ÿWPC6 5# öUN %O 0cUU<¸w@ô44H AQW 0§¨OW 0J_ 0T© 0^ý 0h[ 0rà 0|5 0†± 07 1uÇ 0d< 0@  D3à 0D U>W B)• DC¾ AM U*N Bx Æ• 0D[ 0DŸ D/ã B^/l¶ùU6¯v~åvÓc˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;1˜$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XcXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman ”•E–[—˜U™îšÓ€›Ó€§®§aö"x3|x®*+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(W(3P$¤¤Ý ƒ1˜!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XTXXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd* &Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òJulyÏ31,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó bÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Summary€judgment€was€also€granted€to€defendants€Patricia€ThomasÏand€Susan€Parsons€with€Sullivanððs€consent.€€Thomas€and€Parsons€are€not€partiesÏto€this€appeal.Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€complaint€also€alleges€tortious€interference€with€SullivanððsÏemployment,€outrageous€conduct,€intentional€infliction€of€emotional€distress,Ïand€a€failure€to€provide€proper€notice€of€her€COBRA€rights€in€violation€of€29ÏU.S.C.€ðð€1001€òòet€seq.óó€(1985)€and€T.C.A.€ðð€56„7„2312€òòet€seq.óó€(1994)€thatÏimpermissibly€denied€her€right€to€insurance€benefits.€€These€claims€wereÏdismissed€on€summary€judgment€for€the€defendants,€but€these€claims€were€notÏraised€as€issues€on€appeal.€Ì< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€\¥XXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òKAREN€SULLIVANó ó,ÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Circuit€No.€55553€T.D.ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9610„CV„00237ÌÌò òÙ€*ÙßR€'/&A1-j|ú` à. `€€@ÿRßBAPTIST€MEMORIAL€HOSPITAL,ÌPATRICIA€THOMAS,€ó óIndividuallyÌand€as€Assistant€Director€of€Nursing€atÌBaptist€Memorial€Hospital€East;€and€Ìò òSUSAN€PARSONS,€ó óIndividually€andÌin€her€Capacity€as€Respiratory€TherapyÌManager,€ò òÌÌà àó óDefendants„Appellees.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€TENNESESE€FOR€THEÌà@ àTHIRTIETH€JUDICIAL€DISTRICT€AT€MEMPHISÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€KAREN€R.€WILLIAMS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌà@ àStephen€H.€Biller€and€Sara€Hall;€Baker,€Donelson,Ìà@ àBearman€&€Caldwell€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àJ.€Edward€Wise,€Paul€E€Prather,€Steven€W.€Likens;Ìà@ àKiesewetter,€Wise,€Kaplan,€Schwimmer€&€Prather€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óóóÌÌà@ àOpinion€filed:€ÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌÓÓ›à àThis€is€a€defamation€case.€€Plaintiff,€Karen€Sullivan,€appeals€from€theÏorder€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€to€defendant,€BaptistÏMemorial€Hospital€(BMH).× ƒ0 ××  ×Ìà àKaren€Sullivan€was€a€full„time€staff€nurse€in€the€neonatal€intensive€careÏunit€(NICU)€at€BMH€for€fourteen€years.€€She€also€performed€temporary€nursingÏservices€at€St.€Francis€Hospital€through€a€staffing€agency€known€as€CliniCall.Ìà àIn€the€NICU,€nurses€used€angiocaths€to€start€IVS€on€infants€in€the€unit.€ÏSusan€Parsons,€a€fellow€BMH€nurse,€reported€to€BMH€that€Sullivan€admittedÍtaking€angiocaths€from€BMH€to€use€at€St.€Francis.€€Sullivan€denied€making€theÏstatements€to€Parsons€and€denied€that€she€had€stolen€any€angiocaths.€€After€aÏmeeting€with€Patricia€Thomas,€the€Assistant€Director€of€Nursing,€BMHÏterminated€Sullivan€on€February€22,€1993€for€the€alleged€misappropriation€ofÏhospital€property.Ìà àSullivan€experienced€difficulty€obtaining€new€employment€because€sheÏwas€forced€to€disclose€the€reason€for€her€termination€on€job€applications€toÏprospective€employers.€€She€applied€for€jobs€at€Methodist€North€and€JacksonÏMadison€County€Hospital,€but€was€not€granted€a€position.à àà àÌà àOn€August€3,€1993,€Sullivan€filed€a€complaint€against€BMH,€PatriciaÏThomas,€and€Susan€Parsons€alleging,€òòinter€aliaóó,€defamation.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€In€addition€to€theÏallegations€against€Thomas€and€Parsons,€the€complaint€alleges€that€BMH€hasÏdisseminated€defamatory,€false,€malicious,€and€scandalous€information€aboutÏSullivan€to€her€potential€employers,€precluding€her€from€becoming€gainfullyÏemployed.€Ìà àOn€January€30,€1996,€BMH,€Thomas,€and€Parsons€all€filed€motions€forÏsummary€judgment.€€After€a€hearing€on€April€19,€1996,€the€trial€court€grantedÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€all€three€defendants.€€Sullivan€conceded€thatÏsummary€judgment€was€appropriate€as€to€all€claims€against€Thomas€andÏParsons.€€Sullivan€also€conceded€that€summary€judgment€was€appropriate€inÏfavor€of€BMH€for€all€claims€except€the€defamation€claim.€€However,€the€trialÏcourt€granted€summary€judgment€for€BMH€on€the€defamation€claim€holdingÏthat€ð ðself„publicationðð€of€false€information€does€not€satisfy€the€publicationÏelement€required€to€establish€a€claim€for€defamation.Ìà àSullivan€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€order€granting€summary€judgment€toÏBMH€on€the€defamation€claim€and€presents€one€issue€for€review:€whether€theÏpublication€element€of€defamation€can€be€established€by€compelled€self„publication€in€the€employment€context.Ìà àA€trial€court€should€grant€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€when€theÏmovant€demonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€thatÏthe€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ï56.03.€€The€phrase€ð ðgenuine€issueðð€as€stated€in€Rule€56.03€refers€to€genuineÏfactual€issues€and€does€not€include€issues€involving€legal€conclusions€to€be€drawnÏfrom€the€facts.€€òòò òByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€211€(Tenn.€1993).€€Because€theÍfacts€are€undisputed€in€this€case,€we€must€decide€whether€the€legal€conclusionsÏon€which€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€was€based€are€correct.€ÏOur€review€is€òòde€novoóó€on€the€record€with€no€presumption€of€the€correctness€ofÏthe€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law.€€òòò òUnion€Planters€Natððl€Bank€v.€AmericanÏHome€Assurance€Co.ó óóó,€865€S.W.2d€907,€912€(Tenn.€App.€1993).Ìà àSullivan€argues€that€she€has€experienced€difficulty€in€obtainingÏemployment€because€she€is€forced€to€tell€her€prospective€employers€that€she€wasÏterminated€by€BMH€for€misappropriating€hospital€property.€€She€claims€thatÏthe€publication€element€of€defamation€is€met€because€she€was€forced€to€publishÏBMHððs€statements€on€subsequent€job€applications.€€BMH€argues€thatÏdefamation€by€self„publication€has€been€expressly€rejected€by€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€and€by€this€Court.€€Ìà àIn€ò òòòPress,€Inc.€v.€Verranóóó ó,€569€S.W.2d€435€(Tenn.€1978),€our€SupremeÏCourt,€òòinter€aliaóó,€adopted€as€law€ðð€580B€of€the€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó€(1977):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àðð€580B.€€òòDefamation€of€Private€Person.óóÌà8 àà8 àOne€who€publishes€a€false€and€defamatoryÏcommunication€concerning€a€private€person€.€.€.