ÿWPC …£KWWÛ¡þ ×a†îM–bæh°YœiŠÇ‘õQ¿öÿYWž`¦ˆ0NvWt«È½¬„2­ç¦(—fGÝô2C¿s1+$P(ò–Sâ@#A‚q0çx´¤@…>eüœÎkÞG²˜”b˜×ij¼ùÂWÌç£}°îOì³Uù¸+7¦#V×§åæ¡u1دeñ&úŸóuø$ƒ4E‰ù̉i¨VßC¬BÀä²Ê=í45ÎHÛåO,K(=¢ÕÎÊ;v!ºmmCºÈ~NºêDøá¡R꣱Á½OËéåpØŒšæM߬˜èØ:.Cw+?4éÞ­ZùV¨Õ‚œüÿ¦ˆ¤c¾ ¿3ÈnÛaŸ2sð;éÔ'¸Ú"×UN‡hC…þm“QNkÞ:ˆô¨ ®}p=ãk·œ¦¤’D†Ê® ïßcï\$`ÛBv¤&Æ«$:»xGX‹›ÂSMwNùjé5‘¹+ èœMÕ#—¥¶Åêfe÷*­)÷0LŸ*®šãM&wâîêü'°Czÿ½bŠ{ózÚdÜ&Çã›/sq7Öâèʯ~Q}ìô3ÉŒ,,*èOµÙÚ< Ý£ÅÁb#Á\ % U @# 0ˆc U Në ^ 9 wE zI Òà 4• © ¸ mº ÆÑ Æ— Æ] Æ#éNñññEóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóbõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõõ 0ëýýýý Bèè 0¤ D3© D-Ü 0K   ASTƧ 0¤m 0D A«U˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular “-s  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptš‚,- ¡bk˜a¤3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 - ù-(|G2­ $¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ví»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôûEò»»Ô d(|3‰l$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ví»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‰l$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ví»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ví»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Ví»»»ÔÑ8€ÑXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼Ví»»¼VíÔà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î™-VíÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼Ví»îî™-+#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓMay€8,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XÑX»¼VíÔÌò òÔ#†¼Ví»XXÑ#ÔTHE€TENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OF€HEALTH,€òòet€al.óó€v.€GARY€C.Ð úJ ÐBOYLE,€M.D.,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XÑX»¼VíÔó óÐ  ^ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€99„1343„I€€€€€€Irvin€H.€Ô_ÔKilcreaseÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€ChancellorÐ ú J ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½` AßÐ ¾  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2001„01738„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€19,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<` AßÐ ‘á  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThe€issue€in€this€case€is€the€constitutionality€of€a€Tennessee€statute€requiring€a€private€clinic€thatÐ ŒÜ Ðperforms€a€ð ðsubstantial€numberðð€of€abortions€to€acquire€a€certificate€of€need€from€the€HealthÐ xÈ ÐFacilities€Commission€and€a€license€from€the€Department€of€Health.€€The€Chancery€Court€ofÐ d´ ÐDavidson€County€upheld€the€statute,€enjoined€the€defendants€from€operating€without€a€certificate€andÐ P  Ða€license,€and€imposed€substantial€monetary€sanctions€for€civil€contempt.€€We€hold€that€the€statuteÐ <Œ Ðviolates€relevant€provisions€of€the€United€States€and€Tennessee€Constitutions.€€We€therefore€reverseÐ (x Ðthe€judgment€below€and€dismiss€the€contempt€charge.Ð d ÐÌÌÓ0Óò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ Ø( ÐReversed€and€RemandedÐ Ä Ðó óÌÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Ví»àXѾ#ÔÔ‡XÑX.¼VíÔBen€H.€Ô_ÔCantrellÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,€M.S.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,Ð ˆØ ÐJ.óó€and€òòRobert€E.€Ô_ÔCorlewÔ_Ô,€III,€Sp.€J.óó,€joined.Ð t Ä ÐÌThomas€C.€Ô_ÔJesseeÔ_Ô,€Johnson€City,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Gary€C.€Boyle,€M.D.,€Wesley€A.Ð L"œ! ÐAdams,€Jr.,€M.D.,€Adams€&€Boyle,€P.C.,€d/b/a€The€Womenððs€Center;€Angus€McDonald€GreenÐ 8#ˆ" ÐCrook,€M.D.,€Debra€Jo€Adams,€Ô_ÔLeisaÔ_Ô€Boyle,€Ô_ÔWelshwoodÔ_Ô€Partnership,€Adams€&€Boyle€Partnership,Ð $$t# Ðand€Regina€Taylor€Ô_ÔHensleyÔ_Ô.Ð %` $ ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Michael€E.€Moore,€Solicitor€General;€MichaelÐ è&8"& ÐW.€Ô_ÔCatalanoÔ_Ô,€Associate€Solicitor€General;€and€E.€Blaine€Ô_ÔSprouseÔ_Ô,€Assistant€Attorney€General,€forÐ Ô'$#' Ðthe€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð À($( ÐÓðÓÌÌÌÌÐ \-¬(-ý ÐÔ_Ôò òÌOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Ví»XXÑ #ÔÔ‡XÑX»¼VíÔÐ œì ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼Ví»XXÑ-#ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XÑX»¼VíÔÓÓà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ó óˆÐ tÄ ÐÓÓà  àDr.€Wesley€Adams€and€Dr.€Gary€Boyle€are€residents€of€Bristol,€Tennessee.