ÿWPC&1 …# V %aUFg 0(­4ÕéUFø 0D> 0[‚ 0DÝ 0ª! UFË 0J [ 0Tc 0^· 0h 0r} 0|ï 0†k 0ñ 0@ D3Áw@ô 1u4U,© 0dÕ B9U,VUE6‚B)¸DCá AM$U*q5›[Ðr+qšo¨ÂÙó+ =!>["E™#Þ$õ%"'v~0(vÓ®) AO/ÆÐ/ 0D–0 D/Ú0 B 1˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ò<Ú5 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular($¡¡Gav 3|xwD.Courier New Regular($Ó$‘‘òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(3¨à$¥¥Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(f2üô$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€òÖÈòòòÔÔ€òÖÈòòòÖÈÔ<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd eEfgEhiUjDklmÓ€w ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d----7Border 1dd€.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial +Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌMay€8,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó QÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€òòò òDavis€v.€Davisó óóó,€842€S.W.2d€588,€600€(Tenn.€1992),€òòcert.€deniedóó,Ï113€S.€Ct.€1259€(1993).Ì hÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€ò òòòSimmons€v.€Simmonsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€682,€683„84€(Tenn.€1995);€ò òòòHawk€v.ÏHawkó óóó,€855€S.W.2d€573,€582€(Tenn.€1993).Ì gÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€òòò òCampbell€v.€Sundquistó óóó,€App.€No.€01„A„01„9507„CV„00321€slip.€opn.Ïat€18„20,€21€T.A.M.€7„4€(Tenn.€App.€26€Jan.€1996).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Although€authorities€suggest€that€retaliatory€discharge€is€actuallyÏone€of€the€wrongful€discharge€actions€based€on€a€public€policy€violation,ÏTennessee's€court€often€use€the€terms€wrongful€discharge€and€retaliatoryÏdischarge€interchangeably.€€òòò òSeeóóó ó€òòW.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,€Prosser€and€Keeton€on€theÏLaw€of€Tortsóó€ðð130,€at€1029„30€(5th€ed.€1984);€82€òòAm.€Jur.€2dóó€òòWrongful€DischargeóóÏðð€11€(1992).Ì eÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€22„4„108(f)(1)€(1994);€òòò òsee€also€Hodges€v.€S.C.ÏToof€&€Co.óóó ó,€833€S.W.2d€896,€899€(Tenn.€1992).Ì ¸Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„301(1)€(1991)€(regarding€retaliation€orÏdiscrimination€against€an€employee€who€has€opposed€a€discriminatory€practice);ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„401(a)€(1991)€(defining€a€discriminatory€practice€inÏregard€to€employers);€òòò òsee€also€Newsom€v.€Textron€Aerostructuresóóó ó,€No.Ï01A01„9504„CH„00151,€1995€WL€614203,€at€*7„*9€(Tenn.€App.€20€October€1995);Ïòòò òRoberson€v.€University€of€Tenn.óóó ó,€829€S.W.2d€149,€152€(Tenn.€App.€1992).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(a)€(1993).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„1„304(a),€(c)€(1991).Ì !Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€50„3„106(7),€50„3„409(a)€(1991).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€At€no€time€was€Roche€a€party€to€this€action.Ì 4Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€òòò òClanton€v.€Cain„Sloan€Co.óóó ó,€677€S.W.2d€441,€444„45€(Tenn.€1984).€Ì ;Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€òòò òRoberson€v.€University€of€Tenn.óóó ó,€829€S.W.2d€149,€152€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1992).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð49„6„4213€(1990).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€41„1„122€(1990).€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  Ý€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„7„302(a)(9)(Supp.€1995).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÓ&€++X„d&ÓÑ#€++Xd#ÑÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€¢XXdÖdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€,XÔEVELENE›€N.€STEIN,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9509„CV„00407Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€County€Circuit€CourtÌÙ€€ÙœßL€/1.;+'h|H‡` ç `€€Lß›DAVIDSON€HOTEL€COMPANY,à àà à)à àNo.€95„C„67Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€,¼ÔCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€FIRST€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€HAMILTON€V.€GAYDEN,€JUDGEÔ€,XÔÌÌÌÌÌPATRICIA€A.€MONTGOMERYÌWestlake€&€Marsden,€P.C.ÌThird€National€Financial€CenterÌ424€Church€Street,€Suite€1400ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌJOHN€S.€HICKSÌSTEPHEN€H.