ÿWPC …# V %a 0(gBw@Ñ4 % 4 0l< 0D¨ UFì 0J2 0T| 0^Ð 0h. 0r– 0| 0†„ 0 1uš U, 0d;U,ŸU 6ËB)DC* AMmU*º Bä D3"4…V 0@Ûv~vÓ™ AOlÆ» 0D D/Å Bô˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 X($¡¡C:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT x Ey z D{ | D} ~ e e€ Ó€Š DÒ ‹.Co3|xŠ ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d))))'ÿÿdxd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌJune€28,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó {Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔ€€òòò òHudson€v.€Cappsóóó ó,€651€S.W.2d€243,€247€(Tenn.€App.€1983);€òòò òReserveÏLife€Ins.€Co.€v.€Whittemoreóóó ó,€59€Tenn.€App.€495,€516,€442€S.W.2d€266,€275Ï(1969).Ô€$XÔÌ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€##X„d&ÓÑ#€##Xd#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ñ7€M`XXdÖdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑœCAROLYN›€FAYE€BALL€WILLIAMS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellee,à àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9510„CH„00486Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àRutherford€Chancery€No.ÌÙ€€ÙœßL€'+&;+'h|©` ç `€€Lß›VICTOR€LEGRAND€WILLIAMS,€SR.,à àà à)à à93DR„953Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àRespondent/Appellant.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€$¼Ôà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€FOR€RUTHERFORD€COUNTYÌÌà@ àAT€MURFREESBORO,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€DON€R.€ASH,€JUDGEÔ€$XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌWM.€Kennerly€BurgerÌ301€N.€Spring€StreetÌP.O.€Box€398ÌMurfreesboro,€Tennessee€37133„0398Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌR.€Steven€WaldronÌTerry€A.€FannÌ202€West€Main€StreetÌMurfreesboro,€Tennessee€37130Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€PETITIONER/APPELLEEÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED,€MODIFIED,€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÔ€$¼ÔSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÔ€$XÔÌà@ àòòÔ€$ ÔOPINIONÔ€$XÔóóÌÌÓÓà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€respondent/appellant,€Victor€LegrandÏWilliams,€Sr.€(ð ðHusbandðð),€from€an€order€of€the€trial€courtÏmodifying€the€final€decree€entered€in€the€divorce€of€Husband€andÏpetitioner/appellee,€Carolyn€Faye€Ball€Williams€(ð ðWifeðð).€€TheÏmodification€reduced€Husbandððs€alimony€obligation€to€Wife€byÏ$400.00€per€month.€€The€pertinent€facts€are€as€follows.ÌÌà àOn€5€August€1994,€Judge€Whitney€Stegall€entered€a€finalÏdecree€divorcing€Husband€and€Wife.€€The€decree€ordered€Husband€toÏpay€Wife€alimony€of€$750.00€per€month.€€In€addition,€the€decreeÏprovided€that€Husband€was€to€pay€that€amount€until€Wife€remarriedÏor€he€retired.€€The€court€did€not,€however,€define€or€restrict€theÏretirement€term.ÌÌà àDuring€the€marriage€and€at€the€time€of€the€divorce€hearing,ÏHusband€worked€for€Nissan€Corporation€and€earned€approximatelyÏ$50,000.00€per€year.€€Because€of€a€substantial€raise,€Husband€tookÍa€job€with€Behr€Systems,€Inc€(ð ðBehrðð)€on€5€June€1994.€€His€newÏposition€paid€$60,000€per€year.€€In€addition,€Husband€received€aÏ$10,000€bonus€and€a€car€allowance€of€$5,000€per€year.ÌÌà àHusband€resigned€or,€as€stated€by€him,€retired€from€Behr€onÏ14€October€1994€because€the€"unforeseen€stresses"€were€too€much.€ÏMore€specifically,€Husband€claims€that€he€became€depressed€when€heÏrealized€that€he€could€not€do€the€job.€€After€leaving€Behr,ÏHusband€moved€to€Conyers,€Georgia€and€lived€with€his€sister€andÏher€three€children.€€Husband€cared€for€the€children€while€theirÏmother€worked.€€At€some€point€in€time,€Husbandððs€mother€had€aÏstroke€so€he€began€to€care€for€her€as€well€as€the€children.€€ÌÌà àHusband's€mental€problems€date€back€to€1988.€€FromÏapproximately€1991€to€1993,€Husband€took€Prozac€off€and€on€toÏcontrol€his€depression.€€In€August€1993,€after€being€off€ProzacÏfor€six€months,€Husband€began€seeing€his€current€psychiatrist,€Dr.ÏPatricia€Williams,€who€continued€to€use€Prozac€in€Husband'sÏtreatment.€€Husband€did€not€contact€Dr.€Williams€from€1€June€1994Ïuntil€23€January€1995.€€Prior€to€January€1995,€Husband€had€quitÏtaking€his€Prozac.€€After€seeing€Husband,€Dr.€Williams€resumed€hisÏProzac€treatment€and€determined€that€he€could€not€maintain€anyÏemployment.€€She€further€opined€that,€although€Husband€wouldÏeventually€return€to€the€work€force,€"no€management„type€positionÏwould€be€expected€in€the€foreseeable€future.€.€.€."ÌÌà àConcurrent€with€his€alleged€retirement,€Husband€fell€behindÏin€making€his€alimony€payments.€€Thereafter,€in€January€1995,€WifeÏfiled€a€petition€for€contempt.€€She€also€sought€to€attachÏHusbandððs€401K€monies€and€asked€the€court€for€a€declaratory€orderÏdefining€retirement€as€used€in€the€final€decree€of€divorce.€€On€27ÏJanuary€1995,€Husband€filed€his€response.€€He€alleged€that€he€hadÏnot€worked€since€October€1994€because€of€severe€emotional€problemsÏand€depression€which€began€prior€to€the€parties'€divorce€and€thatÏhe€had€retired€as€described€in€the€final€decree.€ÌÌà àOn€21€February€1995,€Husband€filed€a€petition€to€suspend€theÏalimony€payments.€€He€alleged€that€his€mental€disorder€hadÏdeteriorated€to€the€point€that€he€could€not€work€and€that€this€wasÏa€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances.€€He€asked€theÏcourt€to€eliminate€the€alimony€payments€until€he€could€return€toÏwork.€€He€also€asked€for€immediate€termination€of€the€alimonyÏpursuant€to€the€final€decree€and€for€attorney's€fees.€€In€March,ÏWife€filed€her€answer€and€a€petition€asking€the€court€to€orderÏHusband€to€pay€his€1994€income€tax€refund€into€the€court.ÌÌà àDuring€the€pendency€of€this€action,€the€court€entered€severalÏorders.€€The€effect€of€these€orders€were€as€follows:€1)€requiredÏHusband€to€pay€Wife€$3,000.00,€the€October€1994€to€January€1995Ïarrearage€amount;€2)€restrained€Wife€from€taking€any€action€whichÏwould€diminish€the€value€of€her€real€property;€3)€required€HusbandÏto€deposit€with€the€clerk€a€portion€of€his€401K€funds€and€his€taxÍrefund.€€As€to€this€last€order,€the€court€excepted€$1,500.00€toÏassist€Husband€with€his€living€expenses.ÌÌà àA€hearing€was€held€before€Judge€Don€R.€Ash€on€18€May€1995.€ÏThe€parties€testified,€and€Husband€presented€the€depositionÏtestimony€of€Dr.€Williams.€€On€5€June€1995,€the€court€entered€itsÏfinal€order.€€The€court€held€that€Husband€was€not€retired,€thatÏHusband€was€in€contempt€of€court,€that€Husband€had€voluntarilyÏterminated€his€employment,€that€there€was€"some€change€inÏcircumstances"€warranting€a€modification,€€and€that€HusbandÏdeclined€other€employment€offers.€€The€court€reduced€the€monthlyÏalimony€to€$350.00€and€awarded€Wife€$1,400.00€for€the€alimonyÏwhich€had€accrued€from€February€1995€to€May€1995.€€The€courtÏordered€the€clerk€to€pay€out€the€monies€held€by€the€court€asÏfollows:€1)€$350.00€per€month€to€Wife;€2)€$1,400.00€to€Wife€forÏthe€arrearage;€3)€$150.00€per€month€to€Husband;€4)€$2,000.00€toÏWife's€attorney;€5)€$2,000€to€Husband's€attorney;€and€6)€the€costsÏof€the€action.€€In€addition,€the€court€ordered€Husband€toÏ"immediately€attempt€to€secure€appropriate€gainful€employment.€.€.Ï."€€Finally,€the€court€sentenced€Husband€to€serve€thirty€days€inÏthe€Rutherford€County€Workhouse,€but€suspended€the€sentence€uponÏHusband's€compliance€with€the€order.ÌÌà àHusband€filed€his€notice€of€appeal€on€15€June€1995€and€askedÏthis€court€to€address€the€following€issues:ÌÓÓà8 àà àA.à àAre€the€issues€related€to€the€medicalÍcondition€of€the€[husband]€subject€only€to€proof€by€aÏqualified€medical€expert?Ìà8 àà àB.à àIs€the€wording€set€forth€in€the€original€FinalÏDecree€of€Divorce€self„executing,€terminating€theÏrequirement€for€the€[husbandððs]€payment€of€alimony€as€ofÏthe€date€of€his€ð ðretirementðð€September,€1994?Ìà8 àà àC.à àDoes€any€credible€evidence€in€the€recordÏsupport€the€wifeððs€contention€that€the€husband€hasÏwillfully€disregarded€the€orders€of€the€court€and,Ïaccordingly,€is€in€contempt?Ìà8 àà àD.à àBased€upon€the€facts€of€the€case,€doÏcircumstances€exist€which€would€justify€the€continuationÏof€[husbandððs]€payment€of€alimony€to€the€[wife]?ÌÌÓÓIn€addition,€Wife€presented€two€issues.€€Wifeððs€first€issueÏrelates€to€the€correctness€of€the€courtððs€decision€to€modify€theÏalimony€award.€€We€address€this€issue€within€our€discussion€ofÏHusbandððs€issues.€€Wifeððs€second€issue€is:€ð ðWhether€the€[Wife]Ïshould€be€awarded€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€by€her€on€this€appeal.ðð€ÏWe€address€this€issue€separately.ÌÌà àHusbandððs€first€issue€involves€the€weight€and€credibilityÏgiven€to€the€testimony€of€an€expert€by€the€fact€finder.€€HusbandÏcontends€that€the€chancery€court€erred€when€it€rejected€Dr.ÏWilliamsðð€uncontradicted€medical€opinion€that€Husband€could€notÏperform€any€type€of€work.€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court,Ïhowever,€that€the€Husbandððs€own€testimony€contradicted€theÏdoctorððs€opinion€and€that€the€chancery€court€did€not€completelyÏreject€the€doctorððs€opinion.ÌÌà àð ðThe€weight,€faith€and€credit€to€be€given€to€any€witnessððÏtestimony€lies€in€the€first€instance€with€the€trier€of€fact€andÏthe€credibility€accorded€will€be€given€great€weight€by€theÍappellate€court.ðð€€òòò òLeek€v.€Powellóóó ó,€884€S.W.2d€118,€120€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1994).€€While€it€is€true€that€the€trier€of€fact€should€notÏignore€the€testimony€of€an€expert€witness× ƒ, ××  ×,€the€fact€finder€mayÏweigh€the€testimony€and€even€reject€it.