ÿWPC„ xVV3¶«ÆŒf-ÄUš¿Yª´ —ÐäH:VÕË ÃÞYSÖvaéItuyä ~Ì"U]b™6l¯YÎép' \b-á³ùØGDÝÔÙe íÍ×¼~~ywÅ'á?tÅ|¸/f±.jº`" bëåΠ oêqhÍ“ã>ÂuÌâ‘Æ‘§GO%F‚Oñ½åOg)›jÅÿl$I±|ªi¸“ò ˆ¢hK±i¾ý><øhбÃ'\ é?áõuÿKìX3ñΟ4šØWþÛ•Ë8NëðV«˜ÖÅyˆd‘ö*ð“DäìM‰‚RÚìš ðݨè=êfÚbMëöó"ÄÚ|pñ¿î!Ý\”u$IÔääšø`V4¦o.Ms=R{Yl…# F U NQ %Ÿ 0û¥ UN  wšî 4ˆ œ =« Bè 0? 0DDœˆä$U:&&&&&````````````````````` D3hhh 0D›››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››››› AO߯.. 0Dô D/8 Bg˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLÐ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(ÓŒ $¡¡Ñ7€1dX»d»Xdð7ÑÑ  ÑÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼±g¼»I»ÔÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑ(¶ÍY Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularDD !"#E$%&D'()D*Ó€ýhµ&4%3|x5 3Ý ƒ V4$ÝÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼ôÁ¼XXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€X\§X¼¼ôÁÔHad€DOT€been€aware€of€the€error,€that€is,€had€the€true€location€been€shown,€theÐ ° Ðconsent€of€the€plaintiff€would€have€been€required. d(ï(3½o$¤¤Ý ƒŒ !ÝÑ7€¬´XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼´¥¼XXÔÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ’Ý ƒ V4$ÝÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼ôÁ¼XXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€X\§X¼¼ôÁÔThe€record€indicates€that€Carpenter€was€entirely€versant›€about€the€history€of€thisÐ ° Ðmatter.€€He€did€not€testify.€€When€queried€about€his€failure€to€testify,€counsel€repliedÏsomewhat€cryptically€and€the€matter€was€not€pursued. ÚÝ ƒ V4$ÝÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼ô«¼XXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€X £X¼¼ô«ÔòòThe€offending€curb€is€on€the€right€of€way€of€U.S.€11„E.óó Ô€X÷2XXXÔÔ€îAîîXX÷2ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Ü îîAîÔÐ  ÐÌò òJuly€14,€1999Ð ¶¶ ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ô§Ã ô ÜÔAppellate€CourtÐ –– ÐClerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular 'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒŒ !ÝÑ7€¬´XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÒ°ÒÒH°ÒÔ€¼´¥¼XXÔÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýñ*ñ›ñ*ñÑ  ÑÔ€¼\¼¼¼´¥ÔÑ7€¬´»XdðXXdð7Ññ*ñßr€*<,(j 8 `€€@Ex± tt0"°°¨Órß›ñ*ñà@  Ìàò òòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@LL(ÌàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌÌœÌÌ›ÌÌó óóóSTELLA€WOODY,à h àà À àà  à)à p àGREENE€CIRCUITÐ  b Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àPlaintiff/Appelleeà h àà À àà  à)à p àNO.€03A01„9811„CV„00390Ð 2‚  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìv.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àHON.€KINDALL€T.€LAWSONÐ R¢  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àJUDGEÐ b²  ÐROY€ALLEN€JOHNSON€andà À àà  à)Ð r  ÐGREENEVILLE€OIL€&€à h àà À àà  à)Ð ‚Ò ÐPETROLEUM€COMPANY,€INC.,à  à)Ð ’â Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àREVERSED€andÐ ¢ò Ðà ` àDefendants/Appellantsà À àà  à)à p àDISMISSEDÐ ² ÐÌÌÌRichard€M.€Currie,€Jr.,€Kingsport,€for€Appellants.ÌCharles€R.€Terry,€Morristown;€W.€Lewis€Jenkins,€Jr.,€Dyersburg;€and€Douglas€T.ÏJenkins,€Rogersville,€for€Appellee.ÌÌÌà@!!