€isÏsubject€to€liability,€if,€but€only€if,€heà àà àÌà8 àà8 à(a)€knows€that€the€statement€is€false€and€that€itÏdefames€the€other,Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€acts€in€reckless€disregard€of€these€matters,€orÌà8 àà8 à(c)€acts€negligently€in€failing€to€ascertain€them.Ìà8 àà8 àà àÌÓÓò òòòPress,óóó ó€569€S.W.2d€at€442.€€We€must€decide€in€this€appeal€whether€theÍpublication€element€of€defamation€is€met€when€an€employee€is€compelled€toÏpublish€on€a€job€application€a€former€employerððs€official€reasons€for€theÏemployeeððs€termination.€€ð ðPublicationðð€is€a€term€of€art€meaning€theÏcommunication€of€defamatory€matter€to€a€third€person.€€ò òòòQuality€Auto€PartsÏCo.€v.€Bluff€City€Buick€Co.óóó ó,€876€S.W.2d€818,€821€(Tenn.€1994).Ìà àBMH€relies€on€an€unpublished€opinion€of€this€Court,€ò òòòRaiteri€v.€RKOÏGeneral,€Inc.óóó ó,€Shelby€Law€No.€56,€1989€WL€146743€(Tenn.€App.€Dec.€6,€1989).€ÏIn€ò òòòRaiterióóó ó,€Charles€Raiteri,€a€reporter€for€WHBQ€AM„TV€in€Memphis,€wasÏterminated€for€alleged€biased€and€unbalanced€reporting.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€*1„2.€€RaiteriÏfiled€a€complaint€for€defamation€against€the€TV€station€alleging€that€theÏstatements€that€caused€him€to€be€disciplined€for€biased€and€unbalancedÏreporting€were€published€to€third€parties.€€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€at€*2.€€The€trial€court€grantedÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€defendants,€and€this€Court€affirmed€the€trialÏcourt.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€*8.€€This€Court€held€that€ð ðthe€statement€that€Raiteriððs€report€wasÏððbiased€and€unbalancedðð€is€not€a€defamatory€factual€statement,€but€is€rather€anÏopinion€or€characterization€based€upon€the€disclosed€nondefamatory€facts€ofÏRaiteriððs€report€itself€and€is€not€actionable.ðð€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€*4.€€This€Court€continuedÏand€addressed€Raiteriððs€second€argument:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àRaiteri€also€argues€that€because€he€had€toÏindicate€on€employment€application€forms€that€he€hadÍbeen€fired€for€preparing€a€ð ðbiased€and€unbalancedÏreport,ðð€the€defendants€should€be€liable€for€thisÏrepublication.€€Where€the€statement€is€opinion,Ïpublication€is€not€material.€€However,€assumingÏòòarguendoóó€that€it€is€not€opinion€and€it€is€defamatory,Ïplaintiffððs€action€would€fail€for€want€of€publication.€ÏAlthough€Raiteri€cites€to€cases€in€other€jurisdictionsÏwhich€hold€employers€liable€for€republication€by€theÏplaintiff€under€certain€circumstances,€Raiteri€fails€toÏcite€any€cases€in€Tennessee€on€point.€€In€òòò òSylvis€v.ÏMilleró óóó,€96€Tenn.€(12€Pickle)€94,€33€S.W.€921€(1896),Ïthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€found€there€was€noÏpublication€when€the€plaintiff€received€a€letter€fromÏthe€defendant€and€exhibited€this€letter€to€relatives€andÏfriends.€€Therefore,€the€plaintiff€cannot€base€his€causeÏof€action€upon€his€own€republication.€€Furthermore,Ïsince€we€have€found€the€statement€ð ðbiased€andÏunbalanced€reportðð€to€be€an€opinion,€Raiteri€cannotÏmaintain€an€action€for€republication€of€aÏconstitutionally„protected€opinion.€€€€ÌÌÓÓò òòòIdóóó ó.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€court€relied€on€ò òòòRaiterióóó ó€in€its€order€granting€summaryÏjudgment€in€favor€of€BMH.€€Ìà àWe€do€not€believe€that€ò òòòRaiterió óóó€should€control€on€the€issue€of€publication.€ÏFirst,€the€alternative€holding€is€dicta€from€an€unpublished€opinion.