ÿWPC¦ 9# .UN9 %‡ 0 cU<ðw@,4l€ 0§ AQ6‡ 0J 0TÙ 0^- 0h‹ 0ró 0|e 0†á 0g 1u÷ 0dl AMÐ 0X D3u H¨ 0Dð "4 ÝVU>3B)qDCš BÝÆú 0DÀ 0D D/H Bw AM”U*á ö)U6v~UvÓÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLÜÏ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;cW$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XaBXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman +,E-U.D/U0î1£2Ó€>?§aö"xBìÒ3|x?(W(3Ï2$¤¤Ý ƒcW!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X XXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó*+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ* (Cþÿ << Gÿÿ(0"ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd >Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌò òSeptemberÏ5,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€0ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€one€of€the€children€was€eighteen€years€oldÏand€the€other€child€was€fifteen€years€old.Ì ÓÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€Wifeððs€expert,€who€valued€the€plan,€testified€that€a€defined€benefit€planÏis€a€plan€in€which€a€benefit€is€accumulated€during€oneððs€working€years€or€tenureÏwith€a€particular€employer€that€will€ultimately€be€paid€out€upon€retirement€orÏthe€attainment€of€so€many€years€of€service€or€a€certain€age.Ì< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd* (Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€The€trial€court€accepted€the€lower€value€because€the€parties€testifiedÏthat€the€property€occasionally€floods.Ì ìÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€We€note€that€$1,000.00€is€less€than€one„half€of€the€cost€of€the€trip.Ì< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€&ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€,ÚXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓàÐ àÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òMARY€ANN€UMSTOT,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Counter„Defendant/Appellee,ÌÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9701„CV„00008Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Circuit€No.€150200€R.D.Ìò òEDWARD€SHIRER€UMSTOT,€ó óÌÌà àDefendant„Counter„Plaintiff/Appellant.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€SHELBY€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€KAREN€R.€WILLIAMS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌà@ àDaniel€Loyd€Taylor€and€James€H.€Taylor,€III€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppelleeÌÌà@ àHal€Gerber€and€Karen€R.€Cicala€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòREVERSED€IN€PART,€AFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIED€AND€REMANDEDÌßR€"(A1-j|ûíM` à. `€€@ÿRßÌó óóóà@ àOpinion€filed:€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌDISSENTS€IN€PART,€CONCURS€IN€PARTÌBY€SEPARATE€OPINION:ÌÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEó óÌÓ  Ó›à àThis€is€a€divorce€case.€€Edward€Shirer€Umstot€(Husband)€appeals€theÏorder€of€the€trial€court€awarding€a€divorce,€alimony€òòin€solidoóó,€and€child€supportÏto€Mary€Ann€Umstot€(Wife).Ìà àThe€parties€were€married€on€August€16,€1977€and€had€two€childrenÏduring€the€marriage.× ƒ$ ××  ×€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€Wife€was€52€years€old,€andÏHusband€was€53€years€old.€€Husband€is€in€good€health,€but€Wife€was€recentlyÏdiagnosed€with€malignant€melanoma.€€She€testified€that€she€has€a€40%€chanceÏof€living€another€five€years.€€Ìà àWife€works€for€Arlington€Developmental€Center€as€a€medicalÏtechnologist€with€a€net€monthly€income€of€$2,447.76€and€at€MethodistÏHospital€with€a€net€monthly€income€of€$200.00.€€Wife€has€a€defined€benefitsÏretirement€plan€with€the€State€of€Tennessee€worth€$76,309.00.× ƒ% ××  ×€€Husband€is€aÍresearch€associate€for€the€University€of€Tennessee„Memphis€earning€$35,418.96Ïper€year.€€Husbandððs€net€monthly€income€is€$2,271.64,€and€his€retirementÏbenefits€are€worth€$158,563.00.€€Husbandððs€retirement€plan€began€with€aÏbalance€of€$4,437.00€at€the€time€of€the€marriage.Ìà àThe€parties€owned€an€unencumbered€marital€residence.€€Wife€presentedÏexpert€testimony€that€the€real€estate€was€worth€$130,000.00,€and€HusbandÏpresented€an€expert€witness€who€valued€the€real€estate€at€$146,571.00.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€TheÏparties€also€owned€four€automobiles,€various€personal€property€worth€aboutÏ$13,400.00,€two€individual€retirement€accounts€each€worth€$2,715.23,€andÏgovernment€savings€bonds€worth€$24,000.00.€€Each€party€maintained€a€separateÏbank€account.€€Wife€inherited€an€annuity€and€some€General€Motors€stockÏduring€the€marriage.ÌÓ  Óà àIn€1980,€Wife€had€an€affair€with€a€co„worker,€but€she€terminated€theÏrelationship€after€one€year.€€Husband€testified€that€Wife€was€verbally€abusive€toÏhim,€was€not€supportive€of€him,€and€withheld€affection€and€sexual€relationsÏfrom€him.€€In€1995,€Husband€contacted€an€ex„girlfriend,€Grover€Lynn€Irving,Ïand€reestablished€a€platonic€relationship.€€Wife€testified€that€Husband€andÏIrving€talked€on€the€telephone€every€day.€€Husband€even€informed€the€partiesððÏchildren€about€Irving€and€told€Wife€that€he€loved€Irving€more€than€he€lovedÏWife.€€Husband€sent€$7,500.00€to€Irving€and€incurred€long„distance€phone€billsÏof€$2,500.00€talking€to€Irving.€€Wife€asked€Husband€to€end€this€relationship,Ïbut€he€refused.€€After€Wife€told€Irving€to€stop€calling€the€house,€HusbandÏpurchased€a€beeper€so€he€and€Irving€could€continue€to€talk.Ìà àOn€September€22,€1995,€Wife€filed€a€complaint€for€divorce€allegingÏirreconcilable€differences€and€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€On€October€9,Ï1995,€Husband€filed€an€answer€and€a€counter„complaint.€€In€the€answer,ÏHusband€admits€irreconcilable€differences,€but€denies€that€he€is€guilty€ofÏinappropriate€marital€conduct.€€In€his€counter„complaint,€Husband€agrees€thatÏthe€parties€have€irreconcilable€differences€and€alleges€that€Wife€is€guilty€ofÏinappropriate€marital€conduct.€€On€May€6,€1996,€Wife€filed€an€answer€thatÏdenied€she€was€guilty€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.Ìà àOn€June€20,€1996,€the€trial€court€entered€a€final€decree€of€absoluteÏdivorce€that€awarded€the€divorce€to€Wife€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriateÏmarital€conduct.€€The€final€decree€granted€custody€of€the€minor€children€toÏWife€with€liberal€visitation€to€Husband.€€Husband€was€ordered€to€pay€childÍsupport€of€$730.00€per€month€through€May€1997,€then€to€pay€$479.00€perÏmonth.€€The€trial€court€divided€the€marital€assets€and€determined€that€theÏincrease€in€value€of€Husbandððs€retirement€benefits€was€marital€property.€€TheÏtrial€court€awarded€Husbandððs€interest€in€the€marital€residence,€valued€atÏ$65,000.00,€to€Wife€as€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€and€awarded€$2,500.00€as€additionalÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó€for€Wifeððs€attorneyððs€fees.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€orderedÏHusband€to€pay€Wife€$1,000.00€in€a€lump€sum€as€child€support€to€help€pay€forÏthe€extraordinary€educational€expense€of€a€trip€to€Europe€by€one€of€the€partiesððÏdaughters.Ìà àHusband€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€presents€five€issuesÏfor€review:€€1)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€Wife€alimony€òòin€solidoóó;Ï2)€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€Wife€additional€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€toÏpay€her€attorneyððs€fees;€3)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€determinationÏthat€the€increase€in€the€value€of€Husbandððs€separate€property€was€maritalÏproperty;€4)€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€deviating€from€the€child€supportÏguidelines;€and€5)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€a€divorce€to€WifeÏonly.€€Ìà àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€reviewÏthe€case€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€theÏfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€Unless€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€findings,€we€must€affirm,€absent€error€of€law.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€Ìà àWe€will€first€consider€Husbandððs€third€issue.€€Because€the€valuation€ofÏHusbandððs€retirement€plan€affects€the€division€of€the€marital€property,€HusbandÏargues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€determination€that€the€increase€in€theÏvalue€of€his€retirement€plan€was€marital€property.€€The€trial€court€determinedÏthat€$4,437.00€of€the€value€of€Husbandððs€retirement€plan€was€his€separateÏproperty€and€that€$154,106.00,€which€represents€the€increase€in€value€of€theÏretirement€plan€during€the€marriage,€was€marital€property.€€The€trial€courtÏawarded€both€the€$4,437.00€and€the€$154,106.00€to€Husband.€€Husband€assertsÏthat€the€trial€court€allotted€only€the€original€value€of€the€pension€at€the€time€ofÏthe€marriage,€$4,437.00,€as€separate€property.€€He€argues€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€also€considered€the€interest€earned€on€that€portion€as€separateÏproperty.€€He€contends€that€only€$131,000.00€of€the€increase€in€value€is€martialÏproperty,€instead€of€the€full€$154,106.00,€because€$23,106.00€of€the€interestÏaccumulated€on€the€original€amount€of€$4,437.00€and€is€therefore€separateÏœproperty.›œ€€T.C.A.›€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€provides:Ìà8 àà8 àð ðMarital€propertyðð€includes€income€from,€and€anyÏincrease€in€value€during€the€marriage,€of€propertyÍdetermined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordanceÏwith€subdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€party€substantiallyÏcontributed€to€its€preservation€and€appreciation€andÏthe€value€of€vested€pension,€retirement€or€other€fringeÏbenefit€rights€accrued€during€the€period€of€theÏmarriage.€€ÌÌÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€(1996).€€Marital€property€includes€retirementÏbenefits,€both€vested€and€unvested,€that€accrue€during€the€marriage.€€òòò òCohen€v.ÏCohenóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€830€(Tenn.€1996).€€An€interest€in€a€retirement€benefitÏplan€is€marital€property€subject€to€division€under€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1)Ï(1996).€€òòò òCohenóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d€at€830.Ìà àIn€ò òòòCohenóóó ó,€the€Supreme€Court€reiterated€three€observations:à àÌÓÓà8 àà8 à1.€€Only€the€portion€of€retirement€benefits€accruedÏduring€the€marriage€are€marital€property€subject€toÏequitable€division.€€à àÌà8 àà8 à2.€Retirement€benefits€accrued€during€the€marriageÏare€marital€property€subject€to€equitable€division€evenÏthough€the€non„employee€spouse€did€not€contributeÏto€the€increase€in€their€value.€€Ìà8 àà8 à3.€The€value€of€retirement€benefits€must€beÏdetermined€at€a€date€as€near€as€possible€to€the€date€ofÏthe€divorce.ÌÌÓÓòòò òIdóóó ó.à à€Ìà àHusband€argues€that€the€amount€of€the€retirement€benefits€that€accruedÏduring€the€marriage€should€not€include€the€amount€that€accrued€as€a€result€ofÏhis€separate€property.€€He€asks€this€Court€to€separate€the€appreciation€of€theÍretirement€plan€into€two€income€streams:€€one€based€only€on€the€separateÏproperty€amount€of€$4,437.00€and€one€based€on€the€contributions€made€to€theÏretirement€plan€during€the€marriage.€Ìà àIn€an€unreported€case,€this€Court€addressed€the€division€of€retirementÏfunds:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àWe€believe€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretionÏin€awarding€Wife€$13,311€instead€of€half€of€the€totalÏof€the€partiesðð€retirement€accounts€accumulated€afterÏthe€marriage.