€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€has€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àExpert€opinions,€at€least€when€dealing€with€highlyÏcomplicated€and€scientific€matters,€are€not€ordinarilyÏconclusive€in€the€sense€that€they€must€be€accepted€asÏtrue€on€the€subject€of€their€testimony,€but€are€purelyÏadvisory€in€character€and€the€trier€of€facts€may€placeÏwhatever€weight€it€chooses€upon€such€testimony€and€mayÏreject€it,€if€it€finds€that€it€is€inconsistent€with€theÏfacts€in€the€case€or€otherwise€unreasonable.ÌÌÓÓòòò òGibson€v.€Fergusonóóó ó,€562€S.W.2d€188,€189„90€(Tenn.€1976);Ïòòò òEngland€v.€Burns€Stone€Co.óóó ó,€874€S.W.2d€32,€38€(Tenn.€App.€1993)Ï(referring€to€all€expert€testimony).€€In€other€words,€ð ððð[t]heÏopinion€of€an€expert€may€be€reduced€to€mere€conjecture€by€proof€ofÏphysical€facts€completely€inconsistent€therewith.ðððð€òòò òNashville,€C.Ï&€St.€L.€Ry.€v.€Jacksonóóó ó,€187€Tenn.€202,€217,€213€S.W.2d€116,Ï122€(1948)(on€petition€to€rehear)(citingòòò ò€Standard€Oil€Co.€ofÏLouisiana€v.€Roachóóó ó,€19€Tenn.€App.€661,€675,€94€S.W.2d€63,€69Ï(1935)).ÌÌà àAs€mentioned€earlier,€the€testimony€in€this€case€contradicts,Ïat€least€to€some€degree,€the€opinion€of€Dr.€Williams.€€TheÏevidence€reveals€that€Husband€has€experienced€depression€sinceÏ1988.€€Nevertheless,€he€continued€to€work€until€1994€and,€as€heÍphrased€it,€ð ðnever€missed€a€paycheck.ðð€€In€response€to€questionsÏat€trial€regarding€Husbandððs€current€activities,€he€made€theÏfollowing€responses:€ð ðI€just€was€in€a€situation€that€was€very,Ïvery€good€for€me.€€And€time€slipped€by.€€I€just€„„€Iððve€enjoyedÏbeing€with€my€sisterððs€children€.€.€.€I€was€taking€care€of€theÏkids,€back€and€forth€to€school,€and€errands.€.€.ðð€and€ð ðIððve€gotÏsome€beautiful€children€that€Iððm€taking€care€of.€€Their€motherððsÏworking.€€Iððm€responsible€for€them,€and€Iððm€enjoying€„„€Iððm€aÏhomemaker,€really,€is€what€Iððm€doing.€€Iððm€cooking€for€them.€€IððmÏcleaning€house,€and€Iððm€running€errands.ðð€€Finally,€the€followingÏtestimony€occurred:ÌÓÓà8 àà àQà àTaking€care€of€whose€family?Ìà8 àà àAà àMy€sisterððs€family.€Iððm€at€work;€Iððm€in€aÏsituation€„„€yes,€I€have€a€full„time€job.Ìà8 àà àQà àYou€have€a€full„time€job€that€just€doesnððt€payÏyou€anything,€right?Ìà8 àà àAà àYep.€€Thereððs€a€lot€of€people€that€have€thoseÏnowadays.ÌÌÓÓMoreover,€Husband€testified€that€he€was€caring€for€his€mother€whoÏhad€recently€had€a€stroke.ÌÌà àDespite€Husband's€own€testimony,€Dr.€Williams€opined€thatÏHusband€could€not€even€perform€ministerial€tasks€such€as€sackingÏgroceries.€€Clearly,€the€evidence€is€contradictory.€€Thus,€theÏtrial€court€was€justified€in€not€accepting€Dr.€Williamsðð€opinionÏas€conclusive.€€Further,€although€Husband€contends€that€the€courtÏrejected€in€full€Dr.€Williams'€opinion,€the€record€revealsÏotherwise.€€In€its€order,€the€court€cut€Husbandððs€obligation€byÏmore€than€fifty€percent.€€Had€the€court€rejected€the€expertððsÍopinion€in€toto€there€would€have€been€no€need€for€a€reduction€atÏall.€€Moreover,€although€the€court€ordered€Husband€to€ð ðimmediatelyÏattempt€to€secure€appropriate€gainful€employment.€.€.€,ðð€theÏœrecord›€reveals€that€the€court€did€not€intend€for€the€termÏð ðappropriateðð€to€refer€to€the€types€of€employment€Mr.€WilliamsÏperformed€at€Behr€and€Nissan.€€Instead,€the€trial€court€recognizedÏthat€manual€employment€was€sufficient.€€While€issuing€its€rulingÏat€the€hearing,€the€court€stated€as€follows:€€ð ðI€want€$350€perÏmonth€out€of€that€account€to€go€to€Mrs.€Williams,€for€your€alimonyÏpayment,€and€that€will€continue€until€you€come€in,€Mr.€Williams,Ïand€tell€me€that€you've€found€a€job,€even€if€it's€a€manual€job.€.Ï.€.ðð€€Husbandððs€first€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àHusbandððs€second€issue€involves€the€construction€of€theÏlanguage€in€a€courtððs€decree.€€The€final€decree€of€divorce€enteredÏbetween€the€parties€stated€as€follows:€ð ðMr.€Williams€is€ordered€toÏpay€spousal€support€in€futuro€in€the€amount€of€$750.00€per€monthÏuntil€the€date€of€his€retirement€or€the€date€of€Mrs.€WilliamsððÏremarriage.ðð€€Husband€claims€that€he€retired€from€Behr€and€therebyÏeliminated€his€alimony€obligation.€€Wife,€on€the€other€hand,Ïcontends€that€Husband€did€not€actually€retire€and€that€he€isÏattempting€to€avoid€the€alimony€obligation.ÌÌà àHusband€argues€that€the€final€decree€gave€him€completeÏdiscretion€to€determine€his€retirement€date,€instead€of€assigningÏa€specific€age€or€other€limitation.€€Husband€claims€that€the€courtÍgranted€him€such€control€because€of€the€sizable€estate€it€grantedÏto€Wife€and€because€Husband€never€earned€a€substantial€incomeÏuntil€he€began€his€job€with€Nissan.€€Despite€Husbandððs€assertionÏin€this€court€that€Wife€received€a€greater€share€of€the€maritalÏestate,€his€response€to€Wifeððs€petition€recognized€that€theÏoriginal€division€of€the€marital€property€was€nearly€equal.€€As€toÏthe€other€claims,€we€find€no€evidence€in€the€record€to€supportÏthem€nor€does€Husband€point€to€any€particular€references.ÌÌà àð ðJudgments€are€to€be€construed€like€other€writtenÏinstruments,€the€determinative€factor€being€the€intention€of€theÏcourt€as€gathered€from€all€parts€of€the€judgment.ðð€€òòò òBranch€v.ÏBranchóóó ó,€35€Tenn.€App.€552,€555„56,€249€S.W.2d€581,€582„83Ï(1952)(citations€omitted).€€To€determine€the€intent€of€the€trialÏcourt,€courts€must€focus€on€the€language€in€the€decree€and€shouldÏconstrue€the€language€in€light€of€its€plain,€ordinary€and€popularÏmeaning.€€òòò òSee€Duvier€v.€Duvieróóó ó,€No.€01„A„01„9311„CH„0050,€1995ÏWL€422465,€at€*3€(Tenn.€App.€19€July€1995).€€If€there€is€still€noÏresolution,€courts€may€then€consider€the€circumstances€existing€atÏthe€time€of€the€decree.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.€€It€is€difficult€to€set€out€the€plainÏor€ordinary€meaning€of€retirement€as€used€by€the€trial€courtÏbecause€it€used€the€term€in€its€most€general€sense€providing€noÏrestrictions.€€This€was€also€the€case€in€òòò òDuvier€v.€Duvieróóó ó.€€InÏthat€case,€this€court€looked€to€the€surrounding€circumstances€toÏdetermine€the€courtððs€intent.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€Applying€this€same€logic€toÏthe€present€case,€it€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€theÍevidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€the€trial€court's€finding€thatÏHusband€had€not€retired.ÌÌà àThe€court€entering€the€final€decree€of€divorce€did€not€intendÏfor€Husband€to€retire€at€will.€€To€the€contrary,€the€evidenceÏestablishes€that€the€court€intended€the€alimony€to€continue€intoÏthe€future,€perhaps€until€Husband€reached€the€traditional€age€ofÏretirement€or€was€forced€to€retire.€€Indeed,€Husband€was€only€51Ïat€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€Further,€he€had€worked€at€Nissan€forÏtwelve€and€a€half€years€and€there€was€no€evidence€that€he€plannedÏto€leave.€€Finally,€the€parties€had€been€married€for€28€years€andÏthere€was€a€significant€disparity€between€their€earningÏcapacities.ÌÌà àAt€the€very€least,€the€chancery€court€could€have€intended,€asÏdid€the€court€in€òòò òDuvieróóó ó,€that€the€alimony€continue€until€HusbandÏretired€from€Nissan.€€If€this€were€true,€the€decree€would€stillÏobligate€Husband€to€continue€making€the€payments€because€it€isÏclear€that€he€did€not€retire€from€Nissan.€€Rather,€he€quit€inÏorder€to€accept€what€he€expected€to€be€a€more€lucrativeÏopportunity.€€For€the€foregoing€reason,€Husbandððs€second€issue€isÏwithout€merit.€€To€avoid€future€disputes,€we€remand€to€theÏchancery€court€to€define€retirement€as€used€in€the€final€decree€ofÏdivorce.ÌÌà àHusbandððs€third€issue€asks€whether€there€is€any€evidence€toÍsupport€the€trial€courtððs€finding€of€contempt.€€Specifically,ÏHusband€argues€that€he€lacked€the€ability€to€comply€with€theÏcourtððs€order.€€In€addition,€Husband€contends€that€the€sentenceÏissued€by€the€judge€was€improper.€€The€determination€of€whether€aÏparty€is€in€contempt€of€a€courtððs€order€is€within€the€discretionÏof€the€trial€court.€€As€such,€we€may€not€reverse€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€absent€an€abuse€of€that€discretion.€€òòò òRobinson€v.€AirÏDraulics€Engððg€Co.óóó ó,€214€Tenn.€30,€37,€377€S.W.2d€908,€912Ï(1964).€€ÌÌà àThere€are€two€types€of€contempt,€civil€and€criminal.€Ïð ðCriminal€contempt€actions€are€those€to€preserve€the€power€andÏvindicate€the€dignity€of€the€court€while€civil€contempt€actionsÏare€those€brought€to€enforce€private€rights.ðð€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€It€is€aÏgeneral€rule€that€a€court€can€not€find€a€person€guilty€of€contemptÏif€that€person€lacked€the€ability€to€comply€with€the€courtððsÏorder.òò€€€ò òBradshaw€v.€Bradshawó óóó,€23€Tenn.€App.€359,€363,€133ÏS.W.2d€617,€619€(1939);€òòò òGossett€v.€Gossettóóó ó,€34€Tenn.€App.€654,Ï658,€241€S.W.2d€934,€936€(1951).€€ð ðððWhere€an€alleged€contemner,Ïhowever,€has€voluntarily€and€contumaciously€brought€on€himselfÏdisability€to€obey€an€order€or€decree,€he€cannot€avail€himself€ofÏa€plea€of€inability€to€obey€as€a€defense€to€a€charge€ofÏcontempt.ðððð€òòò òBradshawóó,€ó ó133€S.W.2d€at€619€(citations€omitted).€€ÌÌà àThe€evidence€in€this€case€demonstrates€that€not€only€didÏHusband€have€the€ability€to€pay€the€alimony€for€a€certain€periodÍof€time,€but€that€he€voluntarily€put€himself€in€a€position€inÏwhich€he€was€unable€to€make€the€payments.€€First,€HusbandÏtestified€that,€at€the€time€he€terminated€his€employment€withÏBehr,€he€had€been€able€to€ð ðsave€quite€a€bit€of€moneyðð€because€BehrÏhad€paid€for€all€of€his€expenses€and€meals€while€he€traveled.€ÏNevertheless,€Husband€did€not€use€this€money€to€pay€any€part€ofÏhis€alimony€obligation.€€Second,€he€did€not€petition€the€court€toÏreduce€the€alimony€award€until€after€Wife€filed€her€petition€forÏcontempt.€€Also,€Husband€voluntarily€quit€his€job€at€Nissan€evenÏthough€he€was€doing€well€and€had€received€a€promotion.