ÿWPCø" …# VUNa %¯ 0 cµU < w@T 4” ¨ · 0§¿ 0Jf 0T° 0^ 0hb 0rÊ 0|< 0†¸ 0> 1uÎ 0dCU>§B)åDC 0DQ AM•U*â8 TDŸ˜ B7 D3T‡, 0@BJ‚U6Ìv~vÓ€ AOS!Æ¢! 0Dh" D/¬" BÛ"˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;1˜$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XcXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman )*E+,U-U.î/0Ó€:;DÒ # Roman3|x;(W(3Q $¤¤Ý ƒ1˜!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X„4XXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial .Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌMayÏ9,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó JÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€On€October€24,€1995,€Flora€Scruggs€transferred€the€property€byÏquitclaim€deed€to€her€husband,€John€T.€Scruggs,€Sr.€€On€January€23,€1996,€theÏtrial€court€entered€an€order€substituting€John€T.€Scruggs,€Sr.€in€place€of€FloraÏScruggs€as€the€proper€party€in€interest.€€However,€because€the€trial€court€andÏthe€parties€have€continued€to€refer€to€the€petitioner€as€Flora€Scruggs,€we€will€doÏlikewise.Ì •Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Scruggs€actually€purchased€the€land€with€John€T.€Scruggs,€Sr.€€In€1982,ÏJohn€T.€Scruggs,€Sr.€conveyed€his€interest€in€the€land€to€Flora€Scruggs€makingÏher€the€sole€owner€until€she€conveyed€it€back€to€him€in€1995.Ì d))))'ÿÿdxd …Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Old€New€Cut€Road€is€referred€to€throughout€the€record€as€Old€NewÏCut€Road,€New€Cut€Road,€Triune,€and€Salem€Road,€or€old€dirt€road.€€In€thisÏopinion,€we€will€call€the€road€ð ðOld€New€Cut€Road.ððÌ "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€road€bed€is€about€12€feet€wide,€and€the€cleared€swath€next€to€theÏroad€is€about€33€feet€wide.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€On€September€16,€1994,€Scruggs€filed€another€petition€that€merelyÏadded€Sarah€T.€Bell,€Gordon€Bellððs€wife,€as€a€respondent.€Ì< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€‡WXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òFLORA€SCRUGGS,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellee,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRutherford€Chancery€No.€93CV„464ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€01A01„9610„CH„00475ÌÌò òGORDON€BELL,€ó óÌÌà àDefendant„Appellant.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€RUTHERFORD€COUNTY€CHANCERY€COURTÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€E.€CORLEW,€III,€CHANELLORÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àFrank€M.€Fly€of€MurfreesboroÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àDavid€W.€Kious€and€Robert€O.€Bragdon€of€MurfreesboroÌà@ àFor€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óóóÌÌà@ àOpinion€filed:€ÌÌÙ€€ÙßR€$&"A1-j|Jô` à. `€€@ÿRßÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEÌó óÌÓÓ›à àThis€case€involves€a€dispute€concerning€an€easement€for€ingress€andÏegress.€€Respondents„Appellants,€Gordon€Bell€and€Sarah€T.€Bell,€appeal€from€theÏorder€of€the€trial€court€granting€an€easement€by€estoppel€to€Petitioner„Appellee,ÏFlora€Pope€Scruggs× ƒ' ××  ×,€without€compensation€to€the€Bells.Ìà àIn€1970,€Scruggs€purchased€35€acres€of€unimproved€land€in€ruralÍRutherford€County.× ƒ( ××  ×€€The€land€did€not€front€a€public€road,€but€it€had€aÏconnection€to€a€public€road€by€Old€New€Cut€Road× ƒ+ ××  ×,€an€old€dirt€road€thatÏcrossed€the€neighboring€property.€€Scruggsððs€deed€did€not€provide€for€any€typeÏof€easement€over€the€other€property.Ìà àIn€1981,€the€Bells€purchased€10€acres€of€land€west€of€Scruggsððs€propertyÏwith€the€center€line€of€Old€New€Cut€Road€as€its€southern€boundary,€and€inÏ1987,€the€Bells€purchased€an€additional€23.2€acres€on€the€other€side€of€Old€NewÏCut€Road€with€the€center€line€of€the€road€as€its€northern€boundary.€€Old€NewÏCut€Road€bisects€the€Bellsðð€properties.€€Neither€of€the€Bellsðð€deeds€is€subject€toÏan€easement€in€favor€of€Scruggs.€€€€Ìà àOld€New€Cut€Road€is€described€as€a€10„foot€wide€dirt€road€full€ofÏpotholes€with€tree€branches€hanging€into€the€road€bed€that€would€scratchÏvehicles€and€break€their€side€mirrors.€€Scruggs€used€Old€New€Cut€Road€to€haulÏfirewood€from€her€property€even€though€it€would€damage€her€truck.€€She€andÏher€sons€cut€the€tree€limbs€back€and€laid€flat€rock€in€the€road€bed€to€try€toÍprevent€some€of€the€damage.€€Other€nearby€landowners€also€used€the€road€toÏaccess€their€properties.€€One€landowner€testified€that€he€thought€it€was€an€oldÏcounty€road€and€was€not€owned€by€anybody.€€In€a€1975€survey,€Old€New€CutÏRoad€was€described€as€ð ðold€dirt€road€(not€used).ðð€€The€road€has€been€used€sinceÏ1970,€but€was€not€maintained€by€the€county.€€€€Ìà àScruggs€moved€a€house€onto€her€property€using€Old€New€Cut€Road.€€SheÏhad€to€cut€down€a€few€trees€to€move€the€house.€€Scruggs€wanted€to€completeÏfurther€improvements€to€her€property,€including€electricity,€gas,€water,€andÏphone€service.€€Gordon€Bell€never€prevented€Scruggs€from€using€the€road€norÏdid€he€ever€restrict€her€use.€€However,€in€1991,€Scruggs€cleared€an€area€alongÏOld€New€Cut€Road€with€a€bulldozer€without€Bellððs€permission.× ƒ, ××  ×€€On€July€2,Ï1991,€Gordon€Bell€sued€Scruggs€for€damages€resulting€from€the€bulldozing€andÏfor€an€order€to€permanently€prohibit€Scruggs€from€entering€his€land.€€TheÏgeneral€sessions€court€entered€a€judgment€for€Gordon€Bell€against€Scruggs€forÏ$6,925.00.€€Scruggs€appealed€to€the€circuit€court,€but€all€issues€were€settledÏbefore€trial.Ìà àOn€May€17,€1993,€Scruggs€filed€a€petition€in€chancery€court€seeking€toÏestablish€an€easement€or,€in€the€alternative,€to€establish€her€right€to€a€statutoryÍeasement€for€ingress€and€egress€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€54„14„101€(1993).× ƒ. ××  ×€€In€theÏpetition,€Scruggs€avers€that€she€has€an€existing€easement€for€ingress€and€egressÏover€Old€New€Cut€Road€and€that€she€is€being€denied€free€access€by€the€Bells.€ÏShe€avers€that€the€Bells€are€denying€her€the€right€to€have€utility€service€to€herÏproperty€unless€she€pays€them€a€substantial€sum€of€money.€€She€avers€that€sheÏshould€not€be€restricted€in€her€use€of€Old€New€Cut€Road€and€that€the€BellsÏshould€be€enjoined€from€interfering€with€her€free€access.€€Ìà àThe€petition€prays€that€the€court€find€an€existing€right„of„way€over€OldÏNew€Cut€Road€that€allows€Scruggs€free€access€to€her€land€and€an€existingÏeasement€for€ingress€and€egress€over€Old€New€Cut€Road.€€Further,€Scruggs€praysÏfor€a€finding€of€an€existing€easement€by€implication€for€the€extension€of€utilityÏservices€along€Old€New€Cut€Road.€€In€the€alternative,€Scruggs€requests€anÏeasement€for€ingress€and€egress€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€54„14„101€and€for€anyÏadditional€land€that€would€be€necessary€for€extension€of€utility€service.€€Finally,ÏScruggs€demands€an€injunction€against€the€Bells€preventing€them€fromÏinterfering€with€her€use€of€Old€New€Cut€Road.Ìà àOn€June€20,€1993,€Gordon€Bell€filed€an€answer€to€the€petition€denyingÏthat€he€was€preventing€Scruggs€from€using€Old€New€Cut€Road.€€He€also€deniedÍthat€an€easement€or€right„of„way€already€existed.€€On€October€13,€1994,€SarahÏT.€Bell€filed€an€answer€to€the€petition€denying€the€material€allegations€of€theÏpetition€and€asserting€an€affirmative€defense€of€res€judicata€because€of€the€BellsððÏ1991€suit€against€Scruggs.€€Gordon€Bell€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€based€on€theÏdoctrine€of€res€judicata,€but€the€trial€court€denied€both€the€motion€and€hisÏrequest€for€an€interlocutory€appeal.Ìà àOn€June€13,€1995,€the€case€was€tried€before€the€chancery€court€sittingÏwithout€a€jury.€€On€August€24,€1995,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€grantingÏScruggs€a€45„foot€wide€easement€across€the€Bellsðð€property€consisting€of€a€15„foot€wide€easement€for€ingress€and€egress€and€a€30„foot€wide€easement€forÏutilities.€€The€court€took€under€advisement€the€issue€of€the€easementððs€locationÏand€the€issue€of€payment€to€the€Bells.€€On€September€15,€1995,€the€trial€courtÏfiled€an€opinion€outlining€its€decision,€and€on€May€23,€1996,€the€trial€courtÏentered€a€final€order€that€incorporated€the€August€24€order€and€the€SeptemberÏ15€opinion.€€The€trial€court€granted€Scruggs€an€easement€by€estoppel€consistingÏof€the€15„foot€wide€ingress€and€egress€easement€and€the€30„foot€wide€utilityÏeasement.€€The€ingress€and€egress€easement€was€not€compensable€to€the€Bells,Ïbut€the€utility€easement€was€compensable.€€The€parties€agreed€to€both€theÏlocation€of€the€easements€and€the€value€of€the€utility€easement.Ìà àThe€Bells€appeal€the€order€of€the€trial€court€and€present€two€issues€forÏreview:€€1)€whether€the€present€suit€is€barred€by€the€doctrines€of€res€judicataÏand€collateral€estoppel;€and€2)€whether€Tennessee€law€allows€the€gratuitousÏconversion€of€a€permissive€use€into€an€easement€by€estoppel.Ìà àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€reviewÏthe€case€ò òòòde€novoó óóó€upon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€theÏfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€Unless€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€findings,€we€must€affirm,€absent€error€of€law.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€€Ìà àIn€the€first€issue,€the€Bells€argue€that€the€general€sessions€court€in€theÏBellsðð€1991€suit€against€Scruggs€impliedly€found€that€Scruggs€did€not€have€anÏeasement€because€the€court€awarded€damages€to€the€Bells.€€They€argue€that€ifÏshe€had€an€easement,€then€she€would€have€had€a€right€to€bulldoze€the€trees,€andÏtherefore,€the€court€would€not€have€entered€a€judgment€against€her.€€The€BellsÏclaim€that€Scruggs€should€have€presented€the€issue€of€an€easement€in€aÏcounterclaim€in€the€first€suit.Ìà àScruggs€filed€an€affidavit€of€œRoyce€Taylor,€her€attorney€in›€the€earlier€œsuit,›Ïwhich€was€apparently€considered€by€the€trial€court€without€objection€from€theÏBells.€€The€affidavit€states€that€the€first€suit€dealt€only€with€damages€to€theÏBellsðð€land€and€that€no€ruling€was€made€about€an€easement€because€no€rulingÍwas€requested€by€either€party.€€According€to€Taylor,€the€trial€court€ruled€thatÏScruggs€had€damaged€the€Bellsðð€property€beyond€the€road€and€enjoined€her€fromÏcoming€back€onto€the€Bellsðð€property.€€However,€the€ruling€did€not€prevent€herÏfrom€using€the€road.Ìà à€A€judgment€on€the€merits€exhausts€the€cause€of€action€on€which€it€wasÏbased€and€is€an€absolute€bar€to€a€subsequent€suit€between€the€same€parties€andÏtheir€privies€upon€the€same€cause€of€action.€€òòò òMadyun€v.€Ballardó óóó,€783€S.W.2dÏ946,€948€(Tenn.€App.€1989).€€Res€judicata€operates€to€bar€a€claim€when€a€priorÏjudgment€in€an€action€between€the€same€parties€on€the€same€cause€of€actionÏconcludes€not€only€the€facts€actually€litigated,€but€the€facts€pertaining€to€thatÏissue€that€might€have€been€brought€forth€and€litigated.€€òòò òHarrogate€Corp.€v.ÏSystems€Sales€Corp.ó óóó,€915€S.W.2d€812,€816€(Tenn.€App.€1995).Ìà àRes€judicata€bars€a€second€suit€between€the€same€parties€and€their€priviesÏon€the€same€cause€of€action€as€to€all€issues€that€were€or€could€have€beenÏlitigated€in€the€former€suit.€€Collateral€estoppel€operates€to€bar€a€second€suitÏbetween€the€same€parties€and€their€privies€on€a€different€cause€of€action€only€asÏto€issues€that€were€actually€litigated€and€determined€in€the€former€suit.€€ToÏsupport€a€plea€of€res€judicata,€it€must€be€shown€that€the€judgment€in€the€priorÏcase€was€final€and€concluded€the€rights€of€the€party€against€whom€it€is€asserted.€ÍIt€is€also€necessary€to€show€that€both€cases€involved€the€same€cause€of€action.€ÏTo€sustain€a€plea€of€collateral€estoppel€it€must€be€shown,€òòinter€aliaóó,€that€the€issueÏsought€to€be€concluded€not€only€was€litigated€in€the€prior€suit€but€wasÏnecessary€to€the€judgment€in€that€suit.€€òòò òMassengill€v.€Scottó óóó,€738€S.W.2d€629,Ï631„32€(Tenn.€1987)€(citing€22€Tenn.€Jur.ò òòò€ó óRes€Judicataóó€ðð€4€(1985)).Ìà àOne€defending€on€the€basis€of€res€judicata€or€collateral€estoppel€mustÏdemonstrate€that€1)€the€judgment€in€the€prior€case€was€final€and€concluded€theÏrights€of€the€party€against€whom€the€defense€is€asserted,€and€2)€both€casesÏinvolve€the€same€parties,€the€same€cause€of€action,€or€identical€issues.€Ïòòò òRichardson€v.€Tennessee€Bd.€of€Dentistryó óóó,€913€S.W.2d€446,€459€(Tenn.€1995).Ìà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€Bells€have€simply€failed€to€prove€that€this€case€andÏthe€earlier€case€involved€the€same€causes€of€action€or€identical€issues.€€ThisÏissue€is€without€merit.Ìà àIn€the€second€issue,€the€Bells€assert€that€the€trial€court€misapplied€theÏlaw€and€that€the€grant€of€an€easement€by€estoppel€was€not€appropriate€underÏthe€facts€of€this€case.€€The€Bells€complain€only€about€the€easement€for€ingressÏand€egress,€not€the€utility€easement.€€Furthermore,€the€Bells€do€not€object€to€anÏeasement€for€Scruggs.€€Their€real€objection€is€that€Scruggs€did€not€have€to€payÏfor€the€easement€for€ingress€and€egress.€€To€determine€the€validity€of€thisÍobjection,€we€must€determine€if€Scruggs€is€entitled€to€an€easement€for€ingressÏand€egress€over€the€Bellsðð€property.Ìà àIn€its€September€15,€1995€opinion,€the€trial€court€examined€each€type€ofÏeasement€in€light€of€the€facts€of€this€case.€€The€trial€court€initially€found€thatÏneither€an€express€easement€nor€an€easement€by€dedication€existed€in€this€case.€ÏWe€agree.€€An€express€grant€of€an€easement€is€an€irrevocable€license€to€enterÏupon€land€of€another€and€must€be€in€writing.€€ò òòòChilders€v.€William€H.€ColemanÏCo.ó óóó,€122€Tenn.€109,€126€(1909).€€A€dedication€is€found€where€the€owner€of€landÏsets€apart€a€portion€of€his€land€by€agreement,€either€for€compensation€orÏgratuitously.€€ò òòòSmith€v.€Blackó óóó,€547€S.W.2d€947,€950€(Tenn.€App.€1976).€€It€isÏclear€from€the€record€that€none€of€the€deeds€involved€contained€an€expressÏgrant€of€an€easement€in€favor€of€Scruggs€and€that€the€parties€never€made€aÏseparate€agreement€concerning€an€easement.Ìà àThe€trial€court€next€concluded€that€an€easement€by€prescription€was€notÏestablished€because€Scruggsððs€use€of€Old€New€Cut€Road€through€the€BellsððÏproperty€was€permissive.€€Twenty€years€of€adverse€use€is€required€to€establish€aÏprescriptive€easement.€€òòò òKeebler€v.€Streetóóó ó,€673€S.W.2d€154,€156€(Tenn.€App.Ï1984).€€ð ðThe€use€and€enjoyment€which€will€give€title€by€prescription€to€anÏeasement€.€.€.€must€be€adverse,€under€claim€of€right,€continuous,€uninterrupted,Íopen,€visible,€exclusive,€and€with€the€knowledge€and€acquiescence€of€the€ownerÏof€the€servient€tenement,€and€must€continue€for€the€full€prescriptive€period€.€.€.Ï.ðð€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€(quoting€ò òòòHouse€v.€Closeóóó ó,€346€S.W.2d€445,€447€(Tenn.€App.€1961)).€€AnÏeasement€by€prescription€may€not€be€obtained€where€the€use€is€permissive.€Ïòòò òCity€of€Whitwell€v.€Whiteóóó ó,€529€S.W.2d€228,€230€(Tenn.€App.€1974).€€The€ownerÏof€the€servient€estate€may€defeat€the€claimantððs€right€of€prescription€byÏtestifying€that€he€never€objected€to€the€claimant€using€the€road€regardless€of€forÏhow€long€a€period.€€ò òòòGerman€v.€Grahamóóó ó,€497€S.W.2d€245,€248€(Tenn.€App.Ï1972).Ìà àIn€this€case,€there€is€a€dispute€about€permission.€€Scruggs€claims€that€sheÏasked€only€permission€to€cut€the€trees€along€Old€New€Cut€Road€because€she€feltÏthat€she€was€entitled€to€use€the€road€itself.€€However,€the€Bells€characterize€theÏrequest€for€permission€as€a€request€to€use€and€improve€the€road.€€Regardless,ÏGordon€Bell€testified€that€he€had€never€prevented€nor€objected€to€Scruggs€usingÏOld€New€Cut€Road.€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€that€theÏevidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€there€is€noÏeasement€by€prescription€in€favor€of€Scruggs.Ìà àThe€trial€court€also€found€that€an€easement€by€prescription€for€a€publicÏway€could€not€be€established.€€The€evidence€shows€that€the€public€used€Old€NewÍCut€Road€for€many€years,€but€there€is€no€proof€that€Old€New€Cut€Road€wasÏever€a€county€maintained€road.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€use€of€the€roadÏwas€not€continuous€for€a€period€of€20€years€or€more€and€that€the€use€wasÏpermissive€or€with€the€permission€of€the€landowners€whose€land€abutted€theÏroad.€€Ìà àIt€is€long€settled€law€that€a€public€way€may€be€established€by€evidence€ofÏadverse€use€for€a€long€period€of€time,€without€any€express€dedication,€if€it€isÏshown€that€the€use€is€under€a€claim€of€right,€and€not€merely€permissive.€€Mere€Ïpermissive€use€is€not€sufficient€to€establish€a€dedication.€€òòò òLewisburg,€TennesseeÏv.€Emersonóóó ó,€5€Tenn.€App.€127,€132€(1927).€€To€establish€a€dedication€byÏimplication,€there€must€be€proof€of€facts€from€which€it€positively€andÏunequivocally€appears€that€the€owner€intended€to€part€permanently€with€hisÏproperty€and€vest€it€in€the€public,€and€there€can€be€no€other€reasonableÏexplanation€of€his€conduct.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€againstÏthe€trial€courtððs€finding€that€Old€New€Cut€Road€is€not€a€public€way.€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€next€concluded€that€Scruggs€did€not€have€an€easement€byÏimplication€because€there€was€no€evidence€of€unity€of€title.€€It€is€the€policy€ofÏour€law€to€restrict€the€doctrine€of€implied€easements€because€they€are€notÏfavored€in€the€law.€€ò òòòCole€v.€Dychó óóó,€535€S.W.2d€315,€318€(Tenn.€1976).€€ImpliedÍeasements€are€founded€upon€conveyances€and€are€premised€upon€theÏpresumption€that€they€were€within€the€contemplation€of€the€parties€and€mustÏbe€supported€by€unity€of€title.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€We€find€that€the€evidence€does€notÏpreponderate€against€the€findings€of€the€trial€court€concerning€an€impliedÏeasement.€€We€note€that€the€trial€court€did€not€specifically€consider€anÏeasement€by€necessity€because€such€an€easement€is€a€type€of€implied€easementÏthat€requires€unity€of€title.€€A€way€of€necessity€is€dependent€upon€an€impliedÏgrant€and€cannot€exist€where€there€never€was€any€unity€of€ownership€of€theÏalleged€dominant€and€servient€estates,€for€no€one€can€have€a€way€of€necessityÏover€the€land€of€a€stranger.€€ò òòòEmersonóóó ó,€5€Tenn.€App.€at€134.€Ìà àFinally,€the€trial€court€turned€to€easements€by€estoppel.€€In€its€opinion,Ïthe€trial€court€stated,ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€Court€recognizes€that€easements€by€estoppel€alsoÏare€not€favored€under€the€law,€and,€where€the€Court€isÏable€to€do€so,€courts€even€struggle,€perhaps,€to€find€anÏeasement€by€prescription,€rather€than€easements€byÏestoppel.€€ò òòòSee,€House€v.€Close,€supra€ó óóóat€449;€ò òòòJones€v.ÏRossóóó ó,€388€S.W.2d€640,€646€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1964)Ïò òòòcert.€deniedóóó ó.€€Generally€estoppel€is€available€only€toÏprotect€a€right€that€previously€existed,€but€not€toÏcreate€a€new€right.€€ò òòòE.K.€Hardison€Seed€Company€v.ÏContinental€Casualty€Companyóóó ó,€410€S.W.2d€729,€733Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1966)€ò òòòcert.€deniedó óóó€1967.€€It€was€onÏthis€basis,€that€at€least€one€court€has€held€that€anÏestoppel€is€insufficient€to€establish€the€existence€of€anÏeasement.€€ò òòòCharles€N.€McDowell€v.€Carol€Ratcliff€andÍEllen€Ratcliffóóó ó,€[unpublished]€1992€W.L.€328707,€92ÏLexis€929€(Tenn.€1992)[sic],€Appeal€No.€03A01„9206CH00225€„„€Eastern€Section,€November€12,Ï1992.ÌÌÓÓThe€trial€court€then€stated€that€this€case€was€different€from€ò òòòMcDowellóóó ó€and€thatÏeasements€by€estoppel€should€be€recognized€in€order€to€prevent€gross€injusticeÏfrom€occurring.€€The€trial€court€analyzed€the€facts€of€this€case€using€theÏelements€of€equitable€estoppel€as€stated€in€ò òòòCallahan€v.€Town€of€Middletonóóó ó,€292ÏS.W.2d€501€(Tenn.€App.€1954),€and€concluded€that€this€was€ð ðan€appropriateÏcase€for€the€recognition€of€the€existence€of€an€easement.ðð€€The€trial€courtÏstated,€ð ðThe€easement€then€being€recognized€by€the€Court€under€the€principleÏof€estoppel,€the€Court€finds€the€easement€to€have€previously€existed.€€TheÏeasement,€then,€being€in€existence€prior€to€the€commencement€of€the€lawsuit,Ïthe€Court,€then,€should€not€assess€damages€or€compensation€in€favor€of€theÏDefendant€for€the€taking€of€the€land€for€the€purpose€of€the€easement.ððÌà àWe€believe€that€an€easement€by€estoppel€cannot€be€found€in€this€case€forÏtwo€reasons.€€First,€in€ò òòòCallahanóóó ó,€this€Court€applied€the€elements€of€equitableÏestoppel€to€the€issue€of€an€easement€by€estoppel€and€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€essential€elements€of€an€equitable€estoppel€asÏrelated€to€the€party€estopped€are€said€to€be€(1)€ÏConduct€which€amounts€to€a€false€representation€orÏconcealment€of€material€facts,€or,€at€least,€which€isÏcalculated€to€convey€the€impression€that€the€facts€areÍotherwise€than,€and€inconsistent€with,€those€whichÏthe€party€subsequently€attempts€to€assert;€(2)€ÏIntention,€or€at€least€expectation€that€such€conductÏshall€be€acted€upon€by€the€other€party;€(3)€ÏKnowledge,€actual€or€constructive€of€the€real€facts.€€AsÏrelated€to€the€party€claiming€the€estoppel€they€are€(1)€ÏLack€of€knowledge€and€of€the€means€of€knowledge€ofÏthe€truth€as€to€the€facts€in€question;€(2)€€RelianceÏupon€the€conduct€of€the€party€estopped;€and€(3)€ÏAction€based€thereon€of€such€a€character€as€to€changeÏhis€position€prejudicially.€Ìòòò òÌÓÓCallahanó óóó,€292€S.W.2d€at€508€(quoting€19€Am.€Jur.€òòEstoppelóó€ðð€42€at€642„43).€€InÏthe€case€before€us,€the€trial€court€stated,€ð ð[I]t€appears€to€the€Court€that€a€falseÏimpression€was€provided€to€the€Scruggs.ðð€€We€believe€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€this€finding€of€the€trial€court.€€The€record€does€notÏdisclose€any€false€misrepresentations€or€conduct€that€gives€rise€to€a€falseÏimpression€on€the€part€of€the€Bells.€€We€believe€that€the€Bells€are€not€estoppedÏfrom€denying€the€existence€of€an€easement€because€Scruggs€cannot€show€thatÏthe€elements€of€an€equitable€estoppel€have€been€met.Ìà àSecond,€the€trial€court€stated€that€a€number€of€courts€have€expresslyÏrecognized€the€existence€of€the€finding€of€an€easement€by€estoppel,€citing€ò òòòMooreÏv.€Queeneróóó ó,€464€S.W.2d€296€(Tenn.€App.€1970).€€In€ò òòòMooreóóó ó,€the€plaintiffs€suedÏthe€defendants€to€keep€an€easement€open€across€the€defendantsðð€land.€€TheÏeasement€was€recorded€in€a€plat€of€the€subdivision,€but€the€deeds€were€silent€asÍto€the€existence€of€the€easement.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€299.€€However,€the€deeds€referencedÏthe€recorded€plat.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€In€addition,€the€easement€was€an€announced€conditionÏto€the€purchase€of€the€land€during€the€auction€of€the€subdivisionððs€lots.€€TheÏCourt€stated,€ð ðThe€fact€that€an€easement,€of€some€sort,€over€the€lands€of€theÏdefendants€for€complainantsðð€benefit,€actually€existed€at€the€time€of€theÏconveyances,€cannot€be€and€is€not€controverted.ðð€€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€at€300.€€The€Court€heldÏthat€the€plaintiffs€were€entitled€to€an€easement€by€their€deed€and€that€theÏdefendants€were€estopped€to€deny€the€existence€of€the€easement€because€theyÏhad€notice€of€the€easement€from€the€recorded€plat€and€the€announcedÏconditions.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€302.Ìà àReliance€on€ò òòòMooreóóó ó€is€misplaced.€€In€ò òòòMooreóóó ó,€the€Court€did€not€create€anÏeasement€using€estoppel,€it€merely€estopped€the€defendants€from€denying€thatÏone€already€existed.€€Estoppel€is€available€to€protect€a€right,€but€never€to€createÏone.€€ò òòòE.K.€Hardison€Seed€Co.€v.€Continental€Cas.€Co.óóó ó,€410€S.W.2d€729,€733Ï(Tenn.€App.€1966).€€In€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€carefully€examined€eachÏway€that€an€easement€could€be€created€and€concluded€that€Scruggs€did€not€haveÏan€easement.€€The€trial€court€rejected€an€express€easement,€a€prescriptiveÏeasement,€and€an€implied€easement.€€However,€the€trial€court€granted€ScruggsÏan€easement€by€estoppel€and€said,€ð ð[T]he€Court€finds€the€easement€to€haveÍpreviously€existed.ððÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findings€of€theÏtrial€court€that€there€is€an€easement€by€estoppel.€€Ìà àFinally,€Scruggs€argues€that€abutting€landowners€have€the€right€to€useÏabandoned€roads€touching€their€property.€€ò òòòSee€Current€v.€Stevensonóóó ó,€116ÏS.W.2d€1026€(Tenn.€1938).€€This€argument€must€also€fail€because€there€is€noÏproof€that€the€road€was€a€public€way,€and€the€trial€court€expressly€so€found.€ÏThus,€there€could€be€no€abandonment.Ìà àScruggs€sought€alternatively€for€the€Court€to€provide€ingress€and€egressÏpursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€54„14„101€and€102€(1993).€€œThe€Bells€conceded›€in€the€trialÏcourt€that€œthey€did›€not€object€to€such€an€easement€if€œthey€were€properly›Ïcompensated€as€provided€by€the€statute.€€Ìà àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€Scruggs€an€easement€byÏestoppel€is€reversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€further€proceedings€toÏestablish€a€way€of€ingress€and€egress€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€54„14„102€(1993).€ÏCosts€of€appeal€are€assessed€against€the€appellee.ÌÓÓœà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌó óò ò____________________________________ÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌò ò____________________________________ÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó ó›œÔ€/ÔÔ€/Ô