ÿWPCb 0#†°UN6 %„ 0(Š4²Æ BÕò 0Jò 0T< 0^ 0hî 0rVwÈ 0|Þ 0DZ 0†ž 0$Æ´ 1uzU,ï AO 0Dj 0d® U, U >> 0@| B)¼ D3å DC D/[ AMŠ B× U*ô e ò v~vÓ˜HP LaserJet 4/4MHPPCL5E,,,,0®ØP g4ö÷ Êc æP(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡1# <Ô$$3|xq d2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(Modern$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d 'ÿÿdxd%%%%7Border 1dd**'÷ÿ dxd$'Cþÿ << GÿÿüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial èÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ€+ÔÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔó óÌò òÔ€+¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ, ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€+XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.Ô€#Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€#ÂÔÔ€+ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€#ÔÔ€#XÔPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÙ€ÙÓ  Óò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑßL€)-';+'h|Å;â `€€LßIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEó óÌÌÓ  Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÓ ` ¸ pÈÓÌò òTERESA€K.€ROSS,ó ó€€€à à)€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Respondent/à à)Ìà à€€Counter„Petitioner/Appellant,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìvs.à àà à)€€€€€€€€à à€€€€€€€ò ò€No.€€01A01„9410„PB„00470Ìà àà àó ó)ò ò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Davidson€County€Probateó óÌò òWILLIAM€P.€ROSSó ó,à à)à à€€€€€€€€No.€90D„3573Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Petitioner/à à)Ìà à€€Counter„Respondent/Appellee.à à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓAPPEAL€FROM€THE€PROBATE€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌTHE€HONORABLE€JAMES€EVERETTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òT.€TURNER€SNODGRASSÌó ó2300€21st€Avenue€SouthÌNashville,€Tennessee€€€37212ÌAttorney€for€Plaintiff/Respondent/ÌCounter„Petitioner/AppellantÌÌÌò òGRAYSON€SMITH€CANNONÌó óOne€NorthChaseÌ1000€NorthChase€Drive,€Suite€109ÌP.O.€Box€749ÌGoodlettsville,€Tennessee€€€37070„0749ÌAttorney€for€Defendant/PetitionerÌCounter„Respondent/AppelleeÌÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌÌà àà àà àò òROBERT€E.€CORLEW,€IIIÌà àà àà àSPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€JUDGEÌSAM€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌó óÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÑ7€–)XXdìXXdì7ÑÓ  Óòòò òÔ€#¼ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€#XÔóóó óà àFrom€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€modifying€the€final€decree€of€divorce€between€theÏparties,€terminating€payments€of€spousal€support€previously€ordered€to€be€paid€by€the€husband€toÏthe€wife,€the€wife€appeals.€€Ìà àThe€facts€present€a€particularly€troublesome€situation€for€the€Court.€€The€parties€wereÏmarried€for€twenty„four€years€before€their€divorce,€and€the€evidence€shows€that€from€time€to€timeÏduring€their€marriage€the€parties€enjoyed€favorable€financial€circumstances,€and€at€other€timesÏunfavorable€financial€circumstances.€€€€The€parties€separated,€and€the€husband,€who€it€isÏacknowledged€was€engaged€in€an€extra„marital€affair€with€his€secretary,€sought€a€divorce.€€TheÏhusband€had€moved€to€New€York€state,€but€found€that€he€was€unable€to€file€for€divorce€there€andÏfeared€that€he€had€no€ground€for€divorce€in€Tennessee.€€The€wife€initially€chose€not€to€agree€to€theÏentry€of€a€decree€of€divorce,€but€subsequently,€unbeknownst€to€the€husband,€began€to€engage€in€anÏextra„marital€affair€with€an€attorney€who€had€represented€both€of€the€parties€at€least€at€one€pointÏduring€their€marriage.