ÿWPC q¢ø¶…»› Éz~^ZÞ«^õÞƒüÔ® Dx'*nÕg·0®˜ž#ù'Û.¢Ei–}-þ®+i³mÔ¹õý´47"ªç¨ÙéàQÝH…øM+ë¾î²">Ã,ŽJBæ&¬¢ðwÅ@{m\‚$i>‚j—Á¤?o1-P¼¤¾›ÊžÉ—µ,µIðCyFBÌe0ÎæJ<ⲿEFëuÔêÉ‹W¥uôʉ 4о]=V_ì&Yjw½±ÃŸ7EÁÉ=oUYø1\Ûê0ëٚŚ˟GI¶™b÷]0“ÉM³wa)˕Рälÿ“|1æ®w£÷ñT›Ø¾ÀÁK‰‡îf|â1Š¢Òôªë#·0$þþ!‚½Ûø{Þü¯_HçJÎáŽê†I‹y–ÙŠÇ©^,âtæjøö•N˜^e[SŸüïC ‡vMO ¶qñÝ$²`ƒNŒÁ,Écµ™qh¤óœs$È)÷Û)¡n¨!dì,Ô}qÒ7ÉSéÍsÖvNA2!Ù8VŠg³W&ŸjÓŠG29dWÖ‹Ÿ!ÎZRi‹VäÙÁ<«îÅ.÷Õ݈ÞCy'Ì•’pÅL®>(M ã‡Ò*+5刔ƒâ¨ñ¤mj¼@ ÞKVmecd#!xUN™ %ç 0³íU <  wÜ 4à ô N L 0øQ ^ I “U ¢è Š mŒŒZ££ ýýý@ U:IIIIIII Bƒƒƒƒ 0D                                                        0Ðä D5´´´´´ AQéÆ: 0Ð 0DИHP LaserJet 8000 DN PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(‹7ÿ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ7€ü†XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€Xd|XXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT RomantpO'x3|xC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT(¨(3E´$¤¤Ý ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ8€XXdìdì8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€XÄfXXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóô}\'L  ‰Ý ƒ ×{$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ€XåCXXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ¸ àPlaintiff€(Ô_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô)sustained€injuries€when€the€defendant€(Ô_ÔpromisorÔ_Ô)Ð ° Ðstarted€the€motor€of€his€truck€while€the€plaintiff€was€working€on€the€fan. ˜Ý ƒ ×{$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ€XåCXXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Mr.€Calabroððs€sister€testified€that€Mr.€Calabro€desired€that€his€daughterÐ ° Ðattend€Vanderbilt€in€order€to€be€away€from€the€influence€of€her€mother€and€to€beÐ ° Ðcloser€to€him€and€thus€strengthen€the€ties€between€father€and€daughter. ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ PÝ ƒ ×{$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ€XåCXXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ¸ àCourts€have€not€reached€a€uniform€€standard€to€determine€if€theÐ ° Ðpromisorððs€words€and€actions€justify€the€promisorððs€reliance.€€Some€court€require€thatÐ ° Ðthe€promise€be€ð ðdefinite€and€unequivocalðð,€while€other€courts€will€allow€the€promiseÐ ° Ðto€be€inferred€from€general€statements€of€the€promise.€òòò ò€Amacheró óóó,€826€S.W.€2d€482.Ð ° Ð(citations€omitted). Ý ƒ ×{$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ€XåCXXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee€held€that€ð ð[b]y€foregoing€its€legal€right€toÐ ° Ðcollection€by€levy,€the€Department€of€Revenue€refrained€from€doing€something€it€hadÐ ° Ða€legal€right€to€do€and€therefore€the€assumption€of€liability€agreement€was€supportedÐ ° Ðby€consideration.ðð€€ò òòòBrown€Oil€Co.ó óóó,€689€S.W.2d€151. 6Ý ƒb’"ÝÓ  ÓÔ€XÄfXXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€X2ùXXXÄfÔÔ€Â`XX2ùÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X2ùXÂ`ÔÐ  ÐÌOctober€28,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdA£Ôó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(¨3’$££Ý ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ8€XXdìdì8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€XÄfXXXÔÝ  Ý)ÿÿ!dxdxabZc[Cþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(¨3’$¢¢Ý ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ8€XXdìdì8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€XÄfXXXÔÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óÝ ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ8€XXdìdÈ8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€XÄfXXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTR[° AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÔ_Ôà@Ì Ì ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðßx€`[B2.jz…óO`  `€€@ÿEyÿ` 8ttxP± °ð O xßà@¢¢(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌà ` àà ¸ à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òBELINDA€HOPE€CALABRO,€ó óÐ ° ÐÌà ` àPlaintiff„Appellant,Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àDavidson€Chancery€No.€98„3086„IÌVs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àC.A.€No.€01A01„9902„CH„00116Ð ²  ÐÌò òARTHUR€DONALD€CALABRO,€ó óÐ ²  ÐÌà ` àDefendant„Appellee.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@  ®àFROM€THE€DAVIDSON€COUNTY€CHANCERY€COURTˆÌà@á á ®àTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€KILCREASE,€JR.,€CHANCELLORˆÌÌÌÌÌà@––®àGeorge€E.€Copple,€Jr.,€of€NashvilleˆÌà@>>(®àFor€AppellantˆÌÌà@~~®àJames€M.€Doran,€Jr.;€Paula€A.€Flowers€ofˆÌà@« « ®àWaller€Lansden€Dortch€&€Davis€of€NashvilleˆÌà@rr(®àFor€AppelleeˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@¦¦$®àò òòòREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óóóˆÐ ´&"" ÐÌà@33'®àOpinion€filed:ˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àò òW.€FRANKó ó€ò òCRAWFORD,JUDGEÐ ´3// ÐÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGEó óÐ Â:66 ÐÐ Ä;77 ЇÌÌÌÓÓà ` àThis€appeal€involves€a€suit€for€breach€of€contract.€€Plaintiff,€Belinda€HopeÐ ° ÐÔ_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô,€appeals€from€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgement€toÐ °  Ðdefendant,€€Arthur€Donald€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô.Ð °  Ѐ€€€€à ` àPlaintiff,€Hope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô,€is€the€daughter€of€the€defendant,€Arthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô.€Ð °  ÐArthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€and€Hopeððs€mother€were€divorced€when€Hope€was€four€years€old.€Ð °  ÐFrom€the€time€of€the€divorce€until€Hope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€finished€high€school€she€lived€inÐ °  ÐOklahoma€with€her€mother€who€was€granted€sole€custody€of€Hope€at€the€time€of€theÐ ° Ðdivorce€Ô_ÔprocedingsÔ_Ô.€€During€all€times€material€to€this€case€defendant€lived€inÐ ° ÐMemphis,€Tennessee.€He€provided€financial€support€to€Hope€while€she€was€livingÐ ° Ðwith€her€mother€including€an€allowance,€an€automobile,€and€travel€expenses.€€WhileÐ ° ÐHope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€was€growing€up,€Arthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€saw€her€during€summers€and€on€someÐ ° Ðholidays.€€Ð ° Ðà ` àHope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€had€an€Ô_ÔexcellantÔ_Ô€academic€record€in€high€school.€€During€herÐ ° Ðsenior€year€of€high€school€Arthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€offered€to€pay€his€daughterððs€expenses€toÐ °! Ðattend€a€distinguished,€private€Ô_ÔuniversistyÔ_Ô€if€she€received€at€least€$10,000.00€inÐ °# Ðfinancial€aid.€€At€the€time€that€Hope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€was€applying€to€colleges,€she€knew€thatÐ °%!! Ðshe€was€Ô_ÔelligibleÔ_Ô€to€attend€the€University€of€Oklahoma€and€receive€a€full€scholarship,Ð °'## ÐÔ_ÔsuffcientÔ_Ô€to€pay€tuition,€room,€board,€books,€and€student€activity€fee.€Knowing€thatÐ °)%% Ðher€father€would€be€willing€to€finance€her€college€education€at€a€private€college€if€sheÐ °+'' Ðreceived€$10,000.00€in€financial€aid,€Hope€applied€to€and€was€accepted€at€BostonÐ °-)) ÐUniversity,€Tulane€University,€Ô_ÔPepperdineÔ_Ô€University,€Stanford€University,€theÐ °/++ ÐUniversity€of€California€at€San€Diego,€Southern€Methodist€University,€andÐ °1-- ÐVanderbilt€University.€€Several€of€these€schools€offered€her€financial€aid.€€Ð °3// Ðà ` àIt€is€undisputed€that€in€the€fall€of€1991€Hope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€enrolled€in€and€beganÐ °511 Ðattending€Vanderbilt€€University€with€her€father€paying€expenses€that€exceeded€herÐ °733 Ðscholarship.€€It€is€also€undisputed€that€during€the€Christmas€break€of€1992€ArthurÐ °955 ÐÔ_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€informed€Hope€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€that€he€was€no€longer€willing€to€pay€for€her€collegeÐ ° Ðexpenses.€€Both€parties€agree€that€at€that€time€he€had€prepaid€her€tuition€for€theÐ ° Ðspring€of€1993€at€Vanderbilt.€€€It€is€undisputed€that€Plaintiff€continued€to€attendÐ ° ÐVanderbilt€and€completed€her€course€work€in€the€spring€of€1995,€earning€a€B.A.€inÐ °  Ðpsychology.€€What€remains€in€dispute€is€whether€Arthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€formed€a€legallyÐ °  Ðbinding€contract€with€his€daughter€to€pay€her€college€expenses€and€breached€thatÐ °  Ðcontract€by€refusing€to€continue€his€support€in€December€of€1992.