€BILLERÌKATHERINE€A.€BROWNÌBaker,€Donelson,€Bearman€&€CaldwellÌ1700€Nashville€City€CenterÌ511€Union€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€,¼ÔAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌà@ àòòOPINIONóóÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€,XÔà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€plaintiff/appellant,€Evelene€N.€Stein,Ïfrom€a€judgment€dismissing€five€of€the€seven€claims€alleged€by€Ms.ÏStein€against€defendant/appellant,€Davidson€Hotel€CompanyÏ("Davidson").ÌÌò òI.à àFacts€and€Historyó óÌÌà àMs.€Stein€began€working€at€the€Holiday€Inn€Crowne€Plaza€on€6ÏJune€1989.€€At€that€time,€Flautt€Properties,€Inc.€owned€the€hotel.€ÏIn€September€of€1990,€Flautt€sold€the€hotel€to€Davidson.€€AfterÏthe€sale,€Ms.€Stein€continued€to€work€at€the€hotel.€The€complaintÏalleged€that€Ms.€Stein€was€fifty„one€years€old€and€that€she€was€anÏabove€average€employee€according€to€Davidson's€own€criteria.Ì€€Ìà àIn€1992,€Davidson€instituted€a€drug€and€alcohol€testingÏprogram.€€The€program€included€pre„employment€testing,€reasonableÍsuspicion€testing,€after€accident€testing,€and€random€drugÏtesting.€€Davidson€required€all€employees€to€sign€a€consent€andÏrelease€form.€€Ms.€Stein€alleged€that€the€understanding€of€theÏemployees€was€that€Davidson€would€immediately€terminate€them€ifÏthey€failed€to€sign€the€form.€€Further,€Ms.€Stein€claimed€that€sheÏsigned€the€form€based€on€this€perceived€threat€and€that€she€didÏnot€œrealize›€the€form€released€Davidson€and€the€testing€facilityÏfrom€"liability€for€the€negligent€performance€or€reporting€of€drugÏtest€results."ÌÌà àœIn€October€1994,€Davidson€advised€Ms.›€Stein€œthat€they€hadÏselected€her€for€a€random€drug€test.€€Thereafter,€Ms.€Stein€went›Ïto€Roche€Biomedical€Laboratories,€Inc.€and€provided€them€with€aÏurine€sample.€€Joe€Dietz,€Ms.€Stein's€immediate€supervisor,Ïinformed€Ms.€Stein€that€she€had€tested€positive€for€drugs.€€LaterÏthat€day,€Ms.€Stein€met€with€other€Davidson€managers€and€deniedÏany€drug€use.€€In€her€complaint,€Ms.€Stein€alleged€that€sheÏoffered€to€provide€another€urine€sample€or€a€blood€sample,€butÏDavidson€refused€these€offers.€€In€Davidson's€brief,€DavidsonÏstated€that€it€offered€to€have€Roche€retest€Ms.€Stein's€originalÏurine€sample,€but€Ms.€Stein€refused.€€As€a€result€of€the€positiveÏtest,€Davidson€terminated€Ms.€Stein.ÌÌà àOn€9€January€1995,€Ms.€Stein€filed€her€complaint€againstÏDavidson.€€The€causes€of€action€contained€in€the€complaint€were€asÏfollows:€€1)€wrongful€discharge€in€violation€of€public€policy€asÍexpressed€in€the€federal€and€state€constitutions;€2)€tortiousÏinvasion€of€privacy;€3)€breach€of€an€implied€employment€contract;Ï4)€breach€of€an€implied€covenant€of€good€faith€and€fair€dealing;Ï5)€negligence€on€the€part€of€Davidson;€6)€negligent€infliction€ofÏemotional€distress€and€outrageous€conduct;€and€7)€failure€to€payÏMs.€Stein€her€earned€vacation€time.€€On€7€March€1995,€DavidsonÏfiled€a€"Motion€to€Dismiss€or€for€Summary€Judgment."ÌÌà àOn€9€June€1995,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€granting€theÏmotion€in€part€and€denying€it€in€part.€€The€court€grantedÏDavidson's€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€uponÏwhich€relief€can€be€granted€as€to€counts€one,€two,€three,€five,Ïand€six.€€The€court,€for€"reasons€stated€in€open€court,"€tookÏ"Davidson's€Motion€regarding€the€fourth€cause€of€action€underÏadvisement€pending€further€order."€€Finally,€the€court€reviewedÏthe€affidavits€submitted€by€the€parties€and€concluded€that€thereÏwas€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€raised€by€the€seventh€count.€ÏBased€on€this€conclusion,€the€court€denied€Davidson's€motion€as€toÏthe€seventh€count.€€Pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€ProcedureÏ54.02,€the€court€found€that€there€were€no€just€reasons€for€delayÏand€held€that€the€order€was€final.€€ÌÌà àMs.€Stein€filed€her€notice€of€appeal€with€the€clerk€of€thisÏcourt€on€7€July€1995.€€The€notice€stated€that€Ms.€Stein€sought€toÏappeal€that€part€of€the€9€June€1995€order€dismissing€counts€one,Ïtwo,€and€three€of€her€complaint.€€Later,€in€her€brief,€Ms.€SteinÍvoluntarily€dismissed€her€appeal€as€to€count€three.€€Thus,€Ms.ÏStein€presented€this€court€with€the€following€two€issues:ÌÓÓà8 àI.