€€The€CourtÏstated€that€ð ðpublication€is€not€material.ðð€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€In€the€present€case,€publication€isÏthe€central€issue.€€Second,€the€ò òòòRaiterió óóó€Court€considered€republication€of€anÏopinion,€while€the€present€case€involves€republication€of€a€factual€statement.€Ì€à àBMH€also€cites€òòò òRailroad€v.€Delaneyóóó ó,€102€Tenn.€(18€Pickle)€289,€52€S.W.Ï151€(1899).€€In€ò òòòDelaneyóóó ó,€the€plaintiff€asked€for€and€received€a€recommendationÍletter€from€his€employer.€€102€Tenn.€at€291„92.€€Plaintiffððs€declaration€allegedÏthat€the€letter€contained€false€information€and€ð ðwas€made€willfully€andÏmaliciously€for€the€purpose€of€injuring€plaintiff€in€his€trade€and€calling.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€atÏ290.€€Defendant€filed€a€demurrer€to€the€declaration€on€the€ground€that€thereÏwas€no€averment€of€special€damages,€which€was€necessary€where€the€words€areÏnot€libelous€per€se.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€290„91.€The€trial€court€overruled€the€demurrer,€andÏsubsequently€judgment€was€entered€on€a€jury€verdict€for€the€plaintiff.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€atÏ291.Ìà àOn€appeal,€the€Supreme€Court,€in€discussing€the€evidence€at€the€trial,Ïnoted€that€only€the€plaintiff€and€the€plaintiffððs€agent€acquired€knowledge€of€theÏletter€from€defendant.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€292.€€The€Court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThere€is€no€evidence€of€publication€in€this€record.€ÏThe€proof€is€undisputed€that€this€letter€was€written€byÏSullivan€at€the€request€of€Mr.€Speed,€who€was€actingÏby€authority€of€the€plaintiff.€€Speed€accepted€it€andÏdelivered€it€to€plaintiff,€who€used€it€in€seekingÏemployment.€€Under€the€authorities€the€company€isÏnot€liable€for€any€of€the€consequences€of€the€act€ofÏDelaney€in€making€publication€of€the€letter€containingÏlibelous€matter.€€If€a€person€receives€a€letterÏcontaining€libelous€matter,€he€will€not€be€justified€inÏpublishing€it.€€ò òòòSylvis€v.€Milleróóó ó,€96€Tenn.€94;€ò òòòWilcox€v.ÏMoonóóó ó,€24€Atlantic€Reporter,€244.ÌÌò òòòIdó óóó.€at€294.€€à àÌÌÓÓà àThe€Supreme€Court€reversed€the€trial€court,€sustained€the€demurrer,€andÍdismissed€the€suit.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€297.Ìà àWe€note€a€marked€difference€in€òòò òDelanyó óóó€and€the€case€at€bar.€€We€shouldÏfirst€note,€however,€that€although€the€Court€discussed€the€facts€pertaining€toÏpublication€of€the€alleged€defamation,€the€Courtððs€decision€was€based€upon€theÏallegations€of€the€declaration,€and€the€Court€sustained€the€demurrer€originallyÏfiled€by€the€defendant.€€Therefore,€the€Courtððs€comment€concerning€publicationÏof€the€alleged€defamation€was€dicta.€€Moreover,€the€defamatory€letter€was€aÏletter€of€recommendation,€which€the€plaintiff€was€free€to€use€or€not€to€use€atÏhis€discretion,€and€his€use€of€the€letter€resulted€in€a€voluntary€publication€of€theÏalleged€defamatory€material.Ìà àIn€both€ò òòòRaiteri€ó óóóand€ò òòòDelaneyóóó ó,€the€Court€cited€òòò òSylvis€v.€Milleró óóó,€96€Tenn.Ï(12€Pickle)€94,€33€S.W.€921€(1896).€€In€ò òòòSylvisóóó ó,€the€plaintiff€received€aÏdefamatory€letter€through€the€mail€and€showed€its€contents€to€his€relatives€andÏfriends.€€96€Tenn.€at€95.€€The€Supreme€Court€stated,€ð ð[T]he€defendant€is€notÏanswerable€for€anything€the€plaintiff€may€choose€to€do€with€the€letter€after€itÏhas€once€safely€reached€his€hands.€.€.€.€If€a€person€receives€a€letter€containingÏlibelous€matter,€he€will€not€be€justified€in€publishing€it.