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O*È›?Ò÷V¬°ÃÏ—MS%…)â¦üúÇduÆ›Oœ>ošV§\‹b"àŠ·c–½åhþÏ=ÂßxÒó‹±®ÔŒÊ.NÕ2bj“mѼYkIGà ÝŒòëËO¬·RŽÝwLï­º%ºÞ$ËeM{6?!yM÷.²ŸWB)ÏNÝÈ ñ@ýÀ} l¥Þ&â¡æ¦qw¡vªµ([ôZ¥^Ô}ôš«–Ûá9>5 ̃^sßfWA‰ß·òBË0CõCƒ³ÅßÎ÷;6§± «­[,*ZbÙ*ÕïX«ÖnçË<™«õBWªœ+†¹œ‡ƒ}}[Ÿqq@#¨I:üñðËEÊ^¢4 Zž|þ‡só»ºáä rBÝ¡}jBN_:%quh([öÅí€y)|Ó$#¿*# LUNW %¥ 0(«bÓw@Û4/>NF H^ ht mvU: AQÊÆ 0Dá 0D% 0Di i D/­ BÜ Bù D3 ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- CPCECCeCaCÀC[CgCÓ€Cìu[%3|xC  BPRnonsuitTenn.R.Evidinvitees Coln foreseeabilityBalentineMcClungLindertortfeasorMcLainInman TRECatesù{i%ä ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€Xç4XXXÔÔ€ø!XXç4ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xç4Xø!ÔÐ  ÐÌNovember€9,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔѰÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€9XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òñCññCñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô ` 8ttxP,ð  rßñCññCññCññCñLUCY€L.€BOND,à  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð  ÐñCñßt€ )>.*jx…T` `€€@EyH` 8ttxP±ôð T tßñCñà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àDavidson€CircuitÐ ôì Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appellant,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p àNo.€€€96C„4542Ð àØ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ Ì Ä ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ¸ ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ ¤ œ ÐBELLE€MEADE€FUND€PARTNERS,à  à€€)à p àAppeal€No.Ð  ˆ ÐL.P.;€BRANCH€PROPERTY,€L.P.,à  à€€)à p à01A01„9802„CV„00059Ð | t ÐBRANCH€PROPERTY€LTD.€à À àà  à€€)Ð h` ÐPARTNERSHIP,€à  à€€à h àà À àà  à€€)Ð TL  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appellees.à À àà  à€€)Ð ,$  ÐÌÌà@C C ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@¼¼(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌà@  ®àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYˆÌà@;;#®àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEˆÌà0 ` àÐ ` T$` T$ ÐÓ  ÓHONORABLE€THOMAS€W.€BROTHERS,€JUDGEÌó óÓtÓÌÌÌKeith€Jordan,€BPR€#3000Ì222€Second€Avenue,€NorthÌSuite€360„MÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201ÌATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌM.€Bradley€Gilmore,€#13804ÌPARKER,€LAWRENCE,€CANTRELL€&€DEANÌ200€Fourth€Avenue€NorthÌFifth€FloorÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219ÌATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDED.ó óÐ è+à$( ÐÌÌÓÖ ÓÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àHENRY€F.€TODDÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCURS:ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÐ ”;Œ49  Ðò òLUCY€L.€BOND,à  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àDavidson€CircuitÐ ôì Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appellant,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p àNo.€€€96C„4542Ð àØ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ Ì Ä ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ¸ ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ ¤ œ ÐBELLE€MEADE€FUND€PARTNERS,à  à€€)à p àAppeal€No.Ð  ˆ ÐL.P.;€BRANCH€PROPERTY,€L.P.,à  à€€)à p à01A01„9802„CV„00059Ð | t ÐBRANCH€PROPERTY€LTD.€à À àà  à€€)Ð h` ÐPARTNERSHIP,€à  à€€à h àà À àà  à€€)Ð TL  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appellees.à À àà  à€€)Ð ,$  ÐÌó óÌà@88(®àòòò òÔ‡„kÄXXÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ#†X9X„„kÃ=#Ôó óóóˆÐ ðè  ÐÓÓÓ  ÓÌÓºÓÓ  Óà ` àThe€plaintiff€sued€for€injury€suffered€when€she€stepped€into€a€hole€in€the€asphalt€surfaceÏof€a€parking€lot€provided€for€customers€of€Kroger€Company.€€Kroger€was€dismissed€by€nonsuit,Ïand€the€remaining€defendants€were€dismissed€by€summary€judgment.€€Plaintiff€appealed€andÏpresented€the€following€issue:ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓI.à  àWhether€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€has€beenÐ ˆ€ Ðraised€by€the€plaintiff/appellant,€so€as€to€warrant€this€cause€toÏbe€tried€on€its€merits.ÌÒ¸ -ÒÒ„` ÒÓ;ÓÌà ` àThe€appellees„defendants€presented€the€following€issues:ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓ1.à  àWhether€the€trial€court€properly€granted€summaryÐ ü$ô  Ðjudgment€to€the€defendants€based€on€the€plaintiffððs€failure,Ïafter€adequate€time€for€discovery,€to€establish€the€existence€ofÏany€evidence€that€the€defendants€created€or€had€actual€orÏconstructive€notice€of€an€alleged€defective€condition€on€theÏpremises€that€caused€Ms.€Bondððs€fall.ÌÌ2.à  àWhether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€inÐ p+h$' Ðexcluding€the€affidavits€of€James€Vance€under€Tenn.R.Evid.Ï702€and€703.ò òÐ H-@&) ÐÒ¸ ‰ÒÒ„` {Òó óÓ—Óà ` àÌà ` àPertinent€portions€of€the€complaint€are:ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  àThat€on€or€about€December€19,€1995,€LUCY€L.ÏBOND,€traveled€to€the€Kroger€Co.€Grocery€store€located€atÏ4500€Harding€Road,€Nashville,€Davidson€County,€Tennessee.€ÏThat€while€stepping€out€of€her€vehicle,€she€fell€as€a€result€ofÏa€sizeable€hole€in€the€pavement€of€the€parking€lot,€resulting€inÏa€fractured€ankle€and€other€serious€and€complicated€medicalÏproblems.ÌÌà  àThat€the€hole€in€the€parking€lot€was€a€hazardous,Ïdangerous€condition€unknown€to€the€Plaintiff€and€is€indicativeÐ 0:(37 Ðof€failure€on€the€part€of€the€Defendants€to€properly€maintainÏthe€premises€for€patrons€of€the€store.ÌÌà  àThat€the€Defendants€knew€or€should€have€known€ofÏthe€dangerous€and€hazardous€conditions€of€the€parking€lot,€butÏfailed€to€properly€maintain€and€repair€such.ÌÒ¸ âÒÒ„` ÔÒÓðÓÌà ` àThe€motion€for€summary€judgment€states:ÌÒ¸ ÒÒ` „Òò òÓÓà  àó óThe€undisputed€facts€establish€that€the€defendantsÐ @8  Ðneither€created€the€condition€nor€had€actual€or€constructiveÏnotice€of€it.€€The€undisputed€facts€further€establish€that€beforeÏthe€date€of€the€plaintiffððs€accident,€the€defendants€exercisedÏreasonable€care€in€maintaining€the€parking€lot.ÌÒ¸ †ÒÒ„` ”ÒÓ¥ÓÌà ` àEvidence€submitted€in€support€of€the€motion€consisted€of€the€following:Ìà ` à1.à ¸ àThe€deposition€of€plaintiff€containing€the€following:Ð Œ„ ÐÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  àQ.à h àAnd€when€you€got€out€of€your€van,€you€got€outÐ d\ Ðthe€driverððs€side?ÌÌà  àA.à h àYes.Ð (  ÐÓ\ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓÕÓÓÓà  àQ.à h àDid€you€step€down€right€into€the€hole?Ð ø ÐÌà  àA.à h àYes.€€Because€when€I€stepped€down€into€theÐ Ø Ð Ðhole,€that€first€step€I€was€into€the€hole€and€I€think€I€was€on€theÏground.ÌÓùÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓÓÓÓà  àQ.à h àCan€you€describe€the€hole€that€you€fell€in?Ð ˆ$€  ÐÌà  àA.à h àI€mean,€it€wasnððt€like€a€big€crater€hole.€€It€wasÐ `&X" Ðlike€a€„„€I€mean,€it€was€just€a€„„€like€it€was€not€smooth.€€It€wasÏjust€a€hole.€You€know,€it€was€„„ÌÌà  àQ.à h àDo€you€know€how€deep€it€was?Ð *#& ÐÌà  àA.à h àTwo€or€three€inches.Ð è+à$( ÐÓ7ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ ÓÓÓà  àQ.à h àMy€question€is:€Do€you€remember€looking€at€Ð À-¸&* Ðthe€hole€right€after€you€fell?ÌÌà  àA.à h àNo.Ð „0|)- ÐÒ¸ ÿÒÒ„` ñÒÓ ÓÌà ` à2.à ¸ àThe€affidavit€of€defendantsðð€manager€that,€every€3€or€4€weeks,€she€inspected€theÐ H3@,0 Ðparking€lot€for€defects,€including€potholes€and€had€any€discovered€defects€repaired.Ìâ âÐ ø6ð/4 Ðà ` à3.à ¸ àAn€ð ðon€site€maintenance€personðð€was€instructed€to€inspect€the€parking€lot€dailyÐ  Ðâ âfor€defects€and€to€repair€defects€found.ÌÌà ` à4.à ¸ àA€commercial€sweeping€service€swept€the€lot€daily.€€If€this€service€had€reportedÐ  ˆ Ðany€defects€they€would€have€been€repaired€immediately.ÌÌà ` à5.à ¸ àBusiness€records€of€the€defendants€show€that€the€lot€ð ðunderwent€a€majorÐ   Ðimprovement€in€1988,€potholes€were€patched€and€the€pavement€was€resealed€in€1994.ÌÌà ` à6.à ¸ àð ðParking€lot€repairðð€was€performed€on€February€10,€1995,€ð ðasphalt€repairðð€wasÐ  ˜ Ðperformed€on€May€24,€1995,€ð ðseal€and€stripping€lotsðð€was€performed€August€23,€1995,€ð ðspeedÏbump€repairsðð€were€performed€on€December€14,€1995,€and€ð ðconcrete€island€replaceðð€wasÏperformed€on€December€21,€1995.ÌÌà ` à7.à ¸ àThe€lot€was€pressure€washed€intermittently€and€swept€regularly.à Ð àÐ Ø Ð ÐÌà ` àIt€is€significant€that,€although€the€defendantsðð€affidavits€indicate€that€systems€andÏpersonnel€were€in€place€to€assure€integrity€and€safety€of€the€parking€lot,€no€evidence€is€found€thatÏð ðon€or€about€December€19,€1996"€or€at€any€time€shortly€preceding€that€date,€the€lot€wasÏexamined€and€found€to€be€free€of€potholes.€€Moreover,€the€lack€of€any€report€of€potholes€fromÏthose€who€had€the€duty€to€report€same€is€not€conclusive€evidence€that€there€were€no€potholes.ÌÌà ` àIn€contrast€to€the€inference€to€be€drawn€from€the€negative€evidence€that€no€pothole€wasÏreported,€there€is€the€positive€deposition€of€plaintiff€that€there€was€a€pothole€at€the€time€of€herÏinjury.ÌÌà ` àFor€purposes€of€reviewing€the€summary€judgment,€this€Court€must€view€the€evidence€ofÏplaintiff€in€its€most€favorable€light€and€find€that€the€existence€of€the€pothole€was€a€disputed€issueÐ Ð8È16 Ðfact€which€must€be€resolved€by€a€trial€rather€than€by€summary€judgment.òò€€Barber€v.€RalstonÐ  ÐPurina€Coóó.,€Tenn.€App.€1991,€825€S.W.2d€96.Ð àØ ÐÌà ` àWhat€constitutes€reasonable€care€on€the€part€of€a€parking€lot€in€providing€for€the€safetyÏof€invitees€is€a€question€for€the€jury.€€òòMumford€v.€Thomasóó,€Tenn.€App.€1980,€603€S.W.2d€154.Ð h` ÐÌà ` àIn€the€past,€some€ð ðtrip€and€fallðð€suits€have€been€dismissed€under€the€ð ðopen€and€obviousÏrule.ðð€€Plaintiff€testified€that€the€pothole€was€not€open€and€obvious€to€her€because€her€foot€wentÏinto€the€hole€as€she€stepped€from€her€vehicle.€€If€her€version€of€the€incident€is€found€to€be€true,Ïthen€the€open€and€obvious€rule€might€be€held€to€be€inapplicable.€€Moreover,€the€Supreme€CourtÏhas€recently€modified€the€open€and€obvious€rule€and€revised€the€duty€of€the€owner€or€controllerÏof€a€premises€to€an€invitee€or€licensee€who€is€injured€on€the€premises.ÌÌà ` àIn€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€for€publication,€March€30,€1988,€Tenn.€1998,€966€S.W.2d€Ð ø Ѐ€34,€the€Supreme€Court€said:€ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  àAfter€reviewing€the€two€cases€before€us,€the€extensiveÏliterature,€our€Tennessee€cases€on€the€subject,€and€cases€fromÏother€jurisdictions,€we€conclude€that€an€open€and€obviousÏdanger€does€not€automatically€result€in€a€finding€of€no€dutyÏand€therefore€no€landowner€liability.€€As€in€any€negligenceÏaction,€we€think€a€risk€is€unreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€a€dutyÏto€act€with€due€care€if€the€foreseeable€probability€and€gravityÏof€harm€posed€by€a€defendantððs€conduct€outweigh€the€burdenÏupon€the€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct€thatÏwould€prevent€the€harm.€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150Ð ü*ô#' Ð(Tenn.€1995).€€Applying€this€analysis,€if€the€foreseeability€andÏgravity€of€harm€posed€by€the€defendantððs€conduct,€even€ifÏð ðopen€and€obvious,ðð€outweigh€the€burden€upon€the€defendantÏto€engage€in€alternative€conduct,€the€defendant€has€a€duty€toÏact€with€reasonable€care€and€the€comparative€fault€principlesÏapply€under€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentine,€supraóó.Ð „0|)- ÐÓ-ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓt1ÓÓÓà  àIn€each€of€these€premises€liability€cases,€the€plaintiffÏcontends€that€the€open€and€obvious€rule€does€not€precludeÏfinding€a€duty€owned€by€the€defendant€landowner€and€that€anÏopen€and€obvious€danger€is€merely€a€factor€for€considerationÏin€determining€comparative€fault€under€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó.€Ð  6/3 ÐThe€landowner€defendants€in€both€cases€maintain€that€the€ruleÏis€intact;€that€there€is€no€duty€of€care€when€an€open€andÏobvious€condition€results€in€injury€to€the€plaintiff.€€The€CityÏof€Savannah€in€òòColnóó€also€contends€that€the€plaintiff€was€atÐ ¼9´27 Ðleast€50€percent€negligent,€barring€recovery€underÏcomparative€fault.ÌÓ˜1ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ]4ÓÓ2Óà  àWe€granted€and€consolidated€these€appeals€to€resolveÏthe€conflicting€views€and€to€determine€the€viability€of€theÏð ðopen€and€obviousðð€rule€after€òòMcIntyreóó;€specifically,€whetherÐ ¤ œ Ðan€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€condition€relieves€a€defendantððs€dutyÏof€care€or€whether€it€merely€is€considered€in€assessing€theÏcomparative€fault€of€the€parties.ÌÌà  àA€negligence€claim€requires€proof€of€the€followingÏelements:€(1)€a€duty€of€care€owed€by€the€defendant€to€theÏplaintiff;€(2)€conduct€by€the€defendant€falling€below€theÏstandard€of€care€amounting€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;€(3)€anÏinjury€or€loss;€(4)€causation€in€fact;€and€(5)€€proximate€or€legalÏcause.€€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.Ð ÜÔ  Ð1993).ÌÌà  àIn€òòMcCall€v.€Wilder,€supraóó,€we€explained€that€ð ða€riskÐ  ˜ Ðis€unreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€a€duty€to€act€with€due€care€ifÏthe€foreseeable€probability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€byÏdefendantððs€conduct€outweigh€the€burden€upon€defendant€toÏengage€in€alternative€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€theÏharm.ðð€€Among€the€factors€for€consideration€areÌÌÒ„` 6-ÒÒ¸ „ÒÒ¸ D-ÒÒÒthe€foreseeable€probability€of€the€harm€orÏinjury€occurring;€the€possible€magnitude€ofÏthe€potential€harm€or€injury;€the€importance€orÏsocial€value€of€the€activity€engaged€in€byÏdefendant;€the€usefulness€of€the€conduct€toÏdefendant;€the€feasibility€of€alternative,€saferÏconduct€and€the€relative€costs€and€burdensÏassociated€with€that€conduct;€the€relativeÏusefulness€of€the€safer€conduct;€and€theÏrelative€safety€of€alternative€conduct.ÌÒS9ÒÒ„¸ 39ÒÒ¸ è,ÒÒ` Ú,„ÒÌ913€S.W.2d€at€153.ÌÌà  àThe€determination€of€whether€a€duty€is€owed€requiresÏa€balancing€of€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€the€potentialÏharm€against€the€burden€imposed€in€preventing€that€harm.€ÏòòMcClung€v.€Delta€Square€Lt.€Partnershipóó,€937€S.W.2d€891,Ð Ô,Ì%) Ð901€(Tenn.€1996).€€Assuming€a€duty€of€care€is€owed,€be€it€aÏduty€to€refrain€from€creating€a€danger€or€a€duty€to€warnÏagainst€an€existing€danger,€it€must€then€be€determinedÏwhether€a€defendant€has€conformed€to€the€applicable€standardÏof€care,€which€is€generally€reasonable€care€under€theÏcircumstances.€€ð ðOrdinary,€or€reasonable,€care€is€to€beÏestimated€by€the€risk€entailed€through€probable€dangersÏattending€to€the€particular€situation€and€is€to€be€commensurateÏwith€the€risk€of€injury.ðð€€òòDoe€v.€Linder€Constr.€Co.,€Incóó.,€845Ð  5.2 ÐS.W.2d€173,€178€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà  àIf€the€plaintiff€meets€the€burden€of€establishing€theÏdefendantððs€duty€in€a€particular€case,€as€well€as€the€otherÏelements€of€the€negligence€claim,€the€trier€of€fact€must€applyÐ ¼9´27 Ðthe€principles€of€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentine,€supraóó.€€In€that€case€weÐ  Ðjoined€nearly€every€jurisdiction€in€holding€that€a€plaintiffððsÏcontributory€negligence€no€longer€would€bar€recovery€againstÏa€tortfeasor€and€adopting€a€system€of€comparative€negligenceÏin€which€the€plaintiffððs€negligence€is€compared€to€the€fault€ofÏthe€defendant€or€defendants.€€A€plaintiff€whose€negligence€isÏless€than€that€of€a€tortfeasor€may€now€recover€damagesÏreduced€by€a€percentage€of€the€plaintiffððs€own€negligence.€Ï833€S.W.2d€at€54.ÌÓ4ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓÓAÓÓ3Óà  àIn€premises€liability€cases,€application€of€dutyÏprinciples€resulted€in€imposing€a€duty€on€an€owner€orÏpossessor€of€premises€to€exercise€reasonable€care€under€theÏcircumstances€to€a€guest€(licensee)€or€business€invitee.€€TheÏduty€includes€the€responsibility€of€either€removing€or€warningÏagainst€any€latent€or€hidden€dangerous€condition€on€theÏpremises€of€which€one€was€aware€or€should€have€been€awareÏthrough€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligence.€€òòEaton€v.Ð ´¬ ÐMcLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€594€(Tenn.€1994);€òòSmith€v.€InmanÐ  ˜ ÐRealty€Coóó.,€846€S.W.2d€819,€823€(Tenn.€App.€1992).Ð Œ„ ÐÓ÷AÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÒ„` M;ÒÓ¡DÓÒ¸ „ÒÒ¸ ;;ÒÒÒÓBÓ(1)€A€possessor€of€land€is€not€liable€to€hisÏinvitees€for€physical€harm€caused€to€them€byÏany€activity€or€condition€on€the€land€whoseÏdanger€is€known€or€obvious€to€them,€òòunlessÐ (  Ðthe€possessor€should€anticipate€the€harmÏdespite€such€knowledge€or€obviousnessóó.Ð ø ÐÓEÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓTFÓÓDÓSuch€reason€to€expect€harm€to€the€visitor€fromÏknown€or€obvious€dangers€may€arise,€forÏexample,€where€the€possessor€has€reason€toÏexpect€that€the€inviteeððs€attention€may€beÏdistracted,€so€that€he€will€not€discover€what€isÏobvious,€or€will€forget€what€he€hasÏdiscovered,€or€fail€to€protect€himself€against€it.€ÏSuch€reason€may€also€arise€where€theÏpossessor€has€reason€to€expect€that€the€inviteeÏwill€proceed€to€encounter€the€known€orÏobvious€danger€because€to€a€reasonable€manÏin€his€position€the€advantages€of€doing€soÏwould€outweigh€the€apparent€risk.ÌÓxFÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÒ÷DÒÒ„¸ ×DÒÓÅHÓÒ¸ P:ÒÒ` b:„ÒÓFÓMoreover,€the€open€and€obvious€rule€is€inconsistent€with€ourÏcases€which€analyze€duty€by€balancing€foreseeability€andÏgravity€of€harm€with€feasibility€and€availability€of€alternativesÏthat€would€have€avoided€the€harm.ÌÓ1IÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ+JÓÓIÓà  àWe€reject€the€defendantsðð€contentions€that€restrictionÏof€the€open€and€obvious€danger€rule€will€preclude€the€trialÏcourt€from€applying€mechanisms€such€as€summary€judgmentÏand€directed€verdict€to€evaluate€cases.€€By€retaining€theÏseparate€analysis€of€duty,€and€not€totally€subsuming€all€casesÏby€applying€comparative€fault,€the€mechanisms€of€summaryÏjudgment€and€directed€verdict€remain€viable€to€evaluate€casesÏat€preliminary€stages€in€the€proceedings.€Ìà  àÐ ¼9´27 ÐÒ¸ IÒÒ„` IÒÓR-ÓÓOJÓà ` àThe€evidence€presented€by€defendants€in€support€of€their€motion€is€not€sufficientlyÏconclusive€to€entitle€them€to€dismissal€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Any€doubt€as€to€the€existence€of€aÏgenuine€issue€of€fact€must€be€resolved€against€the€moving€party.òò€€Barber€v.€Ralston€PurinaÐ ¸ ° ÐCoóó.,€Tenn.€App.€1991,€826€S.W.2d€96.€€Generally,€what€constitutes€negligence€on€the€parkingÐ  ˆ Ðlot€is€a€question€for€the€jury.€€òòMumford€v.€Thomasóó,€Tenn.€App.€1980,€603€S.W.2d€154.Ð h` ÐÌà ` àComplaint€is€made€of€the€exclusion€of€the€affidavit€of€a€witness€with€15€yearsÏexperience€in€the€installation,€maintenance€and€repair€of€asphalt€surfaces.€€It€is€not€necessaryÏfor€an€ð ðexpertðð€who€expresses€an€opinion€to€have€any€particular€qualification€exceptÏknowledge€of€the€subject€matter€which€is€not€possessed€by€an€ordinary€person€whichÏinformation€would€ñCñasistñCññCñassistñCñ€the€trier€of€fact€in€reaching€an€accurate€and€just€conclusion.€TREÏRule€702.ÌÌà ` àMr.€Vanceððs€affidavit€makes€a€prima€facie€showing€that€he€is€qualified€to€render€anÏopinion€concerning€the€deterioration€of€asphalt€based€on€his€knowledge,€experience,€andÏtraining€gained€from€working€with€asphalt€for€fifteen€years.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€erred,€to€theÏextent€that€it€excluded€Mr.€Vanceððs€affidavit€based€on€his€lack€for€more€formal€education€orÏqualifications.ÌÌà ` àWe€also€find€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€striking€Mr.€Vanceððs€affidavit€on€the€groundÏthat€it€lacked€trustworthiness€because€Mr.€Vanceððs€opinion€was€based€on€Ms.€BondððsÏdescription€of€the€pothole€or€because€Mr.€Vance€did€not€explain€how€he€arrived€at€hisÏconclusion€that€a€pothole€of€the€size€described€by€Ms.€Bond€ð ðwould€have€taken€numerousÏmonths€to€develop.ðð€€These€are€certainly€appropriate€considerations€when€the€trial€court€isÏperforming€its€ð ðgate€keeperðð€function€at€trial,€but€the€same€standards€do€not€apply€at€theÏsummary€judgment€stage.Ìâ âÐ ø6ð/4 Ðà ` àThe€courts€customarily€treat€the€papers€of€a€party€opposing€a€motion€for€summaryÏâ âjudgment€more€indulgently€than€the€papers€of€the€party€seeking€the€summary€judgment.€€TheÏevidence€supporting€and€opposing€a€summary€judgment€will€be€considered€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€opposing€party,€òòsee€Speaker€v.€Cates€Co.óó,€879€S.W.2d€811,€813€(Tenn.Ð  ˆ Ð1994),€and€the€nonmoving€party€is€also€entitled€to€all€favorable€inferences€that€can€beÏreasonably€drawn€from€the€proof.€€òòSee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210„11€(Tenn.€1993).€Ð @8  ÐThe€courtððs€indulgence€may€extend€to€technically€defective€papers€that€inform€the€court€ofÏimportant€relevant€evidence€that€the€nonmoving€party€can€and€will€introduce€at€trial.€€òòSeeóó€6Ð ðè  ÐJames€A.€Moore,€et€al.,€Mooreððs€òòFederal€Practiceóó€ðð€56.22[1]€(2d€ed.€1995);€10A€Charles€A.Ð ÈÀ ÐWright,€et€al.,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€2738,€at€485€(2d€ed.€1983).Ð  ˜ ÐÌà ` àMr.€Vanceððs€affidavit€should€not€have€been€stricken€because€it€did€not€contain€aÏdescription€of€how€Mr.€Vance€arrived€at€his€opinion.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.06€provides€that€theÏadequacy€of€expert€affidavits€should€be€measured€by€the€requirements€of€the€rules€ofÏevidence.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€705€permits€experts€to€give€an€opinion€without€prior€disclosure€ofÏthe€underlying€facts€or€data.€€Thus,€Mr.€Vanceððs€affidavit€was€competent.€€It€does€notÏnecessarily€follow,€however,€that€Mr.€Vance€will€be€able€to€give€an€expert€opinion€at€trial.€ÏLike€any€other€expert€witness,€Mr.€Vance€may€be€subjected€to€cross„examination€concerningÏthe€basis€of€his€opinion,€and€the€trial€court,€acting€as€gate€keeper,€may€exclude€Mr.€VanceððsÏopinion€if€it€determines€that€the€opinion€will€not€substantially€assist€the€trier€of€fact€or€that€theÏfacts,€data,€or€methodology€on€which€the€opinion€is€based€indicates€a€lack€of€trustworthiness.ÌÌà ` àThe€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€defendants€is€reversed€and€vacated.€€Costs€of€theÏappeal€are€taxed€against€the€defendants„appellees.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€CourtÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÌÌÌÐ Ð8È16 ЇÌÓ  Óò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDED.ó óÐ àØ ÐÓÓÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àHENRY€F.€TODDà x àÐ | t Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌÓ•]ÓÓ¥]ÓÓÓCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌ____________________________ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÐ  d\ ÐñCñÑSÑñCññCñÑ8€F!XXdìXXdì8ÑñCñà@Û Û ®àò òñCñÔ‡¼Ÿ2»XXF!ÔñCñIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ S Ðà@??(®àAT€NASHVILLEñCñó óñCñˆÌñCñÔ#†XF!X»¼Ÿ2†`#ÔñCññCñó óñCñÌÔ_ÔÔ_ÔÌÌò òLUCY€L.€BOND,à  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ? ì Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àDavidson€CircuitÐ + Ø Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appellant,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p àNo.€€€96C„4542Ð Ä Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ ° ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ïœ  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ Ûˆ  ÐBELLE€MEADE€FUND€PARTNERS,à  à€€)à p àAppeal€No.Ð Çt  ÐL.P.;€BRANCH€PROPERTY,€L.P.,à  à€€)à p à01A01„9802„CV„00059Ð ³`  ÐBRANCH€PROPERTY€LTD.€à À àà  à€€)Ð ŸL  ÐPARTNERSHIP,€à  à€€à h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ‹8  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appellees.à À àà  à€€)Ð c ÐÌó óÌà@ss*®àòòò òJUDGMENTóóó óˆÐ 'Ô ÐÌÓÓà ` àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€of€the€Court€filed€herein,€the€judgment€of€the€TrialÏCourt€is€reversed.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€adjudged€against€the€defendants„appellees.€€TheÏcause€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€for€necessary€further€proceedings€consistent€with€theÏopinion€of€this€Court.ÌÌÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à__________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àHENRY€F.€TODD,Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.ñ Cññ CñKñ Cññ Cññ Cñ,€JUDGEÌÌÌñ Cññ Cññ Cñ€ñ Cññ Cññ Cñà ` àñ Cññ Cñà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àñ CññCññ Cñwilliamñ CññCññCñWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEñCñ