ÿWPCÈ …# VU>a %Ÿ 0@¥U Båw@' 4g { xŠ 0J 0TL 0^  0hþ 0rf 0|Ø 0†T 0Ú 1uj U,ß 0d U,oU6›B)ÑDCú AM=U*ŠA´v~õvÓs D3F By 0@– 0©Ö 0J {ªÉ {Øs 0ØK AO#Ær 0D8 D/| B«˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(öÎ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÓ  Ó<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi ÆDÇÈDÉÊDËDÌÍDÎeÏÓ€÷}± ddd3|xÚFeltonAmerisureCAVETTWeigeliaShelby Ins2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial 7Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌò òMay€22,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€$ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò++++'ÿÿdxd d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò(S.2ûß$¤¤Ý ƒöÎ!ÝÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€òUAòXXÔà  àòòò òÚ  Ú0Ú  Úó óóó(—$ò òòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úó óóó<77Dàí:QuickFormat1Ô‡XÔÔ‡XÿÿXÔÔ  ÔÔ‡XÔÔ‡XÿÿXÔÔ  Ô<NND¿þ:QuickFormat1Ô‡Xf‚XXXÔÔÔÔ‡ô)ªôXXf‚ÔÔ‡Xf‚XXXÔÔÔÔ‡ô)ªôXXf‚Ô<NNDÆ:QuickFormat1Ô‡Xf‚XXXÔÔÔÔ‡Xf‚XXXf‚ÔÔ‡Xf‚XXXÔÔÔÔ‡Xf‚XXXf‚Ô€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ‚QÿÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ XÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ7€ÎoXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ ` ÑÑ , ÑÑ 5 ÑÑ  ÑÑ€! §u` ÑÙ€€ÙßL€#%";+'h|` Å `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALSÏOF€TENNESSEEÝ‚QÿÝÝ  ÝÌÌà@ àEASTERN€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌFELTON€M.€SMITH€andà@ à)à àHAMILTON€COUNTYÌMARY€L.€SMITHà@ à)à à03A01„9510„CV„00370Ìà àà@ à)Ìà àPlaintiffs„Appellantsà@ à)Ìà@ à)Ìà àà@ à)à àÌà àv.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à@ à)à àHON.€WILLIAM€L.€BROWN,Ìà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à@ à)à àJUDGEÌà@ à)ÌAMERISURE€INSURANCE€COMPANYà@ à)à àÌà àà à€€à@ à)à àÌà àDefendant„Appelleeà@ à)à àVACATED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌJOHN€C.€CAVETT,€JR.,€OF€CHATTANOOGA€FOR€APPELLANTSÌÌPAUL€CAMPBELL,€JR.,€OF€CHATTANOOGA€FOR€APPELLEEÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà à€€òòO€P€I€N€I€O€NóóÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€à àà àà àGoddard,€P.J.€ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àà àThe€Plaintiffs,€Felton€M.€Smith€and€his€wife€MaryÏL.€Smith,€appeal€for€the€second€time€the€entry€of€a€summaryÍjudgment€in€favor€of€the€Defendant€Amerisure€Insurance€Company€inÏtheir€suit€seeking€recovery€under€a€fire€insurance€policy€issuedÏby€Amerisure.ÌÌà àà àPrior€to€1990€the€Plaintiffs€owned€a€residence€at€5603ÏWeigelia€Avenue€in€Hamilton€County.€€The€Plaintiffs€insured€theirÏresidence€through€the€Defendant€Insurance€Company.€€According€toÏthe€wife,€the€Plaintiffs€paid€their€insurance€premiums€through€anÏescrow€agreement€with€their€savings€and€loan€association.€€TheÏassociation€held€a€deed€of€trust€on€the€Plaintiffsðð€home.ÌÌà àà àIn€early€1990,€the€husband€became€very€ill€and,€as€aÏresult,€incurred€numerous€medical€bills.€€In€his€deposition,€theÏhusband€testified€that€he€had€large€bills€from€the€hospital€andÏhis€doctor€and€that€he€did€not€have€insurance€to€cover€theseÏexpenses.€€In€addition€to€these€bills,€the€Plaintiffs€owed€variousÏsums€to€credit€card€companies.€€The€Plaintiffs€stated€thatÏsometime€prior€to€June€of€1990€they€received€at€least€oneÏthreatening€call€from€one€of€the€credit€card€companies.€€TheÏPlaintiffs€stated€that€a€representative€from€the€credit€cardÏcompany€called€concerning€the€Plaintiffsðð€credit€card€debt€andÏthreatened€the€Plaintiffs€that€the€company€could€take€theÏPlaintiffsðð€home€if€their€debts€were€not€paid.