€€Finally,Ïhe€voluntarily€quit€taking€Prozac€and€did€not€contact€his€doctorÏfor€more€than€six€months.€ÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that,€although€HusbandÏlacked,€to€some€degree,€the€ability€to€pay€the€original€alimonyÏaward€at€the€time€of€the€hearing,€he€did€not€lack€such€abilityÏduring€the€entire€period€from€October€1994€to€May€1995.€€Further,Ïthe€evidence€preponderates€against€a€finding€that€he€completelyÏlacked€the€ability€to€pay€the€alimony€at€any€point€in€time.€€Thus,Ïthe€court€did€not€err€in€finding€Husband€guilty€of€criminalÏcontempt.€€Nevertheless,€the€court€did€err€when€it€sentencedÏHusband€to€a€thirty€day€suspended€jail€term.€€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€29„9„103(b)€limits€the€courts€to€a€$50.00€fineÏand€ten€days€of€imprisonment.€€òòò òSherrod€v.€Wixóóó ó,€849€S.W.2d€780,Ï786€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„9„103(b)€(1980).€€ForÏthis€reason,€we€modify€the€courtððs€sentence€from€thirty€days€toÍten€days.ÌÌà àIn€his€final€issue,€Husband€argues€that€the€court€shouldÏterminate€his€alimony€obligation€because€Wifeððs€needs€are€less€andÏbecause€he€lacks€the€ability€to€pay.€€Specifically,€HusbandÏcontends€that,€at€present,€Wifeððs€income€and€assets€are€greaterÏthan€his.€€Husbandððs€contentions€are€without€merit.€€Wifeððs€incomeÏhas€only€increased€by€$2,000.00€since€1994.€€Further,€there€is€noÏevidence€that€her€accumulation€of€assets€has€changed€since€theÏcourt€entered€the€divorce€decree.€€Finally,€while€it€is€true€thatÏHusbandððs€ability€has€diminished,€it€is€the€opinion€of€the€courtÏthat€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€establishes€that€he€isÏcapable€of€performing€some€form€of€income€producing€activity.€ÏThus,€Husband€has€failed€to€establish€that€the€chancery€courtÏabused€its€discretion€when€it€decided€against€terminating€theÏHusband's€alimony€obligation.ÌÌà àAs€to€wife's€request€for€attorney's€fees,€it€is€the€opinionÏof€this€court€that€the€issue€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court.€Ïð ð[T]he€trial€court€is€the€proper€forum€for€the€determination€ofÏwhether€attorney[']s€fees€should€be€awarded€and€their€amount.ðð€Ïòòò òChaille€v.€Warrenóóó ó,€689€S.W.2d€173,€180€(Tenn.€App.€1985)(citingÏòòò òFolk€v.€Folkóóó ó,€210€Tenn.€367,€379,€357€S.W.2d€828,€828„29€(1962)).€ÏThe€decision€of€whether€to€allow€attorney's€fees€for€an€appealÏincludes€a€review€of€the€ability€to€pay,€the€success€of€theÏappeal,€the€good„faith€of€the€appellant€in€bringing€the€appeal,Íthe€need€for€the€payment,€and€any€other€particular€facts€of€theÏindividual€case.€€òòò òFolkóóó ó,€357€S.W.2d€at€829.Ìà àÌà àFor€the€forgoing€reasons,€we€modify€that€portion€of€theÏchancery€courtððs€order€sentencing€Husband€to€thirty€days€forÏcriminal€contempt€to€ten€days.€€The€remaining€portions€of€theÏorder€are€affirmed€in€all€respects.€€The€case€is€remanded€to€theÏchancery€court€to€define€retirement€as€used€in€the€final€decree€ofÏdivorce€and€to€determine€whether€Wife€is€entitled€to€attorney'sÏfees€and,€if€so,€the€amount.€€Costs€are€taxed€toÏrespondent/appellant,€Victor€Legrand€Williams,€Sr.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ______________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE