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B`@`@ 0}@ D3!A D-TA 0KAA ASAB 0B 0DC ACHP LaserJet 8000 Series PS0?2G+J 0_level1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  (`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular2D+J 0_level2   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2A+J 0_level3   ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2   C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt2>+J 0_level4  ` &<<DL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2;+J 0_level5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  28+J 0_level6    DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  25+J 0_level7  h DDL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  ӁLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 522+J 0_level8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2/+J 0_level9    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levsl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levsl2   ," <DL,23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levsl3   ) <DL)23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levsl4  ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levsl5   #DL#23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levsl6    DL 23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levsl7  h DDL23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levsl8   L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levsl9    L23  Ԁ  2( 4 <DL2  2GJ 0_levnl1  X /%4 4 <DL/23   2( 4 <DL2  2DJ 0_levnl2   ," <DL,23   2( 4 <DL2  2AJ 0_levnl3   ) <DL)23   2( 4 <DL2  2>J 0_levnl4  ` &<<DL&23   2( 4 <DL2  2;J 0_levnl5   #DL#23   2( 4 <DL2  28J 0_levnl6    DL 23   2( 4 <DL2  25J 0_levnl7  h DDL23   2( 4 <DL2  22J 0_levnl8   L23   2( 4 <DL2  2/J 0_levnl9    L23   2( 4 <DL2  <:Default ParaXXXXXX\  `&Times New Roman0;;.header   !XXX   !XXX<6X9`(Courier New 4#  2             Paragraphs13and14oftheagreementprovideasfollows:   8  8`   13.SURRENDER.BythisLease,Lesseeacquiresnoownership p rightsintheEquipment,andhasnooptiontopurchasesame.Upon \ theexpiration,orearlierterminationorcancellationofthisLease,or H intheeventofadefaultunderParagraph21,hereof,Lessee,atits 4 expense,shallreturntheEquipmentingoodrepair,ordinarywearand  p tearresultingfromproperusethereofaloneexcepted,bydelivering  \ it,packedandreadyforshipment,tosuchplaceorcarrierasLessor H mayspecify.4` x` x 8  8`   14.RENEWAL.AttheexpirationoftheLease,Lesseeshallreturn   theEquipmentinaccordancewithParagraph13,hereof.AtLessors  option,thisLeasemaybecontinuedonamonthtomonthbasisuntil  30daysafterLesseereturnstheEquipmenttoLessor.Intheeventthe  Leaseissocontinued,LesseeshallpaytoLessorrentalsinthesame l periodicamountsindicatedunder AmountofEachPayment,above.X ` x` x Theseparagraphsarepartofapreprintedform.Attachedtotheagreementasanaddendumisa 0"  typewrittenoptiontopurchase,providing,inpertinentpart,asfollows: #l! 8  8`   Forandinconsiderationofsaidlease,Lessordoesherebyagreethat $D # thefollowingtermsandconditionswillbeextendedtolesseeupon %0!$ satisfactorycompletionofallthetermsandconditionsofsaidlease.&"%` x` x 8  8`   1.Lesseemayreturntheequipmentleasedinaccordancewith (#' provisionsoftheLeaseAgreement.)$(` x` x Ї8  8`   2.Lesseemayexercisehisoptiontopurchasetheleasedequipment  foritsFairMarketValue,estimatedtobetenpercent(10%).