ÿWPC9  ¿n :Ìg»†i0ukAõ …dÕâø‡“M|èë.3û4G±–ûÈë®´Û¼Góš#T(üÈÔ+NJÁ. )óP>£@UjNi=JÐ#¹RO÷VQ ±rUÇ Û²mgŠ÷Ã9.éóÎLàÞϣسÜùG4†ù¹¿öu̽…o?§iéÔ– /t :Õ›A¥HÂKökônó¶'É4Ã{Ã>Ëã`Ž0«Ð§qIIÚ¯©1÷õ|l gçÝËðôOƒ@û«Ãá×$¢½Ù¦œÉIžü‹Á—Ô”ú—sƒ{ÎÍÀ7œjáD®éð“kX_µ‡¶¯§º™jöE { )¶ÎО‰TÒ´Iž–Ö2ö˜óû(cï[t ä˯%~ÍN¢*÷y¦‚…ÿ\ë{Õ°”ˆ4©DúB‚çEí9±¯‡Œû^iÑPx뀼Ìvà•n"‰Å1§°j1Óüp26µæÐØ ¯£wۚݪÉT7Ñ…{T“x'b݇÷Æû *RËFYpx™}ºÎ‰Õ†e“°* ñB©RÃÄö÷Ö0Vÿ¡6p3Êg!Q¬eÅ÷!Ø®}V3# ‘Áˆ‡ I]œ¼Hèåü;ǯæ2:wyõ™ôÅ·”X*UNL %š 0( JÈw@ŠR 0zÜ 0DV4š® AQ½¶ÌU:ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ B Æ( 0Dî 0D2 0Dv v D/º º Bé D3 (ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡c:\office\wpwin\template\opinion.wpt JUKDLDMUNDOUPDQURÓ€\ €Ý ƒên$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝIndividually€and€d/b/a€Pleasantville€Studio€Two((*2ên$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€€(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÖ…#%3|x\!"#$&Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ ¬Ý ƒên$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝThe€trial€court€excluded€testimony€that€Appellants€had€refused€to€take€a€lie€detector€test. ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XH(XXXÔÔ€×*XXH(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XH(X×*ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€30,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñRñ›ñRñÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ€¼·ž¼XXÔÑ7€¤XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ññ\ññRñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` 8ttxP,°ð  rßñRññ\ññ\ññ\ññRñ›ñRñWAYNE€BRAYFIELD€and€DONà  àà è à)Ð ° ÐCHADWELL,€INDIVIDUALLY€ANDà è à)Ð Æ Ðd/b/a€PLEASANTVILLE€STUDIO€TWO,à è à)Ð Ü, Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àAppeal€No.Ð òB Ðñ\ññ\ñà Ø àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à 8 àà  àà è à)à @ à01„A„01„9701„CV„00007Ð  X Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ìv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ð 4 „ Ðñ\ññ\ñà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)ÌKENTUCKY€NATIONAL€INSURANCEà è à)à @ àCircuit€Court€No.Ð ` ° ÐCOMPANY,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ à14366„CÐ vÆ  Ðñ\ñœßt€ )>.*jxú@` `€€@EîÌ` 8ttxP&Œð @ tß›ñ\ñà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à 8 àà  àà è à)Ð ¢ò  ÐÌÌÌÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌœÌñNñÌñNñAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€SUMNER€COUNTYÌÌAT€GALLATIN,€TENNESSEEñJñÌñJñÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€GOODALL,€JUDGEÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌLOUISE€R.€FONTECCHIOÌBruce,€Weathers,€Corley,€Dughman€&€LyleÌ2075€First›€American€CenterÌ315€Deaderick€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37238„0275ÌATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSÌÌGARY€A.€BREWERÌPARKS€T.€CHASTAINÌBrewer,€Krause,€Brooks€&€MillsÌSuite€2600,€The€TowerÌ611€Commerce€StreetÌP.O.€Box€23890ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37202„3890ÌATTORNEY€FOR€THE€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌœñLñÌñLñ›ÌœñQñÌñQñ›ÌÓ  ÓAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌñRñœñRññMñÌñMñÐ ü:L62 ÐÓ  ÓœñKñÐ à:063‡ ÐñKññPññOñÌñOññPñWALTER›€W.