ÿWPCô* I# UN %g 0cmU<Ðw@ 4L`o 0§w 0J 0Th 0^¼ 0h AQ‚ 0DÓ B Æ4 0Dú 0@> 0D~ 0r D/4 0|c Bß D3ü 0†/ 0µ 1uE 0dº U>&B)dDC AMÐU*^G¥¹EÕMügÃcx&`žuþ,s_Ÿ}þ ({"v~£#vÓ!%˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;cW$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XaBXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman XYDZ[\U]î^_ Ó€`Ó€l n~<$,3|xl(W(3²$¤¤Ý ƒcW!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X´QXXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô !"%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô'''÷ÿ dxd2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxd2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$&)* ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d55557Border 1dd "6Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€8ÔÔ€8ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€8XÔÌÌò òJuneÏ30,Ï1998ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€8ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€This€project€was€also€referred€to€as€the€ð ðM.T.€Mechanical€project.ððÌ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€ð ðLaw€Firmðð€will€be€used€to€refer€to€all€individual€defendants€and€theÏfirm.Ì ;Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Bradsonððs€brief€states€that€on€December€17,€1993,€Shelby€Tissue€filed€aÏMotion€to€Dismiss€in€this€suit,€asserting€that€Bradson€failed€to€comply€with€theÏrequirements€of€the€lien€statutes.€€Bradsonððs€brief€also€includes€a€letter€writtenÏDecember€29,€1993€from€Bradsonððs€new€counsel€to€counsel€for€Law€Firm€inÏwhich€Bradson€states€its€intention€to€pursue€a€legal€malpractice€action€ifÏnecessary€for€the€Shelby€Tissue€liens.€€These€documents,€however,€were€notÏincluded€in€the€record€and,€thus,€we€do€not€consider€them€on€appeal.€€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.€24;€ò òòòState€v.€Thompsonó óóó,€832€S.W.2d€577,€579€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€Ì CÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Although€the€trial€court€did€not€explain€its€reasoning,€May€6,€1994€wasÏthe€date€through€which€the€Tolling€Agreement€was€extended.Ì òÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€trial€court,€however,€suggested€a€remittitur.Ì ¹Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€ò òòòCarvell€ó óóóCourt€stated€that€term,€ð ðirremediable,ðð€used€by€the€CourtÏin€€ò òòòAmeraccount€Club,€Inc.€v.€Hilló óóó,€617€S.W.2d€876,€879€(Tenn.€1984),€wasÏð ðpure€dicta.ðð€€ò òòòCarvell,€ó óóó900€S.W.2dòòò ò€ó óóóat€29„30.Ì nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€parties€also€refer€to€documents€not€in€the€record€indicating€thatÏBradson€had€knowledge€of€the€potential€claim€as€early€as€December€of€1993.€Ïò òòòSee€ó óóóFootnote€3.Ì VÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€A€corporation,€Fabricating,€Inc.,€was€also€listed€as€a€defendant.€€ThisÏsuit€was€eventually€dismissed,€but€a€different€suit€was€later€filed€in€Texas.Ì kÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€€€The€Court,€nevertheless,€held€that€the€cause€of€action€did€not€accrueÏuntil€the€date€that€the€plaintiff€discovered€that€the€initial€suit€was€dismissed.€Ïò òòòId.óóó óÌ "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€plaintiff€had€earlier€filed€a€complaint€but€took€a€voluntaryÏnonsuit.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*1.Ì UÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Although€the€opinion€does€not€specify€the€date€of€the€trial€courtððsÏorder,€presumably€the€order€was€entered€within€one€year€before€June€12,€1995.Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€Court€noted€that€the€plaintiffððs€auditors€should€have€noticed€theÏabsence€of€the€recorded€release€in€their€files€between€January€and€March€ofÏ1990.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*2.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€plaintiff€initiated€foreclosure€proceedings€in€September€of€1991.€Ïò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*1.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€4ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ŒXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Ó›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òBRADSON€MERCANTILE,€INC.,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,ÌÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Circuit€No.€79449„1Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€œ02A01„9710„CV„00272›ÌÙ€ Ùò òœßR€796A1-j|û¥` à. `€€@ÿRß›JOSEPH€H.€CRABTREE,€JR.,€ÌIndividually;€SHUTTLEWORTH,ÌSMITH,€McNABB€&€WILLIAMS,ÌA€Partnership;€KENNETH€R.€ÌSHUTTLEWORTH,€Individually;ÌGARY€K.€SMITH,€Individuallyó ó;Ìò òLELAND€McNABB,€Individually;ÌBRUCE€E.€WILLIAMS,€Individually;ÌROBERT€L.€SABBATINI,€P.C.;Ìand€ROBERT€H.€HARPER,€Individually,Ìas€Partners€of€the€Partnership,€ó óÌÌà àDefendants„Appellees.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€SHELBY€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€WILLIAM€B.€ACREE,€JR.