à0 àWhether€a€cause€of€action€for€wrongful€dischargeÏmay€be€premised€upon€the€termination€of€employmentÏin€violation€of€an€employee's€constitutionalÏrights.Ìà8 àII.à0 àWhether€a€cause€of€action€for€the€tortious€invasionÏof€privacy€requires€state€action€in€a€case€by€anÏemployee€against€a€private€sector€employer.ÌÓÓÌÌà àWe€acknowledge€at€the€outset€that€the€rights€invoked€by€Ms.ÏMs.€Stein€are€substantial.€€Privacy€interests€cover€a€broad€rangeÏof€human€activity.€€In€the€constitutional€context€our€courts€haveÏrecognized€the€privacy€interest€surrounding€human€procreation,× ƒ2 ××  ×€theÏcare€and€custody€of€children,× ƒ3 ××  ×€and€consensual€sexual€activityÏbetween€adults.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€The€right€to€personal€autonomy€is€extremelyÏimportant€in€light€of€the€growing€intrusiveness€of€todayððsÏsociety.€€Invasions€of€privacy€involve€interferences€with€anÏindividualððs€interest€ð ðin€leading,€to€some€reasonable€extent,€aÏsecluded€and€private€life,€free€from€the€prying€eyes,€ears€andÏpublications€of€others.ðð€€òòò òSeeóó€ó óòòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€652A€cmt.Ïb€(1976).€€These€invasions€of€privacy€can€take€many€differentÍforms,€including€opening€a€personððs€private€mail,€searching€aÏpersonsððs€safe,€purse,€or€wallet,€or€examining€a€personððs€privateÏbank€account.€€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€652B€cmt.€b€(1976).€€TheÏinvasion€of€this€right€is€no€less€intrusive€when€it€is€undertakenÏby€a€private€person€than€when€it€is€undertaken€by€the€governmentÏor€a€subsidiary€of€the€government.€€Experience€teaches€us€thatÏpersonal€privacy€is€threatened€by€the€almost€insatiableÏinformation€gathering€appetites€of€not€only€governments€but€ofÏprivate€interests€as€well.€€ò òòòWilkinson€v.€œTimes›€Mirror€Corp.ó óóó,Ï264€Cal.€Rptr.€194,€200€(Cal.€App.€1989).€€The€reasonableÏexpectation€of€privacy€would€be€illusory€at€best€if€individualsÏcould€not€control€the€circulation€of€personal€information€and€ifÏthe€œlaw€only›€restricted€the€governmentððs€collection€and€retentionÏof€information.ÌÌò òII.à àStandard€of€Reviewó óÌÌà àBefore€addressing€Ms.€Stein's€issues,€we€must€first€address€aÏpreliminary€issue€dealing€with€the€standard€of€review.€€Ms.€SteinÏcontends€that€the€trial€court's€failure€to€exclude€affidavits,Ïpresented€by€both€parties,€converted€the€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€toÏdismiss€into€a€Rule€56€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€Thus,€sheÏsuggested€that€we€review€the€trial€court's€decision€as€if€theÏcourt€based€its€decision€on€the€principles€of€summary€judgment.€ÏDavidson,€however,€argued€that€this€court€should€review€the€trialÏcourt's€order€as€if€the€court€dismissed€the€counts€based€on€a€RuleÍ12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss.ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€Davidson.€€Ms.€Stein's€contention€that€a€trialÏcourt€can€convert€a€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€into€a€Rule€56€motion€byÏconsidering€material€outside€the€pleadings€is€correct.òòò ò€€KnierimÏv.€Leatherwoodóóó ó,€542€S.W.2d€806,€808€(Tenn.€1976).€€A€trialÏcourt,€however,€can€"prevent€a€conversion€from€taking€place€byÏdeclining€to€consider€extraneous€matters."€€òòò òPacific€E.€Corp.€v.ÏGulf€Life€Holding€Co.óóó ó,€902€S.W.2d€946,€952€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€ÏThat€is€precisely€what€happened€in€this€case.€€The€relevantÏportion€of€the€trial€court's€order€provided:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€ruling€upon€Davidson's€Motion€as€it€pertains€to€theÏseventh€count€of€the€Complaint,€the€Court€has€consideredÏthe€Affidavit€of€Casey€Stovall€submitted€by€Davidson€andÏhas€considered€the€Affidavit€of€Ms.€Stein.€€Therefore,Ïthe€Court€treats€the€Motion€as€it€pertains€to€theÏseventh€count€of€the€Complaint€as€a€Motion€for€SummaryÏJudgment€pursuant€to€Rule€56€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏCivil€Procedure.ÌÌÓÓAs€to€counts€one,€two,€three,€five,€and€six,€the€trial€courtÏexpressly€stated€that€he€was€dismissing€the€counts€for€failure€toÏstate€a€cause€of€action€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted,€a€RuleÏ12.02€ground€for€dismissal.