ÿWPC  jçmõöðYîÆ8õXbˆMø†æ]î%âÑ}¨%&•úYìÆS'¶¡e][—­§ä×àS¡ZûuVXŸ+¶l)o±ós‡|Î*ŠvÃ1ìZ³¸ÜL “·ºa5¡+Žy×¥“BÕa¾|ƒÌ†Ýä¼|óÌ¿PyL`0Y£¦áôÓ‘ ¿jjkÅë±5˺ Æi3>]ÃïXÈ· ü ÀÚgÀfJƒÍTÝðcÑKk×m•”–>°±ÁÀ6p=oÎ ™ÀMçä” Z¯%¯¹y=¸¦âì¾á l³*LŸ¸š èj¾!\ ZÎIXÁ:?”H‹ l~˜_š|ù‘ ´vÊž¦Y÷6ªÉXv Lª˜c*¿¾™Ò,ÊéÆ^–Yl9ñ-Ô+Š=Œá¥GÊú7üѳ_¥Á~õ,•iôb·2IÿÙ,3¢&3ÓŒ¤Jæ`d´Ä™¼5‰SU-æ¾øîAQ(5QÎÙ6–¶þw¦NVW?ú @mG~µŽ:Ãq%/Љ«WAÏvã¶ó– Ê\ñYäXîS%Äèà+Ähƒm!Nß‚:Ödö ‘LæsÔöÇy⤱s#|Á,ýb#É\ %% ^ + 0ˆ7 UN¿ w 4 z% ÒŸ q € m‚ ™ Æ¡ Æg Æ-Æó 1u¹N. 720 0cbEÅ*Ç 0Dñ`555555555555555555555b•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0ë Bˆˆ 0¤¥ D3I D-| 0K©© ASôÆG 0¤  0D± A«õ˜\\IB01S01\CLERK1NASÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»‹y/Ï (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularqdj/B011C8 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 53#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à Ý ƒRã($ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôð=ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€A€trial€court€might€well€require€the€insurer€to€justify€the€expansive€scope€of€the€June€27,€2000€letter€relatingÐ ° Ðto€production€of€documents.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó VÝ ƒRã($ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôð=ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€It€should€be€noted€that€Tennessee€courts€have€twice€declined€to€extend€the€òòAlcazaróó€rational.€€òòSee€Griffin€v.Ð ° ÐShelter€Mut.€Ins.€Co.óó,€18€S.W.3d€195€(Tenn.2000)€(dealing€with€a€statute);€òòPope€v.€Ô_ÔLentyÔ_Ô€&€Health,€Ô_ÔPLLCÔ_Ôóó,€87€S.W.3dÐ tÄ Ð89€(Ô_ÔTenn.Ct.AppÔ_Ô.2002)€(distinguishing€between€occurrence€policies€and€claims„made€policies).- ù-(|G2ã($¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€O]»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôð=ò»»Ô d(|3ÉX$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€O]»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ÉX$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€O]»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€O]»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼O]»»»ÔÑ8€1XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îXœî»¼O]ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼O]»îîXœ #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  Ó€September€3,€2003€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X1X»¼O]ÔÌò òÔ#†¼O]»XX1÷#ÔBRICK€CHURCH€TRANSMISSION,€INC.òòóó€v.€Ð úJ ÐSOUTHERN€PILOT€INSURANCE€CO.Ô‡X1X»¼O]Ôó óÐ  ^ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€02„1734„II,€Carol€L.€McCoy,€Chancellor€Ð ú J ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½` AßÐ ¾  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2002„02778„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€November€25,€Ô_Ô2003Ô_ԀР¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<` AßÐ ‘á  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓInsured,€Plaintiff/Appellant,€filed€suit€under€a€policy€of€commercial€insurance€alleging€a€loss€by€theftÐ ŒÜ Ðthat€was€covered€by€the€policy.€€Defendant/Appellee€filed€a€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€ProcedureÐ xÈ Ð12.02(6)€Motion€to€Dismiss€based€upon€expiration€of€the€two€year€period€in€which€suit€could€beÐ d´ Ðbrought€under€the€terms€of€the€policy.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€motion€to€dismiss,€and€we€affirmÐ P  Ðthe€action€of€the€chancellor.Ð <Œ ÐÓßÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Ð d ÐAffirmed€and€Remandedó óÐ P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼O]»àX1—#ÔÔ‡X1X.¼O]ÔWilliam€B.€Cain,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòóóPòòATRICIAóó€J.€CòòOTTRELLóó,€J.€and€òòóó,Ð Ø( ÐJòòAMESóó€L.€Ô_ÔWòòEATHERFORDÔ_Ôóó,€SòòRóó.€J.,joined.Ð Ä ÐÌKeith€Jordan€and€Theodora€Ô_ÔPappasÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Brick€ChurchÐ œì ÐTransmission,€Inc.Ð ˆØ ÐÌAlan€Mark€Ô_ÔSowellÔ_Ô€and€M.€Ô_ÔKristenÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔSelphÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Southern€PilotÐ `!°  ÐInsurance€Co.Ð L"œ! ÐÓ˜ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼O]»XX1Ç#ÔÔ‡X1X»¼O]ÔÐ $$t# ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼O]»XX1Ë #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X1X»¼O]Ôà  àPlaintiff,€Brick€Church€Transmission,€Inc.,€operated€a€transmission€repair€business€at€1206AÐ ü%L!% ÐBrick€Church€Pike€in€Nashville,€Tennessee.€€Defendant,€Southern€Pilot€Insurance€Company,€aÐ è&8"& Ðsubsidiary€of€Southern€Guaranty€Insurance€Company,€issued€its€policy€number€00CPP47098€to€BrickÐ Ô'$#' ÐChurch€Transmission,€Inc.,€same€being€a€commercial€property€policy€insuring€the€business€againstÐ À($( Ðcertain€losses.€€During€the€evening€hours€of€December€12,€1999,€Plaintiff€alleged€that€itððs€businessÐ ¬)ü$) Ðestablishment€at€1206A€Brick€Church€Pike€was€burglarized€causing€a€theft€loss€that€was€insuredÐ ˜*è%* Ðunder€the€policy.Ð „+Ô&+ Ðâ âÐ p,À',ýY ÐÔ_Ôà  àPlaintiff€filed€timely€notice€of€its€loss€with€Defendant€and,€on€March€20,€2000,€received€aÐ ° Ðâ âletter€from€Defendant€advising:Ð œì ÐÌà8  àThis€is€to€advise€you€that€the€circumstances€of€this€loss€are€still€under€activeÐ tÄ Ðinvestigation.Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àWe€shall€continue€to€make€every€effort€to€conclude€our€investigation€and€to€take€finalÐ 8 ˆ Ðaction€on€your€claim€as€soon€as€possible.Ð$ tÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€purpose€of€this€letter€is€to€advise€you€that€we€are€undertaking€the€continuedÐ ü L  Ðinvestigation€with€a€full€and€complete€reservation€of€all€rights€afforded€us€under€theÐ è 8  Ðpolicy€of€insurance€issued€to€Brick€Church€Transmission€by€this€company.ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àOn€April€4,€2000,€Plaintiff,€acting€through€its€principle€owner,€Hozell€Anderson,€filed€itsÐ ¬ü  Ðsworn€proof€of€loss€with€Defendant.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àOn€June€27,€2000,€Anderson€received€a€letter€from€counsel€for€Defendant€requesting€that€heÐ pÀ Ðsubmit€to€an€oral€examination€pursuant€to€terms€of€the€policy€and€requesting€that€he€bring€with€himÐ \¬ Ðfor€examination€the€following€documents:Ð H˜ ÐÌà8  à1.