€BUSSART,€JUDGEÐ  ° ÐÓ  ÓòòòòÔ€„IÛ„0¼îyÔOpinionóóóóÐ ° ÐÌÓ  ÓÓ€Óà Ø àÔ€¼îy¼„„IÛÔThis€is€an€appeal€by€plaintiffs/appellants,€Wayne€Brayfield€and€DonÐ pÀ ÐChadwell,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€from€a€jury€verdict€and€order€of€the€trial€court€€awarding€€defendant/Ð  X Ðappellee,€Kentucky€National€Insurance€Company,€$64,754.54.€€AppellantsÏcontend€any€misrepresentations€were€immaterial€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€trial€courtÏincorrectly€instructed€the€jury,€Appelleeððs€counsel€made€improper€statementsÏduring€his€closing€argument,€errors€committed€during€voir€dire€tainted€the€jury,Ïand€the€trial€court€allowed€inadmissable€evidence.€€The€pertinent€facts€are€asÏfollows.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓœI.›à @Ø àœ€€€€€Facts›€and€Procedural€Historyó óÐ È ÐÌÓ  Óà Ø àWayne€Brayfield€and€Don€Chadwell€(ð ðAppellantsðð)€purchased€theÏPleasantville€Studio€Two€(ð ðThe€Studioðð)€from€John€Shelton€in€October€1993.€ÏAppellants€assumed€the€existing€mortgage€of€approximately€$70,000€and€took€outÏa€$63,000€loan€from€a€bank€in€Paris,€Tennessee.€€They€offered€equipment€asÏsecurity€for€the€Paris€bank€loan.€€They€also€paid€Mr.€Shelton€$25,000€cash€andÏagreed€to€pay€him€the€balance€of€approximately€œ$78,000›€in€installments€of€œ$2,000›Ïper€month€beginning€in€March€of€1994.€€Appellants€signed€a€promissory€note,€butÏMr.€Shelton€never€recorded€a€deed€of€trust.€€Kentucky€National€InsuranceÏCompany€(ð ðAppelleeðð)€issued€an€insurance€policy€to€Appellants€covering€theÏStudio.€€The€policy€provided€$250,000€coverage€on€the€building€and€$125,000Ïcoverage€on€the€contents.ÌÌà Ø àA€fire€destroyed€the€Studio€on€11€September€1994.€€There€wasÏcontradictory€proof€as€to€whether€the€building€was€a€total€loss€or€could€beÏsalvaged.€€Appellantsðð€experts€estimated€the€cost€of€repairs€to€be€approximatelyÏ$275,000,€and€Appelleeððs€experts€estimated€the€cost€repairs€to€be€$134,676.95.€ÏThe€parties€stipulated€the€damage€to€the€contents€was€at€least€equal€to€the€coverageÏamount.€€The€Hendersonville€Fire€Marshall€and€Appelleeððs€investigator,€DonÏHoarist,€concluded€the€fire€was€intentionally€started€by€using€large€quantities€ofÏa€flammable€liquid.Ð =72> Їà Ø àAppellants€filed€a€proof€of€loss€with€Appellee.€€Appellee€interviewedÏAppellants,€and€Appellants€provided€Appellee€with€financial€documents.€ÏAppellee€later€questioned€Appellants€under€oath€regarding€the€Studio,€theirÏfinancial€situations,€and€the€fire.€€Ultimately,€Appellee€denied€the€claim€based€onÏits€conclusions€that€Appellants€intentionally€caused€the€fire€and€committedÏmaterial€misrepresentations€in€the€claim€process.€€Appellee€believed€AppellantsÏhad€misrepresented€their€role€in€the€fire€and€the€amount€of€the€loss.€€It€alsoÏbelieved€they€had€misrepresented€their€dealings€with€the€Paris€bank€and€Mr.ÏSheltonððs€interest€in€the€Studio.€€Despite€its€findings,€Appellee€paid€off€the€thirdÏparty€mortgage€holder€in€the€amount€of€$68,378.54.ÌÌà Ø àAfter€purchasing€the€Studio,€Appellants€left€the€Paris€bank€loan€in€Mr.ÏSheltonððs€name.€€They€made€payments€on€the€Paris€bank€loan€from€October€1993Ïuntil€February€1994.