ÿWPCS …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) 8 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0h< 0r¤ 0| 0†’ 0 1u¨ U, 0dI U,­ U*Ù B)DC, AMo¼ BÍv~êvÓh D3; 0@n AO®Æý 0Dà D/ B6˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - ÃÄDÅÆEÇÈDÉ UÊËÓ€ÕDÒ 3|xÕ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌSeptember€6,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€·ôXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑDOUGLAS›€E.€SAMUELSON,€as€theà à)ÌNatural€Father€and€Personal€à àà à)ÌRepresentative€of€KEVIN€L.à àà à)ÌSAMUELSON,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9602„CV„00060ÌœVS›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌCECIL€E.€œMcMURTRY›,€M.D.,à àà à)à àNo.€œ89C›„2581ÌWILLIAM€A.€HOLLAND,€JR.,€M.D.,à à)ÌœH.C.A.›€HEALTH€SERVICES€OFà àà à)̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€#$";+'h|Rý` ç `€€Lß›TENNESSEE,€INC.,€d/b/aà àà àà à)ÌœDONELSON›€HOSPITAL€à àà àà à)ÌœEMERGICARE›,€INC.,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìandà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMARK€S.€œTOTTY›,€Individually€andà à)Ìd/b/a€MARK€S.€TOTTY,€D.C.,€P.C.,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€W.€BROTHERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌJOE€BEDNARZÌSuite€1400,€Parkway€TowersÌ404€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌROGER€T.€MAYÌSuite€300Ì219€Second€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendant/AppelleeÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌLEWIS,€J.ÌœÌDISSENT:ÌKOCH,›€J.ÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€ „ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€ XÔÌÌà àà àIn€this€wrongful€death€case€we€have€determined€that€when€theÏplaintiff„appellant€accepted€a€jury€verdict€finding€the€decedent€was€forty„nineÏpercent€at€fault,€that€finding€œbecame›€binding€in€the€appeal€of€the€trial€judgeððsÏaction€in€dismissing€another€defendant€on€the€day€of€the€trial.€€We,€therefore,Ïpretermit€the€issues€raised€by€the€appellant€and€affirm€the€judgment€below.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àKenneth€L.€Samuelson,€age€28,€died€of€pneumonia€on€August€2,Ï1988.€€In€the€few€days€prior€to€his€death,€Mr.€Samuelson€had€consulted€severalÍmedical€practitioners€and€had€been€seen€in€the€emergency€room€œat›€œDonelson›ÏHospital.€€He€had€also€consulted€Dr.€Mark€S.€Totty,€a€chiropractor.ÌÌà àà àThe€plaintiff,€Douglas€E.€Samuelson,€is€the€natural€father€of€KennethÏL.€Samuelson.€€He€sued€the€other€professionals,€Donelson€Hospital,€and€Dr.€TottyÏfor€his€sonððs€wrongful€œdeath€and›€œthe›€case€was€set€for€trial€before€a€jury€on€April€17,Ï1995.€€On€March€28,€1995€counsel€for€Dr.€Totty€filed€a€motion€in€limine€seeking€toÏprevent€the€plaintiff€from€using€œits€expert€to€establish€that€Dr.€Totty€had€violated€theÏstandard€of€care.€€Dr.€Totty€asserted€that€the€expert›€did€not€meet€the€œpractice›Ïœrequirements›€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„26„115(b).€€The€trial€judge€conducted€aÏhearing€on€March€31,€1995€but€adjourned€the€hearing€to€the€morning€of€the€trial.€ÏAfter€completing€the€hearing,€the€trial€judge€ruled€that€œthe€expert›€did€not€meet€theÏœrequirements€of€the€statute›€and€œthat›€his€testimony€would€not€substantially€assistÏthe€trier€of€fact.€€See€Rule€œ702,›€Tenn.€R.€œEvid›.€€Dr.€Totty€then€moved€to€dismiss€theÏcase€against€him.€€The€trial€judge€treated€the€motion€as€one€for€summaryÏjudgment€and€dismissed€Dr.€Totty.€€The€trial€proceeded€against€the€otherÏœdefendants,›€and€the€jury€returned€a€verdict€against€one€of€œthem,›€finding€that€heÏwas€fifty„one€percent€at€fault€and€œthat€the›€decedent€was€forty„nine€percent€at€œfault.€ÏThe€verdict€also€established€the€pecuniary€value€of€the€decedentððs€life.›ÌÌà àà àWithin€thirty€days€of€the€entry€of€the€order€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€Dr.€Totty,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€motion€to€set€aside€the€œorder,›€supportedÏby€an€affidavit€from€another€chiropractic€expert.€€The€trial€judge€denied€the€motion.ÌÌà àà àOn€September€27,€1995,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€Satisfaction€of€JudgmentÏin€the€trial€œcourt,›€certifying€that€the€judgment€œagainst›€the€other€defendant€had€beenÏfully€satisfied.