(Ìàò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NˆÐ B ’ ÐÌÓÓà ` àó óóóà@*ÌàòòThe€CaseˆÐ ^"® ÐÓ  Óà ` àóóThis€is€an€action€for€damages€for€the€alleged€erection€and€maintenance€of€aÐ ~$Î Ðprivate€temporary€nuisance€affecting€the€plaintiffððs€property.€€The€jury€returned€aÏverdict€for€the€plaintiff€for€damages€for€the€years€1995€„€1996€in€the€amount€ofÏ$50,000.00.€The€motion€of€the€defendant€for€judgment€NOV€or€for€a€new€trial€wasÏoverruled.€€This€appeal€resulted.Ìà ` àThe€issues€are:€(1)€Whether€there€was€material€evidence€to€support€the€findingÏthat€the€defendants„appellants€created€and€maintained€a€œnuisance;›€(2)€whether€thereÏwas€material€evidence€to€justify€an€award€of€damages;€(3)€whether€expert€testimonyÏwas€properly€admitted€with€respect€to€the€costs€of€constructing€an€alternate€entranceÏto€the€plaintiffððs€œproperty;›€and€(4)€whether€expert€testimony€was€properly€admittedÏwith€respect€to€projects€unrelated€to€the€case€at€Bar.€€Our€resolution€of€the€first€issueÏis€dispositive€of€this€appeal€and€we€pretermit€a€consideration€of€the€remainingÐ Þ;.74S Ðissues.Ìâ âà ` àSince€this€is€a€jury€case,€the€verdict€must€be€upheld€if€material€evidence€canÏbe€identified€in€the€record,€T.€R.€C.€P.€13(d);€òòœPullen›€v.€œTextron›,€óó845€S.W.2d€777Ð  ` Ð(Tenn.€App.€1992).Ìà@99(ÌàòòThe€PleadingsóóˆÐ P   Ðà ` àThe€complaint€alleges€that€the€plaintiff€owns€a€parcel€of€land€near€theÏintersection€of€U.S.€Highway€11„E€and€Interstate€81,€adjoining€a€parcel€owned€byÏthe€defendant€Johnson,€which€was€carved€out€of€the€plaintiffððs€property€and€leasedÏto€the€defendant,€Greeneville€Oil€Company,€Inc.,€œwhñ(ñichñ(ññ)ñoñ)ñ,›€on€August€9,€1995,Ïobtained€a€highway€entrance€permit€from€the€Tennessee€DOT€allowing€theÏconstruction€of€an€entrance€from€U.S.€Highway€11„E.€€It€is€alleged€that€this€entranceÏblocks€the€plaintiffððs€entrance€onto€her€property€from€U.S.€Highway€11„E,€withÏresulting€damages.€€By€amended€complaint,€the€plaintiff€demanded€that€the€allegedÏnuisance€created€by€the€construction€of€the€entrance€by€the€defendants€should€beÏœabated.›Ìà ` àThe€defendants€denied€that€they€created€a€nuisance€by€the€erection€of€aÏlawfully€permitted€entrance€into€their€property.Ìà ` àThe€case€was€submitted€to€the€jury€on€the€sole€issue€of€whether€the€defendantsÏcreated€and€maintained€a€nuisance€for€which€damages,€if€any€proved,€were€sought.€ÏThe€demand€for€the€abatement€of€the€nuisance€was€apparently€abandoned.Ìà@ÌàòòThe€Evidence€Respecting€a€NuisanceˆÐ P1 ,* Ðà ` àóóConsidered€in€the€best€possible€light€to€the€plaintiff,€and€disregarding€allÐ p3À., Ðcontrary€evidence,€the€evidence€revealed€that€the€plaintiff€owns€a€20„plus€acre€tractÏâ âof€land€in€œGreenñ'ñeñ'ñ›€County€œat›€the€intersection€of€Interstate€81€and€U.S.€11„E.€€TheÐ °730 ÐInterstate€is€immediately€œwest›€of€the€property;€U.S.€11„E€is€a€divided,€four„œlaned›,Ïlimited„access€highway€bounding€the€property€on€the€œsouth.›Ìâ âà ` àœIdell›€Road,€extending€œnorth›€and€œsouth,›€intersects,€but€does€not€cross,€U.S.€11„¼E€directly€across€from€the€plaintiffððs€property.€€There€is€a€cut€in€the€median€of€U.S.Ï11„E€adjacent€to€the€œsouthwest›€corner€of€her€property,€which€is€unimproved.Ìà ` àIn€1986,€the€plaintiff€and€her€husband€sold€a€1.34€acre€tract€in€the€œsouthwest›Ïcorner€of€their€property€to€Gene€and€Lois€Smith.€€By€this€deed€they€created€two€(2)Ïsmall€triangular€reciprocal€easements€in€recognition€of€access€from€U.S.€11„E,€oneÏof€which€was€for€the€benefit€of€the€remaining€land€of€the€plaintiff.€€It€was€located€inÏthe€œsoutheast›€corner€of€the€1.34€acres€sold€to€Smith.€€A€similar€easement€on€theÏplaintiffððs€property€for€the€benefit€of€Smith€was€created.€€The€two€sides€of€theÏtriangle€formed€a€near„right€angle€and€measured€30€feet€from€the€œsoutheast›€cornerÏof€the€1.34€acre€tract€northwardly€along€the€boundary€between€the€respectiveÏproperties,€and€measured€from€the€common€corner€of€these€properties€30€feetÏwestwardly€along€the€southern€boundary€of€the€1.34€acre€tract,€which€is€also€theÏnorthern€margin€of€the€right€of€way€of€U.S.€11„E.Ìà ` àThese€easements€were€described€as€allowing€for€ingress€and€egress€to€eachÏparty€across€the€respective€corners€of€the€otherððs€property.Ìà ` àSmith€constructed€a€gas€station€and€restaurant€on€the€1.34€acre€tract,€andÏapplied€to€the€DOT€for€a€permit€to€construct€a€driveway€to€his€property.€€In€theÏdrawing€presented€with€his€application,€the€property€line€between€his€tract€and€theÏproperty€of€the€plaintiff€was€represented€to€be€about€25€feet€east€of€its€actualÏlocation.׃ ×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Smith€operated€the€gas€station€until€1988€when€he€sold€it€to€Myers€andÐ 0/€*( МKilday›.€€The€1.34€acre€tract€was€acquired€by€the€defendant€Johnson€in€1994.Ìà ` àThe€plaintiff€is€an€elderly€lady€who€lives€in€Anderson€County€and€wasÏessentially€not€involved€in€œthe€management›€of€her€property.€€She€relied€upon€GeorgeÐ 5à0. ÐCarpenter,œ×ƒ ×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€a€nephew€and€œGreene›€County€resident,€who€acted€as€her€agent€in€allÐ ° Ðmatters€pertaining€to€the€property.€It€was€the€sale€of€the€1.34€acre€tract€that€generatedÏthe€difficulties€encountered€by€the€plaintiff€with€respect€to€her€remaining€property.Ìà ` àAn€entrance€at€the€median€cut€must€be€in€line€with€the€cut€according€to€theÏRules€&€Regulations€of€DOT.€€Vehicles€exiting€the€property€must€be€able€to€œñ ñcrossÏthe€westbound€lanes€and€ñ ñturn›€left€œ(ññeññññññsññññññastññññEstññ)›€into€the€eastbound€lanes,€and€any€entranceÏmust€be€located€at€least€12.5€feet€from€the€adjoining€property€line.€€If€thisÏrequirement€œisññ€notññ›€satisfied,€the€entrance€would€not€line€up€properly€with€the€medianÏcut,€which€the€DOT€cannot€extend€eastwardly€for€two€reasons:€first,€œññit€will€notÏauthorize€ññcuts›€longer€thanÏ80€œfeetññ€will€not€be€permittedññ,›€and€secondly,€the€œññelevationsññññ›gradesññ›€of€the€œeastññboundññ›€and€westboundÏlanes€of€U.S.€11„E€are€not€the€same€at€the€œcut.ññ€€ññññà È àœññññÌ›à ¸ àññThe›€triangular€easements€heretoforeÏdiscussed,€agreed€upon€by€the€plaintiff€and€her€husband,€œññand€by€Smith,€ññwith›€inputÏby€Carpenter,€œññand€agreed€upon€by€Smith,€ññproved›€to€be€inadequate€for€access€by€large€vehicles.€€For€severalÏyears,€Carpenter,€on€behalf€of€the€plaintiff,€tried€unsuccessfully€to€obtain€DOTÏapproval€of€a€commercial€entrance€at€the€Idell€Road€median€cut€for€the€plaintiffððsÏproperty.€€The€record€reveals€that€he€was€repeatedly€advised€that€the€approval€of€theÏadjoining€landowner€would€be€necessary.Ìà ` àThe€record€contains€a€rather€astonishing€amount€of€evidence€reflecting€theÏefforts€of€the€parties€to€adjust€this€matter.€€Over€a€period€of€about€five€years,Ïbeginning€in€1989,€Carpenter,€on€behalf€of€the€plaintiff,€held€discussions€withÏJohnson€about€constructing€an€access€road€from€U.S.€11„E€across€the€plaintiffððs€andÏdefendantððs€properties.€€Carpenter€also€attempted€to€persuade€the€DOT€to€approveÏan€entrance€to€the€plaintiffððs€property.€€The€plaintiff€testified€that€her€nephew€madeÏnumerous€trips€to€Nashville€to€contact€the€DOT€about€the€problem.€€Because€aÐ 5à0. Ðportion€of€the€1.34€acre€tract€would€be€utilized€for€the€access€road,€the€defendantÏurged€the€plaintiffððs€agent€to€trade€a€measure€of€her€land€lying€to€the€rear,€north,€ofÏthe€1.34€tract,€in€exchange.€€This€urging€was€unavailing.Ìà ` àAfter€the€defendant€acquired€the€1.34€acre€tract,€he€employed€an€engineeringÏfirm,€Vaughn€&€Melton,€to€assist€in€its€development.€€An€architect,€John€Fisher,€wasÏalso€employed.€€There€was€a€drainage€easement€on€the€westerly€two„thirds€of€theÏproperty€which€had€been€created€œññand€retained€ññby›€DOT€when€Interstate€81€was€œconstructedññ.ññññ,ññññ€€ThisÏeasementññññ›€whichññ›€hampered€development.€€Melton€and€Vaughn€œññin€timeññññ›proceeded€toññ›€œdevelopññedññ›€a€plan€forÏa€driveway€from€U.S.€11„E€into€the€property€that€was€acceptable€to€the€TennesseeÏœDOTññ,€the€design€of€which€took€into€accountññññ.›Ìñññ ñ€ñ ñññà ` àThe€design€of€the€driveway€involved€ññthe›€plaintiffððs€property,€because€of€theÏDOT€requirement€that€a€driveway€must€be€at€least€12.5€feet€from€the€adjoiningÏ(plaintiffððs)€property€line,€òòunless€approval€is€obtained€from€the€adjoining€owner,óó€andÐ ` Ðbecause€the€right€of€the€plaintiff€to€use€the€easement€created€in€her€deed€to€SmithÏhad€to€be€respected.Ìà ` àThe€driveway€is€located€12.5€feet€from€the€plaintiffððs€property€line,€but€inÏorder€to€preserve€access€to€the€easement,€the€curbing€along€the€driveway€wasÏlowered€to€grade€level,€thus€allowing€vehicles€unhampered€access€to€the€plaintiffððsÏproperty.Ìà ` àBut€the€curb€delineating€the€entrance€extends€into€the€DOT€right€of€wayÏfronting€the€œññsouthwestññññ›S.W.2Dññ›€corner€of€the€plaintiffððs€property.€€It€was€constructedÏaccording€to€DOT€requirements,€and€prevents€a€vehicle€from€crossing€the€right€ofÏway€directly€onto€the€plaintiffððs€property.€€But€it€is€not€disputed€that€the€curb€wouldÏnot€prevent€the€plaintiff€from€obtaining€a€driveway€permit€if€she€could€otherwiseÏmeet€the€requirements€of€the€DOT€for€a€commercial€entrance€at€that€location.׃×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð 5à0. Ðà ` àThe€plaintiffððs€property€fronts€on€U.S.€11„E€for€several€hundred€feet.€€She€hasÏready€access€to€the€westbound€lanes€of€this€highway.€€To€have€access€to€theÏeastbound€lanes€would€require€an€entrance€road€encroaching€upon€the€defendantððsÏproperty€and€thus€requiring€their€consent€as€well€as€the€approval€of€DOT.Ìà@88*ÌàòòAnalysisˆÐ 0 € Ðóóà ` àThe€appellant€strenuously€argues€that€the€evidence€did€not€establish€theÐ P   Ðcreation€or€maintenance€of€a€nuisance.€€We€agree.€€The€pattern€instruction€mirroredÏTennessee€law€that€a€nuisance€is€an€òòunreasonable€óóor€òòunlawfulóó€use€of€property€thatÐ à Ðresults€in€material€or€substantial€annoyance,€discomfort,€harm€or€injury€to€theÏplaintiff,€or€to€her€free€use,€possession€or€occupation€of€her€property.