ÿWPCÃ$ …# VU>a %Ÿ 0(¥4Íáðw@ø<8 t <| ¸ <À ü 0l 0Dp 0L´ b UN V 0J^ 0T¨ 0^ü 0hZ 0r 0|4 0†° 06 0NÆ 1u 0d‰ Bí D3  0@=U6}U >³B)ñDC AM]U*ªÔZä>v~ÍvÓK AO#Æm# 0D3$ D/w$ B¦$˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX($¡¡DÒ xx°°3|xþ  ç Dè Dé ê ì í Dî ï Ó€ù ú c:\wpwin60\template\brief.wptc:\wpwin60\template\brief.wptc:\wpwin60\template\brief.wpt((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó> ÿÿ$Small Circleððà0 à- ù-6Times New Roman Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô>‡¦$"Small Circleð"ðà0  à "# ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d))))'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d44447Border 1dd€-5Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÝ  ÝÔ€7ÔÔ€7ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€7XÔÌÌJanuary€24,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó PÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ€€The€federal€courts€have€held€that€the€federal€rules€allow€courts€to€consider€oral€and€written€arguments.€€Ï27A€Fed.€Pro.€L.€Ed.€ðð62:508€(1996).Ì …Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3Ô€€Ô€3ôÔMrs.€Sanford€also€made€other€allegations€regarding€Metro's€policies.€€These€were€as€follows:Ìà8 àà à35.à àDefendant's€applied€the€Police€Department's€law,€custom€or€policy€regarding€useÏof€a€firearm€in€an€unconstitutional€manner.Ìà8 àà à.€.€.€.Ìà8 àà à43.à àDefendant€Police€Department's€failure€to€adequately€discipline€its€officers€is€aÏpolicy€and/or€custom€of€the€municipality.ÌWe€must€immediately€disregard€paragraph€35€because€it€implies€that€the€employees'€improper€application€of€theÏpolicy€or€custom€caused€the€injuries,€not€the€proper€application€of€the€policy€or€custom.€€In€addition,€the€allegationÏin€paragraph€43€and€Mrs.€Sanford's€discussion€of€this€allegation€in€her€brief€misstates€the€law.€€In€support€of€theÏallegation€Mrs.€Sanford€cites€òòò òGrandstaff€v.€City€of€Borger,€Texasóóó ó,€767€F.2d€161€(6th€Cir.€1985)€andÏòòò òTurpin€v.€Mailetóóó ó,€619€F.2d€196€(2d€Cir.€1980).€€Neither€of€these€cases,€however,€support€the€proposition€thatÏthe€failure€to€discipline€is€a€policy€or€custom€for€the€purposes€of€a€ðð€1983€action.€€Instead,€the€failure€to€discipline€isÏevidence€of€an€acceptance€of€the€prior€conduct.€€In€òòò òGrandstaffóóó ó,€the€court€concluded€that€the€failure€to€discipline€anÏofficer€was€evidence€of€the€municipality's€policy€or€custom€of€dangerous€recklessness.€€òòò òGrandstaffóóó ó,€767€F.2d€atÏ170.€€It€did€not€find€nor€did€the€plaintiff€contend€that€the€failure€to€discipline€was€itself€a€policy€or€custom.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€ÏLikewise,€in€òòò òTurpinóóó ó,€the€plaintiff€used€the€failure€to€discipline€as€evidence€of€a€policy€to€harass€the€deceased.€Ïòòò òTurpinó óóó,€619€F.2d€at€202„03.ÌÔ€2ÔÌÔ€3ÔPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€2ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÓ ` Ü‚Xœ ’X ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€3ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€AXXdìdÈ7ÑÞ ÞÌE.›€SHARON€SANFORD,à à)Ìà àà à)ÌÓ#` Ü‚Xœôx‘X#Óà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9606„CV„00251Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àÌMETROPOLITAN€GOVERNMENT€OFà à)à àDavidson€Circuit̜ـ€ÙßR€685A1-j|Ðk` ç `€€@ÿRß›NASHVILLE€and€DAVIDSON€COUNTY;à à)à àNo.€93C„260ÌCORY€McCLELLAN€individually,à à)à àÌand€in€his€official€capacity;à à)Ìand€CHARLES€STEVENS,€à à)Ìindividually,€and€in€hisà à)Ìofficial€capacity;à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€3¼ÔCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€œHAMILTON€GAYDEN,›€JUDGEÌÓ ` Ü‚XœÈ“X ÓÌÌœÓ  ÓÔ€3XÔRICHARD›€W.€MATTSONÌLevine,€Mattson,€Orr€&€GeraciotiÌ210€Third€Avenue,€NorthÌP.€O.€Box€190683ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219„0683ÌÌCINDY€L.€PORTERÌ5519€Hill€CourtÌNashville,€Tennessee€37220Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌœJAMES›€L.€CHARLESÌAssociate€Metropolitan€AttorneyÌMetropolitan€Department€of€LawÌ204€Metropolitan€CourthouseÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201ÌÌE.€JOSEPH€FITZPATRICK,€JR.ÌSuite€2828€Renaissance€TowerÌ611€Commerce€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37203Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESÌÌÓ  ÓAFFIRMED€IN€PART,ÌREVERSED€IN€PART,ÌAND€REMANDEDÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€3¼ÔSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÓÓòòÓ  ÓÔ€3°ÔOÔ€3¼Ô€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÓ  ÓÓ#` Ü` ä œÈ“X#ÓóóÔ€3XÔà àPlaintiff/appellant,€E.€Sharon€Sanford,€appeals€numerous€decisions€made€by€the€CircuitÏCourt€for€Davidson€County.€€During€the€proceedings,€the€court€dismissed€two€defendants,Ïdismissed€Mrs.€Sanders'€constitutional€deprivation€claim,€and€ordered€defendant/appellee,€theÏMetropolitan€Government€of€Nashville€and€Davidson€County€(ð ðMetroðð),€to€pay€twenty€percent€ofÏMrs.€Sanders'€discretionary€costs.€€In€its€final€judgment,€the€court€allocated€the€fault€between€theÏparties.€€Mrs.€Sander's€contends€that€the€court€erred€in€making€each€of€these€decisions.€€The€factsÏout€of€which€this€matter€arose€are€as€follows.ÌÌà àOn€31€January€1992,€two€Metro€police€officers€responded€to€a€ð ðshots€firedðð€call€onÏHarlan€Drive€in€Davidson€County.€The€following€persons€lived€on€Harlin€Drive:€€Mrs.€SanfordÏand€her€son,€Jamie€Sanford,€lived€at€3010€Harlin€Drive;€Mr.€Joel€Dickerson€lived€across€the€streetÏfrom€Mrs.€Sanford€at€3011€Harlin€Drive;€Mrs.€Margie€George€lived€two€houses€down€from€Mr.ÏDickerson€at€3015€Harlin€Drive;€and€Mrs.€Ezell,€Ms.€Michelle€Tompkins,€and€Ms.€NikkiÏFenstermacher€lived€next€door€to€Mrs.€Sanford€at€3008€Harlin€Drive.ÌÌà àMr.€Dickerson€and€Mrs.€Sanford€were€friends.€€On€31€January€1992,€Mr.€DickersonÏwas€angry€because€of€an€incident€which€occurred€between€him€and€his€girlfriend,€DeborahÏBeasley.€€Mrs.€Sanford€attempted€to€calm€down€Mr.€Dickerson€who€had€been€drinking.€€ShortlyÏafter€midnight€on€1€February€1992,€Mr.€Dickerson€no€longer€appeared€upset€or€angry€so€Mrs.ÍSanford€went€home.€€Twenty€to€thirty€minutes€after€returning€home,€Mrs.€Sanford€heard€gunshots.€ÏMrs.€George€also€heard€the€shots€and€called€Mrs.€Sanford.€€Mrs.€Sanford€told€Mrs.€George€thatÏMr.€Dickerson€was€drunk€and€was€firing€a€gun.€€Mrs.€George€called€911.