ÿWPC …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) 0c8 0‹› U:& ` 0Jh ² 0T¸ 0^ 0hj 0rÒ 0|D 0†À 0F 1uÖ 0dKU*¯B)ÙDC AME B’÷¯v~¦vÓ$ D3÷ 0@* AOjƹ 0D D/à Bò˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLHÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - äåDæçDèéDêDëìÓ€öDÒ 3|xö("_‡$Ô‡XÁáXXXÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(;(2âà$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XÇXXXÔà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó@"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔH2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d íÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌJuly€2,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHLÿôÿô XG(üHHLd'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€ÇXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌJOE€E.€ARMSTRONG,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9610„CH„00476ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95„1996„IIIÌÙ€€ÙßR€$&#A1-j|qº` ç `€€@ÿRßTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OFà àà à)ÌVETERANS€AFFAIRS,€COMMISSIONERà à)ÌFRED€TUCKER€in€his€official€capacity€asà à)ÌCommissioner€of€the€Tennessee€Departmentà à)Ìof€Veteran€Affairs,€TENNESSEE€CIVILà àà à)ÌSERVICE€COMMISSION€and€ELEANORà à)ÌE.€YOAKUM,€in€her€official€capacity€asà àà à)ÌSecretary€of€the€Tennessee€Civil€Serviceà à)ÌCommissioner,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àRespondents/Appellants.à àà àà à)ÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌPETER€M.€OLSONÌOLSON€&€OLSON,€PLCÌ114€Franklin€StreetÌClarksville,€TN€37040Ìà àAttorney€for€Petitioner/AppelleeÌÌJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌJAMES€C.€FLOYDÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌNashville,€TN€37243„0490Ìà àAttorney€for€Respondents/AppellantsÌÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌWELLES,€J.€ÇÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€!„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€!XÔÌÌÑ7€ Ç XXdæXXdæ7Ñà à›à àœThe€question€in€this€case€is€whether€a€state€employee€protected€byÏcivil€service€has€a€right€to€be€heard€before€being€reclassified€to€the€unprotectedÏexecutive€service.€€The€Chancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€held€that€theÏemployee€had€a€right€to€grieve€the€reclassification.€€We€affirm.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ÌÌó óà àà àThe€appellee,€Joe€E.€Armstrong,€was€initially€hired€at€the€TennesseeÏDepartment€of€Veteran€Affairs€("TDVA")€in€May€of€1989€in€the€position€ofÏAdministrative€Service€Assistant€1,€an€executive€position.€€In€the€Spring€of€1994,Ïby€which€time€Mr.€Armstrong€had€been€promoted€to€the€position€of€AdministrativeÏAssistant€4,€he€was€informed€that€his€employment€status€would€be€transferredÏfrom€executive€to€career€service.€€W.€D.€Manning,€the€Commissioner€of€the€TDVAÏat€the€time,€made€a€written€request€for€such€a€change€"due€to€a€change€in€theÏreporting€relationship."€€He€wrote€that€"[p]rior€to€September€20,€1993€[Mr.ÏArmstrong's€position€along€with€one€other]€reported€directly€to€me"€but€that€theyÏcurrently€were€"reporting€to€Administrative€Services€Assistant€5."€€€The€StateÏDepartment€of€Personnel€approved€Mr.€Manning's€request€by€a€letter€dated€MarchÏ10,€1994€which€stated€that€the€approval€was€"based€upon€the€information€[TDVA]Ístaff€provided€that€these€positions,€which€had€previously€reported€to€€an€[sic]ÏCommissioner,€now€report€to€the€Director€of€Administrative€ServicesÏ(Administrative€[S]ervices€Assistant€5)."ÌÌà à€à àWith€a€change€of€administration,€Fred€Tucker€became€theÏCommissioner€of€the€TDVA€on€January€21,€1995.€€On€February€9,€1995,€Mr.ÏTucker€wrote€a€letter€requesting€that€the€classification€of€three€positions€includingÏMr.€Armstrong's€be€changed€to€executive€status€as€"the€reporting€relationship€ofÏthese€three€positions€has€been€changed€to€report€directly€to€me."€€On€February€22,Ï1995,€Tennessee€Department€of€Personnel€Commissioner,€Susan€Williams,Ïreclassified€Mr.€Armstrong's€position€from€career€service€to€executive€serviceÏstatus.€€Only€two€days€following€the€reclassification€of€Mr.€Armstrong's€position,€onÏFebruary€24,€1995,€Mr.€Tucker€terminated€Mr.€Armstrong€from€this€position.ÌÌà àà àIn€a€letter€dated€March€15,€1995,€Mr.€Tucker€denied€Mr.€Armstrong'sÏrequest€for€a€grievance€hearing€stating€that€the€procedures€granting€employeesÏthe€right€to€grieve€apply€only€to€employees€in€career€services.€€Mr.€Armstrong€thenÏobtained€counsel€and€requested€a€Level€V€hearing€before€the€Commission€in€aÏletter€dated€April€11,€1995.€€On€April€27,€1995,€Ms.€Williams,€as€secretary€of€theÏCommission€sent€Mr.€Armstrong€a€€letter€stating€that€because€he€"was€anÏemployee€occupying€an€executive€service€position€[under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„208(b)(5)],€the€[Commission]€lack[ed]€statutory€authority€to€hear€his€grievanceÍconcerning€€his€dismissal."€€Mr.€Armstrong€then€filed€this€petition€in€ChanceryÏCourt€claiming€that€the€reclassification€of€his€job€and€subsequent€termination€fromÏthis€job€divested€him€of€a€constitutionally€protected€property€right€and€therebyÏdeprived€him€of€due€process.̛̜à@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà à›à àThe€facts€of€this€case€must€be€viewed€with€an€understanding€of€theÏTennessee€Civil€Service€Code€which€divides€all€positions€in€the€state€serviceÏbetween€career€service€and€executive€service.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann€ðð€8„30„208Ï(1993);€€œòòsee›€œalsoóó›€ðð€8„30„101(a)(23)€(Supp.€1996)€(defining€"[s]tate€service"€as€"allÏofficers€and€positions€of€trust€or€employment€in€the€service€of€state€government€inÏthe€executive€branch€and€all€boards,€commissions€and€agencies€in€stateÏgovernment"€with€certain€exceptions).€€Generally€speaking,€executive€serviceÏemployees€are€those€in€higher€level€management€and€administrative€positions.€ÏœòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„208(b);€€œòòsee›€also€œóóOp.›€Att'y€Gen.€95„088€(Tenn.€1995).€€Among€thoseÏpositions€designated€for€executive€service€are€specific€positions€fully€defined€byÏthe€titles€of€the€positions€such€as€"[m]embers€of€boards,€commissions,€agenciesÏand€authorities€and€the€chief€executive€officer€of€each€board,€commission,€agencyÏand€authority€and€the€commissioner€of€each€department."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„208(b)(1).€€The€executive€service€also€includes€positions€which€are€notÏdefined€by€the€particular€job's€title€but€by€the€job's€description.€€An€example€is€theÍcategory€of€executive€service€into€which€the€œappellee's›€position€was€classifiedÏwhich€includes€"[a]ny€position€serving€in€a€confidential€administrative€or€programÏmanagement€capacity€to€a€commissioner,€deputy€commissioner,€assistantÏcommissioner€or€equivalent€authority."€€œòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„208(b)(5).€€All€regular€full„timeÏpositions€in€state€service€which€are€not€designated€as€executive€service€inÏSection€8„30„208(b)€are€in€the€career€service.€€œòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„208(c).ÌÌœà à›à àCareer€service€employees€who€have€completed€their€initial€workingÏtest€periods€are€called€"regular€employees"€and€they€are€given€certain€protectionsÏunder€the€Civil€Service€Code.€€œòòSee›€œid.óó›€ðð€8„30„101(a)(20)€(Supp.€1996)€(definingÏ"regular€employee").€€Section€8„30„328€sets€up€a€grievance€procedure€for€regularÏemployees.€€Moreover,€while€executive€service€employees€serve€at€the€pleasureÏof€their€employer,€Tenn.€Dep't€of€Personnel€R.€ðð€1120„10„.02,€a€regular€employeeÏin€the€career€service€acquires€a€property€right€in€that€position.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„331(a)€(1993).€€With€such€a€right,€"no€suspension,€demotion,€dismissal€orÏany€other€action€which€deprives€a€regular€employee€of€such€employee's€propertyÏright€will€become€effective€until€minimum€due€process€is€provided."€€œòòId.óó›€ððÏ8„30„331(a).€€The€statute€provides€that€minimum€due€process€includes€writtenÏnotice€of€the€charges€and€the€opportunity€to€respond€to€these€charges€before€anyÏaction€is€taken.€€œòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„331(b)(1)„(2).€€The€statute€states€that€the€employee'sÏopportunity€to€respond€"shall€be€for€the€purpose€of€allowing€the€employee€toÍpresent€information€to€the€manager€regarding€the€disciplinary€action€underÏconsideration."€€œòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„331(b)(4).€€ÌÌà àœà àIn›€this€case€the€trial€court€based€its€decision€on€the€TennesseeÏDepartment€of€Personnel€Rules€on€Disciplinary€Actions€which€contain€similarÏlanguage€to€the€code€with€respect€to€minimum€due€process.€€Rule€1120„10„.03(1)Ïstates€that€"[c]areer€employees€have€a€'property€right'€to€a€position€in€theÏclassification€in€which€they€currently€hold€career€status.€€Therefore,€noÏsuspension,€demotion,€dismissal€or€any€other€action€which€deprives€a€regularÏ(career)€employee€of€his€property€right€will€become€effective€until€minimum€dueÏprocess€is€provided€as€outlined€below."€€Like€Section€8„30„331(b)€of€theÏTennessee€Code,€the€Department€rules€provide€that€minimum€due€processÏmandates€written€notification€to€the€employee€of€the€charges€against€him€as€wellÏas€the€opportunity€for€the€employee€to€answer€these€charges€and€presentÏinformation€which€might€influence€the€decision.€Tenn.€Dep't€of€Personnel€R.€1120„10„.03(2).€€œòòSeeóó›€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„205€(1993)€(providing€that€the€rulesÏadopted€by€the€commissioner€to€carry€out€the€provisions€of€the€civil€service€codeÏ"shall€have€the€force€and€effect€of€law").€ÌÌœà@ àò òIII.ó óÌ›à àÌœà à›à àThe€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€ConstitutionÏprotects€individuals€against€government€deprivations€of€"life,€liberty€or€propertyÏwithout€due€process€of€law."€€U.S.€Const.€amend.€XIV,€ðð€1.€€In€a€due€process€case,Ïthe€court€follows€an€established€two„step€analyses€determining€whether€theÏplaintiff€was€deprived€of€a€protected€interest€and,€if€so,€what€process€is€due.€€œòòRowe›Ïv.€Board€of€Educ.€of€œChattanooga,óó›€938€S.W.2d€351,€354€(Tenn.€1996),€òòcert.Ïdeniedóó,€117€S.€Ct.€1271€(1997)€(citing€œòòBoard›€of€Regents€of€State€Colleges€v.€œRothóó,›Ï408€U.S.€564,€569„70,€92€S.€Ct.€2701,€2705,€33€L.€Ed.€2d€548€(1972)).€€The€caseÏbefore€us€focusses€on€the€first€question,€specifically€whether€Mr.€Armstrong€had€aÏconstitutionally€protected€property€interest€in€his€job€giving€rise€to€due€processÏprotection.ÌÌà àœà à"Property›€interests€are€not€created€by€the€federal€constitution.€ÏInstead,€they€are€created€and€defined€'by€existing€rules€or€understandings€thatÏstem€from€an€independent€source€such€as€state€law.'"€€œòòRoweóó,›€938€S.W.2d€at€354Ï(citing€œòòRothóó,›€408€U.S.€at€577,€92€S.€Ct.€at€2709).€€The€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€has€stated€that€"[t]he€hallmark€of€property€.€.€.€is€an€individual€entitlementÏgrounded€in€state€law,€which€cannot€be€removed€except€'for€cause.'"€€œòòLogan›€v.ÏZimmerman€Brush€œCo.óó,›€455€U.S.€422,€430,€102€S.€Ct.€1148,€1155,€71€L.€Ed.€2dÏ265€(1982).€€As€stated€above,€Tennessee€law€gives€certain€civil€serviceÏemployees€a€constitutionally€protected€property€interest€in€continued€employmentÏwhich€cannot€be€extinguished€unless€the€employees€are€afforded€procedural€dueÍprocess.€€œòòSeeóó›€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„331€(1993);€Tenn.€Dep't€of€PersonnelÏR.1120„10„.03(1).ÌÌà àIt€is€not€disputed€that€once€Mr.€Armstrong€became€a€career€employee€inÏMarch€of€1994,€he€satisfactorily€completed€his€initial€probationary€period€underÏthe€administration€of€the€former€Commissioner€of€œTDVA,›€and€thus€became€aÏregular€employee€with€a€property€interest€in€his€employment.€€œòòSeeóó›€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€€8„30„331;€€ðð€€8„30„312€(provides€for€probationary€period€of€at€least€3Ïmonths).€€As€a€regular€employee,€the€law€clearly€provides€that€Mr.€ArmstrongÏcould€not€be€deprived€of€his€property€right€by€"suspension,€demotion,€dismissal€orÏò òany€other€actionó ó"€without€minimum€due€process.€€œòòId.óó›€ðð€8„30„331(emphasisÏadded).€€The€question€becomes€whether€the€reclassification€from€career€toÏexecutive€service€constitutes€"any€other€action"€thereby€triggering€the€minimumÏdue€process€protections€of€Section€8„30„331.€€The€lower€court€answered€thisÏquestion€in€the€affirmative€observing€that€the€language€"any€other€action"€isÏexceedingly€broad.€€We€agree.€€Reclassification€of€an€employee€from€the€careerÏservice€to€the€executive€service€is€just€as€much€a€deprivation€of€property€asÏsuspension,€demotion,€or€dismissal.€€Indeed,€as€Mr.€Armstrong's€case€illustrates,Ïreclassification€might€immediately€precede€termination€and€thereby€provide€theÏstate€with€a€means€of€effecting€suspension,€demotion,€or€dismissal€without€theÏburden€of€providing€due€process.ÌÌœà à›à àMoreover,€with€no€means€to€review€the€reclassification€of€executiveÏservice€employees,€the€state€can€arbitrarily€determine€which€employees€will€loseÏtheir€protected€civil€service€status.€€€As€the€trial€court€noted,€it€"requires€theÏexercise€of€some€discretion€to€decide€whether€a€state€employee€falls€within"€theÏcategory€of€€executive€service€(Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„29(5))€into€which€Mr.ÏArmstrong€was€classified.€€"To€hold€[that€reclassification€does€not€trigger€minimumÏdue€process]€would€completely€eliminate€real€civil€service€protection€for€many,€ifÏnot€most,€career€service€employees.€€The€appointing€authority,€for€whateverÏreason,€political€or€otherwise,€could€simply€reclassify€a€position€and€terminate€theÏemployee."€€This€court€has€recognized€that€the€due€process€clause€was€"intendedÏto€secure€the€individual€from€the€arbitrary€exercise€of€the€powers€of€government."€ÏœòòLee›€v.€œLaddóó,›€834€S.W.2d€323,€325€(Tenn.€App.€1992)€(quoting€€œòòDaniels›€v.ÏœWilliamsóó,›€474€U.S.€327,€331,€106€S.€Ct.€662,€665,€88€L.€Ed.€2d€662,€668€(1986)).€€ÌÌà àœà àWe›€recognize€that€in€both€the€statute€and€the€Department€rule,€theÏprocess€that€is€due€is€articulated€in€the€context€of€disciplinary€procedures€againstÏan€employee.€€Though€"suspension,€demotion,€dismissal€or€any€other€actionÏwhich€deprives€a€regular€employee€of€such€employee's€'property€right'"€mightÏoccur€most€often€as€a€consequence€of€disciplinary€procedures,€the€statute€doesÏrequire€that€the€employee's€loss€be€the€result€of€discipline.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„331(a).Ô% € Ô€€Rather,€the€statute€clearly€creates€a€property€right€without€qualificationÏto€all€"'[e]mployees€who€have€successfully€completed€their€probationary€period"Íand€ensures€due€process€for€"any€.€.€.€action"€which€deprives€them€of€€theirÏproperty€interest.€€œòòId.óó›ÌÌœà à›à àIn€holding€that€the€reclassification€of€an€employee's€position€fromÏcareer€service€to€executive€service€requires€that€the€employee€receive€notice€andÏthe€opportunity€to€respond,€we€acknowledge€that€the€legislature€has€given€theÏCommissioner€of€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Personnel€the€duty€to€assign€theÏpositions€in€the€state€service€which€are€not€specifically€identified€as€career€orÏexecutive€service.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„208(d).€€The€statute€provides€thatÏ"[s]uch€determination€shall€be€based€solely€on€duties,€responsibilities€andÏreporting€relationships€and€ò òshall€not€be€subject€to€review€through€anyÏprocedureó ó."€€œòòId.óó›€(emphasis€added).€€To€the€extent€that€this€statute€cannot€beÏreconciled€with€the€state„created€property€interest€in€employment€possessed€by€aÏTennessee€career€service€employee,€we€find€that€it€is€inadequate€as€a€matter€ofÏconstitutional€law.€€In€addressing€the€nature€of€constitutional€due€process,€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€stated€that€because€"'minimum€[procedural]Ïrequirements€[are]€a€matter€of€federal€law,€they€are€not€diminished€by€the€fact€thatÏthe€State€may€have€specified€its€own€procedures€that€it€may€deem€adequate€forÏdetermining€the€preconditions€to€adverse€official€action'.€.€.€.€€Indeed,€any€otherÏconclusion€would€allow€the€State€to€destroy€at€will€virtually€any€state„createdÏproperty€interest."€€œòòLogan›€v.€Zimmerman€Brush€œCo.óó,›€455€U.S.€422,€102€S.€Ct.Í1148,€71€L.€Ed.€2d€265€(1982)€(quoting€œòòVitek›€v.€œJonesóó,›€445€U.S.€480,€491,€100€S.ÏCt.€1254,€1263,€63€L.€Ed.€2d€552€(1980)).€€ÌÌà àœà àThe›€holding€in€œòòLogan›€œóóis›€instructive.€€There,€the€state€of€Illinois€hadÏestablished€a€comprehensive€scheme€for€adjudicating€allegations€of€employmentÏdiscrimination.€€œòòLoganóó,›€455€U.S.€at€422.€€After€being€discharged€from€theÏdefendant€employer,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€charge€with€the€Illinois€Fair€EmploymentÏPractices€Commission€which€triggered€the€Commission's€statutory€obligation€toÏconvene€a€fact„finding€conference€within€120€days.€€œòòId.óó›€at€426.€€However,€by€noÏfault€of€the€plaintiff's,€the€Commission's€representative€scheduled€the€conferenceÏfor€a€date€five€days€after€the€expiration€of€the€statutory€period.€€œòòId.ó󛀀Finding€theÏlegislative€language€with€regard€to€scheduling€a€conference€within€120€days€to€beÏmandatory,€the€state€supreme€court€held€that€the€failure€to€comply€with€thisÏlanguage€deprived€the€Commission€of€jurisdiction€to€hear€the€plaintiff's€charge.€€ÏœòòId.óó›€at€427.€€In€a€decision€which€reversed€the€state€court,€the€Supreme€CourtÏasserted€that€"'[w]hile€the€legislature€may€elect€not€to€confer€a€property€interest,€.€.€.Ïit€may€not€constitutionally€authorize€the€deprivation€of€such€an€interest,€onceÏconferred,€without€appropriate€procedural€safeguards.'"€€œòòId.óó›€at€432€(quoting€œòòVitekóó,›Ï445€U.S.€at€490„91,€n.6,€100€S.€Ct.€at€1262„62,€n.6)€(quoting€œòòArnett›€v.€œKennedyóó,›Ï416€U.S.€134,€167,€94€S.€Ct.€1633,€1650,€40€L.€Ed.€2d€15€(1974)).€€Thus,€while€theÏGeneral€Assembly€of€Tennessee€can€completely€do€away€with€theÏconstitutionally„protected€interest€in€continued€employment€for€the€state's€civilÍservice€regular€employees,€it€cannot€establish€a€system€where€these€employeesÏcan€be€arbitrarily€deprived€of€their€interest€by€reclassification€without€due€processÏprotection.ÌÌœà à›à àWe€hold€that€Mr.€Armstrong,€as€a€regular€employee€with€a€propertyÏinterest€in€his€position,€had€a€right€to€procedural€due€process€upon€theÏreclassification€of€his€position€to€executive€service.€€In€addition,€he€was€entitled€toÏuse€the€grievance€procedures€established€by€the€legislature€for€regularÏemployees.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„328€(1993)€(grievance€procedures);€€ðð€8„30„331(c)€(stating€that€"[t]he€commission€shall€determine€as€a€preliminary€matter€toÏthe€merits€of€a€grievance,€a€grievant's€allegation€of€denial€of€minimum€dueÏprocess").€€We€œstress›€that€it€is€the€reclassification€of€a€career€service€employee€toÏexecutive€service€that€requires€due€process€and€not€the€termination€of€anÏexecutive€service€œemployee,›€for€the€law€explicitly€provides€that€executive€serviceÏemployees€serve€at€the€pleasure€of€their€employers.€€The€nature€of€Mr.ÏArmstrong's€grievance€or€complaint€must€be€that€his€position€has€been€wronglyÏassigned€to€the€executive€service.€€If€it€is€ultimately€determined€that€Mr.ÏArmstrong's€duties€correspond€to€those€of€an€executive€employee€as€outlined€inÏSection€€8„30„29€and€that€his€reassignment€was€proper,€then€he€will€loose€hisÏproperty€right€in€his€position.€€If,€on€the€other€hand,€it€is€determined€that€his€dutiesÏdo€not€place€him€within€the€scope€of€executive€service,€he€is€entitled€"to€beÏreinstated€or€made€whole€or€both"€pursuant€to€Section€8„30„328(e).€ÌÌœà à›à àLastly,€we€address€œappellant's›€contention€that€there€is€no€legalÏfoundation€for€this€appeal.€€Appellant€claims€that€this€was€not€a€"contested€case"Ïwithin€the€œchancery›€œcourt's›€review€authority€under€the€Uniform€AdministrativeÏProcedures€Act€("UAPA")€which€provides€that€"[a]€person€who€is€aggrieved€by€aÏfinal€decision€in€a€contested€case€is€entitled€to€judicial€review€under€this€chapter."€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„322(a)€(Supp.€1996).€€As€stated,€with€regard€to€the€UAPA,Ïthe€trial€court€concluded€"that€the€decision€not€to€hold€a€contested€case€hearing€isÏsubject€to€judicial€review€just€as€if€a€contested€case€hearing€were€held."€€The€courtÏreasoned€that€"[j]udicial€review€would€be€meaningless€if€it€could€be€avoided€byÏsimply€refusing€to€hold€a€contested€case€hearing.€€More€importantly,€if€a€party€hasÏa€right€to€a€contested€case€hearing€and€is€denied€one,€precluding€judicial€reviewÏof€the€denial€would€leave€the€party€with€no€judicial€redress€of€an€obvious€violationÏof€the€party's€right€to€a€hearing."€€€ÌÌà àœà àIn›€support€of€its€contention€that€the€UAPA€is€inapplicable,€œappellant›Ïrelies€upon€œòòMid„South›€Indoor€Horse€Racing,€Inc.€v.€Tennessee€State€RacingÏœComm'nóó,›€798€S.W.2d€531€(Tenn.€App.€1990),€which€involved€the€issue€of€theÏUAPA's€applicability€to€the€review€of€licensing€proceedings€in€which€the€plaintiffÏwas€denied€a€œlicense›€to€conduct€horse€racing.€€In€€œòòMid„Southóó,›€this€court€stated€thatÏsuch€proceedings€"will€be€treated€as€'contested€cases'€only€if€they€contain€threeÏessential€elements.€€They€must€be€a€'proceeding'€conducted€by€an€'agency'€afterÍthe€opportunity€for€a€'hearing.'€.€.€.€Proceedings€lacking€any€of€these€ingredientsÏare€not€contested€cases."€€œòòId.óó›€at€537.€€In€the€case€before€us,€the€œappellant›€assertsÏthat€since€the€Commission€did€not€conduct€a€proceeding€after€the€opportunity€for€aÏhearing,€there€was€no€"contested€case"€as€is€required€by€the€statute€for€judicialÏreview.ÌœÌà à›à àThe€problem€with€œappellant's›€argument€is€that€the€œòòMid„Southóó›€caseÏdid€not€turn€on€the€fact€that€there€was€no€proceeding€after€the€opportunity€for€aÏhearing€but€rather€on€the€fact€that€no€such€proceeding€was€required.€€The€courtÏstated€"the€licensing€proceeding€involved€in€this€case€was€not€a€contested€caseÏbecause€the€commission€ò òwas€not€requiredó ó€to€afford€Mid„South€a€hearingÏbefore€acting€on€its€application."€òò€œId.óó›€at€537€(emphasis€added).€€Significantly,€theÏUAPA€defines€"contested€case"€as€"a€proceeding,€including€a€declaratoryÏproceeding,€in€which€the€legal€rights,€duties€or€privileges€of€a€party€ò òare€requiredÏby€any€statute€or€constitutional€provisionó ó€to€be€determined€by€an€agencyÏafter€an€opportunity€for€a€hearing."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„102(3)€(1991)Ï(emphasis€added).€€In€œòòMid„Southóó,›€the€court€found€that€state€law€did€not€contain€aÏcontested€case€hearing€requirement€nor€was€there€one€arising€from€aÏconstitutionally€protected€property€interest€in€a€racing€œlicense.›€€œòòMid„Southóó,›€798ÏS.W.2d€at€539„40.€€On€the€other€hand,€in€the€case€at€bar,€we€have€concluded€thatÏdue€process€requires€that€a€regular€employee€with€a€property€interest€in€hisÏposition€receive€the€hearing€and€proceedings€upon€the€reclassification€of€hisÍposition€to€executive€service.€€Since€there€is€a€contested€case€hearingÏrequirement,€we€affirm€the€chancery€court€in€its€determination€that€this€was€aÏproper€matter€for€review€under€the€UAPA.ÌÌà àœà àFor›€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€decision€of€the€chancery€court€isÏaffirmed€in€all€œrespects.›€€As€a€regular€employee€with€a€property€interest€in€hisÏposition€under€Tennessee's€Civil€Service€Code,€Mr.€Armstrong€had€a€right€toÏprocedural€due€process€when€his€position€was€reclassified€to€executive€service.€ÏWe€direct€that€he€be€allowed€to€use€the€grievance€procedures€established€by€theÏlegislature€to€raise€his€complaint€regarding€the€reassignment€of€his€position.€ÏFinally,€we€affirm€the€chancery€court's€œÌÌÌdecision›€to€review€Mr.€Armstrong's€petition€under€the€UAPA.€€The€costs€on€appealÏshould€be€taxed€to€the€state.ÌœÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÇÑ ° ÑÑ X ÑÑ  Ñ