ÿWPCç 2# ÌUN× %% 0c+U<Žw@Ê4  AQ- 0§~ 0J% 0Toà 0^Ë 0h) 0r‘ 0| 0† 0 1u• 0d 0@n D3® U>á 0D B)c DCŒ AMÏ U* cF B© ÆÆ 0DŒ 0DÐ D/ BCU6`v~–vÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;cW$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XaBXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman 23E45U6î7Ó€89E:Ó€FŒƒ*#x>?@ABC3|xF*+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(W(3Ï„$¤¤Ý ƒcW!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X$)XXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd* %Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial YÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌò òSeptemberÏ24,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€'ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€\èXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òDORIS€J.€BRIDGES,€ó óÌÌà àAppellant,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Chancery€No.€107732ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9704„CH„00074ÌÙ€*ÙßR€&(%A1-j|ù9` à. `€€@ÿRßÌò òMARGARET€C.€CULPEPPER,€ÌCommissioner€of€the€TennesseeÌDepartment€of€EmploymentÌSecurity;€andÌÌINTERNAL€REVENUE€SERVICE,ó óÌÌà àAppellees.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€SHELBY€COUNTY€CHANCERY€COURTÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€NEAL€SMALL,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌà@ àSheila€L.€Robinson„Beasley€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àJohn€Knox€Walkup,€Attorney€General€and€ReporterÌà@ àKimberly€M.€Frayn,€Assistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà@ àFor€Appellee,€Tennessee€Department€of€Employment€SecurityÌÌà@ àVeronica€F.€Coleman,€United€States€AttorneyÌà@ àJoe€A.€Dycus,€Assistant€United€States€AttorneyÌà@ àFor€Appellee,€Internal€Revenue€ServiceÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌà@ àó óóóOpinion€filed:€ÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌÓÓ›à àThis€appeal€involves€the€denial€of€unemployment€compensation€benefits.€ÏPlaintiff€Doris€J.€Bridges€appeals€the€decree€of€the€chancery€court€whichÏdismissed€her€petition€for€certiorari€and€affirmed€the€denial€of€benefits€by€theÏBoard€of€Review€of€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Employment€Security.€€Ìà àDoris€J.€Bridges€had€been€an€employee€of€the€Internal€Revenue€Service€inÏMemphis€for€over€twenty„two€years€when€she€accepted€an€offer€of€voluntaryÏearly€retirement.€€The€IRS€issued€a€memorandum€in€which€employees€who€wereÏat€least€fifty€years€old€with€twenty€years€of€service,€or€who€had€at€least€twenty„five€years€of€service€regardless€of€age,€could€opt€to€voluntarily€retire€if€theyÏaccepted€the€offer€to€do€so€between€May€1,€1995€and€September€30,€1995.€€It€isÍundisputed€that€without€this€special€program€Ms.€Bridges€would€not€have€beenÏeligible€for€retirement€and€that€eligible€employees€received€no€financialÏincentive€to€retire€other€than€the€early€receipt€of€their€government€pensions.€ÏMs.€Bridges€voluntarily€retired€under€the€IRSððs€Voluntary€Early€Out€RetirementÏprogram€on€May€2,€1995,€one€day€into€the€eligibility€period.€€Ìà àOn€February€1,€1996€Ms.€Bridges€filed€a€claim€for€unemploymentÏinsurance€benefits€with€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Employment€SecurityÏ(TDES).€€Her€claim€was€denied€on€February€23,€1996€because€TDES€found€thatÏshe€had€voluntarily€quit€her€employment€without€good€cause€connected€withÏher€work€and€thus€was€ineligible€for€benefits€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(a)(1)€(Supp.€1996).€€The€Appeals€Tribunal€affirmed€this€decision€on€MarchÏ29,€1996€and€added€that€there€was€no€ð ðevidence€that€her€retirement€was€due€toÏan€established€plan€by€the€employer€which€because€of€a€lack€of€work,€would€haveÏpermitted€her€to€accept€a€separation€from€employment.ðð€€Ms.€Bridges€appealedÏto€the€Board€of€Review€on€April€1,€1996.€€On€April€29,€1996€the€Board€ofÏReview€adopted€the€findings€of€the€Appeals€Tribunal€and€affirmed€its€decisionÏdenying€unemployment€compensation€benefits.