€€She€reported€that€herÏneighbor€was€firing€a€gun€and€that€another€neighbor€had€informed€her€of€what€was€happening.€ÏThereafter,€the€911€dispatcher€put€out€a€shots€fired€in€progress€call€and€reported€that€there€was€aÏdrunk€male€at€3011€Harlin€Drive.€€A€few€minutes€later,€Mrs.€Ezell€called€911.€€She€reported€seeingÏa€man€step€out€of€his€front€door€and€fire€two€or€three€shots€into€the€ground.€€The€dispatchers€didÏnot€dispatch€this€information€to€the€officers.ÌÌà àOfficer€Cory€McClellan€was€the€first€officer€on€the€scene.€€As€he€drove€down€HarlinÏDrive,€he€passed€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€and€Mrs.€George€flagged€him€down.€€Mrs.€GeorgeÏinformed€Officer€McClellan€that€the€man€he€was€looking€for€was€inside€3011€Harlin€Drive€and€thatÏhe€had€fired€nine€shots.€€Thereafter,€Officer€McClellan€parked€on€the€street€between€Mr.ÏDickerson's€and€Mrs.€George's€residences.€€Sergeant€Lonnie€Stevens€arrived€shortly€thereafter€andÏparked€in€front€of€Mr.€Dickerson's€house.€€At€that€time,€Mrs.€œSanford€stood€at€her€storm€doorÏwatching€the€house€across€the€street.€€Neither€officers€questioned€Mrs.€Sanford€or€the€other›Ïneighbors€before€proceeding€and€neither€officer€used€their€emergency€lights€or€sirens€whenÏapproaching€the€scene.ÌÌà àWithout€discussing€a€plan,€the€officers€approached€Mr.€Dickerson's€front€door€withÏtheir€guns€drawn.€€Mr.€Dickerson's€front€door€was€open,€but€his€storm€door€was€closed.€€TheÏlights€were€on€in€the€living€room.€€The€officer€looked€through€the€storm€door€into€Mr.€Dickerson'sÏliving€room.€€No€one€was€in€the€living€room,€but€there€was€a€phone€cord€stretched€from€the€kitchenÏto€the€hallway.€€The€officers€heard€a€voice€coming€from€the€hallway€which€they€described€as€loudÏand€angry.€€The€evidence€later€revealed€that€Mr.€Dickerson€was€arguing€with€Ms.€Beasley€on€theÏphone.ÌÌà àThe€officers€entered€the€house€without€announcing€their€presence.€€They€later€explainedÏthat€they€did€not€announce€their€presence€because€they€feared€there€might€be€someone€inside€whoÏwas€in€danger.€€While€in€the€living€room,€Sergeant€Stevens€heard€Mr.€Dickerson€say€ð ðI've€gotÏsomething€for€your€a„„ðð€and€heard€a€gun€cylinder€snap€shut.€€Mr.€Dickerson€then€exited€theÏbedroom€and€walked€toward€the€living€room€with€œa›€gun€in€one€hand€and€the€phone€in€the€other.€ÏSergeant€Stevens€ducked€into€the€kitchen,€and€Mr.€Dickerson€passed€by€without€seeing€SergeantÏStevens.€€As€Mr.€Dickerson€walked€to€the€front€door,€he€stated€ð ðI'm€going€to€get€you,€m„„„„„€f„„„„„.ðð€€In€the€same€instance,€Officer€McClellan€went€out€the€front€door.€€Mrs.€Sanford€contended€thatÏMr.€Dickerson€may€have€been€checking€for€an€intruder€or€simply€walking€to€the€front€door€whenÏhe€walked€through€the€living€room.€€Metro,€however,€claimed€that€Mr.€Dickerson€was€chasingÏOfficer€McClellan€out€of€the€house.€€After€exiting€the€house,€Officer€McClellan€jumped€down€offÏthe€porch€and€sought€cover€at€the€corner€of€the€house.€€Sergeant€Stevens€remained€in€the€kitchen.ÌÌà àMetro€insisted€that€Mr.€Dickerson€raised€his€gun€after€the€storm€door€closed€behind€himÏand€that€the€officers€fired€simultaneously€at€that€time.€€Mrs.€Sanford€claimed€that€Mr.€Dickerson'sÏarms€remained€at€his€side€as€he€came€through€the€storm€door.€€She€also€claimed€that€SergeantÏStevens€began€to€fire€at€Mr.€Dickerson€as€he€tried€to€go€out€the€door.€€Finally,€Mrs.€SanfordÏclaimed€that€Officer€McClellan€began€firing€after€Mr.€Dickerson€came€out€the€front€door€and€raisedÏhis€hand€holding€the€gun.ÌÌà àMr.€Dickerson€was€fatally€wounded.€€Officer€McClellan€fired€nine€shots,€and€SergeantÏStevens€fired€four€shots.€€A€total€of€nine€shots€œhit›€Mr.€Dickerson.€€Sergeant€Stevens€actionsÏresulted€in€one€wound,€and€Officer€McClellan's€actions€resulted€in€eight.€€One€of€the€bullets€shotÏfrom€Sergeant€Stevens'€gun€traveled€across€the€street,€through€Mrs.€Sanford's€storm€door,€andÏinto€her€living€room€where€it€struck€her€in€the€face€below€her€lip.€€The€shot€shattered€Mrs.ÍSanford's€lower€jaw,€blew€a€hole€in€her€gum,€and€knocked€out€many€of€her€teeth.ÌÌà àOn€28€January€1993,€Mrs.€Sanford€filed€a€complaint.€€She€named€the€MetropolitanÏPolice€Department,€the€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashville€and€Davidson€County,€and€bothÏofficers€in€their€individual€and€official€capacities€as€defendants.€€Mrs.€Sanford€stated€causes€ofÏaction€for€negligence€per€se,€common€law€negligence,€intentional€tort,€and€deprivation€ofÏconstitutional€rights.€€She€claimed€compensatory€damages€of€$1,000,000.00.€DefendantsÏresponded€by€filing€a€motion€to€dismiss€or€for€summary€judgment€as€to€the€entire€complaint.€€ÌÌà àOn€24€May€1994,€the€trial€court€dismissed€Mrs.€Sanford's€constitutional€deprivationÏclaim.€€In€response,€Mrs.€Sanford€filed€a€motion€to€reconsider,€a€motion€for€an€interlocutoryÏappeal,€and€a€notice€of€appeal.€€The€trial€court€later€denied€both€motions.€€On€23€January€1995,€thisÏcourt€entered€an€order€dismissing€Mrs.€Sanford's€appeal€for€lack€of€a€final€judgment.€€On€21€JuneÏ1994,€defendants€Officer€McClellan€and€Sergeant€Stevens€in€their€official€and€individual€capacitiesÏfiled€a€motion€to€dismiss.€€The€court€filed€an€opinion€on€15€July€1994€and€dismissed€bothÏdefendants€from€the€lawsuit.€€Metro€then€filed€its€answer.€€As€affirmative€defenses,€it€alleged€thatÏMr.€Dickerson€was€the€proximate€cause€of€Mrs.€Sanford's€injuries€and€that€Mrs.€Sanford€wasÏcomparatively€more€at€fault€than€Metro.ÌÌà àThe€case€continued€at€the€trial€level.€€On€9€December€1994,€Metro€filed€a€motion€forÏsummary€judgment.€€On€6€February€1995,€the€court€entered€an€ordering€granting€summaryÏjudgment€as€to€all€counts€except€count€II,€common€law€negligence.€€On€11€October€1995,€MetroÏamended€its€answer.€€It€added€specific€allegations€that€Mrs.€œSandford›€and€Mr.€Dickerson€wereÏguilty€of€comparative€negligence.€€The€trial€court€entered€its€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€lawÏon€16€January€1996.€€The€trial€court€stated:ÌÓÓÓ&` Ü` ä <œ ’X&Óà8 àœThe›€Court€considers€and€compares€the€negligence,€if€any,€on€part€of€all€theÍparties€involved:€Metro€Government,€by€and€through€police€œOfficers›ÏMcClellan€and€Stevens;€Dickerson,€the€œdeceased:›€and€Mrs.€Sanford,€theÏplaintiff.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€833€S.W.2d€52€(Tenn.€1992).