` x` x BoththepreprintedformandthetypewrittenaddendumwerepreparedbyU.S.Commerce. t   Upontheexpirationoftheinitialtermin1998,Burkhartcontinuedtomakemonthly L  paymentsatthemonthlyratespecifiedfortheoriginalterm.AlthoughU.S.Commercewasaware 8  thatall27paymentsrequiredfortheinitialtermhadbeenmade,itcontinuedtosendinvoicesto $ t Burkhart.ItdidnotsendnoticetoBurkhartthathehadcompletedmakingthescheduledpayments  ` orthatU.S.Commercewastreatinghimasaholdovertenant.However,acheckfromBurkhartto  L  U.S.CommercedatedSeptember22,1998,aftertheinitialtermhadexpired,hadthewords  8   RenewalIncomeaffixedtoit,apparentlyplacedtherebyU.S.Commerce. $    BurkhartcontinuedtomakepaymentsuntilJuly13,1999.InAugust,1999,hebecameaware   thattheoriginaltermhadexpiredin1998,andhecontactedU.S.Commerce,whichallowedhimto   exercisehisoptiontopurchasefor$11,012.75;butU.S.CommercerefusedBurkhartsrequestfor   arefundofthemoniesBurkhartpaidinexcessofthetotalpaymentsrequiredduringtheoriginal p term.Burkhartsubsequentlyfiledsuit,seekingreturnofhis overpayments.5 4#  3      ׀ \   Afterabenchtrial,thechancellorstatedthefollowingfromthebench: 4 8  8`   [A]ttheendofthelease,pursuanttotheleaseandtheaddendum,I  \ believe[Burkhart]hadthreeoptions,andthatwastoreturn8the H equipment;tokeepitonamonthtomonthtenancyatthesamerate 4 asunderthelease;andthen,undertheaddendum,[he]hadtheoption   topurchasetheequipmentforanestimatedpercentageofpurchase   price.` x` x 8  8`   Idontthinktheresanyquestiontheplaintiff,withoutmeaningto  andmistakenlyandforprobablyreasonsbeyond!somewhatbeyond l hiscontrol,performedasifhewereunderoptiontwo,andthatisto X  keeptheequipmentandpayamonthlyrental.D!` x` x 8  8`   Theresnoevidenceofamutualmistake;theresnoevidenceoffraud #l! oranallegationoffraud.$X"` x` x 8  8`   Whentheplaintiffrealizedwhathadhappened,heexercisedhis %0!$ option,butinthemeantime,hadretainedpossessionduringthe &"% precedingmonths,andIthink[he]isnotentitledtoajudgment,  except,however,Ibelievethatwithhis27installments,heboughtthe  rightat36monthsofpossession.Ibelieveheoverpaidthatbya  monthandshouldberewarded[sic]thatpayment8.t` x` x ThetrialcourtthusawardedBurkhart$10,304.92,theequivalentofonemonthlypayment.Itdid L  notawardeitherpartyattorneysfees,nordiditawardprejudgmentinteresttoBurkhart. 8    Burkhartnowappeals,arguingthatthetrialcourterred(1)infailingtoawardhimtheamount  ` oftheinstallmentpaymentshemadeaftertheexpirationoftheinitialterm;(2)infailingtoaward  L  himprejudgmentinterest;and(3)infailingtoawardhimattorneysfeesastheprevailingparty.U.S.  8  CommercearguesonappealthatthetrialcourterredinmakinganyawardtoBurkhart. $    II.   h+    Inthisnonjurycase,ourreviewisdenovoupontherecord,withapresumptionof   correctnessastothetrialcourtsfactualdeterminations,unlesstheevidencepreponderates p otherwise.Tenn.R.App.P.13(d); Wrightv.CityofKnoxville ,898S.W.2d177,181(Tenn.1995); \  UnionCarbideCorp.v.Huddleston ,854S.W.2d87,91(Tenn.1993).Thetrialcourtsconclusions H oflaw,however,areaccordednosuchpresumption. Campbellv.FloridaSteelCorp. ,919S.W.2d 4 26,35(Tenn.1996); Presleyv.Bennett ,860S.W.2d857,859(Tenn.1993).  p       Ourdenovoreviewisalsosubjecttothewellestablishedprinciplethatthetrialcourtisin H thebestpositiontoassessthecredibilityofthewitnesses;accordingly,suchdeterminationsare 4 entitledtogreatweightonappeal. Massengalev.Massengale ,915S.W.2d818,819(Tenn.Ct.   