€€€€€Ð °  Ðà ` àPlaintiffððs€complaint€alleges€that€she€moved€to€Nashville€to€attend€VanderbiltÐ ° Ðbased€upon€defendantððs€representation€that€he€would€pay€for€all€college€tuition€costsÐ ° Ðand€living€expenses€in€excess€of€plaintiffððs€scholarship€while€she€was€attendingÐ ° ÐVanderbilt.€€She€avers€that€the€defendant€willfully€repudiated€his€contract€to€pay€allÐ ° Ðcollege€tuition€costs€in€excess€of€the€scholarship€that€the€plaintiff€received,€as€well€asÐ ° Ðall€living€expenses€while€she€€was€attending€Vanderbilt€University.€€Plaintiff€furtherÐ ° Ðalleges€that€due€to€his€repudiation€of€the€contract€she€financed€these€cost€by€takingÐ ° Ðout€student€loans€that€became€due€upon€her€graduation.€€Plaintiff€demandsÐ °  Ðcompensatory€damages€representing€the€full€extent€of€all€college€costs,€including,€butÐ °" Ðnot€limited€to,€outstanding€student€loans,€personal€living€expenses€during€college,€andÐ °$  Ðother€related€expenses.Ð °&"" Ðà ` àDefendantððs€answer€admits€that€plaintiff€attended€Vanderbilt€but€denies€thatÐ °($$ Ðhe€made€the€representations€as€alleged€in€the€complaint.€€Defendant€admits€that€ð ðheÐ °*&& Ðadvised€his€daughter€that€if€she€entered€and€successfully€remained€in€a€course€ofÐ °,(( Ðstudy€for€the€purpose€of€gaining€admission€to€medical€school,€he€would€pay€certainÐ °.** Ðof€her€college€related€expenses€while€attending€Vanderbilt€University.ðð€€He€deniesÐ °0,, Ðthat€plaintiff€moved€to€Nashville€and€enrolled€in€Vanderbilt€in€response€to€hisÐ °2.. Ðrepresentation€but€admits€that€plaintiff€enrolled€in€Vanderbilt€and€that€she€took€outÐ °400 Ðvarious€student€loans.€€He€denies€that€he€willfully€repudiated€his€contract€as€alleged.Ð °622 Ðà ` àThe€trial€court€granted€defendant€summary€judgment,€and€plaintiff€hasÐ °844 Ðappealed,€presenting€three€issues€for€review:€€(1)€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÐ ° Ðholding€that€there€was€no€valid€consideration€to€support€the€defendantððs€promise€ofÐ ° Ðhis€offer€to€pay€for€his€daughterððs€college€expenses,€(2)whether€the€court€erred€inÐ ° Ðholding€that€the€contract€between€the€parties€was€barred€by€the€Statue€of€Frauds,€andÐ °  Ð(3)€whether€the€court€erred€in€failing€to€enforce€the€defendantððs€promise€under€theÐ °  Ðdoctrine€of€promissory€estoppel.€€The€trial€courtððs€order€granting€summary€judgmentÐ °  Ðdid€not€state€the€reason€therefor,€and€there€is€no€transcript€of€the€hearing€on€theÐ °  Ðmotion€for€summary€judgment€to€indicate€that€the€trial€judge€made€any€such€rulingÐ ° Ðfrom€the€bench.€€We€perceive€the€Ô_ÔdispositiveÔ_Ô€issue€to€be€whether€the€trial€court€erredÐ ° Ðin€granting€defendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€will€consider€theÐ ° Ðarguments€of€counsel€encompassed€in€the€above„stated€three€issues.Ð ° Ðà ` àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€Ô_ÔmovantÔ_ÔÐ ° Ðdemonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€movingÐ ° Ðparty€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€The€partyÐ ° Ðmoving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuineÐ °  Ðissue€of€material€fact€exists.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔBainÔ_Ô€v.€Wellsó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).€€OnÐ °" Ða€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÐ ´$  Ðof€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€inÐ ´&"" Ðfavor€of€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€In€ò òòòByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847Ð ´($$ ÐS.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993),€our€Supreme€Court€stated:Ð ¸*&& ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€noÐ ¸,(( Ðgenuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€party€mustÐ ¸-)) Ðthen€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discovery€materials,Ð ¸.** Ðthat€there€is€a€genuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€aÐ ¸/++ Ðtrial.€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05€provides€that€theÐ ¸0,, Ðnonmoving€party€cannot€simply€rely€upon€his€pleadingsÐ ¸1-- Ðbut€must€set€forth€òòspecific€factsóó€showing€that€there€is€aÐ ¸2.. Ðgenuine€issue€of€material€fact€for€trial.à8@.¸ ¤¸ ¤àÐ ¸3// Ðò òòòÌÓÓId.ó óóó€at€211€(citations€omitted)€(emphasis€in€original).Ð ¸511 ÐÓÓà ` àSummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legalÐ ¼7 33 Ðconclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permit€only€one€conclusion.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔCarvellÔ_Ô€v.Ð ¼8 44 ÐBottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€If€the€facts€are€Ô_ÔuncontrovertedÔ_Ô,€summaryÐ ¾955 Ðjudgment€is€inappropriate€if€reasonable€minds€could€differ€as€to€the€inferences€to€beÐ ° Ðdrawn€therefrom.€€ò òòòKeene€v.€Cracker€Barrel€Old€County€Store,€Inc.ó óóó,€853€S.W2d€501Ð ° Ð(Tenn.€App.€1992);€ò òòòPrescott€v.€Adamsó óóó,€627€S.W.2d€134€(Tenn.€App.€1981).€€SinceÐ ² Ðonly€questions€of€law€are€involved,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regardingÐ ´ Ða€trial€court's€grant€of€summary€judgment.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔBainÔ_Ôó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€at€622.€€Therefore,€ourÐ ´ Ðreview€of€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€is€ò òòòde€novoó óóó€on€the€record€beforeÐ ¶  Ðthis€Court.€€ò òòòWarren€v.€Estate€of€Kirkó óóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€723€(Tenn.€1997).Ð ¸  ÐÌÓÓà ` àPlaintiff€contends€that€there€was€a€binding€contract€between€the€parties€andÐ º  Ðthat€defendant€breached€the€contract€when€he€refused€to€continue€paying€for€herÐ º  Ðcollege€expenses.€€Plaintiff€contends€that€she€undertook€to€do€something€that€she€wasÐ º  Ðnot€legally€obligated€to€do,€thereby€providing€the€consideration€needed€to€form€aÐ º  Ðcontract.€€€She€asserts€that€defendant€received€a€benefit€by€having€his€daughter€closeÐ º  Ðto€him€and€away€from€her€motherððs€influence,€and€by€having€a€well„educatedÐ º  Ðdaughter.€Plaintiff€further€asserts€that€she€gave€up€substantial€scholarships€andÐ º  Ðfinancial€aid€at€the€University€of€Oklahoma,€Tulane,€Southern€Methodist€University,Ð º  Ðand€Ô_ÔPepperdineÔ_Ô€to€attend€Vanderbilt.€€Plaintiff€asserts€that€these€foregoneÐ º  Ðopportunities,€along€with€the€substantial€expense€she€incurred€to€attend€Vanderbilt,Ð º  Ðconstitute€a€legal€detriment€to€her€as€Ô_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô€and€consideration€for€her€fatherððsÐ º  Ðpromise€to€pay€her€education€expenses.€€Ð º"  Ðà ` àPlaintiff€asserts€that€the€Statute€of€Frauds€presents€no€bar€to€the€enforcementÐ º$  Ðof€defendantððs€oral€promise€to€pay€his€daughterððs€college€expenses.€€Plaintiff€contendsÐ º& "" Ðthat€at€the€very€least€she€partially€performed€the€contract€and€thus€comes€within€theÐ º( $$ Ðexception€of€the€Statue€of€Frauds.€€She€asserts€that€actually€she€has€fully€performedÐ º* && Ðthe€unilateral€contract€by€attending€and€graduating€from€Vanderbilt€University.€Ð º, (( ÐFurthermore€plaintiff€contends€that€the€doctrine€of€promissory€estoppel€takes€theÐ º. ** Ðcontract€out€of€the€Statue€of€Frauds€because€she€detrimentally€relied€on€her€fatherððsÐ º0 ,, Ðpromise.€€€Ð º2 .. Ðà ` àDefendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€properly€determined€that€he€wasÐ º4 00 Ðentitled€to€summary€judgment€as€to€his€daughterððs€claim€relating€to€expenses€andÐ º6 22 Ðdebt€incurred€after€May€1993€because€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€any€material€fact.€Ð º8 44 ÐHe€asserts€that€as€a€parent€he€has€no€legal€obligation€to€pay€for€the€educationalÐ ° Ðexpenses€of€a€child€that€has€reached€the€age€of€majority.€€Arthur€Ô_ÔCalabroÔ_Ô€asserts€thatÐ ° Ðhe€did€not€intend€to€enter€into€a€contract€that€legally€obligated€him€to€pay€for€collegeÐ ° Ðexpenses,€but€merely€desired€to€help€his€daughter€realize€the€dream€she€expressed€toÐ °  Ðhim€of€becoming€a€doctor.€€He€further€contends€that€even€if€his€generosity€could€beÐ °  Ðconstrued€as€an€obligation,€it€is€a€moral€rather€than€a€legal€obligation,€which€is€notÐ °  Ðlegally€enforceable.€€He€asserts€that€his€daughterððs€college€attendance€was€not€aÐ °  Ðbenefit€to€him€and€that€his€satisfaction€at€having€Hope€attend€school€near€his€homeÐ ° Ðwas€not€an€inducement,€because€he€made€no€such€requirement.