WPC |&tp 4[ ۷hn%KMR+جv|cکşSEwfvv%%wJce6Tw)A*+` ЀThompson&Fisher,P.C.Cleveland,Tennessee@$ XXXX  "  X XOPINION  ^   "  XX  ^Ԉ 5x+4  P     P    REVERSEDANDREMANDED h      p      x Susano,J. ^:09  P     P       ` ThisisapostdivorceproceedingconcerningthecustodyofColbyCurtisRaySimmons( Colby)(DOB:March25,1991).Thetrialcourtawarded primaryphysicalcustodyofColbytoXXX XԜthechildsmother,TonyaMichelleCawood,formerly T МSimmons( Mother),# XXXX #therebymodifyingthedivorcejudgmentthat  hadgrantedthiscustodialroletotheboysfather,JosephRaySimmons( Father).TheCourtdidnotdisturbitspreviousgrantofjointlegalcustody.Fatherappeals,arguingthatthetrialcourtmisinterpretedtheprinciplesenunciatedbytheSupremeCourtin Aabyv.Strange ,924S.W.2d623(Tenn.1996),andthat \  theevidencepreponderatesagainstthetrialcourtsdeterminationthatFathersmovefromWhite,Georgia,toSomerset,Kentucky,waspromptedbyvindictivenessonhispart.@tt)I.   ` ThepartiesmarriagewasdissolvedbyfinaljudgmententeredMay19,1994.Thejudgmentincorporatesamaritaldissolutionagreement( MDA)executedbythepartiesonFebruary8and9,1994.TheMDAvestedthepartieswithjointlegalcustodyofColby.WhileitdidnotspecificallyawardresidentialcustodyofColbytoFather,itisclearfromthetenoroftheMDAthatthisiswhatthepartiesintended,afactacknowledgedbyMotherthroughouttheseproceedings.   ` TheMDAincludesthefollowingprovision:  8 ` [Father]andthechildshallhavetherighttoliveinwithinaseventyfivemileradiusof BradleyCounty,Tennessee.Eachpartyshall @9.8 providetransportationofeitherpickingupthechildordeliveringthechildtotheotherparty. ` `   Additionally,theMDAprovidesthatMotheristohavevisitation onalternatingweekendsfrom5:00p.m.Fridayuntil6:00p.m.Sunday,aswellassummervisitationandvisitationonspecifiedholidays.   ` InoraroundAugust,1996,FathermovedwithColbyandhisnewwifetoWhite,Georgia,totakeapositionasanelementaryschoolteacherwiththeBartowCounty,Georgia,schoolsystem.Hisresidencewaswithintherequired75mileradiusofBradleyCounty.HetaughtinBartowCountyforoneschoolyear.Duringthatyear,sometimeinoraroundFebruary,1997,helearnedthathiscontractwouldnotberenewedforthenextschoolyear.HereceivedwrittennotificationofthisfactonApril15,1997.   ` FatherandhiswifehadpurchasedahomeinWhite,Georgia.Itwastheirdesiretoremaininthatlocale.ϜAccordingly,uponlearningthathisteachingcontractwasnotgoingtoberenewed,FatherappliedforateachingpositioninfourGeorgiacounties:Bartow,Cherokee,Gordon,andCobb.HewasnotsuccessfulinsecuringapositioninGeorgia.Hadheobtainedemploymentinanyofthesecounties,hewouldhavecontinuedtoresidewithinthe75mileradiusrestriction.HetestifiedthathedidnotmakeanewapplicationforemploymentintheBradleyCountyorClevelandschoolsystemsbecause meandMs.Cawoodarenotabletoliveinthesametownwithoutmebeingbadgeredalot,soIdidnotreallywanttomovebackto 94/9 Cleveland.Evenatthat,hestatedthatpriortogoingtoGeorgia,hehadappliedtothetwoTennesseeschoolsystems;thatheassumedhisapplicationswerestillonfile;andthathewouldhaveacceptedajobthere ifIhadanoffer.HereiteratedthathisdesirewastostayinGeorgia wherewewerepurchasingthehome.   ` FatherdidnotreceiveanyjoboffersinGeorgia;butinJune,1997,helearnedofafifthgradeteachingpositioninϜPulaskiCounty,Kentucky,some200milesfromBradleyCounty.HeacceptedthispositionandmovedtoSomerset,Kentucky.Hisnewwifesparentsherfatherisaministerwhopastorsachurchinthearealiveinanadjoiningcounty.   ` OnJune19,1997,Fatherfiledapetitionseekingtoberelievedofthe75mileradiusrestrictionsoastofacilitatehismove,withColby,toSomerset.Motherfiledananswerandcounterclaim,denyingthatFatherwasentitledtoreliefwithrespecttotherestriction.Inhercounterclaim,shesoughtsolecustodyor,inthealternative,primaryphysicalcustody.Thegravamenofhercounterclaimisfoundinthefollowingallegations:  8 ` [Mother]aversthatthemoverequestedby[Father]inthismatter,isamaterialchangeofcircumstances,entitling[Mother]toaskthiscourttomodifythemaritaldissolutionagreemententeredintobytheparties,andtoawardfullcustody,oratleastexclusivephysicalcustody,ofthepartiesminorchildto[her]. ` `    8 ` [Fathers]frequentmovesandinabilitytomaintainsteadyemploymentindicatealackofresponsibilitynecessaryforthesuccessfulraisingofachild.Further,thefrequent,almostnomadic,movementby[Father]isdetrimentalto X:0: thechildsmental,emotional,andphysicalwellbeing. ` `    8 ` ThemajorityoftheminorchildsfamilyresidesinCleveland,TennesseeorinthestateofGeorgia.Awardingcustodyto[Mother]wouldbeinthebestinterestoftheminorchild. ` `  ӜThepartiescompetingclaimswereheardbythetrialcourtonJanuary21,1998,followingwhichthecourtorderedthatMotherbedesignatedas primaryphysicalcustod[ian],withcustodytobetransferredattheendofthe19971998schoolyear.Therationaleforthecourtsdecisionisfoundinitsopinionorallyrenderedfromthebench:  8 ` COURT:Well,itsarealdifficultcase.Ithinkitwasadifficultcaseallalongfromreadingthefile. ` `    8 ` BackinMarchwhenjointcustodywasgrantedbytheCourtIthinktheCourtlookedatthepartiesandfoundbothofthemfitpersonstohavecustody.AndIbelievethemaritaldissolutionagreement,ofcourse,itsmergedintotheorderoftheCourtanditwasmadeapartofthecourt,the75mileradiusrequirement,soIbelievetheCourtinmakingthisjointcustodycontemplatedϜthatthatwouldntchange.Thatorderdidntforeseethatwedbetryingtooperatewithjointcustodywithprimaryphysicalcustodywiththefathergoingbeyondthe75mileradius,butitshappenedinthiscase. ` `    8 ` IthinktheresproofofvindictivenessinsofarasτIthinkvindictiveisaverydifficultword,ahardword.ItwouldnotbesomethingIwouldnormallyapplytoMr.Simmons.ButifvindictivenessmeansthedesiretogoagainsttheCourtspriorordersofjointcustody,atleastthespiritofajointcustodyagreement,andifitmeanstodefeatthenoncustodialparentsrightstovisitationandclosenesstothechild,atleasttobewithinacertainmileradius,thenIthinkthefactthathehassaidthathedidnotwanttobeclose,hedidntwanttomoveanyclosertoyou,meetsthatdefinitionofvindictive. ` `    8 ` Andthischildneedstobeinanenvironment,inthemoststableenvironment,foritsownbestinterest.Andanytimeanychangesaremadeits X:0: goingtobedisruptivefortheshorttermbuttheCourtsconvincedthatinthelongtermthestabilityofthechildandthebestinterestofthechildwouldbeservedbyachangeofprimaryphysicalcustodytothemother. ` `  @88)II.   ` Inthe1996caseof Aabyv.Strange ,924S.W.2d623 @  (Tenn.1996),theSupremeCourtrevisitedits1993decisionin Taylorv.Taylor ,849S.W.2d319(Tenn.1993).TheCourtstated `  thatitwantedto dispeltheambiguityof Taylor andclarifyits x( impactonthelawofremoval. Aaby ,924S.W.2dat629.In @  Taylor ,theSupremeCourthadattemptedto makedeterminatean  areaofthelawthatha[d]becomeincreasinglyunsettled, id .at  326,i.e.,theremovalofaminorchildbyacustodialparentto  H alocaleawayfromthatofthenoncustodialparent.The Taylor  X" Courthadheldthatrelocation,standingalone,wasnotasufficientbasisforachangeofcustody. Id. at332. %x     ` Asthe Aaby casepointsout,theSupremeCourtin 8)$  Taylor  + &   8 ` wasfundamentallyconcernedwithfurtheringtwooverarchinggoalsinthelawofremoval:(1) D/$+  limitingjudicialinterventioninpostdivorcefamilydecisionmaking,and(2)makingdisputeseasierofresolutioniftheymustbelitigated.1'.` `   Aaby ,924S.W.2dat629(quotingfrom Taylor ,849S.W.2dat331) @5*2 (emphasisin Aaby ).BecausetheSupremeCourtdecidedthat 7,4  [t]heultimatemessagetobegleanedfrom Taylor isadmittedly 8.6 obscure, Aaby, 924S.W.2d at629,itgrantedthepetitionofthe P  custodialmotherin Aaby forpermissiontoappealsothatit   couldonceagainaddressthesubjectofremoval.   ` In Aaby ,theSupremeCourtsubstantiallylimitedthe 0 circumstancesunderwhichanoncustodialparentcouldpreventremovalorsecureachangeofcustodybasedsolelyuponthe P  plannedremovalofaminorchild.Thecruxoftheholdingin Aaby isfoundinthefollowinglanguagefromthatopinion:     8 ` ...weconclude,asthemotherinsists,thatacustodialparentwillbeallowedtoremovethechildfromthejurisdictionunlessthenoncustodialparentcanshow,byapreponderanceoftheevidence,thatthecustodialparentsmotivesformovingarevindictivethatis,intendedtodefeatordeterthevisitationrightsofthenoncustodialparent. ` `    8 ` Thisconclusiondoesnotmean,however,thatanoncustodialparentshandsaretiedwhereremovalcouldposeaspecific,seriousthreatofharmtothechild.Inthesesituations,thenoncustodialparentmayfileapetitionforchangeofcustodybasedonamaterialchangeofcircumstances.Thepetitionwouldstate,ineffect,thattheproposedmoveevidencessuchbadjudgmentandissopotentiallyharmfultothechildthatcustodyshouldbechangedtothepetitioner.BecauseTennesseelawallowscustodytobechangedifthebehaviorofthecustodialparentclearlypositsadangertothephysical,mentaloremotionalwellbeingofthechild, Musselmanv.Acuff ,826S.W.2d920(Tenn.App. .4$+ 1991),suchapetitionwouldnotviolate Taylor 󀄄 h/%, whichonlyprohibitsachangeofcustodybasedsolelyonthefactofthemove. 1&.` `   Id .at629630(footnoteomitted)(emphasisin Aaby ). |4,*2 ̜  7-6 Л@(III.   ` Asathresholddetermination,wemustdecideiftherearefactualdifferencesbetweentheinstantcaseand Aaby which H impacthowifatalltheprecedentofthatcaseisapplicabletothefactsofthiscase.Withoutquestion,therearefactualdifferencestwoofwhicharearguablypertinenttothequestionnowunderconsideration.Intheinstantcase,thetrialcourtwasfacedwithajointcustodydecree,whiletheϜCourtin Aaby 󛀜wasconfrontedwithadecreeofsolecustody. X Furthermore,theinstantcaseinvolvesaspecificprovisionlimitingtheprimarycustodiansplaceofresidencetotheareawithina75mileradiusofBradleyCounty.Thejudgmentin Aaby  p  containednosuchlimitation. Aaby ,924S.W.2dat624.Wewill 8  addressthesetwofactualdifferencesinreverseorder.@88)IV.   ` Wedonotbelievethatthe75mileradiusrestrictionisanimpedimenttotheapplicabilityofthe Aaby principlesand H*& procedurestothefactsofthiscase.In Taylor ,theSupreme ,!( Courtattemptedtocomprehensivelyaddresstheissueofremoval.Indoingso,theCourtevenaddressedhowacourtshouldviewanorderthatprohibitsorrestrictsrelocation,eventhoughthere (1&. wasnosuchprovisioninthe Taylor case.SincetheCourtin 2(0  Aaby intendedtorefine,anduntangletheambiguityin,the 4`*2 holdingin Taylor ,itislogicaltoassumethatthe Aaby Court x6(,4 wouldhavestatedthatitsholdingwasnotapplicabletocaseswithprohibitorylanguagehaditsointended.Itdidnotso 9/8 state.Weconcludefromthisthatthe Aaby Courtintendedthat P  Мtheprinciplesandproceduresenunciatedinthatcasewouldapplytocaseswithprohibitoryprovisionsaswellastothosecaseswithoutsuchprovisions.   ` Itisclearfromthe Aaby opinionthattheSupreme h  Courtintendedtocovertheentirespectrumofremovalcases.Whileanappellatecourtsdecisionmustbereadinthecontextofthefactsofthecase,see NationalLife&AccidentIns.Co.   v.Eddings ,221S.W.2d695,699(Tenn.1949),wecannotignorea H broadpronouncementbytheSupremeCourt,especiallyonethatisobviouslydesignedtocover,andclarify,thetotalityofanareaofthelaw.See Holderv.TennesseeJudicialSelection ` Commission ,937S.W.2d877,88182(Tenn.1996). x ( @tt)V.   ` Astotheargumentthat Aaby isnotapplicabletoa 8'" jointcustodyarrangementwhereoneparentistheresidentialcustodianandtheotherhasvisitationrights,thatpositionwasconsideredbyusandrejectedin Perryv.Perry ,943S.W.2d884 P,"( (Tenn.App.1996).Inthatcase,JudgeLillard,speakingfortheCourt,saidthefollowing:  8 ` Fatherattemptstodistinguish Aaby byarguing 3(0 thatthecustodialparentinthatcasehadsole 3)1 custody,whilethepartiesinthiscasehavejointcustody,withMotherhavingprimaryphysicalcustody.Thisisadistinctionwithoutadifference. ` `   9|/8  Id .at886.(emphasisin Perry ).Weadheretoourholdingin P   Perry . Aaby iscontrollinghere;hence,theproceduresand   principlessetforthin Aaby controlthedispositionofthis   appeal.  %  1      כ X @88)VI.   ` ItiscleartousthatMotherscounterclaimforchangeofcustodywaspromptedby,andisessentiallybasedupon,thefactthatFatherwasplanningtorelocatetoKentucky. %  2      כThe H trialcourtsotreatedit,andwebelievethisistheproperinterpretationoftheissuesmadebythepleadings.   ` Ingeneralterms, Aaby focusesontwoaspectsofa 8  plannedmove:therelocatingparentsmotiveinmovingand " whethertheproposedmove couldposeaspecific,seriousthreat #p ofharmtothechild. Aaby, 924S.W.2dat629.(emphasis %0  added).Intheinstantcase,Motherdidnotallege,nordidtheproofshow,thetypeofspecific,seriousthreatofharmcontemplatedby Aaby .Thus,thenarrowquestionforusis *H & whetherFathersmotiveforrelocatingthereasonforhismovefromGeorgiatoKentuckywas todefeatordeterthevisitationrightsofMother. Id .Thequestionisnotwhether /`%, theplannedmovewilladverselyaffectMothersvisitationrights.Suchmovesfrequentlydo;rather,therealquestionisϜwhetherFathersmotivehisstateofmindwastodefeatordeterMothersvisitationwithColby.@(VII.   ` Fathersmotiveforrelocatingmustbeviewedinthecontextofhiscircumstances.HereceivedhisdegreefromLeeϜCollegesubsequenttothepartiesdivorce.HisteachingjobinGeorgiawashisfirstpositioninhisnewprofession.HefirstlearnedinoraroundFebruary,1997,thathisteachingcontractwasnotgoingtoberenewed.FathertestifiedthatmostteachingϜpositionsforthenextschoolyearhadalreadybeenfilledbythattimeoftheyear.WhentheschooltermendedintheMayJune,1997,timeframe,FatherwasfacingtheprospectofsupportinghiswifeandColbyinanewhousewithnojobandonlyoneyearsexperienceinhischosenprofession.   ` ItisreasonabletoassumethatFatherdecidedtomovetoKentuckybecauseheneededajob.TheteachingpositioninthatstatehadtheaddedadvantageofplacingFatherandhisfamilynearhisinlaws.TherewasabsolutelynoproofthatFatherhadotherjobopportunitiesinGeorgia,Tennessee,orelsewherewhenhedecidedtomovetoKentucky.   ` Itisimportanttonotethat,priortothemove,FatherhadaffordedMothermore,ratherthanless,visitationthanwas 7,6 requiredbythetrialcourtsjudgment.Fromthetimeofthe 8x.8 divorceuntilMarch,1995,FatherandMotheralternatedweeks P  withtheirminorchild.SincethemovetoKentucky,therehadbeenonlytwooccasionswhenFatherwasunabletostrictlycomplywithMotherseveryotherweekendentitlement.Onbothoccasions,FathergaveMotherotherdaysofvisitationtomakeupforthemisseddays.   ` Thetrialcourtadmittedthattheword vindictivewasnotawordthatitwouldnormallyapplytoFather.However,itthenconcludedthatthe definitionofvindictivewasmetinthiscasebecauseFatherwent againsttheCourtspriorordersofjointcustody,atleastthespiritofajointcustodyagreement.HefurtherfoundthatFatherwas vindictiveinnotdesiringtoliveinMotherscountyofresidence.Withallduerespecttothetrialcourt,thisisnottheissue.Theissue,undertheteachingsof Aaby ,iswhethertherelocatingparents @# motiveforthemoveistodefeatordetertheotherparents %  visitationrights.ThepreponderanceoftheevidenceinthiscaseisthatFathersmotiveformovingoutsidetheareaencompassedina75mileradiusofBradleyCountywastopursueϜgainfulemployment.ThereisnothingabouthisactionsorwordstoindicatethathewantedtohinderMothersvisitationrights.Onthecontrary,therecordisrepletewithevidencethatFatherhasfosteredMotherstimewithColby.ThisCourtfindsparticularlysignificantthefactthatFathervoluntarilysplitthechildstimeequallywithhisformerwifeforaperiodof10Ϝmonthsimmediatelyfollowingthedivorce.eventhoughMotherwasonlyentitledunderthetrialcourtsjudgmenttoeveryotherotherweekendvisitation. 9.8    ` Inthefinalanalysis,wefindthattheevidencepreponderatesagainstthetrialcourtsjudgmentchangingthecustodialarrangementthatexistedpriortotheorderofFebruary18,1998.SeeRule13(d),T.R.A.P. H    ` Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisreversed.Thismatterisremandedtothetrialcourtfortheentryofanorderconsistentwiththisopinion.TheorderwillprovidethatthephysicalcustodyofColbywillbetransferredtoFatherwithinoneweekoftheendofthe19981999schoolyear.񀀜Followingahearing,thetrialcourtshoulddeterminehow,ifatall,Mothersvisitationshouldbemodified,consideringthegeographicdistancebetweentheparties,theirrespectivejobsandthehoursofsame,theoverallbestinterestofthechild,andsuchotherrelevantfactorsasmaybearupontheissueofMothersvisitation.Costsonappealaretaxedagainsttheappellee.   `     h     __________________________   `     h     CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,J.CONCUR:________________________HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.________________________WilliamH.Inman,Sr.J.