ÿWPCN ò/»Œ&Ðuþcr?Ñ<‰–ͧ‡F)öQ,ãDípQYTÆÖ®­ìýù²~C#N=B6ÄØ†bcé%Dý¿ ÛæÁ”Ë^kÇ8‹í“ ]iªãÔ²µ÷3³[„{ꃃ«v¨vƒÿ—‹—‡Õ6 1XBs>gÓȘ@Ûjí;EKO-×N¼Ïäì±UÝåü] ô'ÖkÜ'Ád$¾xóÓÕJƒcìkB5hþÃ{ŽìÝÕê‹äˆ&1`¹1u¬Ü: ùáVY›¾ÞKŸ˜f„ì [¬WÚÎxMBÒ‰¥$"¼6󦦚Y1-X=JæD[ªQÕB¹_qܹÞ,«Ý´ý^i9XŸ»«¤Ë¼îù¢ú7eJÃFÖ!Õ¦80CŠyæöt™¯]à+e£õz =x ùwÞöYëÚöSòÆãù%ˆMƒ.?Ô[4ómÜ*›Jgí±îè¸â²üÛ©¢¢î{ÆÍ˜Ù>1ùÝwi´S«¶k.¥.‡Ê;ˆ>þJã8ã5R›íš¹«eå[xôºb—R’6yįכZZl]ê™_Á¦§˜JS£›œ¾++„ý £ÇÏ9Ï6sÎoG 1Í4‚‰E nÚ½á§Çy@Ågž¨ÕÈÝ`#!@U/Na %¯ 0:µ^ ïwû4ÿ " m$ U(N; N‰ 0~‹ 0V 0D_ ·£ Z g` Ç U@ËU:    EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE AQMÆž 0Vd Bº 0D×× D3˜HP LaserJet 8000 DN PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,Ôhvb'L tpO'´Çœ3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular(.(3Ä($¤¤Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(.3½Þ$££Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ­Ý ƒ Ä($ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ X´XXXÔÔ‡ ôpä õX X´ÔThe€proof€at€trial€established€that€Husband's€one„half€share€of€the€KRIP€(or€ERAP)€fund€appreciatedÐ ° Ðsubstantially€in€the€six€years€that€he€worked€for€Eastman€after€the€divorce.Ô#†ôpä õ õ ôpäe#ÔÔ#†X´X õôpä„#ÔH ]Ý ƒ[½Þ"ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ€X‘XXXÔÔ€ètyçXX‘ÔÓ  ÓÔ_Ôò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€¬€çètyÔÐ  ÐÌNovember€2,€1999ÌÌCecil€Ô_ÔCrowsonÔ_Ô,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€Ô_ÔClerkÔdAŠÔó óÔ_Ô úÝ ƒ Ä($ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ôpä õXXÔÔ€ôpä õ õôpäÔWe€have€carefully€reviewed€the€record€on€appeal€and€find€it€devoid€of€any€factual€evidence€tending€toÐ ° Ðindicate€that€Wifeððs€income€from€her€business€venture€could€reasonably€be€expected€to€increase.€€In€fact,€theÏcompany€accountant€advised€her€to€close€the€business€and€seek€a€sales€job€in€order€to€secure€regular€income.(ìv# Z‹(Times New Roman ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Z[]_Cþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(.3½Þ$¢¢Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý d($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó\\\\'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTR[° AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑò òÑ8€´XdìdÈ8ÑÔ_Ôà@  ìàÔ‡¼Í»XXÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@cc$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†X´X»¼Íî#ÔˆÐ Ä Ðßv€Y_@0,j: `€€@ÿE˜ÜŽtt¨¦ÐØ Zvßà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àÌÌÌÌÌó óRICHARD€THOMAS€BOGAN,à0 h àà0Àh(#h(#à)à0À(#À(#àÐt Ä(#(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à0  àNO.€03A01„9811„CH„00393Ð` °(#(# Ðà  àPlaintiff/Appelleeà0  àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#à)ÐL œ À(#À(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìvs.à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#à)à0À(#À(#àAppeal€as€of€Right€From€TheÐ$t (#(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à0  àSULLIVAN€CO.€CHANCERY€COURTÐ` (#(# ÐDORIS€MAE€BOGAN,à0  àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#à)ÐüL À(#À(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à0  àHON.€JOHN€S.€McLELLAN,€IIIÐè8 (#(# Ðà  àDefendant/Appellant.à0  àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#à)à0À(#À(#àCHANCELLORÐÔ$(#(# ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€the€Appellant:à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àFor€the€Appellee:óóó óÐ H˜ ÐStephenson€Toddà0 ¸ àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àCarl€W.€EilersÐ4„p(#p(# ÐTodd€&€Dossett,€P.C.à0 ¸ àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#à111€East€Market€StreetÐ pp(#p(# Ð134€W.€Center€Streetà0 ¸ àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àKingsport,€TN€37660Ð \p(#p(# ÐKingsport,€TN€37660Ìà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àThomas€F.€BloomÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à500€Church€St.€5òòthóó€Fl.Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àNashville,€TN€37219ÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDà0 h àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àà0Èp(#p(#àà0 È(#È(#àà0x (# (#àSwiney,€J.ÐX$¨"x(#x(# ÐÌÌÌÓ  Óò òòòÔ‡¼Í»XX´ÔOPINIONÔ#†X´X»¼Í #Ôóóó óÐ (X#& ÐÓ ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà  àà ` àThis€is€an€appeal€by€Ms.€Bogan€(Appellant)€from€an€Order€of€the€Chancery€Court€forÏSullivan€County€which€reduced€Mr.€Boganððs€(Appellee)€alimony€payments€to€her€from€$2,300Ïmonthly€to€$945€monthly€after€Appelleeððs€retirement.€€On€appeal,€Appellant€raises€the€issue€ofÏwhether€the€Chancellor€erred€in€finding€that€there€had€been€a€substantial€and€material€change€ofÏcircumstances€under€the€provisions€of€Ô‡ X´XXX´Ô€T.C.A.€ððÔ#†X´XX X´b#Ô€36„5„101(a)(1),€Appelleeððs€retirement,€whichÐ T2¤-1 Ðjustified€a€reduction€of€the€periodic€alimony€awarded€her€at€the€time€of€her€divorce.€€AppelleeÏcontends€that€his€retirement€was€not€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€their€1991€divorce,€was€notÏcontemplated€by€the€divorce€decree,€was€not€voluntary,€and€was€a€substantial€and€material€changeÏof€circumstances€sufficient€to€justify€a€reduction€in€alimony.