€€Defendant€maintainsÐ ° Ðthat€the€cause€of€any€detriment€to€Hope€was€her€failure€to€excel€in€school,€and€he,Ð ° Ðin€fact,€suffered€the€detriment€of€the€expense€of€two€years€of€his€daughterððsÐ ° Ðeducation.€€Ð ° Ðà ` àFinally€defendant€asserts€that€in€December€of€1992,€he€made€it€clear€to€hisÐ ° Ðdaughter€that€he€would€pay€no€more€after€May,€1993,€and€it€was€not€reasonable,Ð ° Ðnecessary€or€justifiable€for€Hope€to€return€to€Vanderbilt€and€rely€on€further€financialÐ °  Ðsupport€based€on€his€gratuitous€promise.à p àÐ °" Ðà ` àð ðA€contract€has€been€defined€over€the€years€as€an€agreement,€upon€sufficientÐ °$  Ðconsideration,€to€do€or€not€to€do€a€particular€thing.ðð€€ò òòòSmith€v.€Pickwick€ElectricÐ °&"" ÐCooperativeó óóó,€212€Tenn.€62,€71„72,€367€S.W.2d€775,€780€(1963)€(citing€ò òòòÔ_ÔFurmanÔ_Ô,Ð ´($$ ÐGreen€&€Co.€v.€Nicholó óóó,€43€Tenn.€443,€445€(1866).€€A€party€attempting€to€prove€theÐ ¸*&& Ðexistence€of€a€contract€ð ðis€required€to€show€that€the€agreement€on€which€he€relies€wasÐ ¼, (( Ðsupported€by€adequate€considerationðð.€€ò òòòPrice€v.€Mercury€Supply€Company,€Inc.ó óóó€€682Ð ¼. ** ÐÔ_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€2d€924,€933€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€ð ð[Ô_ÔI]nÔ_Ô€all€simple€contracts...whether€writtenÐ À0,, Ðor€verbal,€the€consideration€must€be€averred€and€proved.ðð€€ò òòòClark€v.€Smalló óóó,€14€Tenn.Ð À2.. Ð(6€Ô_ÔYerÔ_Ô.)€417,€421€(1834).€€ò òòòSee€alsoó óóó€17€Am.€Ô_ÔJurÔ_Ô.2d€òòContractsóó€ðð€125€(1965)€and€17Ð Ä400 ÐCGS€òòContractsóó€ðð€116€(1963).€€Ð È622 Ðà ` àThe€question€of€what€constitutes€consideration€adequate€or€sufficient€toÐ È844 Ðsupport€a€contract€has€been€addressed€by€a€number€of€Tennessee€courts.€€The€courtÐ ° Ðin€ò òòòUniversity€of€Chattanooga€v.€Ô_ÔStansberryÔ_Ôó óóó,€9€Tenn.€App.€341,€343€(1928)€definedÐ ° Ðconsideration€as€ð ðeither€a€benefit€to€the€maker€of€the€promise€or€a€detriment€to,€orÐ ´ Ðobligation€upon€the€promiseðð.€(citing€ò òòòÔ_ÔFoustÔ_Ô€v.€Board€of€Educationó óóó,€76€Tenn.,€(8€Lea),Ð ´  Ð555).€Courts€have€been€willing€to€find€a€contract€based€on€facts€from€which€a€juryÐ ¸  Ðcould€infer€the€requisite€consideration.Ð ¸  ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àFor€there€to€be€a€consideration€in€a€contract€betweenÐ ¸  Ðparties€to€the€contract€it€is€not€necessary€that€somethingÐ ¸  Ðconcrete€and€tangible€move€from€one€to€the€other.€€AnyÐ ¸ Ðbenefit€to€one€and€detriment€to€the€other€may€be€aÐ ¸ Ðsufficient€consideration.€€The€jury€may€draw€anyÐ ¸ Ðreasonable€and€natural€inference€from€the€proof€and€if€byÐ ¸ Ðinference€from€the€proof€a€benefit€to€the€Ô_ÔpromisorÔ_Ô€andÐ ¸ Ðdetriment€to€the€Ô_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô€might€be€inferred€this€willÐ ¸ Ðconstitute€a€valid€consideration.€€€Ð¸¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòPalmer€v.€Ô_ÔDehnÔ_Ôó óóó,€29€Tenn.€App.€597,€599,€198€S.W.2d€827,€828€(1946);€ò òòòsee€alsoó óóóÐ ¸ Ðò òòòTrailer€Conditioners,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔHuddlestonÔ_Ôó óóó,€897€S.W.2d€728,€731€(Tenn.€App.€1995);Ð ¼  Ðò òòòRobinson€v.€Kenneyó óóó,€526€S.W.2d€115,€118„19€(Tenn.€App.€1973).€€€Ð À Ðà ` àIn€ò òòò€Palmer€v.€Ô_ÔDehnÔ_Ôó óóó€the€€Court€of€Appeals€found€that€the€jury€was€justified€inÐ Ä  Ðdrawing€the€inference€that€the€Ô_ÔpromiseeÔ_Ô€accepted€a€promise€that€he€would€beÐ È" Ðcompensated€for€the€loss€of€his€finger€along€with€any€expenses€caused€by€the€loss€in€Ð È$  Ðconsideration€for€his€foregoing€the€right€of€action€for€a€reasonable€time.Ô_Ô׃ ×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€ò òòòPalmer,ó óóó€Ð È&"" Ð29€Tenn.€App.€600,€198€S.W.2d€828.€€Plaintiffððs€forbearance€in€bringing€a€suit€couldÐ Ì($$ Ðeasily€be€viewed€as€a€detriment€to€the€plaintiff€and€a€benefit€to€the€defendant.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€Ð Ì*&& Ðà ` àConsideration€has€also€been€found€to€pass€between€parties€to€a€contract€in€theÐ Ð, (( Ðform€of€a€promise€for€the€use€€of€€land€to€construct€a€transmission€line,€with€theÐ Ð. ** Ðbenefit€received€in€consideration€for€the€promise€being€the€use€of€the€electric€currentÐ Ð0 ,, Ðprovided€by€the€line.€€ò òòòSmithó óóó,€367€S.W.2d€780.€€Other€consideration€found€sufficientÐ Ð2 .. Ðto€support€a€contract€Ô_Ôby€Tennessee€courts€include:€the€transfer€of€funds€along€withÐ Ô4$00 Ðaccounting€and€bookkeeping€services,€ò òòòTraileró óóó€897€S.W.2d€731;€the€purchase€ofÐ ° Ðbusiness€equipment€from€landlord€by€tenants,€ò òòòJeffers€v.€Hawn€ó óóó186€Tenn.€530,€212Ð ´ ÐS.W.2d€368€(Tenn.€1948);€and€an€agreement€to€reduce€the€rent€where€the€landlordððsÐ ¸ Ðbuilding€remained€occupied€and€he€was€spared€the€hazard€and€expense€of€enforcingÐ ¸  Ða€suit€for€the€entire€debt€owed€him,€ò òòòHaun€v.€Corklandó óóó,€55€Tenn.€App.€292,€399Ð ¸  ÐS.W.2d€518€(Tenn.€App.€1965).€Ð ¼  Ðà ` àIn€addition€to€the€benefit,€detriment€paradigm,€Tennessee€courts€have€definedÐ ¼  Ðvalid€consideration€in€terms€of€the€promiseeððs€legal€rights€and€obligations.€Ð ¼  Ðð ðConsideration€consists€when€the€promisee€does€something€that€he€is€under€no€legalÐ ¼  Ðobligation€to€do€or€refrains€from€doing€[that]€which€he€has€a€legal€right€to€doðð.€òòò òKozyÐ ¼  Ðv.€Werleóóó ó,€902€S.W.2d€404,€411€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(citing€ò òòòBrown€Oil€Co.,€Inc.€v.Ð À ÐJohnsonó óóó,€689€S.W.2d€149€(Tenn.€1985)׃×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×.Ð Ä Ðà ` àSimply€stated,€plaintiffððs€evidence€from€her€deposition€testimony,€and€theÐ È Ðdeposition€of€Mr.€Calabroððs€sister׃’×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×,€is€that€Mr.€Calabro€promised€to€pay€her€tuitionÐ È Ðand€expenses€over€and€above€the€$10,000.00€scholarship€if€she€attended€Vanderbilt.€Ð È  ÐPlaintiff€had€previously€been€entitled€to€various€scholarship€opportunities€at€otherÐ È" Ðcolleges,€but€she€relinquished€those€opportunities€based€upon€the€strength€ofÐ È$  Ðdefendantððs€promise.€€Although€she€preferred€to€go€to€another€college,€she€deferredÐ È&"" Ðto€Mr.€Calabroððs€preference€that€she€attend€Vanderbilt.€€There€was€no€conditionÐ È($$ Ðattached€to€the€promise€to€pay€tuition€that€she€maintain€any€sort€of€grade„pointÐ È*&& Ðaverage€or€class€standing,€nor€that€she€pursue€any€particular€curriculum.Ð È,(( ÐÌà ` àDefendantððs€testimony€by€deposition€indicates€that€he€did€agree€to€pay€theÐ È0,, Ðtuition€and€other€expenses,€but€that€he€did€not€require€that€his€daughter€attendÐ ° ÐVanderbilt.€€He€admits€that€there€was€no€condition€attached€that€she€pursue€a€pre„Ð ° Ðmed€curriculum€or€maintain€a€certain€grade„point€average.Ð ° Ðà ` àWe€believe€under€the€proof€in€this€case€that€there€is€sufficient€evidence€toÐ °  Ðcreate€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€there€was€adequate€considerationÐ °  Ðflowing€between€the€parties€to€constitute€an€enforceable€contract.€€There€is€a€disputeÐ °  Ðas€to€whether€a€benefit€was€conferred€on€defendant€on€his€promise€to€pay€the€tuitionÐ °  Ðand€whether€plaintiff€suffered€a€detriment€in€her€performance€of€the€contract€orÐ ° Ðagreement.Ð ° Ðà ` àDefendant€asserts€that€even€if€there€was€adequate€consideration,€the€oralÐ ° Ðcontract€would€be€barred€by€the€Statute€of€Frauds,€T.C.A.€ðð€29„2„101(a)(5)(1998),Ð ° Ðwhich€provides:Ð ° ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à[U]pon€any€agreement€or€contract€which€is€not€to€beÐ ° Ðperformed€within€the€space€of€one€(1)€year€from€theÐ ° Ðmaking€of€the€agreement€or€contact;€unless€the€promise€orÐ ° Ðagreement,€upon€which€such€action€shall€be€brought,€orÐ ° Ðsome€memorandum€or€note€thereof,€shall€be€in€writing,Ð °  Ðand€signed€by€the€party€to€be€charged€therewith,€or€someÐ °! Ðother€person€lawfully€authorized€by€such€party.а"¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓà ` àPlaintiff€relies€on€her€performance€of€the€contract€as€excepting€the€contractÐ °$  Ðfrom€the€operation€of€the€statute.Ð °&"" Ðà ` àThe€doctrine€of€part€performance€was€utilized€by€the€court€in€ò òòòBlasingame€v.Ð °($$ ÐAmerican€Materials,€Inc.ó óóó,€654€S.W.2d€659€(Tenn.€1983)€in€enforcing€an€oralÐ ´*&& Ðcontract€where€over€a€period€of€years,€the€Ð ¸,(( ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àplaintiff€was€led€to€believe€that€an€oral€employmentÐ ¸.