ÌÌÌà@ àWyatt,€Tarrant,€&€Combs;€Glen€œG.›€Reid,€Jr.€andÌà@ àRoss€Higman€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€Plaintiff„AppellantÌÌà@ àGlassman,€Jeter,€œEdwards›€and€Wade,€P.C.Ìà@ àWilliam€M.€Jeter€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€Defendants„AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌó óóóà@ àOpinion€filed:ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌœHEWITT›€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€œJUDGEó óÌÌò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGE€(Not€Participating)ó óÌÑ 8 ÑÑ 8 ÑÓÓ›à àThis€is€a€legal€malpractice€case.€€Plaintiff/Appellant€Bradson€Mercantile,ÏœInc.,›€(Bradson)€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€order€granting€summary€judgment€onÏthe€ground€that€the€action€is€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Ìò òà àó óDuring€the€late€1980s€and€early€1990s,€Bradson,€as€a€subcontractor,Ïprovided€labor€for€two€construction€projects€in€Shelby€County:€the€MapcoÏproject× ƒ: ××  ×€and€the€Shelby€Tissue€project.€€When€it€was€not€paid€for€itsÏparticipation€in€these€projects,€Bradson€retained€Defendant/Appellee€Joseph€H.ÏCrabtree€of€the€law€firm€Defendant/Appellee€Shuttleworth,€Smith,€McNabb€&ÍWilliams€(Law€Firm)× ƒ; ××  ×€as€legal€counsel€in€1992.€€Bradson€alleges€that€it€hiredÏCrabtree€to€collect€the€sums€due€and€to€perfect€mechanicððs€and€materialmanððsÏliens€on€the€real€property€involved€in€the€projects.€€At€some€point€later,€BradsonÏlearned€that€the€lien€on€the€Mapco€project€was€never€perfected.€€In€an€attemptÏto€resolve€the€dispute€without€litigation,€the€parties€entered€into€a€ð ðTollingÏAgreementðð€on€October€14,€1993.€€This€agreement€states€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€€€Bradson€may€have€and€asserts€a€claim€againstÏCrabtree€and€the€Law€Firm€for€breach€of€contract,Ïlegal€malpractice,€and/or€negligence€arising€out€of€theÏrepresentation€by€Crabtree€and€the€Law€Firm€ofÏBradson€relating€to€Bradsonððs€claim€against€MTÏMechanical€Contractors,€Inc.€and€the€perfection€of€aÏMechanics€œand›€Materialmenððs€Lien€involving€propertyÏof€MAPCO€Petroleum,€Inc.€(ð ðthe€Representationðð).€ÏBradson€has€advised€Crabtree€and€the€Law€Firm€of€itsÏintention€to€file€a€lawsuit€against€them;€andÌ€à8 àà8 à€€€€€Crabtree€and€the€Law€Firm€have€advised€theirÏmalpractice€insurance€carrier€of€the€claim€and€desireÏadditional€time€to€settle€or€reconcile€the€claim€ofÏBradson;€andÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€In€order€to€provide€the€parties€with€a€period€ofÏtime€to€endeavor€to€settle€or€reconcile€the€issues,ÏCrabtree€and€the€Law€Firm€agree€to€extend€and€waiveÏand€otherwise€toll€any€and€all€limitation€periods€orÏstatutes€of€repose,€both€legal€and€equitable,€includingÏbut€not€limited€to€TCA€ðð28„3„104,€applicable€to€anyÏand€all€causes€of€action€which€Bradson€may€have€orÏmay€assert€against€Crabtree€and/or€the€Law€FirmÏand/or€its€Partners,€agents€and€employees€arising€fromÏthe€Representation;Ìà8 àà8 à€€€€€NOW,€THEREFORE,€in€consideration€of€BradsonÏforebearing€until€February€14,€1994,€from€taking€anyÏaction€against€Crabtree,€the€Law€Firm,€its€agents,Ïemployees€or€Partners,€arising€out€of€theÏRepresentation€above€referred€to,€Crabtree,Ïindividually,€the€Law€Firm,€its€Partners,€agents€andÏemployees€hereby€covenant€and€agree€that€they€willÏnot,€in€any€way,€in€response€to€or€in€defense€of€anyÏaction€brought€against€them€or€any€of€them€byÏBradson€relating€to€the€Representation€raise€theÏdefense€of€any€statute€of€limitation€or€of€repose€(legalÏor€equitable)€to€any€claim€asserted€by€Bradson€againstÏCrabtree€and/or€the€Law€Firm,€its€Partners,€agentsÏand/or€employees€relating€to€the€Representation.ÌÌÓÓà àMeanwhile,€Law€Firm€had€filed€an€action€on€behalf€of€Bradson€withÏregard€to€the€Shelby€Tissue€project.€€In€addition,€the€contractor€for€the€ShelbyÏTissue€project€filed€a€Lien€Creditorsðð€Bill€on€behalf€of€several€lien€creditors,Ïincluding€Bradson.€€Subsequently,€Bradson€discovered€that€Law€Firm€may€haveÏfailed€to€comply€with€statutory€requirements€for€the€perfection€of€the€ShelbyÏTissue€lien.× ƒ< ××  ×€€Bradsonððs€Complaint€alleges€that€although€a€Notice€of€Lien€wasÏfiled€in€the€Shelby€County€Registerððs€office,€Law€Firm€ð ðfailed€to€prepare€andÏserve€a€written€notice€that€the€lien€was€being€claimed€within€the€timeÍprescribed€by€T.C.A.€ðð€66„11„115(b).ðð€€In€addition,€Bradsonððs€Complaint€alsoÏalleges€that€Law€Firm€neglected€to€timely€ð ðprepare€and€serve€a€Notice€ofÏNonpayment€by€registered€mail€to€Shelby€Tissue€and€the€property€owner€inÏaccord€with€T.C.A.€ðð€66„11„145.ððÌà àOn€February€14,€1994,€the€parties€entered€into€an€ð ðExtension€of€TollingÏAgreement.ðð€€This€agreement€states€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€€€€€This€Agreement€is€for€the€purpose€of€furtherÏextending€the€Tolling€Agreement€heretofore€enteredÏinto€by€and€between€the€parties€on€October€14,€1993.Ï.