€€They€are€bothÐ L œ Ðlicensed€to€practice€medicine€in€Tennessee,€and€prior€to€1989,€they€practiced€obstetrics€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðgynecology€in€Bristol.€€In€1990€they€opened€an€office€in€Nashville€as€partners.€€In€1992€theyÐ $ t Ðincorporated€their€Nashville€practice€under€the€name€of€Adams€&€Boyle,€P.C.,€and€their€clinic€wasÐ  ` Ðknown€as€The€Womenððs€Center.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€Womenððs€Center€offered€full€gynecological€services€to€women,€including€first€trimesterÐ Ô$  Ðabortions.€€The€Tennessee€legislature€has€defined€any€place€or€building€that€provides€medical€orÐ À  Ðsurgical€services€to€terminate€pregnancies€as€an€ð ðambulatory€surgical€treatment€centerðð€(ASTC).€€ButÐ ¬ü  Ðexempted€from€the€definition€are€ð ðprivate€physiciansðð€and€dentistsðð€office€practices,€except€thoseÐ ˜è  Ðprivate€physiciansðð€and€dentistsðð€offices€in€which€a€substantial€number€of€medical€or€surgicalÐ „Ô  Ðpregnancy€terminations€are€performed.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„201(3).€€Thus,€any€facility€thatÐ pÀ Ðis€not€a€private€physicianððs€or€dentistððs€office€where€even€one€abortion€is€performed€is€an€ASTC.€Ð \¬ ÐOn€the€other€hand,€a€private€physician€or€dentist€may€perform€any€number€of€surgical€procedures,Ð H˜ Ðof€varying€degrees€of€severity€and€risk,€without€being€classified€as€an€ASTC,€so€long€as€the€surgicalÐ 4„ Ðprocedures€do€not€include€a€ð ðsubstantial€numberðð€of€abortions.€€Ð  p ЀÌà  àIn€terms€of€state€regulation€the€consequences€of€being€an€ASTC€are€enormous.€€An€ASTCÐ øH Ðis€also€defined€as€a€Health€Care€Institution.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„102(4)(A)€and€Tenn.€CodeÐ ä4 ÐAnn.€ðð€68„11„106(a)(1)€prevents€the€ð ðconstruction,€development,€or€other€establishment€of€any€typeÐ Ð  Ðof€health€care€institutionðð€without€receiving€a€certificate€of€need€(CON)€from€the€Health€FacilitiesÐ ¼  ÐCommission€(HFC).€€An€ASTC€also€must€be€licensed€by€the€Department€of€Health€(the€Department).€Ð ¨ø ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„204(a)(1).€€The€Department€performs€its€licensing€functions€through€theÐ ”ä ÐBoard€for€Licensing€Health€Care€Facilities.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„202(a)(2).€€As€this€trip€to€andÐ €Ð Ðfro€in€the€Code€indicates,€even€first€trimester€abortions€have€gotten€a€great€deal€of€attention€from€theÐ l¼ Ðlegislature.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àIn€the€early€1990's€the€Department€of€Health€suggested€to€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€that€theyÐ 0"€  Ðshould€acquire€a€CON.€€They€did€so€in€June€of€1994,€and€applied€for€an€ASTC€license.€€TheÐ #l! ÐDepartment€inspectors,€however,€insisted€that€they€install€certain€equipment€in€the€Womenððs€CenterÐ $X" Ðthat€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€did€not€think€was€required.€€The€dispute€dragged€on€and€the€CON€lapsedÐ ô$D # Ðin€August€of€1996.€€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€continued€to€operate€their€offices€in€Bristol€and€Nashville.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àDrs.€Adams€and€Boyle€filed€a€new€application€for€a€CON€for€both€facilities€in€September€ofÐ ¸'#& Ð1998.€€In€December€of€1998€the€HFC€deferred€action€on€the€Bristol€office€and€denied€the€applicationÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfor€the€Nashville€office,€allegedly€to€punish€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€for€operating€without€a€CON€forÐ )à$( Ðâ âan€extended€period€of€time.€€When€operations€at€both€facilities€continued,€the€Department€filed€thisÐ |*Ì%) Ðaction€on€May€13,€1999€seeking€an€injunction€to€prevent€the€Womenððs€Center€from€operating€anÐ ° ÐASTC€without€a€CON€and€a€proper€license.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€defendants€alleged€in€their€answer€that€the€statute€and€the€actions€taken€by€theÐ tÄ ÐDepartment€violated€the€Tennessee€and€United€States€Constitutions€relating€to€the€right€of€privacyÐ `° Ðof€women€and€the€rights€of€the€defendants€to€due€process€and€equal€protection.€€On€July€1,€1999,€theÐ L œ Ðcourt€overruled€the€defenses€and€enjoined€the€defendants€and€anyone€associated€with€them€fromÐ 8 ˆ Ðoperating€an€ASTC€without€a€CON€and€a€license€as€required€by€law.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àIn€the€meantime,€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€took€two€actions.