** Ðcontract€he€made€with€the€defendant€corporation€wouldÐ ¸/++ Ðbe€honored;€that€in€reliance€thereon,€plaintiff€proceededÐ ¸0,, Ðto€perform€his€part€of€the€bargain;€€and€that€in€doing€so,Ð ¸1-- Ðhe€so€altered€his€position€as€to€suffer€an€unconscionableÐ ¸2.. Ðloss€if€the€corporation€was€allowed€to€rely€on€the€StatueÐ ¸3// Ðof€Frauds.€€There€is€material€evidence€in€this€record€toÐ ¸400 Ðsupport€those€concurrent€factual€findings€and€they€areÐ ¸511 Ðbinding€on€this€Court.€€€€Ð¸622¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€663.€€The€Supreme€Court€found€that€such€facts€brought€the€plaintiff€within€theÐ ¸844 Ðexception€of€part€performance,€and€the€plaintiff€thereby€avoided€the€Statute€ofÐ ° ÐFrauds.€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÐ ° Ðà ` àThe€court€in€ò òòòBlasingame€ó óóóclarified€the€equitable€nature€and€limited€the€purposeÐ ´ Ðof€the€doctrine€stating:Ð ¸  ÐÓÓà ` àà8 ¸ àà8¸ ¤¸ ¤à[T]his€doctrine€of€partial€performance€toÐ ¸  Ðtake€the€verbal€contract€out€of€the€operationÐ ¸   Ðof€the€Statue€of€Frauds€is€purely€anÐ ¸  Ðequitable€doctrine€and€is€a€judicialÐ ¸  Ðinterpretation€of€the€acts€of€the€parties€toÐ ¸  Ðprevent€frauds.€€The€acts€of€the€appellantÐ ¸  Ðrelied€on€as€partial€performance€had€beenÐ ¸ Ðdone€by€him€in€pursuance€to€the€averredÐ ¸ Ðcontract€and€agreement€and€are€clearlyÐ ¸ Ðreferable€thereto.€€ððThe€plaintiff€must€beÐ ¸ Ðable€to€show€such€acts€and€conduct€of€theÐ ¸ Ðdefendant€as€the€court€would€hold€toÐ ¸ Ðamount€to€a€representation€that€heÐ ¸ Ðproposed€to€stand€by€his€agreement€and€notÐ ¸ Ðavail€himself€to€the€statue€to€escape€itsÐ ¸ Ðperformance;€and€also€that€the€plaintiff,€inÐ ¸ Ðreliance€on€this€representation,€hasÐ ¸ Ðproceeded,€either€in€performance€orÐ ¸ Ðpursuance€of€his€contract,€so€far€to€alter€hisÐ ¸ Ðposition€as€to€incur€an€unjust€andÐ ¸ Ðunconscious€injury€and€loss,€in€case€theÐ ¸  Ðdefendant€is€permitted€after€all€to€rely€uponÐ ¸! Ðthe€statutory€defense.ðð€€49€Am.Jur.,€ðð€427,Ð ¸" Ðpage€733.и#LL ÐÌò òòòÓÓBlasingame,ó óóó€654€S.W.2d€663€(quoting€ò òòòBuice€v.€Scruggs€Equipment€Co.,ó óóó€194€Tenn.Ð ¸%!! Ð129,€137,€250€S.W.2d€44,€48€(1952)).Ð ¼' ## Ðà ` àPlaintiff€also€relies€upon€the€doctrine€of€promissory€estoppel€as€an€exceptionÐ ¼) %% Ðto€the€Statute€of€Frauds.€€Promissory€estoppel€is€explained€as:€Ð ¼+ '' Ѐ€ÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à[a]€promise€which€the€promisor€should€reasonably€expectÐ ¼- )) Ðto€induce€action€or€forbearance€on€the€part€of€theÐ ¼. ** Ðpromisee€or€a€third€person€and€which€does€induce€suchÐ ¼/ ++ Ðaction€or€forbearance€is€binding€if€injustice€can€be€avoidedÐ ¼0 ,, Ðonly€by€enforcement€of€the€promise.€€The€remedy€grantedÐ ¼1 -- Ðfor€breach€may€be€limited€as€justice€requires.€Ð¼2 ..¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÓÓ€ò òòòÐ ¼3 // ÐAmacher€v.€Brown„Forman€Corp.ó óóó,€826€S.W.2d€480,€482€(Tenn.€App.€1991)€€(quotingÐ ¼5 11 ÐòòRestatement€(Second)€of€Contractsóó€ðð€90);€ò òòòsee€also€Alden€v.€Presleyóóó ó€€637€S.W.2d€862,€864Ð À733 Ð(Tenn.€1982).€€Ð Ä955 Ðà ` àThere€are€limits€to€the€application€of€promissory€estoppel:Ð ° ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àDetrimental€action€or€forbearance€by€the€promisee€inÐ ° Ðreliance€on€a€gratuitous€promise,€within€limits€constitutesÐ ° Ða€substitute€for€consideration,€or€a€sufficient€reason€forÐ ° Ðenforcement€of€the€promise€without€consideration.€€ThisÐ °  Ðdoctrine€is€known€as€promissory€estoppel.€€A€promisorÐ °  Ðwho€induces€substantial€change€of€position€by€theÐ °  Ðpromisee€in€reliance€on€the€promise€is€estopped€to€denyÐ °  Ðits€enforceability€as€lacking€consideration.€€The€reason€forÐ °  Ðthe€doctrine€is€to€avoid€an€unjust€result,€and€its€reasonÐ °  Ðdefines€its€limits.€€No€injustice€results€in€refusal€to€enforceÐ °  Ða€gratuitous€promise€where€the€loss€suffered€in€reliance€isÐ °  Ðnegligible,€nor€where€the€promiseeððs€action€in€reliance€wasÐ °  Ðunreasonable€or€unjustified€by€the€promise.€€The€limits€ofÐ ° Ðpromissory€estoppel€are:€(1)€the€detriment€suffered€inÐ ° Ðreliance€must€be€substantial€in€an€economic€sense;€(2)€theÐ ° Ðsubstantial€loss€to€the€promisee€in€acting€in€reliance€mustÐ ° Ðhave€been€foreseeable€by€the€promisor;€(3)€the€promiseeÐ ° Ðmust€have€acted€reasonable€in€justifiable€reliance€on€theÐ ° Ðpromise€as€made.€Ð°¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòAldenó óóó€637€S.W.2d€864€(citing€L.€Simpson,€Law€of€Contracts€ðð€61€(2d€ed.€1965)).€Ð ° Ðà ` àThe€doctrine€of€promissory€estoppel€is€also€referred€to€as€ð ðdetrimentalÐ ´ Ðrelianceðð€because€the€plaintiff€must€show€not€only€that€a€promise€was€made,€but€alsoÐ ´ Ðthat€the€plaintiff€reasonably€relied€on€the€promise€to€his€detriment.€€ò òòòEngeniusÐ ´  ÐEntertainment,€Inc.€v.€Herentonó óóó,€971€S.W.2d€12,€19„20€(Tenn.€App.€1997)€(citingÐ ¸" Ðò òòòFoster€&€Creighton€Co.€v.€Wilson€Contracting€Co.ó óóó,€579€S.W.€2d€422,€427€(Tenn.Ð ¼$  ÐApp.€1978);€ò òòòand€Quake€Constr.,€Inc.€v.€American€Airlinesó óóó,€141€Ill.2d€281,€152€Ill.Ð À&"" ÐDec.€308,€565€N.E.€2d€990,€1004€(1990).€€Furthermore€the€promise€upon€which€theÐ Ä($$ Ðpromisee€relied€must€be€unambiguous€and€not€unenforceably€vague.€€ò òòòAmacheró óóó,€826Ð Ä*&& ÐS.W.2d€482.׃×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€However,€a€ð ðclaim€of€promissory€estoppel€is€not€dependent€upon€theÐ È,(( Ðexistence€of€an€expressed€contract€between€the€partiesðð.€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€19€(citing€ò òòòArcadianÐ È.** ÐPhosphates,€Inc.€v.€€Arcadian€Corp.ó óóó,€884€F.2d€69,€73„74€(2d€Cir.€1989);€ò òòòUnitedÐ Ì0,, ÐMagazine€Co.€v.€Prudential€Ins.,€Co.ó óóó,€877€F.Supp.€1076,€1084„85€(S.D.€Ohio€1995);€Ð Ð2 .. Ðòòò òQuake€Constr.,€Inc.€v.€American€Airlinesó óóó,€141€Ill.2d€281,€152€Ill.€Dec.€308,€565€N.E.Ð ° Ð2d€990,€1004€(1990).€€€€The€court€in€òòò òEngenius€Entertainment,€Inc.€óóó óheld€that€the€trialÐ ´ Ðcourt€erred€in€dismissing€the€plaintiffððs€promissory€estoppel€claim€where€theÐ ¸ Ðcomplaint€alleged€that€defendant€made€a€promise€which€they€reasonably€should€haveÐ ¸  Ðexpected€to€induce€action€by€the€plaintiff,€that€plaintiff€did€take€such€action€inducedÐ ¸  Ðby€the€promise,€and€that€plaintiff€relied€on€the€promise€to€his€detriment.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€20.€Ð ¸  Ðà ` àFrom€our€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€that€there€are€disputes€of€materialÐ ¼  Ðfact€as€to€the€alleged€promises€of€defendant,€the€plaintiffððs€action€and€responseÐ ¼  Ðthereto,€and€any€inferences€that€legitimately€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€The€trier€ofÐ ¼  Ðfact€should€first€determine€whether€a€valid€contract€exists€between€the€parties.€€InÐ ¼  Ðthis€regard,€our€Supreme€Court€stated€in€ò òòòJohnson€v.€Central€Natððl€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€210Ð ¼  ÐTenn.€24,€356€S.W.2d€277€(1962):Ð À ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà  àWhile€a€contract€may€be€either€expressed€orÐ À Ðimplied,€or€written€or€oral,€it€must€result€from€a€meetingÐ À Ðof€the€minds€of€the€parties€in€mutual€assent€to€the€terms,Ð À Ðmust€be€based€upon€a€sufficient€consideration,€free€fromÐ À Ðfraud€or€undue€influence,€not€against€public€policy€andÐ À  Ðsufficiently€definite€to€be€enforced.€€ò òòòAmerican€Lead€PencilÐ À! ÐCompany€v.€Nashville,€Chattanooga€&€St.€Louis€Ry.€Co.,Ð Â" Ðó óóó124€Tenn.€57,€134€S.W.€613,€32€L.R.A.,€N.S.,€323.ÐÂ#¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌ356€S.W.2d€at€281.Ð Â%!! ÐÌÓÓà ` àAlternatively,€the€trier€of€fact€should€determine€whether€plaintiff€may€relyÐ Â'## Ðupon€the€theory€of€promissory€estoppel.Ð Â)%% Ðà ` à€à ¸ àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€€granting€summary€judgmentÐ Â+'' Ðis€reversed€and€this€case€is€remanded€for€such€further€proceedings€as€necessary.€€CostsÐ Â-)) Ðof€appeal€are€assessed€to€appellee.Ð Â/++ ÐÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_________________________________Ð Â1-- Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€€JUDGEÐ Â2.. ÐÌCONCUR:Ð Æ400 ÐÌó ó____________________________________Ð Ê622 Ðò òBEN€H.€CANTRELL,Ð Ê733 ÐPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.Ð Ì844 ÐÐ Î955 Ð____________________________________Ð ° ÐPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGEó ó