ÿWPC^ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 0l@ 0D¬ ð 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð 1u` 0dÕ B9U>VB)”DC½ AMU*MßwV D3Z›v~( 0@¦vÓæ AO¹Æ 0DÎ D/ BA˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLLÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ªD«D¬U­D®U¯°±Ó€»¼DÒ 3|x¾((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd€-%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌJune€27,€1997ÌÌCecil€V.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó úÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThigpen€styled€the€motion€as€a€Motion€to€Set€Aside€Agreed€Order.€€In€the€motion,€ThigpenÏstated€that€he€ð ðdid€not€agree€to€the€entry€of€the€summary€judgment€which€was€represented€by€hisÏattorney,€Phillip€Davidson.ðð€€However,€there€was€no€agreed€order€of€judgment;€summaryÏjudgment€was€granted€by€default€due€to€Thigpenððs€failure€to€respond.€Ì""""'ÿÿdxd ‘Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€original€complaint€alluded€to€the€lien€lis€pendens,€but€it€was€not€argued€in€connec›„œtion›Ïwith€the€Bankððs€summary€judgment€motion.€€Davidson€testified€in€his€deposition€that,€at€the€time,Ïhe€did€not€believe€the€lien€lis€pendens€to€be€significant.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌJAMES€THIGPEN,€€à à€€à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,ò òà àà àà à)à àó óRutherford€Circuit€No.€27349€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌFIRST€CITY€BANK,€€€€€€€€€à à€€€€€€€€€€€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€œ01A01„9603„CV„00095›Ìò òà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àDefendant/Appellee.à àò òà àà à)à àÌòòó óÌò òóóÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€RUTHERFORD€COUNTY̜ـ€ÙßR€&(%A1-j|‹Œ` ç `€€@ÿRß›à@ àAT€MURFREESBORO,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€DON€R.€ASH,€JUDGEòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendant/Appelleeóó:òòÌóóÌGregory€L.€Cashionà àà àà àà àDavid€B.€Scott€€€€€€ÌCarol€R.€Connor€€€€€à àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€€ÌNashville,€Tennesseeà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ò òÇØØÙ  ÙÓÓÑ7€§SXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ñà@ àOPINIONó óÌà àThis€case€is€an€appeal€of€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€a€Rule€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€an€orderÏof€€summary€judgment.€€We€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court.Ìà àIn€1986,€Appellant€James€Thigpen€(ð ðThigpenðð)€entered€into€a€partnership€with€Sam€NeelyÏ(ð ðNeelyðð)€to€build€single„family€residences.€€Neely€was€to€obtain€financing€and€sell€the€completedÏhomes,€while€Thigpen€was€responsible€for€constructing€them.€€They€began€developing€the€HaynesÏHavens€Estates€in€Murfreesboro,€Tennessee.€€Neely€purchased€lot€32€in€Section€1€of€HaynesÏHavens€Estates,€and€Thigpen€began€building€on€it.€€Subsequently,€Thigpen€sued€Neely€forÏdissolution€of€the€partnership,€a€formal€accounting,€and€damages€for€Neeleyððs€alleged€breach€of€theÏpartnership.€€He€also€filed€a€notice€of€lien€lis€pendens€on€lot€32.Ìà àIn€January€1987,€Neely€secured€a€personal€line€of€credit€with€Appellee€First€City€BankÏ(ð ðBankðð)€by€giving€it€a€deed€of€trust€on€lot€32.€€Later€that€year,€the€Bank€foreclosed€on€the€deed€ofÏtrust,€capitalizing€on€Thigpenððs€equity€in€the€improvements€to€the€lot.€€The€Bank€subsequently€soldÏthe€property.€€In€1990,€Thigpen€sued€the€Bank,€alleging€it€had€breached€its€fiduciary€duty€toÏThigpen,€had€induced€Neely€to€breach€the€partnership€agreement,€and€had€caused€Thigpen€to€loseÏhis€legal€or€equitable€interest€in€lot€32.€€On€January€12,€1995,€the€Bank€moved€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€A€hearing€on€the€summary€judgment€motion€was€set€for€March€3,€1995,€but€ThigpenÏwas€granted€€an€extension€of€time€to€gather€additional€evidence.€€Thigpenððs€counsel,€PhillipÏDavidson€(ð ðDavidsonðð),€concluded€he€could€not€raise€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact.€€DavidsonÏsaid€that€he€met€with€Thigpen€and€told€him€it€was€his€opinion€that€Thigpen€did€not€have€evidence€toÏcreate€a€disputed€material€fact,€and€that€filing€a€response€that€said€otherwise€could€violate€Rule€11Ï(of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure).€€Consequently,€after€talking€with€Thigpen,€DavidsonÏdid€not€file€a€response€to€the€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€did€not€appear€for€the€hearing€onÏthe€motion.€€On€March€31,€1995,€the€trial€court€granted€the€Bankððs€summary€judgment€motion.€€Ìà àThigpen€subsequently€retained€new€counsel.€€On€April€28,€1995,€he€filed€a€motion€to€setÏaside€the€summary€judgment,€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,Íon€the€grounds€that€Davidson€had€allegedly€acted€without€Thigpenððs€agreement.× ƒ) ××  ×€€ThigpenððsÏaccompanying€affidavit€made€the€same€allegation.€€On€June€21,€1995,€Thigpen€finally€filed€aÏð ðresponseðð€to€the€Bankððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€raised€the€issue€of€the€lien€lis€pendensÏas€constructive€notice€to€the€Bank€of€Thigpenððs€interest€in€lot€32.œ× ƒ+ ××  ×›€€€A€hearing€was€held€on€JuneÏ30,€1995,€and€the€trial€court€ordered€that€Davidsonððs€deposition€be€taken.€€Davidson€testified€in€hisÏdeposition€that€he€had€kept€Thigpen€informed€of€the€progress€of€the€case,€and€had€told€Thigpen€thatÏthere€was€not€sufficient€evidence€to€create€any€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€filing€aÏresponse€to€the€Bankððs€motion€that€said€otherwise€could€violate€Rule€11.€€Davidson€testified€that€heÏtold€Thigpen€of€his€decision€not€to€respond€to€the€motion€or€appear€at€the€hearing€thereon.€€Ìà àOn€December€8,€1995,€the€trial€court€denied€Thigpenððs€motion€to€set€aside€the€summaryÏjudgment:ÌÓÓà8 àà àIn€this€case,€Mr.€Thigpen€and€his€counsel,€Mr.€Davidson,€had€this€matterÏcontinued€at€least€once€in€order€to€file€a€response.€€Based€upon€the€deposition€ofÏMr.€Davidson,€Mr.€Thigpen€knew€early€on€of€Mr.€Davidsonððs€reluctance€to€opposeÏthe€Defendantððs€motion.€€The€Court€finds€specifically€that€the€Plaintiff€has€notÏshown€adequate€reason€for€his€failure€to€take€appropriate€and€adequate€action,Ïtherefore€his€request€to€set€aside€the€Courtððs€Order€granting€summary€judgment€isÏdenied.ÌÌÓÓFrom€this€decision€Thigpen€now€appeals.Ìà àOn€appeal,€Thigpen€argues€that€he€raised€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€in€his€June€21,Ï1995€ð ðresponseðð€to€the€Bankððs€summary€judgment€motion.€€He€contends€that€there€was€a€mistakeÏon€the€part€of€Thigpenððs€prior€counsel,€Davidson,€which€should€have€justified€affording€ThigpenÏrelief€from€the€summary€judgment€motion.€€He€argues€that€his€Rule€60.02€motion€should€haveÍbeen€granted€because€the€judgment€he€sought€to€have€set€aside€was€a€default€judgment.€€In€theÏalternative,€Thigpen€contends€that€the€trial€court€should€have€treated€his€Rule€60.02€motion€as€aÏRule€59.04€motion€to€alter€or€amend€a€judgment,€since€his€motion€was€filed€before€the€order€ofÏsummary€judgment€became€final.€Ìà àRule€60.02€states:ÌÓÓà8 àà àOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€party€orÏthe€partyððs€legal€representative€from€a€final€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€theÏfollowing€reasons:€€(1)€mistake,€inadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect;€€(2)Ïfraud€(whether€heretofore€denominated€intrinsic€or€extrinsic),€misrepresentation,€orÏother€misconduct€of€an€adverse€party;€€(3)€the€judgment€is€void;€€(4)€the€judgmentÏhas€been€satisfied,€released€or€discharged,€or€a€prior€judgment€upon€which€it€isÏbased€has€been€reversed€or€otherwise€vacated,€or€it€is€no€longer€equitable€that€aÏjudgment€should€have€prospective€application;€€or€(5)€any€other€reason€justifyingÏrelief€from€the€operation€of€the€judgment.€€The€motion€shall€be€made€within€aÏreasonable€time,€and€for€reasons€(1)€and€(2)€not€more€than€one€year€after€theÏjudgment,€order€or€proceeding€was€entered€or€taken.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02.€€Rule€60.02€is€appropriate€for€a€party€who€seeks€relief€from€a€judgmentÏthat€has€become€final.€€In€this€case,€the€order€of€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€Bank€had€notÏyet€become€final.€€Rule€59.04€provides€ð ð[a]€motion€to€alter€or€amend€a€judgment€shall€be€filed€andÏserved€within€thirty€(30)€days€after€the€entry€of€the€judgment.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59.04.€ÏTherefore,€Rule€59.04€is€appropriate€for€a€party€seeking€relief€from€a€judgment€that€is€not€yet€final:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€function€of€this€Rule€[60.02]€is€to€give€relief€from€òòfinalóó€judgments;€Rule€59,Ïproviding€for€motion€for€new€trial,€is€the€appropriate€remedy€for€asserting€allegedÏerrors€affecting€a€judgment€which€has€not€yet€become€final.ÌÌò òòòÓÓCampbell€v.€Archeró óóó,€555€S.W.2d€110,€112€(Tenn.€1977).€€In€Tennessee,€ð ðcourts€look€to€theÏsubstance€of€a€motion,€not€its€title.ðð€€òòò òParker€v.€Vanderbilt€Univ.ó óóó,€767€S.W.2d€412,€421€n.1Ï(Tenn.€App.€1988);€òòò òHenson€v.€Diehl€Machs.,€Inc.ó óóó,€674€S.W.2d€307,€310€(Tenn.€App.Ï1984)€(Although€defendant€moved€to€set€aside€default€judgment€under€Rule€55.02,€since€theÏmotion€was€filed€before€judgment€became€final,€the€motion€ð ðshould€be€deemed€a€motion€for€a€newÏtrial€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59€which€can€afford€relief€from€a€judgment€because€of€mistake,Ïinadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect.ðð).€€Consequently,€it€would€have€been€appropriate€forÏthe€trial€court€to€treat€Thigpenððs€Rule€60.02€motion€as€a€Rule€59.04€motion€to€alter€or€amend€theÍjudgment.Ìà àGenerally,€a€motion€for€reconsideration€of€the€granting€of€a€summary€judgment€motion€isÏð ðlooked€upon€with€favorðð€if,€prior€to€the€judgment€becoming€final,€the€plaintiff€can€produceÏmaterial€facts€which€are€in€dispute.€€ò òòòSchaefer€by€Schaefer€v.€Larsenó óóó,€688€S.W.2d€430,€433„34€(Tenn.€App.€1984)€(ð ð.€.€.€the€party€[seeking€reconsideration]€is€only€seeking€that€which€he€isÏbasically€entitled€to€„€a€first€trial.ðð)Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€Bank€argues€that€Thigpen€did€not€raise€any€disputed€issues€of€material€factÏprior€to€the€judgment€becoming€final.€€Indeed,€Thigpenððs€motion€and€his€accompanying€affidavitÏmaintain€only€that€Davidson€acted€without€Thigpenððs€permission€in€allowing€the€summaryÏjudgment€motion€to€proceed€uncontested,€an€allegation€which€does€not€address€the€basis€for€theÏBankððs€summary€judgment€motion.€€Thigpenððs€motion€to€set€aside€the€judgment€does€not€allude€toÏthe€lien€lis€pendens.€€œ›œÌ›à àThigpen€states€that€he€raised€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€in€his€ð ðresponseðð€to€the€BankððsÏsummary€judgment€motion,€filed€June€21,€1995.€€In€the€June€21,€1995€pleading,€Thigpen€arguedÏthat€the€lien€lis€pendens€gave€the€Bank€notice€of€Thigpenððs€interest€in€lot€32€prior€to€its€acceptanceÏof€the€deed€of€trust€to€the€property.€€However,€this€was€not€raised€in€Thigpenððs€Rule€60.02€motionÏto€set€aside€the€summary€judgment.€€Rather,€it€was€raised€in€his€ð ðresponseðð€to€the€Bankððs€summaryÏjudgment€motion,€filed€almost€three€months€after€the€grant€of€summary€judgment.€€Subsequently,ÏThigpen€filed€pleadings€regarding€his€Rule€60.02€motion€which€assert€the€lien€lis€pendens€asÏestablishing€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact.€€Ìà àThe€gist€of€Thigpenððs€argument,€then,€is€(1)€Thigpen€had€no€knowledge€of€DavidsonððsÏdecision€not€to€contest€the€Bankððs€summary€judgment€motion,€and€(2)€regardless€of€ThigpenððsÏknowledge,€Davidson€made€a€mistake€in€overlooking€the€fact€that€the€lien€lis€pendens€gave€theÏBank€constructive€notice€and€created€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact.Ìà àAlthough€Thigpen€asserted€that€he€did€not€give€Davidson€ð ðpermissionðð€to€ð ðenter€an€agreedÏorderðð€entering€summary€judgment,€Davidson€testified€in€his€deposition€that€he€kept€ThigpenÍapprised€of€the€progress€of€the€case.€€Davidson€stated€that€he€met€with€Thigpen€and€told€him€thatÏthey€did€not€have€sufficient€evidence€to€create€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact,€and€that€filing€aÏresponse€to€the€summary€judgment€motion€that€asserted€that€a€disputed€material€fact€existed€mightÏviolate€Rule€11.€€Davidson€testified€that€he€specifically€told€Thigpen€of€his€decision€not€to€respondÏto€the€motion€or€appear€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court€had€ample€reason€toÏconclude€that€Thigpen€had€full€knowledge€of€Davidsonððs€decision€not€to€respond€to€the€summaryÏjudgment€motion.€€Ìà àThigpenððs€second€issue,€that€Davidson€mistakenly€failed€to€assert€the€lien€lis€pendens€asÏcreating€a€disputed€material€fact,€clearly€was€not€raised€until€well€after€the€order€of€summaryÏjudgment€became€final.€€However,€even€if€Davidsonððs€alleged€mistake€of€law€were€considered,€itÏwould€not€be€sufficient€basis€to€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€Thigpenððs€motion€to€set€aside€theÏjudgment,€under€Rule€60.02€or€Rule€59.04.€€Under€Rule€60.02,€mistakes€of€law€are€not€a€basis€forÏrelief.€€òòò òFood€Lion,€€Inc.€v.€Washington€County€Beer€Bd.ó óóó,€700€S.W.2d€893,€896€(Tenn.Ï1985)€(ð ðIf€this€Court€were€to€hold€that€ignorance€of€the€law€is€a€proper€ground€for€relief€under€RuleÏ60.02,€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€it€is€hard€to€conceive€how€any€judgment€could€be€safeÏfrom€assault€on€that€ground.ðð);€òòò òAlgee€v.€State€Farm€Gen.€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€890€S.W.2d€445,€448„49€(Tenn.€App.€1994)€(plaintiffsðð€voluntary€nonsuit,€taken€because€of€mistake€of€law,€not€type€ofÏmistake€contemplated€by€Rule€60.02(1));€ò òòòKilby€v.€Sivleyó óóó,€745€S.W.2d€284,€287€(Tenn.€App.Ï1987)€(ð ðThe€mere€fact€that€a€lawyer€is€ignorant€of€the€rules€or€mistakenly€reads€the€rules€is€notÏwithin€itself€reason€to€invoke€Rule€60.02(1),€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.ðð).€Ìà àLikewise,€a€Rule€59.04€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€cannot€be€used€as€a€vehicleÏto€assert€legal€arguments€that€could€have€been€asserted€prior€to€the€grant€of€summary€judgment.€€InÏò òòòConcordia€College€Corp.€v.€œW.R.›€Grace€&€Co.ó óóó,€999€F.2d€326€(8th€Cir.€œ1993),€ò òòòcert.Ïdeniedó óóó,€114€S.€Ct.€926,€127€L.€Ed.€2d€218€(1994),›€summary€judgment€was€granted€in€favor€ofÏthe€defendants,€based€on€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Shortly€afterward,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€motion€toÏalter€or€amend€the€judgment,€pursuant€to€Rule€59(e)€of€the€Federal€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,Íasserting€ò òòòinter€aliaó óóó€that€the€œstatute€of›€limitations€was€tolled€because€the€defendants€allegedlyÏcommitted€fraud.€€The€trial€court€declined€to€consider€this€argument€because€the€plaintiff€failed€toÏraise€it€during€the€pendency€of€the€summary€judgment€motion;€it€was€raised€for€the€first€time€in€theÏplaintiffððs€Rule€59(e)€motion.€€The€plaintiffððs€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€was€denied,Ïand€the€appellate€court€affirmed€the€denial€of€the€motion:ÌÓÓà8 àð ðA€motion€to€alter€or€amend€judgment€cannot€be€used€to€raise€arguments€whichÏcould€have€been€raised€prior€to€the€issuance€of€judgment.ðð€œ.€›€œ.€›€.€[Plaintiff]€couldÏnot€use€a€Rule€59(e)€motion€ð ðto€introduce€new€evidence€that€could€have€beenÏœadduced›€during€€pendency€of€the€summary€judgment€motion.€.€.€.€€Nor€should€aÏmotion€for€reconsideration€serve€as€the€occasion€to€tender€new€legal€theories€for€theÏfirst€time.ðð€œ.€›€œ.€›€.€The€€€District€Court€did€not€abuse€its€broad€discretion€inÏconcluding€that€œ[the›€plaintiff]€was€improperly€attempting€to€raise,€via€a€motion€toÏalter€or€amend,€arguments€that€it€could€have€raised€in€response€to€[the€defendantððs]Ïmotion€for€summary€judgment.ÌÌÓÓò òòòConcordiaó óóó,€999€F.2d€at€œ330)€(quoting›€ò òòòHagerman€v.€Yukon€Energy€Corp.ó óóó,€839€F.2d€407,Ïœ414›€(8th€Cir.),€òòò òcert.€deniedó óóó,€488€U.S.€820,€109€œS.€Ct.›€63,€102€L.€Ed.€2d€40€œ(1988))›€(citationsÏto€cases€quoted€in€ò òòòHagermanó óóó€omitted).€€œGenerally,€a›€œclient€is›€accountable€for€the€acts€andÏomissions€œof€€his›€œattorney.›€€ò òòòPioneer€Investment€Servs.€v.€Brunswick€Assocs.ó óóó,€507€U.S.Ï380,€396,€113€S.Ct.€1489,€œ1499,€123›€L.€Ed.€2d€74€(1993).€€Consequently,€even€if€DavidsonÏmade€a€mistake€œin›€failing€to€assert€during€the€pendency€of€the€summary€judgment€motion€that€theÏlien€lis€pendens€created€a€material€factual€dispute€(an€issue€we€do€not€reach),€the€trial€court€did€notÏerr€in€declining€to€set€aside€the€judgment€under€Rule€60.02€or€Rule€59.04.€œÌ›à àThigpen€contends€that€his€Rule€60.02€motion€should€have€been€granted€because€a€moreÏliberal€standard€is€used€in€determining€whether€or€not€to€set€aside€a€default€judgment.€€òòò òSeeÏTennessee€Dept.€of€Human€Servs.€v.€Barbeeó óóó,€689€S.W.2d€863,€867€(Tenn.€1985)€(ð ðRuleÏ60€is€construed€with€liberality€to€afford€relief€from€a€default€judgment.ðð);€òòò òNelson€v.€Simpsonó óóó,Ï826€S.W.2d€483,€485„86€(Tenn.€App.€1991)€(ð ðTrial€courts€should€grant€relief€whenever€anyÏreasonable€doubt€exists€concerning€whether€the€default€judgment€should€be€set€aside.ðð).€€However,Ïin€this€case,€the€trial€court€had€reason€to€conclude€that€the€failure€to€respond€to€the€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€or€appear€at€the€hearing€was€willful,€the€result€of€a€decision€by€Davidson,€withÍThigpenððs€knowledge.€€ò òòòSeeóóó ó€€òòò òBarbeeó óóó,€689€S.W.2d€at€866;€òòò òNelsonó óóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€485€(courtÏmay€consider€whether€the€movantððs€default€was€willful).€€The€setting€aside€of€a€default€judgmentÏlies€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€œcourt.€ò òòòSeeóóó ó€€òòò òBarbeeó óóó,€689€S.W.2d€at€866;€òòò òNelsonó óóó,€826ÏS.W.2d€at€485.€€In€this€case,€there€was€no€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trial€court.Ìà àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€assessed€against€Appellant,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.Ìò òÌÓÓó óà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìó óà àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ó óÌ