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€œplaintiff›€appealed€the€trial€judgeððs€dismissal€of€Dr.€Totty,€allegingÏthat€the€expert€witness€was€in€fact€qualified,€that€Rule€56.03,€Tenn.€R.€œCiv›.€Proc.,Ïrequired€a€thirty€day€period€before€the€motion€could€be€heard,€and€that€the€trialÏjudge€should€have€set€the€summary€judgment€aside€on€the€strength€of€the€secondÏaffidavit.€€The€appellee€raised€the€issue€that€the€appellant€was€estopped€toÏcontest€the€juryððs€allocation€of€fault.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌà@ àò òRes€Judicata/Collateral€Estoppeló óÌÌà àà àSince€the€appelleeððs€œcontention›€that€the€jury€verdict€binds€theÏplaintiff€€would€be€dispositive€on€appeal,€we€will€address€that€issue€first.ÌÌà àà àAs€Judge€Goddard€said€in€òòPhillips€v.€General€Motors€Corp.óó,€669ÏS.W.2d€665€(Tenn.€App.€1984),€the€rule€as€to€res€judicata€and€collateral€estoppelÏis€easy€to€state€but€difficult€to€apply.€€The€starting€point€is€found€in€òòShelley€v.ÏœGipson›óó,€218€Tenn.€1,€400€S.W.2d€709€œ(1966)€where›€the€court€said:ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓThe€doctrine€of€res€judicata€is€that€an€existing€finalÏjudgment€rendered€upon€the€merits€by€a€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€is€conclusive€of€the€rights,Ïquestions€and€facts€in€issue€as€to€the€parties€and€theirÏprivies€in€the€same€action€in€other€judicial€tribunals€ofÏconcurrent€jurisdiction.€€This€doctrine€is€distinguished€fromÏthe€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€which€precludes€furtherÏlitigation€of€the€particular€facts€on€which€the€jury€or€courtÏnecessarily€made€findings€in€the€former€action.€ÏRestatement€of€Judgments,€sec.€68.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓœ218€Tenn.€at€12,€400€S.W.2d€at€714.ÌÌ›à àà àWhile€œð ðthe›€application€of€collateral€estoppel€requires€identity€ofÏparties€or€their€privies,ðð€òòBlue€Diamond€Coal€v.€Holland„America€œIns›.€Co.óó,€671ÏS.W.2d€œ829€at€832›€(Tenn.€1984),€we€most€often€interpret€the€rule€to€require€thatÏthe€parties€be€exactly€the€same.€€òòœClements›€v.€œPearson›óó,€209€Tenn.€223,€352ÏS.W.2d€236€(1961).€€In€most€cases€that€is€correct,€but€there€is€a€class€of€casesÏwhere€an€adjudication€in€one€case€is€conclusive€on€the€same€question€againstÏanother€party.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòœCantrell›€v.€œBurnett›€&€Henderson€Co.óó,€187€Tenn.€552,€216€S.W.2dÏ307€œ(1948),›€a€case€œin€which€the€dispositive€issues€are€very€similar€to€those€in€theÍcase€before€us,€a›€plaintiff€sued€the€manufacturer€and€a€local€dealer€for€selling€anÏallegedly€defective€automobile.€€The€trial€judge€directed€a€verdict€for€theÏmanufacturer€and€allowed€the€case€to€go€to€the€jury€against€the€local€œdealer,›Ïunder€instructions€that€would€have€resulted€in€a€verdict€for€the€plaintiff€if€the€juryÏfound€the€loss€resulted€from€some€defect€in€the€car.€€The€jury€returned€a€defenseÏverdict.€€The€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€juryððs€determination€on€the€question€ofÏwhether€the€car€was€defective€at€the€time€the€plaintiff€bought€it€was€conclusive€onÏthe€claims€against€the€manufacturer.€€Quoting€from€the€earlier€case€of€òòœRagan›€v.ÏKennedyóó,€1€Tenn.€91,€the€court€said,ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà àIn€order€to€render€a€verdict€in€one€action€evidenceÏin€another,€it€is€not€necessary€that€the€parties€œshould€be›Ïthe€same.€€It€is€sufficient€if€the€party€òòagainst€whom€theÏverdict€is€intended€to€be€introducedóó€was€a€party€to€theÏformer€suit,€and€that€the€same€subject€matter€was€directlyÏput€in€issue€by€the€pleadings.€€(Emphasis€œadded.)Ì›ÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓœ187€Tenn.€at€556,€216›€S.W.2d€at€309.ÌÌà àà àQuoting€again€from€òòœLoveman›€Co.€v.€œBayless›óó,€128€Tenn.€307,€160ÏœS.W.›€841€œ(1913),›€the€œcourt€stated,›ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà àð ðThat€every€one€is€entitled€to€his€day€in€court,€andÏno€more,€on€the€same€cause€of€action;€that€he€has€enjoyedÏthis€right€when€he€has€contested€the€matter€with€personsÏcommitting€the€wrong€and€primarily€liable,€and€has€beenÏcast€in€such€suit;€that€to€permit€him€after€this€to€contest€theÏmatter€with€one€only€secondarily€liable€would€be€to€giveÏhim€two€suits€upon€œthe›€same€cause€of€action.€€It€is€said€toÏbe€a€branch€of€the€law€of€res€adjudicata,€but€òònot€requiringÍthat€the€parties€should€be€the€same,€or€those€strictly€inÏprivity.ððóó€€(Emphasis€added.)ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓ216€S.W.2d€at€310.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòœHammons›€v.€Walker€Hauling€Co.óó,€œ196›€Tenn.€œ26,›€263€S.W.2d€753Ïœ(1953),›€the€Supreme€Court€found€that€the€jury€verdict€was€not€conclusive€on€theÏpoint€in€issue€but€œsaid,›ÌÒ 0 ÒÒ „ ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðWhere€the€verdict€of€a€jury€affirmatively€discloses€aÏparticular€finding€with€reference€to€a€controlling€issue€ofÏfact€a€plaintiff€in€that€suit€is€judicially€bound€by€such€findingÏin€a€subsequent€suit€by€such€plaintiff€against€a€differentÏdefendant.ðð€€ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ  ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓœ196€Tenn.€at€32,€263›€S.W.2d€at€755.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòœAlgood›€v.€Nashville€Machine€Co.,€Inc.óó,€648€S.W.2d€260€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1983),€this€court€recognized€the€difference€between€offensive€and€defensiveÏcollateral€œestoppel.€€The€court›€approved€the€latter€while€rejecting€the€former.ÌÌà àà àCollateral€estoppel€applies€to€parties€òòand€their€priviesóó.€€Privity€in€thisÏinstance€means€ð ðprivity€as€it€exists€in€relation€to€the€subject€matter€of€the€litigation.ðð€ÏòòœCantrell›€v.€œBurnett›€&€Henderson€Co.óó,€216€S.W.2d€at€309„310.€€Or,€as€this€courtÏsaid€in€òòPhillips€v.€General€Motors€Corp.óó,€669€S.W.2d€œ665€(1984),›€privity€exists€asÏto€ð ðthose€so€connected€in€law€with€a€party€to€the€judgment€as€to€have€such€anÏidentity€of€interest€that€the€party€to€the€judgment€represented€the€same€legal€right.ðð€Í669€S.W.2d€at€669.€€Under€that€definition€Dr.€Totty€was€in€privity€with€the€otherÏdefendants€œon€the€issue€of€the€decedentððs€fault.ÌÌà à›à àWhen€the€plaintiff€accepted€the€verdict€of€the€jury€in€the€case€againstÏthe€other€defendants€the€œjudgment€in€that€case€became›€final.€€The€findings€of€theÏœpecuniary€value›€of€the€decedentððs€œlife,›€and€that€the€decedent€was€forty€nineÏpercent€at€fault€are€binding€on€the€plaintiff.€€There€can€be€only€one€œrecovery.€€òòTSCÏIndustries,€Inc.€v.€Tomlinóó,€743€S.W.2d€169€(Tenn.€App.€1987).€€›€œThe›€jury€œfound€the›Ïvalue€of€that€recovery€and€the€plaintiff€has€been€fully€compensated€for€it.ÌÌœà àà àIn€none€of€the€cases€cited€in€the€dissenting€opinion€did€the€plaintiffÏcollect€the€judgment€in€satisfaction€of€the€juryððs€verdict€and€then€pursue€the€otherÏdefendants.€€In€our€opinion,€the€plaintiff€cannot€do€so.€€He€cannot€affirm€the€verdictÏon€one€hand€and€disaffirm€it€on€the€other.€€ÌÌà àà àOtherwise,€questions€raised€by€the€adoption€of€our€version€ofÏcomparative€negligence/fault€will€increase€without€number.€€The€theory€on€whichÏthe€cases€cited€in€the€dissent€proceed€is€that€it€is€unfair€to€make€the€plaintiffÏproceed€against€one€defendant€when€he€might€have€proceeded€against€two€orÏmore,€because€we€cannot€know€what€the€jury€would€have€done€under€thoseÏcircumstances.€€If€we€accept€that€proposition,€justice€would€demand€that€we€setÏaside€the€verdict€against€Dr.€Holland,€and€re„try€him€along€with€Dr.€Totty€„„€evenÍthough€the€verdict€has€not€been€attacked€at€all.€€And€what€of€the€other€twoÏdefendants€that€the€jury€exonerated€completely?€€Shouldnððt€they€be€thrown€backÏinto€the€mix€so€that€someoneððs€notions€of€fairness€can€be€satisfied?€€Or,€at€leastÏshouldnððt€we€allow€Dr.€Totty€to€point€to€the€other€defendants€as€sharing€theÏblame?ÌÌà àà àWe€repeat:€the€plaintiff€has€had€the€jury€determine€the€amount€heÏshould€recover€and€he€has€been€fully€compensated.ÌÌ›à àà àWe€pretermit€the€other€issues.ÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€and€the€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€of€Davidson€County€for€any€further€proceedingsÏnecessary.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.̛̜ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àœ_________________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌœÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌœÌ_______________________________›ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌœÌWILLIAM›€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€œJUDGE,›ÌœSEPARATE€DISSENTING€OPINIONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ›œ›