ÿWPC- k‰’_}â­ï šØùe¿ÉI¦¦pyïcÃÕà¢mYã4Âjã(DkP!¸uÝÉ=5ç€Ș3¾œ[ÁjvzÓNkÉôßÒK›¬á¯Bm¹ΔdN4šØj4¯ø;s—‡ê‹©yô³~À¿~{ÂÓÉìõ2açY<«.QO^x¯á¦Õ©~®³üvÙ;°T¡÷œÌ}…vgK}àb¢µÁØ‚•[9‘u%‰|€Ë#21‹«PI¶íàÆ”Š$heAëåhÒÈ·.ef”Š0¶ÙçñV.L1ɧR•íDÈíÖí@\¾6g•{Hb?—)v0gyÄM}Þ(ˆu#¼¸«Òã šÊVÌ&£ jÞi5Ô£ï¶B‹š<#‰‚mÖÏ#¬3²G ^ïÌ ¥Æbrô ¨×1÷|L†L%‚“µåX­R‡NñU"ýÍ?WîDîÄ·Ý$¦s›°^ Ж禀bf›^5¥ïLÝó ™üáK–*µŽ Ó—ÀÛ×è™àxõS‚sàOdÞ²Só°µ/ZÅ-LÑ'y/‰VÒmÐEdâm¡€±T×—¼OïjÇ;ûÑ<)÷òXeÇKLÆäUâ†{­èZ"Jâ›WúÞI°Tå²o‰îb<Ù]*# LU NW %¥ 04« 0Ïßb®^ ¶w@Â4% m'> 0DFNŠšŒUN& t šv U: ¼J f‹ll·÷÷÷÷÷ B® AQËÆ 0Dâ 0D& 0Djj D/®® BÝ D3ú˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular»( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Ó((2MG$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XcX»»ÔÑ  ÑÑÑà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- lü&c E  D  DDeÓ€©yË&-ingLƒ‚3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ (#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XïAX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSpecifically,€the€trial€court€observed€during€the€August€5,€1997€hearing€that€ð ðIððm€going€toÐ ° Ðstill€have€a€joint€custody€situation€because€I€think€now€the€law€says€you€need€to€do€that€.€.€..ðð(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular øÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€»Úˆ»»»ÔÔ€/“ »»ÚˆÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xs X /“ÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€29,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XjX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSpecifically,€the€trial€court€observed€during€the€August€5,€1997€hearing€that€ð ðIððm€going€toÐ ° Ðstill€have€a€joint€custody€situation€because€I€think€now€the€law€says€you€need€to€do€that€.€.€..ðð,@ÓÐAZ‹"Arial Regular ²Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XjX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Final€Report,€Evaluation€of€Child€Support€Guidelines,€Vol.€I:€Findings€and€ConclusionsóóÐ ° Ððð€1.2.1€(United€States€Depððt€of€Health€&€Human€Servs.,€Admin.€for€Children€&€Families,€Office€ofÏChild€Support€Enforcement€1996). \Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XjX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Thomas€Espenshade,€òòMarriage€Trends€in€America:€Estimates,€Implications,€andÐ ° ÐUnderlying€Causesóó,€11€Population€&€Dev.€R.€193€(1985). Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XjX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Marianne€Takas,€òòAddressing€Subsequent€Families€in€Child€Support€Guidelinesóó€37,òò€inóóÐ ° ÐChild€Support€Guidelines:€The€Next€Generation€(Margaret€C.€Haynes,€ed.€1994).€€ ­Ý ƒNË$ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XjX»»ÔÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€made€specific€mention€of€its€perception€that€Ms.€Smithsonððs€depression€hadÐ ° Ðð ðcome€a€long€wayðð€over€the€years€and€that€the€impending€birth€of€Mr.€Eatherlyððs€child€would€ð ðtakeÏsome€adjustment.ðð€€€ d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ„°ÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ  ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€WV»»ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€„,„»»Ôò òññññßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E ±` 8ttxPX°ð  rßññññññññÌññßt€ )>.*jx` `€€@E"` 8ttxPZð  tßññà@¡ ¡ DàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@ÜÜ)DàAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€¼×U¼„„,ԈР€Ð ÐÌÌÌKAREN€JEAN€(EATHERLY)€SMITHSON,à0 È à)Ð* zÈ€%È€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È à)Ìà ` àPlaintiff/Appellee,à0 À àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àà0Èp€%p€%à)à0 È€%È€%àWilson€CircuitÐV¦  €% €% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È à)à0  àNo.