WPC" # VUNa % 0 (w@4 1 @ 0lH 0D 0J 0TB 0^ 0h 0r\ 0| 0J 0 1u` 0d UP9 D3 B 0@U>U6WB)DC AMU*FpIPE.,Zv~v] AO0!! 0DE" D/" B"HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nLh(hH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($ opEqrEstuvDwӀڃ"3|x((3$ !      0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   !" ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X&@Z 8CaslonOpnface BT Regular++++'dxd d("$    <  9p`(&Times New Roman<  9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d11117Border 1dd-2C << G<  9p`(Arial  !#d#/  44   YYY FILED4X December30,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.4AppellateCourtClerk   !#d#/   $       00ThetrialcourtalsodeclaredthatThompsonwasnotaninsuredundertheHaulerspolicy.Sincetherehasbeennoappealfromthisportionofthelowercourtsjudgment,wedonotfinditnecessaryorappropriatetoconsiderthecorrectnessofthatruling. !#d#/   $       00MikeT.HunterandMichaelT.Hunterareoneandthesameperson. !#d#/   $       00Burkehad nootheravailableinsurance.  !#d#/   $       00Haulersalsoarguesthatitisentitledtosummaryjudgment(1)becauseitsinsuredspermissiontodrivewasinducedbyfraudormisrepresentation;and(2)becauseBurkeandThompsonexceededthe scopeofconsentandpermission.Wefindnoevidencetosupporteitherposition. $ !#d#/   $       00Theword customerisnotdefinedinthepolicyinthecontextoftheprovisionunderdiscussion. { !#d#/   $       00Customerisgenerallydefinedas apersonwhopurchasesgoodsorservicesfromanother;buyer;patron.WebstersUniversalCollegeDictionary200(1997ed.)(emphasisadded).PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'`Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   ion-F Geneva  ion-F Geneva -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! . /  P 7<XXdd7\RA'\  0ԛ @ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEEٜR352A1-j|X&`  `@RߛHAULERSINSURANCECOMPANY,INC.,)C/ANO.03A019611CV00356      )      )  PlaintiffAppellant,)      )v.      )      )      )DAMIANV.BURKE,   )APPEALASOFRIGHTFROMTHE      )BRADLEYCOUNTYCIRCUITCOURT  DefendantAppellee, )      )and      )      )      )MICHAELT.HUNTER,   )      )  Intervening  )HONORABLEJOHNB.HAGLER,JR.,  PetitionerAppellee.)JUDGEForAppellant     ForAppelleeHunterJOHNT.RICE     ROGERE.JENNERice,Kreitzer&Winer,P.C.  Jenne,Scott&BryantChattanooga,Tennessee   Cleveland,Tennessee       ForAppelleeBurke       NOAPPEARANCE@ 0 %OPINION00XAFFIRMEDASMODIFIED       ̜REMANDED          Susano,J.  ThisisadeclaratoryjudgmentactionfiledbyHaulersInsuranceCompany,Inc.(Haulers).Asoriginallyfiled,itsoughtadeclarationthatHaulerswasnotrequiredtoindemnifyordefendDamianV.Burke(Burke)andEdwardThompson(Thompson)withrespecttoasuitforpersonalinjuriesfiledbyMichaelT.Hunter(Hunter)againstBurke,Thompson,andtheownersofJ&DAutoSales.Hunter,whowasallowedtointerveneintheinstantcase,filedamotionforsummaryjudgment,asdidHaulersandBurke.Aftertheunderlyingtortactionwastried,thetrialjudgeinthecaseatbarconsideredthependingmotionsforsummaryjudgment.HeenteredajudgmentonJuly15,1996,declaringthatBurkewascoveredasaninsuredupto$100,000undertheliabilityfeatureofthegarageinsurancepolicyissuedbyHaulerstoDonnieWearandJoeGuffey,apartnershipwhichoperatedausedcarlotinCleveland,TennesseeunderthetradenameofJ&DAutoSales. 