à0` Ð Ð àDetailed€personal€and€business€federal€income€tax€returns€from€1991€throughÐ  p Ð1999.Ð \` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à2.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€all€year€end€financial€statements€including,€but€not€limited€to,€theÐ ä4 Ðaccountantððs/CPAððs€report,€balance€sheets,€income€statements,€cash€flowÐ Ð  Ðstatements,€supplemental€information€and€schedules,€and€footnotes€fromÐ ¼  Ð1991€through€1999.Шø` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à3.à0` Ð Ð àMonthly€income€statements€from€1991€through€present.ЀÐ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à4.à0` Ð Ð àMonthly€and€quarterly€balance€sheets€from€1991€through€present.ÐX ¨` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à5.à0` Ð Ð àCopy€of€detailed€depreciation/fixed€asset€schedules€from€1991€throughÐ 0"€  Ðpresent.Ð#l!` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à6.à0` Ð Ð àPhysical€inventories€from€1991€through€present.Ðô$D #` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à7.à0` Ð Ð àDetailed€information€on€any€loans€or€notes€payable€from€1991€throughÐ Ì&"% Ðpresent€including:и'#&` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àà ¸ à„à0  àamount€borrowedà0(#(#àà0p(#(#à„à0Èp(#p(#àpayment€historyÐ)à$(È(#È(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ à„à0  àmonthly€paymentà0(#(#àà0p(#(#à„à0Èp(#p(#àsecurity€agreementÐ|*Ì%)È(#È(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ à„à0  àmaturity€dateà0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#à„à0Èp(#p(#àloan€applicationÐh+¸&*È(#È(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ à„à0  àinterest€rateà0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#à„à0Èp(#p(#àcreditorаÈ(#È(# ÐÌà8  à8.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€bank€statements€and€canceled€checks€for€all€accounts€from€1991Ð ˆØ Ðthrough€present.ÐtÄ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à9.à0` Ð Ð àA€copy€of€the€cash€receipt€journal,€sales€journal,€accounts€receivable€journalÐ L œ Ðand/or€any€books€and€records€in€which€receipts€and/or€sales€are€recorded€fromÐ 8 ˆ Ð1991€through€present.à0h` Ð ` Ð àÐ$ thÐ hÐ  ÐÌà  à10.à0 ` àSales€invoices€from€1991€through€present.Ðü L ` (#` (# ÐÌà8  à11.à0` Ð Ð àA€copy€of€the€cash€disbursement€journal,€accounts€payable€journal€and/or€anyÐ Ô$  Ðbooks€and€records€in€which€purchases€and/or€expenses€are€recorded€fromÐ À  Ð1991€through€present.Ьü ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à12.à0` Ð Ð àPurchase€and€subcontractor€invoices€for€1991€through€present.Ð„Ô ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à13.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€any€books,€ledgers,€journals€and/or€any€other€records€whereÐ \¬ Ðinventory€detail€and/or€balances€are€recorded€from€1991€through€present.ÐH˜` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à14.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€the€general€ledger€and/or€any€other€summary€journals/ledgers€fromÐ  p Ð1991€through€present.Ð \` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à15.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€the€working€trial€balances€for€the€years€ending€from€1991€throughÐ ä4 Ðpresent.à  àÐÐ ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à16.à0` Ð Ð àA€copy€of€year€end€adjusting€entries€from€1991€through€present.Шø` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà  à17.à0 ` àYear€end€accruals€for€the€years€ended€from€1991€through€present.ЀÐ` (#` (# ÐÌà  à18.à0 ` àPayroll€journal€from€1991€through€present.ÐX ¨` (#` (# ÐÌà  à19.à0 ` àQuarterly€payroll€tax€returns€„€form€941€„€from€1991€through€current.Ð0"€ ` (#` (# ÐÌà  à20.à0 ` àState€withholding€and€unemployment€returns€from€1991€through€present.Ð$X"` (#` (# ÐÌà  à21.à0 ` àMonthly€sales€tax€returns€since€the€inception€of€the€business.Ðà%0!$` (#` (# ÐÌà8  à22.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€all€documentation€supporting€cash€paid€outs€from€1991€throughÐ ¸'#& Ðpresent.Ф(ô#'` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  à23.à0` Ð Ð àA€copy€of€all€equipment€and€building€leases.Ð|*Ì%)` Ð ` Ð  ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  à24.à0 ` àList€of€all€suppliers€and€the€credit€terms.а` (#` (# ÐÌà8  à25.à0` Ð Ð àCopies€of€all€the€documents€in€your€accountantððs/CPAððs€file€and/or€hisÐ ˆØ Ðpossession€from€1991€through€present.ÐtÄ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà  àOn€June€11,€2002,€Plaintiff€filed€suit€to€recover€under€the€policy.€€Defendant€filed€itsÐ L œ ÐTennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€12.02(6)€Motion€to€Dismiss€on€August€7,€2002,€exhibiting€to€the€Ð 8 ˆ ÐMotion€a€certified€copy€of€policy€number€00CPP47098€and€relying€upon€the€provision€of€the€policyÐ $ t Ðproviding:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àò òB.ó óà0` Ð Ð àò òLEGAL€ACTION€AGAINST€USó óÐè 8 ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà  àà8 ` àNo€one€may€bring€a€legal€action€against€us€under€this€Coverage€PartÐ À  Ðunless:Ьü ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà ` à1.à0¸ Ð Ð àThere€has€been€full€compliance€with€all€the€terms€of€the€CoverageÐ „Ô  ÐPart;€andÐpÀ¸ Ð ¸ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à2.à0¸ Ð Ð àThe€action€is€brought€within€2€years€after€you€first€have€knowledgeÐ H˜ Ðof€the€ð ðloss.ððÐ4„¸ Ð ¸ Ð  ÐÌà  àOn€September€30,€2002,€Plaintiff€filed€its€Response€to€Defendantððs€Motion€to€Dismiss,€filingÐ  \ Ðtherewith€the€Affidavit€of€Hozell€Anderson,€providing:Ð øH ÐÌà8  àà ` à1.à ¸ àMy€name€is€Hozell€Anderson,€and€I€am€the€principal€owner€andÐ Ð  Ðoperator€of€a€business€known€as€Brick€Church€Transmission,€Inc.м Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à2.à ¸ àOn€December€12,€1999,€that€business€was€broken€into,€and€certainÐ ¨ø Ðtrade€tools€were€taken€from€the€premises.ДäÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à3.à ¸ àI€reported€the€loss€to€the€Metropolitan€Police€Department€and€toÐ €Ð Ðrepresentatives€of€Southern€Guaranty€Insurance€Company,€with€whom€I€had€securedÐ l¼ Ðtheft€loss€insurance.ÐX ¨Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à4.