ðð€€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€(citationsÏomitted).Ìà àSullivan€argues€that€ò òòòSylvisóóó ó€is€distinguishable€because€that€case€hadÍnothing€to€do€with€employment€and€because€the€self„publication€was€voluntary.€ÏBMH€argues€that€no€Tennessee€case,€including€ò òòòSylvisóóó ó,€has€held€that€ð ðcompelledððÏas€opposed€to€ð ðvoluntaryðð€self„publication€satisfies€the€publication€requirementÏfor€a€defamation€claim.ÌÑ7€¼°XXdðXXdð7Ñà àOther€than€ò òòòDelanyó óóó€and€ò òòòRaiterrió óóó,€which€we€have€heretofore€noted€areÏdistinguishable€from€the€case€at€bar,€we€can€find€no€cases€directly€on€point€inÏTennessee€dealing€with€self„publication€of€alleged€defamatory€matters€in€anÏemployment€setting.€€There€are€cases€from€other€jurisdictions€dealing€with€thisÏquestion€and€with€differing€results.€€It€appears€that€the€minority€view€is€thatÏself„publication€in€the€employment€setting€under€certain€circumstances€satisfiesÏthe€publication€requirement€of€defamation€actions.€€In€ò òòòLewis€v.€Equitable€LifeÏAssurance€Societyóóó ó,€389€N.W.2d€876€(Minn.€1986),€the€Minnesota€SupremeÏCourt€specifically€considered€self„publication€of€defamatory€matter€toÏprospective€employers:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThe€company€presents€two€arguments€againstÏrecognition€of€the€doctrine€of€compelled€self„publication.€€It€argues€that€such€recognition€amountsÏto€creating€tort€liability€for€wrongful€discharge€which,Ïit€asserts,€has€been€rejected€by€this€court.€.€.€.€IfÏplaintiffs€here€can€establish€a€cause€of€action€forÏdefamation,€the€fact€that€the€defamation€occurred€inÏthe€context€of€employment€discharge€should€notÏdefeat€recovery.Ìà8 àà8 àà àThe€company€also€argues€that€recognition€ofÍthe€doctrine€of€self„publication€would€discourageÏplaintiffs€from€mitigating€damages.€€This€concern€doesÏnot€appear€to€be€a€problem,€however,€if€liability€forÏself„publication€of€defamatory€statements€is€imposedÏòòonlyóó€where€the€plaintiff€was€in€some€significant€wayÏcompelled€to€repeat€the€defamatory€statement€andÏsuch€compulsion€was,€or€should€have€been,€foreseeableÏto€the€defendant.€€Also,€the€duty€to€mitigate€can€beÏfurther€protected€by€requiring€plaintiffs€when€theyÏencounter€a€situation€in€which€they€are€compelled€toÏrepeat€a€defamatory€statement€to€take€all€reasonableÏsteps€to€attempt€to€explain€the€true€nature€of€theÏsituation€and€to€contradict€the€defamatory€statement.€ÏIn€such€circumstances,€there€would€be€no€voluntaryÏact€on€the€part€of€the€plaintiff€that€would€constitute€aÏfailure€to€mitigate.€.€.€.Ìà8 àà8 àà àThe€trend€of€modern€authority€persuades€usÏthat€Minnesota€law€should€recognize€the€doctrine€ofÏcompelled€self„publication.€€We€acknowledge€thatÏrecognition€of€this€doctrine€provides€a€significant€newÏbasis€for€maintaining€a€cause€of€action€for€defamationÏand,€as€such,€it€should€be€cautiously€applied.€ÏHowever,€when€properly€applied,€it€need€notÏsubstantially€broaden€the€scope€of€liability€forÏdefamation.€€The€concept€of€compelled€self„publication€does€no€more€than€hold€the€originator€ofÏthe€defamatory€statement€liable€for€damages€causedÏby€the€statement€where€the€originator€knows,€orÏshould€know,€of€circumstances€whereby€the€defamedÏperson€has€no€reasonable€means€of€avoidingÏpublication€of€the€statement€or€avoiding€the€resultingÏdamages;€in€other€words,€in€cases€where€the€defamedÏperson€was€compelled€to€publish€the€statement.€€InÏsuch€circumstances,€the€damages€are€fairly€viewed€asÏthe€direct€result€of€the€originatorððs€actions.Ìà8 àà8 àà àProperly€applied,€the€doctrine€of€self„publication€does€not€unduly€burden€the€freeÏcommunication€of€views€or€unreasonably€broaden€theÍscope€of€defamation€liability.€€Accordingly,€we€holdÏthat€in€an€action€for€defamation,€the€publicationÏrequirement€may€be€satisfied€where€the€plaintiff€wasÏcompelled€to€publish€a€defamatory€statement€to€aÏthird€person€if€it€was€foreseeable€to€the€defendantÏthat€the€plaintiff€would€be€so€compelled.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€at€887„88;€ò òòòsee€also€Churchey€v.€Adolph€Coors€Co.óóó ó,€759€P.2d€1336€(Colo.Ï1988)€(When€the€originator€of€the€defamatory€statement€has€reason€to€believeÏthat€the€person€defamed€will€be€under€a€strong€compulsion€to€disclose€theÏcontents€of€the€defamatory€statement€to€a€third€person,€the€originator€isÏresponsible€for€that€publication.);€òòò òBelcher€v.€Littleóóó ó,€315€N.W.2d€734€(IowaÏ1982)€(The€injured€party€cannot€create€his€own€cause€of€action€byÏcommunicating€the€slanderous€statements€to€others€unless€under€a€strongÏcompulsion€to€do€so.€€What€constitutes€strong€compulsion€must€of€necessity€beÏdecided€by€the€finder€of€fact€under€the€circumstances€in€each€case€whenÏsubstantial€evidence€of€such€compulsion€is€introduced.);€ò òòòMcKinney€v.€County€ofÏSanta€Claraó óóó,€168€Cal.€Rptr.€89€(Cal.€Ct.€App.€1980)€(The€rationale€for€makingÏthe€originator€of€a€defamatory€statement€liable€for€its€foreseeable€republicationÏis€the€strong€causal€link€between€the€actions€of€the€originator€and€the€damageÏcaused€by€the€republication.€€This€causal€link€is€no€less€strong€where€theÏforeseeable€republication€is€made€by€the€person€defamed€operating€under€aÏstrong€compulsion€to€republish€the€defamatory€statement€and€theÍcircumstances€which€create€the€strong€compulsion€are€known€to€the€originatorÏof€the€defamatory€statement€at€the€time€he€communicates€it€to€the€personÏdefamed.);€òòò òGrist€v.€Upjohn€Co.óóó ó,€168€N.W.2d€389€(Mich.€Ct.€App.€1969)€(WhereÏthe€conditions€are€such€that€the€utterer€of€the€defamatory€matter€intends€orÏhas€reason€to€suppose€that€in€the€ordinary€course€of€events€the€matter€willÏcome€to€the€knowledge€of€some€third€person,€a€publication€may€be€effected.);Ïò òòòColonial€Stores,€Inc.€v.€Barrettó óóó,€38€S.E.2d€306€(Ga.€Ct.€App.€1946)Ï(Republication€by€plaintiff€of€defamatory€matter€to€prospective€employer€whenÏdefendant€knew€that€plaintiff€would€have€to€republish€it€was€publication€for€aÏdefamation€claim.).Ìà àOn€the€other€hand,€it€appears€that€the€majority€view€is€that€self„publication€even€in€employment€cases€does€not€satisfy€the€publicationÏrequirement.€€ò òòòSee€DeLeon€v.€Saint€Joseph€Hospitalóóó ó,€871€F.2d€1229€(4th€Cir.Ï1989)€(rejecting€the€doctrine€of€self„publication€because€the€doctrine€mightÏvisit€liability€for€defamation€on€every€employer€each€time€a€job€applicant€isÏrejected);€ò òòòStrange€v.€Nationwide€Mutual€Ins.€Co.óóó ó,€867€F.€Supp.€1209€(E.D.€Pa.Ï1994)€(Pennsylvania€law€does€not€recognize€compelled€self„publication€asÏconstituting€publication€for€defamation€purposes€when€the€initialÏcommunication€is€from€an€employer€to€an€employee€regarding€the€reasons€forÍthe€employeeððs€dismissal.);€ò òòòGore€v.€Health„Tex,€Inc.óóó ó,€567€So.€2d€1307€(Ala.Ï1990)€(refusing€to€hold€that€a€plaintiffððs€own€repetition€of€allegedly€defamatoryÏstatements€can€supply€the€element€of€publication€essential€in€a€slander€action);Ïò òòòWieder€v.€Chemical€Bankóóó ó,€608€N.Y.S.2d€195€(N.Y.€App.€Div.€1994)€(rejectingÏthe€tort€of€defamation€by€compelled€self„publication);€ò òòòAtkins€v.€IndustrialÏTelecommunications€Assððnóóó ó,€660€A.2d€885€(D.C.€1995)€(refusing€to€predict€whatÏVirginia€law€would€be€because€the€doctrine€of€compelled€self„publication€has€notÏbeen€widely€accepted).Ìà àUnder€the€minority€view,€to€allow€self„publication€to€satisfy€theÏpublication€requirements,€the€courts€generally€have€developed€two€approaches:Ïð ð[T]he€first€approach€imposes€liability€if€the€defendant€knew€or€could€haveÏforeseen€that€the€plaintiff€would€be€òòcompelledóó€to€repeat€the€defamatoryÏstatement;€the€second€imposes€liability€if€the€defendant€knew€or€could€haveÏforeseen€that€the€defendant€was€òòlikelyóó€to€repeat€the€statement.ðð€€ò òòòChurchey€v.ÏAdolf€Coors€Co.ó óóó,€759€P.2d€1336,€1344€(Col.€1988)(emphasis€in€original).Ìà àThere€is€a€factual€difference€between€a€ð ðvoluntaryðð€self„publication€toÏrelatives,€friends,€or€other€third€persons,€and€a€necessary€disclosure€on€anÏemployment€application€of€a€former€employerððs€stated€reason€for€termination€ofÏoneððs€employment.€€In€an€ð ðemployment€at€willðð€state,€such€as€Tennessee,€aÍterminated€employee€has€very€limited€recourse€upon€termination€ofÏemployment.€€If€an€employer€has€stated€a€reason€for€discharge€of€the€employee,Ïit€is€reasonable€for€the€employer€to€expect€that€the€employee€seeking€newÏemployment€will€be€required€to€disclose€the€reason€given€for€the€termination€ofÏthe€prior€employment.€€The€employee€has€little€choice€in€applying€for€newÏemployment€and€must€disclose€truthfully€the€information€requested€or€run€theÏrisk€of€being€discovered€as€a€liar€at€a€later€date.Ìà àBy€allowing€ð ðcompelledðð€self„publication€to€satisfy€the€publicationÏrequirement,€the€employer€is€not€left€naked.€€The€employer€has€all€the€defensesÏavailable€in€any€defamation€action,€such€as€privilege,€opinion,€truth€or€lack€ofÏculpability€or€negligence.Ìà àWe€are€persuaded€by€the€reasoning€of€the€Minnesota€Supreme€Court€inÏòòò òLewis€v.€Equitable€Life€Assurance€Societyóóó ó,€389€N.W.2d€876€(Minn.€1986),Ïheretofore€quoted.€€We€understand€that€recognition€of€the€principle€ofÏcompelled€self„publication€is€the€minority€view,€but€we€believe€that€it€is€theÏmore€fair€and€more€just€view.€€The€principle€of€compelled€self„publication€inÏemployment€cases€allows€redress€for€injury€where€otherwise€an€employee€is€leftÏwithout€a€remedy.Ìà àWe€believe€that€the€law€in€Tennessee€should€recognize€the€principle€ofÍcompelled€self„publication.€€We€hold€that€the€publication€element€required€for€aÏdefamation€claim€can€be€met€if€1)€the€republication€of€the€defamatoryÏstatement€is€reasonably€foreseeable€to€the€defendant,€and€2)€the€plaintiff€isÏcompelled€to€republish€the€defamatory€statement.€€The€principle€of€compelledÏself„publication€should€be€limited€to€those€cases€in€an€employment€setting€inÏwhich€the€plaintiff€is€forced€to€republish€false€and€defamatory€reasons€for€his€orÏher€termination€on€subsequent€job€applications.Ìà àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€toÏBMH€is€reversed,€and€this€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€suchÏproceedings€as€may€be€necessary.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€assessed€against€theÏappellee.€€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌ____________________________________ÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEó óÌÌ____________________________________Ìò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óœÔ€2ÔÔ€2Ô