ÿWPCQ 6“(ÅLÄjq*X‚„vSFù,‹Š^½ägËÜfÑP%pÜl²3ÙWÊQœë¨(¨NN#ïd H¬ÔòŽò±ê[l?T2}Æ®Àº AG€Iu¯æ1~€9^1`qâwrÖ˜0@Ï1]­~”záÈxQÚÂXçð¼³*Š ñ%’j‚H£™–ÞÙE–Î66vÃârEmø0.ô‘³ŸÖ…mHªXi™SVöƒú‰^ú•b É$‘Œ•|ÊkÊåO3äÜ,YÊOíá¾·Y;;—nMßc„ꓪØÖA2BQ޶gÜD&MF±´.¤ðLÓë|=ž:Å/¥Œï_²›_;¸yîcVæ²F +Anã±JHi,ˆÕªuµ¾àà…Zá’6 _Zßà ”ñ ór6ókä§–¥|ýíX³”¬BjXO¿’C¸ªúòív)ãäŠÂ¨§aJô4¡a i3ÊG¬Ó î)ÑI=¶ƒ&·å´‚Ÿ„Ø»}x¬0Íœ {Ã7Û0ÍÈb#Á\^  %) 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz P‘ Æá Ƨ ÆmÆ3 0DùN=?‰GEÐÐҼ럧§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§bFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 0ëNNNN B99 0¤V D3ú D-- 0KZZ AS¥Æø 0¤¾ 0Db A«¦˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0,}.)â »(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularŠ~&)€(¢ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ FÝ ƒRÃs$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€is€not€a€novel€or€unheard€of€tactic€among€creditorsðð€lawyers€who€have€been€known€to€refer€to€it€asÐ ° Ðð ðinviting€everyone€to€the€Ô_Ôparty.ððÔ_Ô€€Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó  Ý ƒRÃs$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€rule€was€reflected€in€the€Latin€maxim€òòÔ_ÔodiosaÔ_Ô€non€Ô_ÔpraesumiturÔ_Ôóó€(odious€things€are€not€presumed).€€It€wasÐ ° Ðbased€on€the€charitable€notion€that€individual€deportment,€for€the€most€part,€is€consistent€with€the€socially€desirable€idealÐ tÄ Ðof€good€moral€conduct.€€1€Spencer€A.€Gard,€òòJones€on€Evidenceóó€ðð€3:11€(1972)€(€discussing€the€presumption€in€the€contextÐ 8ˆ Ðof€criminal€cases).€€ Ý ƒRÃs$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔLewis€Carroll,€òòThe€Annotated€Alice:€Aliceððs€Adventures€in€Wonderland€&€Through€the€Looking€Glassóó€231Ð ° Ð(1960).€òòóó€ ²Ý ƒRÃs$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€9.02€with€regard€to€pleading€fraud. •Ý ƒRÃs$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€order€voluntarily€dismissing€ACIððs€claims€against€Brookside€is€not€in€the€record.€€Counsel€informed€theÐ ° Ðcourt€during€oral€argument€of€the€disposition€of€these€claims.€€It€is€undisputed€that€Brookside€is€not€a€party€to€this€appeal.€Ð tÄ Ð- ù-(|G2Ãs$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€N-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç­ò»»Ô d(|3Gy$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€N-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Gy$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€N-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€N-»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑÀ°ÑÔ€¼N-»»»ÔÑ8€IXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñà@¦ ¦ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@§§$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ  Ðà@ff!ìàApril€1998€SessionˆÐ Ô$ ÐÔ‡XIX»¼N-ÔÌò òÔ#†¼N-»XXIÂ#ÔÓ  ÓAMERICAN€CABLE€CORP.òòóó€v.€ACI€MANAGEMENT,€INC.,€òòet€al.óóÔ‡XIX»¼N-Ôó óÐ Ò" ÐÓÓÌà@Ç Ç ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyˆÐ Ò " Ðà@Æ Æ ìàNo.€95„74„I€€€€€€Irvin€H.€Kilcrease,€Jr.,€ChancellorˆÐ ¾  ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<` A߈Ð ‚Ò  ÐÌà@. . ìàNo.€M1997„00280„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€September€14,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ԈР}Í  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<T` AßÐ U¥  Ðó óÌThis€appeal€involves€a€legal€dispute€arising€out€of€a€contract€to€install€television€cable€in€AlabamaÐ P   Ðand€Mississippi.€€After€the€corporation€that€installed€the€cable€did€not€receive€full€payment€for€itsÐ <Œ Ðwork,€it€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€Tennessee€against€the€corporation€andÐ (x Ðpartnership€that€hired€it€and€the€president€of€the€defendant€corporation.