€€It€is€apparent€that€the€trial€court'sÏactions€converted€the€motion€to€dismiss€as€it€pertained€to€theÏseventh€count€into€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€In€contrast,Ïthe€court€did€not€convert€the€motion€to€dismiss€into€a€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€when€it€addressed€counts€one€and€two,€the€countsÏwhich€form€the€basis€of€this€appeal.€€Therefore,€this€court€mustÏuse€the€standard€of€review€applicable€to€Rule€12.02(6)€motions.€€ÌÓÓà8 àIn€reviewing€an€appeal€from€an€order€dismissing€a€suitÏfor€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€beÏgranted,€we€obviously€are€limited€to€the€allegations€inÏthe€complaint,€and€we€must€construe€the€complaintÏliberally€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff,€taking€all€of€theÏallegations€of€fact€therein€as€true.òòò òÌÌÓÓRandolph€v.€Dominion€Bank€of€Middle€Tenn.óóó ó,€826€S.W.2d€477,Ï478€(Tenn.€App.€1991)€(citing€òòò òHuckeby€v.€Spangleróóó ó,€521€S.W.2dÏ568,€571€(Tenn.€1975)).€€Ìò òÌIII.à àWrongful€Discharge€Claimó óÌÌà à"Under€long„established€Tennessee€law,€an€employee„at„willÏcan€be€discharged€without€breach€of€contract€for€good€cause,€badÏcause€or€no€cause€at€all."€€òòò òClanton€v.€Cain„Sloan€Co.óóó ó,€677ÏS.W.2d€441,€443€(Tenn.€1984)(citing€òòò òPayne€v.€Railroad€Companyóóó ó,Ï81€Tenn.€507€(1884)).€€Given€the€long€history€of€this€rule,€theÏsupreme€court€was€unwilling€to€create€any€exceptions.€€In€1984,Ïhowever,€the€court€held€that€the€Workers'€Compensation€LawÏimplicitly€included€an€action€for€retaliatory€discharge.€ÏSpecifically,€the€action€recognized€by€the€court€allowed€anÏemployee€to€bring€a€suit€against€an€employer€who€had€terminatedÏthe€employee€for€filing€a€worker's€compensation€claim.€€òòò òId.€óóó óatÏ443„45.€€In€coming€to€its€final€decision,€the€court€stated€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 à[T]he€Workers'€Compensation€Law€is€a€comprehensiveÏscheme€enacted€to€provide€a€certain€and€expeditiousÏremedy€for€injured€employees.€€It€reflects€a€carefulÏbalancing€of€the€interests€of€employer€and€employee.€.€.Ï.ÌÌà8 àà àRetaliatory€discharges€completely€circumvent€thisÏlegislative€scheme.€€Such€discharges€will€have€theÏeffect€of€relieving€the€employer€of€its€duty€toÏcompensate€and€the€employee€of€his€or€her€right€toÏcompensation.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà àIn€our€opinion,€a€cause€of€action€for€retaliatoryÏdischarge,€although€not€explicitly€created€by€theÏstatute,€is€necessary€to€enforce€the€duty€of€theÏemployer,€to€secure€the€rights€of€the€employee€and€toÏcarry€out€the€intention€of€the€legislature.€€A€statuteÏneed€not€expressly€state€what€is€necessarily€implied€inÏorder€to€render€it€effectual.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.óóó ó€at€443.€€In€a€later€opinion,€the€court€emphasized€that€itsÏdecision€had€not€created€a€new€exception€to€the€employment€at€willÏdoctrine,€but€"merely€recognized€that€implicit€within€theÏprovisions€of€T.C.A.€Sec.€50„6„114€a€cause€of€action€existed.€.€.Ï."€€òòò òHarney€v.€Meadowbrook€Nursing€Ctr.óóó ó,€784€S.W.2d€921,€922Ï(Tenn.€1990);€òòò òsee€Hodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.€óóó ó833€S.W.2d€896,Ï903€(Tenn.€1992)€(O'Brien,€J.,€concurring€and€dissenting).€€ÌÌà àThrough€the€years,€the€supreme€court€has€refined€the€test€forÏdetermining€whether€the€courts€should€recognize€a€cause€of€actionÏfor€wrongful€discharge.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€In€1988,€the€supreme€court€stated€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àTo€be€liable€for€retaliatory€discharge.€.€.€,€theÏemployer€must€violate€a€clear€public€policy.€€UsuallyÏthis€policy€will€be€evidenced€by€an€unambiguousÏconstitutional,€statutory€or€regulatory€provision.€ÏFurther,€the€violation€must€be€a€substantial€factor€inÍthe€termination€of€an€at„will€employee,€agent€orÏofficer.ÌÌÓÓòòò òChism€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.óóó ó,€762€S.W.2d€552,€556€(Tenn.Ï1988).€€Time€and€time€again,€the€supreme€court€has€echoed€thisÏprinciple.€€òòò òReynolds€v.€Ozark€Motor€Lines,€Inc.óóó ó,€887€S.W.2dÏ822,€823€(Tenn.€1994);€ò òòòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.,€óóó ó857ÏS.W.2d€555,€557€(Tenn.€1993);òòò ò€Hodgesóóó ó,€833€S.W.2d€at€899;€ò òòòHarneyóóó ó,Ï784€S.W.2d€at€922„23.ÌÌà àBecause€it€is€not€the€role€of€the€courts€to€create€publicÏpolicy,€it€has€been€difficult,€if€not€impossible,€for€the€courtsÏto€recognize€novel€claims€of€wrongful€discharge.