App.1995); Bowmanv.Bowman ,836S.W.2d563,566(Tenn.Ct.App.1991).     III.  A. l 0    Paragraph7oftheagreementprovidesthatit shallbeinterpretedinaccordancewiththe D! lawsandregulationsofthestateofLessorsprincipalplaceofbusiness.St.Louis,Missouriisthe 0"  defendantsprincipalplaceofbusiness.Paragraph7oftheagreementisvalidunderT.C.A.471 #l! 105(1).6 4#  4      ׀Hence,Missourilawgovernstheresolutionofthiscase. $X"   %0!$   <P=PB.  !3  Manyofthepartiesargumentsarebasedupontheirrespectivecharacterizations!aseither  afinancingarrangementoratruelease!oftheagreementatissue.Thepartiesstipulatedattrialthat t  itisa financeleaseunderMo.Rev.Stat.400.2A103(g)(1994).7 4#  5      ׀#)X)Xş#)XşX)Paragraph2ofthepreprinted ` portionoftheagreementstatesthat itistheintentofbothpartiestothisLeasethatitqualifyasa L  statutoryfinanceleaseunderArticle2AoftheUniformCommercialCode.#?XşXX)Xş#)XşXX?Xş#)X)XşI5#Ԁ)XşX)Despitethestipulation 8  andthelanguageoftheagreement,Burkhartarguesthattheagreementwasmoreofafinancing J  arrangementthanatruelease.Heassertsthattheagreementwasmodifiedbythetypewrittenoption 6  topurchasepreparedbyU.S.Commerce,which,accordingtoBurkhart,revealsthatthetrueintention " r  ofthepartieswasthatBurkhartwouldtaketitletotheequipmentaftermakingthe27paymentsby ^  exercisinghisoptiontopurchase.U.S.Commercecountersthattheoptiontopurchasedidnot J  convertthetransactionintoasecurityagreement.Itcontendsthattheagreementisafinancelease 6   withinthemeaningoftheMissouriCode.Hence,aprimarypointofcontentioniswhetherthe "  <P <  <  agreement,asawhole,constitutesafinanceleaseoris,infact,asecuredtransactionindisguise.8 4#  6      ׀   Thetrialcourt,byfindingthatBurkhartretainedtheequipmentaftertheexpirationofthetermas  amonthtomonthtenant,implicitlyfoundthattheagreementwasatruelease.    Theofficialcommentswarnthattheterm,financelease, inothercontexts,maysometimes ` encompassdisguisedsecuredtransactions.SeeMo.Rev.Stat.400.2A103(g)(1994),comment L  (g)( toavoidconfusionitisimportanttonotethatinothercontexts,e.g.,taxandaccounting,the 8  termfinanceleasehasbeenusedtoconnotedifferenttypesofleasetransactions,includingleasesthat $ t aredisguisedsecuredtransactions.).However,inthecontextoftheMissouriCommercialCode,  ` atransactionconstitutinga financeleaseisentirelydifferentfromatransactioncreatingasecurity  L  interest.Thedefinitionofa securityinterestisfoundinMo.Rev.Stat.400.1201(37)(1994),  8  whichprovides,inpertinentpart,asfollows: $  8  8`    Securityinterestmeansaninterestinpersonalpropertyorfixtures   whichsecurespaymentorperformanceofanobligation. ` x` x Thatsubsectionelaboratesonthedistinctionbetweenaleaseandasecurityinterest: p 8  8`   Whetheratransactioncreatesaleaseorsecurityinterestisdetermined H bythefactsofeachcase;however,atransactioncreatesasecurity 4 interestiftheconsiderationthelesseeistopaythelessorfortheright  p topossessionanduseofthegoodsisanobligationforthetermofthe  \ leasenotsubjecttoterminationbythelessee,9  4#  7      ׀andH` x` x 8        8 @ 8@`   ***   C8  8`   (d)thelesseehasanoptiontobecometheownerofthegoods  for8nominaladditionalconsiderationuponcompliancewiththe  leaseagreement.