€€On€May€28,€1999,€they€filed€anÐ ü L  Ðaction€in€the€United€States€District€Court€in€Nashville€seeking€an€adjudication€that€the€statutes€onÐ è 8  Ðwhich€the€State€relied€were€unconstitutional;€and€on€June€25,€1999,€after€the€chancellor€had€issuedÐ Ô$  Ða€temporary€restraining€order€against€operating€without€a€CON€and€a€license,€they€leased€theÐ À  ÐWomenððs€Center€to€Dr.€James€Oliver.€€The€federal€court€chose€not€to€hear€any€issues€relating€to€Drs.Ð ¬ü  ÐAdams€and€Boyle€since€those€issues€were€pending€in€the€state€court.€€The€plaintiffs€amended€theÐ ˜è  Ðfederal€action€to€make€Dr.€Oliver€and€the€Bristol€Womenððs€Center€the€plaintiffs€and€to€dismiss€Drs.Ð „Ô  ÐAdams€and€Boyle€as€party€plaintiffs.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àOn€March€6,€2000,€the€Department€and€HFC€amended€their€complaint€in€this€action€toÐ H˜ Ðinclude€Dr.€Oliver,€the€employees/manager€of€the€Womenððs€Center,€Dr.€Angus€Crook€whoÐ 4„ Ðperformed€abortions€at€the€Womenððs€Center€on€a€contract€basis,€and€the€owners€of€the€property€onÐ  p Ðwhich€the€Womenððs€Center€sits.€€Again,€the€complaint€sought€an€injunction€against€operating€aÐ  \ ÐASTC€without€a€CON€or€a€proper€license.€€The€same€defenses€were€raised€by€the€new€defendants.Ð øH ÐÌà  àOn€April€17,€2000,€the€federal€court€issued€a€temporary€injunction€enjoining€theÐ Ð  ÐDepartment/HFC€from€enforcing€the€statutes€as€to€Dr.€Oliver€and€the€Bristol€Womenððs€Center.€€TheÐ ¼  Ðnext€day€the€chancery€court€enjoined€all€the€defendants€except€Dr.€Oliver€from€operating,€owning,Ð ¨ø Ðmanaging,€or€maintaining€an€ASTC€without€a€CON€and€a€license.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àOn€September€26,€2000,€the€Department/HFC€filed€a€petition€to€hold€certain€defendants€inÐ l¼ Ðcivil€contempt€for€violating€the€courtsðð€injunctions.€€The€court€found€the€defendants€in€contempt€andÐ X ¨ Ðimposed€a€fine€of€$10,000€each€on€Dr.€Adams€and€Dr.€Boyle;€$7,500€on€Dr.€Crook,€$5,000€each€onÐ D!” Ðthe€executive€director€of€Adams€&€Boyle,€P.C.€and€Welshwood€Partnership,€the€business€entity€thatÐ 0"€  Ðowned€the€property;€and€$2,500€each€on€the€office€manager€at€the€Welshwood€facility€and€one€of€theÐ #l! Ðpartners€in€the€Welshwood€partnership.€€The€court€allowed€the€defendants€to€purge€themselves€ofÐ $X" Ðcontempt€by€withdrawing€their€relationship€to€the€Welshwood€facility,€including€employment€andÐ ô$D # Ðany€other€interest€they€might€have€therein.€€The€court€also€ordered€the€defendants€to€pay€theÐ à%0!$ Ðplaintiffððs€attorneysðð€fees€in€the€amount€of€$17,484.00.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àOn€May€18,€2001,€the€court€entered€a€final€judgment€permanently€enjoining€the€defendantsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfrom€operating€an€ASTC€without€a€CON€and€a€valid€license.Ð )à$( ÐÌÐ h+¸&* ЇÌÌÌà@……)ìàò òII.ó óˆÐ tÄ Ðà@¢ ¢ ìàòòò òConstitutionality€of€the€Statuteó óóóˆÐ `° ÐÌà  àAs€we€have€found,€a€doctor€may€perform€abortions€in€his/her€own€private€office€without€aÐ 8 ˆ ÐCON€or€a€license€to€operate€the€facility,€unless€he/she€performs€a€ð ðsubstantial€numberðð€of€abortions.€Ð $ t ÐIn€that€case€the€facility€becomes€an€ASTC€subject€to€stricter€regulation€by€the€Department.€Ð  ` ÐAccepting€patients€in€an€unlicensed€facility€is€also€a€class€B€misdemeanor.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„Ð ü L  Ð11„213(b)(2).€€For€a€number€of€reasons,€the€defendants€say€that€the€statute€violates€the€Tennessee€andÐ è 8  Ðthe€United€States€Constitution.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThere€are€certain€principles€the€courts€use€when€litigants€mount€an€attack€on€theÐ ¬ü  Ðconstitutionality€of€a€statute.€€First,€the€courts€presume€that€the€Acts€of€the€General€Assembly€areÐ ˜è  Ðconstitutional,€òòIn€Re€Petition€of€Bursonóó,€909€S.W.2d€768€(Tenn.€1995).€€Consequently,€the€courtsÐ „Ô  Ðindulge€every€presumption€and€resolve€every€doubt€in€favor€of€constitutionality.€€òòState€v.€Lyonsóó,€802Ð pÀ ÐS.W.2d€590€(Tenn.€1990).€€When€the€courts€find€that€a€statute€may€be€construed€in€different€ways,Ð \¬ Ðthey€are€required€to€adopt€a€construction€that€will€sustain€the€statute€and€avoid€a€conflict€with€theÐ H˜ Ðconstitution.€€òòMarion€County€Bd.€v.€Marion€Co.€Election€Commððnóó,€594€S.W.2d€681€(Tenn.€1980).€Ð 4„ ÐThe€courts€also€have€a€duty€to€ascertain€and€carry€out€the€legislatureððs€intent€without€undulyÐ  p Ðrestricting€or€expanding€the€statuteððs€coverage.€€òòLavin€v.€Jordonóó,€16€S.W.3d€362€(Tenn.€2000).Ð  \ ÐÌà  àAs€these€rudimentary€principles€show,€the€persons€challenging€a€statute€have€the€burden€ofÐ ä4 Ðshowing€its€unconstitutionality,€òòFritts€v.€Wallaceóó,€723€S.W.2d€948€(Tenn.€1987);€and€unless€theÐ Ð  Ðstatute€restricts€a€fundamental€right,€the€courts€will€uphold€it€if€the€courts€are€able€to€conceive€of€aÐ ¼  Ðrational€basis€for€the€measure€that€is€reasonably€related€to€a€legitimate€governmental€interest.€€òòRiggsÐ ¨ø Ðv.€Bursonóó,€941€S.W.2d€44€(Tenn.€1997).€€Conversely,€ð ðwhere€certain€fundamental€rights€are€involvedÐ ”ä Ð.€.€.€regulation€limiting€these€rights€may€be€justified€only€by€a€ððcompelling€state€interestðð€.€.€.€and€.€.Ð €Ð Ð.€legislative€enactments€must€be€narrowly€drawn€to€express€only€the€legitimate€state€interests€atÐ l¼ Ðstake.ðð€€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€113,€155€(1973);€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1Ð X ¨ Ð(Tenn.€2000).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àA€person€challenging€a€statute€on€constitutional€grounds€must€also€have€standing€to€do€so.€Ð #l! ÐòòNational€Gas€Distributors€v.€Sevier€County€Utility€Districtóó,€7€S.W.3d€41€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€Ð $X" ÐUnder€state€law€the€standing€requirement€demands€a€showing€that€the€statute€infringes€the€rights€ofÐ ô$D # Ðthe€person€attacking€it.€€òòId.óó€€ð ðA€person€has€no€standing€to€contest€the€constitutionality€of€a€statutoryÐ à%0!$ Ðprovision€he€claims€to€be€deficient€unless€the€provision€.€.€.€has€been€used€to€deprive€him€of€hisÐ Ì&"% Ðrights.ðð€€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€762€S.W.2d€110,€118€(Tenn.€1988).€€Under€federal€law,€Article€III€of€theÐ ¸'#& ÐUnited€States€Constitution€restricts€the€jurisdiction€of€federal€courts€to€actual€ð ðcases€orÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcontroversies.ðð€€òòYounger€v.€Harrisóó,€401€U.S.€37€(1971).€€To€have€standing€to€challenge€a€statute€onÐ )à$( Ðconstitutional€grounds€a€plaintiff€must€allege€that€he€has€ð ðsustained€or€is€immediately€in€danger€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ðsustaining€some€direct€injury€as€a€result€of€the€challenged€statute€.€.€.€.€The€injury€or€threat€of€injuryÐ h+¸&* Ðmust€be€both€ððreal€and€immediateðð€not€ððconjectural€or€hypothetical.ðððð€òòOððShea€v.€Littletonóó,€414€U.S.Ð ° Ð488,€494€(1974).€€With€respect€to€abortion€rights,€both€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€and€theÐ œì ÐTennessee€Supreme€Court€have€accorded€physicians€standing€to€challenge€the€constitutionality€ofÐ ˆØ Ðabortion€statutes€on€behalf€of€their€patients.€€ð ð[A]€physician€is€uniquely€qualified€to€litigate€theÐ tÄ Ðconstitutionality€of€the€Stateððs€interference€with,€or€discrimination€against,€[a€womanððs€decision€toÐ `° Ðterminate€her€pregnancy].ðð€€òòSingleton€v.€Wolffóó,€428€U.S.€106,€117€(1976).€€òòSee€also€PlannedÐ L œ ÐParenthood€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1€(Tenn.€2000).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€courts€have€also€applied€the€standing€requirement€to€the€special€circumstance€where€aÐ  ` Ðdefendant€claims€that€a€statute€is€too€vague€to€satisfy€due€process.€€In€òòParker€v.€Levyóó,€417€U.S.€733Ð ü L  Ð(1974),€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€person€who€clearly€understands€that€his€own€conductÐ è 8  Ðcomes€within€the€statuteððs€prohibitions€cannot€challenge€the€statute€because€it€might€be€vague€as€toÐ Ô$  Ðsome€other€conduct.€€Following€this€line€of€thought,€our€Supreme€Court€said,€ð ða€party€who€engagesÐ À  Ðin€conduct€that€is€clearly€proscribed€by€the€state€cannot€complain€of€the€vagueness€of€the€law€asÐ ¬ü  Ðapplied€to€others.ðð€€òòState€v.€Burkhartóó,€58€S.W.3d€694€at€699€(Tenn.€2001).Ð ˜è  ÐÌà@^^(ìàò òIII.ˆÐ pÀ Ðà@¦¦%ìàòòDue€Processó óóóˆÐ \¬ ÐÌà  àThe€defendants€assert€that€the€statute€requiring€a€doctorððs€office€to€obtain€a€CON€and€aÐ 4„ Ðlicense€to€operate€if€a€ð ðsubstantial€numberðð€of€abortions€are€performed€in€the€office€does€not€satisfyÐ  p Ðthe€constitutional€requirement€of€due€process.€€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.,€amend.€XIV;€Tenn.€Const.,€art.€I,€ððÐ  \ Ð8.€€Since€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„213(b)(2)€makes€the€operation€of€an€ASTC€without€a€license€aÐ øH Ðcrime,€due€process€requires€that€such€statutes€be€drawn€with€a€certain€clarity.€€òòCity€of€Chicago€v.Ð ä4 ÐMoralesóó,€527€U.S.€41€(1999).€€The€reasons€are€two„fold.€€The€first€is€one€of€fundamental€fairness.€Ð Ð  ÐIf€the€government€thinks€it€is€necessary€to€punish€one€of€its€citizens€for€violating€the€governmentððsÐ ¼  Ðlaws,€fairness€dictates€that€the€person€affected€be€able€to€understand€what€is€expected€or€prohibited.€Ð ¨ø ÐòòLeech€v.€American€Booksellers€Assððn,€Inc.óó,€582€S.W.2d€738€(Tenn.€1979).€€The€second€reason€isÐ ”ä Ðbased€on€our€concept€of€equality€before€the€law.€€An€imprecise€law€encourages€arbitrary€andÐ €Ð Ðdiscriminatory€enforcement.€€òòSee€Crites€v.€Smithóó,€826€S.W.2d€459€at€473€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð l¼ Ð1991)(Judge€Koch€concurring€and€dissenting.)€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€said€in€òòGraynedÐ X ¨ Ðv.€City€of€Rockfordóó,€408€U.S.€104€(1972),Ð D!” ÐÌà8  àa€vague€law€impermissibly€delegates€basic€policy€matters€to€policemen,€judges€andÐ #l! Ðjuries€for€resolution€on€an€òòad€hocóó€and€subjective€basis,€with€the€attendant€danger€ofÐ $X" Ðarbitrary€and€discriminatory€application.Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐÌ408€U.S.€at€108„9.€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThis€invalidating€principle€has€been€called€ð ðvoid€for€vagueness.ðð€€òòUnderwood€v.€Stateóó,€529Ð ¤(ô#' ÐS.W.2d€45€(Tenn.€1975).€€But€the€term€ð ðvoidðð€may€be€misleading.€€No€one€is€required€to€obey€a€voidÐ )à$( Ðlaw.€€òòCumberland€Capital€Corp.€v.€Pattyóó,€556€S.W.2d€516€(Tenn.€1977).€€Yet€there€are€some€lawsÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€are€invalid€as€to€some€defendants€and€not€invalid€as€to€others.€€The€courts€have€called€laws€thatÐ h+¸&* Ðare€invalid€only€in€certain€circumstances€ð ðinvalid€as€applied,ðð€while€laws€that€are€invalid€in€everyÐ ° Ðconceivable€circumstance€are€ð ðfacially€invalid.ðð€€òòBowen€v.€Kendrickóó,€487€U.S.€589€(1988).€€TheÐ œì Ðdistinction€has€been€described€in€this€way:€ð ðIf€a€statute€is€unconstitutional€as€applied,€the€state€mayÐ ˆØ Ðcontinue€to€enforce€the€statute€in€different€circumstances€where€it€is€not€unconstitutional,€but€if€aÐ tÄ Ðstatute€is€unconstitutional€on€its€face,€the€State€may€not€enforce€the€statute€under€any€circumstances.ðð€Ð `° ÐòòWomenððs€Medical€Professional€Corp.€v.€Voinovichóó,€130€F.3d€187,€193€(6òòthóó€Cir.€1997).€€Therefore,Ð L œ Ðit€seems€to€us€that€only€those€laws€that€are€facially€invalid€are€truly€void.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àArguing€that€the€law€under€consideration€is€not€facially€invalid,€the€State€argues€that€theÐ  ` ÐòòParker€v.€Levy/State€v.€Burkhartóó€principle€prevents€the€defendants€from€attacking€the€statute€onÐ ü L  Ðvagueness€grounds€since€they€knew€that€they€were€performing€a€large€number€of€abortions€and€mightÐ è 8  Ðcome€within€the€statutesðð€application.€€Using€the€language€of€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€theÐ Ô$  ÐState€says:Ð À  ÐÌà8  àNone€of€them€[past€cases]€suggests€that€one€who€has€received€fair€warning€of€theÐ ˜è  Ðcriminality€of€his€own€conduct€from€the€statute€in€question€is€nonetheless€entitled€toÐ „Ô  Ðattack€it€because€the€language€would€not€give€similar€fair€warning€with€respect€toÐ pÀ Ðother€conduct€which€might€be€within€its€broad€and€literal€ambit.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌòòParker€v.€Levyóó,€417€U.S.€733€at€756.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àBut€the€òòParker€v.€Levyóó€prohibition€also€has€its€exceptions.€€By€the€time€the€court€decidedÐ  \ ÐòòParker€v.€Levyóó€it€had€already€decided€that€an€unaffected€plaintiff€could€assert€a€vagueness€defenseÐ øH Ðð ðwhere€individuals€not€parties€to€a€particular€suit€stand€to€lose€by€its€outcome€and€yet€have€noÐ ä4 Ðeffective€avenue€of€preserving€their€rights€themselves.ðð€€òòEisenstadt€v.€Bairdóó,€405€U.S.€438€(1972).Ð Ð  ÐAnother€exception€allowsÐ ¼  ÐÌà8  àLitigants€.€.€.€to€challenge€a€statute€not€because€their€own€rights€of€free€expression€areÐ ”ä Ðviolated,€but€because€of€a€judicial€prediction€or€assumption€that€the€statuteððs€veryÐ €Ð Ðexistence€may€cause€others€not€before€the€court€to€refrain€from€constitutionallyÐ l¼ Ðprotected€speech€or€expression€...ÐX ¨Ð Ð  ÐÌòòBroadrick€v.€Oklahomaóó,€413€U.S.€601,€612€(1973).€€Such€statutes€are€invalidated€because€they€areÐ 0"€  Ðð ðoverbroad,ðð€according€to€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court.€€òòId.óó€€Although€this€doctrine€is€applied€most€oftenÐ #l! Ðto€laws€that€impact€First€Amendment€rights,€our€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€it€applies€alsoÐ $X" Ðto€other€constitutionally€protected€conduct.€€òòSee€State€v.€Burkhartóó,€58€S.W.3d€at€701€(Tenn.€2001).€Ð ô$D # ÐThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€now€held€that€the€standing€requirements€should€be€relaxedÐ à%0!$ Ðwhen€the€challenged€statute€affects€a€substantial€amount€of€constitutionally€protected€conduct.€Ð Ì&"% ÐòòVillage€of€Hoffman€Estates€v.€Flipside,€Hoffman€Estates,€Ltd.óó,€445€U.S.€489,€494„95€(1982).€€Thus,Ð ¸'#& Ðeven€a€person€whose€conduct€is€at€the€core€of€the€activities€clearly€covered€by€a€statuteððs€terms€mayÐ ¤(ô#' Ðraise€a€vagueness€defense€if€the€state€is€one€that€is€likely€to€chill€the€exercise€of€constitutionallyÐ )à$( Ðâ âprotected€conduct.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Loyóó,€237€F.3d€251,€259€(3òòrdóó€Circ.€2001).€€Obtaining€a€firstÐ |*Ì%) Ðtrimester€abortion€is€undisputedly€constitutionally€protected€conduct.€€òòPlanned€Parenthood€of€MiddleÐ ° ÐTennessee€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1€(Tenn.€2000).€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àIt€also€seems€to€us€that€the€òòParker€v.€Levyóó€principle€does€not€apply€to€the€second€prong€of€theÐ tÄ Ðdue€process€argument€ð!ð€that€a€law€encourages€arbitrary€enforcement.€€If€a€defendant€has€notice€thatÐ `° Ðhis€conduct€is€unlawful,€it€makes€sense€to€say€to€him€ð ðyou€cannot€complain€that€the€law€may€not€giveÐ L œ Ðadequate€notice€to€someone€else.ðð€€But€the€same€logic€does€not€apply€to€a€claim€that€a€law€commitsÐ 8 ˆ Ðlaw€enforcement€to€the€personal€whims€of€officers,€prosecutors,€judges,€and€juries.€€òòState€v.€Lyonsóó,Ð $ t Ð802€S.W.2d€590€(Tenn.€1990).Ð  ` ÐÌà  àThe€U.S.€Supreme€Court€seems€to€be€moving€in€that€direction.€€In€two€recent€cases€the€CourtÐ è 8  Ðstated€that€ð ðthe€more€important€aspect€of€the€vagueness€doctrine€is€not€actual€notice,€but€the€otherÐ Ô$  Ðprincipal€element€of€the€doctrine€ð!ð€the€requirement€that€a€legislature€establish€minimal€guidelinesÐ À  Ðto€govern€law€enforcement.ðð€€òòKolender€v.€Lawsonóó,€461€U.S.€352,€358€(1983);€òòCity€of€Chicago€v.Ð ¬ü  ÐMoralesóó,€527€U.S.€41€(1999).€€While€both€cases€involved€loitering€statutes€that€substantiallyÐ ˜è  Ðimpacted€First€Amendment€rights,€the€Courtððs€majority€in€òòKolenderóó€and€a€plurality€in€òòCity€ofÐ „Ô  ÐChicagoóó€relied€more€heavily€on€the€fact€that€the€statutes€allowed€the€law€to€be€arbitrarily€enforcedÐ pÀ Ðand€in€that€way€distinguished€òòParker€v.€Levyóó.€€òòSeeóó€461€U.S.€at€358€ftn.€8;€527€U.S.€at€52,€56.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àFinally,€òòParker€v.€Levyóó€applies€in€circumstances€where€the€challenged€statute,€asÐ 4„ Ðauthoritatively€construed,€contains€some€standards€that€can€be€used€to€determine€whether€conductÐ  p Ðis€proscribed€or€not.€€It€does€not€apply€when€the€challenged€statute€contains€no€standards€at€all.€€TheÐ  \ Ðð ðsubstantial€numberðð€provision€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„201(3)€is€so€nebulous€and€ill„definedÐ øH Ðthat€it€provides€no€notice€at€all€as€a€practical€matter.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€State€argues€that€in€an€appearance€before€the€Health€Facilities€Commission€the€lawyerÐ ¼  Ðrepresenting€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€conceded€that€they€knew€a€substantial€number€of€abortions€wereÐ ¨ø Ðbeing€performed€at€the€Welshwood€facility.€€But€this€statement€does€not€amount€to€an€admission€thatÐ ”ä Ðthey€knew€their€activities€were€in€violation€of€the€statute.€€The€physicians€were€seeking€a€CON,€notÐ €Ð Ðbecause€they€understood€that€the€statute€required€them€to,€but€because€the€state€officials€told€themÐ l¼ Ðthey€needed€to.€€Dr.€Boyle€continued€to€insist€that€he€did€not€have€to€have€an€ASTC€license€toÐ X ¨ Ðperform€gynecology€services€including€first€trimester€abortions€in€his€office.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àEven€if€the€statements€of€the€lawyer€before€the€Health€Facilities€Commission€could€beÐ #l! Ðconstrued€as€concessions€that€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle€understood€that€the€statute€applied€to€theirÐ $X" Ðactivities,€those€statements€can€be€attributed€only€to€Drs.€Adams€and€Boyle.€€The€lawyer€was€notÐ ô$D # Ðspeaking€for€the€other€defendants,€and€so€the€concession€cannot€reasonably€be€attributed€to€them.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àWe€believe€that€these€defendants€have€standing€to€challenge€the€statute€on€the€vaguenessÐ ¸'#& Ðground.€€We€also€believe€the€statute€is€unconstitutional€because€it€fails€to€give€fair€notice€of€what€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðit€requires€and€because€it€encourages€arbitrary€and€discriminatory€enforcement.Ð )à$( ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ h+¸&* Ðà@  ìàòòò òThe€Statuteððs€Effect€on€Fundamental€Rightsó óóóˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àIn€òòPlanned€Parenthood€of€Middle€Tennessee€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1€(Tenn.€2000),€theÐ ˆØ Ðcourt€held€that€a€womanððs€right€to€terminate€her€pregnancy€is€a€vital€part€of€the€right€of€privacyÐ tÄ Ðguaranteed€in€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€Accordingly,€the€statutes€regulating€this€right€must€beÐ `° Ðsubjected€to€a€strict€scrutiny€analysis,€and€must€be€narrowly€tailored€to€achieve€a€compelling€stateÐ L œ Ðinterest.€€òòId.óó€€The€State€argues,€however,€that€this€statute€does€not€purport€to€regulate€abortions;€itÐ 8 ˆ Ðattempts€to€regulate€the€facilities€where€abortions€are€performed;€and,€in€any€event,€the€WelshwoodÐ $ t Ðfacility€is€a€place€devoted€primarily€to€the€performance€of€surgical€procedures.€€Therefore,€it€fits€theÐ  ` ÐASTC€definition€under€the€first€part€of€the€subsection.€€òòSee€Marcowitz€v.€Department€of€PublicÐ ü L  ÐHealthóó,€435€N.E.2d€1291€(Ill.€App.€1982).€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àIn€focusing€on€the€doctors€and€the€facilities€in€which€they€work,€the€State€argues€for€the€moreÐ À  Ðdeferential€rational€basis€test€rather€than€the€strict€scrutiny€the€statute€must€undergo€when€consideredÐ ¬ü  Ðas€a€regulation€on€a€womanððs€right€to€an€abortion.€€We€think,€however,€that€the€Stateððs€argumentÐ ˜è  Ðwould€require€us€to€read€out€of€the€statute€the€references€to€abortions€and€to€ignore€the€fact€that€theÐ „Ô  Ðstatute€seems€to€be€aimed€primarily€at€facilities€where€abortions€are€performed.€€As€we€have€pointedÐ pÀ Ðout,€the€performance€of€even€one€abortion€makes€a€facility€an€ASTC,€unless€the€facility€is€a€privateÐ \¬ Ðdoctor€or€dentistsðð€office.€€In€that€case,€any€number€of€surgical€procedures€may€be€performed€thereÐ H˜ Ðso€long€as€the€procedures€do€not€include€a€substantial€number€of€abortions.€€When€that€invisibleÐ 4„ Ðthreshold€is€crossed,€the€State€insists€on€deciding€if€the€facility€is€needed€and€on€what€terms€it€shouldÐ  p Ðbe€allowed€to€operate.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àOur€Supreme€Court€applied€the€strict€scrutiny€test€to€a€statute€that€required€all€secondÐ ä4 Ðtrimester€abortions€to€be€performed€in€a€hospital.€€Although€the€court€recognized€that€the€State€hasÐ Ð  Ða€compelling€interest€in€maternal€health€from€the€beginning€of€pregnancy,€the€second€trimesterÐ ¼  Ðhospitalization€requirement€was€not€narrowly€tailored€to€further€that€interest.€€òòPlanned€ParenthoodÐ ¨ø Ðof€Middle€Tennessee€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1,€18€(Tenn.€2000).€€Other€courts€have€consideredÐ ”ä Ðstatutes€similar€to€this€one,€and€have€found€that€they€impose€burdens€on€exercising€the€right€to€anÐ €Ð Ðabortion€that€the€State€has€to€justify€by€important€state€health€objectives.€€In€òòRagsdale€v.€Turnockóó,Ð l¼ Ð841€F.2d€1358€(7òòthóó€Cir.€1988),€the€court€noted€how€the€statute€seemed€to€run€counter€to€the€StateððsÐ X ¨ Ðinterest€in€preserving€a€womanððs€health:Ð D!” ÐÌà8  àTo€the€extent€that€there€is€any€basis€for€distinguishing€between€a€doctor€whoÐ #l! Ðoccasionally€performs€an€abortion€in€his€office€and€one€whose€practice€is€primarilyÐ $X" Ðdevoted€to€such€procedures,€the€regulations€appear€to€run€contrary€to€sound€healthÐ ô$D # Ðpolicy.Ðà%0!$Ð Ð  ÐÌ841€F.2d€at€1371.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àIn€òòPlanned€Parenthood€of€Greater€Iowa€v.€Atchisonóó,€126€F.3d€1042€(8òòthóó€Cir.€1997),€the€courtÐ )à$( Ðsaid,€ð ðwhere€a€requirement€serves€no€purpose€other€than€to€make€abortions€more€difficult,€it€strikesÐ |*Ì%) Ðat€the€heart€of€a€protected€right,€and€is€an€unconstitutional€burden€on€that€right.ðð€€òòId.€óó€At€1049.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThere€is€evidence€in€the€record€showing€that€first€trimester€abortions€are€less€likely€to€resultÐ ° Ðin€complications€than€many€other€surgical€procedures€that€are€routinely€performed€in€doctorððsÐ œì Ðoffices.€€Loop€electrical€excision€procedures,€regular€diagnostic€D€&€Cððs,€hysteroscopy,€diagnosticÐ ˆØ Ðlaparoscopy,€genetic€amniocentesis€and€laser€procedures€all€pose€risks€to€women€equal€to€or€greaterÐ tÄ Ðthan€first€trimester€abortions.€€A€tonsillectomy€carries€a€risk€of€death€twice€as€high€as€that€of€a€legalÐ `° Ðabortion.€€The€proof€would€justify€a€conclusion€that€there€is€no€medical€justification€for€treatingÐ L œ Ðabortions€differently€from€other€medical€procedures€of€similar€complexity€and€risk.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€proof€with€respect€to€the€actual€burden€on€a€womanððs€right€to€an€abortion€is€sketchy.€€ButÐ  ` Ðthe€facts€of€this€case€demonstrate€how€the€statute€impacts€the€availability€of€abortions.€€The€attemptsÐ ü L  Ðto€comply€with€the€statute€have€already€cost€the€defendants€in€excess€of€$15,000€and€that€does€notÐ è 8  Ðinclude€the€improvements€to€the€physical€facilities€that€the€State€insists€on€as€a€condition€to€issuingÐ Ô$  Ðthe€license.€€These€costs€will€undoubtedly€be€passed€on€to€the€patients€of€the€Womenððs€Center.€€TheÐ À  Ðdeterrent€effect€of€the€statute€on€the€availability€of€abortions€cannot€be€said€to€be€òòde€minimusóó.€òòSeeÐ ¬ü  ÐRagsdale€v.€Turnockóó,€841€F.2d€1358,€1371€(7òòthóó€Cir.€1988).€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€statuteÐ ˜è  Ðadversely€impacts€a€constitutionally€protected€right€without€a€compelling€state€reason€to€justify€it.€Ð „Ô  ÐòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€of€Middle€Tennessee€v.€Sundquistóó,€38€S.W.3d€1€(Tenn.€2000).€Ð pÀ ÐConsequently,€it€cannot€be€enforced.Ð \¬ ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òV.ó óˆÐ 4„ Ðà@&ìàòòò òContemptó óóóˆÐ  p ÐÌà  àOrdinarily€if€a€court€issues€an€injunction,€the€parties€enjoined€must€obey€it,€even€if€theyÐ øH Ðbelieve€the€statute€on€which€the€injunction€was€based€is€unconstitutional.€€€€This€is€called€theÐ ä4 ÐCollateral€Bar€Rule.€€òòSee€Howat€v.€Kansas,€óó258€U.S.€181€(1922).€€Thus,€even€if€the€injunction€wasÐ Ð  Ðimprovidently€granted,€the€order€must€be€obeyed,€and€disobedience€of€the€injunction€may€beÐ ¼  Ðpunished.€€òòWalker€v.€City€of€Birminghamóó,€388€U.S.€307€(1967).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThis€rule,€however,€does€not€apply€to€civil€contempt.€€In€òòUnited€States€v.€United€MineÐ €Ð ÐWorkers€of€Americaóó,€330€U.S.€258€(1947),€the€Court€said€ð ðthe€right€to€remedial€relief€falls€with€anÐ l¼ Ðinjunction€which€events€prove€was€erroneously€issued.ðð€€The€Court€reasoned€that€since€the€civilÐ X ¨ Ðcontempt€sanction€is€for€the€benefit€of€the€other€party,€a€plaintiff€was€not€entitled€to€profit€from€anÐ D!” Ðorder€that€is€subsequently€reversed.€€Apparently€this€question€has€not€been€decided€before€inÐ 0"€  ÐTennessee,€but€other€courts€have€followed€the€rule€laid€down€in€òòMine€Workersóó.€€In€òòCliett€v.Ð #l! ÐHammondsóó,€305€F.2d€565,€570€(C.A.€5òòthóó€Cir.€Tex.€1962),€the€Court€said,€ð ðIn€contrast,€civil€contemptÐ $X" Ðfalls€with€the€order€if€it€turns€out€to€have€been€erroneously€or€wrongfully€issued.ðð€€Therefore,€theÐ ô$D # Ðcivil€fines€imposed€along€with€the€attorneysðð€fees€awarded€for€violating€the€injunction€in€this€caseÐ à%0!$ Ðare€reversed.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òVI.ó óˆÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àWe€declare€the€statute€unconstitutional€on€the€ground€that€it€is€an€undue€burden€on€aÐ |*Ì%) Ðwomanððs€right€to€privacy.€€We€therefore€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€court€below€and€remand€the€caseÐ h+¸&* Ðto€the€trial€court€for€any€further€proceedings€that€may€become€necessary.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appealÐ ° Ðto€the€State.Ð œì ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð L œ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àòòóóà ` à