€€In€regard€to€theÏcourts€and€the€creation€of€public€policy,€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà àThis€court€can€know€nothing€of€public€policy€exceptÏfrom€the€constitution€and€the€laws,€and€the€course€ofÏadministration€and€decision.€€€It€has€no€legislativeÏpowers.€€€It€cannot€amend€or€modify€any€legislativeÏacts.€€It€cannot€examine€questions€as€expedient€orÏinexpedient,€as€politic€or€impolitic.€€€ConsiderationsÏof€that€sort€must,€in€general,€be€addressed€to€theÏlegislature.€€€Questions€of€policy€determined€there€areÏconcluded€here.Ìà8 àà àThere€are€cases,€it€is€true,€in€which€argumentsÏdrawn€from€public€policy€must€have€large€influence;€€butÏthese€are€cases€in€which€the€course€of€legislation€andÏadministration€do€not€leave€any€doubt€upon€the€questionÏwhat€the€public€policy€is,€and€in€which€what€wouldÏotherwise€be€obscure€or€of€doubtful€interpretation,€mayÏbe€cleared€and€resolved€by€reference€to€what€is€alreadyÏreceived€and€established.ÌÌÓÓò òòòNashville€Ry.€&€Light€Co.€v.€Lawsonóóó ó,€144€Tenn.€78,€91,€229ÏS.W.€741,€744€(1920)€(quoting€òòò òLicense€Tax€Caseó óóó,€5€Wall.€469,€18ÏL.€Ed.€497).ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€General€Assembly€has€also€played€a€role€in€theÏdevelopment€of€the€employment€at€will€doctrine.€€Through€the€yearsÏthe€General€Assembly€has€enacted€various€statutes€which€prohibitÏemployers€from€terminating€employees€for€certain€reasons.€€ForÏexample,€an€employer€may€not€terminate€an€employee€because€theÏemployee€served€as€a€juror× ƒ6 ××  ×;€because€an€employee€is€of€a€particularÏrace,€creed,€color,€religion,€sex,€age,€or€national€origin× ƒ7 ××  ×;Ïbecause€an€employee€is€disabled× ƒ8 ××  ×;€because€an€employee€refused€toÏparticipate€in€or€refused€to€remain€silent€about€illegalÏactivities× ƒ9 ××  ×;€or€because€an€employee€filed€a€complaint,€instituted€aÏproceeding€or€investigation,€testified€in€a€proceeding,€orÏexercised€a€right€pursuant€to€the€Occupational€Safety€and€HealthÏAct€of€1972.× ƒ: ××  ×ÌÌà àTo€summarize,€the€statutes€of€this€state€provide€employeesÍrelief€from€certain€employer€conduct.€€In€addition,€the€courtsÏhave€recognized€a€very€limited€cause€of€action€for€wrongfulÏdischarge€based€on€a€violation€of€clear€public€policy.€€As€to€theÏinstant€case,€it€is€not€the€province€of€this€court€to€create€anyÏadditional€exceptions€to€the€employment€at€will€doctrine€absent€aÏviolation€of€clear€public€policy€evidenced€by€an€unambiguousÏconstitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatory€provision.ÌÌà àMs.€Stein's€first€issue€is€very€broad€and€includes€manyÏtopics€which€are€irrelevant€to€this€case.€€The€actual€issueÏpresented€by€this€appeal€is€whether€the€trial€court€correctlyÏfound€that€count€one€of€Ms.€Stein's€complaint€failed€to€state€aÏclaim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€In€resolving€this€issue,Ïthere€are€two€questions€derived€from€the€above€discussion€which€weÏmust€answer.€€First,€is€there€a€statutory€basis€for€Ms.€Stein'sÏcause€of€action,€and€if€so,€did€Ms.€Stein€allege€the€necessaryÏelements?€€Second,€did€count€one€of€Ms.€Steinððs€complaint€allege€aÏwrongful€discharge€action€based€on€the€theory€that€DavidsonÏviolated€clear€public€policy?€€If€we€answer€these€question€in€theÏnegative,€we€must€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€the€trial€courtÏcorrectly€dismissed€count€one.€€In€her€complaint,€Ms.€SteinÏalleged€that€"[p]laintiff's€employment€was€terminated€for€the€soleÏreason€that€Plaintiff€tested€positive€on€a€single€random€urineÍdrug€screen€negligently€performed€by€Defendant,€Roche."× ƒ; ××  ×€€ThereÏare€no€statutes€which€prohibit€an€employer€from€discharging€anÏemployee€for€a€positive€drug€test.€€Because€there€is€no€statutoryÏcause€of€action,€the€answer€to€the€first€question€is€no.ÌÌà àThe€second€question€is€more€difficult.€€To€explain,€the€casesÏbrought€before€Tennessee's€courts€have€alleged€retaliatoryÏdischarge.€€The€premise€of€an€action€for€retaliatory€discharge€isÏthat€an€employer€terminates€an€employee€because€that€employeeÏacted€in€a€manner€which€was€detrimental€to€the€employer.€€In€otherÏwords,€the€employer€retaliates€against€the€actions€of€theÏemployee.€€Further,€the€action€of€the€employee€is€generally€aÏprotected€action€or€an€action€which€society€deems€beneficial€suchÏthat€terminating€an€employee€for€acting€or€failing€to€act€violatesÏpublic€policy.€€Examples€of€beneficial€or€protected€actionsÏinclude€filing€a€workers'€compensation€claim× ƒ< ××  ×€or€a€discriminationÏclaim.× ƒ= ××  ×€€Clearly,€this€is€not€the€situation€presented€by€thisÏcase.€€ÌÌà àMs.€Stein's€complaint€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà à18.à àDavidson's€stated€policy€of€terminatingÍemployees€for€a€single€positive€drug€test€resultÏviolates€the€public€policy€of€the€State€of€Tennessee€asÏexpressed€in:Ìà8 àà8 àà àà à(a)à àArticle€I€ðð8€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€which€guarantees€citizens€of€thisÏstate€the€right€to€privacy.Ìà8 àà8 àà àà à(b)à àArticle€I€ðð7€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€which€protects€individuals€fromÏunreasonable€searches€and€seizures.Ìà8 àà8 àà àà à(c)€€The€common€law€of€the€State€ofÏTennessee,€which€prohibits€intrusions€on€anÏindividual's€privacy€or€solitude.ÌÌÓÓClearly,€Ms.€Stein's€contention€is€that€Davidson's€terminationÏpolicy,€not€its€mandatory€drug€testing€program,€violatesÏTennessee's€public€policy.€€Thus,€the€issue€before€this€court€isÏwhether€an€employer€violates€public€policy,€as€evidenced€byÏconstitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatory€provisions,€when€thatÏemployer€institutes€a€policy€allowing€it€to€discharge€employeesÏwho€test€positive€for€drugs.ÌÌà àIn€her€brief,€Ms.€Stein€argued€that€Davidsonððs€policy€ofÏterminating€employees€for€a€single€positive€drug€test€resultÏviolated€public€policy€because€there€were€no€safeguards€to€ensureÏthe€accuracy€of€the€result€or€to€prevent€the€collection€methodÏfrom€being€too€intrusive.€€In€other€words,€Ms.€Steinððs€argument€inÏher€brief€was€that€both€Davidson's€termination€policy€andÏDavidson's€method€of€obtaining€the€test€results€violated€theÏpublic€policy€of€this€state.€€In€her€complaint,€however,€Ms.€SteinÏonly€alleged€that€Davidson's€termination€policy€violated€theÏpublic€policy.€€Because€this€appeal€concerns€a€motion€to€dismiss,Ïour€analysis€is€constrained€by€the€allegation€found€in€theÍpleadings.ÌÌà àWhile€the€method€in€which€Davidson€conducted€the€test€mayÏviolate€some€public€policy€in€favor€of€accuracy€and€minimalÏintrusion,€Davidson's€policy€of€terminating€employees€who€testÏpositive€for€drugs€does€not€violate€any€public€policy€known€toÏthis€court.€€To€the€contrary,€Tennessee's€public€policy€is€inÏtotal€opposition€to€drug€use€in€the€workplace.€ÌÌà àMs.€Stein€insists€that€the€stateððs€public€policy€againstÏterminating€employees€who€test€positive€for€drugs€can€be€found€inÏthe€personal€privacy€protections€of€article€1,€sections€7€and€8€Ïof€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€Her€contention€that€TennesseeððsÏBill€of€Rights€protect€the€rights€of€citizens€is€correct,€however,Ïthe€Tennessee€Bill€of€Rights€protects€against€governmentalÏinterference.€€ò òòòFreshwater€v.€Stateó óóó,€2€Tenn.€Crim.€App.€314,€320,Ï453€S.W.2d€446,€449€(1969),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€400€U.S.€840€(1970).€ÏRecognizing€this€fundamental€principal€of€constitutionalÏinterpretation,€other€courts€have€held€that€state€constitutionsÏare€not€sources€of€public€œpolicy€in€wrongful€discharge€casesÏunless€the€constitutional€provision€at€issue€directly€addressesÏprivate€conduct.›€€ò òòòBorse€v.€Peace€Goods€Shop,€Inc.ó óóó,€963€F.2dÏ611,€620€œ(3d›€Cir.€1992);€ò òòòGilmore€v.€Enogex,€Inc.ó óóó,€878€P.2d€360,Ï365€(Ok.€1994).ÌÌà àState€statutes€and€regulations€may€also€provide€the€clearÍpublic€policy€required€for€a€wrongful€discharge€action.€ÏTennesseeððs€statutes,€however,€seem€to€favor€the€use€of€drugÏtesting.€€The€Tennessee€General€Assembly€has€specificallyÏauthorized€drug€testing€for€public€school€students× ƒ> ××  ×€and€theÏsecurity€personnel€employed€by€the€Department€of€Corrections€andÏYouth€Development.× ƒ? ××  ×€€In€1995,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€aÏstatute€providing€that€private€sector€employees€are€not€entitledÏto€unemployment€compensation€if€they€left€their€most€recent€workÏ"either€to€avoid€taking€a€drug€or€alcohol€screening€test,€or€afterÏreceiving€a€positive€result€to€a€drug€or€alcohol€screening€test."× ƒ@ ××  ×€€ÌÌà àSome€courts€have€even€looked€to€the€common€law€as€a€source€ofÏthe€clear€public€policy.€€œThese›€courts€concluded€that€the€stateððsÏrecognition€of€a€common€law€action€for€invasion€of€privacyÏsupplied€the€clear€public€policies€needed€to€support€a€wrongfulÏdischarge€cause€of€action.€€òòò òSee€Borseó óóó,€963€F.2d€at€620„22;Ïò òòòHennessy€v.€Coastal€Eagle€Point€Oil€Co.ó óóó,€609€A.2d€11,€17„9Ï(N.J.€1992).€€The€courts€of€Tennessee€have€never€gone€this€far.€ÏThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€stated€that€"clear€public€policy"Ïis€to€be€found€in€an€"unambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€orÏregulatory€provision."€€ò òòòAndersonó óóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€557.ÌÌà àœMs.›€Steinððs€wrongful€discharge€claim€fails€to€state€a€claimÏupon€which€relief€can€be€granted€because€she€has€not€pointed€toÏœany›€clear€public€policy€against€terminating€employees€who€testÏpositive€œfor€drugs.›€€To€the€contrary,€creating€a€drug€free€workÏenvironment€in€the€public€and€private€sector€is€completelyÏconsistent€with€the€State€of€Tennesseeððs€public€policy.ÌÌò òIV.à àInvasion€of€Privacyó óÌÌà àThe€second€count€of€Ms.€Stein's€complaint€alleged€theÏfollowing:€ÌÓÓà8 à24.à àBy€requiring€Plaintiff€to€submit€to€a€random€drugÏtest€which€has€no€relation€to€Plaintiff's€duties€as€anÏemployee€of€Davidson,€Davidson€has€tortiously€intrudedÏinto€Plaintiff's€privacy.€ÌÌà8 à25.à à.€.€.€The€intrusion€into€Plaintiff's€personal€andÏprivate€habits€is€in€violation€of€Plaintiff'sÏconstitutional€and€common€law€rights.ÌÌÓÓœThese›€allegations€reveal€that€Ms.€Stein€premised€her€invasion€ofÏprivacy€claim€on€two€bases;€one€constitutional€and€one€common€law.€ÏThe€trial€judge€dismissed€the€entire€count€holding€"that€theÏsecond€count€of€the€Complaint€d[id]€not€allege€the€state€actionÏrequired€to€support€the€constitutional€claim€of€invasion€ofÏprivacy.€.€.€."€€In€her€brief,€Ms.€Stein€argued€that€it€is€notÏnecessary€for€a€plaintiff€to€allege€state€action€because€TennesseeÏrecognizes€a€common€law€right€of€action€for€invasion€of€privacyÏagainst€a€private€defendant.€€Thus,€it€is€Ms.€Stein's€contentionÍthat€the€trial€judge€could€not€have€dismissed€her€common€law€claimÏfor€lack€of€state€action.ÌÌà àIn€order€to€establish€a€violation€of€the€constitutional€rightÏto€privacy,€a€party€must€allege€state€action,€however;€a€cause€ofÏaction€for€tortious€invasion€of€privacy€is€not€dependant€on€stateÏaction.€òòò òSee€Ensor€v.€Rust€Engððg€Coó óóó.,€704€F.€Supp.€808,€816Ï(E.D.€Tenn.€1989);€òòò òMartin€v.€Senators,€Inc.óóó ó,€220€Tenn.€465,Ï471,€418€S.W.2d€660,€663€(1967)(stating€when€an€individual€isÏliable€for€tortious€invasion€of€privacy).€€Thus,€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€dismissing€count€two€of€Ms.€Stein's€complaint€in€itsÏentirety€on€this€basis.ÌÌà àMs.€Stein's€complaint€included€allegations€involving€twoÏinvasion€of€privacy€theories.€€The€first€was€that€Davidson€invadedÏher€privacy€by€intruding€into€her€seclusion.€€Second,€sheÏcontended€that€Davidson€publicly€disclosed€private€information€byÏtelling€certain€persons€about€the€results€of€her€drug€test.ÌÌà àò òA.à àPublic€Disclosure€of€a€Private€Factó óÌÌà àIn€a€1967€case,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€defined€the€tortÏof€invasion€of€privacy€as€follows:€€"'A€person€who€unreasonablyÏand€seriously€interferes€with€another's€interest€in€not€having€hisÏaffairs€known€to€others€or€his€likeness€exhibited€to€the€public€isÏliable€to€the€other.'"€€òòò òMartinóóó ó,€418€S.W.2d€at€663€(1967)€(quotingÍòòRestatement€of€Tortsóó€ðð867€(1939)).€€The€court€then€went€on€to€find€thatÏ"liability€exists€only€if€the€conduct€is€such€that€a€defendantÏshould€have€realized€it€would€be€offensive€to€persons€of€ordinaryÏsensibilities;€and€that€it€is€only€where€the€intrusion€had€goneÏbeyond€the€limits€of€decency€that€liability€accrues.€.€.€."€€òòò òId.Ïóóó óat€664;€òòò òsee€also€Swallows€v.€Western€Elec.€Co.óóó ó,€543€S.W.2dÏ581,€583€(Tenn.€1976);€òòò òFann€v.€City€of€Fairviewóóó ó,€905€S.W.2dÏ167,€170€(Tenn.€App.€1994);€ò òòòDunn€v.€Moto€Photo,€Inc.óóó ó,€828ÏS.W.2d€747,€752€(Tenn.€App.€1991).ÌÌà àIn€1987,€the€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Western€SectionÏdetermined€that€a€plaintiff,€who€had€alleged€public€disclosure€ofÏa€private€fact,€failed€to€establish€that€the€defendant€had€madeÏthe€information€public.€€The€court€determined€that,€in€order€toÏsuccessfully€assert€a€public€disclosure€claim,€the€plaintiff€hadÏto€establish€that€"the€matter€is€made€public,€by€communicating€itÏto€the€public€at€large,€or€to€so€many€persons€that€the€matter€mustÏbe€regarded€as€substantially€certain€to€become€one€of€publicÏknowledge."€€òòò òGentry€v.€E.€I.€DuPont€De€Nemours€and€Co.óóó ó,€1987ÏWL€15854,€at€*3€(Tenn.€App.€18€August€1987)(quoting€òòRestatementÏ(Second)€of€Tortsóó€ðð€652(d)€cmt.€a€(1976)).€€They€then€found€that€theÏfacts€established€that€only€a€few€employees€had€heard€theÏinformation€and€that€the€defendant€instructed€them€not€to€repeatÏit.€€Thereafter,€the€court€upheld€the€finding€of€the€trial€courtÏin€favor€of€the€defendant.€€òòò òId.€óóó óat€*4.ÌÌà àThe€only€allegation€regarding€the€extent€of€the€disclosureÏstated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àContrary€to€the€requirement€of€confidentiality€inÏDavidson's€alcohol/drug€testing€policy,€the€results€ofÏPlaintiff's€drug€test€were€disclosed€to€one€ofÏPlaintiff's€peers€and€to€one€of€Plaintiff'sÏsubordinates.€€Upon€information€and€belief,€PlaintiffÏbelieves€that€these€results€have€been€disclosed€toÏadditional€employees€of€Davidson.€€The€results€ofÏPlaintiff's€drug€test€were€revealed€to€employees€who€didÏnot€have€a€legitimate€interest€in€having€thisÏinformation€available.ÌÌÓÓConstruing€the€complaint€liberally,€one€finds€that€Ms.€SteinÏfailed€to€allege€the€disclosure€necessary€to€state€a€cause€ofÏaction€for€public€disclosure€of€a€private€fact.€€She€alleges€thatÏDavidson€disclosed€the€information€to€only€two€people.€€Further,Ïthe€allegation€on€information€and€belief€does€not€allege€theÏnecessary€disclosure€because€it€does€not€necessarily€follow€thatÏDavidson€communicated€the€information€to€so€many€people€that€it€isÏsubstantially€certain€to€become€public€knowledge.€€Because€Ms.ÏStein€failed€to€allege€a€necessary€element€of€the€cause€of€action,Ïthe€court€correctly€dismissed€the€claim.ÌÌò òà àB.à àIntrusion€into€Seclusionó óÌÌà àThe€courts€of€this€state€have€held€that€a€plaintiff€may€waiveÏhis€or€her€right€to€privacy€and,€thus,€waive€their€right€to€bringÏan€action€for€an€invasion€of€that€right.€€òòò òMartinóóó ó,€418€S.W.2d€atÏ662„64;€ò òòòsee€Langford€v.€Vanderbilt€Univ.óóó ó,€199€Tenn.€389,€403„04,€287€S.W.2d€32,€39€(1956).€€"A€waiver€or€relinquishment€of€thisÍright,€or€of€some€aspect€thereof,€may€be€implied€from€the€conductÏof€the€parties€and€the€surrounding€circumstances."€€òòò òMartinóóó ó,€418ÏS.W.2d€at€663€(quoting€41€òòAm.€Jur.óó€p.€937).€€It€is€the€opinion€ofÏthis€court€that€Ms.€Stein€waived€her€right€to€bring€an€actionÏagainst€Davidson€for€intruding€into€her€seclusion.ÌÌà àIt€is€Ms.€Steinððs€contention€that€the€"[e]mployees€wereÏforced€to€consent€to€random€drug€testing€or€risk€immediateÏtermination."€Nevertheless,€she€did€consent€to€the€testing.€ÏFurther,€there€were€no€allegations€that€she€objected€to€the€testÏwhen€asked€to€sign€the€form€or€when€selected€for€the€test.€€InÏaddition,€she€did€not€allege€that€she€sought€other€employmentÏafter€having€to€sign€the€form.€€ÌÌà àEven€if€we€were€to€find€that€Davidson€"forced"€Ms.€Stein€toÏsign€the€consent€form,€our€conclusion€would€be€the€same.€€ToÏexplain,€Ms.€Stein€began€working€for€the€hotel€in€June€1989,€andÏDavidson€instituted€the€drug€policy€in€February€1992.€€Ms.€SteinÏcontinued€to€work€at€the€hotel€for€over€two€years€even€though€sheÏknew€the€nature€of€the€test€and€that€Davidson€could€choose€her€forÏa€test€at€any€time.€€There€is€no€evidence€that€she€wasÏdissatisfied€with€her€employment€or€that€she€intended€to€findÏother€work.€€In€fact,€the€complaint€established€that€the€qualityÏof€her€work€was€above€average.€€ÌÌà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€Ms.€Steinððs€conduct€and€theÍsurrounding€circumstances€established€that€she€waived€her€right€toÏbring€this€action.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€properly€dismissed€countÏtwo€of€Ms.€Steinððs€complaint.ÌÌò òV.à àConclusionó óÌÌà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€theÏdecision€of€the€trial€court€should,€in€all€respects,€be€affirmed.€ÏThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€therefore€affirmed€with€costsÏon€appeal€assessed€to€plaintiff/appellant,€Evelene€N.€Stein,€andÏthe€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€any€further€necessaryÏproceedings.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE