ÿWPC\' …# VUNa %¯ 0 ˜µU<M w@‰ 4É Ý ì 0Üô 0DÐ 0J 0T^ 0^² 0h 0rx 0|ê 0†f 0ì 1u| 0dñU>UB)“DC¼ AMÿU*Lv0Í6 B D3 ¡Sô 0@ö06v~fvÓä AO·%Æ& 0DÌ& D/' B?'˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(püƒ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman $%E&['(E)*U+î,Ó€8z!3|x8(Œ(3qd$¤¤Ý ƒüƒ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¨ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌò òSeptemberÏ26,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€%ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó &Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ÔThe€complaint€also€names€as€defendants€St.€Francis€Hospital,€LaverneÏLutton€and€various€other€officers€and€employees€of€St.€Francis€Hospital.€€AÏconsent€order€of€dismissal€was€entered€as€to€these€defendants,€and€the€actionÏagainst€them€is€not€involved€in€this€appeal.Ì ÃÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€Ô€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€580A€(1977)€deals€with€theÏdefamation€of€a€public€person.€€There€is€no€dispute€in€this€case€that€the€plaintiffÏis€a€private€figure.Ì d))))'ÿÿdxd —Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Ô€ÔThere€is€no€dispute€in€this€case€that€the€statements€were€concerningÏthe€plaintiff€or€that€the€plaintiff€suffered€damages.Ì øÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Ô€Ô€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€presumed€damages€andÏstrict€liability€in€defamation€cases€were€unconstitutional.€€€òòò òGertz€v.€RobertÏWelch,€Inc.ó óóó,€418€U.S.€323,€94€S.Ct.€2997,€41€L.Ed.2d€789€€(1974).Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò &Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Ô€ÔThe€plaintiff€claims€that€Lutton€was€not€the€victim€because€the€securityÏguards€were€investigating€credit€card€fraud.€€However,€it€is€clear€that€LuttonÏwas€the€victim€of€a€theft,€which€was€the€real€thrust€of€the€investigation€by€theÏSt.€Francis€security€department.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÑ7€•_XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÑ  Ñà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OFÏTENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€ATÏJACKSONÌà àà à€€Ï________________________________________________ÌÌò òBERTHA€L.€PATE,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCircuit€Law€No.Ï38960€T.D.ÌÙ€€ÙßL€$&#;+'h|NÖ` à. `€€LßVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9505„CV„00112ÌÌò òSERVICE€MERCHANDISE€CO.,€INC.,ÌMICHAEL€THOMAS,€MANAGER,€LISAÌDUNCAN,€VELMA€WILSON,€ó óÌÌà àDefendants„Appellees.Ì___________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURTÏOF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€GEORGE€H.ÏBROWN,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àGeorge€E.€Skouteris,€Sr.,€ofÏMemphisÌà@ àJohn€W.€Leach€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àGail€O.€Mathes€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòAFFIRMEDÌÌà@ àó óóóOpinion€filed:€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÑ  ÑÑ   ÑÓÓ›à àThis€is€a€defamation€case.€€Plaintiff,€Brenda€L.€Pate,€appeals€from€theÏorder€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€to€defendants,€ServiceÏMerchandise,€Co.,€Inc.,€Michael€Thomas,€Lisa€Duncan,€and€Velma€Wilson.€€TheÏsole€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€the€defendantsðð€motionÏfor€summary€judgment.€ÌÓ  ÓI.€ÌÓ  Óà àThe€plaintiff€filed€this€action€after€she€was€terminated€from€her€positionÏas€a€nurse€manager€by€St.€Francis€Hospital.€€The€plaintiff€was€fired€after€sheÏwas€suspected€of€stealing€a€co„employeeððs€(Laverne€Luttonððs)€credit€card€andÏusing€the€credit€card€to€purchase€two€video€cassette€recorders€(VCRs)€fromÏService€Merchandise.Ìà àLuttonððs€credit€card€was€stolen€on€January€2,€1991€while€she€was€workingÏat€the€hospital.€€Lutton€discovered€later€that€day€that€her€credit€card€had€beenÏstolen,€and€she€reported€the€incident€to€the€security€department€at€St.€FrancisÏHospital.€€The€chief€safety€officer€at€St.€Francis,€Richard€A.€Hunt,€reported€theÏtheft€to€Union€Planters€National€Bank.€€Lutton€filed€a€report€of€the€incidentÏwith€the€Memphis€Police€Department.€Ìà àOn€January€11,€1991,€Lutton€received€her€credit€card€statement€fromÏUnion€Planters€and€discovered€a€charge€at€Service€Merchandise€which€she€didÏnot€make.€€She€asked€Rita€Schroeder,€the€President€of€St.€Francis€Hospital,€toÏaccompany€her€to€Service€Merchandise€in€an€attempt€to€discover€what€hadÏbeen€charged€to€the€card€and€to€determine€the€identity€of€the€thief.€€WhenÏLutton€and€Schroeder€arrived€at€Service€Merchandise,€they€were€informed€byÏstore€management€that€the€items€charged€to€the€card€could€not€be€determinedÍwithout€the€credit€card€receipt,€but€with€the€help€of€Michael€Thomas,€theÏassistant€manager€of€Service€Merchandise,€Lutton€eventually€discovered€thatÏtwo€VCRs€were€purchased€using€her€credit€card.€€Ìà àLutton€suspected€the€plaintiff€of€the€theft€based€upon€a€conversation€inÏwhich€she€told€the€plaintiff€about€the€theft,€and€the€plaintiff€did€not€expressÏconcern€or€surprise.€€Lutton€further€believed€that€the€plaintiff€was€the€thiefÏbecause€she€felt€like€God€was€telling€her€that€the€plaintiff€was€responsible€forÏthe€theft.Ìà àBased€upon€her€suspicions€of€the€plaintiff,€Lutton€obtained€photographsÏof€the€plaintiff€from€Robert€Halford,€the€Director€of€Human€Resources€at€St.ÏFrancis€Hospital,€and,€along€with€Schroeder,€returned€to€Service€Merchandise.€ÏUpon€arriving,€Michael€Thomas€escorted€Lutton€and€Schroeder€to€Lisa€DuncanÏand€Velma€Wilson,€the€two€clerks€who€were€present€when€the€VCRs€wereÏpurchased.€€Thomas€had€previously€been€informed€that€Lutton€and€SchroederÏwere€at€the€store€regarding€a€fraudulent€credit€card€purchase.€€WithoutÏreporting€the€incident€to€the€unit€manager€or€the€district€loss€preventionÏmanager,€Thomas€decided€to€cooperate€with€the€investigation.€€However,€theÏService€Merchandise€policy€manual€states,€ð ðAll€known€or€suspected€credit€cardÍfraud€is€reported€to€the€appropriate€District€Loss€Prevention€Manager€by€theÏUnit€Manager.ðð€€In€addition,€it€is€standard€Service€Merchandise€policy€not€toÏtalk€with€the€general€public€regarding€credit€card€fraud,€but€only€to€talk€withÏthe€local€police.Ìà àLutton€presented€the€defendant€clerks,€Velma€Wilson€and€Lisa€Duncan,€Ïwith€a€photographic€line„up€consisting€of€four€pictures.€€Three€of€theÏphotographs€were€pictures€of€white€females,€and€one€of€the€pictures€was€of€aÏblack€female.€€Lutton€first€showed€the€four€photographs€to€Wilson,€whereuponÏshe€picked€up€the€picture€of€the€plaintiff,€took€it€to€the€other€clerk,€LisaÏDuncan,€and€asked€her€if€she€remembered€the€person€in€the€photograph€(theÏplaintiff).€€Duncan€then€proceeded€to€the€counter€to€view€the€other€threeÏpictures€of€the€white€females.€€Both€clerks€identified€the€plaintiff€as€theÏindividual€who€purchased€the€VCRs€on€January€2,€1991,€but€admitted€that€theÏperson€in€the€photograph€had€a€different€hairstyle.€€The€alleged€defamation€byÏeach€clerk€is€the€oral€statement€identifying€the€plaintiff.Ìà àUpon€returning€to€the€hospital,€Lutton€and€Schroeder€informed€the€St.ÏFrancis€Hospital€security€department€about€the€identification€of€the€plaintiff,Ïand€the€security€department€commenced€its€own€investigation.€€Lt.€Richard€A.ÍHunt€and€Sgt.€Herbert€David€McKee€were€placed€in€charge€of€the€investigationÏand€constructed€their€own€photo€line„up.€€While€the€photo€spread€containedÏpictures€of€five€black€women,€the€photograph€of€the€plaintiff€was€a€blown„upÏversion€of€the€picture€that€Lutton€used€and€was€much€larger€than€the€otherÏfour.Ìà àIn€full€uniform,€Hunt€and€McKee€took€their€photo€line„up€to€ServiceÏMerchandise€to€conduct€a€second€identification€procedure.€€Once€again,ÏThomas€authorized€McKee€and€Hunt€to€present€their€photo€line„up€to€theÏclerks,€Wilson€and€Duncan.€€After€viewing€the€photographic€line„up,€the€clerksÏnoted€that€the€plaintiffððs€photograph€was€outstanding€and€different€from€theÏother€pictures€in€the€spread.€€The€clerks€identified€the€blown„up€version€ofÏplaintiffððs€picture€and€then€executed€a€written€statement€identifying€theÏplaintiff€as€the€person€who€purchased€the€two€VCRs€with€Luttonððs€credit€card.€ÏThe€alleged€defamatory€written€statement€by€Velma€Wilson€is€ð ðI€Velma€WilsonÏpick€out€picture€#3€who€I€sold€2€VCR€to€her€and€a€black€man.ðð€€The€allegedÏdefamatory€statement€by€Lisa€Duncan€is€ð ðI,€Lisa€R.€Duncan,€do€rememberÏseeing€the€person€on€photo€number€3€in€Service€Merchandise.€€I€was€not€theÏactual€person€who€rang€up€the€transaction,€but€I€remember€the€customer.ðð€€Ìà àFollowing€the€second€identification,€the€plaintiff€was€advised€by€Halford,Ïwho€was€acting€for€St.€Francis,€that€she€would€be€cleared€of€any€wrongdoing€ifÏshe€could€prove€her€whereabouts€on€January€2,€1991,€between€the€hours€of€2:00Ïand€3:00€p.m.€(the€time€during€which€the€credit€card€was€stolen€from€theÏhospital).€€On€March€14,€1991,€St.€Francis€suspended€the€plaintiff€because€sheÏwas€unable€to€prove€her€whereabouts€on€the€relevant€date€and€time€other€thanÏby€her€own€statements.€€On€March€18,€1991,€St.€Francis€officially€terminatedÏthe€plaintiff€as€an€employee.Ìà àPlaintiffððs€amended€complaint× ƒ' ××  ×€alleges€that€defendant€ServiceÏMerchandise€and€its€employees,€defendants€Thomas,€Wilson,€and€Duncan,€wereÏnegligent€in€making€the€identification€of€plaintiff,€Bertha€Pate.€€The€complaintÏfurther€avers€that€Service€Merchandise€negligently€violated€its€own€policy€byÏallowing€its€employees€to€talk€to€personnel€of€St.€Francis€Hospitalððs€security€inÏconducting€its€investigation€concerning€the€stolen€property.€€The€complaintÏavers€that€these€defendants€maliciously€or€negligently€identified€plaintiff€as€theÍperson€who€purchased€the€VCRs€on€a€stolen€credit€card.€€Defendantsðð€answerÏjoins€issue€on€the€material€allegations€of€the€complaint€and€denies€that€thereÏwas€any€negligent€or€malicious€identification€and€denies€that€there€were€anyÏslanderous€or€libelous€statements€made€concerning€plaintiff.€€The€answer€aversÏthat€the€defendants€acted€in€good€faith€and€that€their€communications€wereÏmade€in€a€privileged€context€by€cooperating€in€an€investigation€of€possibleÏcredit€card€theft.€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€for€all€defendants€stating€thatÏthere€was€no€statement,€oral€or€written,€that€constituted€defamation€of€theÏplaintiff,€either€libel€or€slander,€as€a€matter€of€law;€and€that€there€was€no€act€ofÏcommission€or€omission€which€constituted€negligence€as€a€matter€of€law.ÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÓ  Óà àA€trial€court€should€grant€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€only€if€theÏmovant€demonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€thatÏthe€moving€party€is€entitled€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.R.Civ.P.Ï56.03;€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòò òDunn€v.€Hackettó óóó,€833ÏS.W.2d€78,€80€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgmentÏbears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.Íòòò òByrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210.€€When€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€made,€theÏcourt€must€consider€the€motion€in€the€same€manner€as€a€motion€for€directedÏverdict€made€at€the€close€of€the€plaintiff's€proof;€that€is,€"the€court€must€takeÏthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,Ïallow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,€and€discard€allÏcountervailing€evidence."€òòò òIdó óóó.€at€210„11.€€In€òòò òByrdó óóó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏstated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€partyÏmust€then€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discoveryÏmaterials,€that€there€is€a€genuine,€material€factÏdispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€[citations€omitted].€€InÏthis€regard,€Rule€56.05€provides€that€the€nonmovingÏparty€cannot€simply€rely€upon€his€pleadings€but€mustÏset€forth€òòò òspecific€factsó óóó€showing€that€there€is€a€genuineÏissue€of€material€fact€for€trial.Ì€à@ àÌòòò òIdó óóó.€at€211.€(emphasis€in€original).€€ÌÌÓÓ€€€€€The€summary€judgment€process€should€only€be€used€as€a€means€ofÏconcluding€a€case€when€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact,€and€theÏcase€can€be€resolved€on€the€legal€issues€alone.€€òòò òIdó óóó.€at€210€(citing€òòò òBellamy€v.ÏFederal€Express€Corpó óóó.,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33€(Tenn.€1988)).€€Summary€judgment€isÏnot€to€be€used€as€a€substitute€for€a€trial€of€genuine€and€material€factual€issues.Íòòò òByrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210€(citing€òòò òBlocker€v.€Regional€Medical€Ctró óóó.,€722€S.W.2dÏ660,€660„61€(Tenn.€1987)).€€Where€a€genuine€dispute€exists€as€to€any€materialÏfact€or€as€to€the€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€those€facts,€a€court€must€deny€aÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.€òòò òByrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€211€(citing€òòò òDunnó óóó,€833ÏS.W.2d€at€80).ÓÓÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓIII.ÌÓ  Óà àIn€òòò òPress,€Inc.€v.€Verranó óóó,€569€S.W.2d€435€(Tenn.