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€€€€€€€€€The€Parties€have€endeavored€to€settle€orÏreconcile€certain€issues€that€may€exist€as€heretoforeÏdelineated€in€the€original€Tolling€Agreement€and,Ïbecause€of€additional€matters€that€may€have€arisen,Ïthe€parties€are€desirous€of€extending€the€originalÏTolling€Agreement€through€May€6,€1994,€pursuant€toÏthe€terms€and€conditions€of€the€original€TollingÏAgreement.€€All€other€provisions€in€the€originalÏTolling€Agreement€shall€continue€to€be€applicable,Ïwith€the€tolling€period€being€extended€from€FebruaryÏ14,€1994€through€and€including€May€6,€1994.ÌÌÓÓBradson€asserts€that€it€was€the€intent€of€the€parties€to€incorporate€the€potentialÏShelby€Tissue€project€claim€as€part€of€the€original€Tolling€Agreement.Ìà àIn€March€1994,€the€parties€settled€the€Mapco€dispute.€€The€Release€andÏIndemnification€Agreement€specifically€excludes€the€Shelby€Tissue€dispute€andÏstates:€€ÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€€€It€is€acknowledged,€understood€andÏagreed€by€Insurers€and€Lawyers€thatÍBradson€does€hereby€specifically€reserveÏany€and€all€rights€and€claims€it€may€haveÏagainst€the€Law€Firm€of€Shuttleworth,ÏSmith,€McNabb€&€Williams,€it€[sic]Ïpartners,€associates€and€employeesÏincluding,€but€not€limited€to,€claims€forÏlegal€malpractice€relating€to€or€arisingÏout€of€the€representation€of€Bradson€byÏsaid€Lawyers€relating€to€a€projectÏcommonly€identified€as€ð ðShelby€TissueððÏon€which€Lawyers€agreed€to€and€didÏperform€and€render€certain€services€andÏcertain€work€and€in€which€the€saidÏLawyers€and€Law€Firm€representedÏBradson.€.€.€.€All€parties€to€this€ReleaseÏfurther€acknowledge€that€a€claim€hasÏheretofore€been€made€with€regard€to€theÏð ðShelby€Tissueðð€representation€and€œthatÏthat›€claim€as€well€as€any€and€all€otherÏclaims€which€Bradson€has€or€may€haveÏare€not€being€released€by€this€Agreement.ÌÌÓÓà àOn€June€11,€1996,€an€order€was€entered€in€the€underlying€Shelby€TissueÏaction€holding€that€because€Bradson€had€failed€to€perfect€its€mechanicððs€andÏmaterialmenððs€lien,€it€had€no€protection€under€the€Lien€Creditorsðð€Bill.€€BradsonÏtimely€filed€a€Notice€of€Appeal€from€this€order.Ìà àOn€June€26,€1996,€Bradson€filed€the€legal€malpractice€Complaint€againstÏLaw€Firm.€€Both€parties€filed€motions€for€summary€judgment.€€Finding€that€theÏstatute€of€limitations€expired€on€May€6,€1994,€the€trial€court€granted€summaryÍjudgment€to€the€Law€Firm.× ƒ= ××  ×€€Bradson€has€appealed,€and€presents€three€issues€forÏreview,€as€stated€Ñ „ Ñin€its€brief:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à1.€€Did€the€Circuit€Court€err€in€allowing€the€law€œfirm›Ïto€raise€the€statute€of€limitations€as€a€defense€whenÏthe€law€firm€had€expressly€waived€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€in€the€Tolling€Agreement€and€theÏExtension€of€Tolling€Agreement.ÌÌà8 àà8 à2.€€Did€the€Circuit€Court€err€in€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€the€law€firm€on€the€basis€of€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€when€the€law€firm€further€indicated€itsÏintention€to€waive€the€statute€œin€the›€Release€andÏIndemnification€Agreement?ÌÌà8 àà8 à3.€€Did€the€Circuit€Court€err€in€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€the€law€firm€on€the€basis€of€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€when€there€was€no€evidence€in€the€recordÏto€establish€when€the€cause€of€action€accrued€or€theÏstatute€of€limitations€ran?ÌÌÓÓœ›à àœA›€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movantÏdemonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€theÏmoving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ï56.04.€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€ofÏdemonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.€€ò òòòBain€v.€Wellsó óóó,€936ÏS.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€courtÏmust€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€theÍnonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,€andÏdiscard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€In€ò òòòByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847€S.W.2d€208Ï(Tenn.€1993),€our€Supreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€partyÏmust€then€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discoveryÏmaterials,€that€there€is€a€genuine,€material€factÏdispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05Ïprovides€that€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€simply€relyÏupon€his€pleadings€but€must€set€forth€òòspecific€factsóóÏshowing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€factÏfor€œtrial.›à8 àÌò òòòÌId.ó óóó€at€211€(citations€omitted)€(emphasis€in€œoriginal).Ì›ÌÓÓà àSummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legalÏconclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permit€only€one€conclusion.€Ïò òòòCarvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€Since€only€questions€ofÏlaw€are€involved,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regarding€a€trial€court'sÏgrant€of€summary€Ñ 8 Ñjudgment.