6   כHaulersappealed,arguing(1)thatHunterwasnotentitledtosummaryjudgment;(2)thatthetrialcourterredindenyingHaulersmotionforsummaryjudgment;(3)thatthetrialcourterredinallowingHunterdiscretionarycosts;and(4)thatthetrialcourterredinnotrequiringtheproductionofastatementgivenbyThompsontoHunterscounsel.@ I.Background  TheinstantlitigationwascommencedonDecember13,1994.ItfollowedthefilingoftheunderlyingtortactiononSeptember6,1994.Theearliersuitwasstyled MikeT.Hunterv.DamianV.Burke;EdwinThompson,alsoknownasEdwardThompson;andDonnieWearandJoeGuffey,individuallyanddoingbusinessasJ&DAutoSales .ItwasalsofiledintheBradleyCountyCircuitCourt.Foreaseofreference,itwillbereferredtointhisopinionas Hunterv.Burke or theunderlyingtortaction.  Thecaseof Hunterv.Burke wastriedtoajury.Thetrialjudgeintheinstantcase,theHonorableJohnB.Hagler,Jr.,alsopresidedatthetrialoftheunderlyingtortaction.Inthatcase,thejuryreturnedaverdictfortheplaintiffMikeT.Hunter 7   ׀intheamountof$270,000.Thetrialjudgeapprovedtheverdict,andthedefendantsDamianV.Burke,DonnieWear,andJoeGuffeyappealed.Weaffirmedthejudgment,andtheSupremeCourtdeniedpermissiontoappealonDecember22,1997.See Hunterv.Burke ,C/ANo.03A019606CV00207,1997WL170307(CourtofAppealsatKnoxville,April11,1997;petitionforrehearingdeniedJune27,1997).@ II. Hunterv.Burke   Ouropinionin Hunterv.Burke ,supra,recitestherelevantfactsinthatlitigation: 8 OntheafternoonofJune3,1994,Burke,whowasthen18yearsold,alongwithhisfriend,EdwinThompson(Thompson),wenttoJ&DAutoSales,ausedcarlotownedandoperatedbyWearandGuffey.Earlierthatday,BurkeandThompsonhadbeenatBurkeshousewithtwoorthreeotherindividuals,smokingmarijuanaanddrinkingbeer.ThereisevidencethatBurkeapproachedGuffeyandaskedtodrivea1971ChevroletMalibu.Guffeyagreed.BurkeandThompsondroveoffthelotwiththelatterbehindthewheel.Guffeydidnotaccompanythem. 8 Aftertravelingashortdistance,Thompsonapparentlyrealizedthathewastooimpairedtodrive.HethenaskedBurketodrive.Burkeagreed,despitethefactthathetoowasundertheinfluenceofmarijuanaandalcohol. 8 Burkedroveafewblocks,swervedintotheoncominglaneoftraffic,andstruckHunter,whowasridinghisbicycle.Burkestoppedthecar,andheandThompsonfledthescene.Theywereapprehendedbythepoliceshortlythereafter.Burkegaveastatementadmittingthathecausedtheaccident.@ *** 8  8 HuntersubsequentlybroughtsuitagainstBurke,Thompson,Wear,andGuffey.Attrial,BurkeadmittedresponsibilityfortheaccidentandthetrialcourtgrantedHuntersmotionforadirectedverdictagainsthimontheissueofliability.ItgrantedthesamemotionastoWearandGuffey,findingthemvicariouslyliableforBurkesactions,duetothefactthatBurkehadbeentestdrivingavehicleownedbythematthetimeoftheaccident.Duringthecourtsjuryinstructions,Huntermovedforavoluntarynonsuitontheissueofpunitivedamages.Thetrialcourtgrantedthemotionandconsequentlysubmittedthecasetothejuryonlyontheissuesofcompensatorydamages,andwhetherThompsonwasliablefornegligentlyentrustingthevehicletoBurke.ThejuryfoundthatThompsonwasnotliable.Itawardedcompensatorydamagesof$270,000againsttheremainingthreedefendants.Expresslyapprovingofthejurysverdict,thetrialjudgedeniedthedefendantsmotionsforanewtrialorremittitur. Id. ,1997WL170307at*35.