€€The€trial€court€was€obviously€influencedÏby€his€express€finding€that€ð ða€good€portion€of€[theÏincrease]€has€been€passive€income€that€has€accruedÏsince€the€partiesðð€marriageðð;€but€the€ð ðpassiveðð€natureÏof€the€accrual€during€the€marriage€is€immaterial.€ÏT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€provides€that€maritalÏproperty€includes€ð ðthe€value€of€a€vested€pension,Ïretirement€or€other€fringe€benefit€rights€accruedÏduring€the€period€of€the€marriage.ðð€€(EmphasisÏAdded).€€This€code€section€does€not€differentiateÏbetween€value€added€by€ð ðpassive€incomeðð€and€valueÏadded€by€additional€contributions€during€theÏmarriage.€€The€critical€determination€is€whether€theÏvalue€ð ðaccruedðð€during€the€marriage.€€In€this€case,Ïeverything€in€Husbandððs€thrift€and€profit€sharing€plan,Ïsave€the€$5,091€in€there€at€the€time€of€the€marriage,Ïð ðaccruedðð€after€the€marriage.€Ìà àÌÓÓòòò òFranklin€v.€Franklinó óóó,€No.€03A01„9410„CV„00364,€1995€WL€371573,€at€*2Ï(Tenn.€App.€June€21,€1995).€€We€agree€with€the€reasoning€of€the€ò òòòFranklinóóó ó€CourtÏthat€the€€critical€determination€is€whether€the€value€ð ðaccruedðð€during€theÏmarriage.€€The€statute€is€clear€that€ð ðthe€value€of€vested€pension,€retirement€orÍother€fringe€benefit€rights€accrued€during€the€period€of€the€marriageðð€is€maritalÏproperty.€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€(1996).€€In€this€case,€all€of€HusbandððsÏretirement€plan,€except€$4,437.00,€accrued€during€the€marriage.€€The€trial€courtÏcorrectly€held€that€$154,106.00€of€the€retirement€plan€was€marital€property.Ìà àIn€his€first€issue,€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awardingÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó€to€Wife.€€Husband€argues€that€Wife€does€not€need€the€award,Ïthat€he€does€not€have€the€ability€to€pay€the€award,€and€that€the€courtððsÏperception€of€the€relative€fault,€which€can€be€considered€in€an€award€of€alimony,Ïunfairly€focused€on€him.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€court€awarded€HusbandððsÏinterest€in€the€marital€residence,€valued€at€$65,000.00,€to€Wife€as€alimony€òòinÏsolidoóó.Ìà àTrial€courts€have€broad€discretion€in€dividing€the€marital€estate€uponÏdivorce.€ò òòòLoyd€v.€Loydó óóó,€860€S.W.2d€409,€411€(Tenn.€App.€1993);€ò òòòLancaster€v.ÏLancasteró óóó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€502€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€Ìà àÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€provides:ÌÌà8 àà8 àIt€is€the€intent€of€the€general€assembly€that€a€spouseÏwho€is€economically€disadvantaged,€relative€to€theÏother€spouse,€be€rehabilitated€whenever€possible€byÏthe€granting€of€an€order€for€payment€of€rehabilitative,Ïtemporary€support€and€maintenance.€€Where€there€isÏsuch€relative€economic€disadvantage€andÏrehabilitation€is€not€feasible€in€consideration€of€allÏrelevant€factors,€including€those€set€out€in€thisÍsubsection,€then€the€court€may€grant€an€order€forÏpayment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long„termÏbasis€or€until€the€death€or€remarriage€of€the€recipientÏexcept€as€otherwise€provided€in€subdivision€(a)(3).€ÏRehabilitative€support€and€maintenance€is€a€separateÏclass€of€spousal€support€as€distinguished€from€alimonyÏin€solido€and€periodic€alimony.€€In€determiningÏwhether€the€granting€of€an€order€for€payment€ofÏsupport€and€maintenance€to€a€party€is€appropriate,Ïand€in€determining€the€nature,€amount,€length€ofÏterm,€and€manner€of€payment,€the€court€shall€considerÏall€relevant€factors,€including:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,Ïand€financial€resources€of€each€party,€includingÏincome€from€pension,€profit€sharing€or€retirementÏplans€and€all€other€sources;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,Ïthe€ability€and€opportunity€of€each€party€to€secureÏsuch€education€and€training,€and€the€necessity€of€aÏparty€to€secure€further€education€and€training€toÏimprove€such€partyððs€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonableÏlevel;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,Ïbut€not€limited€to,€physical€disability€or€incapacityÏdue€to€a€chronic€debilitating€disease;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€aÏparty€to€seek€employment€outside€the€home€becauseÏsuch€party€will€be€custodian€of€a€minor€child€of€theÏmarriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€andÏpersonal,€tangible€and€intangible;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€maritalÏproperty€as€defined€in€ðð€36„4„121;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(I)€The€standard€of€living€the€parties€establishedÏduring€the€marriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€suchÏtangible€and€intangible€contributions€to€the€marriageÏas€monetary€and€homemaker€contributions,€andÏtangible€and€intangible€contributions€by€a€party€to€theÏeducation,€training€or€increased€earning€power€of€theÏother€party;€€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€theÏcourt,€in€its€discretion,€deems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€ÏandÌÌà8 àà8 à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequencesÏto€each€party,€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equitiesÏbetween€the€parties.ÌÌÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€(1996).Ìà àNeed€and€the€ability€to€pay€are€the€critical€factors€in€setting€the€amountÏof€an€alimony€award.€€òòò òSmith€v.€Smithó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€155,€159€(Tenn.€App.€1995);Ïòòò òLancasteró óóó,€671€S.W.2d€at€503.€€In€òòò òLancasteró óóó,€this€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àAlimony€is€not€and€never€has€been€intended€by€ourÏlegislature€to€be€punitive.€€òòò òSee€McClung€v.€McClungó óóó,Ï29€Tenn.€App.€580,€198€S.W.2d€820,€822€(1947).€€NorÏdo€we€believe€it€was€intended€simply€as€an€award€forÏvirtue.€€It€is€not€designed€to€serve€as€an€annuity€forÏthe€wife;€€or€as€Professor€Clark€has€stated€ð ð[t]heÍpurpose€of€alimony€is€to€care€for€the€wifeððs€needs€afterÏdivorce,€not€to€provide€her€with€a€life„time€profit„sharing€plan.ðð€€H.€Clark,€òòLaw€of€Domestic€Relationsóó€ððÏ14.9(4)€(1968).à àÌÌÓÓòòò òIdó óóó.€€The€propriety€of€awarding€alimony€as€well€as€the€adequacy€of€the€amountÏawarded€depends€upon€the€unique€facts€of€each€case.€€òòò òButler€v.€Butleró óóó,€680ÏS.W.2d€467,€470€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€The€amount€of€alimony€to€be€awarded€is€aÏmatter€for€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€in€view€of€the€particular€circumstances€ofÏthe€case,€and€the€appellate€courts€are€not€inclined€to€alter€the€awards€exceptÏwhere€the€record€reflects€that€such€discretion€has€been€abused.€€òòò òGilliam€v.ÏGilliamó óóó,€776€S.W.2d€81,€86€(Tenn.€App.€1988).€Ìà àHusband€asserts€that€Wifeððs€net€monthly€income€is€more€than€his,€thatÏshe€has€more€separate€property,€and€that€her€income€exceeds€her€expenses.€ÏWifeððs€net€monthly€income€is€$2,714.52,€and€Husbandððs€net€monthly€income€isÏ$2,271.64.€€In€addition,€Wife€received€$730.00€per€month€until€May€1997,€andÏnow€receives€$479.00€per€month€as€child€support€from€Husband.€€Wife€listedÏher€monthly€expenses€as€$3,356.00,€which€includes€the€expenses€for€theÏchildren.Ìà àIn€light€of€the€facts€that€Wife€has€a€greater€monthly€net€income€thanÏHusband€and€has€sufficient€separate€assets,€we€believe€that€the€award€ofÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó€in€this€case€was€excessive.€€After€the€trial€courtððs€award€ofÍalimony€òòin€solidoóó,€Wife€received€$252,873.00€or€58%€of€the€marital€estate,€andÏHusband€received€$181,621.00€or€42%€of€the€marital€estate.€€We€believe€thatÏthe€division€of€the€marital€assets€in€this€case€should€approach€a€more€equitableÏdivision.€€However,€we€do€believe€that€Wife€should€be€the€sole€legal€owner€ofÏthe€marital€residence€to€avoid€any€chance€of€a€conflict€in€the€future.€€Therefore,ÏWife€should€be€awarded€Husbandððs€one„half€interest€in€the€marital€residence,Ïbut€in€return,€Wife€should€pay€$30,000.00,€which€should€be€paid€as€determinedÏby€the€trial€court.€€After€Wife€reimburses€Husband€$30,000.00€for€his€share€ofÏthe€marital€residence,€Wife€will€have€received€$222,873.00€or€51%€of€theÏmarital€estate,€and€Husband€will€have€received€$211,621.00€or€49%€of€theÏestate.€€We€find€that€this€division€of€the€marital€assets€is€more€equitableÏconsidering€the€circumstances€of€this€case.Ìà àIn€his€second€issue,€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏawarding€Wife€$2,500.00€as€additional€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€for€her€attorneyððs€fees.€ÏIn€determining€whether€to€award€attorneyððs€fees,€the€trial€court€should€againÏconsider€the€relevant€factors€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1).€€òòò òKincaid€v.€Kincaidó óóó,Ï912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€€When€one€party€demonstrates€that€itÏis€financially€unable€to€afford€counsel,€and€when€the€other€party€has€the€abilityÏto€pay,€the€court€may€properly€order€the€other€party€to€pay€attorneyððs€fees.€€òòò òIdó óóó.€ÍAn€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court,€andÏunless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€award,€it€will€not€be€disturbed€onÏappeal.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€€A€spouse€with€adequate€property€and€income€is€not€entitled€to€anÏaward€of€additional€alimony€to€compensate€for€attorneyððs€fees€and€expenses.€Ïòòò òSee€Duncan€v.€Duncanó óóó,€686€S.W.2d€568€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€Ìà àIn€this€case,€Wife€is€able€to€afford€counsel.€€She€has€separate€assets€thatÏinclude€$7,500.00€in€a€bank€account.€€We€believe€that€the€trial€court€should€notÏhave€awarded€Wife€the€additional€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€for€her€attorneyððs€fees.€Ìà àIn€his€fourth€issue,€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€deviatingÏfrom€the€Tennessee€Child€Support€Guidelines€(Guidelines).€€The€trial€courtÏordered€Husband€to€pay€$1,000.00€as€child€support€to€ð ðhelp€for€theÏextraordinary€educational€expense€of€a€trip€to€Europe€by€one€of€the€minorÏdaughters.ðð€€Husband€argues€that€an€ð ðextraordinary€educational€expenseððÏimplies€a€necessary€expense€over€and€above€the€amount€it€would€cost€to€send€anÏaverage€child€to€school€such€as€special€education€for€the€physically€or€mentallyÏdisabled€or€a€more€challenging€curriculum€for€a€more€gifted€student.€€HusbandÏasserts€that€a€decision€to€spend€extra€money€on€education€ð ðshould€be€a€decisionÏbased€upon€the€opinion€of€a€professional€that€the€added€expense€is€needed,€notÏjust€desired€by€the€custodial€parent€or€the€minor€child.ððÌà àThe€Guidelines€provide€for€the€upward€adjustment€of€child€support€forÏextraordinary€educational€expenses:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€€Since€these€percentage€amounts€are€minimums,Ïthe€court€shall€increase€the€award€calculated€in€RuleÏ1240„2„4„.03€for€the€following€reasons:Ìà8 àà8 àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*à àÌà8 àà8 à(c)€€Extraordinary€educational€expenses€andÏextraordinary€medical€expenses€not€covered€byÏinsurance€shall€be€added€to€the€percentage€calculatedÏin€the€above€rule.€€€€Ìà à€ÌÓÓTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€tit.€10,€ch.€1240„2„4„.04„.04(1)(c)€(1994).€Ìòòò ò€à àóóó óIn€ò òòòDwight€v.€Dwightó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€945€(Tenn.€App.€1996),€this€CourtÏfound€that€private€school€tuition€is€not€to€be€considered€as€a€portion€of€childÏsupport€under€the€Guideline€percentages€and€that€child€support€can€be€adjustedÏupward€for€private€school€tuition.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€at€950.€€The€choice€to€send€a€child€toÏprivate€school€is€not€one€that€must€be€made€by€a€professional€to€determine€ifÏthe€added€expense€is€needed,€and€the€courts€have€allowed€upward€deviation€forÏprivate€school€tuition€without€considering€whose€decision€it€was€to€send€theÏchild€to€private€school.€€In€addition,€private€school€tuition€is€never€aÏð ðnecessaryðð€expense,€and€the€Guidelines€do€not€say€that€the€extraordinaryÏeducational€expense€must€be€ð ðnecessary.ððÌà àLikewise,€in€this€case,€we€do€not€believe€that€the€decision€to€send€a€childÏto€Europe€must€be€made€by€a€ð ðprofessional,ðð€and€because€extraordinaryÍeducational€expenses€are€not€limited€to€ð ðnecessaryðð€expenses,€the€trial€court€didÏnot€err€in€ordering€Husband€to€pay€$1,000.00€of€his€daughterððs€trip€to€Europe.× ƒ3 ××  ×€Ìà àFinally,€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€a€divorceÏto€Wife€only.€€He€asserts€that€the€trial€court€ignored€the€numerous€acts€ofÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€on€the€part€of€Wife.€€Wife€admitted€that€she€hadÏan€affair€with€a€co„worker€in€1980,€and€Husband€testified€that€there€was€anÏabsence€of€love€from€Wife€in€the€marriage€and€that€Wife€verbally€abused€him.€ÏHe€stated€that€Wife€never€appreciated€him€or€encouraged€him.€€On€the€otherÏhand,€Wife€testified€that€she€loved€Husband€and€fully€appreciated€and€cared€forÏhim.Ìà àThe€trial€court€awarded€the€divorce€to€Wife€on€the€grounds€ofÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€and€found€that€Husbandððs€relationship€withÏIrving€precipitated€the€divorce.€€Wife€testified€that€Husband€told€her€that€heÏloved€Irving€more€than€Wife€and€that€he€discussed€his€new€relationship€withÏthe€partiesðð€children.€€The€evidence€showed€that€Husband€lent€Irving€$7,500.00Ïand€spent€$2,500.00€on€phone€bills.€€Finally,€Husband€testified€that€he€happenedÏto€find€Irvingððs€phone€number€in€the€phone€book€while€he€was€visiting€the€localÏlibrary.Ìà àWhen€the€resolution€of€the€issues€in€a€case€depends€upon€the€truthfulnessÏof€witnesses,€the€trial€judge€who€has€the€opportunity€to€observe€the€witnesses€inÏtheir€manner€and€demeanor€while€testifying€is€in€a€far€better€position€than€thisÏCourt€to€decide€those€issues.€€òòò òMays€v.€Brighton€Bankó óóó,€832€S.W.2d€347,€351„52Ï(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€The€weight,€faith,€and€credit€to€be€given€to€any€witnessððsÏtestimony€lie€in€the€first€instance€with€the€trier€of€fact,€and€the€credibilityÏaccorded€will€be€given€great€weight€by€the€appellate€court.€€òòò òIdó óóó.€at€352.Ìà àWe€cannot€say€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€to€award€a€divorce€to€Wife€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€maritalÏconduct.Ìà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€awarding€attorney€fees€isÏreversed.€€The€judgment€is€modified€to€require€Wife€to€pay€HusbandÏ$30,000.00€for€œhis›€equity€in€the€marital€home,€and,€on€remand,€the€trial€courtÏshall€determine€the€manner€for€payment€of€this€sum€and€any€necessary€securityÏfor€the€œpayment.›€€The€judgment€is€affirmed€in€all€other€respects.€€Costs€of€theÏappeal€are€assessed€equally€to€the€parties.ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌó ó____________________________________Ìò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌ____________________________________Ìò òDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEó óœÔ€6ÔÔ€6Ô