` x` x (Emphasisadded). X  Ї  Burkhartarguesthatthetransactioncreatedasecurityinterestbecausethetypewritten  agreementgavehimanoptiontopurchasetheequipmentfornominalconsideration.Theconcept  of nominaladditionalconsiderationiselaborateduponinsubsection(x)ofMo.Rev.Stat.400.1  201(37),whichprovides,inpertinentpart,asfollows: t 8  8`   Additionalconsiderationisnotnominalif8(ii)whentheoptionto L  becometheownerofthegoodsisgrantedtothelesseethepriceis 8  statedtobethefairmarketvalueofthegoodsdeterminedatthetime $ t theoptionistobeperformed.Additionalconsiderationisnominalif  ` itislessthanthelesseesreasonablypredictablecostofperforming  L  undertheleaseagreementiftheoptionisnotexercised. 8 ` x` x Thepertinentlanguageoftheoptionatissueisasfollows:   8  8`   Lesseemayexercisehisoptiontopurchasetheleasedequipmentfor   itsFairMarketValue,estimatedtobetenpercent(10%). ` x` x (Emphasisadded).Ascanbeseen,thelanguagegrantstoBurkharttheoptiontopurchasethe \ equipmentforitsfairmarketvalue.Thus,underMo.Rev.Stat.400.1201(37)(x),theadditional H considerationrequiredtoexercisetheoptionisnotnominalinthesensethatitisstatedtobethefair 4 marketvalue.However,theoptiontopurchasealsoestimatesthefairmarketvalueoftheequipment  p tobe tenpercent.ThefinalsentenceofMo.Rev.Stat.400.1201(37)(x),providesthat  \  [a]dditionalconsiderationisnominalifitislessthanthelesseesreasonablypredictablecostof H performingundertheleaseagreementiftheoptionisnotexercised.(Emphasisadded).Burkhart 4 urgesustoconsiderthe economicrealitiesofthetransactionandtocometotheconclusionthat    nobusinesspersonorprofessionalwouldrentequipmentforanadditionalmonthfor$10,304.92   whenthepurchasepricewas$11,012.75,adifferenceofonly$707.83,andthat [e]venmore  obviousisthatyouwouldnotleaseequipmentforeight(8)additionalmonthsonthoseabsurd  terms.Inessence,Burkhartsargumentisthattheadditionalconsideration!either$20,400(10%  ofthecostoftheequipment)or$11,012.75!isnominalbecauseitwaslessthanBurkhartscostof l continuingtoperformunderthecontract!paying$10,304.92permonthforanadditionaleight X  monthsafterexpirationoftheoriginalleaseterm. D!     WearenotpersuadedbyBurkhartsargument.Thereisnoproofintherecordofwhatthe #l! precise additionalconsiderationtoexercisetheoptionwouldhavebeenattheexpirationofthe $X" originaltermofthelease.Burkhartsargumentassumesthattheadditionalconsiderationwould $D # havebeenequaltothetenpercentestimate,$20,400,orequaltothefigureof$11,012.75,theoption %0!$ priceagreeduponbythepartiesalmostayearaftertheexpirationoftheoriginalterm.Becausethere &"% isnoproofastowhattheadditionalconsiderationwouldhavebeenattherelevanttime,i.e.,atthe '#& endoftheinitialterm,wecannotdeterminewhethertheadditionalconsiderationislessthan (#' Burkhartsreasonablypredictablecostofperformingundertheleaseagreementiftheoptionwasnot )$( exercised. |*%)  h+&* =P =  =    Inaddition,wearewaryofBurkhartsmethodofcalculatinghis reasonablypredictablecost  ofperformingundertheleaseagreementiftheoptionisnotexercised.Itisnotnecessarilytruethat  anyreasonablepersonwouldelecttopurchaseequipmentfor$20,400oreven$11,012.75ratherthan  paying$10,304.92permonthtocontinuerentingthatsameequipment.Therecouldbeanynumber t ofreasonsonemightchoosenottoexercisehisorheroptiontopurchase.Forexample,onemight ` notwanttoownpropertyforaccounting,tax,orotherbusinessreasons.Evenassumingthatwe L  knewthepreciseamountofthe additionalconsideration,i.e.,thefairmarketvalueoftheleased 8  equipmentattheendoftheinitialterm,wearestillfacedwiththeillusiveconceptofBurkharts $ t  reasonablypredictablecostofperformingundertheleaseagreementiftheoptionisnotexercised.  ` Thisisbecause,asofthedateoftheexpirationoftheinitialterm,thereisnowaytoknowhowmany  L  monthsunderthemonthtomonthholdoverleasethatBurkhartintendedtocontinuetoleasethe  8  subjectequipment.Ifhehaddecidedtoleasetheequipmentforjustonemoremonth!ashewas $  certainlyentitledtodounderthemonthtomonthholdover!themonthlyrental,i.e.,$10,304.92,   wouldhavebeenlessthanthepurchaseprice,beit$20,400(10%ofthecostoftheequipment)or   $11,012.75,thepriceatwhichBurkhartwaspermittedtopurchasethepropertyoneyearlater.   Burkhartwouldhaveuscomparetheover$80,000paidbyhimaftertheinitialtermwiththe$20,400   figureor$11,012.75,andconcludefromthisthattheadditionalcompensationisnominal.The p problemwiththisapproachisthatBurkhartwasnotobligatedtokeeptheequipmentformorethan \ onemonthafterheretaineditfollowingtheexpirationoftheinitialterm.Therefore,theeight H monthscannotlogicallybeequatedwiththeperiodoftime ofperformingundertheleaseagreement 4 iftheoptionisnotexercised.IfBurkhartsapproachiscorrect,justaboutanyleasethatdefaults  p toamonthtomonthtenancyattheendoftheoriginaltermcouldbeclassifiedasasecured  \ transactionbecausethecostofcontinuingasamonthtomonthtenantwillatsomepointaddupto H morethanastaticpurchaseoptionprice. 4   Wefindthatthetrialcourtcorrectlycharacterizedthetransactionasafinanceleaseasthat   termisdefinedinMo.Rev.Stat.400.2A103(g).    C.  a  Burkhartarguesthat,evenifwefindthepartiesagreementtobeafinancelease,stillthetrial X  courterredinfindingthathewasnotentitledtorecoverallmoniespaidtoU.S.Commerceinexcess D! ofthe27scheduledpaymentsplustheoptionpurchasepriceof$11,012.75.Hisargumentstakestwo 0"  forms:(1)thatweshouldviewtheextrapaymentsasanexerciseoftheoptiontopurchasethe #l! equipment;and(2)thatbecauseBurkhartsextrapaymentsweremadetoU.S.Commerce by $X" mistake,U.S.Commercemust,inequityandgoodconscience,returnthosefundstoBurkhartunder $D # theequitabledoctrineofmoneyhadandreceived.Wewilladdressthesecontentionsinturn. %0!$   Withrespecttothefirstofthesearguments,Burkhartpositstwosteps.First,heassertsthat '#& thetypewrittenoptiontopurchasesupercededparagraphs13and14ofthepreprintedformand (#' therebyextinguishedthepossibilityofdefaultingtoamonthtomonthtenancy.Theargument )$(  concludesthatBurkhartsextrapaymentsshouldbeviewedasanoverpaymentofhisexerciseofthe |*%) optiontopurchase,especiallyinlightofthefactthatU.S.Commercemisledhim,albeit  unintentionally,bycontinuingtosendinvoicestoBurkhartafterexpirationoftheterm.     Ifacontractisopentotwointerpretations,itisambiguous. Linnenbrinkv.FirstNatlBank t  839S.W.2d618,622(Mo.Ct.App.1992).Ambiguitiesaretobeconstruedagainstthepartywho ` draftedthedocument. Grauev.MissouriPropertyIns.PlacementFacility ,847S.W.2d779,785 L  (Mo.1993)(enbanc). [W]herepreprintedportionsofacontractconflictwithtypewrittenportions 8  ofthesamecontract,thetypewrittenportionswillprevail. Mewsv.CharlieChanPublishingCo. , $ t 884S.W.2d109,111(Mo.Ct.App.1994).  `   Paragraph13statesunequivocallythattheleasegivesBurkhartnoownershiprightsinthe  8  equipmentandthathehasnooptiontopurchasetheequipment.ItalsostatesthatBurkhartmust $  returntheequipmentuponexpirationoftheterm.Paragraph14providesthatBurkhartmustreturn   theequipmentattheexpirationoftheterm,butalsoprovidesthatU.S.Commercehastheoptionof   continuingtheleaseonamonthtomonthbasisafterexpirationoftheoriginalterm.Thetypewritten   optiontopurchaseprovidesthatBurkhartmaypurchasetheequipmentuponsatisfactorycompletion   ofthelease. p   Weareoftheopinionthattheoptiontopurchasesupercedesonlythatportionofparagraph H 13statingtothecontrary,i.e.,thatBurkharthasnooptiontopurchasetheequipment.Thus,atthe 4 expirationoftheterm,Burkhartcouldhavereturnedtheequipment,#?XşXX)Xş6#)XşXX?XşU.S.Commercecouldhave  p exerciseditsoptiontocontinuetheleaseonamonthtomonthbasis,or#?XşXX)Xş(o#)XşXX?XşԀBurkhartcouldhave  \ exercisedhisoptiontopurchase.Accordingly,werejectBurkhartsfirstlineofreasoning. H   Burkhartnextarguesthatmakingadditionalpaymentsfollowingtheexpirationoftheterm   oftheagreementconstitutedanexerciseoftheoptiontopurchase,especiallyinlightofthefactthat   U.S.Commercesactofcontinuingtosendmonthlyinvoicesafterexpirationofthetermwas  misleadingandcontributedtoBurkhartsmistake.Hereliesuponthefollowing:  8  8`   Asageneralrule,inabsenceofequities,anoptioneeisheldtostrict l compliancewiththetermsofanoptionagreement8.Anoptioneewill X  beexcusedfromstrictcompliancewherehisconductinfailingto D! complywasnotduetowillfulorgrossnegligenceonthepartofthe 0"  optioneebutwasrathertheresultofanhonestandjustifiablemistake. #l! Inaddition,equitywillalsoexcusestrictcompliancewherethestrict $X" compliancewaspreventedbysomeactoftheoptionorsuchaswaiver $D # ormisleadingrepresentationsorconduct.%0!$` x` x  CattleFeeders,Inc.v.Jordan ,549S.W.2d29,3233(Tex.App.1977)(citationsomitted). '#&     WecannotviewBurkharts extrapaymentsasanexerciseofhisoptiontopurchasethe )$( equipment.TheevidencedoesnotpreponderateinfavorofafindingthatU.S.Commercesactof |*%) sendinginvoicesaftertheexpirationofthetermwasmisleading.Itisaplausibleexplanationthat h+&* sendingtheinvoiceswasU.S.Commerceswayofexercisingitsoptiontocontinuetheleaseona  monthtomonthbasis.OneofthefirstchecksU.S.Commercedepositedafterthetermexpiredwas  processedandreturnedtoBurkhartbyhisbankwiththenotation RenewalIncome.Burkhart  signedtheoriginalagreementandretainedacopyofit;ifhedidnotwishtocontinuetheleaseafter t theoriginaltermended,hecouldhaveeitherreturnedtheequipmentorexercisedhisoptionto ` purchase.Hedidneitheruntilalmostayearlaterwhenheexercisedtheoptiontopurchase. L      Moreover,bythetermsoftheoptionitwastobeexercisedbypaymentofthefairmarket $ t valueoftheequipment.Aswestatedearlier,thereisabsolutelynoproofintherecordastothefair  ` marketvalueoftheequipmentasofthedateoftheexpirationoftheoriginalterm.Itwouldbe  L  impossibletofindthataportionofBurkhartspaymentsafterthetermconstitutedpaymentofthe  8  fairmarketvalueoftheequipmentwhenthereisnoproofastothatamount.Wecanmakeno $  assumptionsabouttheunprovenvalueofthisequipment.Thisisbecausemanyfactorsimpactthe   fairmarketvalueofequipment,suchastheconditionoftheequipment.Thatvalueisalsoimpacted   bytechnologicaladvancesthatcansubstantiallyreducethevalueofolderequipmentrendered   obsoleteornearobsoletebysuchadvances.Hence,wefindandholdthattheevidencedoesnot   preponderateagainstthetrialcourtsfindingthatBurkhartperformedasamonthtomonthtenant p uponexpirationoftheoriginaltermoftheleaseuntilheexercisedhisoptiontopurchasethe \ equipmentinAugust,1999. H   D.  p p    Burkhartalsoarguesthatbecausehemadetheextrapaymentsbymistake,U.S.Commerce H mustreturnthosefundsundertheequitabledoctrineofmoneyhadandreceived. 4     Aplaintiffmaybringanaction formoneyhadandreceivedagainstadefendantwhohas   receivedmoneyfromtheplaintiff undercircumstancesthatinequityandgoodconsciencerequire  thedefendanttoreturnthemoneytotheplaintiff. Ryanv.Tinker ,744S.W.2d502,504(Mo.Ct.  App.1988);seealso ThirdNatlBankv.St.CharlesSavingsBank ,149S.W.495,502(Mo.1912);   Alarconv.Dickerson ,719S.W.2d458,461(Mo.Ct.App.1986); NewcoLandCo.v.Martin ,213 l S.W.2d504(Mo.Ct.App.1948).Theaction,whichisequitableinnature,is verybroadand X  flexible. Alarcon, 719S.W.2dat461. Thetendencyofthecourtsistowidenratherthanrestrict D! itsscope. Id . 0"        Thedoctrineissometimesdiscussedintermsofrestitutionorunjustenrichment.See Petrie $X" v.LeVan ,799S.W.2d632,635(Mo.Ct.App.1990)( Apersonwhoconfersabenefituponanother $D # becauseofamistakeisentitledtorestitutionifthemistakecausedtheconferringofthebenefit.  The %0!$ righttorestitutionforunjustenrichmentpresupposes:(1)thatthedefendantwasenrichedbythe &"% receiptofabenefit;(2)thattheenrichmentwasattheexpenseoftheplaintiff;(3)thatitwouldbe '#& unjusttoallowthedefendanttoretainthebenefit.)(citationomitted). (#'       Onecircumstancethat inequityandgoodconsciencemightrequireadefendanttoreturn |*%) moneytoaplaintiffiswherethedefendantreceivedthemoneyduetoamistake.See BlueCross h+&* HealthServs.,Inc.v.Sauer ,800S.W.2d72,76(Mo.Ct.App.1990)( Theappropriateactionwhen  onepartyhasbeenunjustlyenrichedthroughthemistakenpaymentofmoneybytheotherpartyis  anactionatlawformoneyhadandreceived.); TicorTitleIns.Co.v.Mundelius ,887S.W.2d726,  727(Mo.Ct.App.1994)( Onewhoconfersabenefituponanotherduetoamistakeisentitledto t restitutioniftheconferringofthebenefitwascausedbythemistake.); Petrie, 799S.W.2dat635 ` ( Thus,apersonwhohasreceivedmoneyfromanotherbymistake,moneythatinequityandgood L  consciencethepersonoughtnottokeep,maybecompelledtomakerestitution!eventhoughthe 8  mistakewasanhonestone.). $ t       Theconverseoftheruleisthatonecannotrecoverapaymentmadetoanother,evenifmade  L  bymistake,iftheonetowhomthepaymentismademayingoodconscienceretainthemoney.See  8   Fosterv.Kirby ,31Mo.496,497(1862); Leachv.Cowan ,125Tenn.182,140S.W.1070,1077 $  (1911);seealsoRestatementofRestitution60(1937)( Apersonwhohasperformedadutyowed   toanother,enforceableatlaworinequity,isnotentitledtorestitutionfromtheotherforsuch   performance,althoughtheperformancewasinducedbymistakeorbythefraudoftheother.);66   Am.Jur.2dRestitutionandImpliedContracts137(1973)( Toallowrecoveryofapaymentjustly   duealthoughmadebymistakewouldinequitable,andhencewouldfallwithintheprinciplethata p paymentinducedbymistakecannotberecoveredifthepayeeisentitledinequityandgood \ consciencetoretainit.).Moreover, [i]nordertosustainanactionformoneyhadandreceived H theremustbenoconsiderationforthemoneyortheconsiderationmusthavefailed. Ryan ,744 4 S.W.2dat505.  p     BurkhartarguesthatallpaymentsmadetoU.S.Commerceinexcessofthe27scheduled H paymentsandthepurchasepriceweremadebymistake,andthatconsideringtheeconomicreality 4 ofthetransaction,U.S.Commercemust,inequityandgoodconscience,returnthosepaymentsto   Burkhart.     Aswehavealreadyfound,theagreementatissueisatruefinanceleaseandtheevidence  doesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsconclusionthatBurkhartperformedasamonthto  monthtenantundertheleaseaftertheexpirationoftheinitialterm.Thus,anypaymentsmadeby l himafterexpirationofthetermweremadeasamonthtomonthtenantandequityandgood X  consciencedonotrequireU.S.Commerce,asamonthtomonthlessor,toreturnthosepayments. D!   E. #l! c  Burkhartnextarguesthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveawardedhimprejudgmentinteresteither $D # fromthetimeU.S.Commerceknewallscheduledpaymentshadbeenmadeorfromthedate %0!$ Burkhartrequestedarefund. &"%   T.C.A.4714123(1995)providesthat (#' 8  8`   [p]rejudmentinterest,i.e.,interestasanelementof,orinthenature |*%) of,damages,8maybeawardedbycourtsorjuriesinaccordancewith h+&* theprinciplesofequityatanyratenotinexcessofamaximum  effectiverateoftenpercent(10%)perannum....` x` x #?XşXX)Xşo#)XşXX?Xş<( 4 <DLX<Inmakinganawardofprejudgmentinterest,trialcourtsaretofollowseveralprinciples.Most t importantly,theawardmustbeequitableunderthecircumstances. Myintv.AllstateIns.Co. ,970 ` S.W.2d920,927(Tenn.1998);T.C.A.4714123.Thedecisionofwhethertoawardprejudgment L  interestiswithinthesounddiscretionofthetrialcourtandwillnotbedisturbedbyanappellatecourt 8  absenta manifestandpalpableabuseofdiscretion. Myint ,970S.W.2dat927. $ t B.X4 <7cLXB#?XşXX)Xş#+XGXX?Xş#?XşXX+XG›#)XşXX?XşK( 4 <DLXX7cXK  WefindthatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionindecliningtoawardBurkhart  6  prejudgmentinterestinthiscase.  "    F.      Burkhartnextarguesthatthetrialcourterredinnotawardinghimhisreasonableattorneys   feesbecause,sotheargumentgoes,heshouldhaveprevailedattrial.Becausewehavefoundthat n  theevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsjudgment,wefindandholdthatBurkhart Z isnotentitledtoattorneysfees. F Ѐ  G. n *  ! !X!)XşXX)Xş  ?( 4 <DL!?*9  *9ߟ݌̌   XX)XşXX)Xş    Finally,U.S.CommercearguesonappealthatthetrialcourterredinawardingBurkharta F judgmentfor$10,304.92.Thisamountreflectswhatthetrialcourtconsideredtobeanextra 2 paymentmadeduringtheoriginal36monthterm.Atrialexhibitreflectsthat,althoughonly27  paymentswererequired,Burkhartmade28payments.U.S.Commercesmanagingmembertestified   thathewas prettysurethatthe28thpaymentreplacedanearlierpaymentthathadbeenabatedat  Burkhartsrequest.HestatedthateventhoughBurkhartnevermadetheabatedpayment,itappeared  onthepaymenthistoryasaregularpaymentbecauseU.S.Commercepaidthebankonbehalfof ~ Burkhart.Burkhartscounsel,inrespondingtothetrialcourtsquestionastowhetheritwascorrect j inbelievingthat28paymentshadbeenmade,statedthatthathethoughtthetrialcourtwascorrect, V butthathehadnotfocusedonit. B    Onappeal,U.S.Commercearguesthatthetrialcourterredinawardingthisextrapayment "j  toBurkhart.Itnotesthattheassertionanextrapaymenthadbeenmadeduringtheoriginaltermwas #V! notraisedinthepleadingsandarguesthatthefindingisnotsupportedbyapreponderanceofthe #B" evidence.Burkhartconcedesthathemadeonly27installmentpaymentsduringthe36monthterm, $. # butarguesthatheisentitledtothetrialcourtsawardbecausehepaidasecuritydepositinthesame %!$ amountthatshouldhavebeen,butwasnot,returnedtohim. &"%   Theevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsaward. (#'   z)$(   IV.    *  ! !X!)XşXX)Xş  ?( 4 <DL!?*S  *S݌̌   XX)XşXX)Xş    Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.Thecaseisremandedforenforcementofthetrial  courtsjudgmentandforcollectionofcostsassessedbelow,allpursuanttoapplicablelaw.Costs t onappealaretaxedtotheappellant. `   #?XşXX)Xş#   `     h     _______________________________  L     `     h     CHARLESD.SUSANO,JR.,JUDGE