ÿWPC“ …# VU>a %Ÿ 0(¥4Íáðw@ø 0J8 0T‚ 0^Ö 0h4 0rœ 0| 0†Š 0 1u  U, 0dA U,¥ U6Ñ B)DC0 AMsU*À Bê#v~*vÓ¨ D3{ 0@® AOîÆ= 0D D/G Bv˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX($¡¡Gav x°°3|xC  1 D2 D3 [4 [5 6 D7 D8 9 Ó€C 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌApril€19,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÓ ` Ü‚Xœ ’X ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€þsXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñ›SHELTER€MUTUAL€INSURANCEà à)ÌCOMPANY€and€SHELTER€INSURANCEà à)ÌCOMPANIES,à à)Ìà àà à)ÌÓ#` Ü‚Xœôx‘X#Óà àPlaintiffs/Appellees,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9510„CH„00433Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)ÌSTATE€FARM€FIRE€AND€CASUALTYà à)à àPutnam€ChanceryÌÙ€€ÙœßL€#&";+'h|5Ï` ç `€€Lß›COMPANY€and€STATE€FARMà à)à àNo.€93„361ÌINSURANCE€COMPANIES,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellants.à à)ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€ ¼ÔCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€FOR€PUTNAM€COUNTYÌÌAT€COOKEVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€VERNON€NEAL,€CHANCELLORÌÓ ` Ü‚XœÈ“X ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÔ€ XÔDANIEL€H.€RADER,€IIIÌMoore,€Rader,€CliftÌand€Fitzpatrick,€P.C.Ì46€North€Jefferson€AvenueÌPost€Office€Box€3347ÌCookeville,€Tennessee€38502ÌÌJON€E.€JONESÌPost€Office€Box€699ÌCookeville,€Tennessee€38503Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEESÌÌÌJAMES€D.€MADEWELLÌKENNETH€S.€WILLIAMSÌMadewell,€Jared,€Halfacre€&€WilliamsÌ230€North€Washington€AvenueÌCookeville,€Tennessee€38501Ìà àœATTORNEYS›€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTSÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€ ¼ÔSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòÔ€ °ÔOÔ€ ¼Ô€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÓ  ÓÓ#` Ü` ä œÈ“X#ÓóóÔ€ XÔà àThis€case€involves€two€liability€insurance€companies.€ÏPlaintiff/appellee,€Shelter€Mutual€Insurance€Company€and€ShelterÏInsurance€Company€("Shelter"),€insured€David€Roland€under€aÏhomeownerððs€policy.€€Defendant/appellant,€State€Farm€and€CasualtyÏand€State€Farm€Insurance€Company€("State€Farm"),€provided€coverageÏunder€a€church€liability€policy€issued€to€Trinity€Assembly€of€GodÏ("Trinity").€€State€Farm€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€order€grantingÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€Shelter.€€The€parties€generally€agreeÏon€the€pertinent€facts€which€are€as€follows.ÌÌà àShelter€insured€David€Roland€under€a€homeownerððs€policy.€ÏThe€policy€included€a€boat€ownerððs€endorsement€with€maximum€limitsÏof€$300,000.00.€€The€policy€also€contained€a€pro€rata€"otherÏinsurance"€clause.€€State€Farm€insured€Trinity€under€a€churchÏpolicy€of€insurance€with€limits€of€$1,000,000.00.€€This€policyÏcontained€an€excess€"other€insurance"€clause.ÌÌà àTrinity€is€located€in€Putnam€County,€Tennessee.€€In€JuneÏ1992,€it€sponsored€a€church€related€outing€at€Center€Hill€Lake€forÏthe€church€youth.€€David€Roland,€a€member€of€Trinity,€wasÏoperating€a€boat€owned€by€him€when€the€leg€of€Elizabeth€AnnÏHolloway,€a€fourteen€year„old€passenger,€became€entangled€in€aÏrope€attached€to€an€inner€tube€being€pulled€behind€the€boat.€€As€aÏresult,€Ms.€Holloway€was€pulled€overboard€and€a€portion€of€herÏleft€leg€was€amputated.€€ÌÌà àIn€February€1993,€Ms.€Holloway,€through€her€parents,€andÏMr.€Roland,€through€appellee€as€his€insurer,€filed€a€jointÏpetition€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€Putnam€County.€€The€petitionÏsought€a€settlement€of€all€of€Ms.€Hollowayððs€claims€on€behalf€ofÏRoland,€Trinity,€Shelter,€and€State€Farm.€€The€court€approved€aÏstructured€settlement€to€be€paid€by€Shelter.€€The€settlementÏrelieved€both€Roland€and€Trinity€from€further€liability€to€Ms.ÏHolloway.ÌÌà àFollowing€approval€of€the€settlement,€Shelter€institutedÏthe€instant€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Putnam€County.€€ShelterÏrequested€the€court€to€declare€that€State€Farm€was€responsible€forÏpayment€of€a€pro€rata€portion€of€the€$300,000.00€paid€by€ShelterÏunder€the€terms€of€the€settlement.€€Shelter€sought,€in€thatÏaction,€to€void€the€"other€insurance"€provisions€of€both€the€StateÏFarm€and€the€Shelter€policies€under€the€theory€that€the€clausesÏwere€repugnant.€€ÌÌà àState€Farm€admitted€that€David€Roland€was€an€insured€underÏthe€terms€of€its€policy€and€that€the€policy€covered€the€accident.€ÏState€Farm€also€admitted€that€the€$300,000.00€settlement€made€byÏShelter€was€fair,€reasonable,€and€made€in€good€faith.€€State€FarmÏdenied€coverage,€however,€insisting€that,€under€the€"otherÏinsurance"€provisions€of€its€policy,€it€was€obligated€to€furnishÏexcess€coverage€only€and€that€excess€coverage€did€not€come€intoÏplay€unless€and€until€Shelterððs€primary€coverage€had€first€beenÏfully€exhausted.ÌÌà àBoth€insurance€companies€filed€motions€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€After€considering€the€entire€record€including€variousÏaffidavits,€depositions,€copies€of€the€insurance€policies,€andÏlegislative€history€transcripts,€the€court€granted€summaryÏjudgment€in€favor€of€Shelter.€€The€order€stated,€in€part,€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àIt€appeared€to€the€court€that€the€pro„rataÏinsurance€clause€in€the€[Shelter]€policy€and€theÏexcess€clause€in€the€[State€Farm]€policy€wereÏmutually€repugnant€and€that€the€coverages€should€beÏpro„rated.€€It€further€appeared€to€the€Court€thatÏ[Shelter]€had€paid€Three€Hundred€ThousandÏ($300,000.00)€Dollars€toward€the€settlement€of€thisÏcase€which€were€the€policy€limits.€€It€appeared€toÏthe€Court€that€the€State€Farm€general€liabilityÏpolicy€had€One€Million€($1,000,000.00)€Dollars€inÏcoverage€available.€€It,€therefore,€appeared€to€theÏCourt,€based€upon€€pro„ration,€that€[Shelter]€wouldÏowe€the€fraction€$300,000.00/$1,300,000.00€orÏ.23076€of€the€settlement€and€that€[State€Farm]Ïwould€owe€the€fraction€$l,000,000.00/$1,300,000.00Ïor€.76923€of€the€loss€or€Two€Hundred€ThirtyÏThousand,€Seven€Hundred€Sixty„Nine€and€23/100Í($230,769.23)€Dollars.ÌÌÓÓThe€chancellor€then€entered€judgment€against€State€Farm€in€theÏamount€of€$230,769.23€with€prejudgment€interest€of€$36,423.59€forÏa€total€judgment€of€$267,192.82.ÌÌà àState€Farmððs€first€issue€is€"whether€Tennessee€law€ignoresÏthe€written€expressions€of€intention€in€separate€insuranceÏpolicies€and€deems€competing€primary€and€excess€ððother€insuranceððÏclauses€to€be€repugnant€and€void€as€a€matter€of€law."ÌÌà àThe€pro€rata€clause€in€the€Shelter€policy€is€as€follows:€Ì"If€both€this€and€other€insurance€apply€to€a€loss,€ò òweó ó€will€pay€ò òouró óÏshare.€€ò òOuró ó€share€will€be€the€appropriate€amount€that€thisÏinsurance€bears€to€the€total€amount€of€all€applicable€insurance."€ÏThe€"other€insurance"€clause€of€the€State€Farm€policy€provides:€Ï"The€insurance€provided€under€Coverage€L„Business€Liability€isÏexcess€insurance€over€any€other€insurance€not€written€by€us€whichÏwould€apply€if€this€policy€had€not€been€written."ÌÌà àIt€is€State€Farmððs€contention€that,€because€the€settlementÏwith€Ms.€Holloway€did€not€exceed€the€scope€of€Shelterððs€coverageÏlimits,€State€Farm€had€no€obligation€to€reimburse€Shelter€for€aÏportion€of€the€settlement€amount.€€State€Farm€also€argues€that€theÏ"other€insurance"€clauses€in€the€two€policies€are€not€repugnant,Ïthat€œShelterððs›€policy€was€intended€as€a€primary€policy,€and€thatÏthe€two€"other€insurance"€clauses€are€in€harmony€and€can€co„existÍunder€Tennessee€law.€€In€its€brief,€State€Farm€asserts€that€"onlyÏwhen€expressions€of€intention€in€separate€insurance€policiesÏcreate€situations€where€no€primary€coverage€is€in€effect€for€theÏinsured€will€competing€primary€and€excess€ððother€insuranceððÏclauses€be€deemed€repugnant€and€void€as€a€matter€of€law."€€It€thenÏstates€as€follows:€ÌÓÓà8 àAn€analysis€of€law€in€the€context€of€competingÏððother€insuranceðð€provisions€illustrates€the€focusÏon€policy€language€to€ascertain€which€policy€isÏintended€to€be€primary€and€which€is€intended€to€beÏsecondary.€€Only€when€dual€policies€contain€likeÏððother€insuranceðð€provisions,€neither€of€whichÏprovide€primary€coverage€to€an€insured,€are€suchÏprovisions€deemed€mutually€repugnant.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àOver€the€years,€courts€have€grappled€with€the€determinationÏof€how€to€allocate€damages€when€two€separate€policies€cover€anÏinsured€involved€in€an€accident.€€This€determination€is€not€anÏeasy€one€to€make€because€insurance€œpolic›œies›€often€contain€ð ðotherÏinsuranceðð€clauses.€€Insurance€companies€use€these€clauses€toÏdefine€the€sum€they€will€pay€in€the€event€that€multiple€insuranceÏpolicies€cover€the€same€injury.€€The€"other€insurance"€clausesÏtraditionally€break€down€into€the€following€three€types:€€1)€proÏrata€clauses,€such€as€the€one€found€in€Shelterððs€policy,€provideÏthat,€in€the€event€other€insurance€is€available,€the€loss€will€beÏprorated€between€the€insurance€policies;€2)€excess€clauses,€suchÏas€the€one€found€in€State€Farmððs€policy,€provide€that,€in€theÏevent€other€insurance€is€available,€the€subject€policy€will€coverÏliability€only€to€the€extent€its€coverage€is€in€excess€of€theÍother€policy€limits;€and€3)€escape€clauses€provide€that,€in€theÏevent€other€insurance€is€available,€the€subject€policy€will€notÏcover€any€liability.ÌÌà àThe€guiding€principle€when€analyzing€such€policies€is€theÏdetermination€of€which€policy€provides€primary€coverage.€€WhenÏstrict€construction€of€"other€insurance"€clauses€results€in€theÏconclusion€that€no€primary€coverage€exists,€courts€are€quick€toÏstrike€down€both€"other€insurance"€clauses€as€repugnant€to€eachÏother.€€This€is€true,€for€example,€when€two€policies€each€haveÏexcess€clauses€as€to€the€same€event€so€that€each€attempts€to€passÏprimary€responsibility€for€coverage€on€to€the€other€company.€€OnÏthe€other€hand,€when€it€is€clear€from€a€reading€of€the€twoÏcompeting€policies€which€policy€is€primary,€there€is€no€need€forÏcourts€to€intrude€because€the€general€rules€of€contract€come€intoÏplay.ÌÌà àThere€are€two€lines€of€reasoning€used€by€the€courts€whenÏanalyzing€this€issue.€€The€majority€rule€is€ð ðthat€where€there€areÏtwo€applicable€insurance€policies,€one€containing€a€pro€rataÏclause€and€the€other€an€excess€clause,€the€provisions€of€each€willÏbe€interpreted€to€give€effect€to€the€intent€of€the€contractingÏparties.ðð€€òòò òJones€v.€Medox,€Inc.óóó ó,€430€A.2d€488,€493€(D.C.€App.Ï1981).€€The€second€line€of€reasoning€is€that€whenever€two€ð ðotherÏinsuranceðð€clauses€conflict€they€are€repugnant,€and€thus,€theÏcourt€must€void€the€clauses€and€prorate€the€damages.€€òòò òLamb„Weston,€Inc.€v.€Oregon€Auto.€Ins.€Co.óóó ó,€341€P.2d€110,€119€(Or.Ï1959).ÌÌà àIn€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó,€a€lesseeððs€employee€drove€a€leasedÏvehicle€and€crashed€it€into€a€warehouse.€€The€owner/lessor€of€theÏvehicle€had€a€pro€rata€"other€insurance"€clause€in€his€insuranceÏpolicy,€and€the€employer/lesseeððs€policy€had€an€excess€"otherÏinsurance"€clause.€€The€òòò òLamb„Westonó óóó€court€held€as€follows:€"InÏour€opinion,€whether€one€policy€uses€one€clause€or€another,€whenÏany€come€in€conflict€with€the€ððother€insuranceðð€clause€of€anotherÏinsurer,€regardless€of€the€nature€of€the€clause,€they€are€in€factÏrepugnant€and€each€should€be€rejected€in€toto."€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€As€such,ÏOregon€courts€will€hold€that€both€policies€provide€primaryÏcoverage€on€a€pro€rata€basis.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€118.ÌÌà àA€key€case€relied€upon€by€the€Oregon€Supreme€Court€inÏò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€was€ò òòòOregon€Auto€Insurance€Co.€v.€United€StatesÏFidelity€&€Guaranty€Co.ó óóó,€195€F.2d€958€(9th€Cir.€1952).€€InÏò òòòOregon€Auto€ó óóóthe€driverððs€policy€had€an€excess€"other€insurance"Ïclause€and€the€ownerððs€policy€had€an€exclusionary€or€exculpatoryÏ"other€insurance"€clause.€€In€that€situation,€a€repugnancy€didÏexist€because€both€insurers€could€have€avoided€primary€liabilityÏto€their€insured€leaving€their€insured€with€no€coverage€evenÏthough€two€companies€had€each€issued€a€policy.€€As€stated€by€theÏcourt€in€ò òòòOregon€Auto:€ó óóó"It€is€plain€that€if€the€provisions€of€bothÏpolicies€were€given€full€effect,€neither€insurer€would€be€liable.€ÍThe€parties€admit€that€such€a€result€would€produce€an€unintendedÏabsurdity...."òòò ò€€Oregon€Auto€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€195€F.2d€at€959.€€TheÏcourt€went€on€to€state€"where€both€polices€carry€like€ððotherÏinsuranceðð€provisions,€[they]€must€be€held€mutually€repugnant€andÏhence€be€disregarded."€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€960.€€Neither€the€facts€in€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€nor€the€facts€in€the€instant€case€involve€like€"otherÏinsurance"€clauses.ÌÌà àWhile€ò òòòOregon€Auto€ó óóówas€correct€in€its€logic,Ïinterpretation,€and€ruling€based€upon€the€express€language€of€theÏtwo€policies€and€the€competing€types€of€"other€insurance"€clauses,Ïthe€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€court€went€one€step€further,€ignored€the€clear,Ïconsistent,€and€unambiguous€language€of€the€policies,€and€renderedÏa€blanket€rule€that€"other€insurance"€provisions€were€null€andÏvoid€in€all€circumstances.ÌÌà àThe€ò òòòJonesó óóó€case,€which€explains€the€majority€view,€involvedÏa€pro€rata€clause€and€an€excess€clause.€€The€issue€in€the€case€wasÏwhether€the€court€should€attempt€to€reconcile€and€to€interpret€theÏclauses€to€give€effect€to€the€intentions€of€the€parties€or€whetherÏit€should€simply€apply€the€òòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó€rule.€€òòò òSee€Jonesóóó ó,€430ÏA.2d€at€489.€€The€court€decided€the€majority€rule€was€the€betterÏapproach.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€493.€€It€then€analyzed€the€facts€of€the€caseÏusing€the€majority€rule€and€concluded€that€the€pro€rata€clause€andÏthe€excess€clause€were€not€repugnant.€€Next,€the€court€held€theÏinsurance€company€using€the€pro€rata€clause€liable€for€the€amountÍcovered€by€the€companyððs€policy€limit€and€held€the€insuranceÏcompany€using€the€excess€clause€liable€for€any€damages€whichÏexceeded€the€policy€limit.€€òòò òId.€óóó óat€494„95.ÌÌà àIn€reaching€its€decision,€the€òòò òJonesóóó ó€court€discussed€theÏcriticisms€of€the€òòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó€rule.€€It€properly€labeled€theÏò òòòLamb„Weston€ó óóóline€of€cases€as€situations€where€courts€"abandon€allÏattempts€to€discern€the€intent€of€the€contracting€parties€whereÏthere€are€dissimilar€ððother€insuranceðð€clauses€and€take€theÏposition€that€all€ððother€insuranceðð€clauses,€regardless€of€theirÏnature,€are€mutually€repugnant,€requiring€proration€of€liability."€Ïò òòòId.ó óóó€at€492.€€A€second€flaw€in€the€application€of€the€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóóÏrule€noted€by€the€court€was€as€follows:€"Courts€applying€the€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€rule€ignore€a€basic€rule€of€contracts€requiringÏconsideration€of€all€the€language€in€a€policy€provision€toÏdetermine€its€meaning€and€intent."€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€In€addition,€the€courtÏpointed€out€that€application€of€the€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€rule€mayÏsubstantially€impact€the€insurance€industry€and€the€policy€ratesÏcharged€to€consumers.€€The€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€rule€introduces€a€new€itemÏof€uncertainty€into€the€equation.€€This€uncertainty€likely€resultsÏin€duplications€of€claim€investigation,€claim€supervision,€andÏsettlement€and€defense€costs.€€Such€duplication€may€increase€theÏcost€of€each€claim€as€well€as€the€ultimate€increase€in€premiumsÏpaid€by€all€policy€holders.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€493.€€ÌÌà àThe€Kentucky€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòò òHartford€Insurance€Co.Ív.€Kentucky€Farm€Bureau€Insurance€Co.ó óóó,€766€S.W.2d€75€(Ky.ÏApp.€1989),€adopted€the€majority€view€and€designated€the€pro€rataÏpolicy€in€that€case€as€the€primary€insurance€policy.€€In€adoptingÏthe€majority€view,€the€court,€relying€on€the€òòò òJones€óóó ódecision,Ïpointed€out€that€a€criticism€of€ò òòòLamb„Westonó óóó€was€that€it€"ignoresÏa€basic€rule€of€contracts€by€failing€to€consider€all€of€theÏlanguage€in€a€policy€to€determine€its€meaning€and€intent."€Ïò òòòHartford€Ins.€Co.,ó óóó€766€S.W.2d€at€77.€€Further,€the€KentuckyÏcourt€noted€that€when€courts€apply€the€minority€repugnancy€rule,Ïthey€are€effectively€"legislating€pro€rata€apportionment€wheneverÏa€policy€has€a€ððother€insuranceðð€clause€and€legislation€is€not€aÏproper€judicial€function."€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÌÌòòà àóóThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€addressed€this€issue€inÏseveral€cases€all€of€which€involved€automobile€liability€policiesÏwhich€contained€ð ðother€insuranceðð€clauses.€€òòò òState€Farm€Ins.€Co.Ïv.€Tayloróóó ó,€511€S.W.2d€464€(Tenn.€1974)€(involving€a€pro€rata€andÏan€€excess€clause);€òòò òContinental€Ins.€Co.€v.€€Insurance€Co.€ofÏN.€Am.ó óóó,€224€Tenn.€306,€454€S.W.2d€709€(1970)€(involving€two€excessÏclauses);€òòò òCommercial€Union€Ins.€Co.€v.€UniversalÏUnderwriters,€Inc.ó óóó,€223€Tenn.€80,€442€S.W.2d€614€(1969)Ï(involving€an€excess€and€a€pro€rata€clause);€òòò òUnited€Servs.€Auto.ÏAssððn€v.€Hartford€Accident€and€Indem.€Co.ó óóó,€220€Tenn.€120,€414ÏS.W.2d€836€(1967)€(involving€an€excess€clause€and€an€escapeÏclause).€€òòò òBut€seeóóó ó€òòò òTennessee€Farmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.€v.€CanalÏIns.€Co.óóó ó,€58€Tenn.€App.€1,€425€S.W.2d€762€(1967)€(finding€that€itÍcould€give€both€of€the€"other€insurance"€clauses€effect€andÏdistinguishing€òòò òUnited€Servs.€Auto€Assððnóóó ó).€€In€1967,€the€supremeÏcourt€adopted€the€view€expressed€in€òòò òOregon€Auto.€€United€Servs.ÏAuto€Assððn.ó óóó,€414€S.W.2d€at€840.€€Later,€in€1969,€the€courtÏexpressly€adopted€the€reasoning€of€òòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó.€€òòò òCommercialÏUnion€Ins.€Co.óóó ó,€442€S.W.2d€at€618.€€Thus,€in€the€cases€citedÏabove,€the€court€applied€the€blanket€rule€of€òòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó,Ïdetermined€that€the€ð ðother€insuranceðð€clauses€were€repugnant,€andÏprorated€the€damages.ÌÌà àIn€response€to€the€courtððs€decision€in€òòò òContinental€Ins.ÏCo.óóó ó,€the€Tennessee€General€Assembly€enacted€legislation€whichÏsuperseded€the€courtððs€decisions.€€1973€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€209Ï(currently€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€56„7„1101€(1994)).€€ThisÏstatute€designated€which€insurance€policy€provides€primaryÏinsurance€coverage€in€all€cases€arising€out€of€the€use€of€motorÏvehicles.€€The€legislative€history€of€this€act€demonstrates€theÏGeneral€Assemblyððs€desire€that€the€courts€attempt€to€apply€theÏprovisions€of€insurance€policies€as€they€are€written.€€In€a€1€MayÏ1973€discussion€of€the€act,€Representative€McWilliams€stated€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àThis€is€a€bill€the€necessity€of€which€was€broughtÏabout€by€a€court€decision€in€the€case€ofÏ[Continental€Insurance€Co.€v.€€Insurance€Company€ofÏNorth€America].€.€.€.Ìà8 àÌà8 àThe€confusion€has€been€brought€about€because€of€aÏcourt€decision€between€two€insurance€companies€inÏwhich€they€said€that€irrespective€of€the€provisionsÏof€the€policy,€[liability]€should€be€pro€ratedÍbetween€the€two€insurance€companies.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 à[This€act]€would€require€the€Supreme€Court€of€thisÏstate€to€follow€the€provisions€of€that€policy,Ïthose€policies.ÌÌÌÓÓGiven€the€fact€that€the€General€Assemblyððs€actions€superseded€theÏcourtððs€decisions,€at€present,€this€court€is€left€without€bindingÏauthority.€€In€other€words,€this€is€essentially€a€case€of€firstÏimpression.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€the€better€approach€isÏthat€explained€in€the€òòò òJonesó óóó€opinion.€€Not€only€is€this€theÏapproached€followed€by€a€majority€of€the€courts,€but€it€alsoÏallows€the€courts€to€consider€the€fact€of€individual€cases€asÏopposed€to€applying€a€blanket€rule.€€Moreover,€there€is€evidenceÏthat€the€supreme€court€no€longer€agrees€wholeheartedly€with€theÏòòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó€rule.€€òòò òSee€Continental€Ins.€Co.€v.€Excel€Ins.ÏCo.óóó ó,€541€S.W.2d€952€(Tenn.€1976).€€In€òòò òContinentalóóó ó,€the€supremeÏcourt€decided€a€case€involving€two€insurance€policies.€€The€1973ÏPublic€Act€did€not€apply,€however,€because€the€policies€wereÏissued€prior€to€May€1973.€€òòò òId.€óóó óat€953.€€In€deciding€the€case,€theÏsupreme€court€noted€the€decisions€adopting€the€òòò òLamb„Westonóóó ó€rule,Ïbut€made€the€following€conclusion:ÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€We€have€examined€with€care€the€provisions€ofÏthe€two€insurance€policies€exhibited€to€theÏstipulation€in€the€present€case,€however,€and€we€doÏnot€find€that€they€are€repugnant€or€in€conflict.€ÏFor€that€reason,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€theÏpre„1973€cases€are€not€applicable,€and€that€theÏappellant€is€not€entitled€to€the€proration€which€itÏclaims.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.óóó ó€at€954.€Finally,€although€the€legislative€history€of€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€section€56„7„1101€is€not€binding€on€this€court,€itÏis€our€opinion€that€it€is€persuasive€authority€in€favor€ofÏadopting€the€majority€view.€ÌÌà àBy€a€plain€reading€of€the€written€terms€of€State€FarmððsÏpolicy,€it€is€clear€that€State€Farmððs€policy€will€always€provideÏprimary€coverage€for€an€insured€event.€€We€contrast€this€plainÏlanguage€of€the€State€Farm€policy€whereby,€in€the€event€any€otherÏinsurance€exists,€State€Farmððs€coverage€will€be€deemed€excessÏonly.€€Rather€than€being€repugnant,€these€two€clauses€meshÏperfectly,€consistently,€and€harmonize€in€all€circumstances.€€NoÏsituation€exists€where€the€other€insurance€provisions€of€theÏrespective€policies€will€not€harmonize€leaving€a€gap€in€coverage.€ÏTherefore,€we€are€unable€to€find€a€reason€to€say€that€theseÏprovisions€are€repugnant.ÌÌà àTherefore,€it€results€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€courtÏis€reversed,€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€anyÏfurther€necessary€proceedings.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€theÏplaintiff/appellee.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà à______________________________à àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌœ›ÌCONCUR:Ìœ›ÌÌ_________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌœ›ÌÌ_________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€œJUDGE›