€1074Ðl¼  €% €% ÐVS.à0 ` àà0¸ ` €%` €%àà0¸ €%¸ €%àà0h€%€%àà0Àh€%h€%àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àà0Èp€%p€%à)Ð‚Ò È€%È€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È à)à0  àAppeal€No.Ð˜è  €% €% ÐDAVID€RAY€EATHERLY,à0 À àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àà0Èp€%p€%à)à0 È€%È€%à01A01„9806„CV„00314Юþ  €% €% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È à)Ìà ` àDefendant/Appellant.à0 À àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àà0Èp€%p€%à)ÐÚ*È€%È€% ÐÌÌÌà@© © DàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€WILSON€COUNTYˆÌà@™™%DàAT€LEBANON,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌÌà@G G DàTHE€HONORABLE€BOBBY€CAPERS,€JUDGEˆÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff/Appelleeóó:à0 h àà0Àh€%h€%àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àòòFor€Defendant/Appellantóó:Ðø"Hp€%p€% ÐÌCalvin€P.€Turnerà0  àà0h€%€%àà0Àh€%h€%àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àHugh€GreenÐ$%t p€%p€% ÐLebanon,€Tennesseeà0 h àà0Àh€%h€%àà0À€%À€%àà0p€%€%àLebanon,€TennesseeÐ:&Š!p€%p€% ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@^^%DàÔ‡„,„¼¼×UÔò òVACATED€AND€REMANDEDó óÔ#†¼×U¼„„,% #ԈР1f,( ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÐ  :h50 Ðò òÔ€„,„¼¼×UÔÑ  ÑÓ€Óà@ÎÎ)DàòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€¼×U¼„„,ԈР° ÐÌà ` àThis€appeal€involves€a€custody€dispute€that€continued€without€final€resolutionÏfor€four€years€over€a€seven„year„old€child.€€The€Circuit€Court€for€Wilson€County€didÏnot€finally€adjudicate€the€childððs€custody€when€it€divorced€the€parties€in€1994.€ÏDuring€the€next€four€years,€the€trial€court€entered€a€series€of€temporary€custody€ordersÏembodying€different€joint€custody€arrangements€notwithstanding€both€parentsððÏrepeated€requests€for€sole€custody.€€Finally,€in€1998,€the€trial€court€determined€thatÏthe€child€should€reside€primarily€with€the€mother€because€the€father€and€his€secondÏwife€were€expecting€a€child.€€The€father€asserts€on€this€appeal€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€awarded€him€custody€because€he€is€comparatively€more€fit€to€be€theÏchildððs€custodian.€€We€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€employ€properÏprocedures€or€criteria€in€making€its€custody€decision.€€Therefore,€we€vacate€the€orderÏawarding€primary€physical€custody€to€the€mother€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€further€proceedings.ÌÌà@ùù.Dàò òI.ó óˆÐ ;‹  ÐÌà ` àDavid€Ray€Eatherly€and€Karen€Jean€(Eatherly)€Smithson€were€married€inÏNovember€1989.€€After€their€wedding,€they€moved€from€Knox€County€to€LebanonÏwhere€Mr.€Eatherly€worked€for€a€construction€company,€and€Ms.€Smithson€workedÏfor€a€bank.€€Their€only€child,€Kelsy€Westyn€Eatherly,€was€born€on€July€12,€1992.€€TheÏparties€separated€six€months€later.ÌÌà ` àMs.€Smithson€sought€sole€custody€of€partiesðð€daughter€when€she€filed€suit€forÏdivorce€in€January€1993€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€Wilson€County.€€Mr.€EatherlyÏresponded€by€denying€that€Ms.€Smithson€had€grounds€for€divorce€and€by€assertingÏthat€he€was€entitled€to€the€divorce€and€to€sole€custody€of€the€partiesðð€daughter.€€InÏMarch€1993,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€granting€custody€pendente€lite€to€Ms.ÏSmithson€and€giving€limited€visitation€to€Mr.€Eatherly.€€For€the€next€four€months,€theÏparties€actually€had€custody€of€their€daughter€for€roughly€equal€amounts€of€time.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€custody€dispute€rekindled€in€July€1993€because€of€Ms.€Smithsonððs€plansÏto€take€the€child€on€a€visit€to€Knoxville.€€Mr.€Eatherly€believed€that€the€childððsÐ ì:<6B Ðrespiratory€problems€were€severe€enough€to€keep€her€at€home.€€When€Ms.€SmithsonÏdid€not€agree,€Mr.€Eatherly€filed€a€petition€seeking€temporary€custody€of€the€child.€ÏHe€asserted€that€Ms.€Smithson€was€suffering€from€depression€and€that€she€had€failedÏto€obtain€adequate€medical€care€for€the€child.€€The€trial€court€immediately€conductedÏan€informal€hearing€and,€after€talking€with€the€childððs€pediatrician€by€telephone,Ïdirected€Ms.€Smithson€not€to€take€the€child€to€Knoxville€until€the€childððs€healthÏimproved.€€The€trial€court€also€modified€the€temporary€custody€arrangement€toÏprovide€that€Mr.€Eatherly€would€have€custody€of€the€child€each€week€day€and€thatÏMs.€Smithson€would€have€custody€at€night.€€The€court€also€ordered€both€parents€toÏundergo€psychological€examinations€prior€to€the€trial€of€the€divorce.ÌÌà ` àThe€proof€regarding€custody€presented€at€the€December€6,€1993€trial€was€notÏto€the€trial€courtððs€liking€because€Ms.€Smithson€had€not€undergone€the€previouslyÏordered€psychological€examination.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€did€not€finallyÏresolve€the€custody€question€when€it€entered€its€ð ðfinalðð€divorce€decree€on€January€10,Ï1994.€€The€trial€court€declared€the€parties€divorced€and€directed€Ms.€Smithson€to€haveÏa€psychological€examination€by€the€same€persons€who€had€already€examined€Mr.ÏEatherly.€€As€a€temporary€matter,€the€trial€court€established€a€joint€custodyÏarrangement€wherein€Mr.€Eatherly€had€physical€custody€from€Monday€morning€untilÏFriday€afternoon,€and€Ms.€Smithson€had€physical€custody€from€Friday€afternoon€untilÏMonday€morning.ÌÌà ` àOn€June€28,€1994,€the€trial€court€entered€a€ð ðfinalðð€custody€order€based€on€aÏMarch€7,€1994€hearing.€€The€court€awarded€the€parties€joint€custody€of€their€daughterÏeven€though€neither€party€had€requested€joint€custody.€€It€also€found€that€Mr.€EatherlyÏshould€be€the€primary€custodian€of€the€child.€€Ms.€Smithson€received€visitation€withÏthe€child€for€three€weekends€each€month€and€every€other€Wednesday€night.€€ForÏreasons€not€readily€apparent€in€the€record,€the€trial€court€did€not€require€Ms.€SmithsonÏto€pay€child€support€to€Mr.€Eatherly.ÌÌÌÐ Ô:$6B Ðà ` àMs.€Smithson€filed€a€petition€to€modify€the€custody€decree€on€February€7,Ï1995.€€She€asserted€in€the€petition€that€giving€her€custody€was€in€the€childððs€bestÏinterests€because€she€had€recently€purchased€a€house€where€she€and€the€child€couldÏlive€and€because€the€current€arrangement€had€ð ðdenied€the€child€the€opportunity€toÏdevelop€a€normal€mother€and€daughter€relationship.ðð€€Mr.€Eatherly€responded€to€theÏpetition€by€denying€that€any€material€change€in€circumstances€had€occurred€andÏasserting€that€granting€him€sole€custody€would€be€in€the€childððs€best€interests.€€TheÏtrial€court€conducted€a€hearing€in€June€1995,€and€on€July€31,€1995€entered€an€orderÏfinding€that€there€had€been€no€material€change€in€the€childððs€circumstances€butÏreserving€the€custody€issue€ð ðpending€further€proof.ðð€€ÌÌà ` àThe€trial€court€conducted€another€custody€hearing€on€July€2,€1996,€and€on€JulyÏ23,€1996€entered€another€custody€order€finding€that€it€was€in€the€childððs€interest€toÏcontinue€the€joint€custody€arrangement.€€The€court€also€determined€that€the€amountÏof€time€the€child€spent€with€each€parent€should€be€modified€because€Ms.€SmithsonÏwas€no€longer€working€full„time.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€modified€the€custodyÏschedule€to€provide€that€the€child€would€reside€with€Ms.€Smithson€from€SundayÏthrough€Thursday€each€week€and€with€Mr.€Eatherly€during€the€remainder€of€the€week.€ÏThe€July€23,€1996€order€also€recited€that€ð ð[a]ll€other€provisions€of€the€previous€ordersÏof€the€court€shall€remain€in€force,€pending€further€orders€of€this€court.ðð€€Accordingly,Ïthe€decree€did€not€represent€the€final€custody€determination.€€Instead,€the€court€madeÏclear€its€intent€to€continue€monitoring€the€parties€and€the€existing€custodyÏarrangement.€ÌÌà ` àMr.€Eatherly€remarried€sometime€after€the€entry€of€the€July€23,€1996€custodyÏorder.€€On€August€5,€1997,€two€and€one„half€years€after€Ms.€Smithson€filed€herÏpetition€to€modify€custody€and€more€than€one€year€after€the€trial€court€issued€its€lastÏorder€in€the€matter,€the€court€held€another€hearing€for€the€purpose€of€making€a€finalÏcustody€determination.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€hearing,€the€court€found€that€bothÏparents€were€equally€qualified€custodians€and€that€the€child€should€remain€in€jointÏcustody.€€However,€the€trial€court€decided€to€award€primary€physical€custody€to€Ms.ÏSmithson€because€of€ÌÓ€Óà8 ` àà8¸ ` (#` (#àthe€fact€that€[Mr.€Eatherlyððs]€wife€is€pregnant€andÏexpecting€a€child.€€Itððs€going€to€take€some€adjustment€inÐ H:˜5A Ðtheir€home€and€I€donððt€know€how€thatððs€going€to€work.€€IÏdonððt€anticipate€any€problems€but€you€bring€a€small€childÏinto€the€home€thereððs€going€to€have€to€be€some€adjustmentsÏmade.€€Ð ¸ Ð ¸ Ð  ÐÓ€i&ÓÌAccordingly,€the€trial€court€determined€that€Ms.€Smithson€would€have€primaryÏphysical€custody€of€the€child€and€that€Mr.€Eatherly€would€have€the€child€for€visitationÏevery€weekend€except€for€the€third€weekend€of€each€month,€six€weeks€during€theÏsummer,€and€on€alternate€holidays.€€The€trial€court€also€directed€Mr.€Eatherly€to€beginÏpaying€Ms.€Smithson€$500€per€month€in€child€support.€€An€order€embodying€theseÏfindings€and€conclusions€was€entered€six€months€later€on€February€6,€1998.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÐ 0€ ÐÓú)ÓÌà ` àAt€the€outset,€the€extraordinary€delay€in€obtaining€a€final€custody€determinationÏin€this€case€demands€comment.€€The€wrangling€between€the€parents€over€custodyÏbegan€with€their€separation€in€January€1993€and€has€continued€through€the€entry€ofÏthe€February€1998€order.€€During€the€intervening€five€years,€the€trial€courtÏexperimented€with€various€custody€arrangements€apparently€intended€toÏaccommodate€the€partiesðð€circumstances€at€the€time.€€Ms.€Smithsonððs€last€custodyÏpetition€went€unresolved€for€three€years.ÌÌà ` àOur€child€custody€decisions€recognize€a€childððs€ongoing€need€for€continuityÏand€stability.€€òòSee€Adelsperger€v.€Adelspergeróó,€970€S.W.2d€482,€485€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð <(Œ#* Ð1997);€òòHill€v.€Robbinsóó,€859€S.W.2d€355,€358„59€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòContreras€v.Ð à)0%, ÐWardóó,€831€S.W.2d€288,€290€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Accordingly,€there€is€a€strongÐ „+Ô&. Ðpresumption€in€favor€of€an€original€custody€award,€òòsee€Taylor€v.€Tayloróó,€849€S.W.2dÐ (-x(0 Ð319,€332€(Tenn.€1993),€that€will€not€be€overcome€without€proof€(1)€that€the€childððsÏcircumstances€have€materially€changed€in€a€way€that€could€not€have€been€reasonablyÏforeseen€at€the€time€of€the€original€custody€decision€and€(2)€that€the€childððs€interestsÏwill€be€best€served€by€modifying€the€existing€custody€arrangement.€€òòSee€AdelspergerÐ ¸3/8 Ðv.€Adelspergeróó,€970€S.W.2d€at€485.Ð \5¬0: ÐÌà ` àWe€have€also€stressed€that€prompt€and€final€custody€decisions€are€mostÏconsistent€with€a€childððs€need€for€continuity€and€stability.€€In€recognition€of€theÐ H:˜5@ Ðinevitable€bonding€between€the€child€and€the€custodial€parent,€òòsee€McDaniel€v.Ð ° ÐMcDanielóó,€743€S.W.2d€167,€169€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987),€we€have€cautioned€thatÐ T¤ Ðtemporary€custody€decisions€should€be€avoided€unless€they€are€necessary€to€protectÏthe€child€or€to€protect€the€integrity€of€the€judicial€process.€€òòSee€Gorski€v.€Ragainsóó,€No.Ð œ ì Ð01A01„9710„GS„00597,€1999€WL€_____,€at€*___€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€21,€1999);ÏòòKing€v.€Kingóó,€No.€01A01„9110„PB„00370,€1992€WL€301303,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ä 4  ÐOct.€23,€1992)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).ÌÌà ` àWe€find€no€reason€in€this€record€for€the€three„year€delay€in€resolving€Ms.ÏSmithsonððs€petition€for€change€of€custody€or€for€the€six€different€custodyÏarrangements€the€trial€court€devised€between€1993€and€1997.€€Our€role€as€judges€isÏto€shield€children,€to€the€greatest€extent€possible,€from€the€adverse€effects€of€divorce.€ÏòòSee€Yeager€v.€Yeageróó,€No.€01A01„9502„CV„00029,€1995€WL€422470,€at€*3€(Tenn.Ð `° ÐCt.€App.€July€19,€1995)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€€€ShuttlecockingÏthis€young€girl€between€her€parents€for€over€four€years€was€simply€inconsistent€withÏthis€role€and€was€contrary€to€the€childððs€best€interests.€€It€also€complicates€the€alreadyÏdifficult€task€of€devising€a€custody€arrangement€that€will€now€be€in€the€childððs€bestÏinterests.€€òòSeeóó€€òòGorski€v.€Ragainsóó,€1999€WL€_____,€at€*___€;€òòBjork€v.€Bjorkóó,€No.Ð ” ä" Ð01A01„9702„CV„00087,€1997€WL€653917,€at€*2„6€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.€22,€1997)Ï(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed);€òòKing€v.€Kingóó,€1992€WL€301303,€*2.Ð Ü#,& ÐÌà@-Dàò òIII.ó óˆÐ $'t"* ÐÌà ` àWe€now€turn€to€the€custody€arrangement€prescribed€in€the€trial€courtððsÏFebruary€6,€1998€order.€€Mr.€Eatherly€takes€issue€with€this€arrangement€by€assertingÏthat€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusing€to€grant€him€sole€custody€of€the€partiesðð€daughter.€ÏWe€have€determined€that€the€trial€courtððs€reasoning€upon€which€this€order€is€basedÏcontains€two€fundamental€flaws€that€require€us€to€vacate€the€order.ÌÌà@ÓÓ.Dàò òA.ó óˆÐ D4”/: ÐÌà ` àThe€first€fundamental€flaw€in€the€trial€courtððs€reasoning€relates€to€its€decisionÏto€continue€the€joint€custody€arrangement.€€Even€though€neither€party€was€seekingÏjoint€custody,€the€trial€court€decided€to€continue€the€joint€custody€arrangementÐ Ô:$6B Ðbecause€of€its€mistaken€belief€that€joint€custody€was€statutorily€mandated.ññ׃×ññññ׃×ññÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€At€theÐ ° Ðtime€of€this€hearing,€joint€custody€was€not€statutorily€mandated,€even€when€bothÏparties€requested€it.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„101(a)(1)€(Supp.€1997)€empoweredÐ øH Ðthe€courts€to€award€custody€to€both€parents€using€either€a€joint€custody€or€sharedÏparenting€arrangement,€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„101(a)(2)€contained€aÏpresumption€that€joint€custody€was€in€a€childððs€best€interest€when€the€parents€haveÏformally€agreed€to€a€joint€custody€arrangement.€€However,€even€when€both€parentsÏrequested€joint€custody,€the€trial€court€had€the€prerogative€to€fashion€another€type€ofÏcustody€arrangement€if€the€record€contained€clear€and€convincing€evidence€that€jointÏcustody€was€not€in€the€childððs€best€interest.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„101(a)(2).Ð tÄ ÐÌà ` àNeither€Mr.€Eatherly€nor€Ms.€Smithson€requested€joint€custody€in€this€case,€andÏthey€certainly€did€not€formally€request€joint€custody€during€any€of€the€numerousÏhearings€the€trial€court€conducted.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€determinedÏthat€the€statute€required€a€joint€custody€arrangement€in€this€case.€€Our€finding€that€theÏtrial€courtððs€reason€for€awarding€joint€custody€was€mistaken€should€not€be€construedÏas€a€determination€that€joint€custody€is€inappropriate€in€this€case.€€Even€without€theÏjoint€request€of€the€parties,€the€trial€court€may€very€well€determine,€after€carefullyÏreviewing€the€factors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„106€(Supp.€1998),€that€a€jointÏcustody€arrangement€of€some€sort€is€in€the€childððs€best€interests.€€ÌÌà@ÙÙ.Dàò òB.ó óˆÐ $'t"* ÐÌà ` àThe€second€fundamental€flaw€in€the€trial€courtððs€reasoning€was€its€belief€thatÏthe€fact€that€Mr.€Eatherlyððs€current€wife€was€pregnant€was€a€material€change€inÏcircumstances€that€warranted€a€change€of€the€custody€arrangement€that€existed€at€theÏtime€of€the€August€1997€hearing.€€This€conclusion€is€inconsistent€with€the€settledÏunderstanding€of€what€constitutes€a€material€change€of€circumstances€in€cases€of€thisÏsort.ÌÌà ` àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„101(a)(1)€empowers€the€courts€to€modify€existingÏcustody€arrangements€ð ðas€the€exigencies€of€the€case€may€require.ðð€€While€initialÐ Œ7Ü2> Ðcustody€decisions€govern€all€factual€circumstances€known€to€the€trial€court€at€the€timeÏof€their€rendering,€they€do€not€prevent€a€court€from€later€modifying€a€custodyÏarrangement€when€required€by€unanticipated€facts€or€subsequently€emergingÏconditions.€€òòSee€Smith€v.€Haaseóó,€521€S.W.2d€49,€50€(Tenn.€1975);€òòAdelsperger€v.Ð œ ì ÐAdelspergeróó,€970€S.W.2d€at€485;€òòWoodard€v.€Woodardóó,€783€S.W.2d€188,€189€(Tenn.Ð @  ÐCt.€App.€1989).€€Thus,€a€party€seeking€to€alter€an€existing€custody€arrangement€mustÏshow€(1)€that€the€childððs€circumstances€have€materially€changed€in€a€way€that€couldÏnot€be€reasonably€foreseen€at€the€time€of€the€original€custody€decision€and€(2)€that€theÏchildððs€best€interests€will€be€served€by€changing€custody.€€òòSee€Adelsperger€v.Ð Ð  ÐAdelspergeróó,€970€S.W.2d€at€485;€òòsee€also€Solima€v.€Solimaóó,€No.€01A01„9701„CH„Ð tÄ Ð00012,€1998€WL€726629,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.€16,€1998),€òòperm.€app.€denied,óóÐ h Ð(Tenn.€Apr.€19,€1999).€€ÌÌà ` àCommon€experience€teaches€that€many€divorced€persons€in€contemporaryÏsociety€will€decide€to€marry€again€and€to€start€a€new€family.€€ññò òññThis€understanding€isÏborne€out€by€statistics€showing€thatññó óññ€an€estimated€seventy„five€percent€of€divorcedÏpersons€marry€again׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€ññò òññthatññó óññ€many€of€these€persons€expect€to€begin€a€new€familyÐ ð@  Ðeither€with€biological€children,€step„children,€or€both.׃`×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Multiple€families€or€serialÐ ” ä" Ðfamily€development€are€now€the€norm€rather€than€the€exception.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð 8"ˆ$ ÐÌà ` àññò òññRecognizing€the€prevalence€of€later€marriages,€this€court€has€held€that€aÏparentððs€remarriage,€without€more,€is€not€the€sort€of€change€of€circumstances€that€willÏtrigger€judicial€reconsideration€of€a€custody€arrangement.€€òòSee€Arnold€v.€Arnoldóó,€774Ð È($, ÐS.W.2d€613,€618€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€Changes€in€the€custodial€home€environmentÏbrought€about€by€a€later€marriage€may,€however,€trigger€a€new€comparative€fitnessÏanalysis€if€these€changes€are€or€may€adversely€affect€the€child.€€òòSee€Tortorich€v.Ð ´-)2 ÐEricsonóó,€675€S.W.2d€190,€192€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Thus,€divorced€parents€shouldÐ X/¨*4 Ðnot€be€permitted€to€upset€an€existing€custody€arrangement€simply€because€one€or€bothÐ ü0L,6 Ðof€them€have€married€again€or€because€the€custodial€parent€and€his€or€her€new€spouseÏhave€started€a€new€family.€€Parents€seeking€to€alter€an€existing€custody€arrangementÏmust€offer€some€specific€evidence€concerning€how€the€later€marriage€or€the€birth€ofÏnew€children€have€or€will€have€an€adverse€effect€on€the€child€before€the€courts€willÏundertake€a€new€comparative€fitness€analysis.ññó óññ€€ÌÌà ` àñ ñò òñ ñBased€on€the€facts€in€this€case,€the€possibility€that€Mr.€Eatherly€and€Ms.ÏSmithson€would€marry€again€and€would€begin€their€second€families€are€developmentsÏthat€the€trial€court€and€both€parties€should€reasonably€have€anticipated€in€1994€whenÏthe€trial€court€entered€its€ð ðfinalðð€divorce€decree€and€its€ð ðfinalðð€custody€decree.€€Ms.ÏSmithson€did€not€come€forward€with€evidence€of€specific€facts€provingñ ñó óñ ñ€that€grantingÏMr.€Eatherly€custody€would€somehow€placeñ ñ€ò òthe€partiesðð€daughteró óñ ñ€ñ ñò òñ ñKelsyñ ñó óñ ñ€at€risk€or€compromise€her€bestÏinterests.€€Quite€the€contrary€may€very€well€be€the€case.€€Growing€up€with€otherÏsiblings€is€commonplace€in€Americañ ñò ò€and€has€never€been€found€to€be€adverse€to€aÐ T Ðchildððs€best€interestsó óñ ñ.€€In€fact,€in€these€types€of€cases,€courts€generallyÏtry€to€keep€siblings€together€based€on€the€belief€that€permitting€siblings€to€grow€upÏtogether€is€in€their€best€interests.€€òòSee€Rice€v.€Riceóó,€983€S.W.2d€680,€684€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð Lœ ÐApp.€1998);€òòBaggett€v.€Baggettóó,€512€S.W.2d€292,€293„94€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973).€Ð ð@  Ðñ ñò òñ ñAccordingly,€Ms.€Smithson€failed€to€allege€or€prove€ññmaterial€ñña€material€change€inÏcircumstances€warranting€a€modification€of€the€existing€custody€arrangement.€€It€alsoÏfollows€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€basing€its€decision€to€award€Ms.€SmithsonÏcustody€of€the€partiesðð€daughter€on€the€fact€that€Mr.€Eatherlyððs€current€wife€wasÏexpecting€a€child.ñ ñó óñ ñÌÌà@ÓÓ.Dàò òC.ó óˆÐ l*¼%. ÐÌà ` àOur€task€with€regard€to€appeals€from€custody€decisions€is€to€review€the€recordÏde€novo€and€to€evaluate€the€trial€courtððs€findings€to€assess€whether€the€trial€courtÏmade€a€proper€disposition€in€light€of€the€statutory€and€common„law€factors.€€òòSeeÐ ü0L,6 ÐNichols€v.€Nicholsóó,€792€S.W.2d€713,€716€(Tenn.€1990);€òòDoles€v.€Dolesóó,€848€S.W.2dÐ  2ð-8 Ð656,€661€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€We€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏâ âemploy€the€correct€methodology€in€this€case€because€it€focused€on€the€attributes€ofÐ è581< Ðthe€parents€it€believed€might€be€harmful€to€the€child€rather€than€on€comparing€theÏrelative€fitness€of€the€parents€to€be€their€childððs€custodian.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð T¤ Ðâ âÌà ` àThe€factual€record€in€this€case€is€sparse.€€The€trial€courtððs€findings€are€limitedÏto€its€assessment€of€Ms.€Smithsonððs€progress€with€her€depression€and€Mr.€EatherlyððsÏdecisions€to€marry€again€and€to€start€a€new€family.€€The€trial€court€appears€to€haveÏoverlooked€the€fact€that€Mr.€Eatherly€was€the€childððs€primary€custodian€forÏapproximately€two€and€one„half€years€and€that€the€child€spent€another€year€beingÏshuttled€between€her€mother€and€father.€€Based€on€the€circumstances€of€this€case,€weÏfind€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€conclusion,€necessarily€implicit€in€theÏtrial€courtððs€February€6,€1998€order,€that€a€material€change€of€circumstance€affectingÏthe€partiesðð€child€had€occurred€since€March€1994€that€warranted€changing€primaryÏphysical€custody€from€Mr.€Eatherly€to€Ms.€Smithson.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(a),€we€have€the€authority€to€fashionÏnew€custody€arrangements€based€on€the€evidence€in€the€record€and€the€application€ofÏthe€relevant€legal€principles.€€However,€custody€determinations€involve€theÏconsideration€of€many€factors,€òòsee€Rogero€v.€Pittóó,€759€S.W.2d€109,€112€(Tenn.€1988);Ð ” ä" ÐòòHolloway€v.€Bradleyóó,€190€Tenn.€565,€571,€230€S.W.2d€1003,€1006€(1950),€and€mayÐ 8"ˆ$ Ðhinge€on€subtle€nuances€in€the€partiesðð€demeanor€and€credibility.€€òòSee€Rutherford€v.Ð Ü#,& ÐRutherfordóó,€971€S.W.2d€955,€956€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€òòGaskill€v.€Gaskillóó,€936Ð €%Ð ( ÐS.W.2d€626,€631€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Thus,€we€should€not€undertake€to€make€aÏcustody€determination€on€appeal€in€the€absence€of€an€adequate€factual€record.ÌÌà ` àThe€factual€record€in€this€case€is€not€sufficient€to€enable€us€to€make€a€custodyÏdecision€based€on€the€childððs€best€interests€under€the€current€circumstances.€€We€areÏmindful€of€the€fact€that€almost€two€years€have€passed€since€the€trial€courtððs€lastÏhearing€and€that€by€now€the€partiesðð€daughter€has€established€a€new€homeÏenvironment€that€is€not€reflected€in€this€record.€€Thus,€we€have€determined€that€theÏproper€course€is€to€vacate€the€February€6,€1998€order€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trialÏcourt€with€directions€to€compare€the€current€fitness€of€Ms.€Smithson€and€Mr.€EatherlyÐ è581< Ðto€be€their€daughterððs€custodian€and€then€to€devise€the€custody€arrangement€mostÏconsistent€with€her€best€interests€at€this€time.ÌÌà@¥¥.Dàò òIV.ó óˆÐ œ ì ÐÌà ` àWe€vacate€the€February€6,€1998€custody€order€and€remand€this€case€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Except€as€modified€by€theÏtrial€court€for€good€cause,€the€custody€arrangement€contained€in€the€February€6,1998Ïorder€shall€remain€in€effect€pending€the€hearing€on€remand.€€We€tax€the€costs€of€thisÏappeal€in€equal€proportions€to€David€Ray€Eatherly€and€his€surety€and€to€Karen€JeanÏSmithson€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.€Ìòòà ` àóóÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,ÌPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.€ÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGEññ€Ð  €%Ð $ ÐÑܰÑѰ„ÑÔ€ G… !»¼;tÔò òÑ8€;t»»d»»d8Ñà@  DàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ Ü Ðà@ZZ)DàAT€NASHVILLEó óˆÐ B ÐÌÔ‡¼;t»»¼;tÔÌKAREN€JEAN€EATHERLY,à0 À àà0À€%À€%à)к Þ€%€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àPlaintiff/Appellee,à0 À àà0À€%À€%à)à0p€%€%àWilson€CircuitÐê p€%p€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à0 p àNo.€1074Ð&p€%p€% ÐVS.à0 ` àà0¸ ` €%` €%àà0¸ €%¸ €%àà0h€%€%àà0Àh€%h€%àà0À€%À€%à)Ð> €%€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à0 p àAppeal€No.Ð2V p€%p€% ÐDAVID€RAY€EATHERLY,à0 À àà0À€%À€%à)à0p€%€%à01A01„9806„CV„00314ÐJn p€%p€% Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àDefendant/Appellant.à0 À àà0À€%À€%à)Ðzž €%€% ÐÌÌÔ#† G… !»¼;tGh#ÔÌò òà@cc(DàòòJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€Tóóó óˆÐ ( ÐÌÔ€Š0³ ‹ ! G…ÔÓ€Óà ` àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€the€Wilson€CountyÐ ˆ¬ ÐCircuit€Court,€the€briefs€of€the€parties,€and€arguments€of€counsel.€€Upon€consideration€of€theÏentire€record,€this€court€finds€and€concludes€that€the€trial€judge's€judgment€should€be€vacated.ÌÌà ` àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€filed€contemporaneously€with€this€judgment,€it€is,Ïtherefore,€ordered,€adjudged,€and€decreed€that€the€trial€court's€judgment€be€and€is€herebyÏvacated,€and€that€the€cause€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistentÏwith€this€court's€opinion.ÌÌà ` àIt€is€further€ordered€that€the€costs€of€this€appeal€be€taxed€in€equal€proportions€to€DavidÏRay€Eatherly,€principal,€and€Hugh€Green,€surety,€and€to€Karen€Jean€Smithson€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue,€if€necessary.ÌÌÌÓ€Óà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_______________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.€ÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_______________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€ÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_______________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE€ññ