€€As€held€by€theÏSupreme€Court€in€òòœFulenwider›€v.€Firefighters€Assððn.€Local€1784,óó€649€S.W.2d€268Ð ð@ Ð(Tenn.€1982):ÌÓÓà8 ` àð ðWe€recognize€that€the€term€ððnuisanceðð€is€a€flexible€one€which€hasÏbeen€applied€to€many€different€factual€situations€and€in€many€differentÏcontexts.€€It€usually€refers,€however,€to€the€creation€of€some€condition,Ïsuch€as€noise,€open€burning,€or€other€offensive€and€unreasonablyÏdangerous€conditions€.€.€.€.ððÐ ` 8"` 8" ÐÌÓÓà ` àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€term€ð ðnuisanceðð€is€not€so€flexible€as€to€includeÏthe€factual€scenario€presented€in€this€case.€€The€defendants€merely€constructed€anÏentrance€into€and€upon€their€property.€€They€did€not€trespass€or€encroach€upon€theÏplaintiffððs€property.€€No€legal€right€of€the€plaintiff€was€violated.€€The€curbingÏcomplained€of€was€mandated€and€approved€by€the€Tennessee€DOT;€the€plaintiffððsÏright€to€access€her€property€òòthrough€the€easement€on€the€defendantððs€property€wasÐ 0/€*( Мundisturbed.ñ!ñ€€óóñ!ññ"ñThe€defendants€made€no€unlawful€use€of€thñ"ññ#ññ"ñe€pñ"ññ#ññ$ñeir€property.ñ$ññ!ñòòñ!ñ›Ð P1 ,* Ðà ` àóóWe€hold€that€as€a€matter€of€law€the€undisputed€evidence€does€not€prove€theÐ p3À., Ðexistence€of€a€private€nuisance.€€We€agree€with€the€appellant€that€considered€in€theÏbest€possible€light€to€the€plaintiff€the€evidence€merely€established€that€the€defendantsÏand€their€predecessors€in€title,€for€nearly€a€decade,€declined€to€give€the€requisiteÐ Ð9 52 Ðpermission€to€the€plaintiff€for€the€construction€of€an€entrance€which€would€haveÏencroached€upon€their€property.€€Resolution€by€mediation€failed,€equity€wasÏapparently€not€resorted€to,€and€this€action€alleging€a€common„law€temporaryÏnuisance€was€filed,€which,€if€sustainable,€can€be€repeatedly€filed€until€the€defendantÏcapitulates€and€surrenders€his€rights€and€his€property€to€the€plaintiff€whose€initialÏconveyance€of€the€1.34€acres€is€at€the€heart€of€the€problem.€€The€actions€of€theÏdefendants€cannot€logically€be€described€as€the€unreasonable,€unwarrantable,€orÏunlawful€use€of€their€property,€nor€as€the€result€of€improper,€indecent,€or€unlawful€Ïpersonal€conduct,€nor€as€anything€that€endangered€the€plaintiffððs€life€or€health,€orÏoffended€her€senses,€or€violated€the€laws€of€decency,€to€utilize€the€historical€andÏempirical€elements€of€a€nuisance.€€òòœSherrod›€v.€Dutton,€óó635€S.W.2d€117€(Tenn.€App.Ð ð@ Ð1982);€òòCaldwell€v.€Knox€Concrete€Products,€óó391€S.W.2d€5€(1964);€and€the€host€ofÐ ` Ðcases€œñ%ñtñ%ñherein›€cited.Ìà ` àThe€judgment€is€reversed.€€The€motion€of€the€defendants„appellants€for€aÏdirected€verdict€is€granted,€and€the€suit€of€the€plaintiff€is€dismissed.€€Costs€areÏassessed€to€the€appellee.€€The€case€is€remanded€for€all€appropriate€purposes.ÌÌÓӜ̛à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_______________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌœñ&ñÌÌÌÌÌÌÌñ&ñÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌœ______________________________›ÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌœ_______________________________›ÌHerschel€P.€Franks,€JudgeÌÐ Ð9 52 ЇÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