€1978),€our€SupremeÏCourt€adopted€the€òòò òRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsó óóó€(1977)€standards€for€liabilityÏin€a€defamation€suit.€€The€Supreme€Court€said:ÌÓÓà àà8 àWe€are€impressed€with€Standards€580A× ƒ( ××  ×€and€580B,ÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€(1977).€€They€read€asÏfollows:ÌÌà àà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 àà8 àðð€580B.€€òòDefamation€of€Private€Person.óó€€OneÏwho€publishes€a€false€and€defamatoryÏcommunication€concerning€a€privateÏperson,€or€concerning€a€public€official€orÏpublic€figure€in€relation€to€a€purelyÏprivate€matter€not€affecting€his€conduct,Ïfitness€or€role€in€his€public€capacity,€isÏsubject€to€liability,€if,€but€only€if,€he€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(a)€knows€that€the€statement€is€false€andÏthat€it€defames€the€other,€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(b)€acts€in€reckless€disregard€of€theseÏmatters,€or€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à(c)€acts€negligently€in€failing€to€ascertainÏthem.€ÌÌà8 àà8 àWe€believe€that€these€standards€meet€the€criteria€ofÏour€federal€and€state€constitutions€and€we€adoptÏthem€as€the€law€of€this€jurisdiction.€€ÌÌò òòòPress,€Inc.ó óóó,€569€S.W.2d€at€442.ÌÌÓÓà àThe€plaintiff€must€establish€that€a€false€and€defamatory€statement€wasÏpublished€concerning€the€plaintiff.€€ò òòòStones€River€Motors,€Inc.€v.€Mid„SouthÏPublishing€Company,€Inc.ó óóó,€651€S.W.2d€713,€717€(Tenn.€App.€1983).€€TheÏdefendants€contend€that€there€are€no€defamatory€statements€because€theÏdefendantsðð€statements€are€only€defamatory€in€light€of€extrinsic€facts.× ƒ+ ××  ×€à àÌà àTraditionally,€defamations€were€classified€as€either€actionableòòò ò€per€seó óóó€orÏò òòòper€quodóóó ó.€€Any€libel€which€was€defamatory€on€its€face,€ò òòòi.e.óóó ó,€the€danger€of€injuryÏto€reputation€was€apparent€from€the€mere€words€themselves,€has€been€held€toÍbe€actionable€ò òòòper€seóóó ó.€€Words€which€were€defamatory€only€in€the€light€of€certainÏextrinsic€facts€were€said€to€be€libelousò òòò€per€quodóóó ó.€€ò òòòMemphis€Publishing€Co.€v.ÏNicholsó óóó,€569€S.W.2d€412,€418„19€(Tenn.€1978).€€Historically,€the€plaintiff€hadÏto€plead€and€prove€special€damages€when€the€defamation€was€libel€òòò òper€quodó óóó.€Ïòòò òId.ó óóó€at€418.€€However€in€òòò òNicholsóóó ó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that,Ïbecause€presumed€damages€were€no€longer€permissible× ƒ, ××  ×,€theòòò ò€per€se/per€quodó óóóÏdistinction€was€no€longer€viable,€and€that€the€plaintiff€had€to€plead€and€proveÏinjury€from€the€alleged€defamatory€words,€whether€their€defamatory€meaningÏwas€obvious€or€not.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€419.Ìà àThe€Supreme€Court€in€ò òòòNicholsóóó ó€was€concerned€with€presumed€damagesÏand€strict€liability,€not€defamation€in€light€of€extrinsic€facts.€€The€Court€didÏnot€hold€that€words€which€were€defamatory€only€in€the€light€of€certainÏextrinsic€facts€were€no€longer€actionable;€instead€they€held€that€damages€mustÏbe€shown€in€all€defamation€cases.€€Although€the€classification€of€libel€òòò òper€quodó óóóÏhas€been€eliminated€in€Tennessee,€extrinsic€facts€may€still€be€used€to€show€theÏdefamatory€meaning€of€words€that€are€not€defamatory€on€their€face.Ìà àHowever,€in€such€cases€the€words€are€said€to€require€an€innuendo„„thatÏis,€a€statement€of€circumstances€which€give€to€the€words€a€signification€andÏmeaning€which€they€do€not€have€on€their€face,€but€which€cannot€enlarge,Ïextend,€or€change€the€sense€of€the€words.€€òòò òFry€v.€McCord€Bros.ó óóó,€95€Tenn.€678,Ï685,€33€S.W.€568,€570€(1895).€€The€extrinsic€facts€cannot€be€stretched€to€giveÏthe€words€a€defamatory€meaning€that€is€not€implied€by€the€words.€€The€literalÏtruth€or€non„defamatory€nature€(without€extrinsic€facts)€of€the€actual€wordsÏused€is€not€a€defense.€€òòò òNicholsóóó ó,€569€S.W.2d€at€420.€€Words€which€areÏsubstantially€true€can€nevertheless€convey€a€false€meaning€whether€intended€byÏthe€speaker€or€not.€€The€proper€question€is€whether€the€meaning€reasonablyÏconveyed€by€the€published€words€is€reasonably€understood€in€a€defamatoryÏsense€by€the€reader€or€listener.€€òòò òId.€óóó óat€419„20;€ò òòòTompkins€v.€Wiseneró óóó,€33€Tenn.Ï458,€463;€òòò òRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ó óóóðð€563€(1977).€€The€determination€ofÏwhether€a€published€report€is€capable€of€a€defamatory€meaning€is€a€question€ofÏlaw€for€the€court.€€òòò òNicholsóóó ó,€569€S.W.2d€at€419.Ìà àApplying€ò òòòNicholsóóó ó€to€the€case€ò òòòsub€judiceó óóó,€we€conclude€that€the€defendantsððÏstatements€are€capable€of€a€defamatory€meaning.€€When€presented€with€theÏphoto€line„up,€Duncan€and€Wilson,€the€defendant€clerks,€both€orally€identifiedÍthe€plaintiff€as€the€woman€who€was€in€the€store€on€January€2,€1991€and€whoÏpurchased€two€VCRs€using€a€credit€card.€€Later,€when€the€security€guardsÏapproached€the€defendants€with€a€second€photo€line„up,€each€clerk€executed€aÏwritten€statement€identifying€the€plaintiff€as€the€woman€who€participated€inÏthe€VCR€transaction.€€While€these€identifications€are€not€defamatory€on€theirÏface,€it€is€possible€for€the€oral€and€written€statements€to€reasonably€convey€aÏdefamatory€meaning.€€The€circumstances€surrounding€the€investigation€of€theÏcredit€card€theft€give€the€identifications€a€significance€that€is€not€apparent€byÏthe€actual€words€themselves.€€The€inference€that€the€plaintiff€was€involved€inÏthe€VCR€transaction€and,€therefore,€the€theft,€is€not€one€that€enlarges€orÏexpands€the€scope€of€the€words.€€It€is€the€meaning€directly€implied€by€theÏwords€and€understood€by€the€recipients,€Lutton€and€the€security€guards.€€TheÏidentification€of€a€person€in€a€photo€line„up€obviously€imputes€them€with€theÏcrime€being€investigated,€regardless€of€whether€the€speaker€means€to€or€not.€ÏThe€non„defamatory€nature€of€the€words€themselves€is€not€a€defense€becauseÏthey€convey€a€false€meaning€that€was€capable€of€being€understood€by€LuttonÏand€the€security€guards€in€a€defamatory€sense.Ìà àHowever,€defamation€is€not€a€strict€liability€tort.€€To€prevail€in€aÍdefamation€cause€of€action,€the€plaintiff€must€also€show€some€level€of€fault€onÏthe€part€of€the€defendant.€€òòò òNicholsóóó ó,€569€S.W.2d€at€418.€€The€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€decided€that€negligence€is€the€standard€in€a€defamation€suitÏinvolving€a€private€plaintiff.€€òòò òId.€€óóó óIn€ò òòòNicholsóóó ó,€the€Supreme€Court€said,€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€determining€the€issue€of€liability,€the€conduct€ofÏthe€defendant€is€to€be€measured€against€what€aÏreasonably€prudent€person€would,€or€would€not,€haveÏdone€under€the€same€or€similar€circumstances.€.€.€.€€InÏour€opinion,€the€appropriate€question€to€beÏdetermined€from€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€isÏwhether€the€defendant€exercised€reasonable€care€andÏcaution€in€checking€on€the€truth€or€falsity€and€theÏdefamatory€character€of€the€communication€beforeÏpublishing€it.Ì€€òòò òÌÓÓId.óóó ó€€Finally,€the€Restatement€imposes€liability€only€if€the€defendant€actsÏnegligently€in€failing€to€ascertain€truth€or€falsity.€€òòò òPress,€Inc.ó óóó,€569€S.W.2d€atÏ442;€òòò òRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsó óóó€ðð€580B€(1977).Ìà àWe€note€that€all€of€the€cases€cited€concern€media€defendants.€€However,Ïin€ò òòòTrigg€v.€Lakeway€Publishers,€Inc.ó óóó,€720€S.W.2d€69,€75€(Tenn.€App.€1986),€theÏMiddle€Section€of€this€Court€specifically€held€that€a€non„media€co„defendantÏwas€entitled€to€the€same€First€Amendment€protection€as€a€media€defendant.Ìà àPlaintiff€claims€that€the€defendants€were€negligent€because€they€did€notÏtake€advantage€of€surveillance€cameras€to€verify€their€identifications.€€However,Íthe€record€establishes€that€no€surveillance€cameras€were€in€place€in€either€theÏelectronics€department€(where€the€transaction€took€place)€or€the€customerÏpick„up€area€(where€the€purchaser€receives€the€goods€purchased)€on€the€date€ofÏthe€alleged€transaction.€€The€store€manager,€Michael€Thomas,€stated€in€hisÏaffidavit€that€there€were€no€surveillance€cameras€in€the€electronics€departmentÏand€in€his€deposition€that€there€were€no€surveillance€cameras€in€the€customerÏpick„up€area.€€The€defendants€did€not€have€any€way€to€verify€the€truth€of€theirÏidentifications€except€through€personal€observation€and€memory.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€further€contends€that€the€clerks€were€negligent€because€theyÏentertained€doubts€about€the€identification.€€Duncan€admitted€that€the€personÏin€the€photograph€had€a€different€hair€style€than€the€plaintiff.€€However,€theÏrecord€states€that€Duncan€was€sure€that€it€was€the€same€person€because€sheÏhad€a€long€time€to€look€at€the€woman€during€the€transaction.€€The€record€isÏdevoid€of€any€proof€that€the€clerks€doubted€their€identification.€€Negligence€isÏnot€established€by€the€fact€that€a€different€hairstyle€appeared€in€the€picture.€ÏMany€people€wear€their€hair€in€different€styles€on€different€days€but€are€stillÏrecognizable.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€also€argues€that€the€clerks€could€have€cleared€up€any€doubtsÍby€sending€the€credit€card€receipt€to€a€handwriting€expert€to€determine€if€theÏplaintiff€was€the€one€involved€in€the€VCR€transaction.€€While€this€may€beÏliterally€true,€we€believe€that€it€is€unreasonable€and€absurd€to€expect€aÏlayperson€who€is€asked€to€identify€someone€in€a€picture€to€suggest€aÏhandwriting€expert€before€pointing€to€a€picture€of€someone€they€reasonablyÏbelieve€that€they€recognize.Ìà àFinally,€the€plaintiff€argues€that€Service€Merchandise€and€its€clerks€wereÏnegligent€because€they€did€not€follow€internal€Service€Merchandise€policies€andÏprocedures€regarding€fraudulent€credit€card€transactions.€€The€plaintiff€allegesÏthat€at€the€time€in€question€it€was€the€standard€policy€of€Service€MerchandiseÏthat€its€employees€were€prohibited€to€talk€with€the€general€public€regardingÏcredit€card€fraud€and€could€only€discuss€credit€card€fraud€with€the€police.€€ThisÏargument€fails€because€a€violation€of€corporate€policy€by€the€clerks€has€nothingÏto€do€with€ascertaining€truth€or€falsity.€€Even€if€they€violated€policy€byÏspeaking€with€Lutton€and€the€security€guards,€the€clerks€may€have€been€carefulÏand€reasonable€in€what€they€told€them.€€€€€€Ìà àWe€believe€that€the€defendants€exercised€reasonable€care€and€caution€inÏchecking€on€the€truth€or€falsity€of€their€statements,€and€therefore,€an€essentialÍelement€of€defamation€fails.€€A€reasonable€and€prudent€person€would€rely€onÏtheir€own€observations€and€memory€to€identify€someone€in€a€photo€line„up.€ÏWe€hold€that€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€granting€summary€judgmentÏbecause€no€statement,€either€written€or€oral,€constituted€defamation€becauseÏthere€was€no€fault€on€the€part€of€any€defendant.€ÌÓ  ÓIV.ÌÓ  Óà àEven€if€the€statements€by€the€defendants€constituted€defamation,€weÏbelieve€that€the€defendants€are€entitled€to€summary€judgment€because€thoseÏstatements€are€conditionally€privileged€under€a€public€interest€privilege.Ìà àA€conditional€privilege€is€recognized€where€the€interest€which€theÏdefendant€is€seeking€to€vindicate€or€further€is€regarded€as€sufficientlyÏimportant€to€justify€some€latitude€for€making€mistakes.€€W.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,Ïòòò òProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsó óóó,€ðð€115,€at€825€(5th€ed.€1988).€€TheÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€authorized€conditional€privileges€in€ò òòòSouthern€Ice€Co.Ïv.€Blackóóó ó,€136€Tenn.€391€(1916):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQualified€privilege€extends€to€all€communicationsÏmade€in€good€faith€upon€any€subject„matter€in€whichÏthe€party€communicating€has€an€interest,€or€inÏreference€to€which€he€has€a€duty€to€a€person€having€aÏcorresponding€interest€or€duty;€and€the€privilegeÏembraces€cases€where€the€duty€is€not€a€legal€one,€butÍwhere€it€is€of€a€moral€or€social€character€of€imperfectÏobligation.€.€.€.€The€rule€announced€is€necessary€inÏorder€that€full€and€unrestricted€communicationÏconcerning€a€matter€in€which€the€parties€have€anÏinterest€may€be€had.€€It€is€grounded€in€public€policyÏas€well€as€reason.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€at€401€(citations€omitted);€òòò òsee€also€Price€v.€Saleóóó ó,€8€Tenn.€Civ.€App.€382,Ï392„3€(1918).Ìà àConditional€privileges€may€cover€many€different€types€of€interestsÏincluding€a€common€interest€and€a€public€interest.€€Keeton€et€al.,€òòò òsupraóóó ó,€atÏ826„31.€€The€common€interest€privilege€has€been€recognized€in€Tennessee€toÏcover€communications€between€employees€or€agents€of€the€same€business€orÏcorporation.€€ò òòòSee€Woods€v.€Helmióóó ó,€758€S.W.2d€219€(Tenn.€App.€1988);Ïòòò òSouthern€Ice€Co.óóó ó,€136€Tenn.€391.€€We€do€not€decide€if€the€parties€involved€inÏthe€case€ò òòòsub€judiceó óóó€have€a€common€interest€because€we€believe€that€theÏdefendantsðð€statements€are€covered€by€a€public€interest€privilege.Ìà àThe€public€interest€privilege€was€discussed€by€the€Tennessee€Court€ofÏAppeals€in€òòò òTravis€v.€Bacherigóóó ó,€7€Tenn.€App.€638€(1928):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€defense€of€privileged€communication€must€beÏmade€in€good€faith€in€the€prosecution€of€an€inquiryÏregarding€a€crime€which€has€been€committed,€and€forÏthe€purpose€of€detecting€and€bringing€to€punishmentÏthe€criminal.€€ð ðThe€law€requires€such€charges€to€beÍmade€in€the€honest€desire€to€promote€the€ends€ofÏjustice,€and€not€with€spite€or€malicious€feeling€againstÏthe€person€accused,€nor€with€the€purpose€ofÏobtaining€any€indirect€advantage€to€the€accuser.€€NorÏshould€serious€accusations€be€made€recklessly€orÏwantonly;€they€should€always€be€warranted€by€someÏcircumstances€reasonably€arousing€suspicion,€andÏthey€should€not€be€made€unnecessarily€to€personsÏunconcerned,€nor€before€more€persons,€nor€inÏstronger€language€than€necessary.ððÌÌòòò òId.ó óóó€at€643€(citations€omitted).Ìà àÌÓÓà àThe€interests€of€the€public€in€preventing€crime€and€punishing€criminalsÏoutweigh€the€interest€of€any€plaintiff€concerning€statements€of€accusation,€asÏlong€as€the€accusation€is€made€in€good€faith€and€without€express€malice.€€TheÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€(1977)€states€the€important€public€interestÏprivilege€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àðð€598.€€òòCommunication€to€One€Who€May€Act€in€the€PublicÏInterestóóÌÌà8 àà8 àAn€occasion€makes€a€publication€conditionallyÏprivileged€if€the€circumstances€induce€a€correct€orÏreasonable€belief€that€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(a)€there€is€information€that€affects€a€sufficientlyÏimportant€public€interest,€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(b)€the€public€interest€requires€the€communication€ofÏthe€defamatory€matter€to€a€public€officer€or€a€privateÏcitizen€who€is€authorized€or€privileged€to€take€actionÍif€the€defamatory€matter€is€true.€ÌÌòòò òRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsó óóó€ðð€598€(1977).€ÌÌÓÓà àOur€Supreme€Court€has€adopted€sections€580A€and€580B€of€theÏRestatement€as€the€law€on€defamation€in€Tennessee.€€òòò òPress,€Inc.ó óóó,€569€S.W.2d€atÏ442.€€Section€598€is€cross„referenced€in€section€580B.€€We€are€not€aware€ofÏany€Tennessee€case€that€has€considered€the€public€interest€privilege€as€itÏapplies€to€communications€with€private€citizens;€however,€we€believe€theÏRestatement€is€a€correct€statement€of€the€law€in€this€regard€and€should€beÏapplied€in€this€state.Ìà àThere€is€no€doubt€that€the€investigation€of€a€crime€and€the€apprehensionÏof€criminals€are€important€public€interests.€€In€the€case€ò òòòsub€judiceó óóó,€even€thoughÏthe€investigation€was€not€conducted€by€the€local€police,€the€investigation€byÏthe€security€department€could€have€led€to€the€apprehension€of€the€criminal.€€ItÏis€reasonable€for€anyone€in€the€position€of€the€clerks€to€believe€that€theÏidentification€would€affect€the€public€interest€of€preventing€crime.€€The€publicÏinterest€privilege€is€grounded€in€public€policy,€and€we€should€encourageÏcooperation€with€an€investigation€of€a€criminal€matter.€€Ìà àThe€statements€made€in€the€course€of€the€cooperation€cannot€includeÍirrelevant€defamatory€matter€not€related€to€the€public€interest€and€cannot€beÏmade€in€the€presence€of€a€third€person€who€does€not€have€a€legitimate€interestÏin€the€matter.€€Keeton€et€al.,€òòò òsupraóóó ó,€at€832.€€The€statements€in€this€case€wereÏdirect€and€to€the€point€and€were€not€overheard€by€any€third€parties.€€TheÏplaintiff€contends,€however,€that€the€recipients€of€the€statements,€Lutton€andÏthe€security€guards,€were€not€the€type€of€citizens€contemplated€by€ðð€598.€€WeÏmust€respectfully€disagree.€€The€comment€to€ðð€598€states,€ð ðThe€privilege€.€.€.Ïaffords€protection€to€a€private€citizen€who€publishes€defamatory€matter€to€aÏthird€person€even€though€he€is€not€a€law€enforcement€officer,€underÏcircumstances€which,€if€true,€would€give€the€recipient€a€privilege€to€act€for€theÏpurpose€of€preventing€a€crime€or€of€apprehending€a€criminal€.€.€.€.ðð€Ïòòò òRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsó óóó€ðð€598€cmt.€f€(1977).Ìà àWe€believe€that€Lutton€and€the€security€guards€are€within€the€purviewÏof€ðð€598.€€It€was€reasonable€for€the€clerks€to€rely€on€the€uniformed€securityÏguards€and€to€help€Lutton,€the€victim€of€a€crime× ƒ. ××  ×.€€The€victim€of€a€crime€hasÍthe€unfortunate€privilege€of€acting€to€apprehend€a€criminal.€€Most€times€itÏwould€be€impossible€for€the€police€to€successfully€investigate€and€apprehendÏcriminals€without€the€actions€of€the€victim.