€€In€March€1994,€Chadwell€obtained€a€secured€loan€from€aÏWest€Virginia€bank€to€purchase€the€equipment€which€secured€the€Paris€bank€loan.€ÏThe€purchase€price€equaled€approximately€one„half€the€outstanding€Paris€bankÏloan€amount.€€Appellants€claim€they€simply€offered€to€purchase€the€equipmentÏfrom€the€bank€and€the€bank€accepted€the€offer.€€Appellee€claims€Appellants€failedÏto€make€the€payments€and€then€offered€to€purchase€the€collateral€at€a€reduced€priceÏwhen€the€bank€repossessed€the€equipment.€€Regardless,€the€parties€do€not€disputeÏthe€fact€that€Appellants€did€not€make€any€payments€to€the€Paris€bank€afterÏpurchasing€the€equipment.€€Instead,€they€made€payments€on€the€note€at€the€WestÏVirginia€bank.ÌÌà Ø àAppellants€did€not€pay€the€œ$2,000›€installments€to€Mr.€Shelton.€€TheyÏclaimed€they€had€an€agreement€with€Mr.€Shelton€under€which€Appellants€wouldÏnot€have€to€pay€the€installments€if€business€was€slow.€€Mr.€Shelton€did,€however,Ïhave€his€attorney€send€a€letter€dated€12€July€1994€demanding€payment.€ÏAppellants€claimed€Mr.€Shelton€changed€his€mind€and€told€Brayfield€in€front€ofÏa€witness,€Michelle€Hughes,€to€ignore€the€letter.€€Appellee€claims€Mr.€Shelton€didÏnot€change€his€mind€and€was€attempting€to€take€back€the€business€when€the€fireÏoccurred.ÌÌà Ø àAppellants€filed€suit€on€28€June€1995€for€their€actual€damages€under€theÐ H9˜4B Ðpolicy.€€Appellee€filed€an€answer€and€counter„claim.€€Appellee€claimed€AppellantsÏwere€not€entitled€to€the€policy€proceeds€because€they€committed€arson€and€madeÏmaterial€misrepresentations.€€Specifically,€Appellee€alleged€Appellants€œmis„¼represented›€the€extent€of€the€damage,€their€purchase€of€the€equipment€securing€theÏParis€bank€loan,€Brayfieldððs€use€of€paint€thinner,€whether€the€Studio€had€ever€beenÏfor€sale,€Sheltonððs€interest€in€the€property,€and€Appellantsðð€dealings€with€Shelton.€ÏAppellee€also€sought€reimbursement€for€the€money€paid€to€the€third€partyÏmortgage€holder€and€damages€for€bad€faith.€€The€parties€entered€an€agreed€orderÏwhich€provided€that€Appelleeððs€counterclaim€was€based€on€misrepresentationsÏconcerning€the€cause€of€the€fire,€not€œAppellantsðð›€insurance€application.ÌÌà Ø àA€jury€heard€the€case€from€29€July€1996€until€5€August€1996.€€The€courtÏdenied€the€partiesðð€motions€for€directed€verdict.€€The€jury€determined€œthat€neither›ÏBrayfield€nor€Chadwell€set€the€fire€and€œthat€Appellants›€made€a€materialÏmisrepresentation€with€respect€to€the€claim€process.€€The€jury€also€determinedÏAppellee€was€not€entitled€to€recover€on€its€bad€faith€counterclaim.€€The€courtÏentered€a€judgment€on€14€August€1996€awarding€Appellee€a€judgment€in€theÏamount€of€$68,754.54.€€Appellants€filed€a€Rule€50.02€motion€or,€in€the€alternative,Ïa€motion€for€a€new€trial.€€Appellee€filed€a€motion€for€discretionary€costs.€€TheÏcourt€entered€two€orders€on€8€November€1996€overruling€Appellantsðð€motion€andÏgranting€Appelleeððs€motion.€€The€court€stayed€the€judgment€pending€appeal.€ÏAppellants€filed€their€notice€of€appeal€on€2€December€1996€and€presented€theÏfollowing€issues:€€1)€whether€the€trial€judge€failed€to€properly€instruct€the€juryÏregarding€the€law;€2)€whether€any€misrepresentations€which€the€jury€foundÏAppellants€committed€were€immaterial€as€a€matter€of€law;€3)€whether€counsel€forÏAppellee€made€improper€jury€argument€which€unfairly€prejudiced€the€jury;€4)Ïwhether€the€jury€was€tainted€by€errors€committed€during€voir€dire€and€notÏcorrected€by€the€trial€judge;€and€5)€whether€the€trial€judge€admitted€inadmissableÏevidence.ÌÌà Ø àBefore€addressing€these€issues€we€note€an€important€point.€€There€is€noÏindication€in€the€juryððs€verdict€of€the€actual€misrepresentation€relied€upon€by€theÏjury€in€rendering€its€decision.€€The€verdict€form€asked€several€questions€of€theÏjurors.€€The€only€question€regarding€misrepresentations€was:€ð ðDid€either€of€theÐ H9˜4B Ðplaintiffs,€Wayne€Brayfield€or€Don€Chadwell,€make€a€willful,€false€statement€asÏto€a€material€matter€in€connection€with€the€claim€process€with€the€intent€to€deceiveÏthe€defendant,€Kentucky€National€Insurance€Company.ðð€€The€jury€answered€yes.€ÏThis€broad€finding€makes€it€difficult€to€review€the€decision€below.€€Nevertheless,Ïit€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€from€which€theÏjury€could€conclude€Appellants€intentionally€misrepresented€a€material€fact€in€theÏclaim€process.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓII.à @Ø àœ€€€€€Potential›€Misrepresentationsó óÐ pÀ  ÐÌÓ  Óà Ø àAppellants€have€listed€four€alleged€misrepresentations€urged€by€AppelleeÏin€closing€argument.€€Those€misrepresentations€involve:€1)€value€of€the€contentÏloss;€2)€value€of€the€property€loss;€3)€Appellantsðð€financial€condition;€and€4)Ïwhether€certain€saddles€were€in€the€building€at€the€time€of€the€fire.€€AppellantsÏargue€these€misrepresentations€were€immaterial€to€the€claim€process.ÌÌà Ø àAn€insurance€company€may€defend€a€suit€for€the€proceeds€of€a€fireÏinsurance€policy€by€proving€the€insured€committed€arson€or€made€an€intentionalÏmisrepresentation€of€a€material€fact€in€the€claim€process.€€òòò òSee€œInsurance›€Co.€v.Ð ]!­$ ÐScalesóóó ó,€101€Tenn.€628,€œ638,›€49€S.W.€743,€œ746›€(1899);€ò òòòWilder€v.€TennesseeÐ ø"H& ÐFarmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€722,€725„26€(Tenn.€œCt.€App.›€1995);€òòò òNix€v.Ð “$ã( ÐSentry€Ins.ó óóó,€666€S.W.2d€462,€463„65€(Tenn.€œCt.€App.›€1983).€€The€insuranceÐ .&~!* Ðcompany€must€establish€either€defense€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòò òSeeÐ É'#, ÐHendrix€v.€Insurance€Co.€of€N.€Am.ó óóó,€675€S.W.2d€476,€481€(Tenn.€œCt.€App.›€1984)Ð d)´$. Ð(cited€in€òòò òWilderó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€at€726).Ð ÿ*O&0 ÐÌò òÓ  Óà @Ø àA.à @0 àœ€€€€€Value›€of€the€Property€Lossó óÐ 2.‚)4 ÐÓ  ÓÌà Ø àAppellants€argue€any€misrepresentations€regarding€the€value€of€the€propertyÏwere€not€material€because€the€application€of€the€valued€policy€law€resulted€in€aÏconclusive€presumption€that€the€value€of€the€property€was€$250,000.€€While€it€isÏtrue€that€the€law€creates€a€rebuttable€presumption,€it€does€not€necessarily€followÏthat€the€value€of€the€property€lost€is€immaterial.€€The€valued€policy€law€provides:ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àEvery€agent,€within€ninety€(90)€days€after€making€or€writing€anyÐ W9§4B Ðcontract€of€fire€insurance€on€any€building€or€structure€in€this€state,Ïshall€cause€the€building€or€structure€to€be€personally€inspected;€€andÏno€company,€and€no€officer€or€agent€thereof,€and€no€insuranceÏbroker,€shall€knowingly€issue,€negotiate,€continue€or€renew€or€causeÏto€permit€to€be€issued,€negotiated,€continued€or€renewed€any€fireÏinsurance€policy€upon€property€or€interests€therein€within€the€stateÏof€an€amount€which,€with€any€existing€insurance€thereon,€exceedsÏthe€fair€value€of€the€property.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÓ€ÓÌÓ€€ÓœTenn.›€œCode›€œAnn.›€ðð€56„7„801€œ(1994).›ÌÓ€Óà8 Ø àIf€buildings€within€the€state€insured€against€loss€by€fire€are€totallyÏdestroyed€by€fire,€the€company€shall€not€be€liable€beyond€the€actualÏvalue€of€the€insured€property€at€the€time€of€the€loss€or€damage;€€andÏif€it€appears€that€the€insured€has€paid€premiums€on€an€amount€inÏexcess€of€the€actual€value,€the€insured€shall€be€reimbursed€theÏproportionate€excess€or€premiums€paid€on€the€difference€between€theÏamount€named€in€the€policy€and€the€actual€value,€with€interest€at€sixÏpercent€(6%)€per€annum€from€the€date€of€issue;€€and€the€excess€ofÏpremiums,€and€interest€thereon,€shall€be€allowed€the€insured€from€theÏtime€any€companies€carrying€the€insurance€at€the€time€of€the€lossÏhave€continuously€carried€the€insurance€on€the€destroyed€buildings,Ïwhether€under€policies€existing€at€the€time€of€the€loss€or€underÏprevious€policies€in€the€same€companies.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÓ€ÓÌÓ€€Óòòò òId.ó óóó€ðð€56„7„802.Ð ¨ø ÐÓ€Óà8 Ø àIf€the€agent€fails€to€place€a€reasonable€value€on€any€such€insuredÏproperty€within€the€ninety€(90)€days,€as€provided€in€ðð€56-7-801,€andÏwhich€is€agreed€to€by€the€insured,€and€a€loss€occurs,€in€that€event€theÏvalue€as€shown€by€the€policy€or€application€shall€be€conclusivelyÏpresumed€to€be€reasonable,€and€settlement€shall€be€made€on€thatÏbasis.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÓ€ÓÌÓ€€Óòòò òId.ó óóó€ðð€56„7„803.€€These€sections€are€remedial,€and€this€court€shall€construe€themÐ +&{!" Ðliberally€in€furtherance€of€their€purpose.€€òòò òPrice€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€614€S.W.2dÐ Æ'#$ Ð377,€381€œ(Tenn.€Ct.›€App.€1981).€€The€primary€purpose€of€these€sections€is€ð ðtoÏprotect€insureds€from€being€subjected€to€the€insurerððs€argument€that€the€buildingÏhad€been€over€insured€and€gives€the€insurer€an€incentive€to€inspect€risks€and€assistÏinsureds€in€establishing€proper€insurance€evaluations.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€The€valued€policy€lawÐ ).y), Ðapplies€only€in€situations€involving€a€total€loss.€€òòò òSee€Third€Natððl€Bank€v.Ð Ä/+. ÐAmerican€Equitable€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€27€Tenn.€App.€249,€271€&€275,€178€S.W.2d€915,Ð _1¯,0 Ð924€&€926€(1943).ÌÌà Ø àAppellee€does€not€insist€that€it€overinsured€the€Studio.€€Instead,€it€arguesÏthat€the€valued€policy€law€does€not€apply€because€the€loss€was€a€partial€loss€asÏopposed€to€a€total€loss€as€claimed€by€Appellants.€€In€other€words,€AppelleeÐ Z9ª4: Ðcontends€Appellants€intentionally€misrepresented€that€the€loss€was€total€in€orderÏto€recover€the€full€amount€of€the€policy.€€Appellants€counter€that€any€disagreementÏover€the€extent€of€the€loss€was€simply€a€difference€of€opinion,€not€an€intentionalÏmisrepresentation€of€a€material€fact.ÌÌà Ø àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€the€valued€policy€law€does€not€enter€intoÏthe€case€until€there€is€a€determination€of€the€extent€of€the€loss,€total€or€partial.€€TheÏvalued€policy€law€provides€an€answer€to€the€question€of€the€value€of€a€total€loss.€ÏIt€does€not€address€the€issue€of€whether€the€insured€misrepresented€the€extent€ofÏthe€loss,€and€it€can€not€be€used€by€the€insured€to€perpetuate€fraud.€€Moreover,€anÏinsurer€may€defend€an€action€by€claiming€the€insured€misrepresented€the€extentÏof€the€loss.€€The€extent€of€the€loss€is€a€material€fact€in€the€claim€process€becauseÏof€the€valued€policy€law.€€That€is,€the€extent€of€the€loss,€total€or€partial,€willÏdetermine€the€application€of€the€valued€policy€law€and,€therefore,€the€amount€ofÏthe€recovery.€€Thus,€the€jury€in€this€case€could€have€found€in€favor€of€Appellee€ifÏit€determined€Appellants€intentionally€misrepresented€that€the€loss€was€total.ÌÌÓ  Óà @Ø àò òB.à @0 àœ€€€€€Interest›€in€the€Property€and€ContentsÐ È" ÐÌÓ  Óà Ø àó óAppellee€alleges€Appellants€misrepresented€John€Sheltonððs€interest€in€theÐ ò"B& ÐStudio€and€the€Paris€bankððs€interest€in€the€equipment€in€the€proof€of€loss.€€SuchÏmisrepresentations€are€material€because€the€fact€misrepresented€could€affect€theÏextent€of€Appellantsðð€recovery€under€the€policy.ÌÌò òÓ  Óà @Ø àC.à @0 àœ€€€€€Evidence›€of€Appellantsðð€Financial€Conditionó óÐ ê*:&0 ÐÓ  ÓÌà Ø àAppellants€argue€that€any€misrepresentations€regarding€AppellantsððÏfinancial€condition,€their€relationship€with€John€Shelton€and€the€Bank€in€Paris,€andÏtheir€intentions€to€buy€the€property€or€rebuild€are€immaterial.€€Appellants€contendÏthese€facts€are€relevant€only€to€prove€motive€to€commit€arson.€€We€œcanñEñ€ñEñnot›€œagreeñFñ.ñFñ›œñGñÏwith€Appellants'€positionñGññHññGñ,ñGññHññGñ.ñGñ›ÌÌà Ø àAppellants€rely€on€òòò òNix€v.€Sentry€Ins.ó óóó,€666€S.W.2d€462€(Tenn.€œCt.€App.›Ð §7÷2@ Ð1983),€to€support€their€argument.€€In€òòò òNixó óóó,€the€insuredððs€house€burned€and€theÐ B9’4B Ðinsurer€refused€to€pay€the€claim.€€The€insurer€defended€against€the€insuredððs€actionÏby€alleging€arson€and€intentional€misrepresentation.€€The€appellate€court€affirmedÏthe€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€there€was€insufficient€evidence€to€sustain€a€findingÏof€arson.€€The€appellate€court€then€concluded€that€the€evidence€of€the€œinsured's›Ïfinancial€condition€was€material€to€the€issue€of€arson,€not€to€the€loss€claimed.€€òòò òNixó óóó,Ð  ` Ð666€S.W.2d€at€464.€€Thereafter,€the€court€addressed€any€possible€œmis„¼representations›€and€concluded€they€were€either€immaterial,€unintentional,€orÏunproven.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€465.€€The€court€then€reversed€the€trial€court's€decision€in€favorÐ Û+  Ðof€the€insured.ÌÌà Ø àAppellantsðð€reading€and€application€of€the€holding€in€òòò òNixó óóó€is€erroneous.€€ToÐ ¦ö Ðexplain,€the€decision€in€òòò òNixó óóó€did€not€involve€whether€a€particular€fact€was€materialÐ A‘ Ðto€the€claim€process.€€Instead,€the€holding€addressed€the€relevancy€of€evidence.€ÏThe€òòò òNixó óóó€court€determined€the€insuredððs€financial€condition€was€not€relevant€to€theÐ tÄ Ðissue€of€whether€the€insured€misrepresented€a€fact€material€to€the€claim€process.ÌÌà Ø àThe€òòò òNixó óóó€court€defined€the€term€ð ðfinancial€conditionðð€as€ð ð[w]hether€or€notÐ ?  ÐNix€was€liquid€or€solvent.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€œ464.›€€A€careful€reading€of€the€case€does€notÐ Ú*" Ðreveal€much€about€the€specific€evidence.€€It€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€thatÏevidence€of€the€solvency€of€an€insured€may€be€relevant€to€the€issue€of€whether€anÏinsured€misrepresented€a€fact€material€to€the€claim€process.€€In€addition,€otherÏfinancial€evidence€may€be€relevant€as€well.€€In€this€case,€for€example,€the€financialÏevidence€is€relevant€to€prove€Appellantsðð€intentions€when€representing€the€lossÏwas€a€total€loss€and€the€validity€of€Appellantsðð€representation€that€no€one€else€hadÏan€interest€in€the€property€or€contents.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓœIII.€€€€€›à @Ø àThe€Juryððs€Verdictó óÐ 5.…)4 ÐÓ  ÓÌà Ø àð ðFindings€of€fact€by€a€jury€in€civil€actions€shall€be€set€aside€only€if€there€isÏno€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict.ðð€€œTenn.›€R.€App.€œP.›€13(d).€€It€is€theÏopinion€of€this€court€that€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€this€jury€verdict.€ÏThe€jury€could€have€determined€based€on€the€evidence€that€AppellantsÏmisrepresented€the€extent€of€the€loss€and€their€interest€in€the€property€or€itsÏcontents.€€Whether€the€misrepresentations€relied€upon€by€this€court€are€the€sameÐ Z9ª4B Ðas€those€relied€upon€by€the€jury€is€something€we€will€never€know.€€Nevertheless,Ïwe€are€compelled€to€uphold€the€verdict€as€it€is€supported€by€the€law€and€evidence.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIV.à @Ø àœ€€€€€Jury›€Instructions,€Closing€Argument,€and€Voir€Direó óÐ x È ÐÓ  ÓÌà Ø àIt€is€the€opinion€this€court€that,€given€the€above€decision,€the€errors€assertedÏby€Appellants€involving€the€jury€instructions,€closing€argument,€and€voir€dire,€ifÏany,€were€harmless.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓV.à @Ø àœ€€€€€Admissibility›€of€Evidenceó óÐ U ÐÓ  ÓÌà Ø àAppellants€argue€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€allowed€Detective€Witherow,Ïa€criminal€investigator€for€the€Hendersonville€Police€Department,€to€testify€thatÏAppellants€were€uncooperative.€€They€contend€the€only€instance€of€non„¼cooperation€was€œAppellants'›€refusal€to€take€a€lie€detector€test,€evidence€of€whichÏis€inadmissible.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Appellants€assert€the€trial€court€should€not€have€allowedÐ ’â ÐDetective€Witherow€to€testify€Appellants€were€uncooperative€when€the€only€basisÏfor€that€testimony€was€inadmissable€evidence.€€Appellee€responds€by€citing€otherÏinstances€in€the€record€œin€which›€Appellants€were€uncooperative.ÌÌà Ø àA€review€of€Detective€Witherow's€testimony€reveals€that€he€related€twoÏ"instances"€of€noncooperation.€€First,€he€described€his€attempts€to€obtainÏinformation€from€Mr.€Brayfield€as€"pulling€teeth".€€Second,€he€testified€to€hisÏbelief€that€Appellants€had€deliberately€hidden€facts.€€Hence,€Detective€WitherowÏdid€not€really€relate€any€instances€of€the€Appellants€being€œ"uncooperative,"›Ïinstead,€he€gave€his€opinion€or€characterized€their€conduct.ÌÌœñAñà Ø àñAññBñà8 Ø àà 0 àñBñRule›€701,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€œis€entitledñ?ñ€ñ?ññ@ñ›Ìñ@ññAñ›ñAñÓ€Óñ@ñà8 è àñ@ññAñ›ñAñ"Opinion›€œTestimony›€œby›ÏœLay›€œWitnesses"€and€provides€as€follows:Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌÓ'€ÐƒX" ˆ—X°œX'Óà8 Ø àà " à(a)€€Generally.€€If€a€witness€is€not€testifying€as€an€expert,€theÏwitness's€testimony€in€the€form€of€opinions€or€inferences€is€limitedÏto€those€opinions€or€inferences€which€areÐ Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌà8 Ø àà " à(1)€€rationally€based€on€the€perception€of€the€witness€andÐ"7r2=Ø ü!Ø ü! Їà8 Ø àà " à(2)€€helpful€to€a€clear€understanding€of€the€witness's€testimony€orÏthe€determination€of€a€fact€in€issue.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌà8 Ø àà " à(b)€€Value.€€A€witness€may€testify€to€the€value€of€the€witness'sÏown€property€or€services.Ð Ø ü!Ø ü! ÐÌÓ€ÓDetective€Witherow's€testimony€in€regard€to€cooperation€is€lay€testimony.€€Hence,Ïhe€must€enumerate€facts,€leaving€it€to€the€jurors€to€draw€inferences,€unless€heÏcannot€readily,€accurately€and€adequately€testify€without€giving€an€opinion.€€Here,Ïhe€could€have€simply€told€what€Appellants€did€or€did€not€do€without€theÏcharacterizations€of€their€conduct.€€We€believe€the€trial€court€should€haveÏexcluded€this€testimony€under€Rule€701.€€There€is,€however,€no€showing€that€thisÏerror€affected€the€jury€verdict€and€it€is,€therefore,€harmless.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï36(b);€ò òòòPettus€v.€Hurstó óóó,€882€S.W.2d€783,€787€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€Ð 8ˆ Ðà Ø à›Ìò òÓ  ÓœV.€€€€€›à @Ø àConclusionó óÐ k» ÐÌñDñÓ  ÓñDñà Ø àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€there€is€material€evidence€in€the€recordÏfrom€which€the€jury€could€determine€Appellants€misrepresented€either€the€extentÏof€the€damage€or€their€interest€in€the€property€or€its€contents.€€Moreover,€theseÏfacts€were€material€to€the€claim€process.€€It€is€also€our€opinion€that€any€errors€inÏthe€jury€instruction,€closing€argument,€and€voir€dire€were€harmless€given€ourÏconclusion€that€the€evidence€supports€the€juryððs€verdict.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€did€Ïerr€in€allowing€Detective€Witherow€to€testify€as€he€did,€but€such€errorÏœwasñCñÏñCñharmless›€here.ÌÌà Ø àTherefore,€it€follows€that€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€andÏremanded€for€any€further€necessary€proceedings.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxedÏagainst€plaintiffs/appellants,€Wayne€Brayfield€and€Don€Chadwell€individually€andÏd/b/a€Pleasantville€Studio€Two.̛̜ÌÓ€Óà Ø àà " àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à_____________________________Ìà Ø àà " àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€JUDGEÌÌÌ̜РÐ9 5? ЇÌÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€Ì