ÌÌà àà àBecause€of€the€call€from€the€credit€card€company€and€theÏmounting€medical€expenses,€the€Plaintiffs€decided,€with€theÏconsent€of€the€savings€and€loan€association,€to€deed€their€houseÏto€their€son€Van€Smith,€who€also€lived€in€Hamilton€County.€€A€quitÏclaim€deed€was€executed€and€recorded€in€June€of€1990.€€NoÏconsideration€was€given€by€Van€Smith€for€the€home.€€No€notice€wasÏgiven€to€the€Defendant€about€the€change€in€ownership.€€TheÏPlaintiffs€continued€to€pay€the€property€taxes€and€mortgageÏpayments€as€well€as€the€insurance€payments€through€the€escrowÏaccount.€€The€Plaintiffs€continued€to€occupy€the€home€while€VanÏSmith€retained€his€own€home€in€Chattanooga.€€The€Plaintiffs€didÏnot€pay€any€rent€to€Van€Smith,€and€he€never€resided€in€the€homeÏafter€the€conveyance.€€The€Plaintiffs€contend€that€they€intendedÏthe€conveyance€of€the€property€to€be€temporary€only€and€that€itÏwould€be€reconveyed€at€a€later€date.ÌÌà àà àOn€about€July€25,€1991,€the€year€following€the€transfer,Ïthe€Plaintiffs€renewed€their€policy€with€the€Defendant€whichÏcontinued€to€insure€the€home€in€which€they€lived.€€The€DefendantÏwas€not€informed€that€the€Plaintiffs€no€longer€held€legal€title€toÏthe€property.€€On€January€14,€1992,€a€fire€destroyed€the€home.€ÏThe€Plaintiffs€notified€the€Defendant€about€the€fire€and€anÍadjuster€was€sent€to€the€home€to€investigate€the€fire.€€TheÏPlaintiffs€told€the€insurance€adjuster€that€they€were€the€ownersÏof€the€home.€€When€the€Defendant€discovered€that€the€Plaintiffs€noÏlonger€owned€the€home,€it€refused€to€pay€the€claim.ÌÌà àà àThe€Plaintiffs€then€brought€suit€in€which€they€allegedÏthe€Defendant€wrongfully€failed€to€pay€their€claim.€€TheÏPlaintiffs€further€alleged€that€the€failure€to€pay€the€claim€wasÏin€bad€faith€and€that€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€56„7„105€the€DefendantÏshould€be€assessed€a€25€percent€penalty.ÌÌà àà àIn€its€answer,€the€Defendant€alleged€that€the€PlaintiffsÏhad€no€insurable€interest€in€the€home€at€the€time€of€the€fire€and,Ïthus,€had€no€right€to€make€a€claim.€€The€Defendant€further€allegedÏthat€the€Plaintiffs€had€violated€the€terms€of€the€policy€byÏdeeding€the€property€to€their€son€without€the€consent€of€theÏDefendant.ÌÌà àà àBoth€parties€then€filed€for€summary€judgment.€€The€TrialÏCourt€Judge€dismissed€the€Plaintiffsðð€motion€but€granted€theÏDefendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€dismissed€theÏPlaintiffsðð€complaint.€€The€Plaintiffs€perfected€the€first€appealÏto€this€Court.ÌÌà àà àWe€determined€that€complete€justice€could€not€be€hadÏbecause€of€deficiencies€in€the€record.€€This€Court€stated€thatÏmaterial€issues€evolved€around€the€provisions€of€the€insuranceÏpolicy,€but€that€the€policy€was€not€included€in€the€record.€€As€aÏresult,€the€case€was€remanded€in€order€to€supplement€the€record.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€record€has€now€been€supplemented€and€the€case€hasÏbeen€returned€to€this€Court€for€a€review€of€the€Trial€CourtððsÏdetermination.€€The€sole€issue€is€whether€summary€judgment€wasÏproperly€awarded€to€the€Defendant.€€The€first€summary€judgment€wasÏapparently€awarded€to€the€Defendant€on€all€issues.€€However,€onÏremand,€the€Trial€Court€awarded€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€thatÏthe€Plaintiffs€did€not€have€any€insurable€interest€in€the€propertyÏat€the€time€of€the€fire.€€It€is€the€second€summary€judgment€thatÏwe€now€address.€ÌÌà àà àThe€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee,€in€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847ÏS.W.2d€208€(Tenn.1993),€set€forth€the€proper€summary€judgmentÏanalysis€to€be€applied€in€Tennessee.€€There,€the€Court€said€inÏevaluating€a€summary€judgment€motion,€these€questions€must€beÏresolved:€"(1)€whether€a€òòfactualóó€dispute€exists;€(2)€whether€theÏdisputed€fact€is€òòmaterialóó€to€the€outcome€of€the€case;€and€(3)Íwhether€the€disputed€fact€creates€a€òògenuineóó€issue€for€trial."€Ï(Emphasis€in€original.)ÌÌà àà àòòByrdóó€further€explained€that€summary€judgment€should€beÏemployed€where€there€is€no€dispute€over€the€evidence€and€there€isÏno€issue€for€a€jury€to€decide.€€For€a€party€to€avoid€summaryÏjudgment,€it€must€show€that€the€fact€in€dispute€is€material.€ÏMeaning,€this€fact€is€one€that€"must€be€decided€in€order€toÏresolve€the€substantive€claim€or€defense€at€which€the€motion€isÏdirected."€€If€such€a€disputed€material€fact€does€exist,€the€courtÏ"must€then€determine€whether€the€disputed€material€fact€creates€aÏgenuine€issue€within€the€meaning€of€Rule€56.03."€€Here,€"the€testÏfor€a€'genuine€issue'€is€whether€a€reasonable€jury€couldÏlegitimately€resolve€that€fact€in€favor€of€one€side€or€the€other.€ÏIf€the€answer€is€yes,€summary€judgment€is€inappropriate;€if€theÏanswer€is€no,€summary€judgment€is€proper€because€a€trial€would€beÏpointless€.€.€.€."€€When€applying€this€test,€"the€court€is€to€viewÏthe€evidence€in€a€light€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€allowÏall€reasonable€inferences€in€his€favor."€€It€is€the€burden€of€theÏnonmoving€party€to€demonstrate€that€there€are€no€disputed,Ïmaterial€facts€creating€a€genuine€issue€for€trial€and€that€summaryÏjudgment€is€appropriate.€Ìà àà àÌà àà àWe€hold€that€under€the€facts€before€us€there€is€aÏgenuine€issue€for€trial,€i.e.,€whether€the€Plaintiffs€had€anÏinsurable€interest€in€the€home.Ìà àà àÌà àà àFirst,€the€Plaintiffsðð€plan€to€deed€the€house€to€theirÏson€was€an€apparent€attempt€to€defraud€their€creditors,€an€actÏwhich€is€certainly€not€condoned€by€this€Court;€however,€theirÏconduct€does€not€necessarily€preclude€the€Plaintiffs€fromÏrecovering.€€The€"doctrine€of€'unclean€hands'"€is€not€a€bar€toÏplaintiff's€claim.€€"'[œI]t›€is€not€every€willful€and€reprehensibleÏact€that€will€preclude€a€litigant€in€a€court€of€equity€fromÏobtaining€the€relief€prayed,€but€such€conduct€.€.€.€òòmust€bear€anÏimmediate€relation€to€the€subject„matter€of€the€suitóó,€and€in€someÏmeasure€affect€the€equitable€relations€subsisting€between€theÏparties€to€the€litigation€and€arising€out€of€the€transaction.'"€ÏòòGreer€v.€Shelby€Mutual€Ins.€Co.óó,€659€S.W.€2d€627€(Tenn.App.1983),Ïquoting€from€òòOverton€v.€Lewisóó,€152€Tenn.€500,€279€S.W.€801€(1926).€Ï(Emphasis€in€original.)€€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòGreeróó,€the€plaintiff€bought€some€property€with€hisÏown€funds€and€had€an€insurance€policy€issued€in€his€name.€ÏHowever,€he€placed€legal€title€of€the€property€in€the€name€of€aÏcorporation€of€which€he€was€part€owner.€€The€plaintiff€laterÍadmitted€that€the€reason€for€placing€legal€title€in€the€name€ofÏhis€corporation€was€to€conceal€the€ownership€from€his€wife€becauseÏhe€and€his€wife€were€seeking€a€divorce.€€When€the€house€on€theÏproperty€was€destroyed€by€fire,€the€plaintiffððs€insurance€companyÏdenied€the€claim.€€The€Court€held€that€the€plaintiffððs€conduct€wasÏcollateral€to€the€transaction€involved€in€the€lawsuit€and,Ïtherefore,€the€plaintiffððs€claim€was€not€barred€by€the€"uncleanÏhands"€doctrine.