Ìà8 àà àThe€œCourt›€concludes€that€the€deceased€Dickerson€was€the€greatestÏcontributor€to€the€unfortunate€injuries€to€the€plaintiff€caused€by€hisÏintentional,€wilful,€wanton,€and€grossly€negligent€conduct.€€However,€theÏCourt€also€finds€that€fault€should€be€apportioned€to€the€law€enforcementÏofficers€acting€on€behalf€of€and€in€the€line€of€duty€with€the€MetropolitanÏGovernment€as€well€as€the€plaintiff.Ìà8 àà àIn€comparing€the€respective€acts€of€negligence€of€the€police€officersÏand€the€plaintiff€to€that€of€the€deceased,€the€Court€finds€that€the€intentional,Ïreckless,€wilful€and€wanton€conduct€of€the€deceased,€Dickerson,€was€theÏoverwhelming€cause€and€a€proximate€cause€of€the€unfortunate€injuries€to€theÏplaintiff.€€òòSeeóó€òòTurner€v.€Jordanóó,€No.€01„A„01„9411„CV00544,€No.€93C„1611€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Aug.€30,€1995).€€However,€the€Court€must€compareÏthe€conduct€of€Mr.€Dickerson€to€the€fault€of€the€other€parties.Ìà8 àà àThe€Officers€negligently€violated€the€following€Metropolitan€PoliceÏDepartment€Guidelines.ÌÌà8 àà8 àœ(1)"...no›€form€of€deadly€force€shall€be€used€which€wouldÏpose€a€substantial€risk€to€innocent€œbystanders."›€€MetropolitanÏPolice€Department€Guidelines€Exhibit€47,€Page€8,€sectionÏB4;Ìà8 àà8 à(2)€Deadly€force€should€not€be€used,€absent€exigentÏœcircumstances"...until›€such€time€as€[subject]€demonstratesÏunwillingness€to€voluntarily€comply€with€directions,€adviceÏor€warnings,€incidental€to€his€arrest.ðð€€Exhibit€47,€P.€10,Ïsection€11.500(d);Ìà8 àà8 à(3)€Deadly€force€ð ðshall€be€used€only€as€a€last€resort,€and€allÏother€reasonable€means€have€failed€or€would€appear€futile.ðð€ÏExhibit€47,€Page€11,€section€11.502(b).ÌÌà8 àThe€officers€violated€these€guidelines€in€apprehending€the€deceasedÏDickerson,€and€the€plaintiffððs€injuries€proximately€resulted€from€theirÏnegligence.Ìà8 àà àOfficers€McClellan€and€Stevens€had€a€duty€to€exercise€reasonableÏcare€in€the€performance€of€their€duties€as€police€officers.€€They€had€a€duty€toÏconduct€a€reasonable€investigation€and€inquiry€under€the€circumstancesÏbefore€entering€the€premises€of€Dickerson€unannounced.€€There€were€noÏexigent€circumstances€that€required€the€immediate€entry€into€the€homeÏwithout€first€ascertaining€important€facts€such€as€the€probability,€or€lackÏthereof,€of€other€persons€being€present€in€the€house.Ìà8 àà àThe€Court€finds€that€the€police€officers€should€have€adopted€a€planÏfor€their€own€safety€and€the€safety€of€bystanders.€€œ(The›€Court€finds€that€theÏmethod€of€entry€was€in€conformity€with€a€narcotics€raid€where€spoilation€ofÏevidence€or€destruction€of€evidence€is€an€overriding€consideration,€asÏopposed€to€a€œshots›€fired€call;€the€Court€finds€that€particularly€OfficerÏStevens,€the€Senior€police€officer,€was€a€long€time€reputable€member€of€theÏVice€squad€who€had€just€œbeen›€transferred€to€the€Patrol€division€prior€to€thisÏincident€and€his€and€Officer€McClellanððs€actions€in€entering€the€houseÏcomport€to€a€drug€raid).Ìà8 àà àThe€Court€is€of€the€opinion€the€situation€dictated€the€policeÏprocedure€for€hostage€situations:€securing€the€area,€getting€backup€in€place,Ïand€then€announcing€their€presence€and€ordering€the€subject€outside.€€ThisÏprocedure€was€fairly€well€dictated€by€the€situation€for€the€safety€of€allÏconcerned€including€themselves.Ìà8 àà àOfficer€McClellan€and€Officer€Stevens€also€had€a€window€ofÏopportunity€to€secure€the€area€from€possible€harm€to€bystanders€such€as€theÏplaintiff.€€They€should€have€ordered€the€bystanders€inside€their€homes€andÏmaintained€further€protection€as€opposed€to€omitting€to€do€anything€relativeÏto€the€bystanders€who€also€included€Mrs.€George.Ìà8 àà àThe€Court€further€finds€that€the€police€officers€and€the€plaintiff€areÏguilty€of€common€law€negligence€for€failing€to€exercise€ordinary€care€underÏthe€circumstances€which€proximately€caused€the€plaintiffððs€injuries.Ìà8 àà àThe€Court€also€finds€that€the€plaintiff€was€negligent€and€should€haveÏœtaken€steps›€to€insure€her€own€safety.€€Her€failure€to€shut€her€own€door€andÏtake€further€actions€to€protect€herself€was€a€proximate€cause€of€her€injuries.€ÏShe€had€already€tried€to€calm€Mr.€Dickerson€and€knew€first€hand€that€heÏwas€very€angry,€intoxicated,€and€had€fired€his€gun.€€In€fact,€the€plaintiffÏwarned€Mrs.€George€not€to€let€her€husband€go€to€Mr.€Dickersonððs€houseÏdue€to€his€dangerous€propensities€and€the€risk€of€being€shot.Ìà8 àà àIn€arriving€at€the€resulting€percentages€of€fault,€the€court€also€takesÏinto€consideration€elements€of€sudden€emergency€and€intervening€causation.€ÏòòEaton€v.€McLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€Court€finds€that€theÏessential€elements€of€sudden€emergency,€pled€by€the€police€officers,€are€notÏcompletely€present.€€Furthermore,€the€party€asserting€the€sudden€emergencyÏdoctrine€must€be€free€of€fault€in€creating€the€emergency€in€whole€or€in€part.€ÏòòKowalski€v.€Eldridgeóó,€765€S.W.2d€746,€749€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€ÏThere€is€also€the€question€of€the€independent€intervening€acts€of€theÏdeceased,€Dickerson,€that€occurred€after€the€entry€of€the€police€officers€intoÏthe€home.€€The€Court€is€of€the€opinion€the€complete€elements€of€independentÏcausation€are€absent€because€the€gravamen€of€the€situation€was€continuousÏand€unbroken.€€Moreover,€there€is€no€requirement€that€a€cause,€to€beÏregarded€as€the€proximate€cause€of€an€injury,€be€the€sole€cause,€the€last€act,Ïor€the€one€nearest€to€the€injury,€provided€it€is€a€substantial€factor€inÏproducing€the€end€result.€€òòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€767,€775Ï(Tenn.€1991).Ìà8 àà àNevertheless,€in€considering€the€totality€of€fault€the€court€doesÏinculcate€those€existing€components€of€sudden€emergency€and€independentÏintervening€cause€which€are€factually€present€in€this€case,€and€the€court€doesÏconvert€those€into€elements€into€degrees€of€fault,€just€as€it€did€in€comparingÏwilful€and€wanton,€and€grossly€negligent€conduct€to€common€lawÏnegligence.€€òòSeeóó€òòTurner€v.€Jordanóó,€No.€01„A„01„9411„CV00544,€No.€93C„1611€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Aug.€30,€1995),€òòEaton€v.€McLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587Ï(Tenn.€1994).Ìà8 àà àTherefore,€the€Court€finds€the€total€amount€of€the€plaintiffððsÏdamages€to€be€$250,000.00.€€However,€the€Court€apportions€fault€amongÏthe€parties€in€the€following€percentages:ÌÌà8 àà8 à75%€is€apportioned€to€the€deceased,€Joel€ð ðBusterððÏDickerson.Ìà8 àà8 à20%€is€apportioned€to€the€Metropolitan€Government€ofÍNashville,€by€and€through€its€Officers,€Cory€McClellan€andÏCharles€Stevens.Ìà àà à5%€is€apportioned€to€the€plaintiff,€Sharon€Sanford.ÌÓӜ̛à àMrs.€Sanford€filed€a€motion€to€amend€the€judgment€due€to€a€mathematical€error.€€SheÏalso€filed€a€motion€for€discretionary€costs.€€The€court€entered€an€order€of€judgment€on€22€FebruaryÏ1996.€€In€the€order,€the€court€incorporated€its€earlier€findings€and€conclusions€and€corrected€itsÏmathematical€error.€€In€a€separate€order,€the€court€awarded€Mrs.€Sanford€twenty€percent€of€herÏdiscretionary€costs.ÌÌò òI.ó óà àò òComparative€Faultó óÌÌà àOn€appeal,€Mrs.€Sanford€presented€five€issues,€the€first€of€which€was:€€œ"Did›€the€trialÏcourt€err€as€a€matter€of€law€in€its€allocation€of€fault€.€.€.€when€the€actions€of€Metro's€officersÏprimarily,€if€not€solely,€caused€Mrs.€Sanford's€œinjuries?"›ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€adopted€œa€modified›€comparative€fault€system€inÏò òòòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€52,€57€(Tenn.€1992).€€Under€this€system,€a€defendant€isÏliable€for€the€percentage€of€the€plaintiff's€damages€attributable€to€the€negligence€of€the€defendant,Ïso€long€as€the€plaintiff€is€less€than€fifty€percent€at€fault.€€In€ò òòòEaton€v.€McLainó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€587Ï(Tenn.€1994),€the€court€clarified€the€issue€of€how€to€allocate€fault.€€The€fact€finder€is€to€apportionÏfault€based€on€œ"all›€the€circumstances€of€the€œcase"›€which€include€such€factors€as:ÌÓÓà8 à(1)€the€relative€closeness€of€the€causal€relationship€between€the€conduct€ofÏthe€defendant€and€the€injury€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)€the€reasonableness€of€theÏparty's€conduct€in€confronting€a€risk,€such€as€whether€the€party€knew€of€theÏrisk,€or€should€have€known€of€it;€(3)€the€extent€to€which€the€defendant€failedÏto€reasonably€utilize€an€existing€opportunity€to€avoid€the€injury€to€theÏplaintiff;€(4)€the€existence€of€a€sudden€emergency€requiring€a€hasty€decision;Ï(5)€the€significance€of€what€the€party€was€attempting€to€accomplish€by€theÏconduct,€such€as€an€attempt€to€save€another's€life;€and€(6)€the€party'sÏparticular€capacities,€such€as€age,€maturity,€straining,€education,€and€soÏforth.ÌÌò òòòEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€œ592€(footnotes›€omitted).€€ÓÓThe€court€did€not€intend€its€list€to€include€all€theÏfactors,€but€realized€that€courts€would€need€to€expand€the€list€in€the€future.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€593.ÌÌà àThe€comparative€fault€system€focuses€on€the€party's€relative€fault€and€not€on€theÏtheoretical€underpinnings€of€the€different€causes€of€actions.€€ò òòòSee€Whitehead€v.€Toyota€MotorÏCorp.ó óóó,€897€S.W.2d€684,€œ687„93€(Tenn.›€œ1995)€(holding€comparative€fault€principles€apply€toÏstrict€products€liability);€ò òòòsee€also€Owens€v.€Truckstops€of€Am.ó óóó€915€S.W.2d€420,€430„33Ï(Tenn.€1996).›€€This€court€has€held€that€œa€trial€court€should€compare€the›€negligence€of€a€psychiatristÏwhose€patient€attacked€a€nurse€œto›€the€intentional€acts€of€the€œpatient€because›€such€an€apportionmentÏof€liability€œ"supports›€the€policy€espoused€in€ò òòòMcIntyreó óóó€that€liability€should€be€proportionate€toÏœfault."›€€ò òòòTurner€v.€Jordan,€óóó óNo.€01„A„01„9411„CV„00544,€1995€WL€512957,€at€œ*8›€(Tenn.€App.Ï30€August€1995),€òòperm.€œapp.›€œgrantedóó›€(9€Sept.€1996);€òòò òseeó óóó€ò òòòPrince€v.€St.€Thomas€Hospital,ó óóóÏNo.€œ01„A„01„9604„CV„00184,›€slip€op.€œat›€10„11€(Tenn.€App.€1€Nov.€œ1996).€€In›€other€states€thatÏhave€adopted€comparative€œnegligence,›€there€is€a€split€of€œauthority€over€whether€courts›€œshould›Ïcompare€the€reckless€or€œgross›€œnegligence›€œof›€one€party€to€the€ordinary€negligence€of€another€for€theÏpurpose€of€apportioning€fault.€€œThe€majority€appears€to€favor€comparison.€€òòApplication›€ofÏComparative€Negligence€in€Action€Based€on€Gross€Negligence,€Recklessness,€or€the€Likeóó,€10ÏA.L.R.€4th€946€œ(1981).›€€ÌÌà àIn€ò òòòEaton,€ó óóóthe€supreme€court€noted€that€in€formulating€the€list€of€factors€to€considerÏwhen€apportioning€fault€in€general€they€relied€heavily€upon€the€Uniform€Comparative€Fault€ActÏœ("the›€œAct").›€€ò òòòEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€592€œn.14.›€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€the€factors€listedÏin€the€Act€and€used€in€ò òòòEatonó óóó€also€apply€when€apportioning€fault€between€one€negligent€œactor€andÏone€grossly€negligent€or›€reckless€actor.€€In€its€definition€of€œ"fault,"›€the€œAct›€states€that€faultÏœ"includes›€acts€or€omissions€that€are€in€any€measure€negligent€or€reckless€toward€the€person€orÍproperty€of€the€actor€or€others,€or€that€subject€a€person€to€strict€tort€œliability."›€€Unif.€Comp.€FaultÏAct,€ðð€1(b),€12€œU.L.A.€127€(1996).›€€The€comment€to€section€one€indicates€that€the€definition€ofÏfault€covers€œ"all›€degrees€and€kinds€of€negligent€conduct€without€the€need€of€listing€themÏœspecifically."›€œò òòò€Id.óóó ó€€Following›€our€review€of€this€record€and€the€numerous€factors€we€are€of€theÏopinion€that€fault€was€not€properly€apportioned€in€this€case.ÌÌà àò òA.à àMrs.€Sanfordó óÌÌà àœMetro€contends€Mrs.›€Sanford€was€œnegligent›€œbecause€she€stood€in€her€living€roomÏlooking€out€her€storm€door.€€We€can€not€agree.€€Under€all€the€circumstances,€we€believe€it€isÏreasonable€for€a€person€to€watch€what€is€happening€when€the€police€arrive€to€arrest€a€man€who€hasÏbeen€disturbing€the€peace.€€The€evidence€is€that€both€Michelle€Tompkins€and€Nikki€FenstermacherÏwere€looking€out€their€storm€door€at€the€same€time.€ÌÌà àIn€order€for€the€court€to€allocate€fault€to€Mrs.€Sanford,€Metro€had€to€satisfy€its€burdenÏby€establishing€that€she€"failed€to€exercise€reasonable€care€under€the€circumstances."€€ò òòòDoe€v.ÏLinder€Constr.€Co.,€ó óóó845€S.W.2d€173,€178€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÓÓà8 àNegligence€consists€in€a€failure€to€provide€against€the€ordinary€occurrencesÏof€life,€and€the€fact€that€the€provision€made€.€.€.€is€insufficient€as€against€anÏevent€such€as€might€happen€once€in€a€life€time€.€.€.€does€not€make€out€a€caseÏof€actionable€negligence.ÌÌò òòòIllinois€Cent.€R.R.€Co.€v.€Nichols,€óóó ó173€Tenn.€602,€613,€118€S.W.2d€213,€217€(1938).€ÏÓÓHere,€it€was€not€foreseeable€to€a€person€such€as€Mrs.€Sanford€that€a€policeman€in€a€neighbor'sÏhome€across€the€street€would€shoot€her.€€Even€though€she€knew€that€Mr.€Dickerson€had€beenÏshooting€his€gun,€she€had€no€reason€to€believe€he€was€shooting€at€anyone€or€that€he€would€try€toÏshoot€her€because€they€were€friends.€€In€addition,€Mrs.€Sanford€had€no€idea€that€the€police€wouldÏstart€shooting€or€that€they€would€fire€in€the€direction€of€her€home.€€The€police€officers€admitted€thatÍthey€gave€no€warning€to€Mrs.€Sanford€or€to€any€of€the€other€neighbors€that€they€might€beginÏshooting.€€We€do€not€believe€that€a€reasonable€person,€under€all€the€circumstances,€would€haveÏexpected€a€shoot€out€to€occur.€€Negligence€is€determined€by€foresight,€not€hindsight,€and€there€isÏno€negligence€if€the€injury€"could€not€have€been€reasonably€foreseen."€€ò òòòDoeó óóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€178.ÌÌà àò òB.à àMr.€Dickersonó óÌÌà àMrs.€Sanford€also€contends€"the€trial€court€erred€as€a€matter€of€law€by€concluding€thatÏMr.€Dickerson's€actions€were€the€overwhelming€cause€of€Mrs.€Sanford's€injuries,€when€in€fact€hisÏactions€either€were€not€the€proximate€cause€of€her€injuries,€or€a€remote€cause."ÌÌà àPrior€to€the€officers'€arrival,€Mr.€Dickerson€was€shooting€his€gun€into€the€ground€toÏscare€his€girlfriend,€Deborah€Beasley,€who€he€was€speaking€to€on€the€phone.€€He€did€not€fire€anyÏshots€after€the€police€arrived.€€There€is€no€doubt€that€the€actions€of€Mr.€Dickerson,€which€resultedÏin€the€police€being€called€to€the€scene,€were€irresponsible,€grossly€negligent,€and€reckless.€€We€areÏof€the€opinion,€however,€they€were€too€remote€to€require€the€allocation€of€seventy„five€percent€ofÏthe€fault.ÌÌà àWhen€apportioning€fault,€the€fact€finder€should€initially€take€into€account€"the€relativeÏcloseness€of€the€causal€relationship€between€the€conduct€of€the€defendant€and€the€injury€to€theÏplaintiff."€€ò òòòEatonó óóó,€891€S.W.2d€at€592.€€This€factor€is€derived€from€the€doctrine€of€remoteÏcontributory€negligence,€the€principles€of€which€have€been€merged€into€our€new€fault€system€andÏare€to€be€considered€when€apportioning€fault.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€592€&€n.9.€ÌÌà àUnder€our€law€before€the€adoption€of€comparative€fault,€remote€contributory€negligenceÏwas€"that€which€is€too€far€removed€as€to€time€or€place,€or€causative€force,€to€be€a€direct€orÍproximate€cause€of€the€accident."€€ò òòòArnold€v.€Hayslettó óóó,€655€S.W.2d€941,€945€(Tenn.€1983)Ï(citing€ò òòòStreet€v.€Calvertó óóó,€541€S.W.2d€576,€585€(Tenn.€1976)).€€"Remote€cause"€of€an€injuryÏwas€defined€as€"that€which€may€have€happened€and€yet€no€injury€have€occurred,€notwithstandingÏthat€no€injury€could€have€occurred€if€it€had€not€happened."€€ò òòòSee€Barnes€v.€Scottó óóó,€35€Tenn.ÏApp.€135,€151,€243€S.W.2d€133,€140€(1950).€€Here,€Mr.€Dickerson€did€not€injure€the€plaintiffÏand€his€negligence€would€not€have€resulted€in€any€injury€to€her€if€not€for€the€negligent€actions€ofÏthe€police€officers.€€Because€the€causal€relationship€between€Mr.€Dickerson's€conduct€and€Mrs.ÏSanford's€injuries€is€tenuous€at€best,€any€percentage€of€fault€attributable€to€him€is€minimal.€€We€areÏof€the€opinion€that€the€maximum€of€fault€to€be€assigned€to€Mr.€Dickerson€under€all€theÏcircumstances€is€not€more€than€twenty€percent.ÌÌò òà àC.à àMetroÌó óÌà àMrs.€Sanford€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€as€a€matter€of€law€by€allocating€onlyÏtwenty€percent€of€the€fault€against€Metro€because€it€primarily€caused€Mrs.€Sanford's€injuries.€€WeÏagree.ÌÌà àHere,€the€police€officers,€to€a€large€degree,€created€a€situation€which€led€to€Mrs.ÏSanford€being€shot.€€They€improperly€entered€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€with€their€guns€drawn,Ïwithout€investigating€the€circumstances€or€announcing€their€presence€in€any€way.€€We€are€also€ofÏthe€opinion€that€Sergeant€Stevens€negligently€fired€his€gun€at€Mr.€Dickerson€despite€having€no€ideaÏof€what€was€beyond€his€target.€€Sergeant€Stevens€fired€directly€at€Mrs.€Sanford's€home€which€wasÏilluminated€at€the€time.ÌÌÓ)` Ü` ä <Iœx‘X)Óà àà àò ò1.€€ImmunityÌ€€ó óÌà à"Immunity€from€suit€of€all€governmental€entities€is€removed€for€injury€proximatelyÏcaused€by€a€negligent€act€or€omission€of€any€employee€within€the€scope€of€his€employment"€exceptÏin€certain€enumerated€circumstances.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€29„20„205€(1980).€€We€find€none€of€theÏexceptions€to€the€rule€applicable€here.€€Despite€Metro's€arguments,€the€discretionary€functionÏexception€to€the€rule€removing€immunity€is€not€applicable€because€Sergeant€Stevens€and€OfficerÏMcClellan€were€not€policy€makers€for€the€Metropolitan€Police€Department.€€Under€the€planning„operational€test€adopted€by€the€supreme€court,€only€decisions€that€rise€to€the€level€of€planning€orÏpolicy€making€are€considered€discretionary.€€òòò òBowers€v.€City€of€Chattanoogaó óóó,€826€S.W.2dÏ427,€430€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€fact€that€the€officers€responding€to€the€call€on€Harlan€Drive€exercised€discretion€isÏirrelevant.€€The€court€in€ò òòòBowersó óóó€explained€that€"discretionary€function€immunity€does€notÏautomatically€attach€to€all€acts€involving€choice€or€judgment."€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€supreme€court€describedÏthe€planning„operational€test€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 à[D]ecisions€that€rise€to€the€level€of€planning€or€of€policy„making€areÏconsidered€discretionary€acts€which€do€not€give€rise€to€tort€liability,€whileÏdecisions€that€are€merely€operational€are€not€considered€discretionary€actsÏand,€therefore,€do€not€give€rise€to€immunity.ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€430.€€ÓÓò òòòBowersó óóó€goes€on€to€elaborate€on€the€distinction€between€planning€decisions€andÏoperational€acts€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 à[A]€decision€resulting€from€a€determination€based€on€preexisting€laws,Ïregulations,€policies,€or€standards,€usually€indicates€that€its€maker€isÏpreforming€an€operational€act.€€Similarly€operational€are€those€ad€hocÏdecisions€made€by€an€individual€or€group€not€charged€with€the€developmentÏof€plans€or€policies.€€These€operational€acts,€which€often€implement€priorÏplanning€decisions,€are€not€"discretionary€functions"€within€the€meaning€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act.ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€431.€€ÓÓHere,€Metro€is€not€protected€by€any€discretionary€function€immunity.€€The€factsÏestablish€that€these€officers€were€preforming€operational€functions,€both€when€they€initially€wentÏinto€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€and€later€when€they€shot€at€him€striking€Mrs.€Sanford.ÌÌà àà àò ò2.à àNegligenceÌó óÌà àBoth€Sergeant€Stevens€and€Officer€McClellan€had€a€duty€to€use€due€care€in€theÏperformance€of€their€duties.€€They€had€an€express€duty€to€investigate€the€situation€upon€their€arrivalÏon€the€scene,€to€knock€and€announce€their€presence,€and€to€fire€their€weapons,€if€necessary,€inÏsuch€a€way€as€not€to€injure€innocent€bystanders.€€The€officers€breached€their€duty€of€care€by€goingÏinto€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€without€investigating€and€by€violating€the€knock€and€announce€rule.€ÏFurther,€Sergeant€Stevens€breached€his€duty€when€he€fired€his€gun€in€the€direction€of€Mrs.ÏSanford's€home.€€Ì›à àPolice€officers€are€required€by€state€and€federal€law€to€knock€and€announce€theirÏpresence€œ"[b]efore›€an€officer€may€make€a€forced€entry€into€an€occupied€residence,€the€officer€mustÏgive€'notice€of€his€authority€and€œpurpose'."›€€ò òòòState€v.€Lee,ó óóó€836€S.W.2d€126,€128€(Tenn.€Cr.ÏApp.€1991).€€œ"This›€requirement€mandates€that€officers€(a)€identify€themselves€as€law€enforcementÏofficials€and€(b)€explain€the€purpose€of€their€presence€.€.€.€œ."›€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€When€œthe€officers›€violated€theÏknock€and€announce€rule,€œthey›€œcreated›€a€dangerous€situation€which€resulted€in€Mrs.€Sanford'sÏinjuries.€€The€only€recognized€exceptions€to€the€knock€and€announce€rule€are:ÌÓÓÓ)` Ü` ä Iœx‘X)Óœà8 à(1)›à àthe€persons€within€already€know€of€the€œofficers'›€authority€and€œpurpose;Ìà8 à(2)›€œthe›€œofficers›€have€a€justifiable€belief€that€someone€within€is€in€œimminent›Ïperil€of€bodily€harm;€or€(3)€the€officers€have€a€justified€belief€that€thoseÏwithin€are€aware€of€their€presence€and€are€engaged€in€escape€or€theÏdestruction€of€evidence.ÌÌò òòòÓÓUnited€States€v.€Francis,€ó óóó646€F.2d€251,€258€(6th€Cir.€1981);€òòò òaccordó óóó€œòòò òHall›€v.€Shipleyó óóó,Ï932€F.2d€1147,€1152€(6th€Cir.€1991).€€œAs›€the€trial€judge€noted€œ"[t]here›€was€no€exigentÏcircumstances€that€required€the€immediate€entry€into€the€home€.€.€.€œ."›ÌÌà àHere,€the€officers'€pretext€for€entering€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€was€that€they€believedÏthere€might€be€someone€inside€in€danger.€€This€belief€was€not€justified.€€The€officers€had€noÍinformation€or€evidence€that€anyone€else€was€inside€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€or€that€another€personÏwas€in€danger.€€A€slight€investigation€on€the€officers'€part€would€have€revealed€that€Mr.€DickersonÏwas€alone.€€The€officers€had€no€legal€excuse€for€neglecting€to€knock€and€announce.€€Hearing€aÏloud€and€angry€voice€coming€from€within€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€did€not€provide€the€officers€withÏa€justifiable€belief€that€someone€else€was€inside€given€that€the€single€voice€was€coming€from€theÏdirection€in€which€a€telephone€cord€was€stretched.€€Even€if€we€assume€that€the€officers€had€goodÏreason€to€believe€that€someone€else€was€inside€with€Mr.€Dickerson,€they€heard€no€cries€for€help,Ïmoans,€or€sounds€of€a€struggle€that€would€have€suggested€that€the€second€person€was€œinÏ"imminent›€peril€of€bodily€œharm."›€€ÌÌà àThe€Metropolitan€Police€Department's€policy€allowing€an€officer€to€œ"break›€open€anyÏouter€or€inner€door€of€a€dwelling€house€or€other€œstructure"›€is€limited€to€the€followingÏcircumstances:ÌÓÓà8 à(1)à àHe€has€identified€himself€and€stated€his€authority€and€purpose;Ìà8 à(2)à àHe€has€been€refused€admittance;Ìà8 à(3)à àThere€is€no€alternative€means€readily€available€to€secure€the€arrest€exceptÏto€enter€such€place€by€force.ÌÌÓÓWe€note,€if€announcing€his€presence€would€endanger€the€officer's€life,€such€an€announcement€isÏnot€required.€€Here,€the€officers€did€not€identify€themselves€and€did€not€seek€admittance.€€They€hadÏan€alternative€means€of€dealing€with€Mr.€Dickerson.€€Specifically,€they€could€have€called€to€himÏfrom€behind€cover€and€demanded€he€come€out€with€his€hands€up.€€Under€these€circumstances,€thisÏwould€have€been€a€safer€alternative€than€the€officers'€unannounced€entry€which€precipitated€anÏarmed€confrontation.€€The€trial€judge€concluded€that€the€officers€negligently€violated€a€number€ofÏMetropolitan€Police€Department€guidelines.€€They€used€excessive€force€in€violation€of€theÏDepartment's€use€of€force€policy€providing€that€œ"a›€member€shall€not€cause€or€allow€force€to€beÏused€upon€or€against€any€person€until€such€time€as€that€person€demonstrates€unwillingness€toÏvoluntarily€comply€with€directions,€advice,€or€warnings,€incidental€to€his€œarrest."›€€The€officers€hereÍgave€Mr.€Dickerson€no€opportunity€whatsoever€to€comply€or€to€give€himself€up€before€entering€hisÏhome€with€their€guns€drawn.€€The€officers€also€violated€their€duty€under€the€police€department'sÏguidelines€to€use€deadly€force€œ"only›€as€a€last€result,€after€all€other€reasonable€means€have€failed€orÏwould€appear€œfutile."›€€They€utilized€no€other€means€whatsoever€to€arrest€Mr.€Dickerson€beforeÏentering€his€home€with€œtheir€guns›€drawn.ÌÌà àPolice€officers€are€taught€that€when€they€approach€a€house€where€a€suspect€is€armed,Ïthey€should€take€cover€and€first€try€to€get€the€suspect€outside€the€house.€€The€reason€police€officersÏare€taught€to€issue€verbal€challenges€from€positions€of€cover€when€confronting€armed€individuals€isÏto€keep€the€situation€from€escalating€into€violence.€€Another€reason€is€that€situations€where€œofficers›Ïconfront€armed€individuals€are€not€always€what€they€seem.€€When€an€officer€announces€themselvesÏand€orders€the€subjects€to€surrender,€he€is€able€to€buy€time€in€which€to€better€ascertain€the€œsuspect's›Ïidentity€and€intentions€and€to€avoid€the€unnecessary€use€of€deadly€force.ÌÌà àHere,€the€improper€unannounced€entry€into€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€by€the€policeÏofficers€endangered€the€lives€of€not€only€the€police€officers€but€also€of€Mr.€Dickerson€and€ofÏinnocent€citizens€in€the€area.€€The€trial€court€concluded€that€the€method€of€entry€was€œ"in›€conformityÏwith€a€narcotics€raid€where€spoilation€of€evidence€or€destruction€of€evidence€is€an€overridingÏconsideration,€as€opposed€to€a€shot's€fired€œcall."›€€Had€the€officers€utilized€proper€procedures€andÏstayed€outside€the€home,€they€may€not€have€œfelt€the€need›€to€shoot€at€Mr.€Dickerson.ÌÌà àIn€addition,€Sergeant€Stevens€breached€his€duty€of€care€to€Mrs.€Sanford€and€otherÏneighbors€in€the€area€by€firing€at€Mr.€Dickerson's€back€when€he€had€no€idea€what€was€beyond€hisÏtarget.€€Before€violating€a€cardinal€rule€of€firearm€safety,€to€be€sure€of€your€target€and€what€isÏbeyond€it,€Sergeant€Stevens€had€to€have€a€reasonable€belief€that€Officer€McClellan's€life€was€inÏdanger.€€Here,€the€evidence€reveals€he€did€not€have€such€a€belief.€€He€had€no€idea€where€OfficerÍMcClellan€was€and€began€shooting€at€Mr.€Dickerson's€back€before€he€knew€if€Mr.€DickersonÏposed€any€threat€to€his€partner.€€ÌÌà àThe€officers€owed€a€duty€of€care€to€Mrs.€Sanford€and€Mr.€Dickerson's€other€neighbors.€ÏThey€breached€that€duty€by€escalating€a€misdemeanor€disturbance€call€into€a€gun€battle.€€EvenÏthough€they€were€clearly€operating€in€a€heavily€populated€residential€area,€they€made€no€attempt€toÏwarn€any€of€the€residents€of€a€potential€shoot€out.€€They€made€no€attempt€to€move€residents€in€theÏpossible€line€of€fire€to€a€safe€area.€€They€merely€went€into€Mr.€Dickerson's€home€without€anyÏregard€for€the€possible€consequences€to€innocent€residents€of€that€immediate€vicinity.€€When€weÏreview€the€officers'€actions€in€light€of€the€facts€set€forth€in€ò òòòEatonó óóó,€we€are€persuaded€that€theÏmajority€of€the€fault€in€this€case€should€have€been€assessed€against€Metro.ÌÌò òII.à àFindings€of€FactÌó óÌà àMrs.€Sanford's€second€issue€was€œ"[d]id›€the€evidence€preponderate€against€certain€of€theÏtrial€court's€findings€of€œfact."›€€We€are€of€the€opinion€that€some€of€the€facts€found€by€the€trial€courtÏare€not€supported€by€the€evidence.€€On€appeal,€we€review€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€de€novoÏupon€the€record€of€the€trial€court€accompanied€by€a€presumption€that€the€findings€are€correctÏœ"unless›€the€preponderance€of€evidence€is€œotherwise."›€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)(1996).€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€Mr.€Dickerson€yelled€œ"I›€am€going€to€get€your€œa„„"›€in€theÏdirection€of€the€police€officers€in€his€living€room.€€The€only€evidence€in€this€record€is€that€the€threatÏwas€made€to€Mr.€Dickerson's€girlfriend€and€was€directed€to€the€telephone€receiver€he€had€in€hisÏhand.€€Sergeant€Stevens€testified€that€at€the€time€he€did€not€think€Mr.€Dickerson€was€aware€of€theÏofficers'€presence€in€his€home€and€thought€the€threat€was€directed€to€someone€else.€€Thus,€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€court's€finding.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€Mr.€Dickerson€ran€to€his€front€door€with€a€gun€in€one€handÏand€a€telephone€in€the€other€and€was€discarding€the€telephone€as€he€ran.€€The€photographs€takenÏafter€the€shooting€show€that€the€phone€cord€was€wrapped€around€a€glass€and€metal€shelf€near€Mr.ÏDickerson's€front€door.€€The€telephone€which€was€not€disturbed€from€the€time€of€the€shooting€untilÏthe€photographs€were€taken€could€not€have€become€wrapped€around€the€shelf€merely€by€beingÏdiscarded.€€It€appears€that€Mr.€Dickerson€threw€the€phone€down€possibly€when€Sergeant€StevensÏbegan€shooting€at€him.ÌÌà àThe€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€also€against€the€trial€court's€finding€that€SergeantÏStevens€did€not€start€shooting€until€Mr.€Dickerson€was€outside€on€his€front€porch€with€the€stormÏdoor€almost€completely€closed€behind€him.€€œThe›€moment€Mrs.€Sanford€was€shot€Mr.€DickersonÏhad€just€reached€the€inside€of€his€door.€€Sergeant€Stevens€admitted€that€he€began€shooting€as€Mr.ÏDickerson€got€to€the€door,€not€after€Mr.€Dickerson€had€already€gone€out€the€door€and€œit›€shut€behindÏhim.€€ÌÌà àWe€are€also€of€the€opinion€that€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€against€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€that€œ"it›€is€not€clear€which€officer€actually€fired€œfirst."›€€It€is€true€that€OfficerÏMcClellan€could€not€identify€the€sequence€of€the€shots€having€never€heard€any€of€the€shotsÏSergeant€Stevens€fired.€€However,€the€circumstances€taken€as€a€whole€establish€that€SergeantÏStevens€began€shooting€first.€€Sergeant€Stevens€acknowledges€that€he€began€shooting€as€Mr.ÏDickerson€got€to€the€door€and€that€the€other€shots€he€heard€began€afterwards.ÌÌò òIII.à àConstitutional€Deprivation€ClaimÌó óÌà àœMrs.€Sanford's€third€issue€is€ð ð[d]id€the€trial€court€err€in€dismissing€Mrs.€Sanford'sÍconstitutional€claims.ðð€€ÌÌà àAt€the€outset,€we€must€determine€the€appropriate€standard€of€review.€€To€explain,€inÏtheir€motion,€defendants€requested€the€court€dismiss€the€constitutional€claim€based€on€either€RuleÏ12.02(6)€or€Rule€56.€€In€addition,€defendants€attached€the€affidavits€of€Officers€McClellan€andÏStevens€to€the€motion.€€It€is€well€settled€in€this€state€that€a€trial€court€converts€a€Rule€12.02(6)Ïmotion€into€a€summary€judgment€motion€when€the€trial€court€considers€matters€outside€theÏpleadings.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02€(West€1996).€€In€this€case,€however,€the€trial€court's€orderÏreveals€that€the€court€did€not€consider€matters€outside€the€pleadings.€€Instead,€the€order€clearlyÏstates€that€the€court€relied€on€the€motions€and€the€arguments€in€support€thereof€and€nothing€more.× ƒ9 ××  ×€ÏThus,€this€court€must€determine€whether€defendants€correctly€asserted€that€the€court€should€dismissÏMrs.€Sanford's€claim€pursuant€to€Rule€12.02(6)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.ÌÌà àIn€her€complaint,€Mrs.€Sanford€alleged:ÌÓÓà8 àà à30.à àAll€of€the€defendants€[except€McClellan€and€Stevens,Ïindividually],€who,€under€color€of€any€statute,€ordinance,€regulation,Ïcustom,€or€usage€of€Tennessee€subjected€Sanford,€a€citizen,€to€theÏdeprivation€of€her€rights€and€privileges€secured€by€the€state€and€federalÏConstitutions€and€laws,€are€liable€to€Sanford€pursuant€to€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983,Ïof€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€Act.ÌÌÓÓAs€to€the€constitutional€claims,€Mrs.€Sanford€alleged€that€the€officers€violated€her€Eighth€andÏFourteenth€Amendment€rights.ÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€Mrs.€Sanford€failed€to€articulate€a€claim€under€theÏEighth€Amendment.€€ð ðEighth€Amendment€scrutiny€is€appropriate€only€after€the€State€has€compliedÏwith€the€constitutional€guarantees€traditionally€associated€with€criminal€prosecutions.ðð€€òòò òIngrahamÍv.€Wrightóóó ó,€430€U.S.€651,€671€n.40,€97€S.€Ct.€1401,€1412€n.40,€51€L.€Ed.€2d€711,€730€n.40Ï(1977).€€Such€was€not€the€case€here.€€Thus,€the€court€properly€dismissed€her€claim€based€on€aÏviolation€of€the€Eighth€Amendment.ÌÌà àMrs.€Sanford€also€asserted€that€Metro€violated€her€Fourteenth€Amendment€Due€ProcessÏrights€by€failing€to€properly€train€the€officers.€€€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€Mrs.€SanfordÏstated€a€cause€of€action€and€that€there€are€genuine€issues€of€material€fact.ÌÌà àAs€a€starting€point,€we€must€establish€the€contours€of€the€claim.€€It€is€well€settled€that€aÏparty€may€not€bring€an€action€pursuant€to€section€1983€against€a€municipality€on€the€basis€ofÏrespondeat€superior.€€òòò òMonell€v.€Dep't€of€Soc.€Servs.óóó ó,€436€U.S.€658,€694,€98€S.€Ct.€2018,Ï2037,€56€L.€Ed.€2d€611,€638€(1978).€Thus,€any€constitutional€claim€alleged€by€Mrs.€SanfordÏagainst€Metro€based€solely€on€the€actions€of€Officers€McClellan€and€Stevens€must€fail.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€This€isÏnot€to€say€that€a€municipality€cannot€be€liable€to€a€citizen€because€of€the€actions€of€its€employees.€ÏInstead,€a€municipality€will€be€liable,€assuming€a€constitutional€violation,€only€when€the€ð ðexecutionÏof€a€government's€policy€or€custom€.€.€.€inflicts€the€injury€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€2037„38.€€In€addition,€theÏmunicipal€policy€must€be€ð ðthe€moving€force€of€the€constitutional€violation.€.€.€.ðð€€òòò òSee€idó óóó.€at€2038.€ÏWhen€faced€with€an€issue€similar€to€that€here,€the€Supreme€Court€elaborated€on€its€decision€inÏòòò òMonellóóó ó.€€The€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€municipality€may€be€liable€if€it€has€a€policy€or€custom€ofÏfailing€to€train€its€employees€and€if€that€failure€to€train€causes€a€deprivation€of€constitutional€rights.€Ïòòò òCanton€v.€Harrisóóó ó,€489€U.S.€378,€387,€109€S.€Ct.€1197,€1205,103€L.€Ed.€2d€412,€425„26Ï(1989).€€Moreover,€a€municipality's€failure€to€train€an€employee€becomes€a€policy€or€custom€forÏthe€purposes€of€section€1983€when€the€failure€evidences€a€deliberate€indifference€to€the€rights€of€theÏpublic.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€1205.€€Thus,€in€order€to€state€the€claim€contemplated€by€Mrs.€Sanford,€a€party€mustÏallege:€1)€the€deprivation€of€a€constitutional€right;€2)€the€existence€of€a€municipality€policy€orÏcustom,€i.e.,€the€failure€to€train€evidences€a€deliberate€indifference€to€the€rights€of€the€public;€and€3)Íthe€existence€of€a€causal€link€between€the€deprivation€of€rights€and€the€policy€or€custom.× ƒ: ××  ×ÌÌà àMrs.€Sanford€properly€alleged€a€cause€of€action.€€First,€she€alleged€that€there€was€aÏviolation€of€her€Fourteenth€Amendment€rights.€€Next,€she€alleged€that€the€failure€to€adequately€trainÏthe€officers€was€a€policy€or€custom€and€that€the€failure€to€properly€train€the€officers€evidenced€aÏdeliberate€indifference.€€Finally,€she€alleged€that€the€policy€or€custom€of€failing€to€properly€train€theÏofficers€caused€her€injuries.€€Thus,€Mrs.€Sanford€stated€a€claim€for€relief€under€section€1983.ÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€Metro's€arguments€in€their€motion€and€their€brief€areÏwithout€merit.€€Metro€focussed€on€the€actions€of€the€officers€and€argued€that€the€actions€were€anÏinsufficient€basis€for€a€section€1983€claim.€€If€this€were€a€respondeat€superior€claim,€we€wouldÏagree€with€Metro€that€the€actions€of€the€officers€are€of€critical€importance€to€the€determination€of€theÏissues.€€Nevertheless,€this€case€does€not€turn€on€the€actions€of€the€officers.€€Instead,€the€focus€hereÏis€on€the€actions€of€Metro€in€failing€to€provide€adequate€training€if€such€be€the€case.€€€Thus,ÏMetro's€argument€is€without€merit.€€ÌÌà àTherefore,€it€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€dismissed€Mrs.ÏSanford's€constitutional€deprivation€claim€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€Although€Mrs.€Sanford'sÏclaim€survives,€we€note€that€she€has€a€heavy€burden€of€proof€in€this€case.€€ò òòòSee€Cantonó óóó,€109€S.ÏCt.€at€1205„06.ÌÌò òIV.à àThe€Dismissal€of€Officers€McClellen€and€StevensÌÌà àó óAt€the€time€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€officers,€it€had€entered€orders€dismissing€all€ofÏMrs.€Sanford's€claims€except€count€II,€common€law€negligence.€€Thus,€the€dismissal€of€theÏofficers€as€to€the€dismissed€claims€was€not€even€necessary€because€they€were€dismissed€as€partiesÏwhen€the€claims€were€dismissed.€€In€addition,€the€officers€were€immune€from€liability€under€countÏII€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€29„20„310(b)€because€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€29„20„205€removed€the€government's€immunity.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€properlyÏdismissed€the€officers€as€parties€to€count€II€of€the€complaint.€€Now,€however,€this€court€hasÏdetermined€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€dismissed€Mrs.€Sanford's€constitutional€deprivationÏclaim.€€Moreover,€this€court€is€of€the€opinion€that€the€officers'€motion€to€dismiss€failed€to€state€aÏproper€basis€for€dismissal€absent€the€dismissal€of€the€claim€itself.€€Thus,€it€is€the€opinion€of€thisÏcourt€that€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€dismissing€the€officers€should€be€reversed.ÌÌò òV.à àConclusionó óÌÌà àThe€judgments€of€the€trial€court€dismissing€Mrs.€Sanford's€constitutional€claim€and€theÏofficers€and€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€assessing€fault€are€reversed.€€On€remand,€the€trial€courtÏshall€enter€an€order€assessing€Mr.€Dickerson€with€twenty€percent€of€the€fault€and€the€MetropolitanÏGovernment€with€eighty€percent€of€the€fault.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendants.€€TheÏcause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€necessary€proceedings€including€the€properÍassessment€of€damages€and€a€hearing€on€the€merits€of€the€section€1983€claim.€€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,ÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