€€€The€wife€initially€resisted€the€divorce,€but€after€her€relationship€developedÏwith€the€attorney,€she€contacted€the€husband,€telling€him€she€would€agree€to€the€entry€of€theÏdivorce€if€it€could€be€done€quickly.€€The€Husband,€who€had€been€eager€to€divorce€for€a€lengthyÏperiod€of€time,€quickly€proceeded€to€negotiate.€€The€wife€hired€an€attorney€who€had€just€completedÏlaw€school€and€either€had€just€been€licensed€or€was€provisionally€licensed,€and€who€worked€in€theÏlaw€office€of€the€attorney€with€whom€she€was€engaged€in€the€affair.€€This€attorney€met€with€theÏwife€on€only€one€occasion,€found€employment€elsewhere,€and€the€divorce€was€ultimately€presentedÏto€the€Court€by€the€attorney€with€whom€the€wife€was€socially€engaged.€€Ìà àIn€an€effort€to€expedite€the€granting€of€the€divorce,€the€wife€suggested€to€the€husband€thatÍhe€should€hire€a€Tennessee€lawyer€who€would€file€an€answer€for€him,€thus€preventing€a€wait€ofÏthirty€days€after€the€filing€of€the€divorce€before€the€final€decree€could€be€entered.€€€To€this€end,€theÏattorney€with€whom€the€wife€was€engaged€in€the€affair€contacted€another€attorney€who€agreed€toÏserve€as€counsel€for€the€husband.€€The€record€reflects€that€the€husband,€then,€transmitted€a€largeÏamount€of€funds€to€the€escrow€account€of€the€wife's€attorney€for€the€payment€of€outstanding€bills,Ïand€also€for€payment€of€the€retainer€fee€for€the€husband's€lawyer.€€The€evidence€reflects€that€theÏhusband's€attorney€did€give€him€advice,€although€primarily€after€the€decree€of€divorce€was€entered.€€ÏThe€husband€and€wife€agreed€upon€a€marital€dissolution€agreement€which€the€husband's€attorneyÏdid€not€review€but€which€was€entered€as€a€part€of€the€decree€of€divorce.€€€Ìà àAt€issue€in€this€appeal€is€a€provision€of€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,€which€providedÏin€part:ÌÓ` ¸ pÈÓÓÓà8 à1.à àThe€parties€acknowledge€that€wife€has€advanced€husband€certain€moniesÏduring€their€marriage€and€that€husband€desires€to€repay€these€monies€as€well€as€payÏto€wife€monies€for€their€years€of€marriage.€€€Husband€agrees€to€pay€wife€$5,000.00Ïfor€each€of€the€twenty„four€years€of€their€marriage;€€$80,000.00€for€the€money€wifeÏplaced€into€the€home€at€Abbottsford€that€was€foreclosed€upon;€€$35,000.00€for€theÏmoney€wife€placed€into€the€home€on€Park€Avenue,€Milan,€Tennessee;€€andÏ$22,000.00€wife€loaned€husband's€brother€and€sister€in€law,€for€a€total€ofÏ$257,000.00.€€€Husband€agrees€to€repay€the€$257,000.00€as€alimony€in€monthlyÏinstallments€of€$2,000.00€per€month€commencing€October€15,€1990€withÏsubsequent€installments€due€and€payable€on€or€before€the€15th€of€each€successiveÏmonth.€€The€parties€agree€that€these€payments€shall€continue€until€the€$257,000.00Ïhas€been€paid€in€full;€that€is€husband€agrees€to€pay€the€$2,000.00€for€128€monthsÏwith€the€final€$1,000.00€due€in€the€129th€month.€€ÌÌÌÓÓà àSome€two€weeks€after€the€entry€of€the€final€decree€of€divorce,€the€wife€married€herÏattorney.€€The€husband€asserts€that€the€wife€concealed€her€remarriage€from€him,€and€on€occasionsÏrepresented€to€him€that€she€was€contemplating€marriage€to€other€persons.€€It€was€not€until€theÏhusband€had€made€thirty„one€monthly€payments€that€he€was€contacted€by€a€representative€of€theÏFederal€Bureau€of€Investigation,€who€was€investigating€the€wife,€and€from€when€the€husbandÏlearned€that€the€wife€had€in€fact€married€her€attorney.€€Ìà àThe€husband€then€moved€the€Trial€Court€to€set€aside€the€decree€of€divorce,€asserting€that€itÍwas€granted€upon€a€fraudulent€basis,€in€that€the€wife€was€then€engaged€in€an€extra„marital€affairÏand€failed€to€disclose€that€fact€to€the€husband.