€€ò òòòBainó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€at€622.€€Therefore,€our€reviewÏof€the€trial€courtððs€grant€œof›€summary€judgment€is€ò òòòde€novoó óóó€on€the€record€beforeÏthis€Court.€€ò òòòWarren€v.€Estate€of€Kirkó óóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€723€(Tenn.€œ1997).òòò ò›Ìà àó óóóThe€first€two€issues€presented€for€review€require€the€interpretation€of€theÏagreements€referred€to.€€The€cardinal€rule€in€the€construction€of€contracts€is€toÏascertain€the€intent€of€the€parties.€€ò òòòWest€v.€Laminite€Plastics€Mfg.€Co.ó óóó,€674ÏS.W.2d€310€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€If€the€contract€is€plain€and€unambiguous,€theÍmeaning€thereof€is€a€question€of€law,€and€it€is€the€Courtððs€function€to€interpretÏthe€contract€as€written€according€to€its€plain€terms.€€ò òòòPetty€v.€Sloanó óóó,€197€Tenn.Ï630,€277€S.W.2d€355€(1955).€€The€language€used€in€a€contract€must€be€takenÏand€understood€in€its€plain,€ordinary,€and€popular€sense.€€ò òòòBob€Pearsall€Motors,ÏInc.€v.€Regal€Chrysler„Plymouth,€Inc.ó óóó,€521€S.W.2d€578€(Tenn.€1975).€€InÏconstruing€contracts,€the€words€expressing€the€partiesðð€intentions€should€beÏgiven€the€usual,€natural,€and€ordinary€meaning.€€ò òòòBallard€v.€North€American€LifeÏ&€Cas.€Co.,ó óóó€667€S.W.2d€79€(Tenn.€App.€1983).€€If€the€language€of€a€writtenÏinstrument€is€unambiguous,€the€Court€must€interpret€it€as€written€rather€thanÏaccording€to€the€unexpressed€intention€of€one€of€the€parties.€€ò òòòSutton€v.€FirstÏNat.€Bank€of€Crossville,€ó óóó620€S.W.2d€526€(Tenn.€App.€1981).€€Courts€cannotÏmake€contracts€for€parties€but€can€only€enforce€the€contract€which€the€partiesÏthemselves€have€made.€€œò òòòMcKee›€v.€Continental€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€191€Tenn.€413,€234ÏS.W.2d€830,€22€ALR2d€980€(1951).Ìà àWe€have€examined€the€tolling€agreement€and€the€agreement€for€theÏextension€thereof.€€In€neither€agreement€do€we€find€reference€made€to€theÏShelby€Tissue€project,€nor€do€we€find€that€the€language€makes€any€indicationÏthat€the€Shelby€Tissue€project€was€intended€to€be€included€in€the€tollingÏagreement€relied€upon€by€Bradson.€€As€to€the€Release€and€IndemnificationÏAgreement,€the€usual€and€ordinary€meaning€of€the€language€used€merelyÍindicates€an€intention€to€make€it€clear€that€the€release€does€not€include€anyÏclaim€relating€to€the€Shelby€Tissue€project.€€We€find€no€language€in€thisÏagreement€that€would€indicate€an€intention€to€waive€or€toll€any€statute€ofÏlimitations.Ìà àAppellantððs€first€two€issues€are€without€merit.Ìà àThe€third€issue€for€review€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€grantingÏsummary€judgment€on€the€basis€that€Bradsonððs€claim€was€barred€by€the€statuteÏof€limitations.€òòò òÌóóó óà àAn€action€for€legal€malpractice€must€be€commenced€ð ðwithin€one€(1)€yearÏafter€the€cause€of€action€accrued.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„104€(a)(2)€(Supp.€1997).€Ïò òòòCarvell€v€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23€(Tenn.€œ1995),›€is€the€seminal€case€inÏTennessee€involving€the€accrual€of€a€legal€malpractice€cause€of€action.€€InÏò òòòCarvelló óóó,€the€plaintiffs€retained€the€legal€services€of€the€defendants€for€theÏpurpose€of€selling€a€real€estate€parcel€to€Ms.€Roaby€Baxter.€€Although€aÏpreliminary€title€opinion€drafted€by€the€defendants€indicated€the€existence€of€aÏpipeline€easement€across€the€property,€the€warranty€deed€prepared€by€theÏdefendants€did€not€mention€the€easement.€€A€few€years€after€purchasing€theÏproperty,€Ms.€Baxter€filed€suit€against€the€Carvells€upon€discovering€theÏexistence€of€the€easement.€€The€plaintiffs€were€put€on€notice€at€some€pointÏsoon€thereafter€that€the€defendants€may€have€negligently€drafted€the€warrantyÍdeed.€€In€January€of€1989,€a€trial€court€entered€an€order€on€a€jury€verdict€inÏfavor€of€Ms.€Baxter.× ƒ> ××  ×€€Both€parties€appealed,€but€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€wasÏaffirmed€in€March€of€1990.€€The€plaintiffs€proceeded€to€bring€a€legalÏmalpractice€suit€against€the€defendants€in€May€of€1990.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€24„25.Ìà àThe€plaintiffs€argued€that€the€cause€of€action€did€not€accrue€until€theÏCourt€of€Appealððs€decision€was€filed€in€March€of€1990,€claiming€that€their€injuryÏdid€not€become€ð ðirremediableðð€until€all€of€their€possible€appeals€had€beenÏexhausted.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€29.€€œThe›€Supreme€Court€rejected€the€plaintiffsðð€argument€andÏheld€that€although€the€plaintiffsðð€injury€need€not€be€ð ðirremediableðð€there€mustÏbe€a€ð ðlegally€cognizableðð€or€ð ðactualðð€injury.× ƒ? ××  ×€€òòò òCarvelló óóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€29„30.€€TheÏCourt€further€stated€that€ð ða€plaintiff€is€deemed€to€have€discovered€the€right€ofÏaction€if€he€is€aware€of€facts€sufficient€to€put€a€reasonable€person€on€notice€thatÏhe€has€suffered€an€injury€as€a€result€of€wrongful€conduct.