ÿWPCÓ …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) n­8 å 0lå 0DQ 0J• 0Tß 0^3 0h‘ 0rù 0|k 0†ç 0m 1uý U,r 0džU,U *.B)XDC AMÄ.v~M BË D3èvÓ 0@î AO.Æ} 0DC D/‡ B¶˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - YZD[Õ\U]^D_D`aÓ€kGav 3|xk«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌApril€19,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€"ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóA€copy€of€the€back€page€of€the€contract€signed€by€Mr.€Ransdell€is€attached€as€an€appendixÏto€this€opinion.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@ d))))'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€!!X„d&ÓÑ#€!!Xd#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€WéXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑONE€STOP€SUPPLY,€INC.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9509„CV„00403ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMontgomery€CircuitÌÙ€€ÙßL€%&$;+'h|<å` ç `€€Lßà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€C7„398ÌJOHNNY€RANSDELL,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€MONTGOMERY€COUNTYÌAT€CLARKSVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€W.€WEDEMEYER,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌROGER€A.€MANESSÌCARMACK€C.€SHELLÌ114€South€Second€StreetÌClarksville,€TN€37041„1149Ìà àAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌJOHN€M.€RICHARDSON,€JR.ÌP.€O.€Box€808ÌClarksville,€TN€37041„0808ÌÌGREGORY€D.€SMITHÌOne€Public€Square,€Suite€321ÌClarksville,€TN€37040Ìà àAttorneys€for€Defendant/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌLEWIS,€J.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà@ àò òòòÔ€"„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€"XÔÌÌà àà àThe€question€raised€in€this€appeal€is€whether€a€personal€guarantyÏclause€in€a€credit€application€binds€the€president€of€a€corporation€who€signed€it€onÏbehalf€of€his€company.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€clause€was€ð ðclearlyÏboilerplate,€fine„print€contract€language,ðð€which€did€not€bind€the€contractorÏpersonally.€€We€reverse.€€Ìà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àAppellee€Johnny€Ransdell€was€the€President€of€Ransdell€AirÏConditioning€Plumbing€and€Heating,€Inc.,€(hereafter€Ransdell€AC)€and€hadÏfunctioned€in€that€capacity€since€1979.€€In€April€of€1987,€he€sought€a€line€of€creditÏfrom€appellant€One€Stop€Supply,€Inc.€€Mr.€Ransdell€filled€out€a€double„sided,€one„page€pre„printed€credit€application€provided€by€the€supply€company.€€On€the€backÏof€the€application,€above€the€signature€line,€was€a€paragraph€all€in€capital€letters,Ïreading€in€relevant€part:€ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒTHE€UNDERSIGNED€AGREES€THAT€IN€THE€EVENTÏLEGAL€ACTION€IS€INSTITUTED€TO€ENFORCEÏPAYMENT€OF€ANY€MONEY€DUE€ONE€STOP€SUPPLYÏINC.,€THE€UNDERSIGNED€SHALL€BE€LIABLE€FOR€ALLÏATTORNEYððS€FEES,€COSTS,€AND€EXPENSES€OFÏCOLLECTION,€AS€WELL€AS€INTEREST€AT€THEÏMAXIMUM€LEGAL€RATE€FROM€THE€DATE€THEÏORIGINAL€AMOUNT€WAS€DUE.€THE€UNDERSIGNEDÏFURTHER€AGREES€THAT€NOTWITHSTANDING€THEÏFACT€THAT€THIS€CREDIT€APPLICATION€ANDÏREPRESENTATIONS€HAVE€BEEN€EXECUTED€IN€AÏCORPORATE€OR€REPRESENTATIVE€CAPACITY,€EACHÏSIGNER€HEREOF€BY€SUCH€SIGNATURE,€HEREBY€AREÏPERSONALLY€AND€INDIVIDUALLY€RESPONSIBLE€FORÏPAYMENT€TO€ONE€STOP€SUPPLY,€INC.,€OF€ALLÏAMOUNTS€DUE€PURSUANT€TO€SUCH€EXTENSION€OFÏCREDIT€.€.€.€.ððÌÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓÌà àà àMr.€Ransdell€signed€the€application€as€President€of€Ransdell€AC.€ÏUpon€receipt€of€the€credit€application,€Kenneth€McMaster,€One€Stop's€creditÏmanager,€checked€the€credit€references€Mr.€Ransdell€had€listed€for€his€company.€ÏMr.€McMaster€also€procured€a€consumer€credit€report€on€Mr.€Ransdellððs€personalÏfinances.€€The€credit€manager€signed€the€document€on€April€22,€1987,€approvingÏa€line€of€credit€in€the€amount€of€$2,500€per€month.€€The€credit€line€was€increasedÏto€$10,000€per€month€on€March€15,€1988.ÌÌà àà àRansdell€used€the€credit€line€extensively,€purchasing€as€much€asÏ$21,000€worth€of€supplies€in€a€single€month€(July€1988).€€Bills€were€paid€in€aÏtimely€way€until€the€Summer€of€1988.€€On€September€19,€1988,€Mr.€RansdellÏplaced€his€company€in€Chapter€7€Bankruptcy.€€At€the€time€of€the€bankruptcy,ÏRansdell€AC€owed€One„Stop€about€$48,000.ÌÌà àà àOn€May€29,€1990,€One„Stop€filed€suit€against€Johnny€RansdellÏindividually€for€$48,631.39,€plus€attorney€fees€and€interest,€claiming€that€he€wasÏobligated€under€his€personal€guaranty.€€After€the€bankruptcy€settlements€andÏcollection€of€materialmen's€liens,€the€unpaid€portion€of€the€debt€amounted€toÏ$12,572.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àà àAt€trial€Mr.€Ransdell€argued€that€the€guaranty€language€in€the€creditÏapplication€was€never€brought€to€his€attention,€and€that€he€was€not€aware€that€heÏcould€be€held€personally€liable€for€debts€incurred€by€Ransdell€AC.€€In€theÏalternative,€he€argued€that€his€personal€guarantee€was€limited€to€$2,500,€theÏinitial€amount€of€monthly€credit€approved€by€One„Stop€Supply,€because€he€wasÏnever€directly€notified€that€his€credit€line€had€been€increased.€€€€ÌÌà àà àMr.€Ransdellððs€trial€briefs€(and€his€appellate€brief)€rely€heavily€uponÏprior€opinions€of€this€court,€particularly€òòParton€v.€Pirtle€Oldsmobile„Cadillac„Isuzu,ÏInc.,óó€730€S.W.2d€634€(Tenn.App.€1987),€where€we€found€that€the€plaintiffððsÏsignature€on€a€car€dealerððs€work€order€did€not€constitute€a€waiver€of€his€right€toÏhold€the€dealer€liable€for€negligence.€€We€acted€in€part€because€the€waiverÏprovision€on€the€order€was€never€brought€to€the€attention€of€the€signatory,€wasÏinconspicuously€placed€on€the€document,€and€was€difficult€for€a€layperson€toÏunderstand.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€found€that€Mr.€Ransdellððs€signature€bound€hisÏcorporation,€but€did€not€bind€him€personally.€The€courtððs€order€made€no€directÏreference€to€any€of€the€cited€cases,€but€its€language€and€reasoning€so€closelyÏfollow€the€opinions€in€those€cases€that€it€is€quite€clear€that€that€the€trial€judgeÏrelied€squarely€upon€them€to€reach€his€decision.ÌÌà àà àWe€believe,€however,€that€the€present€case€is€distinguishable€fromÏòòParton€v.€Pirtle€Oldsmobileóó,€supra,€and€from€the€other€cases€cited€in€this€appeal.€ÏThose€cases€involved€exceptional€circumstances€that€enabled€us€to€relieve€theÏsignatories€from€the€normal€rule€that€a€party€is€bound€by€all€the€provisions€of€aÏwritten€contract€that€he€signs.€€We€find€no€equivalent€circumstances€in€the€presentÏcase.€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àà àIn€the€òòPartonóó€case,€supra,€the€plaintiff€automobile€wholesaler€signedÏa€preprinted€work€order€which€authorized€the€defendant€dealerððs€service€shop€toÏperform€repairs€on€the€plaintiffððs€Cadillac.€€In€one€corner€of€the€work€order,€was€aÏparagraph€which€stated€in€small€print:€€ð ðI€hereby€authorize€the€repair€workÏhereinafter€set€forth€to€be€done€along€with€the€necessary€material€and€agree€thatÏyou€are€not€responsible€for€loss€or€damage€to€the€vehicle€or€articles€left€in€case€ofÏfire,€theft,€€or€Ìany€other€cause€beyond€your€control.ðð€€The€car€was€subsequently€stolen€from€anÏunfenced€and€untended€rear€lot€where€the€defendantððs€employees€had€parked€it.€ÏIt€was€eventually€recovered,€but€in€a€damaged€condition.ÌÌà àà àThe€dealer€argued€that€the€customerððs€signature€on€the€documentÏcontaining€the€above„quoted€paragraph€relieved€it€from€any€responsibility€for€theÏdamage€that€resulted€from€the€theft€of€the€automobile,€even€though€it€couldÏreasonably€be€inferred€that€the€damage€would€not€have€occurred€were€it€not€forÏthe€negligence€of€the€dealerððs€employees.€€à àÌÌà àà àIn€rejecting€the€dealerððs€argument,€we€discussed€the€generalÏprinciples€of€contract€formation.€€It€is,€of€course,€axiomatic€that€the€minds€of€theÏparties€must€meet€before€a€contract€between€them€is€formed.€òò€Johnson€v.€CentralÍNational€Ins.€Co.€Of€Omahaóó,€356€S.W.2d€277,€210€Tenn.€24€(1961);€òòAmericanÏLead€Pencil€Co.€v.€Nashville€C.€&€St.€L.€Ryóó,€134€S.W.€613,€124€Tenn€57€(1911).ÌÌà àà àHowever€we€also€noted€that€it€has€long€been€the€general€rule€that€ð ðaÏperson€cannot€avoid€a€written€contract€into€which€he€has€entered€on€the€groundÏthat€he€did€not€attend€to€its€terms,€that€he€did€not€read€the€document.ðð€€730€S.W.2dÏat€636€quoting€òòDeFord€v.€National€Life€and€Accident€Insurance€Co.óó,€182€Tenn.Ï255,€185€S.W.2d€617€(1945).ÌÌà àà àWe€dealt€with€the€apparent€contradiction€between€these€two€veryÏwell€established€principles€of€law,€by€focusing€on€the€question€of€assent€toÏcontract€terms,€making€use€of€the€writings€of€Professor€Karl€Llewellyn€andÏProfessor€J.€Murray,€who€have€extensively€studied€contracts€for€the€sale€of€goods.€ÌÌà àà àWe€agreed€with€both€writers€that€a€party€need€not€specifically€assentÏto€each€provision€in€a€written€contract€in€order€to€make€that€provision€binding€onÏhim.€Speaking€of€contract€formation€involving€a€form€furnished€by€one€of€theÏparties,€Professor€Llewellyn€said:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒInstead€of€thinking€about€ð ðassentðð€to€boilerplate€clauses,Ïwe€can€recognize€that€as€far€as€concerns€the€specific,Ïthere€is€no€assent€at€all.€€What€has€in€fact€been€assentedÏto,€specifically,€are€the€few€dickered€terms,€and€the€broadÏtype€of€the€transaction,€and€but€one€more.€€That€one€thingÍmore€is€a€ð ðblanket€assent€(not€a€specific€assent)€to€any€notÏunreasonable€or€indecent€terms€the€seller€may€have€onÏhis€form,€which€do€not€alter€or€eviscerate€the€dickeredÏterms.ðð€730€S.W.2d€at€637.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÌÓÓà àà àProfessor€Murray€referred€to€the€binding€terms€of€a€contract€as€fallingÏwithin€a€ð ðcircle€of€assentðð€and€opined€that€we€should€permit€the€enforcement€ofÏð ðterms€which€allocate€the€risks€of€the€bargain€in€a€manner€which€the€partiesÏshould€reasonably€have€expected.ðð€€He€also€emphasized€the€importance€of€anyÏreallocation€of€risk€being€physically€conspicuous,€and€comprehensible€to€theÏparty€against€whom€enforcement€is€sought,€and€that€ð ðsuch€party€must€have€had€aÏreasonable€choice€in€relation€to€such€reallocation.ðð€€730€S.W.2d€at€637.€€ÌÌà àà àWe€adopted€these€principles€in€our€own€formulation,€which€weÏstated€somewhat€more€broadly:€ÌÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ 0 ÒÒ  Ò.€.€.€the€party€who€signs€a€printed€form€furnished€by€theÏother€party€will€be€bound€by€the€provisions€in€the€form€overÏwhich€the€parties€actually€bargained€and€such€otherÏprovisions€that€are€not€unreasonable€in€view€of€theÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€transaction.ðð€€730€S.W.2dÏat€638.ÌÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÌÌÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àà àApplying€these€principles€to€the€work€order€in€question,€we€found€itÏunreasonable€to€enforce€a€waiver€of€negligence€in€favor€of€the€party€that€hadÏsupplied€the€form,€where€the€primary€subject„matter€of€the€contract€was€the€repairÍof€an€automobile,€not€the€terms€of€its€bailment,€and€where€the€waiver€provisionÏwas€in€fine„print,€was€inconspicuously€placed€on€the€document,€and€wasÏapparently€never€brought€to€the€attention€of€the€signatory.€€We€included€aÏfacsimile€of€the€work€order€with€the€published€opinion€to€afford€some€basis€ofÏcomparison€in€future€cases.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àà àThough€there€are€some€obvious€similarities€between€the€facts€of€theÏpresent€case€and€those€discussed€in€òòParton€v.€Pirtle€Oldsmobile,óó€we€believe€that€itÏis€the€differences€which€€dictate€the€outcome.× ƒ' ××  ×€€In€òòPartonóó,€the€offending€clauseÏbore€only€a€tangential€relationship€to€the€terms€ð ðover€which€the€parties€actuallyÏbargained.ðð€Clearly,€the€nature€and€cost€of€the€repairs€to€be€made€were€theÏprimary€concerns€of€the€parties.€€Provisions€for€allocation€of€risk€in€case€of€fire€andÏtheft€were€not.€€In€the€present€case€the€contract€was€for€the€extension€of€credit,€andÏthe€question€of€responsibility€for€payment€was€central.ÌÌà àà àFurther,€there€were€no€indications€that€Mr.€Parton€had€theÏopportunity€to€peruse€the€work€order€at€his€leisure€before€signing€it,€and€as€weÏsaid€earlier,€there€was€no€evidence€that€the€offending€clause€was€ever€pointed€outÍto€him.€€It€is€true€that€the€guaranty€clause€was€never€specifically€pointed€out€to€MrÏRansdell,€but€the€record€shows€that€he€was€furnished€with€a€copy€of€One„StopððsÏcredit€application,€that€he€took€it€home,€and€that€he€had€ample€opportunity€to€readÏit€and€study€its€provisions€before€filling€it€out€and€returning€it.€ÌÌà àà àOther€questions€upon€which€the€appellee€places€much€emphasisÏare€the€alleged€lack€of€clarity€and€the€inconspicuousness€of€the€guaranty€clause.€ÏWe€believe€Mr.€Ransdell€overstates€these€arguments.€€The€appelleeððs€briefÏmentions€in€five€different€places€that€the€personal€liability€clause€is€in€the€form€of€aÏsix€(6)€line€run„on€sentence,€and€in€four€other€places€he€declares€that€it€is€part€of€aÏlonger€sentence€of€84€words!€€From€these€facts,€he€concludes€that€the€clauseÏwould€not€be€clear€to€the€average€reader.ÌÌà àà àWhile€we€would€be€reluctant€to€present€the€disputed€clause€as€aÏmodel€of€clarity,€we€believe€that€if€a€knowledgeable€businessman€like€€Mr.ÏRansdell€actually€read€it,€he€would€easily€realize€that€it€purports€to€hold€himÏpersonally€responsible€for€the€debts€of€his€company.ÌÌà àà àThe€appelleeððs€argument€that€the€guaranty€clause€is€notÏconspicuous,€consists€of€the€observations€that€it€is€single„spaced,€while€otherÏparts€of€the€contract€are€double„spaced,€and€that€no€typographic€device,€such€asÏbolding,€is€used€for€emphasis€to€set€it€off€from€the€longer€paragraph€of€which€it€is€aÍpart.€€He€also€notes€that€the€clause€is€on€the€back€of€the€form,€and€that€all€theÏquestions€for€the€credit€applicant€to€fill€out€are€on€the€front.ÌÌà àà àBut€we€do€not€agree€that€the€clause€is€so€inconspicuous,€either€byÏvirtue€of€its€appearance€or€of€its€position,€to€excuse€Mr.€Ransdellððs€alleged€failureÏto€read€it.€€We€observe€that€the€typeface€is€of€the€same€size€and€boldness€as€theÏrest€of€the€application,€and€that€one€cannot€read€the€rather€short€contract€fromÏbeginning€to€end€without€reading€the€guaranty€clause€(as€opposed€to€the€workÏorder€in€the€òòPartonóó€case,€where€the€waiver€clause€was€in€one€corner€of€a€form€thatÏwas€not€designed€to€be€read€sequentially).€€It€is€true€that€the€clause€is€on€the€backÏof€the€form,€but€the€signature€line€is€also€on€the€back,€and€as€the€clause€relates€toÏthe€legal€effect€of€the€signature€affixed€below,€we€cannot€agree€with€the€appelleeÏthat€the€location€of€the€clause€ð ðappears€to€be€designed€to€obtain€personal€liabilityÏby€using€strategem,€trick€or€artifice.ðð€€ÌÌà àà àWe€must€also€consider€the€reasonableness€of€the€clause,€or€to€use€aÏterm€derived€from€Professor€Murray,€its€ð ðdecency.ðð€€Of€course,€an€individual€is€freeÏto€bind€himself€by€a€contract€whose€terms€may€not€seem€reasonable€or€decent€toÏan€outside€observer,€and€the€court€will€not€concern€itself€with€the€wisdom€or€follyÏof€the€contract.€€See€òòChapman€Drug€Co.€v.€Chapmanóó,€341€S.W.2d€392,€207€Tenn.Ï502€(1961).€€But€where€the€question€is€legitimately€raised€as€to€whether€a€partyÏknew,€or€should€have€known,€that€he€was€binding€himself€by€a€particularÍprovision,€the€court€has€the€power€to€examine€the€contract€to€determine€if€thatÏprovision€falls€within€the€ð ðcircle€of€assent.ðð€ÌÌà àà àIn€the€present€case,€we€have€the€signature€of€the€president€of€aÏclosely€held€corporation,€on€a€credit€contract€which€states€that€the€signatory€willÏbe€personally€liable€for€payment€on€purchases,€even€if€he€signs€in€aÏrepresentative€capacity.€€We€have€numerous€purchases,€all€of€which€Mr.€RansdellÏadmits€were€made€either€by€the€signatory€or€by€his€designated€agents,€and€all€ofÏwhich€were€used€to€further€the€purposes€of€Mr.€Ransdellððs€business.ÌÌà àà àIf€the€appellee€objected€to€the€guaranty€clause,€he€was€under€noÏcompulsion€to€sign€the€application,€for€One„Stop€was€only€one€of€many€supplyÏhouses€to€which€he€could€have€turned€for€purchases.€€He€testifed€that€he€wantedÏto€deal€with€One„Stop€because€their€prices€were€good,€but€he€could€also€haveÏavailed€himself€of€those€prices€by€paying€cash.€€It€is€no€defense€to€the€contract€toÏstate,€as€the€appellee€has€done,€that€the€whole€reason€he€adopted€the€corporateÏform€was€to€avoid€personal€liability,€for€that€only€begs€the€question€of€whether€inÏthis€situation€he€surrendered€corporate€immunity€for€business€advantage.€€€€€€€ÌÌÌÌà@ àò òV.ó ó€€ÌÌà àà àTo€bolster€his€arguments,€the€appellee€cites€several€other€casesÏfollowing€òòPartonóó,€in€which€this€court€declined€to€enforce€a€provision€in€a€pre„printed€contract.€€An€examination€of€those€cases€reveals,€however,€that€he€failedÏto€mention€some€of€the€most€important€reasons€that€we€ruled€as€we€did.€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellee€cites€òòHarriman€School€District€v.€SouthwesternÏPetroleumóó,€757€S.W.2d€669€(Tenn.App.€1988),€for€example,€for€its€discussion€ofÏwhat€is€required€before€a€contract€clause€can€be€considered€to€be€ð ðconspicuous.ðð€ÏIn€that€case,€the€Eastern€Division€of€this€Court€found€ineffective€a€disclaimer€ofÏwarranty€on€an€order€form€for€roofing€materials€that€proved€to€be€defective.€€TheÏcourt€noted€that€the€disclaimer€was€in€extremely€small€print,€but€in€addition€theÏdisclaimer€did€not€use€the€language€required€by€the€U.C.C.€to€draw€attention€to€aÏwaiver€of€statutory€warranty,€and€it€directly€contradicted€language€of€warrantyÏconspicuously€present€in€other€parts€of€the€agreement.€€Thus€theÏinconspicuousness€of€the€disclaimer€was€only€one€if€its€flaws.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€unpublished€case€of€òòTaylor€v.€Liberty€Mutual€Insurance€Co.óó,ÏAppeal€No.€01„A„01„9210„CV„00420€(filed€January€26,€1994),€was€also€cited€byÏthe€appellee€for€its€use€of€ð ðcircle€of€assentðð€analysis,€and€as€a€source€for€theÏlanguage€he€used€to€accuse€One„Stop€of€resorting€to€ð ðstategem,€trick€or€artificeðð€inÍobtaining€Mr.€Ransdellððs€signature€on€a€contract€purporting€to€hold€him€personallyÏliable.€ÌÌà àà àThe€òòTayloróó€case€involved€a€private€individual€who€was€involved€inÏan€auto€accident.€€Pamela€Taylor€accepted€a€$69.43€insurance€company€checkÏfor€out„of„pocket€prescription€expenses€related€to€the€accident.€€The€checkÏincluded€a€broad€release,€found€in€fine€print€on€the€reverse€side€above€theÏendorsement€line.€€Nowhere€on€the€face€of€the€check€did€it€state€that€it€was€aÏrelease,€and€the€insurance€adjustor€did€not€direct€Ms.€Taylorððs€attention€to€theÏlanguage€on€the€back.ÌÌà àà àWhen€she€subsequently€incurred€$27,000€in€medical€expenses,€asÏa€result€of€neck€and€shoulder€injuries€that€later€manifested€themselves,€theÏinsurance€company€insisted€that€Ms.€Taylorððs€endorsement€and€cashing€of€itsÏcheck€released€it€from€any€further€liability€to€her.€€We€reversed€the€trial€courtððsÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€insurance€company,€because€we€believedÏthere€was€a€genuine€dispute€concerning€Mrs.€Taylor€intentions€when€sheÏaccepted€and€endorsed€the€check.€Needless€to€say,€the€facts€in€the€òòTayloróó€caseÏare€not€truly€analogous€to€those€in€the€case€before€us,€and€they€suggest€a€moreÏcompelling€case€against€enforcement€of€the€disputed€provision.€€Ìà@ àÌà@ àò òVI.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€order€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed.€€€Remand€this€cause€to€theÏCircuit€Court€of€Montgomery€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏopinion.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellee.€€ÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,ÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÑ  Ñà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌÌONE€STOP€SUPPLY,€INC.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9509„CV„00403Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMontgomery€CircuitÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€C7„398Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àReversedÌJOHNNY€RANSDELL,à àà àà à)à àand€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àRemandedÌà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àò òòòÔ€"¼ÔJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€Tó óóóÔ€"XÔÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€theÏCircuit€Court€of€Montgomery€County,€briefs€and€argument€of€counsel;€uponÏconsideration€whereof,€this€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€in€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€there€is€reversible€error.Ìà àà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€and€adjudged€by€this€Court€that€the€judgmentÏof€the€trial€court€is€reversed.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€ofÏMontgomery€County€for€further€proceedings€in€accordance€with€the€opinion€filedÏherein.Ìà àà àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€Johnny€Ransdell.Ìà àà àENTER:€___________________.ÌÓÓÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à___________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