ÿWPC   tÔé¤?ü„hý¨ ‡žã•íT•¬ùj5&ËH{âk_ËÜíCj{u…R»°Pù‡0ñÒã_ÒþU¤/ãØ[ëT R›Ç7ÉÍ0?jë"tÀfÅ“»°×ý|÷LðØ…†ºfä–tR¹¡%9|lVFWf[îµæÛb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë 0D±NõUN÷EE]J_X©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©b 0ë     Bôô 0¤ D3µ D-è 0K AS`Ƴ 0¤y 0D A«a˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»ᢅ+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÝ^p+bk1hÿ« ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular Ý ƒRØ~$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô” ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€based€this€finding€on€the€employment€handbook€which€Plaintiffs€attached€to€their€complaint.€Ð ° ÐThe€courtððs€order€stated:€ð ðThe€Trial€Court€after€taking€all€of€the€factual€allegations€contained€in€the€Complaint€as€trueÐ tÄ Ðand€construing€the€Complaint€liberally€in€favor€of€the€plaintiffs,€the€court€finds,€based€upon€the€plaintiffs[ðð]€allegationsÐ 8ˆý Ðcontained€in€ðð€5€of€the€Complaint€and€the€document€attached€to€Plaintiffs[ðð]€complaint€as€attachment€one,€finds€that€theÐ ° Ðemployer„employee€relationship€was€governed€by€the€document€which€plaintiffs€relied€upon€in€their€Complaint.€€SaidÐ tÄ Ðdocument€unequivocally€Ô_Ôestablish[esÔ_Ô]€the€existence€of€an€employer„employee€relationship€by€and€between€the€namedÐ 8ˆ Ðplaintiffs€and€Prime€Focus,€Inc.ðð @Ý ƒRØ~$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô” ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€permit€a€party€to€amend€his€complaint€once€without€leave€of€the€courtÐ ° Ðif€no€responsive€pleading€has€yet€been€served€by€the€opposing€party.€€Once€a€responsive€pleading€has€been€served,Ð tÄ Ðhowever,€the€party€must€secure€written€agreement€from€the€opposing€party€or€leave€of€the€court€to€amend.€€Leave€toÐ 8ˆ Ðamend€is€liberally€granted.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€15.01. NÝ ƒRØ~$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô” ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔRule€11.03€provides€that€sanctions€may€be€initiated€by€motion€of€a€party€or€on€the€initiative€of€the€court.€€WhenÐ ° Ðmade€by€motion,€the€motion€must€be€served€as€provided€in€Rule€5,€but€may€not€be€filed€with€the€court€until€21€days€afterÐ tÄ Ðservice,€providing€the€party€against€whom€it€is€served€opportunity€to€make€appropriate€corrections€before€considerationÐ 8ˆ Ðby€the€court.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€11.03(1)(a),€(b).- ù-(|G2Ø~$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€DÌ»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô6@ò»»Ô d(|3Ñc$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€DÌ»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ñc$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€DÌ»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€C<»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼)ñ»»»ÔÑ8€?œXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î:p)ñÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼)ñ»îî:p #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓJuly€10,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XgÍX»¼)ñÔÌò òÔ#†¼)ñ»XXgÍò#ÔYONA€BOYD,€òòet€al.óó€v.€PRIME€FOCUS,€INC.,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XgÍX»¼)ñÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€99„3716„II€€€€€€Carol€L.€McCoy,€ChancellorÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2000„02105„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€5,€2001Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€case€began€as€a€dispute€between€the€plaintiffs€and€their€employers.€€The€defendant€was€awardedÐ xÈ  Ðsummary€judgment,€and€plaintiffs€were€sanctioned€by€the€court€pursuant€to€Rule€11€of€the€TennesseeÐ d´ ÐRules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€Plaintiffs€now€appeal€this€sanction.€€We€affirm€sanctions€but€modify€theÐ P  Ðorder.Ð <Œ ÐÓ¡Óòòò òóóó óÔ#†¼)ñ»XXgÍr#ÔÔ‡XgÍX»¼)ñÔÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Affirmed€asÐ d ÐModified;€and€Remandedó óÐ P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼)ñ»àXgÍn#ÔÔ‡XgÍX.¼)ñÔDavid€R.€Farmer,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòW.€Frank€Crawford,€P.J.,€W.S.,óóÐ Ø( Ðand€òòHolly€K.€Lillard,€J.óó,€joined.Ð Ä ÐÌDavid€E.€Danner,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Yona€Boyd€and€Brenda€Collier.Ð œì ÐÌThomas€L.€Whiteside,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellees,€Prime€Focus,€Inc.,€Donald€Bruce,Ð tÄ ÐM.D.€and€D&C€Property€Management€Corp.Ð `° ÐÓ)ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼)ñ»XXgÍX#ÔÔ‡XgÍX»¼)ñÔÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÌÔ#†¼)ñ»XXgÍ #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XgÍX»¼)ñÔà  àThis€dispute€originated€in€August€of€1999,€when€Plaintiffs/Appellants€(ð ðPlaintiffsðð)€filed€suitÐ #`" Ðin€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€against€Donald€Bruce,€M.D.€(ð ðDr.€Bruceðð)€and€D&CÐ ü#L# ÐProperty€Management€Corp.€(ð ðD&Cðð)€alleging€breach€of€employment€contract.€€For€simplicity,€weÐ è$8 $ Ðshall€refer€to€this€as€ð ðBoyd€I.ðð€€In€response,€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failureÐ Ô%$!% Ðto€state€a€claim€and€failure€to€join€an€indispensable€party.€€The€claim€was€heard€on€November€19,Ð À&"& Ð1999,€and€the€trial€court€found€that€no€employer„employee€relationship€existed€between€the€parties,Ð ¬'ü"' Ðand€that€an€employer„employee€relationship€did€exist€between€the€Plaintiffs€and€Prime€Focus,€Inc.Ô_Ô׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_ԀР˜(è#(ý ÐAccordingly,€on€December€8,€1999,€the€trial€court€granted€the€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€stateÐ ° Ða€claim€and€failure€to€join€an€indispensable€party.€€Plaintiffs€did€not€appeal€this€order.Ð œì ÐÌà  àPlaintiffs€next€filed€suit€in€chancery€court€against€Prime€Focus,€Inc.€(ð ðPrime€Focusðð)€inÐ tÄ ÐDecember€of€1999,€which€we€shall€refer€to€as€ð ðBoyd€II..ðð€€In€February€of€2000,€Prime€Focus€filedÐ `° Ða€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€motion€to€be€considered€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€under€Rule€56,€Ð L œ Ðarguing€that€Plaintiffs€were€employed€by€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C.€€The€trial€court€denied€this€motion€forÐ 8 ˆ Ðfailure€to€comply€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03,€but€stated€that€Prime€Focus€could€still€file€a€motionÐ $ t Ðfor€summary€judgment.€€The€trial€court€ultimately€granted€summary€judgment€to€Prime€Focus€onÐ  ` ÐJune€6,€2000.€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àDuring€the€course€of€litigation€in€Boyd€II,€the€question€again€arose€as€to€whether€the€PlaintiffsÐ Ô$  Ðwere€actually€employed€by€Prime€Focus€or€by€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C.€€€Plaintiffs€thus€filed€a€motionÐ À  Ðfor€leave€to€join€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€as€indispensable€parties€on€February€25,€2000,€and€filed€anÐ ¬ü  Ðamended€complaint€on€March€10,€2000,€to€include€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C.€€Prime€Focus€did€notÐ ˜è  Ðrespond€to€the€motion,€and€it€was€therefore€granted€on€March€22,€2000.€€We€note,€however,€thatÐ „Ô  Ðleave€to€amend€had€not€yet€been€granted€by€the€court€when€Plaintiffs€in€fact€filed€the€amendedÐ pÀ Ðcomplaint.׃d×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€responded€through€counsel€to€Plaintiffsðð€counsel,€advising€him€thatÐ \¬ Ðthe€complaint€against€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€was€unwarranted€due€to€the€courtððs€action€in€Boyd€I,Ð H˜ Ðwhere€Plaintiffsðð€cause€of€action€was€dismissed€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€This€response€notifiedÐ 4„ ÐPlaintiffs€that€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€would€seek€sanctions€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€11€if€theÐ  p Ðamended€complaint€was€not€withdrawn.׃< ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€complaint€was€not€withdrawn,€and€in€May€of€2000,Ð  \ ÐDr.€Bruce€and€D&C€filed€a€Rule€11€motion€for€sanctions€against€Plaintiffs,€Plaintiffsðð€counsel€orÐ øH Ðboth.€€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€moved€that€the€complaint€against€them€be€dismissed€per€the€decision€inÐ ä4 ÐBoyd€I,€and€requested€expenses€and€attorneyððs€fees.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€issue€of€sanctions€was€heard€by€the€trial€court€on€June€2,€2000.€€After€hearing€argumentsÐ ¨ø Ðby€counsel€for€both€parties,€and€after€reviewing€the€entire€records€of€Boyd€I€and€Boyd€II,€the€courtÐ ”ä Ðordered€that€the€amended€complaint€of€March€10,€2000,€joining€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C,€be€strickenÐ €Ð Ðfrom€the€record.€€The€court€further€granted€the€motion€for€sanctions,€and€awarded€Dr.€Bruce€andÐ ° ÐD&C€$1,337.50€in€attorneyððs€fees€and€expenses.€€It€is€this€order€which€Plaintiffs€now€appeal.Ð œì ÐÌòòò òó óóóà  àThe€issue€in€this€case,€as€we€perceive€it,€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€imposing€Rule€11Ð tÄ Ðsanctions€on€the€Plaintiffs.Ð `° ÐÓ  Óòòò òó óóóÌÓµÓà  àOur€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€on€a€Rule€11€motion€is€under€an€abuse€of€discretionÐ 8 ˆ Ðstandard.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔKrugÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKrugÔ_Ôóóó ó,€838€S.W.2d€197,€205€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€An€abuse€of€discretion€occursÐ $ t Ðwhen€the€decision€of€the€lower€court€has€no€basis€in€law€or€fact€and€is€therefore€arbitrary,€illogical,Ð  ` Ðor€unconscionable.€òòò ò€State€v.€Brown€&€Williamson€Tobacco€Corp.ó óóó,€18€S.W.3d€186,€191€(Tenn.Ð ü L  Ð2000).€€Our€review€of€Rule€11€decisions€is€governed€under€this€deferential€standard€since€theÐ è 8  Ðquestion€of€whether€a€Rule€11€violation€has€occurred€requires€the€trial€court€to€make€highly€fact„Ð Ô$  Ðintensive€determinations€regarding€the€reasonableness€of€the€attorneyððs€(and€clientððs)€conduct.€òòò ò€Ô_ÔKrugÔ_Ôóóó ó,Ð À  Ð838€S.W.2d€at€205.€€We€review€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.€Ð ¬ü  ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€Ð ˜è  ÐÓ  Óòòò òó óóóÌÓS Óà  àWhen€an€attorney€signs€a€motion,€document,€or€other€paper€submitted€to€the€court,€heÐ pÀ Ðcertifies€to€the€court€that€he€has€read€it,€that€he€has€reasonably€inquired€into€the€facts€and€law€itÐ \¬ Ðasserts,€that€he€believes€it€is€well„grounded€in€both€fact€and€law,€and€that€he€is€acting€withoutÐ H˜ Ðimproper€motive.€€òòò òAndrews€v.€Bibleó óóó,€812€S.W.2d€284,€287€(Tenn.€1991).€€The€purpose€of€Rule€11Ð 4„ Ðsanctions€is€to€emphasize€to€the€attorney€that€his€signature€is€not€meaningless,€but€conveys€a€messageÐ  p Ðto€the€court€for€which€he€alone€is€responsible.€€òòò òAndrewsóóó ó,€812€S.W.2d€at€288.€€€Rule€11€establishesÐ  \ Ðthat€an€attorney€who€signs€such€a€paper€without€the€required€belief€is€subject€to€appropriate€sanctionÐ øH Ðby€the€court.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€It€has€been€characterized€by€this€Stateððs€Supreme€Court€as€a€ð ðpotent€weapon€thatÐ ä4 Ðcan€and€should€be€used€to€curb€litigation€abuses.ððòòò ò€€Id.€ó óóóat€292.€€However,€our€Supreme€Court€hasÐ Ð  Ðcautioned€that€while€trial€courts€should€impose€sanctions€when€a€Rule€11€violation€is€found,€it€shouldÐ ¼  Ðdo€so€only€with€the€utmost€care.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€Such€sanctions€may€include€payment€of€the€opposing€partyððsÐ ¨ø Ðlegal€expenses.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€288.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€established€the€standard€for€determining€whether€anÐ l¼ Ðattorneyððs€conduct€is€sanctionable€under€Rule€11€as€one€of€objective€reasonableness€under€theÐ X ¨ Ðcircumstances.€òòò ò€Id.ó óóó€€The€reasonableness€of€the€attorneyððs€belief€must€be€evaluated€in€light€of€theÐ D!” Ðcircumstances€as€they€existed€when€the€document€was€signed.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€Sanctions€are€appropriate€whenÐ 0"€  Ðan€attorney€submits€a€motion€or€other€paper€on€grounds€which€he€knows€or€should€know€are€withoutÐ #l! Ðmerit,€and€a€showing€of€subjective€bad€faith€is€not€required.€€òòò òÔ_ÔAlsideÔ_Ô€Supply€Center€of€Knoxville€v.Ð $X" ÐSmith€Heritage€Siding€Co.ó óóó,€No.€03A01„9702„CH„00069,€1997€WL€414982,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ô$D # ÐJuly€25,€1997)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó).€€When€assessing€whether€a€Rule€11€violation€has€occurred,€theÐ à%0!$ Ðtrial€court€should€consider€all€circumstances€bearing€on€the€reasonableness€of€the€attorneyððs€conduct,Ð Ì&"% Ðincluding€his€experience€and€past€performance€and€the€general€standards€of€conduct€of€the€bar,€andÐ ¸'#& Ðwhether€his€actions€were€the€result€of€neglect,€willfulness,€incompetence€or€deliberate€choice.€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðòòò òAndrewsó óóó,€812€S.W.2d€at€293,€FN4.€€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àIn€imposing€sanctions€in€this€case,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€doctrine€of€òòò òres€judicataóóÐ ° Ðâ âó óbarred€Plaintiffs€from€pursing€their€claims€against€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€in€Boyd€II.€€òòò òRes€judicataóó€ó óbarsÐ œì Ða€second€suit€between€parties€or€their€privies€on€the€same€claim.€€It€precludes€a€second€suit€withÐ ŒÜ Ðrespect€to€all€issues€which€were€or€which€could€have€been€litigated€in€the€first€action.€€òòò òHampton€v.Ð xÈ ÐTennessee€Truck€Sales,€Incó óóó.,€993€S.W.2d€643,€645€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€The€doctrine€appliesÐ d´ Ðonly€to€final€judgments€on€the€merits.€€òòò òSeeóó€òòid.ó óóó€€An€order€granting€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€motionÐ P   Ðto€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted€is€an€adjudication€on€theÐ @  Ðmerits.€€òòò òDyer€v.€Ô_ÔInteraÔ_Ô€Corp.ó óóó,€870€F.2d€1063,€1066€(6òòthóó€Cir.€1989).€€A€dismissal€for€failure€to€joinÐ , | Ðan€indispensable€party,€however,€does€not€act€as€an€adjudication€upon€the€merits.€€òòò òId.ó óóó;€òòRobertÐ  h ÐBanks,€Jr.,€et€al.,€Tennessee€Civil€Procedureóóòòò òóó€ó óðð11„5(b)€(1999).€€It€is€within€the€discretion€of€theÐ  T  Ðtrial€court€to€specify€that€a€claim€has€been€dismissed€without€prejudice,€or€that€the€dismissal€shallÐ ô D  Ðnot€operate€as€an€adjudication€on€the€merits.€€òòò òIdóóó ó.ò ò€ó óðð11„5(b).€€If€the€order€of€the€trial€court€dismissingÐ à0  Ðan€action€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€does€not€specify€that€it€is€without€prejudice€or€that€it€should€notÐ Ð  Ðoperate€as€an€adjudication€on€the€merits,€the€order€should€be€treated€by€the€enforcing€court€as€anÐ ¼  Ðadjudication€on€the€merits.€€òòò òId.€€ó óóóÐ ¨ø  ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€the€doctrine€of€òòò òres€judicataóó€ó ódoes€not€apply€to€the€trial€courtððsÐ €Ð Ðorder€of€December€1999,€which€granted€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&Cððs€motion€to€dismiss€in€Boyd€I.€PlaintiffsÐ pÀ Ðcontend€that€the€only€issue€addressed€in€the€order€in€Boyd€I€was€the€question€of€the€appropriate€party.€Ð \¬ ÐAccordingly,€Plaintiffs€submit€that€the€decision€was€not€a€decision€on€the€merits€or€a€finalÐ H˜ Ðadjudication,€but€a€€procedural€order€which€allowed€the€cause€of€action€to€survive.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWe€cannot€agree€with€this€argument.€€In€its€order€in€Boyd€I,€the€trial€court€specifically€found:Ð  \ Ð1)€Plaintiffsðð€claims€were€dependent€on€the€existence€of€an€employer„employee€relationship€betweenÐ øH Ðthe€Plaintiffs€and€Defendant;€2)€that€an€employer„employee€relationship€existed€between€PlaintiffsÐ ä4 Ðand€Prime€Focus;€3)€that€Prime€Focus€was€an€indispensable€party€to€the€claim;€and,€4)€that€noÐ Ð  Ðemployer„employee€relationship€existed€between€Plaintiffs€and€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C.€€The€trial€courtÐ ¼  Ðthus€granted€the€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim,€as€well€as€for€failure€to€join€anÐ ¨ø Ðindispensable€party.€€This€was€not€a€procedural€order,€nor€did€the€court€specify€that€it€was€not€to€beÐ ”ä Ðconsidered€an€adjudication€on€the€merits.€€We€read€the€order€as€plainly€granting€the€motion€toÐ €Ð Ðdismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€Since€it€was€not€appealed,€this€order€became€a€final€judgmentÐ l ¼ Ð30€days€after€entry.€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59.02;€òòò òsee€Jerkins€v.€Ô_ÔMcKinneyÔ_Ôó óóó,€533€S.W.2d€275€(Tenn.€1976).€Ð X!¨ ÐOnce€this€order€became€final,€the€doctrine€of€òòò òres€judicataóó€ó óoperated€to€bar€Plaintiffs€from€assertingÐ D"”  Ða€claim€against€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€which€was€or€which€could€have€been€litigated€in€the€first€action.€Ð 4#„! ÐClearly,€the€question€of€whether€an€employer„employee€relationship€existed€between€the€parties€notÐ  $p" Ðonly€could€have€been€but€in€fact€was€an€issue€resolved€in€Boyd€I.Ð  %\ # ÐÌà  àPlaintiffs€further€assert€that€even€if€òòò òres€judicataóó€ó ódid€apply,€the€trial€courtððs€subsequent€ordersÐ ä&4"% Ðin€Boyd€II€essentially€nullified€what€Plaintiffs€characterize€as€the€ð ðprocedural€orderðð€in€Boyd€I.€€WeÐ Ô'$#& Ðcannot€agree€with€this€contention.€€The€order€in€Boyd€I€was€not€procedural.€€It€did€not€grant€Dr.Ð À($' ÐBruceððs€and€D&Cððs€motion€to€dismiss€only€for€failure€to€join€an€indispensable€party,€but€also€forÐ ¬)ü$( Ðfailure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€Plaintiffsðð€proper€course€of€action€wouldÐ ˜*è%) Ðhave€been€to€appeal€the€order€in€Boyd€I,€not€to€merely€reassert€the€claim€in€Boyd€II.Ð „+Ô&* Їà  àPlaintiffs€also€argue€that€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€should€have€raised€òòò òres€judicataóó€ó óas€anÐ ° Ðaffirmative€defense,€rather€than€using€it€as€the€basis€for€sanctions.€€Plaintiffs€assert€that€Rule€11€wasÐ  ð Ðused€as€a€ð ðscare€tactic€.€.€.€with€the€complicity€of€a€court€that€was€willing€to€shift€blame€to€appellantsÐ ŒÜ Ðand€their€counsel€for€its€own€prior€error€.€.€.€.ðð€€Regardless€of€how€the€Rule€11€ð ðtacticðð€was€used€byÐ xÈ Ðopposing€party,€a€Rule€11€sanction€is€imposed€by€the€court€at€its€informed€discretion€based€on€anÐ d´ Ðexamination€of€the€facts€and€history€of€the€case€in€question.€€We€suggest€that€if€Plaintiffs€believedÐ P   Ðthe€courtððs€action€in€Boyd€I€to€be€in€error,€Plaintiffs€should€have€appealed€that€action€in€a€timelyÐ < Œ Ðmanner€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€3.€€Plaintiffs€cannot€fail€to€appeal€and€then€simply€reassert€theÐ ( x Ðsame€claim€in€a€later€action.€€Whether€the€court€erred€in€dismissing€the€claim€in€Boyd€I,€and€we€doÐ  d Ðnot€suggest€that€it€did€so€err,€Plaintiffsðð€remedy€is€to€appeal,€not€to€seek€an€end„run€around€the€rulesÐ  P  Ðby€raising€a€claim€they€know€or€reasonably€should€know€is€òòò òres€judicataóóó ó.ò òòòóó€Ð ì <  ÐÌà  àó óPlaintiffsðð€final€assertion€is€that€the€court€in€Boyd€II€erred€when€it€found€that€Plaintiffs€failedÐ È  Ðto€secure€leave€of€the€court€before€amending€their€complaint€against€Prime€Focus€to€join€Dr.€BruceÐ ´  Ðand€D&C.€€As€we€understand€it,€Plaintiffs€assert€that€they€were€not€required€to€seek€leave€of€the€courtÐ  ð  Ðto€amend€their€complaint€because,€although€an€answer€had€been€filed€by€Prime€Focus,€no€answer€hadÐ ŒÜ  Ðbeen€filed€by€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C,€to€whom€the€amendments€applied.€€This€argument€is€withoutÐ xÈ Ðmerit€and€reflects€Plaintiffsðð€misreading€of€the€rules.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€15.01€permits€a€party€toÐ d´ Ðamend€his€complaint€once€as€a€matter€of€course€before€a€responsive€pleading€is€served.€€Once€aÐ P  Ðresponsive€pleading€has€been€filed€by€the€named€opposing€party,€that€partyððs€written€consent€or€leaveÐ <Œ Ðof€the€court€is€required€for€later€amendments.€€€òòò òSeeóóó óòò€Robert€Banks,€Jr.,€et€al.,€Tennessee€CivilÐ (x ÐProcedureóóòòò òóóó ó,€ðð€5„7(d)€(1999).€€Since€the€defendant€in€Boyd€II,€Prime€Focus,€had€filed€an€answer,Ð d Ðleave€of€the€court€was€required€for€Plaintiffs€to€amend€their€complaint.€€The€record€shows€thatÐ P ÐPlaintiffs€improperly€filed€their€amendment€on€March€10,€2000,€before€obtaining€leave€of€the€courtÐ ì< Ðto€do€so.€Ð Ø( ÐÌà  àIn€light€of€the€foregoing,€we€must€determine€whether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€inÐ ° Ðimposing€Rule€11€sanctions€on€Plaintiffs€in€its€July€2000€order.€€The€court€ordered€sanctions€afterÐ œì Ðfinding€that€Plaintiffs€failed€to€comply€with€Rule€15,€in€that€Plaintiffs€did€not€obtain€leave€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðcourt€before€amending€their€complaint€in€Boyd€II.€€The€court€further€found€that€the€December€orderÐ tÄ Ðin€Boyd€I€clearly€granted€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&Cððs€motion€to€dismiss,€and€that€the€doctrine€of€òòò òresÐ ` ° Ðjudicataóó€ó ótherefore€barred€Plaintiffs€from€asserting€the€same€claim€against€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€in€aÐ L!œ Ðsubsequent€case.€€Plaintiffs€were€properly€notified€that€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C€would€seek€sanctions,Ð <"Œ  Ðand€were€given€the€opportunity€to€withdraw€their€claim€as€required€by€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€11.03.€Ð (#x! ÐConsidering€the€circumstances€as€they€existed€at€the€time€Plaintiffs€filed€their€amended€complaintÐ $d" Ðjoining€Dr.€Bruce€and€D&C,€Plaintiffsðð€counsel€should€have€known€that€the€December€order€in€BoydÐ %P # ÐI,€which€Plaintiffs€failed€to€appeal,€was€a€final€judgment€on€the€merits€and€thus€precluded€litigationÐ ì%