€€€It€was€the€contention€of€the€husband€that€the€wifeÏknew€of€the€affair€in€which€he€was€engaged,€and€thus€that€she€had€grounds€for€divorce,€but€that€heÏknew€of€no€ground€that€he€had€for€divorce,€forcing€him€to€agree€to€a€marital€dissolution€agreementÏto€which€he€would€not€have€otherwise€agreed€had€he€known€that€he€also€had€grounds€for€divorce.€ÏThe€file€contains€no€evidence€of€any€questions€falsely€answered€by€the€wife,€either€in€depositions,Ïinterrogatories,€or€in€open€court.€€Further,€the€husband€acknowledges€that€the€wife's€attorneyÏnever€provided€any€advice€to€him,€and€never€made€representations€to€him.€€Ìà àThe€husband€filed€suit€seeking€the€order€of€the€Court€setting€aside€the€decree€of€divorce,€orÏalternatively,€modifying€the€award€of€spousal€support.€€€The€Trial€Court,€apparently€incensed€byÏthe€conduct€of€trial€counsel,€none€of€whom€are€involved€in€this€appellate€action,€granted€the€petitionÏto€modify€support,€terminating€the€award€of€alimony€immediately.€€€We€find€that€the€decree€wasÏimprovidently€modified,€and€we€therefore€reverse€the€Trial€Court.Ìà àWe€concur,€however,€with€the€Trial€Court€that€the€conduct€of€trial€counsel€in€this€matterÏwas€extremely€unfortunate.€€€The€unethical€behavior€of€counsel,€however,€is€a€collateral€issue,€andÏdoes€not€affect€the€merits€of€this€case.€€Nonetheless,€being€faced€with€the€unethical€actions,€it€is€theÏduty€of€this€Court€to€recognize€more€appropriate€behavior€which€counsel€should€have€followed.€ÏThe€òòTennessee€Code€of€Professional€Responsibilityóó€sets€forth€guidelines€which€attorneys€shouldÏfollow€in€the€practice€of€law.€€Canon€1€of€that€code€provides€"a€lawyer€should€assist€in€maintainingÏthe€integrity€and€confidence€of€the€legal€profession."€€Further,€lawyers€are€encouraged€to€"maintainÏhigh€standards€of€profession€conduct."€€òòTennessee€Code€of€Professional€Responsibilityóó,€EthicalÏConsideration€1„5.ÌÓÓà8 àLawyers€should€be€...€dignified,€and€should€refrain€from€all€illegal€and€morallyÏreprehensible€conduct.€€€Because€of€the€lawyer's€position€in€society,€even€minorÏviolations€of€law€by€a€lawyer€may€tend€to€lessen€the€public€confidence€in€the€legalÏprofession.ÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€A€lawyer€should€decline€to€represent€an€individual€where€he€is€emotionally€involved€with€thatÍindividual€and€the€intensity€of€his€personal€feeling€may€tend€to€impair€his€effective€professionalÏrepresentation€of€that€individual.€€€òòTennessee€Code€of€Professional€Responsibilityóó,€EthicalÏConsideration€2„30.€€Ethical€Consideration€5„3€further€suggests€that€a€lawyer's€judgment€may€beÏclouded€when€he€gains€an€interest€in€property€in€which€the€client€also€has€an€interest.€€òòIdóó.€€€It€isÏfurther€suggested€that€ÌÓÓà8 àthe€possibility€of€an€adverse€effect€upon€the€exercise€of€free€judgment€by€a€lawyerÏon€behalf€of€a€client€during€litigation€generally€makes€it€undesirable€for€the€lawyerÏto€acquire€a€proprietary€interest€in€the€cause€of€a€client€or€otherwise€to€becomeÏfinancially€interested€in€the€outcome€of€the€litigation.€€ÌÌÌÓÓòòTennessee€Code€of€Professional€Responsibilityóó,€Ethical€Consideration€5„7.€€One€of€the€Canons€ofÏthe€Code€provides€that€an€attorney€should€avoid€even€the€appearance€of€professional€impropriety.€ÏòòTennessee€Code€of€Professional€Responsibilityóó,€Canon€9.€€"Public€confidence€in€law€and€lawyersÏmay€be€eroded€by€irresponsible€or€improper€conduct€of€a€lawyer."€€òòTennessee€Code€ofÏProfessional€Responsibilityóó,€Ethical€Consideration€9„2.€€Ìà àThe€evidence€contained€herein€reflects€that€the€actions€of€the€wife's€attorney€certainly€wereÏquestionable,€and€the€independence€of€the€attorney€for€the€husband€certainly€may€be€called€intoÏquestion€because€of€the€manner€in€which€he€was€hired.€€Unfortunate€though€these€circumstancesÏare,€they€merely€divert€our€attention€from€the€issues€presented€in€this€cause.€€Ìà àSuccinctly€stated,€the€issues€presented€for€our€review€are€(1)€€whether€the€failure€of€aÏdivorcing€litigant€to€voluntarily€disclose€to€her€spouse€the€existence€of€an€extra„marital€affair,Ïwithout€responding€falsely€to€interrogatories,€questions€in€a€deposition,€or€other€discovery€matters,Ïcombined€with€the€failure€of€the€other€party€otherwise€to€learn€of€the€existence€of€that€extra„maritalÏaffair,€sets€forth€a€ground€for€modification€of€a€divorce€decree€subsequently€entered,€incorporatingÏa€marital€dissolution€agreement€entered€by€the€parties;€€and€(2)€€whether€the€secret€remarriage€of€aÏrecipient€of€spousal€support,€after€the€entry€of€the€decree€of€divorce,€presents€a€ground€forÏmodification€of€a€decree€of€divorce,€terminating€an€order€for€spousal€support.€€€Ìà àWe€must€recognize€initially€that€in€many,€many€divorces€the€full€spectrum€of€misconduct€ofÍeach€of€the€parties€is€not€known€to€the€other.€€€Were€we€to€recognize€this€as€a€ground€forÏmodification€of€a€final€decree€of€divorce,€there€would€be€no€end€to€orders€of€modification.€€€AÏformer€spouse€is€not€entitled€to€relief€from€a€decree€of€divorce€upon€the€ground€that€the€formerÏspouse€failed€to€disclose€matters€of€significance,€which€were€not€provided€through€discovery.€€ÏòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€863€S.W.2d€432,€434€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993)€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó.€€Ìà àA€party€moving€for€post„judgment€relief€must€describe€with€specificity€the€basis€uponÏwhich€relief€should€be€granted,€and€show€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence€that€relief€from€theÏjudgment€is€warranted.€€òòDuncan€v.€Duncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€557,€563€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990)€òòperm.Ïapp.€deniedóó.€€There€is€no€provision€of€law€which€requires€a€party€voluntarily€to€disclose€allÏindiscretions€or€circumstances€of€marital€infidelity,€absent€such€issues€being€addressed€to€the€partyÏformally,€through€permissible€discovery€procedures.€€Certainly€a€different€decision€is€reachedÏwhere€perjured€testimony€is€presented,€or€withholding€of€evidence€which€has€been€sought€occurs.€ÏòòIdóó.€€There€is€no€evidence,€however,€in€the€record€before€us€which€reflects€that€any€requests€forÏdiscovery€were€ever€made,€nor€was€any€evidence€which€was€formally€requested€ever€withheld,€norÏwas€perjured€testimony€ever€provided.€€Ìà àSimilarly,€there€is€no€obligation€to€disclose€the€fact€of€remarriage.€€òòButcher€v.€Webbóó,€869ÏS.W.2d€336,€338€(Tenn.€1994).€€Where€the€actions€on€the€part€of€a€party€concealing€the€fact€ofÏremarriage€are€not€made€at€a€time€when€there€is€an€affirmative€duty€to€notify€the€former€spouse€ofÏremarriage,€it€has€been€held€that€these€actions€do€not€constitute€fraud.€€òòIdóó.€Ìà àWe€must€also€consider€whether€the€subsequent€remarriage€of€the€wife,€separate€and€apartÏfrom€any€allegation€of€fraud,€should€justify€the€termination€of€her€right€to€continue€to€receiveÏspousal€support.€€òòTennessee€Code€Annotated€ððóó36„5„101€(a)€(3)€(1991)€provides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€all€cases€where€a€person€is€receiving€alimony€in€futuro€and€the€alimony€recipientÏlives€with€a€third€person,€a€rebuttal€presumption€is€thereby€raised€that:Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 à(A)€€The€third€person€is€contributing€to€the€support€of€the€alimonyÏrecipient€and€the€alimony€recipient€therefore€does€not€need€theÏamount€of€support€previously€awarded,€and€the€court€thereforeÏshould€suspend€all€or€part€of€the€alimony€obligation€of€the€formerÍspouse;€orÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€€€€The€third€person€is€receiving€support€from€the€alimonyÏrecipient€and€the€alimony€recipient€therefore€does€not€need€theÏamount€of€alimony€previously€awarded€and€the€court€thereforeÏshould€suspend€all€or€part€of€the€alimony€obligation€of€the€formerÏspouse.ÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€The€proof€is€uncontradicted€that€the€wife€remarried€immediately€after€the€entry€of€the€decree€ofÏdivorce.€€€Therefore,€if€in€fact€the€alimony€which€she€was€ordered€to€receive€is€alimony€in€futuro,Ïthe€rebuttable€presumption€arises.€€€Alimony€in€futuro€has€been€defined€to€continue€the€supportÏincident€to€the€marital€relationship,€for€an€indefinite€period€of€time.€€òòSelf€v.€Selfóó,€861€S.W.2d€360,Ï361€(Tenn.€1993);€€òòIsbell€v.€Isbellóó,€816€S.W.2d€735,€738€(Tenn.€1991);€€òòBrewer€v.€Breweróó,€869ÏS.W.2d€928,€935€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993)€òòperm.€app.€denied.€€óóThis€presumption€may€be€overcome,Ïhowever,€when€there€is€a€showing€that€the€recipient€of€the€spousal€support€award€is€still€in€need€ofÏsupport,€despite€her€new€relationship.€€òòAzbill€v.€Azbillóó,€661€S.W.2d€682,€686€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1993)€òòperm.€app.€denied.€€óóWe€first€find€that€the€alimony€awarded€herein€is€not€alimony€in€futuro,Ïand€thus€not€subject€to€the€statutory€presumption.€€The€payments€discussed€in€the€maritalÏdissolution€agreement€between€these€parties€do€not€meet€the€definition€of€alimony€in€futuro.€ÏFurther,€were€the€statutory€presumption€to€arise,€as€asserted€by€the€Appellee,€then€we€find€that€theÏfactual€circumstances€presented€in€this€cause€show€that€the€wife,€despite€her€remarriage,€continuesÏto€be€in€need€of€spousal€support.€€€Testimony€concerning€this€issue,€presented€by€the€wife'sÏcurrent€husband,€shows€that€she€is€separated€from€her€husband,€and€receives€no€income€from€him.€€ÏFurther,€it€was€introduced€that€she€has€been€convicted€under€provisions€of€federal€law,€and€wasÏsentenced€to€serve€a€brief€period€of€time€in€federal€prison,€and€was€placed€on€probation€for€aÏlengthy€period€of€time.€€Given€these€factual€circumstances,€we€cannot€find€that€the€wife's€need€forÏsupport€has€ceased.€€Ìà àIf,€rather€than€alimony€in€futuro,€the€spousal€support€ordered€is€considered€to€beÏrehabilitative€alimony,€then€under€current€law,€this€support€remains€subject€to€the€continued€ordersÍof€the€Court.€€òòTennessee€Code€Annotated€ððóó36„5„101€(d)€(2)€(1991).€€Due€to€the€failure€of€the€wifeÏto€be€rehabilitated,€however,€€as€demonstrated€by€the€facts€cited€above,€we€find€it€to€have€been€anÏabuse€of€discretion€for€the€Honorable€Trial€Court€to€modify€the€support€award.Ìà àFinally,€upon€close€examination€of€the€marital€dissolution€agreement€incorporated€into€theÏdecree€of€divorce,€we€must€consider€that€the€language€contained€therein€appears€to€recognize€that€aÏsubstantial€sum€of€the€total€payments€ordered€to€be€paid€by€the€husband€to€the€wife,€althoughÏdenominated€alimony€within€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,€actually€was€not€alimony€at€all,€butÏin€the€nature€of€property€division.€€Certainly€the€payments€to€the€wife€in€contemplation€of€fundsÏwhich€she€had€expended€in€purchases€of€residences€and€loans€to€the€husband's€family€members,Ïwhere€properly€repaid€to€the€wife,€constitute€divisions€of€property,€and€not€payments€of€support.€€ÏWhere€sums€of€money€are€paid€by€one€spouse€to€another€in€consideration€of€the€division€ofÏproperty,€a€court€should€not€subsequently€modify€those€payments€as€they€remain€contractual€inÏnature.€€€òòTowner€v.€Towneróó,€858€S.W.2d€888,€890€(Tenn.€1993).€€Although€the€husband€testifiedÏthat€he€did€not€concern€himself€with€the€precise€language€of€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,Ïleaving€such€wording€to€his€wife,€it€is€difficult€to€find€that€payment€to€the€wife€of€"$22,000.00€forÏthe€money€wife€loaned€husband's€brother€and€sister€in€law"€and€"$35,000.00€for€the€money€wifeÏplaced€into€the€home€on€Park€Avenue"€is€not€a€division€of€property.€€€In€fact,€only€$120,000,Ïrepresenting€"$5,000€for€each€of€the€24€years€of€their€marriage"€appears€to€be€in€the€nature€ofÏalimony.€Ìà àWe€therefore€find€that€it€is€not€proper€to€modify€the€decree€of€divorce,€and€we€reverse€theÏdecision€of€the€Trial€Court.€€€Payments€of€spousal€support€from€the€husband€to€the€wife€shall€beÏresumed€immediately,€and€shall€continue€at€the€monthly€rate€provided€by€the€marital€dissolutionÏagreement€until€paid€in€full.€€€Ìà àThis€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€the€termsÏof€this€Opinion.€€€Costs€of€appeal€must€be€borne€by€the€Appellee.€€€Ìà àÌÌÓÓà àà àà àÌÌÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àóóROBERT€E.€CORLEW,€III,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóHENRY€F.€TODD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóSAM€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÑ7€βXXdðXXdð7ÑÌÓ  Óò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEó óÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÓ ` ¸ pÈÓÌÓ  Óò òTERESA€K.€ROSS,ó ó€€€à à)€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Respondent/à à)Ìà à€€Counter„Petitioner/Appellant,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìvs.à àà à)€€€€€€€€à à€€€€€€€ò ò€No.€€01A01„9410„PB„00470Ìà àà àó ó)ò ò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Davidson€County€Probateó óÌò òWILLIAM€P.€ROSSó ó,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Petitioner/à à)Ìà à€€Counter„Respondent/Appellee.à à)ÌÌÌÌÓ  Óòòò òJUDGMENTÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓó óà àóóThis€cause€came€on€further€to€be€considered€by€the€Court€upon€the€notice€of€appeal€filed€byÏthe€Plaintiff,€and€upon€the€briefs€of€both€parties,€the€arguments€of€counsel,€and€upon€the€entireÏrecord€in€this€cause,€from€all€of€which€the€Court€finds€that€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€shouldÏbe€reversed,€and€that€the€decree€of€divorce€originally€entered€by€the€Trial€Court€should€not€beÏmodified,€but€should€remain€in€force€as€originally€issued.€€Ìà àIT€IS€THEREFORE€ORDERED€that€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€reversed,€and€theÏcause€is€remanded€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€the€Opinion€of€this€Court.€€€Costs€ofÏappeal€are€taxed€against€the€Appellee.ÌÌÓÓÌÌÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Íà àà àà àóóROBERT€E.€CORLEW,€III,€SPECIALÏJUDGEÌÌÌÌÌòòà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà àà àà àóóHENRY€F.€TODD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌòòà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà àà àà àóóSAM€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