€€Likewise,€the€police€depend€onÏthe€separate€investigations€and€services€of€independent€security€forces€to€aid€inÏtheir€own€investigations.€€A€uniformed€security€guard€may€act€to€apprehend€aÏcriminal€or€arrest€a€subject€and€detain€him€until€the€police€arrive.€€The€initialÏinvestigations€by€security€forces€are€many€times€the€springboards€for€successfulÏconvictions.Ìà àEven€if€the€recipient€is€not€a€proper€candidate€to€hear€the€defamatoryÏstatements,€we€believe€the€cornerstone€of€the€public€interest€privilege€shouldÏbe€good€faith.€€As€stated€in€ò òòòTravisóóó ó,€7€Tenn.€App.€at€643,€ð ðthe€defense€ofÏprivileged€communication€must€be€made€in€good€faith€.€.€.€in€the€honest€desireÏto€promote€the€ends€of€justice.ðð€€If€the€speaker€of€the€defamatory€statementÏmakes€the€identification€or€accusation€in€good€faith,€the€statement€is€coveredÏby€the€public€interest€privilege€even€if€the€speaker€makes€a€mistake€about€theÏrecipient.€€Prosser€and€Keeton€state€that€ð ðwhile€a€misguided€notion€as€to€theÏdefendantððs€moral€obligation€or€justification€to€make€the€statement€will€notÏexonerate€him,€he€is€privileged€to€publish€it€to€any€person€who€reasonablyÍappears€to€have€a€duty,€interest€or€authority€in€connection€Ñ  Ñwith€the€matter.ððÏKeeton€et€al.,€òòò òsupraóóó ó,€at€833.€€€€Ìà àThe€clerks€made€their€identifications€in€good€faith€in€an€honest€attemptÏto€help€in€the€investigation.€€While€the€record€indicates€that€Lutton€may€notÏhave€been€acting€in€good€faith,€it€is€the€good€faith€of€the€speaker,€not€theÏrecipient,€that€is€the€key€to€the€public€interest€privilege.€€The€uniformedÏsecurity€guards€reasonably€appeared€to€the€clerks€to€have€a€duty€and€theÏauthority€to€conduct€the€investigation.€€Lutton€also€appeared€to€have€anÏinterest€that€the€clerks€could€vindicate€by€making€a€good€faith€identification.€Ìà àThe€privilege€can€be€lost,€however,€if€the€defendant€does€not€act€withÏgood€faith€or€acts€with€actual€malice.€€When€a€statement€is€conditionallyÏprivileged,€it€is€not€actionable€unless€actual€or€express€malice€is€shown€by€theÏplaintiff.€€ò òòòWoods€v.€Helmió óóó,€758€S.W.2d€219,€224€(Tenn.€App.€1988);€òòò òSouthernÏIce€Co.óóó ó,€136€Tenn.€at€401.€€Once€privileged,€the€statement€is€presumed€to€haveÏbeen€made€without€malice,€and€the€burden€is€on€the€plaintiff€to€prove€expressÏmalice.€€òòò òLangford€v.€Vanderbilt€Universityóóó ó,€318€S.W.2d€568,€576€(Tenn.€App.Ï1958).€€To€prove€actual€malice,€there€must€be€sufficient€evidence€to€permit€theÏconclusion€that€the€defendant€in€fact€entertained€serious€doubts€as€to€the€truthÍof€his€publication,€and€that€publishing,€with€such€doubt,€shows€recklessÏdisregard€for€truth€or€falsity€and€demonstrates€actual€malice.€€òòò òMoore€v€Baileyóóó ó,Ï628€S.W.2d€431,€433„4€(Tenn.€App.€1981).Ìà àThe€record€does€not€show€any€actual€malice€on€the€part€of€theÏdefendants.€€As€we€stated€above,€the€record€does€not€even€show€any€negligence,Ïmuch€less€any€malice€or€reckless€disregard€for€the€truth.€€There€is€no€evidenceÏthat€the€defendants€entertained€serious€doubts€or€acted€with€actual€malice.€ÏWe€hold€that€the€statements€by€the€defendants€identifying€the€plaintiff,€bothÏorally€and€written,€are€conditionally€privileged€under€a€public€interest€privilege€Ïand,€therefore,€are€not€actionable.€€à àÌÓ  ÓÌV.€€€€ÌÓ  Óà àThe€plaintiff€also€claims€that€the€defendants€were€negligent€regardless€ofÏany€defamatory€statement.€€However,€the€trial€court€granted€summaryÏjudgment€for€the€defendants€partly€on€the€basis€that€there€was€no€act€ofÏcommission€or€omission€which€constituted€negligence€as€a€matter€of€law.€€TheÏrecord€does€not€establish€any€negligence€on€the€part€of€the€defendants.€€For€theÏreasons€stated€above,€we€believe€that€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€grantingÍsummary€judgment€because€there€was€no€negligent€act.€€Our€holding€todayÏpretermits€the€issue€of€whether€the€actions€of€St.€Francis€Hospital€and€St.ÏFrancis€employees€were€superseding,€intervening€acts.Ìà àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€toÏdefendants,€Service€Merchandise,€Co.,€Inc.,€Michael€Thomas,€Lisa€Duncan,€andÏVelma€Wilson€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€assessed€against€theÏappellant.ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌ_________________________________ÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌ_________________________________Ìò òHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌÔ€Ôœ