@ III.StandardofReview  Anappellatecourt,whenreviewingagrantofsummaryjudgment,mustdecideanewifjudgmentinasummaryfashionisappropriate. Cowdenv.SovranBank/CentralSouth ,816S.W.2d741,744(Tenn.1991).Wemustaffirmthegrantofsummaryjudgment ifthepleadings,depositions,answerstointerrogatories,andadmissionsonfile,togetherwiththeaffidavits,ifany,showthatthereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactandthatthemovingpartyisentitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.Rule56.04,Tenn.R.Civ.P.  InmakingourRule56analysis,wearenotboundbythetrialcourtsreasoning.Summaryjudgmentisaquestionoflaw.Ϝ Bainv.Wells ,936S.W.2d618,622(Tenn.1997); Cowden ,816S.W.at744.Thereisnopresumptionofcorrectnessastotheresultreachedbythetrialcourt. Bain ,936S.W.2dat622; Cowden ,816S.W.2d744.@ IV.Analysis  ThefirsttwoissuesraisedbyHaulersrequirethatwefocusonthepertinentlanguageofthepolicyofinsuranceissuedbyHaulerstoDonnieWearandJoeGuffey,doingbusinessasJ&DAutoSales.Thepartiesagreethattheseissuescanberesolvedwithreferencetothe WhoisanInsuredprovisionsofthepolicyunderSectionIILiabilityCoverage:@ SECTIONIILIABILITYCOVERAGE  A.COVERAGE@ ***  1.WHOISANINSURED  8 a.8 Thefollowingare insuredsforcovered autos.    (1)8 Youforanycovered auto.    (2)8 Anyoneelsewhileusingwithyourpermissionacovered autoyouown,hireorborrowexcept:    8 (a)Theowneroranyoneelsefromwhomyouhireorborrowacovered auto.Thisexceptiondoesnotapplyifthecovered autoisa trailerconnectedtoacovered autoyouown.    8 (b)Youremployeeifthecovered autoisownedbythatemployeeoramemberofhisorherhousehold.    8 (c)Someoneusingacovered autowhileheorsheisworkinginabusinessofselling,servicing,repairing,parkingorstoring autounlessthatbusinessisyour garageoperations.    8 (d)Yourcustomers,ifyourbusinessisshownintheDeclarationsasan autodealership.However,ifacustomerofyours:     8 (i)Hasnootheravailableinsurance(whetherprimary,excessorcontingent), 8   theyarean insuredbutonlyuptothecompulsoryorfinancialresponsibilitylawlimitswherethecovered autoisprincipallygaraged.@ ***Ӝ(Emphasisadded).ThepolicyprovidesthatHaulersmaximumliabilityforanyoneaccidentis$100,000.  ThetrialcourtheldthatthematerialfactsregardingHaulerscoveragewithrespecttoBurkesliabilityin Hunterv.Burke wereundisputed.ItdeterminedthatBurkewasdrivingavehicleownedbyWearandGuffeyatthetimehestruckHuntersbicycleandthatBurkewasthendrivingwiththeactualorconstructivepermissionoftheownersofthecarlot.Thecourtfurtherconcludedthatthewords customerand customers,asusedinthe WhoisanInsuredpartoftheliabilitycoverageofthepolicy,eitherdidnotapplytoBurkeorwereambiguous.ItheldthatBurkewasthereforeentitledtothefull$100,000ofcoverage.  Onthisappeal,HaulersmakesanumberofargumentsastowhyHunterandBurkearenotentitledtosummaryjudgmentandwhyitisentitledtosummaryjudgment.Webelievetherearereallyonlytwoquestions: 8 1.DidBurkehavethecarlotownerspermissiontousetheirvehicleatthetimeoftheaccident? 