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€29€(quotingÏò òòòRoe€v.€Jeffersonóóó ó,€875€S.W.2d€653,€657€(Tenn.€1994)).€€Applying€this€standard,Ïthe€Court€noted€that€the€Carvells€should€have€known€that€they€had€sustained€anÏinjury€as€a€result€of€the€lawyerððs€negligence€when€they€were€sued€by€Baxter€inÍ1986.€€œò òòòCarvelló óóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€29.›Ìà àThus,€a€cause€of€action€for€legal€malpractice€accrues€when:€1)€theÏdefendantððs€negligence€causes€the€€plaintiff€to€suffer€a€legally€cognizable€or€actualÏinjury;€and€2)€the€plaintiff€knows€ð ðor€in€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligenceÏshould€have€known€that€this€injury€was€caused€by€defendantððs€negligence.ðð€€œò òòòIdó óóó.Ïat€28,›€30.€€In€the€instant€case,€there€is€little€question€that€Bradson€knew€orÏshould€have€known€of€a€potential€cause€of€action€against€the€Defendants€moreÏthan€one€year€before€the€Complaint€was€filed.€€The€Release€and€IndemnificationÏAgreement€executed€in€May€of€1994€expressly€demonstrates€that€Bradson€hadÏknowledge€of€this€potential€claim.× ƒ@ ××  ×€€The€more€crucial€issue€involves€the€date€atÏwhich€Bradson€suffered€from€an€ð ðactual€injuryðð€or€a€ð ðlegally€cognizable€injury.ðð€Ïœò òòòId.€óóó óat›€30.Ìà àBefore€ò òòòCarvell,€ó óóóTennessee€courts€struggled€with€the€issue€of€the€accrual€ofÏa€legal€malpractice€cause€of€action€on€numerous€occasions.€€In€ò òòòAmeraccountÏClub,€Inc.€v.€Hilló óóó,€617€S.W.2d€876€(Tenn.€1981),€the€plaintiff€corporationÏemployed€the€defendant€attorneys€to€register€a€service€mark€and€logo€with€theÏUnited€States€Patent€Office.€€After€learning€in€March€of€1975€that€theirÏapplication€filed€December,€1974,€was€incomplete,€the€defendants€completedÍthe€application€and€a€registration€date€of€March€13,€1975€was€assigned.€€TheÏdefendants,€however,€failed€to€conduct€a€search€of€whether€any€otherÏapplications€for€similar€service€marks€had€been€submitted.€€By€letter€of€AugustÏ13,€1975,€the€plaintiff€was€notified€that€another€company€had€submitted€anÏapplication€for€a€similar€service€mark€in€February€of€1975.€€Although€the€otherÏcompany€was€conferred€precedence,€the€plaintiff€was€notified€that€it€retainedÏthe€right€to€contest€this€conferral.€€Shortly€thereafter€(before€August€27,€œ1975),›€Ïthe€plaintiff€conducted€a€shareholdersðð€meeting€in€which€the€members€agreedÏthat€the€defendants€had€acted€negligently.€€The€plaintiff€never€contested€theÏPatent€Officeððs€decision€and€was€notified€on€April€27,€1976€that€the€PatentÏOffice€had€officially€refused€its€application.€€The€plaintiff€filed€a€legalÏmalpractice€suit€against€the€defendants€on€August€27,€1976.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€876„77.Ìà àThe€Supreme€Court€rejected€the€defendantsðð€argument€that€the€cause€ofÏaction€accrued€at€the€point€that€the€plaintiff€discovered€the€defendantsððÏnegligence.€€Instead,€the€Court€held€that€ð ðmore€was€required,€viz.,€damage€orÏinjury€to€the€plaintiff€resulting€from€that€negligence,ðð€œand›€found€that€theÏplaintiff€did€not€suffer€an€injury€from€the€alleged€negligence€until€the€PatentÏOffice€rejected€its€application€on€April€27,€1996.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€878.òòò ò€€ó óóóThe€Court€citedÏapprovingly€the€notion€that€the€cause€of€action€accrues€at€the€point€at€whichÏthe€alleged€negligence€becomes€ð ðirremediable.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€879€(quotingÍò òòòChamberlain€v.€Smithó óóó,€72€Cal.App.3d€835,€140€Cal.Rptr.€493€(1977)).€€Ìà àIn€ò òòòSecurity€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€v.€Fabricating,€Inc.ó óóó,€673€S.W.2d€860Ï(Tenn.€1983),€a€townððs€local€bond€counsel€assisted€in€the€issuance€of€revenueÏbonds€that€were€personally€guaranteed€by€two€individuals.€€The€bonds€defaultedÏon€October€1,€1974,€and€it€was€subsequently€discovered€that€the€bond€issueÏmay€have€been€fraudulently€conceived€by€the€two€individual€guarantors.€€A€fewÏmonths€later,€the€town€and€the€trustee€bank€filed€suit€against€the€twoÏguarantors,× ƒA ××  ×€seeking€recovery€for€the€failure€of€the€bond€issue.€€In€the€SummerÏof€1975,€letters€were€written€to€the€trustee€bank€recommending€that€a€suit€beÏbrought€on€behalf€of€the€bondholders€against€certain€parties,€including€the€bondÏattorneys.€€A€legal€malpractice€suit€was€not€brought€against€these€attorneys,Ïhowever,€until€November€of€1976.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€861„63.Ìà àThe€Supreme€Court€rejected€the€plaintiffsðð€argument€that€the€cause€ofÏaction€did€not€accrue€until€the€suit€against€the€guarantors€was€concluded.€ÏCiting€ò òòòAmeraccount,€supra,€ó óóóthe€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àObviously,€negligence€without€injury€is€not€actionable;Ïhence,€the€statute€of€limitations€could€not€begin€toÏrun€until€the€attorneyððs€negligence€had€resulted€inÏinjury€to€the€plaintiff.€€In€the€instant€case,€the€injuryÏto€the€bondholders€occurred€on€October€1,€1974,Ïò òòòwhen€the€bonds€defaultedó óóó.€€There€is€no€merit€whateverÍin€the€plaintiffsðð€argument€that€their€injury€did€notÏoccur€until€the€suit€against€the€guarantors€in€TexasÏwas€concluded.€€A€plaintiff€cannot€be€permitted€toÏwait€until€he€knows€all€of€the€injurious€effects€asÏconsequences€of€an€actionable€wrong.ÌÌÓÓò òòòSecurity€Bankó óóó,€673€S.W.2d€at€864„65€(internal€citation€omitted)€(emphasis€inÏoriginal).€€€€€€òòò ò€€ó óóó€Ìà àIn€ò òòòChambers€v.€Dillowó óóó,€713€S.W.2d€896€(Tenn.€1986),€the€plaintiff€hiredÏthe€defendant€attorney€to€represent€him€in€a€suit€against€the€county.€€TheÏplaintiffððs€suit€against€the€county€was€dismissed€in€March€of€1981€for€failure€toÏprosecute.€€After€being€notified€of€this€dismissal€in€March€of€1982,€the€plaintiffÏhired€another€attorney,€who€filed€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02€motion€to€set€asideÏthe€order€of€dismissal.€€Although€this€motion€was€granted,€the€trial€courtÏultimately€dismissed€the€suit€for€the€second€time€in€April€of€1983.€€The€plaintiffÏfiled€a€malpractice€suit€against€the€defendant€and€the€defendantððs€law€firm€inÏOctober€of€1983.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€896„97.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€argued€that€his€cause€of€action€did€not€accrue€until€the€dateÏof€the€second€dismissal.€€The€Supreme€Court,€however,€found€that€the€plaintiffÏsuffered€ð ðirremediableðð€injury€on€the€date€of€the€first€order€of€dismissal€inÏMarch€of€1981,€since€this€dismissal€qualified€as€ð ðan€adjudication€upon€theÍmeritsðð€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€41.02€(3).× ƒB ××  ×€€ò òòòChambersó óóó,€713€S.W.2dÏat€898.€The€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhere€as€here€the€client€has€knowledge€of€the€lawyerððsÏnegligence,€of€the€termination€of€his€lawsuit,€of€theÏlegal€consequences€of€that€termination,€and€hasÏemployed€another€lawyer€to€prosecute€his€malpracticeÏclaim,€he€cannot€defer€the€irremediable€injury€date€byÏfutile€efforts€to€revive€a€legally€dismissed€lawsuit.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Court€also€noted€that€the€plaintiff€had€suffered€ð ðsufficientðð€tangibleÏinjury€at€the€point€of€his€discovery€that€the€initial€suit€was€dismissed:€namely€heÏwas€liable€for€the€court€costs€of€his€dismissed€suit,òòò ò€ó óóóhe€had€lost€at€least€theÏinterest€on€anticipated€money€recovery,€and€he€was€faced€with€the€prospect€ofÏincurring€attorneyððs€fees€for€the€impending€legal€malpractice€suit.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€898„99.€Ïò òòòSee€also€Bland€v.€Smithó óóó,€197€Tenn.€683,€277€S.W.2d€377€(1955).Ìà àThis€Court€considered€this€issue€in€1986€in€ò òòòMemphis€Aero€Corp.€v.ÏSwainó óóó,€732€S.W.2d€608€(Tenn.€App.€1986).€€The€plaintiff€in€ò òòòMemphis€Aeroó óóóÏhired€the€defendant€attorney€to€collect€the€balance€of€an€account€owed€byÏArgonauts,€Inc..€€The€defendant€proceeded€to€file€a€civil€warrant€and€anÏattachment€for€an€aircraft€owned€by€Argonauts€that€was€stored€on€the€plaintiffððsÏpremises.€€The€plaintiffððs€attachment€was€sustained€when€Argonauts€failed€toÍappear,€and€the€aircraft€was€sold€to€satisfy€the€judgment.€€One€month€later,ÏArgonauts€notified€the€defendant€that€the€attachment€was€wrongfully€obtainedÏsince€no€service€of€process€was€ever€received€by€Argonauts.€€Consequently,ÏArgonauts€filed€suit€for€damages€resulting€from€the€wrongful€attachment€againstÏthe€defendant€and€the€plaintiff€in€August€of€1978.€€A€1982€order€by€the€trialÏcourt€dismissing€the€suit€was€reversed€by€the€Court€of€Appeals€and,€ultimately,ÏArgonauts€was€awarded€a€judgment€in€December€of€1983.€€Also€in€December€ofÏ1983,€the€plaintiff€sued€the€defendant€for€legal€malpractice.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€608„09.Ìà àWe€held€that€the€cause€of€action€accrued€more€than€one€year€before€theÏcomplaint€was€filed.€€Citing€the€aforementioned€cases,€we€found€that€theÏplaintiff€suffered€an€injury€as€early€as€the€time€that€Argonauts€filed€its€suit€forÏthe€wrongful€attachment€in€August€of€1978,€when€the€plaintiff€ð ðreceivedÏperiodic€billings€from€its€lawyers€for€services€in€the€defense€of€the€ArgonautsÏcase€and€paid€bills€as€they€were€received€throughout€the€pendency€of€that€suit.ðð€Ïò òòòIdó óóó.€at€612;€ò òòòsee€also€Tennessee€WSMP,€Inc.€v.€Cappsó óóó,€No.€03A01„9407„CV„00241,€1995€WL€83579€(Tenn.€App.€Mar.€2,€1995)òòò ò;€€Dukes€v.€Noeó óóó,€856€S.W.2dÏ403€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€ò òòòBatchelor€v.€Heiskell,€Donelson,€Bearman,€Adams,ÏWilliams€&€Kirschó óóó,€828€S.W.2d€388€(Tenn.€App.€1991);€ò òòòBridges€v.€Bairdó óóó,ÏShelby€Law€No.€32,€1989€WL€740€(Tenn.€App.€Jan€9,€1989);€ò òòòDenley€v.€Smithó óóó,ÏShelby€Law€No.€48,€1989€WL€738,€*4€(Tenn.€App.€Jan.€9,€1989)€(ð ð[T]he€actionÍaccrued€when€any€damages,€no€matter€how€small,€became€apparent.ðð);€ò òòòMasterÏSlack€Corp.€v.€Bowlingó óóó,€Hardeman€Law€No.€2,€1987€WL€10406€(Tenn.€App.ÏMay€5,€1987);€ò òòòCitizens€Bank€v.€Willifordó óóó,€No.€85„315„II,€1986€WL€6056,€*7„9Ï(Tenn.