ÿWPC:  7# UN %k 0 šqw@ 4K_ 0Þn 0DL AQ˜ 0Jé 0T3 0^‡ 0hå 0rM 0|¿ 0†; 0Á 1uQ 0dÆ B* ÆG 0D  0@Q 0D‘ D/Õ B D3!U>TB)’DC» AMþU*K¦uG6b˜:¯v~évÓg˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(r7$¡¡ÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÓ  Ó VD‘D’D“”D•D–—Ó€£ n~<$3|x£(Ž(3°$¤¤Ý ƒ7!ÝÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó !"#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd "-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial œÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òJune€30,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€The€definition€of€ð ðhandicapðð€in€the€THRA€is€virtually€identical€to€the€definition€ofÏð ðdisabilityðð€in€the€Rehabilitation€Act.€€Therefore,€Tennessee€courts€seek€guidance€from€both€federalÏand€state€case€law€when€interpreting€the€THRA€definition.€€ò òòòCeciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€361.Ì ,Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Barnes€does€not€appeal€this€ruling.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Although€Barnes€leaves€open€the€possibility€that€Goodyear€may€also€have€regarded€himÏas€handicapped€in€light€of€his€knee€problems,€the€record€contains€no€evidence€that€Goodyear€everÏconsidered€this€as€a€factor€in€any€of€its€employment€decisions.€Ì 0Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Goodyear€concedes€this€point€on€appeal.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ7€ÌÓXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓò ò›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÙ€ ÙœßR€.0-A1-j|¬G` 7 `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌLARRY€W.€BARNES,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellantò òà àà àà à)à àó óObion€Chancery€œNo.€16,153›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌTHE€GOODYEAR€TIRE€AND€RUBBER€€€€€€€€€€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€€02A01„9707„CH„00157Ìò òCOMPANY,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à€à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àà àDefendants/Appellees.à àò òà à)à àÌó óòòÌóóò òÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€OBION€COUNTY€Ìà@ àœAT€UNION€CITY,€TENNESSEE›ÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€œMICHAEL€MALOAN,›€CHANCELLOR€€€€€ÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendants/Appelleesóó:òòÌóóÌDan€M.€Norwood€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àJames€M.€Glasgow,€Jr.ÌJames€R.€Becker,€Jr.à àà àà àà àUnion€City,€TennesseeÌMemphis,€Tennesseeà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àTim€K.€GarrettÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMichael€S.€MoschelÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òà àà àà àà àà àà àREVERSEDÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SP.J.ÌÇÓÓà@ àò òOPINIONÌó óà àThis€is€a€suit€for€wrongful€termination€under€the€Tennessee€Handicap€Act.€€After€denyingÏthe€employerððs€motion€for€a€directed€verdict,€the€trial€court€sent€the€case€to€the€jury€to€determineÏwhether€the€employer€regarded€the€plaintiff€as€handicapped.€€The€jury€found€that€the€employerÏregarded€the€plaintiff€as€handicapped€and€awarded€$150,000€in€back€pay€and€$150,000€forÏhumiliation€and€embarrassment.€€Invoking€remittitur,€the€trial€court€reduced€the€damages€toÏ$100,000€for€back€pay€and€$75,000€for€emotional€damages€and€ordered€the€defendant€to€payÏplaintiff€approximately€$30,000€for€attorneyððs€fees€and€court€costs.€€Both€parties€have€appealed.€ÏWe€œreverse€and€direct€a€verdict€for€the€employer.ò ò›Ìà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant€Larry€W.€Barnes€(ð ðBarnesðð)€was€employed€by€Defendant/AppelleeÏGoodyear€Tire€&€Rubber€Company€(ð ðGoodyearðð)€at€its€tire€manufacturing€facility€in€Union€City,ÏTennessee.€€Goodyear€hired€Barnes€in€1970.€€At€the€time€that€his€employment€was€terminated,ÏBarnes€was€employed€as€a€Process€Control€(ð ðPCðð)€Operator€in€the€Final€Finish€Process€Control€Ïunit€(ð ðthe€Unitðð)€and€earned€approximately€$15€per€hour.€€As€a€PC€Operator,€Barnesðð€primary€dutyÏwas€to€assure€the€quality€of€the€tires€manufactured€at€the€facility.€€The€Unit€consisted€of€sixÏemployees,€with€David€Nelms€(ð ðNelmsðð)€as€the€supervisor.€€€Ìà àDuring€Barnesðð€employment,€he€suffered€recurring€knee€problems.€€Barnes€also€developedÏa€temporary€case€of€Bellððs€Palsy€during€the€summer€of€1989.€€Bellððs€Palsy€is€a€condition€of€theÏnervous€system€that€affects€the€facial€muscles.€€Barnesðð€Bellððs€Palsy€caused€him€to€be€absent€fromÏwork€for€five€or€six€weeks.€€Barnesðð€Bellððs€Palsy€caused€distortion€of€the€facial€muscles,€paralysisÏof€his€eye,€and€slurred€speech.€€All€of€these€symptoms€were€temporary.€€€Barnes€alleged€that€hisÏco„workers€ridiculed€him€because€of€his€Bellððs€Palsy,€and€that€they€were€uncomfortable€in€hisÏpresence.Ìà àAlso€during€the€summer€of€1989,€the€Unit€was€reorganized.€Barnes€had€been€working€onÏthe€first€shift€starting€in€the€morning.€€After€the€reorganization,€Barnes€was€switched€to€the€secondÏshift.€€The€PC€Operators€chose€their€shifts€based€on€their€seniority.€€After€the€most€senior€OperatorÍchose€the€first€shift,€Barnes,€second€in€seniority,€chose€the€second€shift.€€€Nelms€testified€thatÏBarnes€was€upset€about€the€shift€change€and€refused€to€communicate€with€the€first€shift€OperatorÏduring€shift€changes.€€A€performance€evaluation€completed€by€Nelms€for€1989€states€that€BarnesÏneeded€to€ð ðimprove€beginning€and€end€of€shift€communicationsðð€and€that€his€ð ðreaction€to€the€shiftÏchange€was€poor.ðð€€€Barnes,€however,€testified€that€he€was€not€upset€at€the€first€shift€Operator,€andÏthat€he€was€not€bothered€by€the€transition€to€the€second€shift€because€he€enjoyed€hunting€in€theÏmorning.€€Barnes€refuted€Nelmsðð€contention€that€he€did€not€communicate€well€during€shiftÏchanges.€Ìà àIn€August€1990,€Goodyear€notified€its€North€American€plants€that€it€œwould›€reduce€itsÏsalaried€work€force€by€twenty€percent€over€the€next€three€years.€€The€Union€City€plantÏimplemented€its€layoffs€based€on€job€performance.€€Job€performance€was€measured€by€an€elaborateÏperformance€appraisal€scheme€that€had€already€been€implemented€by€Goodyear.€€ManagementÏutilized€performance€appraisals€for€the€1989€calendar€year€in€making€its€layoff€decisions.€€OfÏeighty„eight€quality€assurance€inspectors€at€the€facility,€Barnes€received€the€fifth€lowestÏperformance€evaluation.€€In€September€1990,€Goodyear€laid€off€the€seven€lowest€ranked€qualityÏassurance€inspectors,€including€Barnes.€€€Ìà àAfter€Goodyear€notified€Barnes€that€he€had€been€laid€off,€Barnes€claims€that€he€confrontedÏNelms.€€At€trial,€Barnes€testified€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àI€said,€ð ðWhy€am€I€being€laid€off?€€Is€it€because€of€my€job€performance,€my€attitude,Ïmy€attendance?ðð€€He€said,€ð ðNaw.ðð€€I€said,€ð ðIs€it€because€I€had€Bellððs€palsy€and€IÏmissed€time€and€nobody€else€didnððt?ðð€€He€said,€ð ðThatððs€right.ðð€€He€got€up€and€left.ÌÌÓÓNelms€testified€that€he€did€not€remember€having€such€a€conversation€with€Barnes.€€NelmsÏmaintained€that€he€never€regarded€Barnes€as€being€handicapped€and€that€he€never€consideredÏBarnesðð€Bellððs€Palsy€as€a€factor€in€his€performance€evaluation.Ìà àGoodyear€designated€Barnesðð€layoff€as€ð ðrecallable,ðð€meaning€that€he€was€eligible€for€recallÏfor€a€four€year€period.€€Goodyear€also€offered€Barnes€a€position€with€Hamilton„Ryker,€an€affiliateÏof€Goodyear.€€Barnes€rejected€this€offer.€€He€enrolled€in€barber€school€in€July€œ1991.›€€Ìà àIn€September€1991,€Barnes€filed€this€suit,€alleging€that€Goodyear€violated€the€TennesseeÏHandicap€Act€(ð ðTHAðð),€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€8„50„103€(1993),€by€terminating€hisÏemployment€based€on€his€handicap€or€perceived€handicap.€€In€the€meantime,€Barnes€graduatedÏfrom€barber€school€and€began€working€as€a€barber.€€In€July€1993,€Goodyear€recalled€Barnes€to€anÏhourly€position.€€Barnes€earned€over€$16€per€hour€for€this€position.€€Approximately€one€year€later,ÏBarnes€took€a€medical€disability€from€Goodyear€due€to€a€knee€injury€and€has€not€returned.€€Ìà àBarnesðð€lawsuit€against€Goodyear€went€to€trial€in€May€1996.€At€the€conclusion€of€BarnesððÏproof,€Goodyear€moved€for€directed€verdict,€arguing€that€Barnes€had€failed€to€demonstrate€that€heÏwas€ð ðhandicappedðð€pursuant€to€the€THA.€€The€trial€court€held€that€Barnes€had€failed€to€demonstrateÏthat€he€actually€suffered€from€or€had€a€record€of€€a€handicap.€€The€trial€court,€however,€deniedÏGoodyearððs€motion€with€respect€to€the€issue€of€whether€Goodyear€ð ðregardedðð€Barnes€asÏhandicapped.Ìà àThe€jury€returned€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Barnes€and€awarded€damages€of€$150,000€for€backÏpay€and€$150,000€for€humiliation€and€embarrassment.€€Goodyear€filed€a€motion€for€a€directedÏverdict€or,€in€the€alternative,€for€a€new€trial.€€In€the€alternative,€Goodyear€€suggested€remittitur.€€InÏan€order€dated€February€14,€1997,€the€trial€court€upheld€the€juryððs€finding€of€liability,€butÏsuggested€a€remittitur€of€Barnesðð€damages€to€$100,000€for€back€pay€and€$75,000€for€humiliationÏand€embarrassment.€€The€trial€court€also€ordered€Goodyear€to€pay€Barnes€$28,690€for€attorneyððsÏfees€and€$1,073.37€for€court€costs.€€Barnes€accepted€the€remittitur€under€protest€and€appealed.€ÏGoodyear€appeals€as€well.Ìà àOn€appeal,€Barnes€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€reducing€the€damages€awarded€byÏthe€jury.€€Barnes€also€appeals€the€calculation€of€the€attorneyððs€fees€awarded€by€the€trial€court.€€OnÏappeal,€Goodyear€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€direct€a€verdict€for€Goodyear€on€theÏissue€of€whether€Goodyear€regarded€Barnes€as€suffering€from€a€handicap.€€In€the€alternative,€ÏGoodyear€asserts€that€the€trial€court€should€have€reduced€Barnesðð€damages€beyond€the€suggestedÏremittitur€due€to€his€failure€to€mitigate€his€damages.Ìà àWe€first€address€Goodyearððs€appeal€of€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€€its€motion€for€directedÏverdict.€€When€reviewing€a€trial€courtððs€denial€of€a€directed€verdict€motion,€an€appellate€court€ð ðmustÏtake€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff,€indulging€in€allÏreasonable€inferences€in€his€favor,€and€disregarding€any€evidence€to€the€contrary.ðð€€ò òòòWilliams€v.ÏBrownó óóó,€860€S.W.2d€854,€857€(Tenn.€1993)€(quoting€ò òòòCecil€v.€Hardinó óóó,€575€S.W.2d€268,€271Ï(Tenn.€1978)).€€A€directed€verdict€is€only€appropriate€ð ðif€there€is€no€material€evidence€in€the€recordÏthat€would€support€a€verdict€for€the€plaintiff,€under€any€of€the€theories€that€he€has€advanced.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó;Ïò òòòConaster€v.€Clarksville€Coca„Cola€Bottling€Co.ó óóó,€920€S.W.2d€646,€647€(Tenn.€1995).Ìà àThe€Tennessee€Handicap€Act€forbids€discrimination€by€private€employers€ð ðbased€solelyÏupon€any€physical,€mental€or€visual€handicap€of€the€[employee],€unless€such€handicap€to€someÏdegree€prevents€the€[employee]€from€performing€the€duties€required€by€the€employment€sought€orÏimpairs€the€performance€of€the€work€involved.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(a).€€Since€the€THAÏdoes€not€define€ð ðhandicap,ðð€courts€turn€to€three€sources€for€its€interpretation:€(1)€the€TennesseeÏHuman€Rights€Act€(ð ðTHRAðð),€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(9)(A)€(Supp.€1997);€(2)€theÏcomparable€federal€statutes,€the€Americans€with€Disabilities€œAct,€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð€12102€(2)(1995),›Ïand€the€Rehabilitation€Act,€29€U.S.C.A.€ðð€706(8)(B)€œ(Supp.€1998),›€and€(3)€federal€and€state€caseÏlaw€interpreting€these€statutes.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€ò òòòCecil€v.€Gibsonó óóó,€820€S.W.2d€361,€364€(Tenn.€App.€œ1991).Ìà àThe€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€provides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àð ðHandicapðð€means,€with€respect€to€a€person:Ìà8 à(i)€A€physical€or€mental€impairment€which€substantially€limits€one€(1)€or€more€ofÏsuch€personððs€major€life€activities;Ìà à(ii)€A€record€of€having€such€an€impairment;€orÌà à(iii)€Being€regarded€as€having€such€an€impairment;ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(9)(A).€€The€two€elements€of€a€prima€facie€case€under€the€TennesseeÏHandicap€Act€are:ÌÓÓà8 à(1)€proof€that€the€plaintiff€is€handicapped€or€is€regarded€as€such€by€the€defendantÏand€(2)€proof€that€the€plaintiff€is€capable€of€performing€the€job€from€which€he€orÏshe€was€fired€notwithstanding€the€actual€or€perceived€handicap.ÌÌÓÓò òòòWatkins€v.€Shared€Hosp.€Services€Corp.ó óóó,€852€F.Supp.€640,€644€(M.D.Tenn.€1994)Ï(citing€ò òòòCeciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€365„66).Ìà àThe€trial€court€directed€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Goodyear€on€the€first€two€prongs€of€theÏhandicap€definition.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(9)(A)€(i)€and€(ii).€€The€trial€court€declined€toÏdirect€a€verdict€on€the€third€prong€of€the€handicap€definition,€finding€that€Barnes€had€presentedÏsufficient€facts€from€which€the€jury€could€determine€that€Goodyear€had€ð ðregarded€[him]€as€havingÏsuch€an€impairment.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ðð€4„21„102(9)(A)(iii).€€Goodyear€contends€that€in€order€for€Barnes€toÏprevail€on€this€third€prong,€he€needed€to€demonstrate€not€only€that€Goodyear€regarded€him€asÏhaving€an€impairment,€but€also€that€Goodyear€regarded€that€impairment€as€one€which€ð ðsubstantiallyÏlimits€one€(1)€or€more€of€[Barnesðð]€major€life€activities.ðð€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€ðð€4„21„102(9)(A)(i).€€GoodyearÏasserts€that€Barnes€presented€no€material€evidence€indicating€that€Goodyear€regarded€BarnesððÏimpairment€as€Çsubstantially€limiting€one€or€more€of€his€major€life€activities.€€Consequently,€Goodyear€contendsÏthat€the€trial€court€should€have€directed€a€verdict€in€Goodyearððs€favor€on€the€entire€suit.Ìà àUnder€the€third€prong€of€the€definition€of€a€handicap,€plaintiff€may€recover€under€the€THAÏif€he€suffers€from€ð ðan€impairment€[that]€might€not€diminish€[the]€personððs€physical€or€mentalÏcapabilities,€but€could€nevertheless€substantially€limit€that€personððs€ability€to€work€as€a€result€of€theÏnegative€reactions€of€others€to€the€impairment.ðð€€ò òòòSchool€Bd.€of€Nassau€County€v.€Arlineó óóó,Ï480€U.S.€273,€283,€107€S.Ct.€1123,€1128„29,€94€L.Ed.2d€307€(1987).€€An€employee€is€notÏð ðregardedðð€as€handicapped€simply€because€the€employer€is€aware€that€the€employee€has€anÏimpairment;€rather,€the€employer€must€regard€the€employeeððs€impairment€as€substantially€limiting€atÏleast€one€major€life€activity.€€ò òòòSee€e.g.,€Kelly€v.€Drexel€Univ.ó óóó,€94€F.3d€102,€109€(3d€Cir.Ï1996).€€Thus,€two€requirements€must€be€met:€1)€the€employer€must€perceive€the€employee€asÏhaving€an€impairment,€and€2)€the€employer€must€perceive€that€impairment€as€substantially€limitingÏa€major€life€activity.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Ceciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€366;€ò òòòKocsis€v.€Multi„Care€Mgmt.,ÏInc.ó óóó,€97€F.3d€876,€884€(6th€Cir.€1996);€ò òòòJohnson€v.€Boardman€Petroleum,€Inc.ó óóó,€923ÏF.Supp.€1563,€1568€(S.D.Ga.€1996).Ìà àThe€parties€do€not€dispute€that€Goodyear€perceived€Barnesðð€bout€with€Bellððs€Palsy× ƒ3 ××  ×€as€anÏimpairment.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€The€parties€also€do€not€dispute€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€Barnesðð€past€bout€with€ÏBellððs€Palsy,€in€and€of€itself,€did€not€substantially€limit€one€or€more€of€Barnesðð€major€life€activities.€ÏThe€issue€is€whether€Goodyear€òòperceivedóó€that€the€Bellððs€Palsy€still€substantially€limited€one€orÏmore€of€Barnesðð€major€life€activities.Ìà àThe€Equal€Employment€Opportunity€Commission€(ð ðEEOCðð)€provides€guidelinesÍconcerning€the€third€prong.€€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2€(West,€Westlaw€through€Jan.1,€1998).€€ð ðMajorÏlife€activitiesðð€include:ÓÓÌÌà8 àfunctions€such€as€caring€for€one's€self,€performing€manual€tasks,€walking,€seeing,Ïhearing,€speaking,€breathing,€learning,€and€working.€€ÌÌò òòòId.óóó ó€ðð€1630.2(I).€€The€term,€ð ðsubstantially€limits,ðð€is€defined€as:ÌÌà8 à(i)€Unable€to€perform€a€major€life€activity€that€the€average€person€in€the€generalÏpopulation€can€perform;€orÌà8 à(ii)€Significantly€restricted€as€to€the€condition,€manner€or€duration€under€which€anÏindividual€can€perform€a€major€life€activity€as€compared€to€the€condition,€manner,Ïor€duration€under€which€the€average€person€in€the€general€population€can€performÏthat€same€major€life€activity.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€ðð1630.2(j)(1).€€Factors€that€should€be€taken€into€account€when€considering€whether€a€personÏis€ð ðsubstantially€limited€in€a€major€life€activity,ðð€include:ÌÓÓà8 à(i)€The€nature€and€severity€of€the€impairment;Ìà8 à(ii)€The€duration€or€expected€duration€of€the€impairment;€andÌà8 à(iii)€The€permanent€or€long€term€impact,€or€the€expected€permanent€or€long€termÏimpact€of€or€resulting€from€the€impairment.ÌÌò òòòId.€ó óóóðð€1630.2(j)(2).€€In€addition,€ð ð[w]ith€respect€to€the€major€life€activity€of€workingðð:ÌÌà8 à(i)€The€term€substantially€limits€means€significantly€restricted€in€the€ability€toÏperform€either€a€class€of€jobs€or€a€broad€range€of€jobs€in€various€classes€asÏcompared€to€the€average€person€having€comparable€training,€skills€and€abilities.€ÏThe€inability€to€perform€a€single,€particular€job€does€not€constitute€a€substantialÏlimitation€in€the€major€life€activity€of€working.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.€óóó óðð€1630.2(j)(3).€€The€EEOC€states€further€that€a€person€who€is€ð ðregarded€as€having€such€anÏimpairment,"ÌÓÓà8 à(1)€Has€a€physical€or€mental€impairment€that€does€not€substantially€limit€major€lifeÏactivities€but€is€treated€by€a€covered€entity€as€constituting€such€a€limitation;Ìà8 à(2)€Has€a€physical€or€mental€impairment€that€substantially€limits€major€life€activitiesÏonly€as€a€result€of€the€attitude€of€an€employer€toward€such€impairment;€orÌà8 à(3)€Has€none€of€the€impairments€defined€in€[other€portions]€of€this€section€but€isÏtreated€by€a€covered€entity€as€having€a€substantially€limiting€impairment.€€ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€ðð€1630.2(l).€€Ìà àIn€ò òòòCecil€v.€Gibsonó óóó,€820€S.W.2d€361€(Tenn.€App.€1991),€we€addressed€this€third€prongÏof€the€€definition€of€handicap.€€The€plaintiff€in€ò òòòCecil€ó óóóapplied€for€a€position€as€a€police€officerÏtrainee.€€He€was€denied€employment€because€he€could€not€comply€with€visual€standards.€€TheÍplaintiff€then€filed€suit€under€the€THA.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€363.€€The€Court€found€that€the€plaintiff€did€not€meetÏthe€first€prong€of€the€definition€of€handicap,€because€his€visual€impairment€did€not,€in€fact,Ïsubstantially€limit€one€or€more€of€his€major€life€activities.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€365.€€The€Court€then€consideredÏwhether€the€defendant€nevertheless€ð ðregardedðð€the€plaintiff€as€handicapped.€€ò òòòId.Ìóóó óà àThe€only€evidence€presented€by€the€plaintiff€that€he€was€regarded€as€visually€handicapped€Ïwas€the€defendantððs€rejection€of€his€job€application.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€366.€€€€€The€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 à[u]nder€our€statutes,€the€proper€inquiry€is€whether€the€employer€regards€theÏapplicant€as€having€a€physical€or€mental€impairment€òòwhich€substantially€limits€oneÏor€more€of€the€applicantððs€major€life€activitiesóó.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€(emphasis€added).€€After€discussing€the€EEOC€guidelines,€the€Court›€noted€that€ð ð[a]nÏimpairment€must€limit€a€person's€general€employability€in€order€to€substantially€limit€a€major€lifeÏactivity,ðð€and€that€ð ð[w]hile€ððworkingðð€is€a€major€life€activity,€working€at€the€specific€job€of€one'sÏchoice€is€not.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€364„65€(internal€citations€omitted).€€The€Court€found€that€the€defendant€didÏnot€regard€the€plaintiff€as€handicapped€merely€because€it€determined€that€the€plaintiff€failed€to€meetÏthe€job€requirements€for€that€particular€job.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€366.€€The€inability€to€perform€one€particular€jobÏis€not€considered€a€substantial€limitation€of€a€major€life€activity.€€ò òòòId.€€ó óóóat€365„66.€€The€CourtÏconcluded€that€the€plaintiff€failed€to€demonstrate€that€the€defendant€regarded€him€as€having€anÏimpairment€that€substantially€limited€one€or€more€of€his€major€life€activities.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€366.Ìà àGoodyear€cites€ò òòòCzopek€v.€General€œElec.€Co.ó óóó,€4€A.D.€Cases€1231€(N.D.Ill.€1995).€ÏIn€ò òòòCzopekó óóó,€€the€plaintiff€was€an€employee€whose€job€requirement€called€for€routine€lifting.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€atÏ1232.€€After€suffering€a€heart€attack,€the€plaintiff€was€absent€from€work€for€one€month€and€thenÏreturned€to€work€on€light€duty.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€plaintiff€was€later€terminated€because€he€failed€to€satisfyÏthe€lifting€requirements.€€He€filed€suit€under€the€Americans€with€Disabilities€Act€(ð ðADAðð).€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ÏThe€plaintiff€argued€that€he€was€ð ðsubstantially€limited€in€the€major€life€activities€of€performingÏmanual€tasks€and€working.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€1233.€€Ìà àThe€ò òòòCzopekó óóó€court€found€that€the€plaintiff€had€failed€to€demonstrate€that€he€wasÏð ðsignificantly€restricted€in€the€ability€to€perform€either€a€class€of€jobs€or€a€broad€range€of€jobs€inÍvarious€classes,ðð€and€therefore€held€that€the€plaintiff€had€failed€to€demonstrate€that€a€major€lifeÏactivity€was€substantially€limited.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóó(quoting€29€C.F.R.ðð€1630.2(j)(3)).€€The€court€also€heldÏthat€the€plaintiff€had€failed€to€proffer€any€evidence€showing€that€he€was€regarded€as€ð ðlimited€in€anyÏother€way€than€his€ability€to€lift€more€than€twenty€pounds€or€to€perform€his€former€position.ðð€€ò òòòId.€Ïó óóóNoting€that€the€employer€attempted€to€place€the€plaintiff€in€another€position€within€the€company,Ïthe€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àThis€demonstrates€that€defendants€did€not€regard€plaintiff€as€having€an€impairmentÏthat€substantially€limited€his€major€life€activities;€rather,€defendants€regardedÏplaintiff€as€having€a€physical€impairment€that€limited€him€in€his€previous€job.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.€€ó óóóThus,€the€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€defendants.€€ò òòòId.;€see€also€OððDell€v.ÏAltec€Industries,€Inc.ó óóó,€4€A.D.€Cases€1776,€1995€WL€611341,€at€*4€(W.D.Mo.€Oct.€16,€1995)Ï(ð ðThere€is€no€indication€that€defendant€regarded€plaintiff€as€suffering€from€anything€other€than€theÏrelatively€narrow€lifting€restriction,€which€does€not€amount€to€a€substantial€limitation.ðð)€òòò òÌÇà àó óóóIn€ò òòòKocsis€v.€Multi„Care€Mgmt,€Inc.ó óóó,€97€F.3d€876€(6th€Cir.€1996),€a€nurse€filed€suitÏagainst€her€former€employer€under€the€ADA€for€failing€to€promote€her,€for€reassigning€her,€and€forÏconstructively€discharging€her.€€The€plaintiff€suffered€from€health€problems€that€included€arthritis,Ïfibromyalgia,€and€the€possibility€of€multiple€sclerosis.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€878„79.€€The€trial€court€grantedÏsummary€judgment€to€the€defendant,€finding€that€the€plaintiff€had€failed€to€present€any€materialÏevidence€showing€that€the€defendant€was€liable€under€the€ADA.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€881„82.€€On€appeal,€theÏplaintiff€argued€€that€the€defendant€regarded€her€as€suffering€from€a€substantially€limitingÏimpairment.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€885.€€The€plaintiff€relied€on€performance€evaluations€indicating€that€theÏdefendant€was€aware€of€the€plaintiffððs€ð ðhealth€problems,€lack€of€energy,€and€mood€swings.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ÏBased€on€this€evidence,€the€plaintiff€argued€that€the€ð ðdefendant€viewed€her€activities€asÏsubstantially€limited.ðð€€ò òòòId.Ìà àó óóóThe€Sixth€Circuit€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€plaintiff€proffered€insufficientÏevidence€to€support€her€claim:ÌÓÓà8 àWhile€the€defendant€may€have€perceived€that€[the€plaintiffððs]€health€problems€wereÏadversely€affecting€her€job€performance,€there€is€no€evidence€that€defendantÏregarded€[the€plaintiff]€as€being€unable€to€care€for€herself€or€to€perform€all€of€theÏduties€of€her€job.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.€€ó óóóConsequently,€the€Court€found€that€the€plaintiff€failed€to€ð ðestablish€that€she€had€a€disabilityÏunder€the€ððregarded€asðð€prong€of€the€definition.ðð€€ò òòòId.Ìóóó óà àò òòòJohnson€v.€Boardman€Petroleum,€Inc.ó óóó,€923€F.Supp.€1563€(S.D.Ga.€1996),€alsoÏinvolved€a€suit€brought€under€the€ADA.€€The€plaintiff€was€a€district€supervisor€of€eight€of€theÏdefendantððs€stores.€€The€defendant€informed€her€that€she€was€being€terminated€for€failure€toÏinvestigate€and€remedy€cash€shortage€problems€in€her€stores.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€1566.€€The€plaintiff€allegedÏthat€she€was€being€terminated€because€the€defendant€regarded€her€as€physically€and€mentallyÏdisabled.€€ò òòòId.Ìà àó óóóThe€plaintiff€cited€three€incidents:€1)€her€supervisor€gave€her€time€off€after€her€husband€diedÏand€told€her€to€seek€professional€help;€2)€her€supervisor€required€a€release€from€her€doctor€beforeÍshe€could€return;€and€3)€when€she€was€terminated,€her€supervisor€told€her€that€she€was€ð ðphysicallyÏand€mentally€incapable€of€continuingðð€her€job.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1568.€€The€court€granted€summary€judgmentÏto€the€defendant,€finding€that€the€defendantððs€€acknowledgment€that€the€plaintiff€was€suffering€fromÏemotional€problems,€standing€alone€ð ðdoes€not€rise€to€the€level€of€demonstrating€[that€the€defendant]Ïthought€she€had€a€mental€disability€or€that€she€was€unable€to€work€because€of€this€disability.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóÌÇà àIn€ò òòòHowell€v.€Samððs€Club€#8160ó óóó,€959€F.Supp.€260€(E.D.Pa.€1997),€the€plaintiff€suedÏhis€former€employer€under€the€ADA€after€he€was€terminated€from€his€employment€as€a€maintenanceÏworker.€€The€employer€notified€the€plaintiff€that€he€was€being€terminated€due€to€sexual€harassment.€Ïò òòòId.ó ó€óóat€263.€€The€plaintiff,€however,€claimed€that€this€stated€reason€was€a€pretext€and€that€he€wasÏdiscriminated€against€due€to€a€back€and€knee€disability.€€ò òòòId.€€ó óóóAfter€first€finding€that€the€plaintiffÏfailed€to€show€that€he€suffered€from€or€had€a€record€of€an€impairment€that€substantially€limited€oneÏor€more€of€his€major€life€activities€(the€first€two€prongs€of€the€ð ðdisabilityðð€definition),€the€courtÏconsidered€whether€the€plaintiff€had€presented€sufficient€proof€that€the€employer€had€regarded€himÏas€suffering€from€such€an€impairment.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€264„68.Ìà àThe€court€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€employer€on€the€third€prong€as€well.€Ïò òòòId.óóó ó€at€269„70.€€The€only€evidence€presented€by€the€plaintiff€was€proof€that€the€employer€wasÏaware€of€his€impairment.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€269.€€The€court€held€that€the€employerððs€mere€awareness€of€anÏimpairment€was€insufficient€to€demonstrate€a€claim€under€the€third€prong.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóó€(citing€ò òòòKellyó óóó,€94ÏF.3d€at€109).€€Because€the€plaintiff€failed€to€offer€any€evidence€that€the€employer€ð ðperceived€him€asÏhaving€an€impairment€that€substantially€limited€his€ability€to€work,ðð€the€court€dismissed€theÏplaintiffððs€claim.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€€€Ìà àThe€court€in€ò òòòHowelló óóó€contrasted€the€case€with€ò òòòOlson€v.€General€ElectricÏAstrospaceó óóó,€101€F.3d€947€(3d€Cir.€1996).€€ò òòòHowelló óóó,€959€F.Supp.€at€269.€€In€ò òòòOlsonó óóó,€anÏapplicant€brought€suit€under€the€ADA€and€its€New€Jersey€counterpart€against€an€employer.€Ïò òòòOlsonó óóó,€101€F.3d€at€949.€€The€applicant€had€been€previously€employed€by€the€employer€but€hadÏbeen€laid€off.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€former€employer€was€aware€that€the€plaintiff€had€been€hospitalized€for€fourÏmonths€for€depression.€€ò òòòId.€€ó óóóThe€plaintiff€alleged€that€a€substantial€portion€of€his€job€interviewÏwas€devoted€to€questions€relating€to€the€current€status€of€his€health,€such€as€medication€he€wasÏtaking€and€medical€tests€that€had€been€performed.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€950.€€The€district€court€ruled€that€theÏplaintiff€failed€to€show€that€he€was€ð ðdisabledðð€under€any€of€the€prongs€of€the€ð ðdisabilityððÏdefinition,€and€the€plaintiff€appealed.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€952„53.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€pointed€to€the€job€interview€as€demonstrating€that€the€employer€regarded€himÏas€suffering€from€an€impairment.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€954.€€The€plaintiff€also€proffered€a€performanceÏevaluation€completed€during€the€plaintiffððs€prior€employment€which€contained€ð ðmultiple€referencesððÏto€the€fact€that€[the€plaintiff]€had€missed€a€significant€amount€of€work€because€of€illness.ðð€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€ÏConsequently,€the€evaluation€stated€that€ð ð[h]is€work€habits€are€questionable.ðð€€ò òòòId.€€›ó óóóUnder€theseÏcircumstances,€the€appellate€court€reversed€the€trial€court€and€held€that€ð ða€reasonable€fact„finderÏcould€infer€that€œ[the€employer]›€perceived€œ[the€plaintiff]›€to€be€disabled.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€955.Ìà àAnother€case€in€which€the€plaintiff€presented€a€prima€facie€case€under€the€third€prong€isÏò òòòCook€v.€State€of€Rhode€Island,€Dept.€of€Mental€Health,€Retardation,€and€œHosps.ó óóó,›Ï10€F.3d€17€(1st€Cir.€1993).€€In€ò òòòCookó óóó,€€the€plaintiff€applied€for€a€position€as€an€institutionalÏattendant€for€a€mental€hospital.€€Although€the€plaintiff€passed€her€physical€examination,€theÏdefendant€hospital€refused€to€hire€her.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€21.€€The€defendant€felt€that€the€plaintiff€wasÏð ðmorbidly€obese,ðð€and€that€this€conditionÌÓÓà8 àcompromised€her€ability€to€evacuate€patients€in€case€of€an€emergency€and€put€her€at€Ïgreater€risk€of€developing€serious€ailments€(a€ð ðfactðð€that€[the€defendantððs]€hierarchsÏspeculated€would€promote€absenteeism€and€increase€the€likelihood€of€workersððÏcompensation€claims).ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.€€óóó óThe€plaintiff€sued€the€hospital€under€the€Rehabilitation€Act.€€The€jury€found€€that€theÏdefendant€had€regarded€the€plaintiff€as€disabled€under€the€Act€and€the€defendant€appealed.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€Ìà àOn€appeal,€the€First€Circuit€considered€whether€the€plaintiff€had€presented€sufficientÏevidence€to€show€that€the€defendant€regarded€her€as€suffering€from€an€impairment€that€substantiallyÏlimited€one€or€more€of€her€major€life€activities.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€25.€€The€Court€first€considering€the€phrase,Ïð ðmajor€life€activities.ðð€€The€plaintiff€proffered€the€testimony€of€the€hiring€physician,€who€testifiedÏthat€he€refused€to€hire€the€œplaintiff€because€he€believed›€that€her€condition€ð ðinterfered€with€her€abilityÏto€undertake€physical€activities,€including€walking,€lifting,€bending,€stooping,€and€kneeling,€toÏsuch€an€extent€that€she€was€incapable€of€working€as€an€[attendant].ðð€€ò òòòId.€€ó óóóAfter€quoting€theÏapplicable€EEOC€guidelines,€the€Court€found€that€œthe›€physicianððs€testimony€alone€demonstrated€hisÍbelief€that€the€ð ðplaintiffððs€limitations€foreclosed€a€broad€range€of€employment€options€in€the€healthÏcare€industry.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Thus,€the€Court€held€that€the€plaintiff€presented€sufficient€evidence€œfrom›Ïwhich€a€reasonable€jury€could€conclude€that€the€defendant€regarded€the€plaintiff€as€suffering€fromÏan€impairment€that€substantially€limited€œa€major€life€activity,€the€plaintiffððs€ability€to€work.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóatÏ25„26.€€òòò òÌà àó óóóIn€this€case,€on€appeal,€we€must€construe€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€toÏBarnes.€€ò òòòWilliamsó óóó,€860€S.W.2d€at€857.€€Barnes€points€to€two€portions€of€the€record:€1)€theÏalleged€conversation€between€Barnes€and€Nelm€in€which€Nelms€allegedly€admitted€that€Barnes€wasÏlaid€off€because€he€had€Bellððs€Palsy€and€missed€time€as€a€result;€and€2)€the€1989€performanceÏevaluation€of€ÇBarnes€prepared€by€Nelms€in€which€Barnes€was€criticized€for€communication€problems.€€BarnesÏalso€€disputes€Nelmsðð€assertion€that€Barnes€had€a€communication€problem.Ìà àThe€fact€that€Nelms€regarded€Barnes€as€suffering€from€Bellððs€Palsy€is€insufficient€toÏestablish€a€cause€of€action€under€the€third€prong.€€ò òòòCeciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€366;€ò òòòKocsisó óóó,€97€F.3d€atÏ884;€ò òòòKellyó óóó,€94€F.3d€at€106;€ò òòòHowelló óóó,€959€F.Supp€at€269.€€Barnes€does€not€appeal€the€trial€courtððsÏfinding€that€the€Bellððs€Palsy€did€not€substantially€limit€one€or€more€of€his€major€life€activities.€ÏConsequently,€Barnes€was€required€to€prove€that€Goodyear€regarded€the€past€bout€of€Bellððs€PalsyÏimpact€as€substantially€limiting€one€or€more€of€Barnesðð€major€life€activities.Ìà àBarnes€does€not€specify€which€ð ðmajor€life€activitiesðð€that€Goodyear€regarded€as€beingÏsubstantially€limited.€€The€only€major€life€activities€that€conceivably€may€apply€include€ð ðworking,ððÏð ðperforming€manual€tasks,ðð€and€ð ðspeaking.ðð€€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(i).€€There€is€no€evidence€thatÏGoodyear€perceived€Barnes€as€suffering€from€a€speaking€limitation.€€The€performance€evaluation€atÏissue€does€not€suggest€that€Barnes€had€difficulty€talking€as€a€result€of€the€Bellððs€Palsy;€it€suggestsÏthat€Barnes€had€personality€problems€with€his€co„workers€during€shift€changes.€€Barnes€arguesÏthat€the€alleged€communication€problem€was€a€pretext€for€Goodyearððs€criticism€of€the€sole€fact€thatÏBarnes€had€Bellððs€Palsy.€€Even€if€the€alleged€communication€problem€were€a€pretext,€the€fact€thatÏGoodyear€regarded€Barnes€as€suffering€from€Bellððs€Palsy,€standing€alone,€is€insufficient€to€satisfyÏthe€third€prong.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Johnsonó óóó,€923€F.Supp.€at€1568„69;€ò òòòHowelló óóó,€959€F.Supp.€at€269.Ìà àBarnes€argues€that€Nelmsðð€statement€about€Barnes€missing€work€due€to€his€Bellððs€PalsyÏindicates€that€Goodyear€regarded€Barnes€as€substantially€limited€in€the€ability€to€work€or€performÏmanual€tasks.€€Taking€adverse€employment€action€against€an€employee€for€past€absenteeism€as€aÏresult€of€an€impairment€is€not€a€violation€of€the€THA.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(a)€(ð ðThereÏshall€be€no€discrimination€.€.€.€based€solely€upon€any€.€.€.€handicap€.€.€.€unless€such€handicap€toÏsome€degree€prevents€the€applicant€from€performing€the€duties€required€by€the€employment€soughtÏor€impairs€the€performance€of€the€work€involved.ðð).€€An€employer€may€terminate€an€employee€forÏa€òòconsequenceóó€of€a€disability€but€not€the€disability€itself.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Matthews€v.ÍCommonwealth€Edison€Co.ó óóó,€128€F.3d€1194,€1198€(7th€Cir.€1997).€€A€violation,€however,Ïmay€occur€if€an€employerððs€comment€or€concern€about€an€employeeððs€absenteeism€indicates€theÏemployerððs€belief€that€the€employee€will€be€substantially€limited€from€working€in€the€future.€€ò òòòSee,Ïe.g.,€Olsonó óóó,€101€F.3d€at€954„55€(evidence€demonstrated€the€employerððs€concern€of€futureÏabsenteeism€by€the€employee€as€a€result€of€the€employeeððs€impairment);€ò òòòCookó óóó,€10€F.3d€at€21,€25„26€(same).Ìà àIn€this€present€case,€Nelmsðð€alleged€comment€about€Barnesðð€period€of€absence€resultingÏfrom€his€temporary€bout€with€Bellððs€Palsy€refers€to€a€past€period€of€absenteeism.€€The€trial€courtÏconcluded€that€this€extended€absence€did€not€substantially€limit€any€of€Barnesðð€major€life€activities.€ÏThere€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€that€Goodyear€was€concerned€that€Nelms€would€be€frequentlyÏabsent€in€the€future.€€Thus,€Nelmsðð€alleged€comment€does€not€suggest€that€Goodyear€regardedÏBarnes€as€suffering€from€an€impairment€that€substantially€limited€any€of€his€major€life€activities.Ìà àAfter€reviewing€the€record,€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€permit€the€jury€to€infer€thatÏGoodyear€violated€the€third€prong.€€There€is€not€sufficient€evidence€that€Goodyear€perceived€thatÏBarnesðð€past€impairment€would€be€an€impairment€in€the€future.€€The€impairment€was€onlyÏtemporary,€and€there€is€no€evidence€that€Goodyear€anticipated€the€duration€of€the€impairment€to€beÏbeyond€its€actual€scope.€€ò òòòSee€óóó ó29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(j)(2)(ii)€and€(iii);€ò òòòOgburn€v.€Gas€&€WaterÏDept,€City€of€Clarksvilleó óóó,€No.€01„A„01„9702„CH„00056,€1997€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€585,€at€*6Ïn.1€(Tenn.€App.€Aug.€27,€1997)€(ð ð[T]emporary,€non„chronic€impairments€of€short€duration,€withÏlittle€or€no€long€term€or€permanent€impact,€are€usually€not€disabilities.ðð);€ò òòòRoush€v.€Weastec,ÏInc.ó óóó,€96€F.3d€840,€843€(6th€Cir.€1996)€(ð ðGenerally,€short„term,€temporary€restrictions€are€notÏsubstantially€limiting.ðð).Ìà àMoreover,€there€is€no€evidence€that€Goodyear€regarded€Barnes€as€physically€unable€toÏperform€his€specific€job€as€a€PC€Operator,€much€less€perform€a€broad€range€of€jobs.€€29€C.F.R.€ððÏ1630.2(j)(3);€ò òòòCeciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€366.€€In€fact,€Goodyear€offered€Barnes€a€position€with€itsÏaffiliate,€Hamilton„Ryker.€€ò òòòSee€Czopekó óóó,€4€A.D.€Cases€at€1233.€€Thus,€Barnes€has€failed€toÍdemonstrate€that€Goodyear€regarded€Barnes€as€substantially€limited€in€his€ability€to€work€orÏperform€manual€tasks.€€à àThe€evidence€is€insufficient€to€permit€a€jury€to€find€that€GoodyearÏregarded€Barnes€as€suffering€from€an€impairment€that€substantially€limited€a€major€life€activity.€ÏTherefore,€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€direct€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Goodyear.€€Accordingly,€weÏreverse€the€trial€courtððs€decision€and€direct€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Goodyear.€€The€remaining€issuesÏon€appeal€are€pretermitted€by€this€holding.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings€consistent€with€this€Opinion.ÌÇà àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€and€a€verdict€is€directed€in€favor€of€Goodyear.€ÏThe€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€Opinion.€€CostsÏon€appeal€are€taxed€to€Barnes€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìó óà àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SP.J.ó óÌ