’WPCŁ …# VU:a %› 0(”b Éw@Õ4 ) 0J8 0T‚ 0^Ö 0h4 0rœ 0| 0†Š 0 1u  0d U*y B)£ DCĢ AM÷\v~SvÓŃ B¤ D3Į 0@ō AO4ʃ 0DI D/ B¼˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTČŚŲŚŚŲČŚ0nLHĪ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($””- ł - śDūüDżDžD’DӀ DŅ 3|x 2 ’’0Indent1Ō2ŌŌ3  Ō2" ’’0Indent2ą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2, ’’0Indent3ą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō26 ’’0Indent4ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2@ ’’0Indent5ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2J ’’0Indent6ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2T ’’0Indent7ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō2^ ’’0Indent8ą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąą0 ąŌ2ŌŌ3  Ō  ’’?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ’’8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cž’ << G’’ ķŻ ƒ!ŻŃ  ŃŃ#€d#ŃŌ€ŌŻ  ŻŌ€ŌÓ  Óņ ņŌ YYY ŌFILEDŌ€XŌĢĢMay€21,€1997ĢĢCecil€W.€CrowsonĢAppellate€Court€ClerkŌ  Ōó óPtPtHHŚ(’į’āłFG(üHHŚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆ ĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆĆŠ ŠŠHHŠŠ  ŠŠ2ŠŠ’’øę$’ŠŠHHŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ  ŠŠ ŠŠ ŠŃŃŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŃ € ŃŃ<Px–ČŃŅŅŅ443!#4ŅŅ$ *$ŅŅ$*$ŅŅ ’KK ŅŅ  Geneva ŅŅ  Geneva ŅÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßŃGenevaŃŃ ŃŅ  h HD: Geneva ŅŅ  h HD: Geneva Ņ d%%%%'’’dxd("’’$££Ņ  ŅŅ  Ņ€-‚ƒCž’<< C’’ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ņ ņŚ  Ś1Ś  Śó ó„„'÷’ dxdü’P PdŻ ƒ!ŻŌ . ŌŌ€ŌŻ  ŻŃ  ŃŅ € ŅŅ ° ŅŅ € ŅŅ „ ŅŃ\R AŲ'\ŃŃ\R AŲ'\ŃŃ€ŃŃ7€·čXXdędČ7ŃŃ  ŃŃ  ŃŽ ŽĢJAMES€DOYLE€RUST,€II,ą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąPlaintiff/Appellant,ą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)ą ąAppeal€No.Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)ą ą01„A„01„9608„CH„00361ĢVS.ą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)ą ąRutherford€ChanceryĢŁ€€ŁßR€ A1-j|^` ē `€€@’Rßą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)ą ąNo.€90DR„360ĢKAREN€RUTH€WAX€RUSTą ąą ą)ĢGERBMAN,ą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą)Ģą ąDefendant/Appellee.ą ąą ą)ĢĢĢĢą@ ąCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEĢą@ ąMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEĢĢĢĢAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€RUTHERFORD€COUNTYĢAT€MURFREESBORO,€TENNESSEEĢĢTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€E.€CORLEW,€III,€CHANCELLORĢĢĢĢĢRONALD€L.€STONEĢ6th€Floor,€211€Printers€AlleyĢNashville,€Tennessee€37201Ģą ąAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantĢĢBRAD€W.€HORNSBY€(At€trial)ĢJAY€B.€JACKSON€(On€appeal)ĢBULLOCK,€FLY€&€McFARLINĢ301€N.€Spring€StreetĢP.€O.€Box€398ĢMurfreesboro,€Tennessee€37133„0398Ģą ąAttorney€for€Defendant/AppelleeĢĢĢĢĢĢą@ ąAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDĢĢĢĢĢĢą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEĢĢĢCONCUR:ĢLEWIS,€J.ĢKOCH,€J.ĢĢÓÓÓ  Óą@ ąņ ņņņŌ€„ŌO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóŌ€XŌĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€experienced€a€dramatic€decline€in€income€after€his€divorce,Ļand€petitioned€for€a€reduction€in€his€child€support€obligation.€€Following€a€lengthyĻcourse€of€litigation,€the€trial€court€reduced€his€obligation€from€$1,500€per€month€toĻ$690€per€month,€and€made€the€reduction€retroactive€to€the€date€he€petitioned€forĻthe€modification.ĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€appealed,€arguing€that€even€this€drastically€reducedĻobligation€was€in€excess€of€the€presumptively€correct€amount€to€be€awardedĻunder€the€child€support€guidelines.€€His€former€wifeššs€position€on€appeal€was€thatĻit€was€error€to€order€any€reduction€at€all€in€child€support,€because€the€husbandĻwas€willfully€underemployed.€€Other€issues€on€appeal€involved€the€modification€ofĶthe€alimony€award,€the€conduct€of€the€wifeššs€attorney,€and€a€finding€of€contemptĻagainst€the€husband.€€We€affirm€the€trial€court€in€all€respects.ĢĢą@ ąņ ņI.€€The€Proceedingsó óĢĢą ąą ąIn€October€of€1989,€James€Doyle€Rust€left€the€marital€home€that€heĻhad€shared€with€Karen€Rust.€€The€couple€had€three€young€children,€one€of€whomĻhad€been€born€in€March€of€that€same€year.€€Mrs.€Rust€filed€a€petition€for€childĻsupport,€and€an€agreed€order€was€entered€on€July€10,€1990,€which€obligated€Mr.ĻRust€to€pay€$1500€per€month€in€child€support,€to€provide€medical€insurance€forĻMrs.€Rust€and€the€three€children,€and€to€pay€all€their€uninsured€medical€andĻdental€expenses.ĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€quickly€fell€behind€on€his€child€support€obligation,€and€Mrs.ĻRust€filed€a€petition€for€contempt€and€for€judgment€on€the€arrearages.€€The€petitionĻwas€still€pending€when€the€wife€filed€for€divorce€on€October€16,€1990.ĢĢą ąą ąThe€parties€subsequently€entered€into€a€Marital€DissolutionĻAgreement,€which€was€incorporated€into€the€Final€Decree€of€Divorce,€filed€MarchĻ19,€1991.€Divorce€was€granted€to€the€wife€on€the€ground€of€irreconcilableĻdifferences,€and€child€support€was€set€at€$1,200€per€month.€€The€contempt€caseĻand€divorce€complaint€were€consolidated€for€the€purpose€of€resolving€all€theĶpending€issues€in€a€single€proceeding.€€A€judgment€against€Mr.€Rust€for€the€childĻsupport€arrearage€in€the€amount€of€$7,192€was€made€a€part€of€the€decree,€butĻexecution€on€the€judgment€was€stayed€pending€continuing€payment€on€theĻobligation€of€$100€per€month.ĢĢą ąą ąFurther€litigation€followed,€largely€involving€visitation€and€schoolingĻfor€the€children,€the€details€of€which€it€is€unnecessary€to€recite€here,€except€insofarĻas€the€courtššs€order€resolving€those€issues€also€modified€Mr.€Rustššs€supportĻobligations€once€again.ĢĢą ąą ąThe€court€ordered€that€child€support€again€be€increased€to€$1,500Ļper€month.€€Because€of€a€physical€condition€that€made€it€difficult€for€Mrs.€Rust€toĻobtain€medical€insurance,€Mr.€Rustššs€insurance€obligation€as€to€her€was€replacedĻwith€a€requirement€that€he€pay€her€$150€per€month€for€sixty€months.€€The€courtĻlater€characterized€this€obligation€as€alimony.€€Mr.€Rust€was€ordered€to€continue€toĻprovide€medical€insurance€for€his€children.ĢĢą ąą ąMrs.€Rust€subsequently€remarried€and€took€her€new€husbandššs€lastĻname.€€Henceforth€in€this€opinion€she€will€be€referred€to€as€Mrs.€Gerbman.€€Mr.ĻRust€also€remarried.€€On€September€3,€1993,€Mr.€Rust€filed€a€pro€se€Petition€toĻModify€Child€Support.€€He€claimed€that€his€net€income,€which€had€been€$4,100Ļper€month€at€the€time€the€prior€support€order€was€issued,€had€been€reduced€toĶ$1,300€per€month.€Mrs.€Gerbman€answered,€and€filed€a€counter„petition€forĻcontempt,€alleging€Mr.€Rustššs€failure€to€make€monthly€payments€on€the€judgment,Ļand€on€his€child€support.€€She€claimed€that€he€was€understating€his€income,€andĻthat€he€was€voluntarily€underemployed.ĢĢą ąą ąBoth€parties€subsequently€filed€numerous€motions€which€raisedĻadditional€issues€and€lengthened€the€course€of€the€proceedings.€After€disposingĻof€those€issues,€the€court€issued€its€ruling€from€the€bench,€and€ordered€Mrs.ĻGerbmanššs€attorney€to€draft€the€order.€€Mr.€Rustššs€attorney€moved€the€court€toĻamend€the€judgment,€and€the€court€responded€to€his€objections€before€theĻamended€order,€from€which€this€appeal€was€taken,€was€finally€entered€andĻapproved€by€both€counsel.€€The€date€was€April€30,€1995,€more€than€twentyĻmonths€after€Mr.€Rust€filed€his€pro€se€petition.€ĢĢą ąą ąThe€court€reduced€Mr.€Rustššs€child€support€to€$690€per€month,€andĻmade€the€reduction€retroactive€to€September€3,€1993.€€The€court€also€reduced€theĻalimony€payment€(the€money€previously€ordered€to€be€paid€in€lieu€of€medicalĻinsurance)€to€$75€per€month,€retroactive€to€the€same€date,€but€extended€theĻperiod€during€which€it€had€to€be€paid€to€120€months,€so€that€the€total€payoutĻ($9,000)€remained€unchanged.ĢĢą ąą ąGiving€retroactive€effect€to€these€modifications€reduced,€but€did€notĻeliminate€the€arrearages€Mr.€Rust€had€accumulated,€and€the€courtššs€orderĻincluded€a€new€schedule€for€paying€off€those€arrearages.€€The€court€also€foundĻMr.€Rust€to€be€in€contempt€for€having€made€only€one€child€support€payment€duringĻthe€first€four€months€of€1995,€and€for€failing€to€comply€with€the€courtššs€order€toĻattend€a€seminar€for€divorcing€parents.€€The€judge€ordered€Mr.€Rust€to€serve€fourĻdays€in€the€Rutherford€County€jail€for€his€contempt.€ĢĢĢą@ ąņ ņII.€€Child€Supportó óĢĢą ąą ąThe€Tennessee€legislature€has€provided€specific€direction€to€theĻcourts€charged€with€setting€child€support,€by€ordering€that€uniform€child€supportĻguidelines€be€established.€€See€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„5„101(e).€€The€guidelinesĻare€promulgated€by€the€Department€of€Human€Services,€and€are€based€on€a€flatĻpercentage€of€the€obligorššs€net€income.€€By€law€they€create€a€rebuttableĻpresumption€that€the€amount€of€child€support€determined€by€an€application€of€theĻguidelines€is€the€correct€amount€to€be€awarded.ĢĢą ąą ąIn€applying€the€guidelines,€the€courts€determine€the€income€of€theĻobligor€parent€for€the€year€or€years€immediately€preceding€the€filing€of€the€petitionĻfor€support,€and€find€the€corresponding€amount€of€support€in€the€guideline€tablesĶfor€that€level€of€income€and€the€number€of€children€for€whom€support€is€beingĻsought.€€Since€the€obligor€is€expected€to€pay€future€support€out€of€future€income,Ļthe€rebuttable€presumption€of€correctness€obviously€indicates€a€corollaryĻpresumption€that€prior€earnings€are€a€reliable€predictor€of€future€earnings.€ĢĢą ąą ąIt€is€not€easy€for€the€obligor€to€attack€this€corollary€(nor€should€it€be),Ļsince€past€income€is€easier€to€verify€than€future€income€is€to€predict,€and€since€theĻorder€remains€within€the€courtššs€control€and€subject€to€modification€if€future€eventsĻresult€in€a€significant€change€in€the€obligorššs€income,€or€his€earning€capacity.€€€€€€€€Ģą ąĢą ąą ąIn€the€present€case,€the€proof€showed€that€although€Mr.€Rust€hadĻbeen€able€to€earn€a€very€good€living€from€the€sale€of€automobiles,€he€frequentlyĻcame€into€serious€conflict€with€his€employers.€€He€worked€for€several€differentĻdealerships,€but€his€income€was€highest€when€he€was€employed€as€financeĻmanager€at€Superior€Motors€in€Nashville.€€He€earned€$83,362€during€elevenĻmonths€in€1992,€and€made€timely€payments€on€his€child€support€during€that€time.€ĻAccording€to€Mr.€Rust,€he€had€to€quit€that€job€because€of€stress€related€to€hisĻemployerššs€order€that€he€falsify€certain€entries€on€the€books€of€the€company,€andĻbecause€of€a€worsening€alcohol€problem€related€to€that€stress.€€Bill€Proctor,Ļcomptroller€of€Superior€Motors,€denied€any€wrongdoing€by€the€company,€butĻconfirmed€that€Mr.€Rust€had€a€drinking€problem€that€created€concern€andĻdifficulties€for€the€employer.Ģ€Ģą ąą ąAfter€leaving€Superior€Motors,€Mr.€Rust€changed€his€line€of€work,Ļand€began€selling€insurance.€€He€earned€no€income€during€the€period€while€heĻwas€being€trained.€€After€he€acquired€his€license,€he€managed€to€earn€a€netĻincome€of€$13,986€in€1993.€€During€that€year,€he€fell€behind€on€his€child€supportĻpayments€again,€but€managed€to€avoid€a€threatened€contempt€by€making€twoĻpayments€that€amounted€to€$5,600,€from€the€sale€of€the€house€that€had€belongedĻto€his€present€wife.ĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€testified€that€when€the€books€were€closed€on€his€1994Ļtransactions,€he€expected€them€to€show€that€he€had€netted€between€$18,000€andĻ$20,000.€€He€had€acquired€some€large€institutional€clients,€and€hoped€thatĻcommissions€from€them€would€result€in€a€1995€net€income€between€$40,000€andĻ$50,000.€€However€problems€with€his€new€marriage€plunged€him€back€intoĻalcohol€abuse,€and€he€testified€that€he€had€been€attending€an€outpatient€alcoholĻrehabilitation€program€for€the€five€or€six€weeks€preceeding€the€hearing€of€April€29,Ļ1995.€The€program€involved€at€least€three€three„hour€sessions€each€week.€€TheĻeffect€of€Mr.€Rustššs€problems€on€his€1995€income€was€uncertain.€€ĢĢą ąą ąThese€facts€were€before€the€trial€court€when€it€ordered€that€childĻsupport€be€set€at€$690€per€month.€€Such€an€award€for€the€support€of€threeĻchildren€corresponds€to€an€annual€income€of€$25,200€for€the€obligor.€€Both€partiesĶdisputed€the€correctness€of€the€trial€courtššs€determination,€but€in€light€of€theĻfluctuations€and€uncertainty€surrounding€Mr.€Rustššs€income,€we€do€not€believe€theĻtrial€court€erred.ĢĢą ąą ąIn€his€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€courtššs€judgment,€Mr.€Rust€arguedĻthat€the€only€correct€way€to€calculate€the€retroactive€portion€of€his€obligation€wouldĻhave€been€to€base€it€directly€on€his€income€for€those€years.€€He€contended€thatĻsuch€a€calculation€would€result€in€an€obligation€of€only€about€$350€per€month€forĻ1993,€and€$550€per€month€for€1994.€€The€courtššs€response€to€the€motion€includedĻa€finding€that€Mr.€Rust€was€voluntarily€underemployed€during€those€years,€andĻthat€š šhe€had€the€capability€and€capacity€to€earn€more€than€he€asserted.šš€ĢĢą ąą ąMrs.€Gerbman€seized€on€this€finding€to€argue€that€Mr.€Rust€was€notĻentitled€to€any€reduction€at€all.€€She€reasoned€that€the€language€of€Rule€1240„2„4„.03(d)€of€the€Child€Support€Guidelines,€precluded€any€downward€modificationĻunder€the€facts€of€this€case:ĢŅ € ŅŅ  ŅÓÓŅ 0 ŅŅ  ŅIf€an€obligor€is€willfully€and€voluntarily€unemployed€orĻunderemployed€child€support€shall€be€calculated€basedĻon€a€determination€of€potential€income,€as€evidenced€byĻeducational€level€and/or€previous€work€experience.ĢŅ € ŅŅ  ŅĢŅ € ŅŅ „ ŅÓÓĢą ąą ąSince€the€earlier€order€of€child€support€was€based€on€an€incomeĻlevel€that€Mr.€Rust€admittedly€achieved€(and€in€fact€subsequently€exceeded),€Mrs.ĶGerbman€argued€that€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€trial€court€was€not€permitted€toĻreduce€his€obligation.ĢĢą ąą ąWe€believe€that€both€parties€have€taken€too€restrictive€a€view€of€theĻpower€of€the€trial€court€to€fashion€an€equitable€order€within€the€constraints€of€theĻchild€support€guidelines.€€A€finding€that€an€obligor€is€voluntarily€underemployedĻenables€the€court€to€set€a€child€support€amount€commensurate€with€his€earningĻcapacity€rather€than€his€actual€earnings.€€Such€a€finding€obligates€the€court€toĻascertain€that€capacity;€it€does€not€create€an€automatic€determination€that€heĻremains€capable€of€earning€what€he€has€earned€in€the€past.€ĢĢą ąą ąIn€the€present€case,€there€is€evidence€that€even€aside€from€hisĻdifficulties€at€Superior€Motors,€the€automobile€sales€business€has€been€a€sourceĻof€constant€stress€for€Mr.€Rust,€and€has€worsened€his€alcohol€problem.€€Hopefully,Ļthe€insurance€business€will€offer€him€a€more€stable€working€environment,€and€aĻreliable€income€that€will€be€of€benefit€to€himself€and€his€three€young€children.€InĻlight€of€the€facts€in€the€record,€we€cannot€say€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€findingĻthat€at€this€point€in€his€new€career,€Mr.€Rustššs€potential€income€could€only€sustainĻa€child€support€obligation€of€$690€per€month.€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņIII.€Alimonyó ó€ĢĢą ąą ąA€second€issue€on€appeal€involves€the€alimony€payments€that€Mr.ĻRust€was€ordered€to€make€in€lieu€of€medical€insurance.€The€trial€court€found€thatĻthe€payments€were€in€the€nature€of€rehabilitative€alimony,€and€that€the€courtĻaccordingly€retained€jurisdiction€to€modify€it.€€As€we€discussed€above,€the€courtĻchose€only€to€modify€the€payment€schedule,€and€it€left€the€size€of€the€totalĻobligation€unchanged.€Once€again,€both€parties€objected€to€the€trial€courtššs€actionĻon€grounds€that€are€diametrically€opposed€to€each€other.ĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€argued€that€the€payments€should€have€been€terminatedĻbecause€of€the€rebuttable€presumption€stated€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€€36„5„101(a)(3),€which€reads€as€follows:ĢŅ 0 ŅŅ „ ŅŅ 0 ŅŅ  ŅÓÓ(3)€In€all€cases€where€a€person€is€receiving€alimony€inĻfuturo€and€the€alimony€recipient€lives€with€a€third€person,€aĻrebuttable€presumption€is€thereby€raised€that:ĢĢą ą(A)€The€third€person€is€contributing€to€the€support€ofĻthe€alimony€recipient€and€the€alimony€recipient€thereforeĻdoes€not€need€the€amount€of€support€previously€awarded,Ļand€the€court€therefore€should€suspend€all€or€part€of€theĻalimony€obligation€of€the€former€spouse;€orĢĢą ą(B)€The€third€person€is€receiving€support€from€theĻalimony€recipient€and€therefore€does€not€need€the€amountĻof€alimony€previously€awarded€and€the€court€thereforeĻshould€suspend€all€or€part€of€the€alimony€obligation€of€theĻformer€spouse.€ĢŅ € ŅŅ  ŅŅ € ŅŅ „ ŅĢÓÓĢą ąą ąMrs.€Gerbman€argues€that€when€the€trial€court€modified€theĻinsurance€obligation€to€make€it€a€fixed€number€of€payments€of€a€fixed€size,€withoutĻstating€any€conditions€or€limitations€on€the€award,€the€award€was€converted€intoĻalimony€in€solido,€which€the€court€no€longer€had€any€power€to€modify.€€Thus,€sheĻimpliedly€argues,€the€court€was€in€error€in€reducing€the€monthly€payments,€andĻextending€the€length€of€the€payment€obligation.ĢĢą ąą ąThe€advent€of€rehabilitative€alimony€as€a€distinct€category€of€spousalĻsupport€has€added€complexity€to€the€problem€of€correctly€classifying€an€alimonyĻaward.€€Whereas€alimony€in€solido€and€alimony€in€futuro€can€usually€beĻdistinguished€without€difficulty,€rehabilitative€alimony€has€some€of€theĻcharacteristics€of€both.€€It€has€a€calculable€total€value€like€alimony€in€solido,€but€itĻis€modifiable€like€alimony€in€futuro.ĢĢą ąą ąIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€modified€an€insurance€obligationĻof€indefinite€duration€(which,€if€it€was€alimony,€was€alimony€in€futuro)€to€anĻobligation€of€limited€duration€and€fixed€total€value€(which€could€theoretically€beĻconsidered€either€rehabilitative€alimony€or€alimony€in€solido).€€Responding€toĻarguments€from€both€sides,€the€chancellor€stressed€the€purpose€of€the€originalĻaward€and€the€circumstances€that€made€its€initial€modification€necessary.€€BasedĻon€these€considerations,€he€concluded€that€the€modification€created€the€kind€ofĶtemporary€support€that€remained€within€the€jurisdiction€of€the€courts€to€adjust€asĻcircumstances€required.€€Ģ€ą ąą ąWe€do€not€believe€the€chancellor€erred€in€this€determination,€but€weĻdo€not€adopt€the€appellantššs€argument€that€the€rebuttable€presumption€found€inĻTenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€36„5„10(a)(3)€thereby€applies€to€this€case.€€We€note€that€theĻterms€of€the€statute€refer€specifically€to€alimony€in€futuro,€not€to€rehabilitativeĻalimony,€and€that€the€two€forms€of€modifiable€alimony€are€based€on€oppositeĻfindings€as€to€the€possibility€of€the€obligee€spouse€becoming€capable€of€providingĻhis€or€her€own€support.€€Of€course€even€without€the€presumption,€Mr.€Rust€was€notĻprevented€from€asserting€that€Mrs.€Gerbmanššs€remarriage€eliminated€her€need€forĻfurther€spousal€support.€€But€he€did€not€make€that€argument,€nor€is€there€anyĻevidence€in€the€record€to€support€it.€€Ģą ąĢą@ ąņ ņIV.€€Contemptó óĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€him€in€willfulĻcontempt€and€sentencing€him€to€four€days€in€jail,€because€inability€to€pay€is€aĻdefense€to€contempt.€€He€claims€that€he€was€not€capable€of€complying€with€theĻtrial€courtššs€order€during€the€four€month€period€when€he€failed€to€pay€his€childĻsupport.€€He€attributed€this€alleged€incapacity€to€two€problems:€€lack€of€incomeĻduring€the€relevant€period,€and€impairment€of€judgment€due€to€a€deterioratingĻdomestic€situation€that€plunged€him€into€alcohol€abuse.€ĢĢą ąą ąHowever€by€his€own€admission€Mr.€Rust€had€some€income€everyĻmonth€during€the€relevant€period,€and€we€do€not€believe€that€his€personalĻproblems,€grave€though€they€may€have€been,€excused€him€from€the€duty€toĻsupport€his€children€by€his€former€marriage.€€As€for€the€argument€that€hisĻalcoholism€somehow€made€his€non„compliance€with€the€courtššs€ordersĻinvoluntary,€it€does€not€appear€to€us€to€be€based€on€sound€reasoning€or€to€beĻsupported€by€any€precedent€or€other€authority€that€we€are€bound€to€respect.€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņV.€€Attorney€Disqualificationó óĢĢą ąą ąIn€the€course€of€the€prolonged€struggle€between€the€parties,€BradĻHornsby,€the€wifeššs€attorney€filed€a€motion€to€terminate€Mr.€Rustššs€visitationĻprivileges.€The€ground€was€that€š šrecently€discovered€evidencešš€of€felony€warrantsĻagainst€Mr.€Rust€in€Florida€and€South€Carolina€indicated€that€Mr.€Rust€š šposes€aĻrisk€of€flight€with€the€partiesšš€children.ššĢĢą ąą ąIn€response,€Mr.€Rustššs€attorney€filed€a€motion€to€disqualify€Mr.ĻHornsby,€arguing€that€he€was€guilty€of€blatant€misrepresentation€to€the€court.€€Mr.ĻRust€claimed€that€as€a€family€friend€and€advisor€on€financial€and€legal€matters,€Mr.ĻHornsby€had€long€been€aware€of€the€disputes€Mr.€Rust€had€with€former€employersĻin€those€states,€including€their€threats€to€swear€out€criminal€warrants€against€him,Ķand€that€he€had€specific€knowledge€as€to€the€Florida€warrant€at€least€thirty„oneĻmonths€before€he€presented€it€to€the€court€as€š šnewly€discovered€evidence.ššĢĢą ąą ąMr.€Rust€further€claimed€that€Mr.€Hornsby€had€threatened€him€withĻcriminal€prosecution€to€get€him€to€sign€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,€and€thatĻMr.€Hornsbyššs€prior€relationship€with€the€parties€gave€him€knowledge€ofĻconfidential€information€about€Mr.€Rust€that€should€have€precluded€hisĻsubsequent€representation€of€Mrs.€Gerbman.€€ĢĢą ąą ąThe€trial€court€considered€Mr.€Rustššs€allegations€and€dismissed€theĻmotion€to€compel€Mr.€Hornsby€to€withdraw.€€The€court€found€that€Mr.€Hornsby€hadĻnot€established€an€attorney„client€relationship€with€either€of€the€parties€prior€to€theĻbeginning€of€the€divorce€proceedings,€and€that€he€had€therefore€not€violated€DRĻ4„101€of€the€rules€of€the€Code€of€Professional€Responsibility€in€regard€toĻpreserving€the€confidences€and€secrets€of€a€client.€€The€court€also€found€that€Mr.ĻHornsby€had€not€violated€DR€7„105,€which€prohibits€using€the€threat€of€criminalĻprosecution€to€gain€advantage€in€a€civil€matter.€€The€court€did€not€directly€addressĻthe€question€of€Mr.€Hornsbyššs€alleged€misrepresentation,€but€presumably€foundĻthat€Mr.€Rust€did€not€meet€his€burden€of€proof€on€that€issue,€or€that€the€allegation,Ļif€proven,€was€not€sufficiently€grave€to€warrant€disqualification.€€ĢĢą ąą ąWe€believe€that€it€rests€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€toĻdetermine€whether€an€an€attorney€should€be€disqualified€from€appearing€before€itĻin€a€particular€case.€€That€discretion€is€rooted€in€the€courtššs€general€powers,€foundĻin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€šš€16„1„102(4),€to€š š[c]ontrol,€in€furtherance€of€justice,€theĻconduct€of€its€officers,€and€all€other€persons€connected€with€a€judicial€proceedingĻbefore€it,€in€every€matter€pertaining€to€the€proceedingšš.€€The€courtššs€decisionĻshould€not€be€reversed€except€for€abuse€of€that€discretion.€€We€do€not€find€that€theĻchancellor€abused€his€discretion,€and€we€accordingly€affirm€his€decision.€€€ĢĢą@ ąņ ņVI.ó óĢĢą ąą ąAt€the€conclusion€of€the€opinion€which€preceded€his€final€order,€theĻchancellor€wrote,€š š[i]t€certainly€is€the€hope€of€the€Court€that€with€the€conclusion€ofĻthese€proceedings,€the€bitter€disputes€and€ill„feelings€which€the€parties€haveĻexperienced€toward€each€other€will€cease.€€Certainly€the€lives€of€the€minorĻchildren€will€be€enriched€by€such€cessation.šš€€This€court€heartily€concurs.€TheĻorder€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€Remand€this€cause€to€the€Chancery€Court€ofĻRutherford€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€Tax€theĻcosts€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ĢĢĢÓÓą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ą_____________________________Ģą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąą ąBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEĢĢCONCUR:ĢĢĢĢĢ_______________________________ĢSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEĢĢĢĢĢ_______________________________ĢWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEĢĢĢĒŃ  Ńą@ ą