€€The€trial€court€granted€aÐ d Ðsummary€judgment€dismissing€the€claims€against€the€defendant€corporationððs€president,€and€theÐ P Ðinstaller€took€a€default€judgment€against€the€corporation€for€$1,059,743.€€On€this€appeal,€the€installerÐ ì< Ðtakes€issue€with€the€summary€judgment€dismissing€its€claims€against€the€defendant€corporationððsÐ Ø( Ðpresident.€€We€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€properly€granted€the€summary€judgment€becauseÐ Ä Ðthe€installer€failed€to€demonstrate€that€it€will€be€able€to€prove€all€the€essential€elements€of€its€tortÐ ° Ðclaims€against€the€defendant€corporationððs€president.Ð œì ÐÌò òÓ  ÓTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Affirmedó óÐ tÄ ÐÓJ ÓÌòòÔ#†¼N-»àXIT#ÔÔ‡XIX.¼N-ÔWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,€óóJ.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHenry€F.€Todd,€P.J.,€M.S.,óóÐ Lœ Ðand€òòJerry€Smith,€J.óó,€joined.Ð 8ˆ ÐÌW.€Gary€Blackburn€and€William€J.€Shreffler,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€AmericanÐ !`  ÐCable€Corporation.Ð ü!L! ÐÌH.€Frederick€Humbracht,€Jr.,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Vince€King.Ð Ô#$# ÐÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼N-»XXIó #ÔÔ‡XIX»¼N-ԈР¬%ü % ÐÌÔ#†¼N-»XXI #ÔÔ€XIX»¼N-Ôà  àACI€Management,€Inc.€(ð ðACIðð)€was€the€general€partner€of€a€Brookridge€Cable€SpecialÐ „'Ô"' ÐPurpose€Partnership€(ð ðÔ_ÔBrookridgeÔ_Ôðð).€€ACI€and€Brookridge€obtained€contracts€to€install€televisionÐ p(À#( Ðcable€in€Alabama€and€Mississippi.€€In€December€1993,€they€entered€into€an€oral€contract€withÐ \)¬$) ÐAmerican€Cable€Corporation€(ð ðAmerican€Cableðð)€to€install€four€hundred€miles€of€cable€in€Cullman,Ð H*˜%* ÐAlabama€and€Hatton,€Alabama€and€in€Iuka,€Mississippi.€€The€parties€agreed€that€American€CableÐ 4+„&+ Ðwould€perform€the€work€and€then€submit€invoices€for€the€completed€work€to€ACI€and€Brookridge.€Ð  ,p', ÐThese€invoices€were€to€be€payable€within€thirty€days.Ð  -\(- Ðâ âÐ ø-H).ýC Ðà  àAmerican€Cable€commenced€work€and€began€submitting€invoices€to€ACI€and€Brookridge.€Ð ° Ðâ âAt€first,€ACI€and€Brookridge€paid€these€invoices€in€a€timely€manner;€however,€their€payments€beganÐ œì Ðto€fall€behind€before€the€contract€had€been€in€effect€for€a€full€fiscal€quarter.€€By€the€third€week€ofÐ ˆØ ÐMarch€1994,€ACI€and€Brookridge€owed€American€Cable€$450,000€for€work€that€had€already€beenÐ tÄ Ðperformed€and€invoiced.€€Even€though€the€relationship€between€the€parties€began€to€deteriorate,Ð `° ÐAmerican€Cable€continued€to€work€and€to€submit€invoices.€€By€mid„May€1994,€ACI€and€BrookridgeÐ L œ Ðstill€owed€American€Cable€$300,000.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àAt€this€point,€American€Cable€sought€assurances€from€ACI€and€Brookridge€that€it€would€beÐ  ` Ðpaid€for€the€work€being€performed.€€Vincent€King,€ACIððs€president,€told€American€Cable€that€itsÐ ü L  Ðinvoices€would€be€paid€and€instructed€American€Cable€to€continue€working.€€Mr.€King€apparentlyÐ è 8  Ðalso€told€American€Cable€that€it€would€not€be€paid€until€the€subscribers€in€the€three€cities€whereÐ Ô$  Ðcable€was€being€laid€began€to€purchase€cable€subscriptions.€€American€Cable€continued€working,€butÐ À  ÐACI€and€Brookridge€paid€only€$25,000€of€the€invoiced€charges.€€When€the€work€was€fully€performedÐ ¬ü  Ðin€August,€1994,€American€Cableððs€outstanding,€overdue€invoices€amounted€to€$444,134.53.€€Mr.Ð ˜è  ÐKing€acknowledged€that€ACI€and€Brookridge€owed€the€money€and€assured€American€Cable€that€itÐ „Ô  Ðwould€be€paid.€€During€the€remainder€of€1994,€ACI€and€Brookridge€paid€American€Cable€anotherÐ pÀ Ð$175,330.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  à€€€In€January€1995,€American€Cable€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ 4„ Ðagainst€ACI,€Brookridge,€and€Mr.€King.€€The€claims€asserted€against€Mr.€King€included€promissoryÐ  p Ðfraud€and€unjust€enrichment.€€ACI,€Brookridge,€and€Mr.€King€denied€liability,€and€BrookridgeÐ  \ Ðcounterclaimed€against€American€Cable€for€delay€in€performing€the€work.€€Prior€to€trial,€AmericanÐ øH ÐCable€voluntarily€dismissed€Brookridge€as€a€party.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€March€1996,€the€trial€court€granted€summaryÐ ä4 Ðjudgment€dismissing€all€the€personal€claims€against€Mr.€King.€€Three€months€later,€on€June€17,€1997,Ð Ð  Ðthe€trial€court€awarded€American€Cable€a€$1,059,743€judgment€against€ACI.€€American€Cable€nowÐ ¼  Ðappeals€from€the€summary€judgment€dismissing€Mr.€King€as€a€defendant.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ˆÐ €Ð Ðà@0 0 ìàòòAppellate€Review€of€Summary€Judgmentsóóó óˆÐ l¼ ÐÌò òòòóóó óà  àAs€we€have€said€many€times,€summary€judgments€are€not€some€sort€of€disfavored€proceduralÐ D!” Ðshortcut.€€òòBradley€v.€McLeodóó,€984€S.W.2d€929,€932€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòMansfield€v.€ColonialÐ 0"€  ÐFreight€Sys.óó,€862€S.W.2d€527,€530€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993)òòóó.€€They€are,€instead,€part€and€parcel€of€theÐ #l! Ðpretrial€proceedings€in€most€civil€cases.€€Their€salutary€purpose€is€ð ðto€enable€the€courts€to€pierce€theÐ $X" Ðpleadings€to€determine€whether€the€case€justifies€the€time€and€expense€of€a€trial.ðð€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847Ð ô$D # ÐS.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993).€€Accordingly,€a€summary€judgment€motion€can€provide€a€relativelyÐ à%0!$ Ðquick€and€efficient€means€of€concluding€a€case€when€the€law€is€clear€and€when€the€material€facts€areÐ Ì&"% Ðnot€genuinely€disputed.€€òòSmith€v.€Bridgestone/Firestone,€Inc.óó,€2€S.W.3d€197,€200€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ¸'#& Ð1999).Ð ¤(ô#' Їà  àThe€party€seeking€the€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuineÐ ° Ðdispute€of€material€fact€exists€and€that€it€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€òòShadrick€v.Ð œì ÐCokeróó,€963€S.W.2d€726,€731€(Tenn.€1998);€òòBelk€v.€Obion€Countyóó,€7€S.W.3d€34,€36€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ˆØ Ð1999).€€Once€the€moving€party€carries€its€burden,€the€nonmoving€party€must€come€forward€withÐ tÄ Ðevidence€to€demonstrate€that€there€are€sufficient€factual€disputes€to€warrant€a€trial.€€The€nonmovingÐ `° Ðparty€may€carry€its€burden€by€(1)€pointing€to€evidence€either€overlooked€or€ignored€by€the€movingÐ L œ Ðparty€that€creates€a€material€factual€dispute,€(2)€rehabilitating€evidence€challenged€by€the€movingÐ 8 ˆ Ðparty,€(3)€producing€additional€evidence€that€creates€a€material€factual€dispute,€or€(4)€submitting€anÐ $ t Ðaffidavit€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.07€requesting€additional€time€for€discovery.€Ð  ` ÐòòMcCarley€v.€West€Quality€Food€Serv.óó,€950€S.W.2d€585,€588€(Tenn.€1998);òò€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2dÐ ü L  Ðat€215€n.6;€òòDeVore€v.€Deloitte€&€Toucheóó,€No.€01A01„9602„CH„00073,€1998€WL€68985,€at€*3€(Tenn.Ð è 8  ÐCt.€App.€Feb.€20,€1998)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€€Nonmoving€parties€who€do€notÐ Ô$  Ðcarry€their€burden€face€summary€dismissal€of€the€challenged€claim€because,€as€our€courts€haveÐ À  Ðrepeatedly€observed,€the€ð ðfailure€of€proof€concerning€an€essential€element€of€a€cause€of€actionÐ ¬ü  Ðnecessarily€renders€all€other€facts€immaterial.ðð€€òòAlexander€v.€Memphis€Individual€Practice€Assððnóó,€870Ð ˜è  ÐS.W.2d€278,€280€(Tenn.€1993);òò€Strauss€v.€Wyatt,€Tarrant,€Combs,€Gilbert€&€Milomóó,€911€S.W.2dÐ „Ô  Ð727,€729€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àWhen€reviewing€a€summary€judgment€on€appeal,€we€must€consider€the€same€materialsÐ H˜ Ðconsidered€by€the€trial€court€to€decide€anew€whether€the€summary€judgment€was€appropriate.€€òòHunterÐ 4„ Ðv.€Brownóó,€955€S.W.2d€49,€50„51€(Tenn.€1997);€òòMason€v.€Seatonóó,€942€S.W.2d€470,€472€(Tenn.€1997);Ð  p ÐòòHart€v.€Tourteóó,€10€S.W.3d€263,€267„68€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€Summary€judgments€enjoy€noÐ  \ Ðpresumption€of€correctness€on€appeal.€€òòNelson€v.€Martinóó,€958€S.W.2d€643,€646€(Tenn.€1997);€òòCityÐ øH Ðof€Tullahoma€v.€Bedford€Countyóó,€938€S.W.2d€408,€412€(Tenn.€1997).€€Thus,€when€we€review€aÐ ä4 Ðsummary€judgment,€we€view€all€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party,€andÐ Ð  Ðwe€resolve€all€factual€inferences€in€the€nonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòLuther€v.€Comptonóó,€5€S.W.3d€635,Ð ¼  Ð639€(Tenn.€1999);€òòMuhlheim€v.€Knox€County€Bd.€of€Educ.óó,€2€S.W.3d€927,€929€(Tenn.€1999).€€WeÐ ¨ø Ðwill€find€summary€judgments€appropriate€only€when€the€governing€law€applied€to€the€uncontrovertedÐ ”ä Ðfacts€permits€only€one€conclusion€ð"ð€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÐ €Ð Ðlaw.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153€(Tenn.€1995);€òòBelk€v.€Obion€Countyóó,€7€S.W.3d€atÐ l¼ Ð36„37.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@……)ìàò òII.ó óˆÐ 0"€  Ðà@‰‰ìàòòò òThe€Claims€Against€Mr.€Kingó óóóˆÐ #l! ÐÌà  àAmerican€Cableððs€sole€argument€on€appeal€is€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€granting€a€summaryÐ ô$D # Ðjudgment€dismissing€its€claims€against€Mr.€King€personally.€€Mr.€King€characterizes€AmericanÐ à%0!$ ÐCableððs€tactics€as€nothing€more€than€ð ða€collection€effort€where€the€[creditor]€attempted€to€bring€inÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€president€of€one€of€the€defendants€simply€to€apply€pressure.ðð׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Whatever€American€CableððsÐ ¸'#& Ðmotives,€we€have€determined€that€it€has€not€demonstrated€that€it€will€be€able€to€prove€all€the€essentialÐ ¤(ô#' Ðelements€of€its€promissory€fraud€or€negligent€misrepresentation€claims€against€Mr.€King.Ð )à$( Їà@‹‹)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà@  ìàòòò òPersonal€Liability€of€Corporate€Officersó óóóˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àThe€law€distinguishes€between€corporations€and€their€officers€and€directors.€€CorporationsÐ tÄ Ðare€distinct€legal€entities.€€òòGeneral€Tel.€Co.€v.€Boydóó,€208€Tenn.€24,€29,€343€S.W.2d€872,€875€(1960);Ð `° ÐòòJackson€Mobilphone€Co.€v.€Tennessee€Pub.€Serv.€Commððnóó,€876€S.W.2d€106,€115€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð L œ Ð1993).€Corporate€officers€and€directors€are€considered€agents€of€the€corporation.€€As€agents,€they€areÐ 8 ˆ Ðnot€personally€liable€for€the€corporationððs€debts.€€òòSchlater€v.€Haynieóó,€833€S.W.2d€919,€924€(Tenn.Ð $ t ÐCt.€App.€1991);€òòBowman€v.€Home€Med.€Co.óó,€7€Tenn.€Civ.€App.€(Higgins)€265,€285€(1917);€3A€JamesÐ  ` ÐSolheim€&€Kenneth€Elkins,€òòFletcherððs€Cyclopedia€on€the€Law€of€Private€Corporationsóó€ðð€1117€(rev.Ð ü L  Ðperm.€ed.€1994).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€relation€between€corporations€and€their€creditors€is€one€based€on€contract.€€òòBowman€v.Ð À  ÐHome€Med.€Co.óó,€7€Tenn.€Civ.€App.€(Higgins)€at€287.€€A€corporationððs€contracts€do€not€personallyÐ ¬ü  Ðbind€the€corporate€officers€who€execute€them.€€òòBill€Walker€&€Assoc.,€Inc.€v.€Parrishóó,€770€S.W.2dÐ ˜è  Ð764,€770€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€Ordinarily,€an€officer€of€a€corporation€can€be€held€personally€liableÐ „Ô  Ðto€a€disappointed€creditor€of€the€corporation€only€if€the€officerððs€own€conduct€toward€that€party€hasÐ pÀ Ðbeen€tortious.€€òòSchlater€v.€Haynieóó,€833€S.W.2d€at€924;€òòBowman€v.€Home€Med.€Co.óó,€7€Tenn.€Civ.Ð \¬ ÐApp.€(Higgins)€at€285.€€When€a€corporate€officer€has€engaged€in€tortious€conduct,€he€or€she€may€beÐ H˜ Ðliable€to€third„parties,€and€this€liability€is€separate€and€independent€from€any€liability€the€corporationÐ 4„ Ðmay€have.€€òòJudds€v.€Pritchardóó,€No.€01A01„9701„CV„00030,€1997€WL€589070,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð  p ÐSept.€24,€1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed);€òòBrungard€v.€Caprice€Records,€Inc.óó,€608Ð  \ ÐS.W.2d€585,€590„91€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980).Ð øH ÐÌà  àIt€is€beyond€reasonable€dispute€that€Mr.€King€cannot€be€personally€liable€to€American€CableÐ Ð  Ðfor€ACIððs€contractual€debt.€€Realizing€this,€American€Cable€argues€that€Mr.€Kingððs€liability€is€notÐ ¼  Ðderived€from€ACIððs€contractual€obligations,€but€rather€is€based€on€his€own€tortious€acts.€Ð ¨ø ÐAccordingly,€we€turn€to€American€Cableððs€promissory€fraud€and€negligent€misrepresentation€claimsÐ ”ä Ðagainst€Mr.€King.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà@)ìàò òB.ó óˆÐ X ¨ Ðà@‹‹ìàòòò òThe€Promissory€Fraud€Claimó óóóˆÐ D!” ÐÌà  àIn€order€to€make€out€a€claim€for€promissory€fraud€against€Mr.€King,€American€Cable€mustÐ #l! Ðallege€and€prove€that€he€promised€to€perform€some€act€in€the€future€and€that€at€the€time€he€made€theÐ $X" Ðpromise€he€had€no€intention€to€honor€it.€€òòAxline€v.€Kutneróó,€863€S.W.2d€421,€423€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ô$D # ÐApp.1993);€òòDobbs€v.€Guentheróó,€846€S.W.2d€270,€274€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòOak€Ridge€PrecisionÐ à%0!$ ÐIndus.,€Inc.€v.€First€Tenn.€Bankóó,€835€S.W.2d€25,€28€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€When€faced€with€Mr.Ð Ì&"% ÐKingððs€summary€judgment€motion,€American€Cable€was€obligated€to€demonstrate€that€it€would€beÐ ¸'#& Ðable€to€prove€that€Mr.€King€lacked€any€intention€of€paying€American€Cable€during€the€summer€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ð1994€when€he€stated€that€American€Cableððs€invoices€would€be€paid.Ð )à$( ÐÌà  àThe€evidentiary€record€on€this€point€is€not€particularly€well€developed.€€When€we€match€theÐ h+¸&* Ðfacts€in€the€affidavits€and€depositions€with€American€Cableððs€legal€arguments,€American€Cable€isÐ T,¤'+ Ðsimply€asking€us€(and€presumably€the€jury)€to€infer€that€Mr.€King€must€never€have€intended€to€payÐ ° Ðits€invoices€because€all€of€American€Cableððs€invoices€were€not€paid.€In€addition€to€its€pronouncedÐ œì Ðcircularity,€this€argument€brings€to€mind€Tweedledeeððs€definition€of€logic:€€ð ð[Ô_ÔI]fÔ_Ô€it€was€so,€it€mightÐ ˆØ Ðbe;€and€if€it€were€so,€it€would€be;€but€as€it€isnððt,€it€ainððt.ðð׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àGetting€at€a€personððs€intent€can€be€a€tricky€proposition,€made€no€less€difficult€because€intentÐ L œ Ðand€action€are€usually€separated€in€time€and€because€intentions€are€sometimes€only€imperfectlyÐ 8 ˆ Ðcarried€into€action.€€Actions€are€only€crude€gauges€of€the€intent€behind€them,€but€they€are€frequentlyÐ $ t Ðthe€only€gauges€available.€€In€addition,€people€can€sometimes€be€less€than€candid€about€theirÐ  ` Ðintentions€or€motives.€€Thus,€judges€and€juries,€lacking€the€ability€to€look€into€a€personððs€mind,€areÐ ü L  Ðleft€to€deduce€a€personððs€intent€from€his€or€her€actions€or€from€other€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòStateÐ è 8  Ðv.€Washingtonóó,€658€S.W.2d€144,€146€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983);€òòBurns€v.€Stateóó,€591€S.W.2d€780,€784Ð Ô$  Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1979).€Ð À  ÐÌà  àAs€in€other€cases€where€intent€is€an€issue,€a€party€may€prove€an€intent€to€defraud€usingÐ ˜è  Ðconduct€or€other€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòMetropolitan€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Hedgepathóó,€182€Tenn.€296,Ð „Ô  Ð300,€185€S.W.2d€906,€907€(1945).€€However,€proving€fraudulent€intent,€like€pleading€fraud,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€isÐ pÀ Ðparticularly€demanding.€€Outside€of€cases€involving€fiduciary€relationships,€fraud€can€never€beÐ \¬ Ðpresumed.€€òòIn€re€Ashleyóó,€5€B.R.€262,€266€(Bankr.€E.D.€Tenn.€1980);€òòSnapp€v.€Mooreóó,€2€Tenn.€(2Ð H˜ ÐOvert.)€236,€239€(1814);€òòHiller€v.€Haileyóó,€915€S.W.2d€800,€803€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€òòóóThis€rule€isÐ 4„ Ðpart€of€the€lawððs€larger,€overarching€view€that€where€the€same€set€of€circumstances€can€give€rise€toÐ  p Ðopposite€inferences,€the€law€presumes€innocent€acts€rather€than€intentional€misconduct.€€òòMemphisÐ  \ ÐCotton€Press€&€Storage€Co.€v.€Hansonóó,€4€Tenn.€App.€293,€301€(1926).׃¤×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Thus,€no€inference€of€fraudÐ øH Ðshould€be€made€from€circumstances€that€equally€permit€reasonable€inferences€of€non„fraudulentÐ ä4 Ðconduct.òò€€In€re€Homeróó,€45€B.R.€15,€22€(Bankr.€W.D.€Mo.€1984).Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àFailure€to€perform€a€promise,€standing€alone,€is€not€competent€evidence€that€the€promisorÐ ¨ø Ðnever€intended€to€perform.€€òòWorld€Help€v.€Leisure€Lifestyles,€Inc.óó,€977€S.W.2d€662,€670€(Tex.€Ct.Ð ”ä ÐApp.€1998).€€In€the€context€of€a€promissory€fraud€claim,€the€mere€fact€that€the€promisor€failed€toÐ €Ð Ðperform€the€promised€act€is€insufficient€by€itself€to€prove€fraudulent€intent.€€òòBryant€v.€SouthernÐ l¼ ÐEnergy€Homes,€Inc.óó,€682€So.€2d€3,€5€(Ala.€1996)€(affirming€summary€judgment);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòIn€reÐ X ¨ ÐEmeryóó,€52€B.R.€68,€70€(Bankr.€E.D.€Pa.€1985).€€The€reason€is€that€ordinarily,€where€nothing€else€isÐ D!” Ðshown,€mere€failure€to€perform€a€promise€can€be€as€consistent€with€an€honest€intent€as€with€aÐ 0"€  Ðdishonest€one.€€òòMurphy€v.€T.B.€OððToole,€Inc.óó,€87€A.2d€637,€638€(Del.€Super.€Ct.€1952).€€Not€everyÐ #l! Ðbroken€promise€starts€with€a€lie.Ð $X" Їà  àMr.€Kingððs€summary€judgment€motion€required€American€Cable€to€demonstrate€that€it€couldÐ ° Ðpresent€some€competent€and€material€evidence€that€Mr.€King€never€intended€to€keep€his€promiseÐ œì Ðwhen€he€made€it.€€òòLonning€v.€Jim€Walter€Homes,€Incóó.,€725€S.W.2d€682,€685€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986).€Ð ˆØ ÐAmerican€Cable€could€have€forestalled€the€summary€judgment€in€two€ways.€€First,€it€could€haveÐ tÄ Ðpointed€to€competent€evidence€tending€to€establish€Mr.€Kingððs€lack€of€present€intent.€€EvidenceÐ `° Ðmerely€inviting€the€fact„finder€to€guess€at€Mr.€Kingððs€intent€would€not€be€competent.òò€€Black€MotorÐ L œ ÐCo.€v.€Spiceróó,€160€S.W.2d€336,€337€(Ky.€Ct.€App.€1942);€òòFarmer€v.€Stateóó,€208€Tenn.€75,€78,€343Ð 8 ˆ ÐS.W.2d€895,€896€(1961)€(observing€that€no€person€may€be€deprived€of€his€or€her€rights€byÐ $ t Ðconjecture).€€Second,€it€could€have€pointed€to€evidence€from€which€a€fact„finder€could€reasonablyÐ  ` Ðinfer€that€Mr.€King€did€not€intend€to€pay€American€Cable€when€he€promised€that€it€would€be€paid.€Ð ü L  ÐTo€be€permissible,€however,€such€an€inference€cannot€be€based€on€speculation€or€conjecture.€€It€mustÐ è 8  Ðbe€reasonably€drawn€from€the€facts€on€which€it€purports€to€be€based,€and€it€must€be€made€inÐ Ô$  Ðaccordance€with€correct€and€common€modes€of€reasoning.€€òòPatton€v.€L.O.€Brayton€&€Co.óó,€184€Tenn.Ð À  Ð592,€598,€201€S.W.2d€981,€984€(1947).Ð ¬ü  ÐÌòòóóà  àAmerican€Cableððs€promissory€fraud€claim€is€supported€by€evidence€of€two€facts:€first,€thatÐ „Ô  ÐMr.€King€promised€in€May€and€August€1994€that€American€Cable€would€be€paid€for€its€work€andÐ pÀ Ðsecond,€that€American€Cable€was€not€thereafter€paid€for€its€work€in€full.€€However,€those€facts,Ð \¬ Ðstanding€alone,€cannot€support€the€inference€that€Mr.€King€never€intended€for€American€Cable€to€beÐ H˜ Ðpaid€for€its€work.€€Without€more,€that€conclusion€would€be€nothing€but€speculation.€€To€get€past€aÐ 4„ Ðsummary€judgment€motion,€a€non„moving€party€must€do€much€more€than€set€the€stage€for€wildÐ  p Ðguesses.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àThe€record€contains€one€other€piece€of€evidence€that€could€possibly€shed€some€light€on€Mr.Ð ä4 ÐKingððs€intentions€when€he€promised€American€Cable€that€it€would€be€paid€for€its€work.€€ThisÐ Ð  Ðevidence€consists€of€Edward€Timmonsððs€affidavit€in€which€he€states€that€Mr.€King€ð ðasked€me€toÐ ¼  Ðverbally€discredit€the€quality€of€the€work€of€.€.€.€American€Cable€Corporation€so€that€[it]€would€notÐ ¨ø Ðhave€to€get€paid€for€the€work€it€had€provided.ðð€€If€this€statement€was€made€before€orÐ ”ä Ðcontemporaneous€with€Mr,€Kingððs€promises€that€American€Cableððs€invoices€would€be€paid,€it€wouldÐ €Ð Ðprovide€some€evidence€that€Mr.€King€was€looking€for€ways€to€avoid€paying€American€Cable.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àMr.€Timmons€does€not,€however,€state€when€this€conversation€took€place.€€Taking€Mr.Ð D!” ÐTimmonsððs€statements€as€true,€which€we€must€for€summary€judgment€purposes,€we€do€not€knowÐ 0"€  Ðwhether€it€occurred€before€or€after€Mr.€King€promised€that€American€Cableððs€invoices€would€be€paidÐ #l! Ðor€even€whether€it€occurred€after€this€lawsuit€was€filed.€€Thus,€we€are€left€to€guess€when€theÐ $X" Ðstatement€was€made.€€Without€more€details,€Mr.€Timmonsððs€statement€that€Mr.€King€wanted€him€toÐ ô$D # Ðdiscredit€American€Cableððs€work€is€legally€insufficient€to€create€a€factual€dispute€regarding€Mr.Ð à%0!$ ÐKingððs€intent€in€May€and€August€1994.€€American€Cable€failed€to€demonstrate€that€it€could€produceÐ Ì&"% Ðadmissible€evidence€from€which€a€trier„of„fact€could€reasonably€conclude€that€Mr.€King€had€noÐ ¸'#& Ðintention€to€pay€American€Cable€when€he€promised€that€the€companyððs€invoices€would€be€paid.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐAccordingly,€the€trial€court€correctly€granted€summary€judgment€on€the€promissory€fraud€claim.Ð )à$( ÐÌÌÐ T,¤'+ Ðà@‹‹)ìàò òC.ˆÐ ° Ðà@Z Z ìàòòThe€Negligent€Misrepresentation€Claimóóó óˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àAlmost€two€centuries€ago,€Chief€Justice€Best€summarized€the€essence€of€a€misrepresentationÐ tÄ Ðclaim€as€follows:€€ð ðHe€who€affirms€either€what€he€does€not€know€to€be€true,€or€knows€to€be€false,Ð `° Ðto€anotherððs€prejudice€and€his€own€gain,€is,€both€in€morality€and€law,€guilty€of€falsehood,€and€mustÐ L œ Ðanswer€in€damages.ðð€€òòAdamson€v.€Jarvisóó,€4€Bing€66,€73,€130€Eng.€Rep.€693,€696€(C.P.€1827).€€Today,Ð 8 ˆ Ðthese€principles€are€embodied€in€the€elements€of€the€cause€of€action€for€negligent€misrepresentationÐ $ t Ðfound€in€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€552€(1977)€which€has€been€adopted€by€the€TennesseeÐ  ` ÐSupreme€Court.€€Thus,€a€plaintiff€seeking€damages€for€negligent€misrepresentation€must€prove:€Ð ü L  ÐÌà0  à(1)€à0` (#(#àthat€the€defendant€was€acting€in€the€course€of€its€business,€profession,€orÐ Ô$  Ðemployment,€or€in€a€transaction€in€which€it€had€a€pecuniary€(as€opposed€toÐ À  Ðgratuitous)€interest;Ьü ` (#` (# ÐÌà  à(2)à0 ` àthat€the€defendant€supplied€faulty€information€meant€to€guide€others€in€their€businessÐ „Ô  Ðtransactions;ÐpÀ` (#` (# ÐÌà  à(3)à0 ` àthat€the€defendant€failed€to€exercise€reasonable€care€in€obtaining€or€communicatingÐ H˜ Ðthe€information;€andÐ4„` (#` (# ÐÌà  à(4)à0 ` àthat€the€plaintiff€justifiably€relied€upon€the€information€provided€by€the€defendant.Ð \` (#` (# ÐÌòòRobinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€423,€427€(Tenn.€1997);€òòRitter€v.€Custom€Chemicides,€Inc.óó,€912Ð ä4 ÐS.W.2d€128,€130€(Tenn.€1995);€òòJohn€Martin€Co.€v.€Morse/Diesel,€Inc.óó,€819€S.W.2d€428,€431€(Tenn.Ð Ð  Ð1991).Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àAmerican€Cableððs€negligent€misrepresentation€claim€against€Mr.€King€hinges€on€theÐ ”ä Ðtestimony€of€its€vice€president€that€ð ðKing€stated€that€ACI€and€Brookridge€were€successful€andÐ €Ð Ðfinancially€strong€developers€of€cable€projects.ðð€€Assuming,€as€we€must,€that€Mr.€King€made€thisÐ l¼ Ðstatement,€it€could€only€provide€a€basis€for€a€negligent€misrepresentation€claim€if€(1)€ACIððs€andÐ X ¨ ÐBrookridgeððs€financial€condition€was€not€successful€and€financially€strong€when€Mr.€King€made€theÐ D!” Ðstatement€and€(2)€Mr.€King€did€not€use€reasonable€care€in€obtaining€or€communicating€thisÐ 0"€  Ðinformation.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àThe€appellate€record€contains€absolutely€no€evidence€of€either€ACIððs€or€BrookridgeððsÐ ô$D # Ðfinancial€condition€while€American€Cable€was€performing€the€work.€€The€suit€had€been€pending€forÐ à%0!$ Ðmore€than€one€year€by€the€time€Mr.€King€filed€his€summary€judgment€motion€ð!ð€time€enough€forÐ Ì&"% ÐAmerican€Cable€to€ascertain€the€companiesðð€financial€condition€by€discovering€their€books€andÐ ¸'#& Ðrecords.€€Yet,€American€Cable€apparently€presented€no€evidence€regarding€the€companiesðð€financialÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcondition€in€May€or€August€1994€when€Mr.€King€allegedly€represented€that€their€financial€conditionÐ )à$( Ðwas€solid.€€Thus,€we€find€ourselves€back€on€the€road€to€surmise€and€conjecture.€€For€all€we€can€tellÐ |*Ì%) Ðfrom€this€record,€Mr.€Kingððs€representations€about€the€companiesðð€financial€condition€may€very€wellÐ h+¸&* Ðhave€been€true€when€he€made€them.Ð T,¤'+ Їà  àAs€tested€by€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€American€Cableððs€negligent€misrepresentationÐ ° Ðclaim€has€even€less€factual€substance€than€its€promissory€fraud€claim.€€Its€affidavits€opposing€Mr.Ð œì ÐKingððs€summary€judgment€motion€contain€no€factual€information€about€ACIððs€or€BrookridgeððsÐ ˆØ Ðfinances€in€1994.€€This€information€is€essential€because€without€it,€American€Cable€cannot€prove€thatÐ tÄ Ðthe€two€entitiesðð€financial€positions€were€not€strong€and€that€Mr.€King€failed€to€use€reasonable€careÐ `° Ðin€obtaining€or€communicating€the€information€regarding€their€financial€condition.€€Accordingly,Ð L œ ÐAmerican€Cable€failed€to€come€forward€with€competent€evidence€either€to€create€a€genuine€factualÐ 8 ˆ Ðdispute€regarding€ACIððs€and€Brookridgeððs€financial€condition€in€1994€or€to€demonstrate€its€abilityÐ $ t Ðto€prove€all€the€elements€of€its€negligent€misrepresentation€claim.€€In€light€of€these€shortcomings,Ð  ` Ðthe€trial€court€properly€granted€the€summary€judgment€dismissing€the€negligent€misrepresentationÐ ü L  Ðclaims.Ð è 8  ÐÌà@^^(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ À  ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€order€dismissing€American€Cableððs€claims€against€Vincent€King€and€remandÐ ˜è  Ðthe€case€to€the€trial€court€for€whatever€further€proceedings€may€be€required.€€We€also€tax€the€costsÐ „Ô  Ðof€this€appeal€to€American€Cable€Corporation€and€its€surety€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€mayÐ pÀ Ðissue.Ð \¬ ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_________________________________Ð  \ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€