€App.€May€29,€1986)€(Koch,€J.,€concurring);€Annotation,€òòWhen€Statute€ofÏLimitations€Begins€to€Run€Upon€Action€Against€Attorney€for€Malpracticeóó,€18€A.L.R.3dÏ978€(1968).Ìà àSince€ò òòòCarvelló óóó,€the€issue€has€been€revisited€by€the€Court€of€Appeals€on€aÏfew€occasions.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Tanaka€v.€Mearesó óóó,€No.€03A01„9710„CV„00463,€1998ÏWL€237717€(Tenn.€App.€May€12,€1998);òòò ò€€Rayford€v.€Leffleró óóó,€953€S.W.2d€204Ï(Tenn.€App.€1997);€ò òòò€Bokor€v.€Bruceó óóó,€No.€01A01„9603„CV„00119,€1996€WLÏ465235€(Tenn.€App.€Aug.€16,€1996)òòò ò;€Smith€v.€Petkoffó óóó,€919€S.W.2d€595€(Tenn.ÏApp.€œ1995).›€€In€ò òòòPorter„Metler€v.€Edwardsó óóó,€No.€03A01„9709„CV„00393,€1998ÏWL€131515€(Tenn.€App.€Mar.€25,€1998),€the€plaintiff€hired€the€defendantÏattorney€to€represent€her€in€a€personal€injury€suit.€€A€complaint€was€filed× ƒC ××  ×€butÏprocess€and€alias€process€were€returned€unserved€in€1993.€€Because€furtherÏprocess€was€not€issued€and€a€new€complaint€was€not€timely€filed,€the€trial€courtÍdismissed€the€action.× ƒD ××  ×€€The€plaintiff€proceeded€to€bring€a€legal€malpractice€suitÏagainst€the€defendant€on€June€12,€1995.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*1.€€Citing€the€two„prong€ruleÏarticulated€in€ò òòòCarvell,€supra,€ó óóóthe€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€€€Regarding€the€first€part€of€the€discovery€rule,Ïplaintiff€argues€that€she€did€not€suffer€a€legallyÏcognizable€injury€until€the€court€entered€an€orderÏdismissing€her€underlying€case.€€If€the€issue€of€whetherÏdismissal€should€have€been€granted€were€ò òòòless€clear€orÏopen€to€reasonable€legal€debateóóó ó,€the€plaintiff€mightÏhave€a€stronger€argument.€€But€in€this€case,€whereÏservice€of€process€was€not€timely€reissued,€it€wasÏpatently€clear€that€plaintiffððs€claim€against€[the€allegedÏpersonal€injury€tortfeasor]€had€become€time„barredÏand€there€was€nothing€that€could€have€been€done€toÏrevive€her€action.€€Thus,€she€suffered€a€legallyÏcognizable€injury€at€the€expiration€of€the€six„monthÏperiod€within€which€she€was€allowed€by€the€TennesseeÏRules€of€Civil€Procedure€to€reissue€a€summons.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*2€(emphasis€added).Ìà àòòò òCarver€Plumbing€Co.€v.€Beckó óóó,€No.€01A01„9708„CV„00377,€1998€WLÏ161112€(Tenn.€App.€Apr.€8,€1998),€involved€facts€somewhat€similar€to€the€factsÏin€the€present€case.€€The€defendant€attorney€was€hired€by€the€plaintiff€to€file€aÏmechanicððs€lien.€€The€defendant€filed€the€lien€but€failed€to€timely€file€a€suit€toÏenforce€the€lien€in€accordance€with€T.C.A.€ðð€66„11„115€(c)€(1993)€(suit€must€beÏbrought€within€ninety€days€of€filing€of€the€mechanicððs€lien).€€The€issues,Íhowever,€were€different€than€the€issues€in€the€present€case,€since€in€ò òòòCarverÏPlumbingó óóó€the€parties€did€not€dispute€that€the€plaintiff€ð ðsuffered€a€legallyÏcognizable€injury€.€.€.€when€the€90„day€time€period€for€filing€a€suit€to€enforceÏthe€mechanicððs€lien€expired.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*3.€€€€€€€Ìà àA€legal€malpractice€suit€in€òòò òCiticorp€Mortgage,€Inc.€v.€Robertsó óóó,€No.€02A01„9608„CH„00196,€1997€WL€275587€(Tenn.€App.€May€27,€1997),€ò òòòperm.€to€appealÏgrantedó óóó,€(Dec.€8,€1997),€involved€the€closing€of€a€real€estate€loan.€€The€plaintiffÏwas€a€lender€who€sought€to€refinance€a€debt€encumbering€the€ownerððs€property.€ÏThe€plaintiff€hired€the€defendantððs€law€firm€to€ensure€that€all€preexisting€liensÏon€the€property€were€satisfied€so€that€the€plaintiff€could€hold€a€first€lien€on€theÏproperty.€€The€defendantððs€firm,€however,€neglected€to€execute€a€release€of€aÏpreexisting€lien€held€by€Shelby€Bank,€so€that€Shelby€Bankððs€lien€was€superior€toÏthat€of€the€plaintiff€after€the€closing€in€January€of€1990.× ƒE ××  ×€€After€the€propertyÏowner€defaulted€on€his€indebtedness€to€Shelby€Bank€and€the€plaintiff,€bothÏcreditors€initiated€foreclosure€proceedings.× ƒF ××  ×€€In€December€of€1991,€ShelbyÏBank€foreclosed€on€its€deed€of€trust€and,€subsequently,€the€plaintiffððs€lien€wasÍextinguished.€€The€plaintiff€filed€a€malpractice€suit€against€the€defendant€inÏAugust€of€1992.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*1.Ìà àAfter€reviewing€the€aforementioned€authorities,€the€court€held€that€theÏplaintiffððs€cause€of€action€did€not€accrue€until€December€of€1991,€when€ShelbyÏBankððs€foreclosure€extinguished€the€plaintiffððs€lien.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€*6.€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àBefore€Shelby€Bankððs€foreclosure,€Plaintiff€had€not€suffered€anÏinjury€as€a€result€of€[the€defendantððs]€negligent€failure€to€retainÏ[sic]€a€release€of€the€Shelby€Bank€lien.€€Although€[the€defendant]Ïcommitted€the€negligent€act€in€January€1990,€this€act€did€notÏbecome€legally€injurious€until€certain€consequences€occurred,€ie.Ïwhen€Shelby€Bank€foreclosed€upon€its€lien€in€December€1991.€€ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€€Ìà àIn€the€instant€case,€Bradson€contends€that€it€did€not€suffer€from€a€ð ðlegallyÏcognizable€injuryðð€until€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€dismissing€its€lienÏinterest€in€the€Shelby€Tissue€project€on€June€11,€1996.€€Bradson€claims€that€itÏwas€impossible€for€it€to€know€whether€it€had€suffered€an€injury€until€itsÏalternative€claims€related€to€the€Shelby€Tissue€litigation€were€resolved.€€œLaw›ÏFirmððs€Responses€to€Request€for€Admissions€includes€the€following:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àòòREQUEST€NO.€8óó:à àAdmit€that,€as€a€result€of€attorneyÏJoseph€Crabtreeððs€failure€to€perfect€this€lien,€BradsonÏlost€its€rights€to€assert€a€lien€against€the€Shelby€TissueÏProject.ÌÌà8 àà8 àòòRESPONSE€NO.€8óó:€€€Denied.€€It€is€admitted€thatÏChancellor€Peete€has€ruled€that€the€lien€was€notÏperfected€but€the€Defendants€understand€that€theÍruling€is€on€appeal€by€the€Plaintiff.€€The€DefendantsÏassert€that€the€position€taken€by€Plaintiff€will€beÏsustained.ÌÌÓÓBradson€argues€that€this€admission€demonstrates€the€partiesðð€belief€thatÏBradson€would€prevail€in€the€underlying€action.€€Ìà àThere€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€that€Bradson€suffered€any€ð ðactualðð€orÏð ðlegally€cognizableðð€injury€until€the€trial€court€entered€its€order€on€the€ShelbyÏTissue€Lien€Creditorsðð€Bill€on€June€11,€1996.€€ò òòòCarvelló óóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€30.€ÏAlthough€the€evidence€unequivocally€demonstrates€that€Bradson€was€aware€thatÏthe€Defendants€may€have€been€guilty€of€negligence€at€least€as€early€as€1994,Ïð ðmore€was€required,€viz.,€damage€or€injury€to€the€plaintiff€resulting€from€thatÏnegligence.ðð€€ò òòòAmeraccountó óóó,€617€S.W.2d€at€878.€€Until€an€adverse€judgment€wasÏrendered€in€the€Shelby€Tissue€litigation,€the€mere€potential€for€an€injury€existedÏas€opposed€to€an€actual€injury.€€Just€as€in€ò òòòAmeraccount,€supra,€ó óóóalthough€BradsonÏcould€possibly€foresee€an€adverse€adjudication€concerning€the€lien,€it€does€notÏautomatically€follow€that€it€had€been€injured€at€that€point€in€time.€€TheÏjudgment€that€was€rendered€on€June€11,€1996€was€an€ð ðadjudication€on€theÏmeritsðð€and,€thus,€qualified€as€a€legal€injury.€€ò òòòChambersó óóó,€713€S.W.2d€at€898.€€€AsÏopposed€to€other€aforementioned€cases,€it€was€not€demonstrated€that€BradsonÏsuffered€from€ò òòòanyó óóó€harm€until€this€judgment€was€entered.€€ò òòòCf.€Security€Bankó óóó,Ï673€S.W.2d€at€864„65;€ò òòòChambersó óóó,€713€S.W.2d€at€898„99;€ò òòòMemphis€Aeroó óóó,€732ÍS.W.2d€at€612;€ò òòòTennessee€WSMPó óóó,€1995€WL€83579,€at€*4.€€à àÌà àThe€decision€in€ò òòòPorter„Metler,€supra,€ó óóóappears€to€suggest€that€a€legalÏmalpractice€cause€of€action€may€accrue€before€the€occurrence€of€any€tangibleÏinjury€in€the€event€that€eventual€injury€is€a€foregone€conclusion.€€In€contrast€toÏthe€facts€in€ò òòòPorter„Metleró óóó,€however,€the€issue€of€whether€Law€Firm€in€theÏinstant€case€failed€to€comply€with€the€recording€statutes€during€œits€attempted›Ïperfection€of€the€Shelby€Tissue€lien€was€ð ðless€clearðð€and€was€ð ðopen€to€reasonableÏlegal€debate.ðð€€ò òòòPorter„Mettleró óóó,€1998€WL€131515,€at€*2;€ò òòòcf.€also€Carver€Plumbingó óóó,Ï1998€WL€161112,€at€*3.€€By€its€own€admission,€Law€Firm€stated€its€belief€thatÏthe€trial€courtððs€June€11,€1996€order€would€be€reversed€on€appeal.€€ThisÏindicates€œLaw›€Firmððs€confidence€that€œBradson›€would€prevail€in€the€trial€court.€ÏTherefore,€it€was€not€ð ðpatently€clearðð€that€Bradsonððs€Shelby€Tissue€lien€would€beÏextinguished.€€ò òòòPorter„Mettleró óóó,€1998€WL€131515,€at€*2.€€Because€there€is€noÏevidence€in€the€record€indicating€that€Bradson€reasonably€should€have€beenÏaware€that€an€adverse€judgment€in€the€Shelby€Tissue€suit€was€inevitable,€andÏbecause€there€is€no€evidence€that€Bradson€suffered€any€actual€injury€before€theÏjudgment€was€entered,€we€find€that€Bradson€did€not€suffer€from€a€legal€injuryÏuntil€the€adverse€judgment€was€entered€against€it€on€June€11,€1996.Ìà àSince€June€11,€1996€was€the€earliest€date€that€Bradson€(1)€suffered€fromÏa€legally€cognizable€injury€and€(2)€had€knowledge€of€such€an€injury,€its€cause€ofÍaction€against€the€Defendants€did€not€accrue€until€this€date.€€ò òòòCarvelló óóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€at€28,€30.€€Because€Bradsonððs€Complaint€was€filed€within€one€year€ofÏthis€date,€the€statute€of€limitations€does€not€bar€this€action.€€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„104Ï(a)(2).€€Consequently,€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€toÏthe€Defendants.Ìà àThe€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€to€theÏDefendants€is€reversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court.€€Costs€onÏappeal€are€assessed€against€the€Appellees.ÌÓÓœ›à àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌœ____________________________________ÌHEWITT€P.€TOMLIN,€JR.,€SENIOR€JUDGEó óÌÌò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó ó€(Not€Particpating)›