9   כ 8 2.Ifso,whatisthelimitofHaulerscoverageastotheliabilityofBurke?@ A.IssueofPermission  HaulersarguesthatBurkedidnothaveitsinsuredspermissiontodrivetheirvehicleatthetimeoftheaccident;or,inthealternative,thatthereisagenuineissueofmaterialfactwithrespecttopermissionthatrenderssummaryjudgmentinappropriate.  When Hunterv.Burke ,supra,wasappealedtothiscourt,weheldthatBurke hadthepermissionofGuffeytotestdrivethecar.Inviewofthisspecificfinding,canHaulersnowrelitigatetheissueofpermissioninthiscase?Weholdthatitcannot.Thedoctrineofcollateralestoppelprecludesarelitigationofthatissueinthiscase.  CollateralestoppelhasbeendefinedbytheSupremeCourtasfollows: 8 thedoctrineofcollateralestoppelorestoppelbyjudgmentisanextensionoftheprincipal[sic]ofresjudicata,andisgenerallyheldtobeapplicableonlywhenitaffirmativelyappearsthattheissueinvolvedinthecaseunderconsiderationhasalreadybeenlitigatedinapriorsuitbetweenthesameparties,eventhoughbaseduponadifferentcauseofaction,ifthedeterminationofsuchissueintheformeractionwasnecessarytothejudgment. Dickersonv.Godfrey ,825S.W.2d692,694(Tenn.1992)(citing HomeInsuranceCo.v.Leinart ,698S.W.2d335,336(Tenn.1985)andothercases).Inanothercase,theSupremeCourtstatedthat 8 [c]ollateralestoppeloperatestobarasecondsuitbetweenthesamepartiesandtheirpriviesonadifferentcauseofactiononlyastoissueswhichwereactuallylitigatedanddeterminedintheformersuit. Richardsonv.TennesseeBd.ofDentistry ,913S.W.2d446,459(Tenn.1995)(quoting Goekev.Woods ,777S.W.2d347,349(Tenn.1989))(quoting Massengillv.Scott ,738S.W.2d629,631(Tenn.Ϝ1987))(emphasisadded);or,asstatedanotherway,thedoctrine 8 precludesrelitigationofindividualissueswhichwereactuallyandnecessarilydeterminedinaformeractionbetweenthenamedpartiesortheirpriviesonadifferentcauseofaction. AlliedSound,Inc.v.Neely ,909S.W.2d815,820(Tenn.App.1995)(emphasisinoriginal).   Thecaseof Phillipsv.GeneralMotorsCorp. ,669S.W.2d665(Tenn.App.1984),containsthefollowingexplanationoftheconceptofprivity: 8 Privityinthetraditionalsensemeantmutualorsuccessiverelationshiptothesamerightsofproperty,butvariousstateshaveemployedotherdefinitionswhenusedinthecontextofresjudicataandcollateralestoppel.@ *** 8 TheTennesseeruleholdsthatprivityasusedinthecontextofresjudicatadoesnotembracerelationshipsbetweenpersonsorentities,butrather[goes]tothesubjectmatterofthelitigation. Cantrellv.Burnett&HendersonCo. ,187Tenn.552,216S.W.2d307(1948). Id. at669.Inanothercase,afterfindingthatcollateralestoppelwasapplicabletothefactsbeforeit,theSupremeCourtnotedthatcollateralestoppelwasanextensionofthedoctrineofresjudicata,andthat [p]rivitywithinthemeaningofthedoctrineofresjudicataisprivityasitexistsinrelationtothesubjectmatterofthelitigation. Harrisv.St.MarysMedicalCenter,Inc. ,726S.W.2d902,905(Tenn.1987).  Intheinstantcase,itisclearthattherewasprivitybetweenHaulersanditsinsureds,WearandGuffey.Thesepartieshadanidenticalinterest inrelationtothesubjectmatteroftheunderlyingtortaction.See Harris ,726S.W.2dat905.WearandGuffeysoughttoavoidpersonalliabilityintheunderlyingtortactionbyshowingthatBurkedidnothavepermissiontodrivetheirvehicle.Bythesametoken,alackofpermissionisatthecoreofHaulerspositionintheinstantcase.IfBurkedidnothavepermissiontodrive,hisliabilitytoHunterisnotcoveredunderthetermsofHaulerspolicy.Underthedoctrineofcollateralestoppel,HaulersisestoppedfromrelitigatingtheissueofwhetherBurkehadthepermissionofthecarlotownerssincethisissuewaspreviouslylitigatedintheunderlyingtortϜaction.SinceWearandGuffeyareboundbythatdecision,soisHaulers.Thus,Haulersisboundbyadecisionthathasbeenadverselydecidedtoitspositioninthiscase.@ B.Coverage  Haulersarguesthat,evenifBurkehadpermissiontodrivethevehicleinquestion,thetrialcourterredinholdingthatthemaximumlimitofliabilityunderthepolicy$100,000appliestoBurkesliabilitytoHunter,asdeterminedintheunderlyingtortaction.HaulerspointstoparagraphA(1)(a)(2)(d)(i)oftheliabilitycoverage,whichprovides,inpertinentpart,asfollows: 8 ...ifacustomerofyours[h]asnootheravailableinsurance(whetherprimary,excessorcontingent),theyare insuredbutonlyuptothecompulsoryorfinancialresponsibilitylawlimitswherethecovered autoisprincipallygaraged.Thus,HaulersclaimsthatitsmaximumcoverageforBurkesliabilitytoHunterintheunderlyingtortactionis$25,000,theminimumindividuallimitofcoverageundertheTennesseeFinancialResponsibilityLaw.SeeT.C.A.5512102(12)(C)(ii).̛  Thetrialcourtheldthatthewordcustomer seemstobesynonymouswithabuyerorapurchaser. :   ׀Itconcludedthat,sinceBurkedidnotpurchasethecarthathewastestdrivingatthetimeoftheaccident,hewas nomoreapurchaserthanaprospectiveinsuredisaninsured.ItconcludedthatBurkewasa mereprospectivecustomer[].Hence,sothetrialcourtreasoned,paragraphA(1)(a)(2)(d)(i)oftheliabilitysectionofthepolicydidnotencompasshimwithinitsterms.  Inthealternative,thetrialcourtconcludedthatthe meaningofcustomersisambiguousandmust,therefore,beconstruedagainsttheinsurancecompanyandinfavoroftheinsured,citingthecaseof St.PaulFire&MarineIns.v.Torpoco ,879S.W.2d831(Tenn.1994).Thus,thetrialcourtheldthat,asconstruedinfavoroftheinsured,Burkewasanoncustomerwhowasdrivingwithpermission,andhenceentitledtothefull$100,000ofcoverageunderthegeneral permissionlanguageofparagraphA(1)(a)(2).  Itisaxiomaticthat [i]nsurancecontractsaresubjecttothesamerulesofconstructionandenforcementasapplytocontractsgenerally. McKimmv.Bell ,790S.W.2d526,527(Tenn.1990);seealso AllstateIns.Co.v.Wilson ,856S.W.2d706,708(Tenn.App.1992); Whaleyv.Underwood ,922S.W.2d110,112(Tenn.App.1995).Therefore,generallyspeaking,courtsmustenforcecontractsaswritten,absentfraudormistake. Id .Wordsusedininsurancecontractsmustbegiventheirusualandordinarymeaning. DrexelChemicalCo.v.BituminousIns.Co. ,933S.W.2d471,477(Tenn.App.1996); Gredigv.TennesseeFarmersMut.Ins.Co. ,891S.W.2d909,912(Tenn.App.1994); Hillv.TennesseeRuralHealthImprovementAssn ,882S.W.2d801,802(Tenn.App.1994).  Wemustrespectfullydisagreewiththetrialcourtsreasoning.Wefindandholdthattheword customer,accordingtoitsusualandordinarymeaning,includeswithinitsambitsomeonewhocomesonacarlotforthepurposeoftestdrivingacar.Inordinaryparlance,onewhoisconsideringapurchaseaswasBurkeisacustomerwhetherthatpersonactuallyconsummatesapurchaseornot.Thisisparticularlytrueinthiscase,giventhecontextinwhichthewordisusedinthesubjectpolicy.  ThepolicyprovisionsbeforeusaddresscoveragefortheϜliabilityofoneusingavehicle own[ed],hire[d]orborrow[ed]byJ&DAutoSales.Theword customermustbeviewedinthiscontext.Toconstruetheword customertomean,orataminimumtoinclude,onewhohasalreadypurchasedavehicleisinconsistentwiththegeneralfocusoftheliabilitysectionofthepolicy.Generallyspeaking,onceanindividualtakesownershipofavehicle,thepreviousownerinthiscaseJ&DAutoSalesnolongerhasaneedforliabilityinsurancesinceitnolongerhasanypotentialliability.Theprovisioninquestionisdesignedtocovera customerbeforeownershippasses;therefore, customercannotbeconstruedtoaddressauserofavehicleafterownershiphaspassed.  Ifpossible,wemustconstrueasinglewordinapolicyofinsuranceinawaythatisconsistentwithotherpertinentpartsofthepolicy.See Raineyv.Stansell ,836S.W.2d117,119(Tenn.App.1992)( Allprovisionsofacontractshouldbeconstruedasinharmonywitheachother...soastoavoidrepugnancybetweentheseveralprovisionsofasinglecontract.)  Wefindnoambiguityintheword customerasusedintheHaulerspolicy. ;   כWeholdthatthespecificprovisionsofparagraphA(1)(a)(2)(d)(i)applytoBurke.ItresultsthatBurke,asa customer,islimitedtocoverageof$25,000withrespecttohisliabilitytoHunterintheunderlyingtortcase.Insoholding,wedonotaddressthequestionofavailablecoverageundertheHaulerspolicywithrespecttoHuntersjudgmentagainstWearandGuffey.TheinstantcasedidnotseekadeclarationastothecoverageavailabletoWearandGuffeywithrespecttoHunterssuitagainstthem.Thisissueisnotbeforeusandwedonotdecideit.̛̜@ C.OtherIssues  ThetrialcourtalloweddiscretionarycoststotheappelleeHunterintheamountof$371.00,representingaportionofthecostofthetranscriptoftheunderlyingtortaction.Thattranscriptwasfiledintheinstantcase.Anawardofsuchcostsissubjecttothediscretionofthetrialcourt. Lockv.NationalUnionFireIns.Co.ofPittsburgh ,809S.W.2d483,490(Tenn.1991).Wefindnoabuseofthatdiscretion.  ThelastissuemadebytheappellantpertainstothetrialcourtsrefusaltorequireHuntertoproduceastatementallegedlygivenbyThompsontoHunterscounsel.ThisstatementisrelevanttotheissueofwhetherBurkehadthepermissionofthecarlotownerstodrivetheircaratthetimeoftheaccident.OurfindingthatHaulersiscollaterallyestoppedtoraisethisissuerendersthisquestionmoot.@ V.Conclusion  ThetrialcourtsjudgmentismodifiedtoreflectthatthelimitofliabilitycoverageapplicabletoBurkesliabilitytoHunterundertheHaulerspolicyis$25,000.Inallotherrespects,thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.Exercisingourdiscretion,wetaxthecostsonappealonehalftotheappellantandonehalftotheappelleeHunter.Thiscaseisremandedforsuchfurtherproceedingsasmaybenecessary,consistentwiththisopinion,andforcollectionofcostsassessedbelow,allpursuanttoapplicablelaw.      __________________________      CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,J.CONCUR:________________________HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.________________________DonT.McMurray,J.