€beÏentered€against€him€earlier€in€the€proceeding.€€As€previously€noted,€the€œTrustee›Ïallowed€a€default€judgment€to€be€entered€against€him€in€May€1995€based€upon€hisÏfailure€to€file€an€answer.€œThe›€œTrustee,›€who€was€not€represented€by€counsel€until€thisÏappeal,€never€moved€to€set€aside€the€default€judgment€in€the€lower€court.€€Instead,€theÏœTrustee›€elected€to€appeal€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree€to€this€court.ÌÌà àBy€permitting€a€default€judgment€to€be€entered€against€him,€a€defendantÏð ðimpliedly€confesses€all€of€the€material€allegations€of€fact€contained€in€[the]€complaint,Ïexcept€the€amount€of€the€plaintiffððs€unliquidated€damages.ðð€€œòòPatterson›€v.€Rockwell€œIntððlóó,›Ï665€S.W.2d€96,€101€(Tenn.€1984).€€As€a€general€rule,€therefore,€the€defendant€againstÏwhom€a€default€judgment€has€been€entered€is€thereafter€precluded€from€litigating€anyÏsubstantive€issues€in€the€lawsuit,€except€for€the€establishment€of€the€amount€ofÏdamages.€€œòòWitter›€v.€œNesbitóó,›€878€S.W.2d€116,€119€(Tenn.€App.€œ1993),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€115ÍS.€Ct.€199€(1994).›€€In€accordance€with€this€principle,€appellate€review€of€a€defaultÏjudgment€or€decree€is€ð ðquite€limited.ðð€€5€C.J.S.€œòòAppeal›&€œErroróó›€ðð€718€(1993).ÌÌà àNevertheless,€appellate€courts€may€review€default€judgments€for€fundamentalÏerror,€œòòi.e.óó,›€error€ð ðapparent€on€the€face€of€the€record€and€going€to€the€very€foundation€ofÏthe€action.ðð€€5€C.J.S.€œòòAppeal›€&€œErroróó›€ðð€718€(1993).€€Thus,€on€appeal€from€a€defaultÏjudgment€or€decree,€an€appellate€court€may€consider€the€issue€of€subject€matterÏjurisdiction,œ× ƒJ ××  ×›€as€well€as€ð ðthe€sufficiency€of€the€bill€or€the€complaint€to€sustain€the€decreeÏof€judgment.ðð€€5€C.J.S.€œòòAppeal›€&€œErroróó›€ðð€718€(1993);€œòòaccordó󛀜òòEdington›€v.€Michigan€Mut.ÏLife€Ins.€œCo.óó,›€183€S.W.€728,€729€(Tenn.€1915)€(stating€that,€on€appeal€from€defaultÏjudgment,€appellate€court€reviews€sufficiency€of€complaint€by€same€standard€by€whichÏcourt€considers€motion€to€dismiss).ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€Plaintiffððs€petition€for€an€accounting€and€dissolution€of€the€TrustÏis€insufficient€to€sustain€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree€œterminating›€the€Trust€because€theÏpetition€fails€to€name€the€necessary€parties€to€a€termination€of€trust€proceeding.œ× ƒK ××  ×›€Íð ðPersons€beneficially€interested€in€a€trust€are€necessary€parties€to€a€suit€to€terminateÏthe€trust.ðð€€89€C.J.S.€œòòTrustsóó›€ðð€93e€(1955);€œòòaccordó󛀜òòFlorida›€Natððl€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€v.ÏœBlakeóó,›€155€So.€2d€798,€800€(Fla.€Dist.€Ct.€App.€1963)€(holding€that€termination€ofÏirrevocable€trust€was€improper€because€all€beneficiaries€were€not€parties€toÏproceedings);€œòòFirst›€Natððl€Bank€v.€œKernessóó,›€142€So.€2d€777,€780€(Fla.€Dist.€Ct.€App.Ï1962)€(indicating€that€court€must€decline€to€dissolve€or€terminate€irrevocable€trustÏwhen€all€persons€beneficially€interested€in€trust€are€not€before€court).€€In€this€regard,Ïthe€Plaintiffððs€petition€fails€to€name€as€parties€one€of€the€present€beneficiaries€of€theÏTrust,€Zoe€Nickas€Galis,€who,€like€the€Settlorððs€other€children,€has€a€current€vestedÏinterest€in€the€Trust€income.€€The€petition€also€fails€to€name€the€Capadalis€childrenœ× ƒL ××  ×›Ïand€the€rest€of€the€Settlorððs€grandchildren,€all€of€whom€have€a€contingent€interest€inÏboth€the€income€and€the€corpus€of€the€Trust.€€ÌÌà àAs€a€corollary€matter,€we€note€that€the€trial€courtððs€early€termination€of€the€TrustÏwas€improper€because€fewer€than€all€of€the€Trust€beneficiaries€consented€to€the€TrustððsÏtermination.€œTennessee›€courts€recognize€two€situations€in€which€a€trust€may€beÏterminated:€€(1)€when€the€event€happens€upon€which€the€trust€is€to€cease;œ× ƒM ××  ×›€and€(2)Íwhen€all€of€the€trust€beneficiaries€ð ðare€in€existence€and€sui€juris,€and€hold€vestedÏinterests,€and€all€consent€and€agree.ðð€€œòòHunter›€v.€œBargeróó,›€6€Tenn.€App.€559,€567€(1926);Ïœòòaccordó󛀜òòAlcott›€v.€Union€Planters€Natððl€œBankóó,›€686€S.W.2d€79,€82€(Tenn.€App.€1984);€œòòsee›Ïœalsoóó›€Restatement€(Second)€of€Trusts€ðð€340(1)€(1959)€(stating€that,€with€limitedÏexceptions,€ð ðif€one€or€more€of€the€beneficiaries€of€a€trust€do€not€consent€to€itsÏtermination€or€are€under€an€incapacity,€the€others€cannot€compel€the€termination€of€theÏtrust,€except€in€accordance€with€the€terms€of€the€trustðð).€€Here,€some€of€the€TrustÏbeneficiaries€did€not€consent€to€the€Trustððs€termination€because€they€were€not€madeÏparties€to€the€termination€proceeding.€€Further,€although€the€œTrustee›€did€not€file€hisÏanswer€objecting€to€termination€of€the€Trust€until€after€permitting€a€default€judgment€toÏbe€entered€against€him,€the€œTrustee›€did€appear€earlier€in€the€lawsuit€and€orally€objectÏto€the€Trustððs€termination.ÌÌà àAdditionally,€we€question€whether€œtermination›€of€the€Trust€is€proper€at€this€timeÏbecause,€even€if€the€existing€beneficiaries€consent€to€the€Trustððs€termination,€theÏrecord€suggests€that€there€may€be€unborn€œor€unascertained€contingent›€beneficiariesÏwho€are€not€represented€in€this€proceeding€and,€thus,€who€cannot€consent€to€theÏTrustððs€termination.€€This€court€previously€has€held€that€termination€of€a€trust,€except€inÏaccordance€with€the€trustððs€express€terms,€is€precluded€where€the€interests€of€œunbornÍor€unascertained›€contingent€œbeneficiaries›€are€not€before€the€court.€€œòòAlcott›€v.€UnionÏPlanters€Natððl€œBankóó,›€686€S.W.2d€79€(Tenn.€App.€1984).œ× ƒN ××  ×›ÌÌà àIn€light€of€our€resolution€of€the€foregoing€issue,€we€also€reverse€the€awards€ofÏattorneyððs€fees€made€in€this€case.€€In€an€action€involving€a€trust,€the€award€of€attorneyððsÏfees€from€the€trust€corpus€is€permitted€ð ðonly€when€the€services€of€such€attorneys€inureÏto€the€benefit€of€the€entire€estate€as€distinguished€from€services€rendered€to€benefitÏone€or€more€of€the€individuals€interested€in€the€trust.ðð€€œòòMarshall›€v.€First€Natððl€œBankóó,›€622ÏS.W.2d€558,€560€(Tenn.€App.€1981)€(citing€œòòPierce›€v.€œTharpóó,›€œ455›€S.W.2d€145€œ(Tenn.Ï1970),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€402€U.S.€929€(1971)).›€€For€example,€attorneyððs€fees€may€beÏawarded€to€the€successful€petitioner€in€an€action€against€a€trustee€for€breach€of€trust.€ÏœòòMarshallóó,›€622€S.W.2d€at€560€(citing€œòòHail›€v.€Nashville€Trust€œCo.óó,›€212€S.W.2d€51€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1948)).€€Unless€some€benefit€is€contributed€to€the€preservation€of€the€trust€estate,Ïhowever,€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€not€permitted€from€the€trust€fund,Ïð ðnotwithstanding€the€rule€that€a€trust€estate€should€bear€the€expense€of€theÏadministration€of€the€trust.ðð€€œòòMarshallóó,›€622€S.W.2d€at€560.ÌÌà àBased€on€the€record€before€this€court,€we€are€not€convinced€that€the€awards€ofÏattorneyððs€fees€were€proper€in€this€case.€€The€record€suggests€that,€instead€ofÏcontributing€to€the€preservation€of€the€Trust€estate,€the€Plaintiffððs€action€sought€toÏterminate€the€Trust€prematurely€and€to€distribute€its€corpus€to€beneficiaries,€includingÏhimself,€who,€under€the€terms€of€the€Trust,€were€not€entitled€to€the€Trust€corpus€butÏwere€entitled€only€to€Trust€income.€€The€record€further€indicates€that€the€PlaintiffððsÏaction€against€the€co„trustees€for€breach€of€fiduciary€duty€was€not€successful.€ÏRegarding€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€Capadalisððs€counsel,€at€least€some€ofÏcounselððs€efforts€appeared€to€be€directed,€not€at€preserving€the€Trust€estate,€but€atÏreaching€a€settlement€agreement€to€effect€an€early€termination€of€the€Trust.€€In€thisÏregard,€œcounselððs›€actions€also€appeared€designed€to€benefit€Capadalis€individuallyÏrather€than€to€benefit€the€Trust.œ× ƒO ××  ×›€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€the€awards€of€attorneyððsÏfees€and€remand€for€the€trial€courtððs€reconsideration€of€this€issue€in€light€of€theÏforegoing€principles€and€in€light€of€the€trial€courtððs€disposition€of€the€case€on€œremand.ÌÌà àWe€affirm,€however,€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€on€the€statute€of€limitations€defenseÏraised€by€the€Plaintiff€relative€to€the€Trusteeððs€claim€for€reimbursement€for€loans€madeÏto€the€Trust.€€The€Trustee€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€on€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€issue€because€the€Trusteeððs€claim€for€loans€made€to€the€Trust€was€notÏproperly€before€the€court.€€In€support€of€this€contention,€the€Trustee€argues€that€he€didÍnot€file€a€cross„claim€relative€to€the€loans,€òòseeóó€T.R.C.P.€13.07,€and€that€no€evidenceÏwas€presented€below€upon€which€the€trial€court€could€have€based€its€ruling.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€Trustee€did€not€file€a€cross„claim€relative€to€the€loans,€the€TrusteeÏdid€allege€in€his€òòproóó€òòseóó€answer€that€he€was€entitled€to€reimbursement€for€the€loans.€€AsÏpreviously€indicated,€the€Trustee€filed€his€answer€after€the€default€judgment€wasÏentered€against€him€based€upon€his€failure€to€file€an€answer.€€Procedurally,€therefore,Ïthe€Trusteeððs€answer€could€not€effectively€address€or€raise€any€issues€in€the€lawsuitÏbeyond€the€issue€of€the€amount€of€damages.€€òòWitter€v.€Nesbitóó,€878€S.W.2d€116,€119Ï(Tenn.€App.€1993),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€115€S.€Ct.€199€(1994).ÌÌà àNevertheless,€ð ðwhen€issues€not€raised€by€the€pleadings€are€tried€by€the€expressÏor€implied€consent€of€the€parties,€those€issues€will€be€treated€in€all€respects€as€if€theyÏhad€been€raised€in€the€pleadings.ðð€€òòChisholm€v.€Bohannonóó,€558€S.W.2d€446,€448Ï(Tenn.€App.€1977).€€In€this€case,€the€Trustee€raised€the€issue€of€reimbursement€for€theÏloans€in€the€hearing€before€the€master,€as€well€as€in€his€subsequently„filed€answer€inÏthe€trial€court.€€The€Trustee€again€may€have€raised€this€issue€at€the€hearing€before€theÏtrial€court€just€prior€to€entry€of€the€courtððs€final€decree.€€Without€a€transcript€of€thisÏhearing,€however,€we€are€unable€to€determine€what€evidence,€if€any,€was€presented€atÏthe€hearing€or€whether€the€Trustee€agreed€that€this€issue€would€be€decided€at€theÏhearing.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€has€the€duty€ð ðto€prepare€a€record€which€conveys€a€fair,€accurateÏand€complete€account€of€what€transpired€in€the€trial€court€with€respect€to€the€issuesÏwhich€form€the€basis€of€the€appeal.ðð€€òòState€v.€Bolingóó,€840€S.W.2d€944,€951€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1992)€(citing€T.R.A.P.€24(b)).€€The€only€record€before€this€court€suggests€that€theÏissue€of€the€Trusteeððs€claim€for€reimbursement€for€loans€made€to€the€Trust€was€triedÏbelow€with€either€the€express€or€implied€consent€of€the€Trustee.€€Accordingly,€we€rejectÏthe€Trusteeððs€contention€that€this€claim€was€not€properly€before€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€portions€of€the€trial€courtððs€final€decree€terminating€the€Trust€and€awardingÏattorneyððs€fees€are€reversed€and€this€cause€remanded€for€further€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€Appellees,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌTOMLIN,€Sr.€J.Ì