€€Appellant€also€argues€that€this€CourtÐ ´959 Ðð ðshould€adopt€the€approach€used€by€most€other€jurisdictions€in€which€a€good€faith€retirement,Ïalthough€foreseeable€or€voluntary,€nevertheless€gives€the€obligor€the€right€to€have€his€or€her€alimonyÏobligation€reassessed.ðð€€Under€the€particular€facts€of€this€case,€we€find€that€Appellantððs€retirementÏwas€voluntary€and€foreseeable,€and€was€in€fact€foreseen€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€We€reverse€theÏdecision€of€the€Trial€Court€and€reinstate€the€prior€award€of€$2300€monthly€alimony€provided€in€theÏpartiesðð€original€divorce€decree.ÌÓ  Óòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóÐ À  ÐÓ¬Óà  àà ` àPlaintiff€[Appellee]€was€62€years€old€on€September€19,€1999,€and€DefendantÏ[Appellant]€is€60€years€old.€€After€30€years€of€marriage,€and€upon€Appellee's€complaint€for€Divorce,ÏAppellant€was€granted€a€divorce€on€July€24,€1991,€upon€the€grounds€of€adultery.€€The€Judgment€ofÏAbsolute€Divorce€incorporated€a€property€settlement€agreement€which€apportioned€the€marital€assets.€ÏThe€marital€residence€was€sold€and€the€equity€realized€was€divided€equally.€Appellant€received€asÏher€separate€property€all€of€the€parties'€one„half€interest€in€Sheffield€Studios,€Inc.,€d/b/a/€The€ShadeÏShop,€and€all€real€estate€owned€by€that€corporation,€and€assumed€any€liabilities€owing€and€theÏmortgage€on€a€vacant€lot€owned€by€the€corporation.à  àThe€amount€existing€in€Husband's€KodakÐ €Ð ÐRetirement€Income€Plan€(KRIP)€as€of€the€date€of€the€divorce€was€equally€divided€between€AppelleeÏand€Appellant.€€Accordingly,€each€party€was€entitled€to€$144,888€of€the€retirements€rights,€whichÏwere€valued€at€the€time€at€$289,776.€€Appellant€was€entitled€to€any€pre„retirement€survivor€benefits,Ïand€could€elect€to€receive€post„retirement€survivor€benefit€coverage€at€her€cost.€Appellee€receivedÏas€his€separate€property€all€of€his€Kodak€Employee€Stock€Ownership€Plan€(KESOP).€€AppellantÏreceived€10%€of€the€present€value€of€Appellee's€Savings€and€Investment€Plan€(SIP)€(401[k])€as€ofÏthe€date€of€the€divorce,€Ô‡ X´XXX´Ôpayable€in€a€lump€sum,€andÔ#†X´XX X´‡#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€Appellee€received€90%.€€Each€party€received€asÐ h+¸&* Ðtheir€separate€property€their€individual€IRA€accounts.€€Appellant's€credit€union€savings€accountsÏtotaling€$4,083.01€were€divided€equally,€and€the€remaining€personal€property€was€divided€as€agreed.€ÏIn€addition€to€these€property€settlement€provisions,€Wife€was€awarded€periodic€alimony€in€theÏamount€of€$2,300€per€month,€until€her€remarriage€or€the€death€of€either€party.€€Ìà  àà ` àSix€years€later,€on€August€25,€1997,€Appellee€filed€a€Motion€to€Terminate€AlimonyÏalleging€two€material€changes€in€circumstances:€€(1)€that€he€had€reached€retirement€status€with€hisÏemployer€and€due€to€his€retirement,€he€would€no€longer€be€earning€wages€through€his€employer,€andÏ(2)€that€because€he€would€reach€"pay€status€for€his€retirement,"€Appellant€would€"also€reach€payÐ (:x5: Ðstatus€and€will€also€receive€retirements€benefits€[from€her€$144,888€share€of€the€KRIP,€which€sheÏreceived€as€part€of€the€property€settlement€in€the€divorce€decree]."Ìà  àà ` àAppellant€answered€on€December€4,€1997,€denying€that€there€had€been€a€legallyÏrelevant€material€change€in€circumstances€sufficient€to€terminate€Appellee's€alimony€obligation.€€SheÏaverred€that€Appellee's€retirement€was€voluntary,€and€that€Appellee€received€total€lump€sumÏretirement€distributions€of€$595,344€while€she€will€receive€approximately€$144,888.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð è 8  Ðà  àà ` àA€hearing€on€Appellee's€Motion€to€Terminate€Alimony€was€held€on€February€19,Ï1998.€€Appellee€testified€that,€at€the€time€of€the€divorce,€alimony€was€set€at€$2,300€by€agreement€ofÏthe€parties,€and€that€"[r]etirement€wasn't€even€on€my€mind€at€the€time."€€Appellee€testified€he€hadÏnever€thought€about€retiring€and€had€never€discussed€it€with€the€Appellant.€€However,€Appellee€€thenÏtestified€on€cross€examination€that€he€had€expected€to€retire€at€age€60„62.€Ìà  àà ` àAppellee€testified€that,€between€1991€and€1996,€Eastman,€his€employer,€underwentÏmajor€changes€which€precipitated€his€decision€to€retire.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€his€gross€wagesÏas€a€Ph.D.€chemist€at€Eastman€were€$6,908€per€month,€and€at€the€time€of€his€retirement,€he€wasÏearning€$8,375€per€month.€€Ô#†X´XX X´ã#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔAlthough€his€salary€was€never€reduced,€he€was€transferred€several€times,Ð €Ð Ðand€he€ultimately€held€a€job€as€an€individual€scientist€who€supervised€one€technician,€whereas€he€hadÏformerly€held€a€management€position€and€supervised€up€to€40€people.€€After€his€divorce,€theÏcompany€established€a€stated€objective€to€reduce€costs€by€500€million€dollars,€largely€throughÏreduction€in€force.€€Goals€were€set€by€the€company€to€achieve€the€cost€reduction,€and€from€late€1996Ïthrough€1997,€employees€who€were€eligible€to€retire€began€receiving€e„mail€encouraging€them€toÏattend€seminars€about€the€benefits€of€retirement.€€He€was€more€than€eligible€to€retire,€since€theÏcompany€requires€85€"points"€for€retirement€eligibility,€and€he€had€90.€€Because€of€all€of€theseÏchanges,€he€felt€that€"[i]t's€time€to€go."€€During€this€testimony,€counsel€for€Appellant€objected€toÏAppelleeððs€statements€about€the€goals€of€the€company,€and€the€Court€and€the€parties€agreed€that€anÏexpert€witness€from€the€employer€company€would€be€required,€so€the€hearing€was€continued.Ô#†X´XX X´8##ÔÐ ð0@,0 Ðà  àà ` àAt€the€rescheduled€April€22,€1998€hearing,€and€pursuant€to€Appellee's€subpoena,ÏÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔGeorge€Devinney,€Manager€of€Employee€Benefits€at€Eastman€Chemical€Company,Ô#†X´XX X´ (#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€provided€copiesÐ  4ð/4 Ðof€information€about€retirement€that€the€company€had€distributed€to€employees€between€JanuaryÐ x6È16 Ð1996€and€September€1,€1997.€€He€presented€a€large€number€of€in„house€newspaper€articles,€copiesÏof€information€on€the€company€web€site,€and€videos€of€presentations€made€at€company„wideÏmeetings€about€changes€in€the€retirement€policy.€€He€then€described€Eastman's€new€benefit€program,Ïwhich€took€effect€on€January€1,€1998.€€Salaries€earned€after€that€date€are€subject€to€a€retirement€fundÏcomputation€whereby,€when€the€employee€reaches€85€points€in€the€retirement€system,€"the€lump€sumÏwould€start€to€decrease."€€Because€Appellee€had€over€85€points€when€he€retired,€under€the€newÏsystem,€€€his€lump€sum€payout€for€salaries€earned€after€January€1,€1998€€would€decrease€the€longerÏhe€stayed€at€Eastman.€€Also,€for€salaries€earned€after€January€1,€1998,€there€is€no€survivor€benefit.€ÏMoreover,€January€1,€1998,€was€the€last€date€one€could€retire€and€elect€both€a€lump€sum€and€get€theÏsurvivor€benefit,€even€as€to€retirement€benefits€on€salary€earned€before€that€date.€€There€were€alsoÏdecreases€in€life€insurance€availability€after€that€date.€€On€cross€examination,€Devinney€testified€thatÏthe€spinoff€of€Eastman€from€Kodak€took€place€January€1,€1994,€and€it€was€never€the€intent€of€theÏbenefit€strategy€review€committee€to€encourage€people€to€retire€prior€to€January€1,€1998.€€That€wasÏnever€mentioned€as€a€goal€in€any€management€meetings€he€attended€or€stated€in€any€literature€he€wasÏinvolved€in€disseminating.ÌÔ#†X´XX X´¬(#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôà  àà ` àDavid€Grice,€First€Vice„President€of€Smith„Barney€brokerage€firm€in€Asheville,€NorthÐ X ¨ ÐCarolina,€then€testified€for€Appellee€that€he€is€Appelleeððs€"money€manager"€and€handles€his€EastmanÏretirement€fund.€€Appellee€is€currently€receiving€about€$3,500€a€month€income€from€the€investmentÏof€his€lump€sum€retirement€payout.€€Mr.€Grice€testified€that€"we€set€it€up€where€we€draw€pretty€muchÏwhat€the€fund€earns."€€The€plan€is€designed€so€Appellee€will€not€go€through€the€principal.€€Appellee'sÏcounsel€provided€Grice€with€a€list€of€assets€Appellant€received€in€the€divorce,€including€$10,414€inÏcash,€$8,200€in€an€IRA€and€$144,880€lump€sum€entitlement€from€Appellee's€Eastman€retirementÏ(KRIP).€€With€that€list,€Grice€prepared€a€"cash€flow€analysis,"€based€on€the€long„term€rate€of€returnÏof€a€hypothetical€mixed€portfolio€of€stocks€and€bonds.€€Grice€opined€that,€assuming€a€10%€rate€ofÏreturn,€and€if€Appellant€used€all€of€the€principal€during€her€lifetime,€she€would€have€an€income€ofÏ$16,283€per€year€[or€$1,356.92€per€month]€until€age€85,€at€which€time€she€would€be€"out€of€money."€ÏIn€addition,€Appellee€will€be€entitled€to€approximately€$1,200€per€month€in€social€security€benefitsÏat€age€62€and€Appellant€will€be€entitled€to€$600€per€month€at€age€62.€€Grice€prepared€anotherÏscenario,€which€he€thinks€is€a€little€bit€more€realistic,€using€the€same€list€of€assets€but€assuming€sheÏwould€not€diminish€principal.€€Under€that€scenario,€she€would€"take€out€$14,763€per€year"€[$1,230.35Ð (:x5: Ðper€month]€for€the€first€15€years,€but€as€the€principal€increased,€her€income€would€increase.Ìà  àà ` àOn€cross„examination,€Grice€testified€that€Appellee€has€approximately€$600,000Ïinvested€with€Smith„Barney,€on€which€he€is€withdrawing€approximately€$3,500€per€month,€or€sevenÏpercent.€€He€anticipates€the€fund€to€earn€ten€percent€over€time,€but€Appellee€is€withdrawing€onlyÏseven€percent€so€that€his€account€value€can€keep€up€with€inflation.€€On€Appellant's€analysis,€he€didÏnot€consider€inflation.€€Mr.€Grice€had€no€real€explanation€why€he€used€seven€percent€in€hisÏcalculation€for€Appelleeððs€income€but€used€ten€percent€in€his€calculation€as€to€Appellantððs€income.€ÏWe€agree€with€Mr.€Griceððs€candid€admission€that€"you€can€do€anything€you€want€to€with€theÏnumbers."Ô#†X´XX X´ /#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔÐ pÀ Ðà  àà ` àPamela€Benzer,€CPA€and€Certified€Financial€Planner€with€Gilbert,€Carrier,€MauriceÏand€Benzer€in€Johnson€City,€testified€for€Appellant€about€five€separate€cash€flow€analyses€herÏcompany€prepared.€€She€assumed€Appellant's€current€income€of€$800€per€month€from€her€businessÏuntil€her€hypothetical€retirement€at€age€70,€income€of€$2,300€per€month€alimony,€social€security€atÏage€62,€and€income€from€$165,000€investment,€consisting€of€proceeds€of€the€divorce€settlementÏ(KRIP),€IRA€and€cash.€€She€assumed€an€annual€rate€of€return€of€eight€percent,€and€expenses€as€theyÏcurrently€exist,€as€provided€by€Appellant€and€her€counsel.€€In€this€hypothetical,€assuming€alimonyÏterminates€"on€the€date€of€this€hearing,"€she€opined€Appellant€would€"run€out€of€money€at€age€69."€ÏUnder€another€scenario,€in€which€Appellant€receives€alimony€until€Appellee€attains€the€age€of€65Ïyears,€Appellant€"will€be€able€to€make€it€through€part€of€age€72."€€Under€a€third€scenario,€in€whichÏAppellant€is€able€to€reduce€her€annual€living€expenses€by€25%,€€and€if€alimony€stopped€on€the€dateÏof€the€hearing,€Appellant€would€run€out€of€money€at€age€72.€€Finally,€if€Appellant€reduced€herÏexpenses€by€25%€and€alimony€ended€when€Husband€attains€the€age€of€65,€Wife€would€deplete€herÏassets€at€age€79.€€She€testified€that€a€ten€percent€rate€of€return€might€be€accurate€historically€if€youÏconsider€from€1926€to€the€present,€based€on€100€percent€investment€in€large€company€US€stocks,€butÏshe€has€never€seen€anybody€[client]€who€could€handle€the€volatility.€€Further,€a€retiree€whose€incomeÏis€based€solely€on€such€an€investment€would€have€years€in€which€their€income€would€be€minus€tenÏpercent.€€For€that€reason,€her€firm€never€assumes€a€rate€of€return€higher€than€eight€percent.€€ÌÔ#†X´XX X´p8#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôà  àà ` àAppellee€testified€that€he€receives€$3,150€in€net€proceeds€of€his€retirement€(KRIP)Ð x6È16 Ðinvestment€monthly.€€He€has€no€other€source€of€monthly€or€regular€income.€€His€lump€sumÏretirement€benefit€was€$429,000,€which€was€combined€with€$164,000€in€401(k)€funds€and€investedÐ (:x5: Ðwith€Smith„Barney.€€Ô#†X´XX X´±?#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔHe€has€remarried.€€His€current€wife€is€an€Eastman€employee€with€29€plus€years'Ð ° Ðservice,€who€anticipates€working€full„time€there€for€another€decade€or€more,€with€a€bi„weeklyÏincome€OF€$1,500.Ô#†X´XX X´RA#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€€Ð `° Ðà  àà ` àOn€the€subject€of€his€decision€to€retire,€he€testified€that,€after€his€divorce,€he€attendedÏmeetings€at€Eastman€and€received€pamphlets€in€the€mail.€€Appellee€learned€about€the€loss€of€survivorÏbenefit€for€anyone€selecting€lump€sum€distribution,€and€that€lump€sum€on€future€earnings€was€goingÏto€be€eliminated.€€Based€on€that€information,€he€determined€that€he€would€lose€benefits€if€heÏremained€employed€after€January€1,€1998.€€Despite€the€fact€that€the€new€plan€at€Eastman€did€not€goÏinto€effect€until€January€1,€1998,€Appellee€retired€on€September€1,€1997,€a€few€days€short€of€60€yearsÏold,€with€88€or€89€retirement€points€accumulated,€and€with€full€benefits.€€€It€was€his€understandingÏthat,€if€he€had€stayed€longer,€Appellant's€portion€of€his€lump€sum€benefit€could€in€fact€have€decreasedÏunder€the€new€system.€€His€job€at€Eastman€had€plateaued€and€was€probably€in€a€downward€direction,Ïhis€job€satisfaction€was€fairly€low,€and€he€was€looking€forward€to€leaving€the€company.€€He€formedÏthat€mind€set€probably€in€late€1996,€and€before€that€time,€his€mind€set€was€neutral.€Ìà  àà ` àOn€cross„examination,€Appellee€agreed€that€the€following€colloquy€occurred€whenÏhe€was€deposed€by€Appellant's€counsel€on€November€14,€1997:ÌÓÓà8  àà0` Ð Ð àQ:à8¸ ` Ð ` Ð àDid€you€envision€working€at€the€time€that€you€were€divorcedÐ 0"€  Ðto€the€age€of€65€and€retiring,€or€when€did€you€envisionÏworking?Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA:à8¸ ` x` xàNo,€I€never€envisioned€working€to€65.Ðà%0!$¸ ¸  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àQ:à8¸ ` x` xàWhat€age€did€you€envision€working€to?и'#&¸ ¸  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA:à8¸ ` x` xàI€fully€expect€to€retire€probably€sometime€between€60Ð )à$( Ðand€62.Ð ¸ ¸  ÐÌà8  àà ` àHe€also€amplified€this€prior€depositional€testimony€at€trial:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àQ:à8¸ ` Ð ` Ð àSo€what€your€mind€„„€what€you€told€me€what€your€mind€wasÐ ,.|)- Ðlast€November€about€the€divorce€time€is€different€than€whatÏyou€recall€your€mind€being€today.€€Is€that€right?Ð ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA:à8¸ ` x` xàI€think€it's€always€been€in€my€mind€that€I€would€retireÐ Ü1,-1 Ðsometime€between€„„€I€think€that's€something€betweenÏyou€and€my€ex„wife€that€came€up€with€the€65€idea.€ÏAnd€this€business€of€magicness€of€65€is€somethingÏthat€I€just€don't€understand.€€I€mean,€I€was€a€retirementÏeligible€person.Ð ¸ ¸  ÐÌà8  àà ` àQ:à8¸ Ð Ð àSo€you€had€always€envisioned€that€you€wouldÐ P8 38 Ðprobably€retire€between€60€and€65?Ð ¸ ¸  ÐÐ (:x5: Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA:à8¸ ` x` xà60€and€62€would€be€more€like€it.а¸ ¸  ÐÌà  àÓÓà ` àHusband€further€testified€at€trial€that€the€decision€not€to€classify€Wife's€alimony€asÏrehabilitative€in€the€original€divorce€and€the€failure€to€address€the€issue€of€modification€of€alimonyÏupon€his€retirement€were€mistakes€on€his€part€made€on€the€day€the€divorce€agreement€was€reached.Ìà  àà ` àPaul€Rhoton,€CPA,€testified€that€he€is€the€accountant€for€Sheffield€Studios,€Inc.,Ïowned€by€Janice€Comsa€and€Doris€Bogan.€€He€prepared€the€tax€returns€of€the€company€for€the€yearsÏ1993€through€1997,€and€the€only€year€the€company€actually€showed€a€profit€was€1996.€€In€that€year,Ïthe€actual€net€profit€was€$634.€€There€was€a€capital€gain€from€the€sale€of€the€Bloomer€building€inÏKingsport,€where€her€shop€was€located,€and€the€$20,000€actually€received€in€1997€went€to€retire€debt.€ÏAnother€$80,000€in€capital€gain€from€that€sale€was€received€by€the€company€in€1998.€Appellant€hadÏbeen€holding€six€months€of€payroll€checks€to€herself€because€of€lack€of€company€funds€to€pay€them,Ïand€she€paid€herself€for€those€checks.€€Then€she€received€a€one„half€share€of€the€capital€gain,€orÏ$31,377.€€He€described€the€two€owners€of€the€business€as€having€to€"struggle€.€.€.€put€in€a€lot€of€timeÏand€effort€.€.€.€to€stay€in€business."Ìà  àà ` àPersonal€income€tax€returns€of€Appellant€showed€wages€of€$6,850€in€1994,€wagesÏof€$9,600€in€1995,€wages€of€$5,200€in€1996,€wages€of€$5,750€in€1997,€and€alimony€in€each€of€thoseÏyears€of€$27,600.€€Joint€income€tax€return€of€Husband€and€his€present€wife€Ô#†X´XX X´fB#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôfor€1997,€the€last€year€heÐ 0"€  Ðworked,€Ô#†X´XX X´fT#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôshowed€wages€of€$152,514.Ð $X" Ðà  àà ` àAppellant€testified€that,€at€the€time€of€her€divorce,€she€had€been€married€to€AppelleeÏfor€two€months€short€of€30€years,€and€that€she€had€never€worked€outside€the€home€until€she€andÏJanice€Comsa€went€into€business€with€The€Shade€Shop€in€1983.€€Since€the€business€opened,€she€hadÏtried€to€draw€$200€per€week€salary€from€the€Shop€but€was€not€always€able€to€cash€the€checks.€€AtÏthe€time€of€the€divorce,€the€business€consisted€of€two€shops,€one€in€Kingsport€and€one€in€Bristol.€InÏthe€divorce,€she€received€the€parties'€one„half€interest€in€the€business,€including€the€Bloomer€buildingÏand€a€vacant€lot€on€Jack€White€Drive€in€Kingsport.€€The€Jack€White€property€sold€in€1993,€and€sheÏused€her€proceeds€to€make€the€down€payment€on€the€condominium€where€she€now€lives.€TheÏBloomer€building€sold€in€1997,€as€previously€described,€and€she€used€the€proceeds€received€that€yearÏto€pay€off€consumer€debt€incurred€to€meet€her€regular€living€expenses.€She€and€Comsa€opened€aÏShade€Shop€in€Johnson€City€soon€after€her€divorce;€now€she€owns€that€shop€individually,€ComsaÏowns€the€Kingsport€shop,€and€the€Bristol€shop€is€closed.€€She€testified€that€she€expects€to€have€toÐ (:x5: Ðwork€until€age€70€because€of€her€limited€earning€power.€€Her€accountant€has€advised€her€to€considerÏclosing€the€shop,€which€has€not€been€successful,€but€the€only€job€she€thinks€she€could€get€would€beÏas€a€clerk€in€a€department€store.€Ìà  àà ` àAppellee€submitted€a€Statement€of€Estimated€Monthly€Expenses€indicating€individualÏmonthly€itemized€expenses€of€$2,867€plus€$2,300€alimony€paid€to€Appellant,€for€a€total€monthlyÏbudget€of€$5,167.51.€€He€showed€net€monthly€Ô#†X´XX X´ßT#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔincomeÔ#†X´XX X´á[#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€from€his€retirement€investment€of€$3,150,Ð è 8  Ðresulting€in€a€net€monthly€loss€of€$2,017.51.€€His€eligibility,€as€of€September€19,€1999,€for€socialÏsecurity€benefits€of€$1,200€per€month,€if€included€in€the€calculation€of€monthly€income,€would€resultÏin€a€net€monthly€loss€of€$817.Ìà  àà ` àAppellant€Ô#†X´XX X´)\#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôsubmitted€a€Statement€of€Estimated€Monthly€Expenses€indicatingÐ H˜ ÐindividualÔ#†X´XX X´¶]#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€monthly€itemized€expenses€of€$3,313,€net€monthly€income€from€her€business€of€$735,€andÐ  p Ðnet€monthly€alimony€of€$2,033,€resulting€in€a€net€monthly€loss€of€€$545.€€She€will€not€be€eligible€forÏsocial€security€benefits€of€$600€per€month€until€she€reaches€age€62,€on€July€14,€2001.€Ìà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court,€in€a€Memorandum€Opinion€and€Order€filed€July€13,€1998,€found€thatÏAppellee€has€experienced€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances€owing€to€his€retirementÏwhich,€although€voluntary,€was€occasioned€by€the€employer's€retirement€policy€changes,€which€wereÏunforeseeable.€€Having€made€the€decision€to€retire€by€January€1,€1998,€as€required€under€theÏemployer's€new€policy€in€order€to€retain€full€benefits,€ð ðAppellee€cannot€reverse€the€decision.ðð€ÏFurther,€the€Court€found€that€Appellant's€financial€situation€is€somewhat€improved€because€she€nowÏhas€the€opportunity€for€a€successful€business€enterprise,€since€she€is€sole€owner€of€The€Shade€ShopÏin€Johnson€City.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€Court€found€that€Appellant€still€needs€alimony€and€Appellee€still€has€anÐ )à$( Ðability€to€pay,€and€ordered€a€decrease€in€alimony€from€$2,300€per€month€to€$945€per€month.€€TheÏCourt€calculated€this€amount€to€be€one„third€of€Appellee's€current€net€monthly€income,€and€orderedÏ"said€sum€of€alimony€to€be€further€subject€to€any€additional€income€earned€by€the€[Husband]€in€theÏfuture."€€Appellee€was€ordered€to€provide€Appellant€each€year€a€complete€and€correct€copy€of€hisÏincome€tax€reports,€W„2's€or€other€documents€of€income€earned€for€such€time€as€[his]€obligation€toÏpay€periodic€alimony€continues.€à h à€€Ð  4ð/4 Ðò òòòà@VV$ìàDISCUSSIONóóó ó€Ô#†X´XX X´U^#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€ˆÐ ° Ðà  àÔ#†X´XX X´še#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôà ` àOur€review€is€de€novo€upon€the€record,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€theÐ à Ðcorrectness€of€the€findings€of€fact€Ô#†X´XX X´ÿe#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôof€the€trial€courtÔ#†X´XX X´Ðf#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€isÐ h¸ Ðotherwise.€€Rule€13(d),€T€R€A€P.;€€òòLindsey€v.€Lindsey,€óó976€S.W.2d€175,€178€(Tenn.€App.€1997).€€WeÐ @  Ðhave€addressed€in€detail€the€facts€of€this€case€because€whether€or€not€there€was€a€substantial€andÏmaterial€change€in€circumstances€is€entirely€dependent€upon€the€specific€facts€of€this€case.€€Ô#†X´XX X´$g#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔÐ ð @  Ðà  àà ` àAppellant€contends€that€Appellee's€retirement€was€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€the€1991Ïdivorce,€was€contemplated€in€the€divorce€judgment€since€a€division€of€retirement€benefits€wasÏincorporated€in€the€order,€and€was€voluntary.€€Appellant€maintains€that€Appelleeððs€retirement€cannotÏbe€a€substantial€and€material€change€in€circumstances€as€contemplated€by€€Ô#†X´XX X´åh#ÔT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(a)(1).Ð P  Ðà  àà ` àAppellee€argues€his€retirement€was€not€foreseeable,€and€that€while€he€generally€mayÏhave€had€some€type€of€expectation€or€hope€in€1991€that€he€would€retire€at€the€age€of€60„62,€there€wasÏno€definitive€plan€to€do€so.€€Appellee€argues€that€the€evidence€proves€his€retirement€was€neitherÏforeseeable€nor€voluntary,€but€predicated€on€major€changes€in€his€job,€the€company,€and€theÏretirement€benefits€policy.€€Ìà  àà ` àAppellee€acknowledges€that€the€alimony€provision€in€the€divorce€decree€does€notÏaddress€whether€a€reduction€would€be€made€upon€his€later€retirement.€€However,€citing€as€persuasiveÏthe€decision€of€a€Pennsylvania€court,€he€argues€there€is€no€requirement€that€a€divorce€decreeÏanticipate€and€address€every€possible€change€of€circumstances.€òòMcFadden€v.€McFadden,óó€563€A.2dÐ è%8!$ Ð180,€183€(Pa.Super.€1989).€€He€also€cites€cases€in€other€jurisdictions€which€hold€that€"silence€in€aÏdivorce€decree€about€what€will€happen€in€the€event€of€retirement€should€not€preclude€considerationÏof€a€reasonable€retirement€as€part€of€the€total€circumstances€in€determining€if€sufficient€changedÏcircumstances€exist€to€warrant€a€modification€of€alimony."€€òòPimm€v.€Pimm,€óó601€So.2d€534€(Fla.Ð H-˜(, Ð1992).€€Finally,€Appellee€argues€that€this€Court€should€adopt€the€approach€used€by€other€jurisdictionsÏin€which€a€good€faith€retirement,€although€foreseeable€or€voluntary,€nevertheless€gives€the€obligorÏthe€right€to€have€his€or€her€alimony€obligation€reassessed.€€Appellee€argues€that€the€"strictÏforeseeability/voluntariness€approach€urged€by€Appellant"€is€obviously€out€of€step€with€the€modernÏtrend€in€the€law,€and€that€only€two€jurisdictions,€New€York€and€North€Dakota,€appear€to€adhere€toÏsuch€an€inflexible€position€on€this€issue.Ìà  àÔ% € ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôà ` àT.C.A.Ô#†X´XX X´r#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€ðð€36„5„101Ô#†X´XX X´cr#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€provides€that€the€court€may€order€spousal€support€and,€€".€.€.€onÐ 0:€5: Ðapplication€of€either€party€for€spousal€support,€the€court€may€decree€an€increase€or€decrease€of€suchÏallowance€only€upon€a€showing€of€a€substantial€and€material€change€of€circumstances."Ô#†X´XX X´³r#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€€T.C.A.Ô#†X´XX X´t#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€ððÐ ˆØ Ð36„5„101Ô#†X´XX X´Qt#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô(a)(1)€(1996€&€Supp.€1998).€€The€party€seeking€relief€on€the€grounds€of€a€substantial€andÐ `° Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances€has€the€burden€of€proving€such€changed€circumstances€warrantingÏan€increase€or€decrease€in€the€amount€of€the€alimony€obligation.€€òòSeal€v.€Seal,€óó802€S.W.2d€617,€620Ð  ` Ð(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€The€change€in€circumstances€must€have€occurred€since€the€entry€of€the€divorceÏdecree€ordering€the€payment€of€alimony.€€òòElliot€v.€Elliot,€óó825€S.W.2d€87,€90€(Tenn.€App.€1991).€Ð À  ÐFurthermore,€the€change€in€circumstances€relied€upon€must€not€have€been€foreseeable€at€the€time€theÏdecree€was€entered.€òòId.Ð pÀ Ðà  àóóà ` àThe€decision€to€modify€the€alimony€obligation€is€factually€driven€and€requires€aÐ H˜ Ðcareful€balancing€of€several€factors.€€òòCranford€v.€Cranford,€óó772€S.W.2d€48,€50€(Tenn.€App.€1989).€Ð  p ÐThe€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d),€applicable€to€the€initial€grant€of€spousal€support€andÏmaintenance,€where€relevant,€must€be€taken€into€consideration€in€determining€whether€there€has€beenÏa€change€in€circumstances€to€warrant€a€modification€of€the€alimony€obligation.€€òòThreadgill€v.Ð ¨ø ÐThreadgill,€óó740€S.W.2d€419,€422„23€(Tenn.€App.€1987).Ð €Ð Ðà  àà ` àWhile€T.C.A.€Ô#†X´XX X´µt#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔððÔ#†X´XX X´ez#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€36„5„101(d)€enumerates€several€factors€for€the€court€to€consider,€theÐ X ¨ Ðneed€of€the€spouse€receiving€the€support€is€the€single€most€important€factor.€€òòCranford,€óó772€S.W.2dÐ 0"€  Ðat€50.€€In€addition€to€the€need€of€the€spouse€receiving€support,€courts€most€often€take€intoÏconsideration€the€ability€of€the€obligor€spouse€to€provide€support.€€òòId.óóò òÐ à%0!$ Ðà  àó óà ` àThis€Court,€in€an€Opinion€filed€January€27,€1999,€has€reaffirmed€these€long„heldÐ ¸'#& Ðprinciples€of€Tennessee€law€in€cases€where€the€payor€seeks€to€reduce€or€terminate€periodic€alimony.€ÏIn€the€case€of€òòSannella€v.€Sannella,€óóNo.€01A01„9701„CV„000004€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Nashville€JanuaryÐ h+¸&* Ð27,€1999,€perm.€app.€denied€June€7,€1999),€Husband€òòóópetitioned€to€terminate€his€spousal€supportÐ @-(, Ðobligation€following€a€twenty„year€marriage€by€filing€a€petition€shortly€after€his€retirement,€allegingÏdecrease€in€his€income€and€post„divorce€increase€in€his€former€wife's€income.€€The€Sanellas,€nowÏboth€in€their€late€60s,€were€divorced€in€1976;€Wife€was€awarded€the€divorce€based€on€cruel€andÏinhuman€treatment.€€Husband€had€a€successful€pathology€practice€and€Wife€did€not€work€outside€theÏhome€during€the€marriage,€although€she€had€a€master€of€science€degree.€€The€trial€court€directedÏHusband€to€pay€Wife€$1,250€per€month€in€long„term€spousal€support€until€her€death€or€remarriage.€ÏWife€obtained€a€job€after€the€divorce,€at€which€she€earned€$6€per€hour;€she€later€obtained€a€positionÐ (:x5: Ðat€Vanderbilt€University€School€of€Medicine,€where,€at€the€time€of€the€alimony€termination€hearing,ÏÔ#†X´XX X´«z#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôshe€earned€approximately€$38,000€per€year.€€Husband€remarried€and€moved€to€Utah,€where€heÐ ˆØ Ðestablished€a€successful€solo€practice€and€co„owned€an€air€ambulance€service.€€He€retired€in€1994Ïbecause€he€was€"tired,"€because€the€work€had€become€difficult,€and€because€he€did€not€believe€heÏwas€as€sharp€as€he€once€had€been.€€He€then€moved€to€Florida€with€his€third€wife,€who€earns€$65,000Ïannually.€€They€owned€a€$185,000€home€with€a€pool€and€a€$60,000€sailboat,€as€well€as€aÏcondominium.€€Their€joint€income€tax€return€for€1995€stated€that€their€gross€income€was€$222,349.€ÏThe€Trial€Court€denied€Mr.€Sanella's€petition€after€concluding€that€his€retirement€did€not€affect€hisÏability€to€pay€spousal€support€and€that€his€former€wife€continued€to€need€support.€€This€CourtÏaffirmed,€reciting€the€familiar€principles€of€law€as€stated€above.€€Applying€those€principles€to€theÏfacts,€we€found€that:€ÌÓÓà8  àà0` Ð Ð àWhen€the€parties€divorced€[in€1976],€Dr.€Sanella's€eventual€retirement€[inÏ1994]€and€Ms.€Sannella's€re„entry€into€the€workforce€were€certainlyÏforeseeable€.€.€.€€At€the€time€of€trial,€his€net€worth€had€increased€to€$750,000Ï.€.€.€[a]lthough€Dr.€Sannella€is€now€retired,€he€still€earns€$2,500€a€month€fromÏhis€position€with€Med„Arrow,€Inc€and€his€social€security€benefits.€€During€theÏfirst€quarter€of€1996,€he€paid€himself€only€$3,500€from€his€professionalÏcorporation,€even€though€the€corporation's€gross€income€for€1995€wasÏ$78,245€.€.€.€.Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÓ;…ÓÓÓÌÓ·‡Óà@ÙÙ&ìà*€€*€€€*ˆÌÓÓà8  àà8` Ð Ð àCounting€the€support€received€from€Dr.€Sannella,€Ms.€SannellaÏreceives€$3,400€each€month€and€has€expenses€of€$3,543,€creating€aÏ$134€monthly€shortfall.€€Dr.€Sannella's€support€payments€constituteÏ36%€of€Ms.€Sannella's€income.€€She€has€managed€to€accumulateÏ$296,000€in€assets€.€.€.€.€€Ms.€Sannella€plans€to€work€as€long€as€sheÏcan,€but€she€will€only€be€able€to€work€until€her€seventieth€birthdayÏbecause€of€Vanderbilt's€mandatory€retirement€policy.€€Ð ` x` x ÐÌà@ÀÀ&ìà*€€*€€*€€ˆÌÓü‡ÓÓÓà8  àà8` Ð Ð àAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€Dr.€Sannella€has€failed€to€prove€thatÏthe€change€in€circumstances€is€material€enough€to€justify€terminatingÏhis€spousal€support€obligation.€€His€retirement€from€a€lucrativeÏmedical€practice,€his€purchase€of€a€new€home,€and€his€remarriageÏwere€voluntary€decisions€that€have€not€rendered€him€unable€toÏcontinue€to€meet€his€support€obligation.€€Under€the€facts€of€this€case,ÏDr.€Sannella€has€failed€to€provide€justification€for€terminating€Ms.ÏSannella's€support.Ð ` x` x ÐÓ;ŠÓÌIn€affirming€the€trial€court,€this€Court€considered€its€findings€of€foreseeability€and€voluntariness€andÏacknowledged€the€statutory€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.Ô#†X´XX X´#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€ðð€36„5„101(d),€with€the€need€of€the€spouseÐ x6È16 Ðreceiving€the€support€as€the€single€most€important€factor.€òòCranford,€óó772€S.W.2d€at€50.€Ô#†X´XX X´G#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ôà Ð àÐ P8 38 Ðà  àApplying€those€same€principles€to€the€case€at€bar,€we€find€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€inÐ (:x5: Ðdecreasing€Appellee's€alimony€obligation€in€this€case.€€As€in€òòSanella,óó€Appelleeððs€eventual€retirementÐ ° Ðwas€certainly€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€The€proof€shows€the€parties€contemplated€thatÏeventuality€since€they€divided€retirement€benefits€as€part€of€their€property€settlement.€€Despite€theÏAppelleeððs€initial€testimony€that€retirement€wasnððt€even€on€his€mind€at€the€time€of€the€divorce,€heÏadmitted€on€cross„examination€that€he€had€never€envisioned€working€to€age€65.€€In€fact,€he€testifiedÏthat€he€had€fully€expected€to€retire€somewhere€between€60€and€62.€€Appellee€retired€a€few€short€daysÏbefore€his€sixtieth€birthday€even€though€he€could€have€worked€past€his€sixtieth€birthday€under€theÏold€benefit€plan€at€Eastman.€€The€evidence€in€the€record€before€us€is€clear€that€Appellee€made€aÏvoluntary€determination€that€it€was€in€his€financial€interest,€as€well€as€his€personal€interest,€to€takeÏearly€retirement€as€he€had€fully€expected€to€do€all€along.€€€Ìà  àà ` àAppellee€receives€a€monthly€payment€from€the€investment€of€his€KRIP€retirementÏassets€which€is€one„half€the€amount€he€formerly€received€in€salary,€and€he€stated€that€he€is€nowÏeligible€for€an€additional€$1,158€in€social€security€benefits.€€Appellant's€monthly€alimony€paymentsÏare€the€primary€source€of€her€income.€€Her€income€disbursements€from€the€distribution€of€her€shareÏof€Appellee's€KRIP€account€will€not,€by€any€testimony,€exceed€$1,450€per€month.€€She€will€not€beÏeligible€for€social€security€for€several€years,€and€then€she€will€be€limited€to€one„half€of€the€amountÏAppellee€receives.€€€€€€€€€€à  àÐ 0"€  Ðà  àà ` àWÔ#†X´XX X´)Ž#Ôe€find€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€Trial€Courtððs€finding€that€AppelleeððsÐ $X" Ðretirement€was€unforeseeable.€€The€record€as€a€whole€shows€that€Appelleeððs€retirement€was€bothÏvoluntary€and€foreseeable,€and€in€fact,€was€foreseen€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€The€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence€is€that€Appelleeððs€retirement€was€not€a€substantial€and€material€change€inÏcircumstances€as€contemplated€by€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(a)(1).€Appelleeððs€decision€to€retire€wasÏpredicated,€at€least€in€large€part,€on€his€determination€that€it€was€in€his€financial€interest€to€do€so.€ÏAppellee€admits€that€his€failure€to€address,€at€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€issue€of€modification€ofÏalimony€upon€retirement€was€a€mistake€on€his€part€made€on€the€day€the€divorce€agreement€wasÏreached.€€Appelleeððs€voluntary€and€foreseeable€retirement€should€not€result€in€Appellantððs€financialÏdetriment.€€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€and€reinstate€the€prior€award€ofÏ$2,300€monthly€alimony€as€provided€in€the€partiesðð€original€divorce€decree.Ìà  àà ` àWe€do€not€hold€by€this€Opinion€that€retirement€is€always€a€foreseeable€event€so€asÏto€preclude€later€modification€of€periodic€alimony€due€to€a€partyððs€retirement.€€Our€holding€expressedÐ (:x5: Ðin€this€Opinion€is€based€upon€the€particular€facts€as€evidenced€in€the€record€before€us€in€this€case.€ÏWhether€a€partyððs€retirement€is€a€substantial€and€material€change€of€circumstances,€as€expressedÏearlier€in€this€Opinion,€is€dependent€on€the€facts€of€Ô‡ X´XXX´Ôeach€case.Ð `° Ðà  àà@FF%ìàò òòòCONCLUSIONóóÔ#†X´XX X´É›#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔˆÐ 8 ˆ Ðà  àó óÔ#†X´XX X´[œ#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€reversed€and€this€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€forÐ  ` Ðsuch€further€proceedings,€if€any,€as€may€be€required,€consistent€with€this€Opinion,€and€for€collectionÏof€the€costs€below.€€The€costs€on€appeal€are€assessed€against€the€Appellee.ÌÓÓÔ#†X´XX X´œ#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ìà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àD.€MICHAEL€SWINEY,€J.ÌÌÌÌòòò òÌÌCONCUR:ó óóóÐ ”ä ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€P.J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ_òòSeparate€Dissenting€Opinion€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ T,¤'+ ÐCHARLES€D.€SUSANO,€JR.,€J.Ô#†X´XX X´;ž#ÔÔ‡ X´XXX´Ô€Ô#†X´XX X´2 #Ô