€€€Ms.€Bridgesðð€request€for€aÏrehearing€by€the€Board€was€denied,€and€her€petition€for€certiorari€wasÏsubsequently€denied€by€the€chancery€court.€€Ìà àMs.€Bridges€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€chancery€court,€and€the€soleÏissue€for€our€review€is€whether€the€chancellor€erred€in€affirming€the€Board€ofÏReviewððs€denial€of€unemployment€compensation€benefits.€€Appellant€argues€thatÏeven€if€she€could€not€show€good€work€related€cause€for€leaving€her€employment,Ïher€claim€for€benefits€should€be€allowed€because€she€qualifies€for€the€ð ðlack€ofÏworkðð€and/or€the€ð ðlabor„management€contract€or€agreementðð€exceptions€ofÏT.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(c)(1).€Ìà àThe€standard€for€judicial€review€of€a€TDES€Board€of€Review€decisionÏregarding€unemployment€benefits€is€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ðð€œ50„7„304(i)›€whichÏprovides€in€pertinent€part:€Ìà8 àà8 à(2)€The€chancellor€may€affirm€the€decision€of€theÏboard€or€the€chancellor€may€reverse,€remand€orÏmodify€the€decision€if€the€rights€of€the€petitionerÏhave€been€prejudiced€because€the€administrativeÏfindings,€inferences,€conclusions€or€decisions€are:Ìà8 àà8 à(A)€In€violation€of€constitutional€or€statutoryÏprovisions;Ìà àà8 à(B)€In€excess€of€the€statutory€authority€of€the€agency;Ìà àà8 à(C)€Made€upon€unlawful€procedure;Ìà8 àà8 à(D)€Arbitrary€or€capricious€or€characterized€by€abuseÏof€discretion€or€€clearly€unwarranted€exercise€ofÏdiscretion;€orÌà8 àà8 à(E)€Unsupported€by€evidence€which€is€bothÏsubstantial€and€material€in€the€light€of€the€entireÏrecord.Ìà8 àà8 à(3)€In€determining€the€substantiality€of€evidence,€theÏœchancellor€shall›€take€into€account€whatever€in€theÏrecord€fairly€detracts€from€its€weight,€but€theÏœchancellor›€shall€not€substitute€the€œchancellorððs›Ïjudgment€for€that€of€the€board€of€review€as€to€theÏweight€of€the€evidence€on€questions€of€fact.ÌÌT.C.A.€€ðð€œ50„7„304(i)›€(Supp.€1996).€€This€Court€must€apply€the€same€standardÏas€the€trial€court€in€reviewing€the€trial€courtððs€decision€in€an€unemploymentÏcompensation€case.€€ò òòòFord€v.€Traughber,€óóó ó813€S.W.2d€141,€144€(Tenn.€App.Ï1991).€€Therefore,€in€reviewing€TDESððs€findings€of€fact,€we€are€constrained€to€aÏdetermination€of€whether€there€is€substantial€and€material€evidence€to€supportÏthe€findings.€€ð ðSubstantial€and€material€evidence€is€such€relevant€evidence€as€aÍreasonable€mind€might€accept€to€support€a€rational€conclusion€and€such€as€toÏfurnish€a€reasonably€sound€basis€for€the€action€under€consideration.ðð€€òòò òSouthernÏRy.€Co.€V.€State€Bd.€Of€Equalizationó óóó,€682€S.W.2d€196,€199€(Tenn.€1984)Ï(citations€and€internal€quotations€omitted).€€If€the€record€contains€suchÏevidence,€we€are€limited€to€a€review€of€the€questions€of€law€presented.€Ïòòò òPerryman€v.€Bibleó óóó,€653€S.W.2d€424,€429€(Tenn.€App.€1983).Ìà àAn€individual€is€disqualified€from€receiving€unemployment€compensationÏbenefits€where€the€claimant€ð ðleft€such€claimantððs€most€recent€work€voluntarilyÏwithout€good€cause€connected€with€such€claimantððs€work.ðð€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(a)(1)€(Supp.€1996).€€The€TDES€issued€its€initial€decision€denying€theÏappellantððs€claim€on€February€23,€1996.€€The€agency€found€that€appellant€hadÏvoluntarily€quit€her€employment€without€good€work€related€cause€andÏdisqualified€the€appellant€for€benefits€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(a)(1).€€€ItÏis€undisputed€in€this€case€that€Ms.€Bridges€voluntarily€left€the€employment€ofÏthe€IRS€to€retire€early.€€Although€it€is€unclear€from€appellantððs€brief€whetherÏMs.€Bridges€contests€the€Boardððs€finding€that€she€left€work€without€good€cause,Ïor€if€she€relies€instead€on€her€argument€that€one€of€the€statutory€exceptions€toÏthis€requirement€applies€to€her€case,€we€feel€it€is€prudent€to€address€the€goodÏcause€issue.€€Ìà àInò ò€òòFroggeóó€šòòòŒòv.€DavenportóŒóóó,€ó ó906€S.W.2d€920,€924€(Tenn.€App.€1995)š,€weÏnoted€that€the€term€ð ðgood€causeðð€is€not€defined€in€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303,€but€foundÏthe€following€discussion€from€81€C.J.S.€òòSocial€Security€and€Public€Welfareóó€ðð€226Ï(1977)€to€be€helpful:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€general,€ð ðgood€cause,ðð€as€used€in€an€unemploymentÏcompensation€statute,€means€such€a€cause€as€justifiesÏan€employeeððs€voluntarily€leaving€the€ranks€of€theÏemployed€and€joining€the€ranks€of€the€unemployed;Ïthe€quitting€must€be€for€such€a€cause€as€wouldÏreasonably€motivate€in€a€similar€situation€the€averageÏable„bodied€and€qualified€worker€to€give€up€his€or€herÏemployment€with€its€certain€wage€rewards€in€order€toÏenter€the€ranks€of€the€compensated€unemployed.€€TheÏterms€ð ðgood€causeðð€and€ð ðpersonal€reasonsðð€connote,Ïas€minimum€requirements,€real€circumstances,Ïsubstantial€reasons,€objective€conditions,€palpableÏforces€that€operate€to€produce€correlative€results;Ïadequate€excuses€that€will€bear€the€test€of€reason;€justÏgrounds€for€action.€The€test€is€one€of€ordinaryÏcommon€sense€and€prudence.Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 àIn€order€to€constitute€good€cause,€the€circumstancesÏwhich€compel€the€decision€to€leave€employment€mustÏbe€real,€not€imaginary,€substantial€not€trifling,€andÏreasonable,€not€whimsical;€there€must€be€someÏcompulsion€produced€by€extraneous€and€necessitousÏor€compelling€circumstances.ÌÌÓÓà àUtilizing€this€guidance€in€interpreting€the€ð ðgood€causeðð€requirement€ofÏthe€statute,€this€Court€has€held€that€an€individualððs€voluntary€decision€to€quitÏwhich€was€motivated€only€by€speculation€that€he€would€lose€his€job€and€hisÍaccumulated€benefits€was€not€good€cause€to€leave€his€employment.€€òòò òFroggeó óóó,€906ÏS.W.2d€at€924.€€òòSee€alsoóó,€òòò òHill€v.€Kellyó óóó,€No.€17531(T)€C.A.€No.€127,€1987€WLÏ15855€(Tenn.€App.€W.S.€1987).€Similarly,€this€court€feels€that€without€more,ÏMs.€Bridgesðð€alleged€fear€that€she€would€lose€her€job€and€benefits€if€she€did€notÏvoluntarily€retire€is€not€sufficient€to€show€good€cause.Ìà àAppellant€Bridges€argues€essentially€that€even€if€good€cause€is€not€shown€Ïshe€is€qualified€for€benefits€pursuant€to€the€ð ðlack€of€workðð€exception€of€theÏstatute€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(c)€QUALIFICATIONS.€Notwithstanding€any€otherÏprovision€of€law€to€the€contrary:€(1)€Benefits€shall€notÏbe€denied€under€this€chapter€to€any€otherwise€eligibleÏclaimant€for€separation€from€employment€pursuant€toÏa€labor„management€contract€or€agreement,€orÏpursuant€to€an€established€employer€plan,€program,Ïpolicy,€layoff€or€recall€which€permits€the€claimantÏ(employee),€because€of€lack€of€work,€to€accept€aÏseparation€from€employment.ÌÌÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(c)(1)€(Supp.€1996).€€Bridges€argues€that€the€IRS€offered€theÏearly€out€retirement€as€part€of€the€general€downsizing€of€the€government€andÏthat€this€offer€was€made€because€there€was€a€lack€of€work€at€the€IRS.€€Ms.ÏBridges€claims€that€she€opted€to€retire€early€because€she€was€in€fear€of€laterÏbeing€forced€out€without€any€retirement€benefits.€€The€IRS€vigorously€deniesÏthat€there€was€a€lack€of€work€and€are€quick€to€point€out€that€Ms.€BridgesÍaccepted€the€offer€to€retire€during€the€second€day€of€the€window€of€opportunityÏwithout€discussing€the€matter€with€her€supervisor.€€The€only€evidence€in€theÏrecord€of€a€lack€of€work€at€the€IRS€are€statements€to€that€effect€by€Ms.€BridgesÏand€her€contention€that€the€IRS€would€not€offer€early€retirement€if€there€wasÏno€lack€of€work.€€Ms.€Bryant,€Labor€Relations€Specialist€for€the€IRS,€testifiedÏbefore€the€appeals€tribunal€that€there€was€still€work€available€at€the€IRS€andÏthat€even€if€some€positions€were€eliminated,€there€would€be€work€for€thoseÏemployees€elsewhere€within€the€service.€€Ms.€Bridges€admitted€that€no€one€atÏthe€IRS€told€her€she€would€lose€her€job€if€she€did€not€retire.€€€In€addition,€Ms.ÏBridges€was€classified€as€ð ðredeployment€eligibleðð€and€conceded€that€due€to€herÏseniority€she€ð ðmaybe€could€have€stayed€longer.ðð€€We€find€that€there€isÏsubstantial€and€material€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€the€Board€ofÏReviewððs€finding€that€there€was€no€lack€of€work€at€the€IRS.€€The€Board€properlyÏexercised€its€discretion€in€accordance€with€law€and€did€not€act€arbitrarily€orÏcapriciously.Ìà àFor€the€first€time€on€appeal,€appellantððs€counsel€also€argues€that€the€earlyÏretirement€program€was€a€labor„management€contract€or€agreement€and€thatÏshe€should€fall€within€that€exception€to€the€good€cause€requirement.€€TheÏparties€dispute€the€interpretation€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„303(c)(1),€with€the€appellantÍurging€that€if€there€is€a€ð ðlabor„management€contract€or€agreementðð€it€isÏunnecessary€for€the€claimant€to€also€show€that€there€was€a€lack€of€work.€€€ThisÏCourt€need€not€decide€this€issue€of€statutory€interpretation€because€we€findÏthat€there€is€no€evidence€that€the€unilateral€offer€of€voluntary€early€retirementÏwas€any€sort€of€contract€or€agreement€between€labor€and€management.€ÏAlthough€we€were€unable€to€find€any€cases€on€point,€this€Court€presumes€thatÏwhen€the€drafters€added€this€phrase€they€contemplated€some€sort€of€collectiveÏbargaining€agreement€or€bargained€for€exchange€and€not€a€unilateral€offer€fromÏan€employer.€Ìà àThe€appellant€also€contends€that€the€Board€of€Review€and€the€ChancellorÏerred€in€refusing€to€consider€additional€evidence€that€she€offered€to€show€thatÏthe€agencyððs€decision€was€arbitrary€and€capricious.€€Appellant€asserts€in€herÏbrief€to€this€Court€that€in€seeking€a€rehearing€of€her€case€she€notified€the€BoardÏof€Review€that€she€was€prepared€to€offer€the€testimony€of€three€witnesses€whoÏallegedly€retired€under€the€same€early€retirement€program,€but€wereÏsubsequently€allowed€to€collect€unemployment€benefits.€€Appellant€argues€thatÏunder€the€Administrative€Rules€and€Procedures€Act,€new€evidence€is€admissibleÏupon€judicial€review€if€the€court€is€satisfied€that€the€evidence€is€material€andÏthat€there€were€good€reasons€for€failure€to€present€it€in€the€proceeding€beforeÍthe€agency.€€However,€as€the€appellee€TDES€correctly€points€out,€theÏDepartment€of€Employment€Security€is€expressly€excepted€from€this€provision.€€Ìà àThis€Court€must€affirm€the€chancery€courtððs€judgment€if€we€find€that€theÏBoard€of€Review€did€not€act€arbitrarily€or€capriciously€and€there€is€substantialÏand€material€evidence€to€support€its€findings.€€The€refusal€of€the€Board€to€grantÏa€rehearing€will€not€be€found€to€be€arbitrary€or€capricious€unless€the€appellantÏcan€ð ðshow€specifically€why€[she]€was€unable€to€procure€the€ððnewly€discoveredððÏevidence€and€that€[she]€exercised€due€diligence€in€attempting€to€obtain€theÏevidence€prior€toðð€the€hearing.€€òòò òSee€Brown€v.€Weikó óóó,€725€S.W.2d€938,€947Ï(Tenn.€App.€1983).€€Although€the€ò òòòBrownó óóó€controversy€was€in€a€trial€court,€we€seeÏno€reason€that€this€rule€should€not€be€equally€applicable€to€an€administrativeÏhearing.€€Ms.€Bridges€had€ample€opportunity€to€discover€and€present€the€ð ðnewððÏevidence,€but€failed€to€do€so€until€her€claim€was€denied€three€times.€€The€recordÏalso€shows€that€Ms.€Bridges€arrived€at€the€Appeals€Tribunal€hearing€withoutÏimportant€documentary€evidence€to€support€her€case„„not€even€the€IRSÏmemorandum€upon€which€she€was€basing€her€entire€case.€€€Ms.€Bridges€did€notÏmention€any€possible€witnesses€until€after€her€claim€was€denied€by€the€Board€ofÏReview.€€This€Court€does€not€find€that€the€Board€acted€arbitrarily€orÏcapriciously€when€it€was€simply€relying€on€the€record€before€it.€€œÌà àThe›€judgment€of€the€chancery€court€affirming€the€Board€of€ReviewððsÏdecision€is€affirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€such€further€proceedings€asÏnecessary.€€€Costs€of€appeal€are€assessed€against€the€appellant.€ÓÓò òÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________________ÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEó óÌÌò ò____________________________________ÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEœÔ€/ÔÔ€/Ô