€€We€are€presented€with€a€very€similar€issue€inÏthe€case€now€before€this€Court.€€The€Plaintiffsðð€conduct€here€isÏcollateral€to€the€transaction€with€the€Defendant€as€was€that€inÏòòGreeróó.€€The€Plaintiffs€deeded€their€house€to€their€son€in€anÏattempt€to€defraud€their€creditors,€not€their€insurance€company.€ÏAs€such,€the€Plaintiffsðð€conduct€is€not€a€bar€to€their€claimÏagainst€this€Defendant.Ìà àà àÌà àà àThe€Defendant€maintains€that€because€the€Plaintiffs€noÏlonger€hold€title€to€the€home€they€do€not€have€an€insurableÏinterest€in€the€home.€€We€disagree.€€A€person€is€not€required€toÏhave€"title€to€or€possession€of€property€in€order€to€have€anÏinsurable€interest€in€the€property€ððif€by€its€continued€existenceÏhe€will€gain€an€advantage,€or€if€by€its€damage€or€destruction€heÏwill€suffer€a€loss.€.€.€.ðð"€€òòOliver€v.€Johnsonóó,€692€S.W.2d€855Ï(Tenn.App.1985),€quoting€from€òòDuncan€v.€State€Farm€Fire€&€CasualtyÍCo.óó,€587€S.W.2d€375€(Tenn.1979).€€It€is€not€necessary€for€a€personÏto€show€for€a€certainty€that€he€suffered€economic€harm€from€a€lossÏof€property.€€Rather,€it€is€sufficient€to€show€that€the€loss€mightÏsubject€the€person€to€injury.€€òòBrewer€v.€Vanguard€Ins.€Coóó.,€614ÏS.W.2d€360€(Tenn.App.1980).€€A€person€who€has€care€and€custody€orÏpossession€of€anotherððs€property€may€obtain€insurance€on€theÏproperty€for€the€benefit€of€the€owner.€€In€fact,€any€interest€inÏproperty,€legal€or€equitable,€qualified,€conditional,€contingent,Ïor€absolute,€or€merely€the€right€to€use€the€property,€with€orÏwithout€the€payment€of€rent€is€sufficient.€€òòBreweróó,€supra.€€UnderÏthe€facts€now€before€us,€we€find,€as€already€noted,€that€there€isÏa€genuine€issue€for€trial,€i.e.,€whether€the€Plaintiffs€had€anÏinsurable€interest€in€the€home.€€€€€By€the€homeððs€destruction,Ïthey€certainly€suffered€an€economic€loss.€€They€no€longer€have€aÏhome€in€which€to€live.€€Additionally,€by€simply€living€in€theÏhome,€the€Plaintiffs€have€a€sufficient€interest€as€described€aboveÏin€òòBreweróó.€€Thus,€the€Plaintiffsðð€claim€cannot€be€denied€on€theÏlack€of€an€insurable€interest.ÌÌà àà àThis€Court€is€not€persuaded€by€the€case€of€òòPappas€v.ÏInsurance€Co.€of€the€State€of€Penn.óó,€54€Tenn.App.€633,€393€S.W.2dÏ298€(1965).€€In€that€case,€the€Court€held€that€a€father€who€deededÏproperty€to€his€son€did€not€have€an€insurable€interest€in€theÍproperty.€€The€Court€determined€that€the€father€would€not€beÏadvantaged€by€the€continued€existence€of€the€property€nor€would€heÏbe€disadvantaged€by€the€loss€of€the€property.€€That€is€simply€notÏthe€case€here.€€The€Plaintiffs€lived€in€the€home€and€cared€for€theÏhome.€€It€appears€that€in€òòPappasóó,€the€plaintiff€did€not€live€onÏthe€property,€which,€as€noted€in€òòBreweróó,€can€be€a€sufficientÏinterest.€ÌÌà àà àIn€conclusion,€we€have€not€overlooked€the€fact€thatÏAmerisure€has€briefed€other€matters€which€it€contends€justifiesÏthe€Court's€granting€a€summary€judgment.€€We,€however,€in€thisÏcase,€are€disinclined€to€consider€matters€not€addressed€by€theÏTrial€Court.ÌÌà àà à€For€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€of€the€TrialÏCourt€is€vacated€and€the€cause€remanded€for€proceedings€notÏinconsistent€with€this€opinion.€€€€ÌÌà àà àCosts€of€appeal€are€adjudged€against€Amerisure.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.€ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌDon€T.€McMurray,€J.ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.Ì