à ¸ àAfter€initial€discussions€with€an€adjustor,€Bonnie€Yow,€I€submittedÐ D!” Ða€Proof€of€Loss€on€April€4,€2000.€€On€June€27,€2000,€I€was€mailed€a€letter€from€Mr.Ð 0"€  ÐAlan€Sowell,€an€attorney€in€Nashville,€which€requested€the€submission€to€him€ofÐ #l! Ðcomprehensive€business€records,€the€bulk€of€which€were€not€immediately€availableÐ $X" Ðto€me.à ` àà ¸ àÐô$D #Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à5.à ¸ àDespite€my€best€efforts,€I€had€not€been€able€to€secure€all€theÐ à%0!$ Ðinformation€required,€and€in€the€summer€of€2001,€I€first€sought€legal€representationÐ Ì&"% Ðon€the€claim.и'#&Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à6.à ¸ àMy€counsel€was€in€the€process€of€compiling€the€requested€documentsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðwhen€the€second€anniversary€of€the€break„in€and€theft€loss€occurred.Ð)à$(Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à7.à ¸ àDuring€this€entire€period,€I€made€good€faith€endeavors€to€cooperateÐ |*Ì%) Ðwith€Southern€Guaranty€Insurance€Company€in€meeting€its€demands.Ðh+¸&*Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` à8.à0 ¸ àFurther€affiant€sayeth€not.а¸ (#¸ (# ÐÌà  àThe€case€was€heard€on€October€4,€2002€on€Defendantððs€Motion€to€Dismiss€and€PlaintiffððsÐ ˆØ ÐResponse€thereto€resulting€in€an€Order€of€October€14,€2002,€providing:Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àà ` àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€on€the€4th€day€of€October,€2002,€before€theÐ L œ ÐHonorable€Carol€McCoy,€Chancellor€for€Part€II€of€the€Chancery€Court€for€DavidsonÐ 8 ˆ ÐCounty,€Tennessee,€upon€the€Defendantððs€Motion€to€Dismiss.€€After€statement€ofÐ $ t Ðcounsel€and,€in€consideration€of€the€entire€record,€the€Court€was€of€the€opinion€thatÐ  ` Ðthe€Plaintiff€failed€to€file€suit€against€the€Defendant€within€two€(2)€years€of€the€dateÐ ü L  Ðof€the€loss€as€required€by€the€policy,€and€therefore,€granted€the€Defendantððs€MotionÐ è 8  Ðto€Dismiss.ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àIT€IS€THEREFORE,€ORDERED,€ADJUDGED€AND€DECREED€that€thisÐ À  Ðcause€is€hereby€dismissed.€€The€Court€Costs€are€taxed€against€the€Plaintiff€for€whichÐ ¬ü  Ðlet€execution€issue€if€necessary.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€case€is€before€this€Court€on€the€technical€record€alone,€òòsee€óóTennessee€Rule€of€AppellateÐ pÀ ÐProcedure€24(a),€there€being€no€stenographic€record€and€no€statement€of€the€evidence€pursuant€toÐ \¬ ÐAppellate€Rule€24(c).€€Nothing€else€appears€in€the€technical€record€save€the€documents€discussedÐ H˜ Ðabove.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àA€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss€is€not€inhibited€in€the€same€measure€as€a€demurrer€atÐ  \ Ðcommon€law.€€A€demurrer€could€not€ð ðspeak,ðð€meaning€that€it€could€not€introduce€into€the€record€aÐ øH Ðnew€fact€not€disclosed€by€the€face€of€the€complaint.€€òòGore€v.€Tenn.€Depððt.€of€Corr.óó,€No.€M2002„Ð ä4 Ð02640„COA„R3„CV,€2003€WL€22289944€(Tenn.Ct.App.Oct.€6,€2003).€€A€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€canÐ Ð  Ðð ðspeak,ðð€but€when€it€does€so,€it€is€converted€into€a€Rule€56€motion€for€summary€judgment€by€theÐ ¼  Ðexpress€terms€of€Rule€12.02,€which€provides:Ð ¨ø ÐÌà8  àIf,€on€a€motion€asserting€the€defense€numbered€(6)€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€aÐ €Ð Ðclaim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted,€matters€outside€the€pleading€are€presentedÐ l¼ Ðto€and€not€excluded€by€the€court,€the€motion€shall€be€treated€as€one€for€summaryÐ X ¨ Ðjudgment€and€disposed€of€as€provided€in€Rule€56,€and€all€parties€shall€be€givenÐ D!” Ðreasonable€opportunity€to€present€all€material€made€pertinent€to€such€a€motion€byÐ 0"€  ÐRule€56.Ð#l!Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€policy€of€insurance,€not€having€been€exhibited€to€the€Complaint€itself,€did€not€becomeÐ ô$D # Ða€part€of€the€Complaint€pursuant€to€Rule€10.03.€€The€Rule€12.02(6)€Motion€cannot€ð ðspeakðð€€byÐ à%0!$ Ðexhibiting€the€policy€of€insurance€that€is€extraneous€to€the€Complaint€without€effecting€a€conversionÐ Ì&"% Ðof€the€Rule€12.02(6)€Motion€into€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€wherein€all€parties€ð ðshall€be€givenÐ ¸'#& Ðreasonable€opportunity€to€present€all€material€made€pertinent€to€such€a€motion€by€Rule€56.ðð€€Thus,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðthe€door€is€opened€for€consideration€of€the€Anderson€Affidavit€in€response€to€what€is€nowÐ )à$( ÐDefendantððs€Rule€56€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àWhile€the€controlling€question€on€appeal€is€still€a€question€of€law,€it€is€now€a€Rule€56Ð ° Ðquestion€rather€than€a€Rule€12.02(6)€question.€€The€Rule€12.02(6)€question€is€whether€or€not€theÐ œì Ðcomplaint,€without€any€consideration€of€extraneous€materials,€fails€to€ð ðstate€a€claim€upon€whichÐ ˆØ Ðrelief€can€be€granted.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6);€òòsee€also€League€Cent.€Credit€Union€v.€Motternóó,Ð tÄ Ð660€S.W.2d€787€(Tenn.Ct.App.1983).€€A€Rule€56€motion,€however,€addresses€not€the€allegations€ofÐ `° Ðthe€complaint,€but€the€merits€of€the€litigation.€€òòFowler€v.€Happy€Goodman€Familyóó,€575€S.W.2d€496,Ð L œ Ð498€(Tenn.1978).€€The€question€here€is€not€whether€the€allegations€of€the€complaint€are€sufficientÐ 8 ˆ Ðto€state€a€cause€of€action€but€ð ðwhat€material€facts€are€actually€and€in€good€faith€controverted.ðð€€Tenn.Ð $ t ÐR.€Civ.€P.€56.05.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àSince€the€policy€of€insurance€in€issue€first€appeared€in€the€case€as€an€exhibit€to€the€MotionÐ è 8  Ðto€Dismiss€filed€August€7,€2002,€the€provisions€of€Rule€12.02€converted€the€Motion€at€that€time€toÐ Ô$  Ða€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment€under€Rule€56.€€The€nonmoving€party€is,€thus,€entitled€to€theÐ À  Ðbenefit€of€ð ðreasonable€opportunity€to€present€all€material€made€pertinent€to€such€a€motion€by€RuleÐ ¬ü  Ð56.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02.€€€The€hearing€on€the€Motion€was€timely€held,€since€more€than€thirtyÐ ˜è  Ðdays€had€elapsed€between€the€August€7,€2002€filing€of€the€Motion€to€Dismiss€and€the€October€4,Ð „Ô  Ð2002€hearing€thereon.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€The€nonmoving€party€is,€further,€entitled€to€submitÐ pÀ Ðaffidavits€in€opposition€to€the€Motion€and€to€make€further€discovery€if€such€is€necessary.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð \¬ ÐR.€Civ.€P.€56.06;€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€215€(Tenn.1993).€€In€this€case,€there€is€no€statementÐ H˜ Ðof€undisputed€facts€filed€pursuant€to€Rule€56.03.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThe€failure€to€comply€with€the€specifics€of€Rule€56€are€rendered€harmless€if€the€record€beforeÐ  \ Ðthe€court€clearly€shows€that€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€remedy€a€defect€fatal€to€his€cause€of€action.€Ð øH ÐòòCraven€v.€Lawsonóó,€534€S.W.2d€653€(Tenn.1976).€€In€this€case,€the€nonmoving€party€did€not€seek€toÐ ä4 Ðtake€additional€discovery€after€filing€the€September€30,€2002€Affidavit€of€Hozell€Anderson,€and€thisÐ Ð  ÐAffidavit€itself€is€fatal€to€Plaintiffððs€case€under€òòCertain€Underwriterððs€at€Lloydððs€of€London€v.Ð ¼  ÐTranscarriers,€Inc.óó,€107€S.W.3d€496€(Tenn.Ct.App.2002),€unless€Plaintiff€can€find€some€way€aroundÐ ¨ø Ðthat€case.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àTennessee€has€long€held€that€an€insurance€policy€provision€establishing€an€agreed€limitationsÐ l¼ Ðperiod€within€which€suit€may€be€filed€against€the€company€is€valid€and€enforceable.€€òòGuthrie€v.Ð X ¨ ÐConn.€Indem.€Assððnóó,€49€S.W.€829,€830€(Tenn.€1898);€òòHill€v.€Home€Ins.€Co.óó,€125€S.W.2d€189,€192Ð D!” Ð(Tenn.Ct.App.1938).€€By€way€of€modification€to€a€policy€provision€that€provides€for€the€limitationÐ 0"€  Ðto€begin€with€the€actual€loss,€the€supreme€court€has€held€that€where€such€policy€also€contains€aÐ #l! Ðprovision€for€a€settlement€period€after€the€loss€during€which€the€insured€is€prohibited€from€bringingÐ $X" Ðsuit€under€the€policy,€the€commencement€of€the€limitation€period€is€extended€until€the€expiration€ofÐ ô$D # Ðthe€settlement€immunity€period.€€òòBoston€Marine€Ins.€Co.€v.€Scalesóó,€49€S.W.€743,€747€(Tenn.1898).€Ð à%0!$ ÐIf€the€insurance€company€affirmatively€denies€the€insuredððs€claim€before€the€expiration€of€theÐ Ì&"% Ðsettlement€of€loss€immunity€period,€the€contractual€limitation€of€actions€provision€commences€to€runÐ ¸'#& Ðupon€the€date€of€such€denial.€€òòSee€Certain€Underwriterððsóó,€107€S.W.3d€at€502.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àThe€factual€situation€in€this€case€closely€parallels€òòCertain€Underwriterððsóó.€€In€that€case,€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðinsured€suffered€two€losses€on€May€3,€1998€and€June€1,€1998,€respectively.€€Timely€proof€of€loss€wasÐ h+¸&* Ðfiled,€but€the€claim€was€neither€accepted€nor€denied€during€the€twelve€month€contractual€limitationÐ ° Ðperiod.€€In€November€of€1999,€òòCertain€Underwriterððsóó€filed€a€declaratory€judgment€action€seekingÐ œì Ða€declaration€of€whether€or€not€it€was€required€to€provide€coverage€for€the€claims.€€In€June€of€2000,Ð ˆØ ÐòòTranscarriersóó€filed€its€counter„complaint€alleging€breach€of€contract€and€seeking€recovery.€€ThisÐ tÄ Ðcounter„complaint€was€met€by€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€by€the€insurer€asserting€that€the€suitÐ `° Ðwas€time€barred€under€the€twelve€months€limitation€period.€€The€ð ðsettlement€of€lossðð€provision€ofÐ L œ Ðthe€òòCertain€Underwriterððsóó€policy€provided:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  à17.€€SETTLEMENT€OF€LOSS.€€All€adjusted€claims€shall€be€paid€or€made€good€toÐ  ` Ðthe€Insured€within€sixty€(60)€days€after€presentation€and€acceptance€of€satisfactoryÐ ü L  Ðproof€of€interest€and€loss€at€the€office€of€the€Company.€€No€loss€shall€be€paid€or€madeÐ è 8  Ðgood€if€the€Insured€has€collected€the€same€from€others.ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐòòÌCertain€Underwriterððsóó,€107€S.W.3d€at€498.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÌà  àUnder€this€ð ðsettlement€of€lossðð€provision,€òòCertain€Underwritersóó€had€a€period€of€sixty€daysÐ pÀ Ðfrom€and€after€the€filing€of€the€proof€of€loss€within€which€either€to€pay€or€deny€the€claim.€€If€it€deniedÐ \¬ Ðthe€claim,€the€limitations€period€of€the€policy€would€begin€to€run€upon€denial.€€As€in€the€case€at€bar,Ð H˜ Ðhowever,€the€insurance€company€neither€paid€nor€denied€responsibility€for€the€loss.€€The€court€heldÐ 4„ Ðthat€the€limitations€period€in€the€policy€commenced€to€run€at€the€end€of€the€sixty€day€settlement€ofÐ  p Ðloss€period.Ð  \ ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€holding€that€a€cause€of€action€accrues€upon€denial,€the€courts€did€not€alterÐ ä4 Ðthe€contractual€limitations€period€or€rewrite€the€contract€so€that€denial€is€requiredÐ Ð  Ðbefore€an€insured€may€bring€an€action€against€the€insurer.€€To€require€denial€of€aÐ ¼  Ðclaim€before€a€cause€[of]€action€could€accrue€would€permit€the€insurer€to€merely€sitÐ ¨ø Ðon€a€claim€and€do€nothing.€€Rather,€such€cases€have€recognized€that€it€is€inequitableÐ ”ä Ðfor€the€insurer€to€effectively€shorten€the€period€in€which€a€cause€of€action€could€beÐ €Ð Ðmaintained€by€granting€itself€a€period€in€which€it€is€immune€from€suit€while€theÐ l¼ Ðlimitations€period€is€slipping€away.€€òòBoston€Marineóó,€49€S.W.€at€747.€€The€immunityÐ X ¨ Ðperiod€therefore€postpones€the€accrual€of€the€insuredððs€action.€€òòHillóó,€125€S.W.2d€atÐ D!” Ð192.€€€Once€the€action€has€accrued,€the€limitations€period€begins€to€run.€€If€an€insurerÐ 0"€  Ðneither€pays€nor€denies€a€claim€brought€by€its€insured,€a€suit€against€the€insurer€mayÐ #l! Ðbe€sustained€upon€expiration€of€the€settlement€of€loss/immunity€period.€€òòIdóó.€Ð $X" ÐAccordingly,€the€contractual€statute€of€limitations€begins€to€run€upon€denial€ofÐ ô$D # Ðliability€or€upon€expiration€of€the€immunity€period,€whichever€comes€first.à @H àÐà%0!$Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` à.€.€.€.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€contractual€limitations€period€in€a€contract€of€insurance€begins€to€runÐ )à$( Ðwhen€the€insuredððs€cause€of€action€accrues.€€Notwithstanding€language€in€the€policyÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€the€cause€of€action€must€be€brought€within€so€many€months€of€occurrence€of€theÐ h+¸&* Ðloss,€a€settlement€of€loss€period€which€gives€the€insurance€carrier€so€many€days€inÐ ° Ðwhich€to€settle€the€claim,€thereby€rendering€the€insurer€immune€from€suit,€postponesÐ œì Ðaccrual€of€the€insuredððs€action€until€the€expiration€of€the€settlement€of€loss€period.€Ð ˆØ ÐDenial€of€the€claim€by€the€insurer€results€in€a€waiver€of€the€settlement€of€loss€period,Ð tÄ Ðand€thus€the€insuredððs€cause€of€action€accrues€upon€denial.€€When€the€insurer€neitherÐ `° Ðpays€nor€denies€a€claim€within€the€settlement€of€loss€period,€it€is€no€longer€immuneÐ L œ Ðfrom€suit€and€the€insuredððs€cause€of€action€accrues.€€Thus€the€limitations€period€isÐ 8 ˆ Ðtriggered€either€by€denial€of€the€claim€by€the€insurer€or€by€expiration€of€the€settlementÐ $ t Ðof€loss€period,€whichever€comes€first.Ð `Ð Ð  ÐòòÌCertain€Underwriterððsóó,€107€S.W.3d€at€499„500,€502.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€corresponding€provision€relative€to€ð ðloss€paymentðð€in€the€Southern€Pilot€Policy€provides:€Ð À  Ðð ðWe€will€give€notice€of€our€intentions€within€30€days€after€we€receive€the€sworn€proof€of€loss.ðð€€TheÐ ¬ü  Ðsworn€proof€of€loss€was€filed€on€April€4,€2000,€and,€as€in€òòCertain€Underwriterððsóó,€Southern€PilotÐ ˜è  Ðneither€paid€the€loss€nor€denied€liability€under€the€policy€within€the€thirty€day€ð ðloss€paymentðð€period.€Ð „Ô  ÐThe€policy€limitation€period€commenced€to€run€on€May€4,€2000€and€had€expired€prior€to€the€filingÐ pÀ Ðof€the€suit€on€June€11,€2002.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àPlaintiff€seeks€to€escape€the€effect€of€òòCertain€Underwritersóó€by€expanding€the€scope€ofÐ 4„ ÐòòAlcazar€v.€Hayesóó,€982€S.W.2d€845€(Tenn.1998)€(dealing€with€insuredððs€failure€to€comply€with€theÐ  p Ðnotice€provisions€of€a€U.€M.€policy)€to€make€that€case€apply€to€the€limitation€of€action€provisions€ofÐ  \ Ðthis€policy.€€òòAlcazaróó€was€a€suit€by€a€passenger€riding€in€the€trunk€of€an€automobile€for€injuriesÐ øH Ðsustained€in€an€accident€and€a€claim€under€the€provisions€of€an€uninsured€motorist€section€of€a€policyÐ ä4 Ðof€insurance.€€In€that€case,€notice€of€the€accident€was€not€provided€to€the€insurance€company€untilÐ Ð  Ðapproximately€one€year€after€the€accident.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àPrior€to€òòAlcazaróó,€Tennessee€had€consistently€followed€the€traditional€common€law€approachÐ ”ä Ðthat€notice€was€a€condition€precedent€to€recovery€under€the€policy€and€that€no€showing€of€prejudiceÐ €Ð Ðwas€necessary.€€Quoting€from€òòAppleman€on€Insuranceóó,€ðð€4.30€(2nd€Ed.1996),€the€supreme€courtÐ l¼ Ðstated€the€rationale€for€such€rule€as€follows:Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àThe€purpose€of€a€policy€provision€requiring€the€insured€to€give€the€company€promptÐ 0"€  Ðnotice€of€an€accident€or€claim€is€to€give€the€insurer€an€opportunity€to€make€a€timelyÐ #l! Ðand€adequate€investigation€of€all€the€circumstances.€€An€adequate€investigation€oftenÐ $X" Ðcannot€be€made€where€notice€is€long€delayed,€because€of€the€possible€removal€orÐ ô$D # Ðlapse€of€memory€on€the€part€of€witnesses,€the€loss€of€opportunity€for€examination€ofÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€physical€surroundings€and€making€photographs€thereof€for€use€at€the€trial,€and€theÐ Ì&"% Ðpossible€operation€of€fraud,€collusion,€or€cupidity.€€Such€a€requirement€tends€toÐ ¸'#& Ðprotect€the€insurer€against€fraudulent€claims,€and€also€against€invalid€claims€made€inÐ ¤(ô#' Ðgood€faith.€€If€the€insurer€is€given€the€opportunity€for€a€timely€investigation,Ð )à$( Ðreasonable€compromises€and€settlements€may€be€made,€thereby€avoiding€prolongedÐ |*Ì%) Ðand€unnecessary€litigation.€Ðh+¸&*Ð Ð  ÐòòAlcazaróó,€982€S.W.2d€at€849.Ð ° ÐÌà  àAfter€tracing€in€great€detail€the€trend€away€from€the€common€law€rule€and€toward€a€ruleÐ ˆØ Ðrecognizing€that€the€insurance€policy€is€a€contract€of€adhesion€drafted€by€the€insurer,€the€òòAlcazaróóÐ tÄ Ðcourt€overruled€prior€Tennessee€cases€and€adopted€a€standard€involving€two€questions:Ð `° Ð1.à0  àð ðDid€the€insured€provide€timely€notice€in€accordance€with€the€contract?ðð€€òòId.óó€at€856.ÐL œ(#(# Ð2.à  àð ðIf€not,€did€the€insured€carry€its€burden€of€proving€that€the€insurer€was€not€prejudiced€by€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðdelay?ðð€€òòId.óóÐ $ t ÐÌà  àThe€òòAlcazaróó€court€specifically€overruled€òòHartford€Accident€Indemnity€Co.€v.€Creasyóó,€530Ð ü L  ÐS.W.2d€778€(Tenn.1975),€and€òòPhoenix€Cotton€Oil€Co.€v.€Royal€Indemnity€Co.óó,€205€S.W.€128Ð è 8  Ð(Tenn.1918),€applying€a€general€principle€pronounced€by€this€Court€fifty€years€earlier.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àà8 ` àà ¸ àIt€is€a€general€principle,€pervading€the€law€of€all€forms€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðinsurance,€that€policies€shall€be€liberally€construed€in€favor€of€theÐ ˜è  Ðinsured.€€This€€because€courts€do€not€shut€their€eyes€to€realities;€theyÐ „Ô  Ðknow€that€the€policy€is€a€contract€of€ð ðadhesion,ðð€i.e.€not€one€whichÐ pÀ Ðthe€parties€have€reached€by€mutual€negotiation€and€concession,€notÐ \¬ Ðone€which€truly€expresses€any€agreement€at€which€they€have€arrived,Ð H˜ Ðbut€one€which€has€been€fixed€by€the€insurer€and€to€which€the€insuredÐ 4„ Ðmust€adhere,€if€he€chooses€to€have€insurance.Ð p` x` x ÐÌòòBrandt€v.€Mut.€Benefit€Health€&€Accident€Assððnóó,€202€S.W.2d€827,€831€(Tenn.Ct.App.1947).Ð øH ÐÌà  àAttempting€to€apply€òòAlcazaróó€to€a€contractual€limitation€of€actions€provision€in€a€policy€wouldÐ Ð  Ðpresent€the€same€near€insurmountable€obstacle€as€would€be€presented€in€trying€to€apply€it€to€aÐ ¼  Ðstatutory€limitation€of€actions€provision.€€The€first€òòAlcazaróó€question€would€be€whether€or€not€theÐ ¨ø Ðinsured€filed€his€action€within€the€contractual€limitation€period.€€In€this€case,€the€answer€is€ð ðno.ðð€€TheÐ ”ä Ðnext€question€would€be€whether€or€not€the€insured€could€carry€its€burden€of€proving€that€the€insurerÐ €Ð Ðwas€not€prejudiced€by€the€failure€to€timely€file€the€action.€€This€would€seem€to€be€an€impossibleÐ l¼ Ðburden€for€the€plaintiff€to€carry€since€a€statute€of€limitations€ð ðconfers€a€positive€rightðð€on€theÐ X ¨ Ðdefendant.€€òòC.A.€Hobbs,€Jr.,€Inc.€v.€Brainardóó,€919€S.W.2d€337,€339€(Tenn.Ct.App.1995).€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àReported€case€law€is€sparse€addressing€the€issue€of€prejudice€in€a€statute€of€limitations€or€aÐ #l! Ðpolicy€limitation€analysis.€€The€Common€Wealth€Court€of€Pennsylvania€observed:Ð $X" ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€first€argument€which€Appellants€make€is€that€since€March€of€1995,Ð à%0!$ ÐPhiladelphia€has€prepared€its€case€as€if€the€federal€claims€were€part€of€this€suit€andÐ Ì&"% Ðtherefore,€Philadelphia€suffers€no€prejudice€from€reinstating€the€federal€claims.€€InÐ ¸'#& Ðresponse,€Philadelphia€notes€that€it€was€only€prudent€for€it€to€prepare€to€meet€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfederal€claims€because€it€could€not€be€absolutely€certain€given€the€vagaries€of€theÐ )à$( Ðâ âlaw,€that€the€trial€court€would€rule€that€the€federal€claims€were€time€barred.Ð|*Ì%)Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àAppellantsðð€argument€regarding€prejudice€to€Philadelphia€is€a€red€herring.€Ð ° Ðâ âPrejudice€is€simply€not€part€of€the€analysis€to€determine€whether€a€claim€is€timeÐ œì Ðbarred€by€the€statute€of€limitations€or€not.€€Either€the€time€limitation€has€run€or€it€hasÐ ˆØ Ðnot€run.€€If€it€has€run,€a€suit€cannot€be€initiated€even€if€there€is€no€prejudiceÐ tÄ Ðdemonstrated.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€Wilkes„Barre€General€Hospital€v.€Leshoóó,€62€Pa.Cmwlth.Ð `° Ð222,€435€A.2d€1340,€1343€(1981)(ð ðprejudice€is€not€a€consideration€in€most€casesÐ L œ Ðwhere€the€bar€of€the€statute€of€limitations€may€apply.€.€.€.ðð).Ð8 ˆÐ Ð  ÐòòÌVetenshtein€v.€City€of€Philadelphiaóó,€755€A.2d€62,€66€(Pa.Cmmw.Ct.2000),€òòappeal€deniedóó,€764€A.2dÐ  ` Ð1071€(Pa.€Nov.27,2000).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€Supreme€Court€of€Minnesota€faced€the€issue€of€prejudice€relative€to€the€limitation€ofÐ Ô$  Ðaction€provision€in€a€policy€of€insurance€in€òòL€&€H€Transport,€Inc.€v.€The€Drew€Agency,€Inc.óó,€403Ð À  ÐN.W.2d€223€(Minn.1987).€€In€that€case,€the€supreme€court€first€affirmed€a€court€of€appealsðð€findingÐ ¬ü  Ðthat€the€limitation€clause€barred€a€suit€under€the€policy€only€if€the€insurer€could€show€prejudice.€€OnÐ ˜è  Ðrehearing,€the€supreme€court€reversed€itself€and€made€clear€the€distinction€between€notice€provisionsÐ „Ô  Ðin€a€policy€and€limitation€of€actions€provision.Ð pÀ ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€òòL€&€H€Transport,€Inc.€v.€Drew€Agency,€Inc.óó,€369€N.W.2d€608Ð H˜ Ð(Minn.App.1986),€the€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€the€failure€of€an€insured€to€bringÐ 4„ Ðsuit€against€its€insurer€within€the€period€provided€for€by€a€suit€limitation€clause€in€theÐ  p Ðpolicy€barred€a€suit€to€recover€under€the€policy€only€if€the€insurer€could€showÐ  \ Ðprejudice.€€By€order€we€affirmed€that€decision.€€òòL€&€H€Transport,€Inc.€v.€DrewÐ øH ÐAgency,€Inc.óó,€384€N.W.2d€435€(Minn.1986).€€We€granted€appellant€Chubb€and€SonsððÐ ä4 Ðpetition€for€rehearing€for€the€purpose€of€reviewing€that€order.€€We€conclude€that€ourÐ Ð  Ðorder€was€incorrect€and€we€withdraw€it.€€The€decision€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€isÐ ¼  Ðreversed€in€part€and€affirmed€in€part.òò€€óó€€Ð¨øÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` à.€.€.€.Ð €Ð ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€L€&€H„Chubb€insurance€policy€contained€a€suit€limitation€clause€whichÐ X ¨ Ðprovided€that€ð ð[n]o€suit,€action€or€proceeding€for€the€recovery€of€any€claim€under€thisÐ D!” Ðpolicy€shall€be€sustainable€in€any€court€of€law€or€equity€unless€the€same€beÐ 0"€  Ðcommenced€within€twelve€(12)€months€next€after€discovery€by€the€Insured€of€theÐ #l! Ðoccurrence€which€gives€rise€to€the€claim€*€*€*€.ðð€€In€this€case,€the€accident€giving€riseÐ $X" Ðto€L€&€Hððs€claim€occurred€and€was€discovered€by€L€&€H€on€July€22,€1982;€however,Ð ô$D # ÐL€&€H€did€not€commence€suit€against€Chubb€until€July€12,€1984.Ðà%0!$Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€Court€of€Appeals€holding€that€because€Chubb€was€not€prejudiced€by€LÐ ¸'#& Ð&€Hððs€failure€to€bring€suit€within€the€limitation€period,€L€&€H€could€still€bring€suitÐ ¤(ô#' Ðagainst€Chubb€rested€on€that€courtððs€earlier€decision€in€òòLoram€Maintenance€of€Way,Ð )à$( ÐInc.€v.€Consolidated€Rail€Corpóó.,€354€N.W.2d€111€(Minn.App.1984),€òòpet.€for€reviewÐ |*Ì%) Ðdeniedóó€(Minn.€January€11,€1985).€€In€òòLoramóó,€the€Court€of€Appeals,€addressing€theÐ h+¸&* Ðissue€of€whether€a€suit€limitation€clause€in€the€insurerððs€policy€barred€a€suit€by€theÐ ° Ðinsured,€held€that€suit€was€barred€only€if€the€insurer€could€show€prejudice.€€òòIdóó.€at€114.МìÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àAlthough€we€declined€to€review€the€òòLoramóó€decision,€in€òòHenning€NelsonÐ tÄ ÐConst.€Co.€v.€Firemanððs€Fund€Am.€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€383€N.W.2d€645€(Minn.1986),€weÐ `° Ðaddressed€the€same€issueð!ðwhether€a€suit€limitation€clause€in€the€insurerððs€policyÐ L œ Ðbarred€a€suit€by€the€insured.€€We€held€that€prejudice€to€the€insurer€was€not€a€properÐ 8 ˆ Ðconsideration;€rather,€the€rule€is€that€a€suit€limitation€clause€will€bar€an€untimely€suitÐ $ t Ðif€the€clause€does€not€conflict€with€a€specific€statute€and€if€the€limitation€periodÐ  ` Ðprovided€for€is€not€unreasonable€in€length.€€òòHenningóó,€383€N.W.2d€at€650„51.Ðü L Ð Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àUnderstandably,€the€Court€of€Appeals€decision€inòò€Henning,€Henning€NelsonÐ Ô$  ÐConst.€Co.€v.€Firemanððs€Fund€Am.€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€361€N.W.2d€446€(Minn.App.1985),Ð À  Ðrelied€upon€òòLoramóó€for€its€holding€that€the€insurer€must€show€prejudice€before€a€suitÐ ¬ü  Ðlimitation€clause€will€work€to€bar€a€suit.€€In€our€decision€in€òòHenningóó,€we€spoke€to€theÐ ˜è  ÐCourt€of€Appeals€reliance€on€òòLoramóó.€€We€held€it€to€be€incorrect€on€the€ground€thatÐ „Ô  Ðin€òòLoramóó€the€Court€of€Appeals€ð ðwas€considering€the€effect€of€the€injured€partyððsÐ pÀ Ðfailure€to€file€a€òònoticeóó€of€loss€with€the€insurance€company€within€the€limitation€periodÐ \¬ Ðprescribed€by€contract.ðð€€òòHenningóó,€383€N.W.2d€at€650,€n.€6€(emphasis€in€original).ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àWe€find€that€we€incorrectly€distinguished€the€òòLoramóó€case€in€our€decision€inÐ  p ÐòòHenningóó.€€òòLoramóó€and€òòHenningóó€addressed€the€same€issueð!ðwhether€a€suit€limitationÐ  \ Ðclause€in€an€insurance€policy€will€bar€a€suit€by€the€insured€commenced€outside€of€theÐ øH Ðlimitation€period.€€To€the€extent€òòLoramóó€is€inconsistent€with€our€decision€in€òòHenningóó,Ð ä4 ÐòòLoramóó€is€wrongly€decided.ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€òòLoramóó€holding€resulted€from€a€confusion€of€notice€limitation€clausesÐ ¨ø Ðwith€suit€limitation€clauses.€€The€rules€in€Minnesota€are€that€when€an€insuranceÐ ”ä Ðclause€requires€òònoticeóó€of€a€claim€to€be€given€within€a€certain€period,€failure€to€giveÐ €Ð Ðòònotice€óówithin€that€period€absolves€the€insurer€of€liability€only€if€the€failure€prejudicesÐ l¼ Ðthe€insurer.€€òòReliance€Ins.€Co.€v.€St.€Paul€Ins.€Co.óó,€307€Minn.€338,€239€N.W.2d€922Ð X ¨ Ð(1976).€€When€an€insurance€clause€requires€òòsuitóó€to€be€brought€within€a€certain€period,Ð D!” Ðfailure€to€bring€òòsuitóó€within€that€period€bars€suit€if€the€limitation€clause€does€notÐ 0"€  Ðconflict€with€a€specific€statute€and€is€not€unreasonable€in€length.€€òòHenningóó,€383Ð #l! ÐN.W.2d€645€(Minn.1986).Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€Court€of€Appeals€decided€this€case€based€on€òòLoram€óóand€sinceòò€HenningÐ à%0!$ Ðóócontrols,€we€withdraw€our€original€order,òò€L€&€H€Transportóó,€384€N.W.2d€435Ð Ì&"% Ð(Minn.1986),€and€reverse€that€portion€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€decision€inconsistentÐ ¸'#& Ðwith€òòHenningóó.Ф(ô#'Ð Ð  ÐòòÌL€&€H€Transportóó,€403€N.W.2d€at€224,€225„26.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àIn€òòHospital€Support€Services€v.€Kemper€Groupóó,€889€F.2d€1311€(3rd€Cir.1989),€the€courtÐ ° Ðaddressed€Pennsylvania€law€on€this€subject€in€a€diversity€jurisdiction€case.€€Noting€that€the€SupremeÐ œì ÐCourt€of€Pennsylvania€in€òòBrakeman€v.€Potomac€Ins.€Co.óó,€371€A.2d€193€(1977),€had€invoked€aÐ ˆØ Ðprejudice€element€into€the€equation€involving€a€policy€notice€provision€and€that€the€case€had€led€toÐ tÄ Ða€variety€of€opinions,€both€in€the€courts€of€Pennsylvania€and€in€federal€courts€sitting€in€PennsylvaniaÐ `° Ðon€diversity€jurisdiction€cases,€as€to€the€question€of€extending€the€prejudice€requirement€to€policyÐ L œ Ðlimitation€of€action€clauses,€the€court€held€that€such€extension€was€improper.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àà ` àThus,€the€only€member€of€this€Court€to€consider€the€issue€has€expressed€theÐ  ` Ðview€that€òòBrakemanððs€óósecond€theoretical€basisð!ðthat€the€purpose€of€the€notice€of€lossÐ ü L  Ðclause€is€to€prevent€prejudice€to€the€insurerð!ðcannot€justify€application€of€theÐ è 8  Ðprejudice€rule€to€limitation€of€suit€clauses.€€ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àWe€agree€and€believe€the€better€view€is€that€the€òòBrakemanóó€rule€does€not€applyÐ ¬ü  Ðto€limitation€of€suit€clauses.€€Neither€of€the€purported€justifications€for€òòBrakemanððsÐ ˜è  Ðóódeparture€from€a€strict€contractual€approach€apply€to€suit€limitations€clauses.€€WeÐ „Ô  Ðrecognize€that€ð ð[s]uch€clauses€were€completely€acceptable€and€enforceable€atÐ pÀ Ðcommon€law€without€any€demonstration€of€prejudice.ðð€€òòHamilton€Bank€v.€Export„Ð \¬ ÐImport€Bank€of€U.S.óó,€634€F.Supp.€195€(E.D.Pa.1986).€€Under€the€sweeping€languageÐ H˜ Ðof€òòBrakemanóó,€many€clauses€arguably€could€be€held€to€be€unenforceable€absent€aÐ 4„ Ðshowing€of€prejudice.€€We,€therefore,€hesitate€to€hold€that€limitation€of€suit€clausesÐ  p Ðcan€be€enforced€only€in€the€absence€of€prejudice€to€the€carrier.€€Further,€as€we€findÐ  \ Ðthe€purposes€of€the€notice€and€suit€limitations€clauses€differ,€the€theoreticalÐ øH Ðjustifications€for€requiring€prejudice€in€the€notice€clauses€at€issue€in€òòBrakemanóó€areÐ ä4 Ðnot€apt€with€respect€to€limitations€of€suit€clauses.€€òòSee€Brandywineóó,€405€F.Supp.€atÐ Ð  Ð151.м Ð Ð  ÐòòÌHosp.€Support€Servs.óó,€889€F.2d€at€1316.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àApplying€Delaware€law,€the€Federal€District€Court€in€òòBrandywine€100€Corp.€v.€Hartford€FireÐ l¼ ÐIns.€Co.óó,€405€F.Supp.€147€(Del.1975),€refused€to€extend€the€prejudice€element€of€a€failure€to€giveÐ X ¨ Ðnotice€so€as€to€also€effect€a€prejudice€requirement€before€enforcement€of€a€limitation€of€actionÐ D!” Ðprovision€of€the€policy.€€Said€the€court:€€ð ðThe€purpose€of€the€former€is€to€avoid€prejudice;€the€latterÐ 0"€  Ðis€simply€a€contractual€modification€of€the€statute€of€limitation.ðð€€òòBrandywineóó,€405€F.Supp.€at€151.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àIf€òòAlcazar€óóis€to€be€expanded€to€introduce€a€ð ðprejudiceðð€analysis€into€limitation€of€actionsÐ ô$D # Ðprovisions,€statutory€or€contractual,€such€expansion€must€come€from€the€Supreme€Court€ofÐ à%0!$ ÐTennessee€or€from€the€General€Assembly.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð Ì&"% Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àÐ ¸'#& Ðà  àPlaintiff/Appellant€next€asserts€that€the€policy€provision€relative€to€ð ðfull€complianceðð€withÐ ° Ðthe€terms€of€the€policy€is€ambiguous€and€puts€the€insured€in€an€impossible€position.€€First€the€insuredÐ œì Ðmust€comply€with€the€extensive€document€production€demand€contained€in€the€insurerððs€letter€ofÐ ˆØ ÐJune€27,€2000.€€Then€his€action€must€be€brought€within€two€years€after€the€expiration€of€theÐ tÄ Ðsettlement€immunity€period.€€In€his€brief€Plaintiff€asserts:à p à€Ð `° ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€drafting€this€proviso,€the€Insurer/Appellee€clearly€created€two€separateÐ 8 ˆ Ðconditions€which€an€insured€must€comply€with€before€being€eligible€to€file€suitÐ $ t Ðagainst€his€insurer€under€the€terms€of€the€contract.Ð `Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àThe€importance€of€the€ð ðfull€complianceðð€phrase€in€the€policy€is€that€if€anÐ ü L  Ðinsured€was€attempting€to€comply€with€the€demands€of€the€insurer€but€was€unable€to,Ð è 8  Ðan€insured€would€be€in€a€quandry€as€to€how€to€get€relief€„€„€either€keep€trying€toÐ Ô$  Ðcomply€with€the€insurerððs€demands€[which€might€put€one€over€the€two€year€period]Ð À  Ðor€sue€the€insurer€while€not€being€in€full€compliance.€€However,€if€the€insured€sues€Ð ¬ü  Ðwhile€not€being€in€ð ðfull€compliance,ðð€it€is€a€forgone€conclusion€that€the€Insurer€willÐ ˜è  Ðfile€a€Motion€to€Dismiss€on€the€ground€that€the€Insured€filed€suit€against€the€insurerÐ „Ô  Ðwithout€being€in€full€compliance€„€„€as€is€mandated€by€the€policy€terms.€€Either€way,Ð pÀ Ðaccording€to€the€insurance€policy,€an€insured€would€lose.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€difficulty€with€this€position€is€that€it€assumes€an€incompatibility€between€the€ð ðfullÐ 4„ Ðcomplianceðð€provision€of€the€policy€and€the€limitation€of€action€provision.€€The€ð ðfull€complianceððÐ  p Ðprovision€of€the€policy€does€not€provide€an€extension€to€the€settlement€immunity€period.€€Nor€is€itÐ  \ Ðthe€prerogative€of€the€insurer€to€decide€the€question€of€whether€or€not€the€insured€is€in€fullÐ øH Ðcompliance.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×à ` àÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àFinally,€Plaintiff€asserts€that€the€insurer€should€be€estopped€to€rely€on€the€limitation€of€actionÐ ¼  Ðprovision€of€the€policy.€€The€record€before€the€Court€establishes€no€basis€for€estoppel.€€The€recordÐ ¨ø Ðshows€no€action€at€all€by€either€party€between€the€June€27,€2000€letter€by€the€insurer€demandingÐ ”ä Ðproduction€of€documents€and€the€expiration€of€the€limitation€of€action€period€on€May€4,€2002.€€TheÐ €Ð Ðdiscussion€by€this€Court€in€òòFairway€Village€Condominium€Association,€Inc.€v.€Connecticut€MutualÐ l¼ ÐLife€Insurance€Co.óó,€934€S.W.2d€342€(Tenn.Ct.App.1996)€is€enlightening.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àà ` àIt€is€well„settled€in€Tennessee€law€that€a€party,€by€its€conduct,€may€beÐ 0"€  Ðestopped€to€rely€on€the€statute€of€limitations.€€òòSparks€v.€Metropolitan€Government€ofÐ #l! ÐNashville€and€Davidson€Countyóó,€771€S.W.2d€430,€433€(Tenn.App.1989).Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà8 ` à[Where€by]€promises€or€appearances€one€party€is€induced€to€believeÐ à%0!$ Ðthat€the€other€party€is€going€to€pay€a€claim€or€otherwise€satisfy€theÐ Ì&"% Ðclaims€of€the€first€party,€and€in€reliance€on€that€representation€the€firstÐ ¸'#& Ðparty€delays€filing€suit€[within]€[sic]€the€applicable€statute€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ðlimitations,€the€party€making€the€representations€may€be€estopped€toÐ ° Ðraise€the€statute€of€limitations€as€a€defense.Мì` x` x ÐÌà8  àòòId.óó€€Plaintiffs€have€pled€facts€in€their€complaint€which€arguably€support€a€finding€ofÐ tÄ Ðestoppel.€€For€purposes€of€determining€whether€summary€judgment€was€proper,€weÐ `° Ðare€obliged€pursuant€to€òòByrdóó€to€do€as€the€trial€court€did€and€treat€PlaintiffsððÐ L œ Ðallegations€as€true€and€assume€for€the€moment€that€Plaintiffs€were€lulled€intoÐ 8 ˆ Ð[in]activity€[sic]€by€the€Defendantsðð€representations€and€acts€between€February€13,Ð $ t Ð1979,€and€June€6,€1980.€à h à€€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àTaking€such€allegations€as€true,€we€must€then€determine€how€long€theÐ è 8  ÐPlaintiffs€had€to€file€their€claim€after€the€period€of€estoppel€ended.€€There€is€no€clearÐ Ô$  Ðanswer€under€Tennessee€law.€€Under€some€authorities,€a€party€is€allowed€a€reasonableÐ À  Ðtime€in€which€to€file€claim€after€the€estoppel€ends,€and€under€other€authority,€theÐ ¬ü  Ðestoppel€continues,€following€the€expiration€of€the€statutory€period,€until€the€party€isÐ ˜è  Ðallowed€a€period€equal€to€the€statutory€period€for€the€commencement€of€an€action.€Ð „Ô  ÐòòDuncan€v.€Gaffney€Mfg.€Co.óó,€214€S.C.€502,€53€S.E.2d€396,€399€(1949);€51€Am.Jur.2dÐ pÀ ÐòòLimitation€of€Actionsóó€ðð€437€(1970).Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àPlaintiffs€urge€us€to€adopt€a€rule€whereby€a€party€lulled€into€inaction€isÐ 4„ Ðentitled€to€a€day„for„day€tolling€of€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Thus,€under€PlaintiffsððÐ  p Ðsuggested€rule,€a€party,€whose€cause€of€action€has€accrued€and€who€is€lulled€intoÐ  \ Ðinaction€by€the€representations€of€another€party€for€45€days,€would€be€entitled€to€anÐ øH Ðadditional€45€days€to€bring€suit€at€the€end€of€the€original€statutory€period.€€PlaintiffsÐ ä4 Ðargue€that€such€a€rule€would€be€fairer€and€would€be€more€exact€than€a€rule€whichÐ Ð  Ðrequired€a€court€to€determine€whether€a€party€had€a€reasonable€time€to€bring€suit.м Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àNotwithstanding€Plaintiffsðð€arguments,€we€believe€that€the€better„reasonedÐ ”ä Ðrule€is€the€one€followed€by€a€majority€of€jurisdictions,€which€hold€that€the€effect€ofÐ €Ð Ðsuch€an€estoppel€is€not€to€stop€the€running€of€the€statute€or€to€create€a€new€date€forÐ l¼ Ðits€commencement.€€Instead,€under€the€majority€rule,€if€a€reasonable€time€to€file€suitÐ X ¨ Ðwithin€the€statutory€period€exists€after€the€circumstances€inducing€delay€have€ceased,Ð D!” Ða€party€should€not€be€estopped€from€pleading€the€bar€of€the€statute.€€òòGlennan€v.Ð 0"€  ÐLincoln€Inv.€Corp.óó,€110€F.2d€130€(D.C.Cir.1940);€òòProperty€10„F,€Inc.€v.€Pack€&Ð #l! ÐProcess,€Inc.óó,€265€A.2d€290€(D.C.1970);€òòLobrovich€v.€Georgisonóó,€144€Cal.App.2dÐ $X" Ð567,€301€P.2d€460€(1956);€51€Am.Jur.2d€òòLimitation€of€Actionsóó€ðð€437€(1970).€Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐòòÌFairway€Village€Condoóó,€934€S.W.2d€at€346.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThe€record€shows€no€action€by€Southern€Pilot€Insurance€Company€designed€to€lull€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðinsured€to€sleep€and,€indeed,€no€action€of€any€kind€by€the€insurance€company€after€the€letter€of€JuneÐ )à$( Ð27,€2000.€€More€than€22€months€elapsed€between€the€June€27,€2000€letter€and€the€expiration€of€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðlimitation€period€provided€by€the€policy.€€The€record€does€not€support€the€assertions€of€estoppel.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€in€all€respects€affirmed,€and€costs€are€assessed€againstÐ ° ÐAppellant.Ð œì ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð L œ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGE